Holding

The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly exercised its power under Section 344 CrPC and the conviction for perjury stands.

Summary

Mahila Vinod Kumari filed a rape complaint against two men, who were later acquitted when she recanted her statement during trial, claiming she had never been raped. The trial court found that she had deliberately fabricated false evidence and, under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, sentenced her to three months' simple imprisonment for perjury. The High Court dismissed her appeal, holding that she had admitted her guilt and that the procedural safeguards of Section 344 were satisfied. The Supreme Court examined the purpose and conditions of Section 344, emphasizing that it is a tool to eradicate perjury and can be invoked even in sexual offence cases where the victim's testimony is central. The Court affirmed that the trial court correctly applied Section 344, found no infirmity in the lower courts' orders, and dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

Issues considered

Whether the trial court was justified in invoking Section 344 CrPC to punish the prosecutrix for perjury.
Whether the mandatory conditions for summary punishment under Section 344 CrPC were fulfilled.
Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of the petitioner’s admission of guilt.
Whether the perjury provision can be applied when the alleged false statement pertains to a sexual offence.
Whether the sentence of three months’ imprisonment is within the limits prescribed under Section 344.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 340, s. 344, s. 351
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376

Subjects

perjurySection 344 CrPCsummary trialfalse evidencesexual offencevictim testimonycriminal procedureconvictionappeal

Judgment

[2008] 10 S.C.R. 869
~

MAHILA VINOD KUMARI A
II.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(SLP (Criminal) No. 4950-4951 of 2008)

- "'/
JULY 11, 2008
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHAVIVAM, JJ.]
B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss. 340 & 3441
Penal Code, 1960: s. 376
Perjury - Petitioner lodging a report against two persons c
for committing rape - Resiled from statement made during
investigation - Acquitting accused persons trial Court directed
to take cognizance against piosecutrix in terms of S. 344 of
the Code -Admission of guilt by petitioner - Trial Court found
-~ 1 prosecutrix guilty of committing the offence of perjury, sen- D
tenced her to undergo imprisonment for 3 months - Appeal
dismissed by High Court - Correctvero of of - Held: Correct -
The purpose of enacting S. 344 Cr. PC. is to eradicate the evil
of perjury and also fabrication of evidence - even recourse to
S.340 (l)CrPC could bo taken by Courts in case they failed to E
take action against such witness such witness underS. 344
Cr.PC.- In the facts and circumstances of the case, Trial Court
has rightly taken action against the Prosecutrix in terms of
S. 344 CrPC - No infirmity found in the order of Courts below
A warranting intetference. F
s. 344 - Power of Courts to take action against witnesses
for Committing the offence of perjury!fabriction of false evi~
dence - Discussed.
The Petitioner lodged a report against two persons
G
at the Police Station for committing rape on her, one after
,J.
another. The accused persons faced trial for alleged com-
mission of offence punishable under Section 376(2)(9) of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. During trial, the petitioner
869 H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

-f
A stated that she had actually not been raped. As she resiled
from the statement made during investigation, she w,as
permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. She
even denied to have lodged the first information report
and to have given any statement to the police. Trial Court
B acquitting the accused persons found that the petitioner y ..-'
had tendered false.evidence and had fabricated evidence
against the accused persons with the intention that such
evidence shall be used in the proceedings, and, there-
fore, directed cognizance of offence in terms of Section
c 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to be taken
against her. A show-cause notice was issued and the case
was registered against her. She filed a reply, admitting her
guilt. Trial Court sentenced her to undergo three months'
simple imprisonment. Appeal filed thereagainst by the
petitioner was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the
D
present Special Leave Petition. -t· A·

Dismissing the petition, the Court
· HELD: 1. It is a settled position in law that so far as
sexual offences are concerned, sanctity is attached to the'
E statement of a· victim. This Court, has, in several cases,
held that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is suffi-
cient for the purpose of conviction if it is found to be reli-
able, cogent and credible. In the present case, on the basis
of the allegations made by the petitioner, two persons were t

F arrested and had to face trial and suffered the ignominy of .,..
being involved in a serious offence like rape. Their acquittal,
may, to a certain extent, have washed away the stigme, but
that is not enough. [Para 6] [873-F,G & H; 874-A]

G
2.1. The purpose of enacting Section 344, Cr.P.C. ap-
pears to be furt'1er arm the. Court with a weapon to deal
with more flagrant cases and not to take away the ~eapon
already in its possession. The object of the legislature ·uri- .....
'derlying enactment of the provision is that the evil of per-
jury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and
H
MAHILA VINOD KUMARi v. STATE OF MADHYA 871
PRADESH

can be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to A
take recourse to Section 340(1) Cr.P.C. in cases in which
they are failed to take action under Section 344 Cr.P.C.
[Para 6] [874-A,B & C]
2.2. For exercising the powers under s.344/ the Code
the Court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order 8
must at the first instance express an opinion to the effect
that the witness before it has either intentionally given
false evidence or fabricated such evidence. The second
condition is that the Court must come to the conclusion
that in the interests of justice the witness concerned C
should be punished summarily by it for the offence which
appears to have been committed by the witness. And the
third condition is that before commencing the summary
trial for punishment the witness must ·be given reason~
... ;. able opportunity of showingcause why he should not be D
so punished. All these conditions are mandatory. The
object of the provision is to deal with the evil of perjury in
a summary way. [Para 8 and 9] [875-E,F,G & H]
Narayanswamy v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC
182 - reliced on. E
2.3. The evil of perjury has assumed alarming propo-
sitions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order
to deal with the menace effectively it is desirable for the
• A courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently F
than it is presently done. [Para 10] [876-A]
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Petition for spe-
cial Leave to Appeal (Criminal) Nos. 4950-4951 of 2008
From the Judgment and final Order dated 30.11.2007 of G
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Crl.
_. Appeal No. 173 of 2002
Suryanarayana Singh and Pragati Neekhra for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
i

A Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner.
2. Delay condoned.
3. Though, we are not inclined to entertain the special leave
B petitions, but we find that there is a need for expressing views ,, ... _

on action to be taken for maliciously setting law into motion.

4. The petitioner lodged a report against two persons at
Pichhore Police Station to the effect that on 28.1.1993 between
6.00 to 7.00 a.m. she was waylaid by them who dragged her
c and committed rape on her, one after another. She claimed to
have narrated the incident to her father and uncle and, thereat-
ter lodged the report at the police station, On the basis of the
report, matter was investigated. The accused persons were
arrested. Charge-sheet was filed. The accused persons faced
D trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Sec- + ,4.

tion 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the IPC').
The accused persons abjured their guilt. During trial, the peti-
tioner stated that she had actually not been raped. As she resiled
from the statement made during investigation, she was permit-
E ted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. She even denied
to have lodged the first information report (Exh.P-1) and to have
given any statement to the police (Exh.P-2). In view of the state-
ment of the petitioner, the two accused persons were acquitted
by judgment dated 28.11.2001. The Trial Court found that the
F petitioner had tendered false evidence and had fabricated evi- ~
dence against the accused persons with the intention that such
evidence shall be used in the proceedings, and, therefore, di-
rected cognizance in terms of Section 344 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') to be taken against
the petitioner. A show-cause notice was issued and the case
G
was registered against the petitioner who filed reply to the ef-
feet that being an illiterate lady, she had committed the mistake
+
and may be excused. The Trial Court found that the petitioner
admitted her guilt that she had lodged false report of rape against
the accused. She was, accordingly, sentenced to undergo three
H
MAHILA VINOD KUMARI v. STATE OF MADHYA 873
PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
' months' simple imprisonment. Aggrieved by the order, the pe- A
titioner filed an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
which, by the impugned order, was dismissed.
5. Stand before the High Court was that being an illiterate
. ~
lady, she does not understand law and the particulars of the
offence were not explained to her and, therefore, the appeal 8
should be allowed. This was opposed by the State on the ground
that the petitioner had admitted her guilt before the Trial Court
and, therefore, the conviction is well founded. The High Court
perused the records of the Trial Court and found that in the show-
cause reply she had admitted that she had told lies all through. c
..
~
The stand that the particulars of the offence were not explained
to her, was found to be equally untenable, because in the show-
cause notice issued, relevant details were given. In the first
information report, and the statement recorded by the police,
....• ~ she had clearly stated that she was raped by the accused per- D
sons. But in Court she denied to have stated so. Learned coun-
_j sel for the petitioner submitted that the Court imposed 15 days'
simple imprisonment which is harsh. But that is not the end of
the matter. The petitioner filed an application before the High
Court stating that a wrong statement was made before the High E.
Court that she had already suffered custody for 15 days, which
weighed with the High Court to reduce the sentence.

.. ....
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that being a
girl of tender age, she was pressurized by her mother and uncle
to give a false report. This is at variance with the statement made F
in court during trial to the effect that she had not reported any-
thing to the police. It is a settled position in law that so far as
sexual offences are concerned, sanctity is attached to the state- •
ment of a victim. This Court, has, in several cases, held that the
evidence of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient for the purpose of G
conviction if it is found to be reliable, cogent and credible. In the
.... present case, on the basis of the allegations made by the peti-
tioner, two persons were arrested and had to face trial and suf-
fered the ignominy of being involved in a serious offence like
rape. Their acquittal, may, to a certain extent, have washed away H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
·f

A the stigma, but that is not enough. The purpose of enacting
Section 344, Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 479-A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Old Code') appears to be further arm the Court with a
weapon to deal with more flagrant cases and not to take away
B the weapon already in its possession. The object of the legisla-
ture underlying enactment of the provision is that the evil of per-
jury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and can
be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to take re-
course to Section 340( ~) (corresponding to Section 4 76 of the
c Old Code) in cases in which they are failed to take action under
Section 344 Cr.P.C.
7. This section introduces an additional alternative proce-
dure to punish perjury by the very Court before which it is com-
mitted in place of old Section 479 Awhich did not have the de-
D sired effect to eradicate the evils of perjury. The salient features
of this new provision are:
(1) Special powers have been conferred on two
specified Courts, namely Court of Session and
Magistrate of the First Class, to take cognizance of
E an offence of perjury committed by a witness in a
proceeding before it instead of filing a complaint
before a Magistrate and try and punish the offender
by following the procedure of summary trials. For
summary trial, see Ch. 21.
F
(2) This power is to be exercised after having the matter
considered by the Court only at the time of delivery ~
of the judgment or final order. I
I--
•f
(3) The offender shall be given a reasonable opportunity
G of showing cause before he is punished.
(4) The maximum sentence that may be imposed is 3
month's imprisonment or a fine up to Rs.500 or both.

(5) The order of the Court is appealable (vide S. 351 ).
H
MAHILA VINOD KUMARI v. STATE OF MADHYA 875
~ PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

(6) The procedure in this section is an. alternative to one A
under Sections 340-343. The Court has been given
an option to proceed to punish summarily under this
section or to resort to ordinary procedure by way of
complaint under Section 340 so that, as for instance,
...,
where the Court is of opinion that perjury committed B
is likely to raise complicated questions or deserves
more severe punishment than that permitted under
this section or the case is otherwise of such a nature
or for some reasons considered to be such that the
case should be disposed of under the ordinary c
-,.;
procedure which would be more appropriate, the
1 Court may chose to do so [vide sub-section (3)].
(7) Further proceedings of any trial initiated under this
section shall be stayed and thus, any sentence
/
• imposed shall also not be executed until the disposal D
of an appeal or revision against the judgment or order
in the main proceedings in which the witness gave
perjured evidence or fabricated false evidence [vide
sub-section (4)].
8. For exercising the powers under the section the Court E
at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first
instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness be-
fore it has either intentionally given false evidence or fabricated
- ~
such evidence. The second condition is that the Court must come
to the conclusion that in the interests of justice the witness con- F
cerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which
appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third
condition is that before commencing the summary trial for pun-
ishment the witness must be given reasonable opportunity of
I
_, showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these G
I
conditions arc mandatory. [See Narayanswamy v. State of
+
Muharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 182].

9. The object of the provision is to deal with the evil perjury
in a summary way.
H
c
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
f
..'
A 10. The evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions
in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with "
.,/

the menace effectively it is desirable for the courts to use the
provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently done.
11. In the c. ase at hand, the court. has rightly taken action
B and we find nothing infirm in the order of the Trial Court and the
High Court to warrant interference. The special leave petitions
are, accordingly dismissed. :·1. ,.

S.K.S. SLP dismissed.

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