MAHNOOR FATIMA IMRAN & ORS.versusM/S VISWESWARA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT LTD. & ORS.

                 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2515 : 2025 INSC 646

                   Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors.
                                 v.
            M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6600 of 2025)
                                  07 May 2025
           [Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       1.    Whether an unregistered sale agreement can confer valid
             title or ownership of immovable property.
       2.    Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226
             can direct dispossession of a party without proof of actual
             and physical possession.

                                   Headnotes†
       Registration Act, 1908 – Section 17 & Section 49 – Immovable
       property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only
       by a registered deed of conveyance:
       Held: By referring to Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
       Haryana & Anr (2012) 1 SCC 656, it was held that the transactions
       of the nature of “GPA sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey
       title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or
       treated as a valid mode of transfer of immovable property – The
       courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded
       transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create
       any interest in an immovable property – They cannot be recognized
       as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53-A of the
       Transfer of Property Act – Such transactions cannot be relied upon
       or made the basis for mutations in municipal or revenue records –
       The registration of a document gives notice to the world that such
       a document has been executed is not to confer an unimpeachable
       validity on all such registered documents. [Para 17]

       Registration Act, 1908 – Section 17 & Section 49 – Compulsory
       registration of certain types of documents:
       Held: The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with the intention
       of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to

* Author
2516                                                          [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


    transactions relating to immovable property and protection from
    fraud and forgery of documents of transfer – This is achieved by
    requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents
    and providing for consequences of non-registration – Section 17
    of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other
    than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to
    create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or
    in future ‘any right, title or interest’ whether vested or contingent
    of the value of Rs.100 and upward to or in immovable property –
    Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by
    Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property
    comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction
    affecting such property, unless it has been registered – Registration
    of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has
    been executed. [Para 15]

    Constitution of India – Article 226 – Order of dispossession
    cannot be granted unless actual and physical possession is
    proved:
    Held: The Division Bench has found possession on the appellants
    and the writ petitioners by virtue of two interim orders passed by
    Co-ordinate Benches of the High Court – Actual and physical
    possession must be proved, which principle would apply even
    in a writ petition under Article 226, more strictly since there is no
    evidence led and the consideration is only based on documents
    produced on affidavit – When dispossession by the State is alleged
    on the strength of possession, mere reliance on interim orders
    passed in writ petitions earlier filed cannot establish such actual
    and physical possession. [Paras 26, 27]

    Land Reforms Act – No provision for a review of notifications
    affirming statutory vesting – Observation on title and
    possession prima facie – To deny discretion to invoke extra
    ordinary power under Article 226 – Subject to legitimate legal
    scrutiny:
    Held: The vesting and allotment of 424.13 acres to the Andhra
    Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (APIIC), now
    Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited
    (TSIIC), had attained finality, leaving no room for dispute over title
    or possession on that land – There cannot be reversion of 99.07
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                             2517

                     Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
              M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

     acres (including the 53 acres in dispute) to the original declarants
     since the Land Reforms Act does not provide for a review of
     notifications affirming statutory vesting.
     The cloud of title and doubts raised on possession are merely prima
     facie observations to deny discretion to invoke extra ordinary power
     under Article 226 – The reservation in faour of the State also arises
     only from our anxiety to preserve the property, without creation
     of any third-party interest – This is to avoid any hindrance of the
     State’s power to invoke the provisions under the Land Reforms
     Act, if done within a reasonable period, which would be subject
     to legitimate legal scrutiny. [Para 28]

                              Case Law Cited
     S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (D) by LRs v. Jagannath (D) by LRs
     and Ors. [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 422 : (1994) 1 SCC 1; State of
     A.P and Ors. v. N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. [2001] Supp.
     5 SCR 162 : (2002) 1 SCC 227; Omprakash Verma v. State of
     A.P. [2010] 15 SCR 302 : (2010) 13 SCC 158; Suraj Lamp &
     Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Anr. [2011] 11 SCR
     848 : (2012) 1 SCC 656; Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v.
     Balkrishna Rambharose Gupta [2019] 2 SCR 791 : (2020) 19
     SCC 119 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Registration Act, 1908; Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling
     on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973; Urban Land (Ceiling and
     Regulation) Act, 1976; Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

                             List of Keywords
     Dispossession; Sale Agreement; Unregistered document.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6600 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 24.08.2023 of the High Court
     for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WA No. 697 of 2023
     With
     Civil Appeal Nos. 6601, 6602 and 6603 of 2025
2518                                                          [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                                Supreme Court Reports


                                Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellants:
       Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Adv., Yelamanchili Shiva Santosh Kumar,
       Rudrajit Ghosh, Ms. Japneet Kaur, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Avi Leuna,
       Ms. Khyati Chhabra, Maria Jerome J, Tarun Gupta, P. Mohith Rao,
       Ms. J Akshitha, J Venkat Sai, Eugene S Philomene, P. S. Sudheer,
       M. A. Chinnasamy, Devendra Pratap Singh.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Hiren P. Raval, S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Advs., Mahesh Agarwal,
       Arshit Anand, Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Aryan Rachh, Ms. Urmi H.
       Raval, Ms. Shreshtha N., E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Devina Sehgal,
       S.uday Bhanu, Akhila Palem, Ms. Akhila Palem, P. Mohith Rao,
       Ms. J Akshitha, J Venkat Sai, Eugene S Philomene, D. Srinivas,
       T Ratnakar, Somanatha Padhan, Tarun Gupta, M. A. Chinnasamy,
       C Raghavendren, P. S. Sudheer.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                      Judgment

       K. Vinod Chandran, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     These appeals arise from the order of the Division Bench of the
       High Court of Telangana in a writ appeal filed from the judgment in
       a batch of writ petitions dismissed by a common order. The appeal
       was only against the judgment in W.P No.30855 of 2016; which
       writ petition essentially prayed for restraining the Telangana State
       Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited1, the first respondent
       therein from attempting to enter into the land of the writ petitioners
       having an extent of 53 acres, situated in Survey No.83/2 of Raidurg
       Panmaktha, Village Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District,
       with prayers also against demolition of the fencing and structures
       without any notice or without any right or authority. The connected writ
       petitions also claimed similar reliefs as against the first respondent,
       but with respect to smaller extents of property, said to have been
       purchased from the original owners. The appellants before the Division


1    For brevity ‘the TSIICL’
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                         2519

                          Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
                   M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

       Bench claimed that they are in possession of the subject property
       on the strength of registered title deeds in which the vendor is one
       M/s Bhavana Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.2 who obtained
       possession of the land under an agreement of sale on 19.03.1982.
       We are not concerned with the other writ petitions since the impugned
       judgment in the SLPs are concerned with only an appellate order
       reversing the judgment in WP No.30855 of 2016 and allowing the
       said writ petition.
3.     The learned Single Judge after dealing with the various proceedings
       taken against the total extent of 525 acres 31 guntas in Survey No.83
       of Raidurg Panmaktha Village, Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy
       District, originally belonging to 11 individuals, under the Andhra
       Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 19733
       and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 19764 confined the
       consideration to the 53 acres. It was noticed that the agreement of
       sale dated 19.03.1982 was validated by proceedings of the Assistant
       Registrar, Ranga Reddy District on 11.09.2006 which validation
       was held to be fraudulent by the District Registrar, Karimnagar by
       order dated 12.08.2015. The No Objection Certificates issued by
       the Urban Land Ceiling authorities against the writ petitioners also
       stood cancelled, against which no proceedings were taken. There
       was nothing to show a valid title having been conferred on the writ
       petitioners and the vendor of the writ petitioners had filed a suit for
       specific performance; O.S.No.248 of 1991 before the jurisdictional civil
       court which had been dismissed for default on 06.04.2001 and the
       application for restoration was also dismissed on 23.02.2004. Finding
       no valid explanation as to how another agreement of sale of the same
       date i.e., 19.03.1982 surfaced, relying on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu
       (D) by LRs v. Jagannath (D) by LRs and Ors.5 emphasised the
       fraud perpetrated by the petitioners. The subject land was comprised
       in a total of 99 acres 17 guntas, covered by the agreement of sale
       dated 19.03.1982; stated to be in the possession of the Government
       as on the date of the agreement, having vested in the Government
       under the Land Reforms Act. The possession was said to have been


2    Bhavana Society hereinafter
3    (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Land Reforms Act’)
4    (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Land Ceiling Act’)
5    (1994) 1 SCC 1
2520                                                         [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


      redelivered to the General Power of Attorney (GPA) of the original
      declarants, thus, negativing the claim of possession with M/s. Bhavna
      Cooperative Housing Society from 1982. The writ petition filed on
      the ground of possession stood dismissed.
4.    In the appeal, the Division Bench found that the State was concerned
      with only 470 acres of land out of the total 525.31 acres, as per the
      learned Advocate General and hence the 53 acres stood distinct
      and separate. The learned Single Judge, according to the Division
      Bench, erred in so far as looking into the title of the writ petitioners
      since the prayer was against illegal dispossession, based merely on
      the possession of the subject land. As far as the possession, interim
      orders by co-ordinate benches were relied on. One in WP No.29547
      of 2011, wherein a Division Bench by interim order dated 01.03.2011
      restrained the Lok Ayukta from proceeding further in an application
      filed by the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd.6,
      the predecessor of TSIIC. The other order was passed on 17.02.2012
      in WP No.4466 of 2012 filed by the appellants wherein there was a
      stay of demolition of the structures raised by the writ petitioners (the
      appellants herein) in Survey No.83/2 in Raidurg Panmaktha, Village
      Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Relying on the settled
      legal position that a person in possession cannot be dispossessed,
      except in accordance with law and finding the actions of the TSIIC, to
      be in violation of the interim orders issued, restrained the respondents
      from dispossessing the appellants from 53 acres situated in Survey
      No.83/2 as also from demolishing the fencing sheets and construction
      raised by the appellants without taking recourse to law.
5.    The appeals before us have been filed by the party respondents
      in the writ petition who are the legal heirs of the original owners
      and one, by individuals claiming smaller extents of property. Before
      us, for the appellants Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel
      appeared, Shri Hiren P.Raval, learned Senior Counsel appeared for
      the respondents who are the writ petitioners and Shri S. Niranjan
      Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the State of Telangana
      and the petitioners in SLP (C) Diary No.19071 of 2024 are represented
      by Shri P. Mohith Rao, Advocate on Record, who adopted the
      arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing in the
      other appeals.


6    The APIIC
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                         2521

                        Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
                 M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

6.    At the outset, we notice that the writ petition is only one filed seeking
      an order against dispossession, unless in accordance with law, as
      noticed by the Division Bench. However, we cannot but say that the
      learned Single Judge has not decided the question of title and has
      only raised an apprehension on the asserted title and possession by
      the writ petitioners. The title was asserted to be validly obtained by
      instruments of conveyance, but the title of the vendor was suspect.
      Likewise, possession, on the ground, in reality, had not been proved
      was the essence of the findings of the learned Single Judge. Before
      we look at the sustainability of the impugned judgment, we have
      to notice that the subject land, rather the total larger extent; the
      original owners being the 11 individuals, predecessors in interest
      of the appellants herein, had a chequered career as is seen from
      the decisions produced in the records; State of A.P and Ors. v. N.
      Audikesava Reddy and Ors.7 and Omprakash Verma v. State of
      A.P.8
7.    We notice the facts from Omprakash Verma8 which, at the outset,
      found that one Mohd. Ruknuddin Ahmed and 10 others were the
      original owners of a land admeasuring 526.07 acres in Survey No.83
      situated at Village Raidurg (Panmaktha) of Ranga Reddy District
      in the State of Andhra Pradesh; comprised in which is the subject
      land of this litigation having an extent of 53 acres. On 07.07.1974,
      the owners executed registered GPA in favour of a partnership firm
      known as Sri Venkateswara Enterprises, represented by its Managing
      Partners A. Ramaswamy and A. Satyanarayana. On 01.01.1975,
      when the Land Reforms Act came into force, the said land being an
      agricultural land, the owners filed 11 declarations under the Land
      Reforms Act. About 99.07 acres was found surplus in the hands of 4
      declarants and possession was taken on 11.04.1975, which vested
      in the State Government. Later, the Land Ceiling Act came into force
      and the owners through their GPA, filed declarations under Section
      6 (1) of the that Act, allegedly on a mistaken impression, since the
      land in question was agricultural land and it was not included in the
      Master Plan under that Act.
8.    Draft statements were issued on 06.12.1979 and 25.01.1980 under the
      Land Ceiling Act. The final statements under Section 9 were issued


7    (2002) 1 SCC 227
8    (2010) 13 SCC 158
2522                                                     [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     declaring the surplus area for each of the declarants on 16.09.1980
     and 30.01.1980. A notification was issued by the competent authority
     under Section 10 (1) by GOMS No.5013 dated 19.12.1980 vesting
     the surplus land determined. The State Government under Section
     23 of the Land Ceiling Act allotted 470.33 acres to the Hyderabad
     Urban Development Authority (HUDA), the possession of which was
     not surrendered. Later, in exercise of the powers conferred under
     Section 20(1) of the Land Ceiling Act, certain exemptions were
     granted, entitling each holder of excess land to hold 5 acres instead
     of 1000 sq. meters. A number of persons, including the appellants
     purchased different extents of land which sale deeds were directed
     to be cancelled by the Inspector General of Registrations. The
     cancellation order passed by the Registrar was challenged in a writ
     petition which was allowed. A Division Bench rejected the appeal
     against which a SLP was filed in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors.7,
     in which the decision of the High Court was reversed. The State
     Government then took a decision to allot the excess land to third
     parties who were in occupation of such excess land on payment
     of prescribed regular charges, upon which the original declarants
     sought for a consideration providing them to retain the excess land
     on payment of requisite compensation.
9.   The State Government without taking any action on the representations
     allotted 424.13 acres of land in the name of APIIC against which
     four writ petitions were filed in the High Court by individual owners
     as well as one M/s. Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society
     Ltd., Secunderabad which Society claimed that the proceedings of
     the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act stood restored
     by the judgment in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors.7 The Division
     Bench rejected the writ petitions against which SLPs were filed which
     were decided in Omprakash Verma’s8 case. The learned judges in
     Omprakash Verma’s8 case rejected the contention that the original
     owners had filed the declaration on a misconception and confusion.
     We extract paragraph 86 to 88 of the cited decision: -
          “86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not been
          questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants.
          Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society
          was in possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar
          Enterprises was given possession by the owners and
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           2523

                     Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
              M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

           possession was also given to Golden Hill Construction
           Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers,
           the fact remains that the owners are not in possession.
           In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that
           the possession was taken by the State legally and validly
           through a panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves
           to be upheld.
           87. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the appellants
           in the previous proceedings which were highlighted by the
           learned Senior Counsel for the State as well as APIIC.
           They are:
                (a) the appellants themselves described the land in
                Survey No. 83 as “grazing land” in their declarations
                filed under Section 6(1);
                (b) the appellants filed declarations under the Land
                Reforms Act subjecting the land to the jurisdiction
                of the Tribunal;
                (c) filing declarations under the ULC Act treating the
                land in Survey No. 83 as vacant land;
                (d) the transaction of agreement of sale entered
                into between GPA and Chanakyapuri Cooperative
                Housing Society;
                (e) owners and Society filed applications for
                exemptions which were rejected;
                (f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its remedies against
                such rejection of exemption up to this Court in which
                the owners through their power of attorney were
                sailing with the Society.
                In fact these instances were projected in their counter-
                affidavit before the High Court by the State and APIIC
                to non-suit the appellants. Though the learned Senior
                Counsel for the appellants pointed out that these
                aspects were not highlighted before the High Court,
                the conduct of the appellants as regards the above
                aspects cannot be ignored.
2524                                                         [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


           88. It is pointed out that the owners themselves have
           described the land in Survey No. 83 as “grazing lands” and
           “vacant land” in the relevant columns of their declaration
           under Section 6(1) and, therefore, the proceedings of the
           competent authority under Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid.
           Though the said aspect had not been disputed by the
           appellants, however, it is pointed out that the mentioning
           of “grazing lands” in the said declaration is not conclusive.
           However, as observed earlier, their statements in the form
           of declarations before the authorities concerned cannot be
           denied. In fact, we were taken through those entries which
           are available in the paper book in the form of annexures.”
10. Hence, in so far as the land allotted to APIIC, now in the possession
    of TSIIC, which is 424.13 acres, the vesting and allotment has
    attained finality. There can be no dispute either of title or possession
    raised on that land.
11. Now, we come to the 99.07 acres, vested under the Land Reforms
    Act. While proceedings were continuing under the Land Ceiling Act,
    which were also challenged on the ground that the entire lands were
    agricultural lands, not included under the Land Ceiling Act, the GPA of
    the original declarants filed a petition before the Land Tribunal pointing
    out the proceedings taken under the Land Ceiling Act, asserting that
    the provisions of the Land Reforms Act are not applicable since the
    entire land in Survey No.83 was treated as vacant land under the
    provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. The GPA sought release of the
    extent of 99.07 acres which was rejected. Four appeals were filed
    before the Land Reforms Appellate Authority-cum-District Judge,
    Ranga Reddy in which there was a remand. The Land Tribunal on
    remand accepted the plea of the declarants and directed the extent of
    99.07 acres to be released to the declarants; which according to the
    learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State was not permissible.
12. Subject of the present appeals; 53 acres, is said to be comprised
    in the 99.07 acres of land allegedly reverted to the declarants on
    25.04.1990, the possession allegedly having been handed over to the
    GPA of the declarants. In so far as the remaining 46.20 acres, there
    is said to be a writ petition pending before the High Court in which
    the High Court has permitted the State to protect the total 470.33
    acres, including the 424.32 acres earlier allotted to APIIC, now with
    the TSIIC. While the appellants herein, the legal representatives
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                      2525

                     Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
              M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

     of the original owners/declarants asserted their possession and
     ownership, the respondents who are the writ petitioners equally
     assert their possession on the strength of title deeds which have
     not been challenged at all.
13. All the parties have filed their detailed written submissions. On the
    arguments, suffice it to notice that Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior
    Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there could be
    no conveyance effected by the sale agreement of 19.03.1982 and
    the title deeds executed cannot confer any title on the vendees
    since the vendor did not have a valid title. The vendor in the said
    title deeds had sought for specific performance which suit stood
    dismissed for default and the application for restoration was also
    rejected. Based on the sale deeds, the writ petitioners had taken
    loans from banks, offering the said lands as collateral security, which
    had led to a CBI investigation where the sale deeds were found to be
    fraudulent. Proceedings were initiated under the criminal law against
    the writ petitioners and their Directors. In so far as the 46.20 acres,
    the appellants would agitate their cause in the writ petition pending
    before the High Court. The remaining 53 acres was admittedly taken
    possession by the GPA of the original declarants, which possession
    is with the appellants, the ownership having devolved upon them.
14. Shri Hiren P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
    respondents on the other hand submits that there is no challenge
    to the sale deeds and the entire exercise is experimental, especially
    considering the development agreement entered into with a builder
    as is produced by the Respondent No.1 to 7 through I.A. No.83765
    of 2025. Behind the scenes, the developer is funding the litigation in
    the hope that the appellants who are all living abroad would obtain
    possession of the disputed land on which the developer could carry
    out their activities. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
    on the other hand submits that the State is concerned with 99.07
    acres of land which had vested in the State under the Land Reforms
    Act. The land having vested with the State, there is no reason for
    reverting it back to the original declarants who had claimed the said
    lands to be agricultural lands when the Land Reforms Act came
    into force. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy also points out Section 9-A of
    the Land Reforms Act which provides for reopening of cases. It is
    also pointed out that though the Land Ceiling Act, 1976 has been
2526                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


     repealed in 1999, the vesting cannot be disturbed and the decisions
     of this Court on the earlier two occasions has brought about a finality
     to the vesting under the repealed Act.
15. The respondents herein who were the writ petitioners have
    emphasised their claims on the basis of the decision in Suraj Lamp &
    Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Anr.9. The said decision
    has been cited to argue that the title deeds; registered instruments
    of conveyance, are to be deemed valid unless set aside or declared
    void by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. There is no such
    dictum in the said decision wherein a Division Bench of this Court was
    concerned with conveyances made on the strength of agreements of
    sale, General Power of Attorney and Wills. The issue addressed was
    avoidance of execution and registration of deed of conveyances as
    a mode of transfer of a free hold immovable property, especially in
    the teeth of Section 17 and Section 49 of the Registration Act. The
    tendency to adopt Power of Attorney sales along with execution of
    sale agreements and a bequeath by way of will, instead of execution
    and registration of proper deeds of conveyance on receipt of full
    consideration was deprecated. We extract paragraphs 15 to 17 of an
    earlier order dated 15.05.2009 in the said case, extracted as such
    in para 15 of the aforesaid decision:
            “15. The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with the
            intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public
            notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable
            property and protection from fraud and forgery of
            documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring
            compulsory registration of certain types of documents and
            providing for consequences of non-registration.
            16. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides
            that any document (other than testamentary instruments)
            which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit
            or extinguish whether in present or in future ‘any right, title
            or interest’ whether vested or contingent of the value of
            Rs.100 and upward to or in immovable property.
            17. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document
            required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect


9   (2012) 1 SCC 656
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           2527

                     Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
              M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

           any immovable property comprised therein or received
           as evidence of any transaction affecting such property,
           unless it has been registered. Registration of a document
           gives notice to the world that such a document has been
           executed.”
16. The observation that registration of a document gives notice to the
    world that such a document has been executed is not to confer an
    unimpeachable validity on all such registered documents. Even the
    respondents/writ petitioners accept that the presumption coming forth
    from a registered deed of conveyance is rebuttable. While reserving
    the right of persons who had obtained sale agreement/general power
    of attorney/will executed, to complete confirmation of title on them by
    getting registered deeds of conveyance, the conclusion of the cited
    decision, which acts as a binding precedent, is available in para 24,
    which we extract hereunder: -
           “24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can
           be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a
           registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature
           of “GPA sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey title
           and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognised
           or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts
           will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded
           transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title
           nor create any interest in an immovable property. They
           cannot be recognised as deeds of title, except to the limited
           extent of Section 53-A of the TP Act. Such transactions
           cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations
           in municipal or revenue records. What is stated above
           will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to
           freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property.
           A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered
           assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to the
           pernicious practice of SA/GPA/will transactions known as
           GPA sales.”
17. It is in this context that we must examine the document of 19.03.1982,
    an agreement which is said to have been validated in the year 2006.
    We immediately notice that the very contention of the writ petitioners
    is only that they have obtained proper conveyances by registered sale
2528                                                         [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                                Supreme Court Reports


       deeds from Bhavana society, whose claim is under the agreement of
       1982, which has not till date been registered and hence cannot be
       recognized as a valid mode or instrument of transfer of immovable
       property, going by the above decision.
18. We refer to the documents from the memorandum of appeal in SLP
    (C) No. 1866 of 2024. The agreement of sale executed by the GPA
    holder of the original declarants, in favour of M/s. Bhavana Society is
    produced as Annexure P-33. The agreement is dated 19.03.1982 and
    the extent of the property agreed to be sold is 125-35 acres. Clause
    (2) of the agreement clearly indicates only a payment of Rs.50,000/-
    by cheque towards part of sale consideration, the balance sale
    consideration to be paid within six months from the date of obtaining
    permission under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. The original
    declarants represented through the GPA, termed as the vendors in
    the agreement, also spoke of the delivery of vacant possession of
    the land to the intending purchaser. The plaint in the suit filed by
    the Bhavana Society is produced as Annexure P-32 which, while
    asserting actual physical possession having been handed over to the
    plaintiff sought only for a direction to the defendants 1 to 9 through the
    defendants 10 and 11 to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff
    society in respect of the scheduled land admeasuring 125-35 acres.
    Hence Bhavana Society was aware that they obtained no valid title
    from the agreement of sale. The suit filed in 1991 after possession
    of 99.07 acres was taken under the Land Reforms Act, was stood
    dismissed for default on 06.04.2001. The petition filed under Order
    IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190810 was rejected on
    23.02.2004 as seen from Annexure P-36. After this, the revalidation
    was done on the agreement of sale, as is produced at Annexure P-37,
    a copy of which also has been produced by respondents Nos.1 to
    7 as Annexure 2 in IA No. 83765 of 2025; but without registration,
    which in any event is not possible at this distance of time.
19. Moreover, though the agreement of sale dated 19.03.1982 is said
    to be one based on which the suit for specific performance was
    filed and later revalidated, both differ considerably. The agreement
    produced as Annexure P-37, though of the same date and the very
    same vendors and vendees, as is seen from Annexure P-34, the


10   (for brevity, ‘the CPC’)
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           2529

                     Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
              M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

     extent differs in so far as it refers to 99.17 acres out of the total extent
     of 525.35 acres. Here, we must specifically notice that there was a
     demarcation of 99.17 acres of land out of the total extent when the
     land had been declared vested in the State under the Land Reforms
     Act and possession taken by the State in 1975. In 1982 when the
     agreement of sale validated subsequently was executed, that extent
     had vested in the State and was in the State’s possession. The
     alleged reversion of such land to the original declarants occurred
     only in the year 1990 and hence there was no reason for the sale
     of the specified extent as seen from Annexure P-37 at that point of
     time. These are not two separate transactions since the consideration
     paid is Rs.50,000/- by cheque issued on Andhra Bank, Mukharamjahi
     Road, Hyderabad. However, the cheque numbers differ in so far as
     Annexure P-33 showing the number of 738569 while Annexure P-37
     indicates it to be 238569; obviously a printer’s devil.
20. Further clause (2) in the said agreements also differ which stands
    extracted hereunder:
           Annexure P-33: -
                “2) That in pursuance of the above said offer and
                acceptance, the Second party purchaser has this day
                paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousands
                only) by cheque no. 738569 on Andhra Bank,
                Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad towards part of
                sale consideration and agreed to pay the balance of
                sale consideration within six months from the date of
                obtaining permission under the provisions of Urban
                Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976.”
                                                     (para-2, page 872)

           Annexure P-37 :
                “That in pursuance of the above said offer and
                acceptance, the Second party purchaser has paid
                the total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- this day
                and out of which a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty
                thousands only) by cheque no. 238569 on Andhra
                Bank, Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad.”
                                                     (para-2, page-906)
2530                                                       [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     The very recital in Annexure P-37 is anomalous and does not with
     certainty declare that the entire consideration was paid or only
     Rs. 50,000/ as part payment by cheque.
21. Annexure P-33 speaks only of a consideration of Rs. 50,000/- and
    the balance consideration to be paid within six months from the date
    of obtaining permission under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.
    Annexure P-37 speaks of payment of total sale consideration of
    Rs. 4,95,350/- out of which Rs.50,000/- has been paid by cheque;
    the recital not really lending any assurance of the payment. Though
    the extents differ, the schedule of the property in both the agreements
    shows the very same boundaries, another anomaly which raises a
    suspicion on the actual demarcation and reversion to the original
    declarants.
22. Further, an instrument of conveyance is compulsorily registrable
    as required under the Registration Act. Section 23 prescribes four-
    months’ time for presenting a document for registration from the
    date of its execution. Section 24 provides that if there are several
    persons executing a document at different times, such document
    may be presented for registration or re-registration within four
    months from the date of such execution. In the instant case, all
    the executants, parties to the agreement, have signed on the day
    shown in the agreement. The proviso to Section 34 also enables
    the Registrar to condone the delay, if the document is presented
    within a further period of four months, on payment of a fine. The
    validation of the sale agreement, which clearly is shown to be not
    one executed by the declarants, by reason of it materially differing
    from that produced as Annexure P-33, on the strength of which a
    suit for specific performance was filed by the vendor, the Bhavana
    Society, which is also the intended purchaser in the sale agreement
    of 1982, it smacks of fraud. The agreement of 1982, the original
    one and the revalidated one, cannot result in a valid title, merely for
    reason that the subsequent instrument had been registered. As we
    noticed at the outset, the learned Single Judge did not decide the
    title but only raised valid suspicion insofar as the title of the vendor
    in the deed of conveyance. Even according to the writ petitioners,
    their claim stems from a sale agreement, which is not a proper deed
    of conveyance, especially since it is not a registered document.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                      2531

                     Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
              M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

23. The Division Bench has found possession on the appellants and the
    writ petitioners by virtue of two interim orders passed by Co-ordinate
    Benches of the High Court. The first one is in W.P. No. 29547 of 2011,
    wherein the Lok Ayukta was directed not to pass any further orders
    but the State Government and the APIIC Ltd. were not restrained
    from taking any action in accordance with law. The interim order in
    W.P. No. 4466 of 2012 also does not establish possession on the
    writ petitioners. Undoubtedly, the 53 acres would be comprised in the
    99.07 acres alleged to have been resumed to the possession of the
    original declarants through their GPA, but there is nothing on record
    indicating the possession, either of the respondents/writ petitioners
    or the appellants/respondents in the writ petition.
24. We also take serious notice of the submission made by the State
    insofar as the invocation of Section 9-A of the Land Reforms Act,
    as of now against the 99.07 acres vested in the State, which would
    ideally remain in the possession of the State. As far as 46.20 acres
    is concerned, it would depend upon writ petitions pending before
    the Telangana High Court and the proceedings sought to be initiated
    by the State under the Land Reforms Act. But we cannot ignore the
    submission of the State that the Land Ceiling Act permits retention
    of only 1000 Sq. m. with each declarant. At the same time, we must
    notice that Omprakash Verma8 speaks of an exemption granted to
    the original declarants to hold 5 acres each instead of 1000 Sq.m.
    We notice this not as an entitlement which exemption will have to
    be proved in accordance with the Act when a claim is raised or an
    action against the land is resisted. Even then the declarants cannot
    have possession of 99.07 acres; the reversion of which, physically
    is not clearly established. The fate of 53 acres comprised in 99.07
    acres also would be subject to a proposed action by the State under
    the Land Reforms Act.
25. We make it clear that we have not said anything about the possession
    of 99.07 acres which will have to be agitated in appropriate
    proceedings. As far as the writ petition praying for a direction not to
    dispossess, we find that the writ petitioners to have not established
    a valid title. We prima facie find the title to be suspect, which would
    disentitle them from claiming a rightful possession, which also has
    not been proved.
2532                                                        [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


26. In this context, we refer to the judgment of this Court in Balkrishna
    Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rambharose Gupta11. The
    dispute was with respect to a tenant and landlord and the bone
    of contention was possession. In the suit for permanent injunction
    filed by the tenant, the Trial Court, on appreciation of the oral and
    documentary evidence found that the plaintiff failed to prove his
    actual and physical possession over the suit property. The finding
    of the Trial Court based on the oral and documentary evidence was
    overturned by the First Appellate Court and the High Court drawing
    inference of possession from applications filed in an earlier suit. This
    Court restored the order of the Trial Court, finding that actual and
    physical possession must be proved, which principle would apply
    even in a writ petition under Article 226, more strictly since there is
    no evidence led and the consideration is only based on documents
    produced on affidavit.
27. When dispossession by the State is alleged on the strength of
    possession, mere reliance on interim orders passed in writ petitions
    earlier filed cannot establish such actual and physical possession.
    We have also noticed that the validated agreement of 19.03.1982,
    based on which conveyance is claimed by the writ petitioners,
    cannot be sustained on the clear terms in the two agreements. We
    noticed on a comparison of the actual agreement on which a suit for
    specific performance was filed and the latter agreement, which stood
    validated but not registered even now that the original declarants
    and the writ petitioners have been approbating and reprobating. The
    power of absolute right over lands is on the State and the person in
    occupation, is only there, by virtue of the grants, which can be brought
    to an end by the State which has the power of eminent domain.
    Here there is a statutory vesting of property and prima facie, guile
    employed in making conflicting claims before the authorities under
    the Land Reforms Act and the Land Ceiling Act as also entering into
    multiple transactions to defeat the statutory vesting with successive
    litigations, all in vain, which travelled up to this Court twice earlier.
28. The cloud on title and the doubts raised on possession by the learned
    Single Judge, as affirmed by us are merely prima facie observations to
    deny discretion to invoke the extra ordinary power under Article 226.


11   (2020) 19 SCC 119
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                          2533

                        Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v.
                 M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. & Ors.

     So are the misgivings expressed on the claim of repossession by the
     original declarants through their GPA and the skepticism regarding
     their very right to obtain repossession of property already vested in
     the State, under a Statute, which Statute also does not provide for
     any review of the notification issued under the Act; the notification
     having merely affirmed the statutory vesting. The reservation in
     favour of the State also arises only from our anxiety to preserve the
     property, without creation of any third-party interest, to avoid any
     hindrance of the State’s power to invoke the provisions under the
     Land Reforms Act, if done within a reasonable period, which would
     also be subject to legitimate legal scrutiny. It goes without saying;
     then, the parties would be entitled to agitate their respective causes,
     in the appropriate civil forum or if statutorily prohibited, avail of the
     remedies made available under the statute which proceedings will
     not be governed by the findings in our judgment, we having only
     prima facie declined invocation of the discretionary, extraordinary
     jurisdiction.
29. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored, and the appeals
    stand disposed of, with the above observations and reservations.
30. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal disposed of with observations and
                          reservations.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Mukund P. Unny, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)