Holding

The Supreme Court held that there was no causal connection between the accident and the driver’s employment, so no liability under Section 3(1) of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923.

Summary

The deceased, a driver employed by the appellant, was directed to take a vehicle with passengers to a temple. While at the temple he slipped on the steps of a pond and drowned. His wife claimed compensation under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, alleging that the death occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment, making the insurer liable. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "accident", "in the course of employment" and "arising out of employment" under Section 3(1) of the Act, emphasizing the need for a causal connection between the accident and the employee's duties. Relying on precedents, the Court held that the driver’s death was unrelated to his work duties and there was no casual link to the employment, thus no liability under the Act. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, overturning the High Court’s decision and absolving the insurer and employer from compensation liability.

Issues considered

Whether the death of a driver, occurring while taking a bath at a temple pond, constitutes an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" under Section 3(1) of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923.
Whether the insurer is liable to pay compensation under the policy when the accident is unrelated to the vehicle.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 147(1)(b)(i)

Subjects

Workmen Compensation Actemployer liabilityaccidentarising out of employmentcausal connectioninsurance liabilitydriver deathcompensation

Judgment

[2009] 2 S.C.R. 320

A MALLIKARJUNA G. HIREMATH ~
,,
V. ,,,
BRANCH MANAGER, ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.&
ANR.
Civil Apeal No. 956 Of 2009
B FEBRUARY 12, 2006
~
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY,
JJ]
~

Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 :
c
s.3(1) - Driver of vehicle on direction of employer-owner
of insured vehicle went to temple alongwith passengers -
Slipped on the steps of the pond inside the 'temple, and fell
into pond and died due to drowning - Liability of employer to
pay compensation - Held: Not liable - There was no casual
D
connection between the death of the workman and his
employment.
Words and Phrases: 'accident', injury, 'in the course of
employment' and 'arising out of employment' - Meaning of, in
E the context of Workmen Compensation Act, 1923.
The claimant-respondent 2 was the wife of the
deceased who was employed as a driver of the appellant.
... ,
The deceased took the vehicle along with the passengers -t

to a temple as per the directions of the appellant. At ~he
F temple, the deceased went to the pond. He slipped there
and drowned. The claim petition was filed on the ground
that death of the deceased h~d occurred during the
course of and in the employment under the appellant.

G In appeal to this Court, the appellant-employer
contended that the death was not occasioned during and
\I
in the course of the employment.
Allowing the appeal, the Court

H 320
,.

MALLIKARJUNA G. HIREMATH V. BRANCH MANAGER, 321
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.& ANR.
....(" ~
HELD: 1. Under Section 3(1) of the Workmen A
Compensation Act, 1923, it has to be established that there
was some casual connection between the death of the
workman and his employment. If the workman dies a
natural death because of the disease which he was
suffering or while suffering from a particular disease he B
dies of that disease as a result of wear and tear of the
employment, no liability would be fixed upon the employer.
But if the employment is a contributory cause or has
accelerated the death, or if the death was not only due to
the disease but also the disease coupled with the
employment, then it can be said that the death arose out
c
of the employment and the employer would be liable. [Para
9] [ 326-F, G]
2.1. The expression "accident" means an untoward
mishap which is not expected or designed. "Injury" means
... "" physiological injury. [Para 10] [ 326-G, H] D
Jyothi Ademma v. Plant Engineer, Ne/lore and Anr. 2006
(5) sec 51·3 - relied on.
Fenton v. Thorley & Co. Ltd. (1903) AC 448; Trim Joint
District, School Board of _Management v. Kelly (1914) A. C. E
676; ES/ Corpn. v. Francis De Costa 1996 (6) SCC 1 ; Dover
Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig 1940 AC 190; Fenton
~

(Pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd. 1903 AC 443 - referred to.
"'
2.2. An accident may lead to death but an accident
took place must be proved. Only because a death has F
taken place in course of employment would not amount
to accident. In other words, death must arise out of
accident. There is no presumption that an accident had
occurred. In a case of this nature to prove that accident
has taken place, factors which would have to be
.• established are: stress and strain arising during the G
course of employment, nature of employment, injury
aggravated due to stress and strain. [Paras 15, 16] [ 329-
8, C, D]
G.M., B.E.S. T Undertaking v. Agnes 1964 (3) SCR 930; H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Co. v Bai Valu Raja AIR 1958 SC 881 - I>- .
relied on.
Jenkins v Elder Dempster Lines Ltd. 1953 (2) All ER 1133
-referred to.
2.3. To come within the Act, the injury by accident
B must arise both out of and in the course of employment.
The words 'in the course of the employment' mean 'in the
course of the work which the workman is employed to do .~
and which is incidental to it'. The words 'arising out of
employment' are understood to mean that 'during the
c course of the employment, injury has resulted from some
risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless
engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable
to believe the workman would not otherwise have
suffered'. In other words there must be a causal
D relationship between the accident and the employment. )a.
't
The expression 'arising out of employment' is again not
confined to the mere nature of the employment. The
expression applies to employment as such-to its nature,
its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason
E of any of those factors the workman is brought within the
zone of special danger the injury would be one which
arises 'out of employment'. To put it differently if the
accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an .... ~

incident of the employment, the claim for compensation
F must succeed, unless of course the workman has
exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent
act." [Para 18] [ 329-G, H; 330-A, B, C]
Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. (P) Ltd. v Ibrahim Mohd.
lssak 1969 (2) SCC 607; Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti
G v Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Anr. 2007 ( 11) SCC 668 - ....
relied on. ~

3. It is the specific case of the claimants that on
30.11.2000 the deceased who was driving the vehicle on
the direction of the insured had gone to a temple and was
H sitting on the steps of the pond in the temple and he
-I

MALLIKARJUNA G. HIREMATH V. BRANCH MANAGER, 323
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.& ANR.
'
\I --! slipped and fell into the water and died due to drowning. A
' This is not sufficient to fasten liability on either the insurer
or the insured. The High Court was not justified in holding
that the appellant was liable to pay compensation. [Para
20] [ 330-E, F]
Case Law Reference B

2006 (5) sec 513 relied on Para 11
(1903) AC (1914) relied on Para 11
(1996 (6) sec 1) relied on Para 11
c
(1940 AC 190) relied on Para 11
(1903 AC 443) referred to Para 13
1964 (3) SCR 930 relied on Para 17
.
~
AIR 1958 SC 881 relied on Para 17 D
•
1953 (2) All ER 1133 referred to Para 18
1969 (2) sec 607 relied on Para 18
2001 (11) sec 668 relied on Para 19 E
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 956
of 2009
-· "' From the final Judgement and Order dated 8.8.2005 of
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Miscellaneous First
Appeal No. 5908 of 2002 F

Kiran Suri, for the Appellant.
0. Varadarajan and Shiv Prakash Pandey, for the
Respondent.
G
' ~
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowing the ).. '
Miscellaneous First Appeal filed under Section 30(1) of the
Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 (in short the 'Act') filed by f-
respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'insurer'). The
insurer had challenged the award passed by the Commissioner
B for Workmen Compensation (hereinafter referred to as the
'Commissioner') in respect of the death of a driver.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
,'(

The appellant was the owner of the vehicle of which the
c deceased was employed as a driver. Respondent No.2 filed a
Claim Petition inter-alia stating as follows:

· Her husband Veeresh Kumar (hereinafter referred to as
the 'deceased') was working as a driver in a truck bearing No.KA
34 1183. He left Siraguppa to go to Gurugunta Amreshwara
D ,;....
Temple alongwith certain passengers as· per the directions of --.
the present appellant. When the vehicle reached Gurugunta, the
deceased went to the pond and while taking bath at a pit, he
had slipped and fell down and had drowned and breathed his
last.The Claim Petition was filed taking the stand that the death
E
of the deceased had occurred during the course of and within
the employment under the appellant. The vehicle was the subject
matter of insurance with the insurer and, therefore, it was claimed
that the insurer was liable to pay the compensation as the risk
.. -,..,
of the driver was covered under the policy. The Commissioner,
F Bellary by his order. dated 11. 7 .2002 allowed the petition and
determined the compensation payable at Rs.2,20,046/- with .
12% interest. It was held that the insurer was liable to pay the
compensation. Insurer filed an appeal before the High Court.
As noted above, the stand taken by both the insurer and the '-...
G appellant was that there was no connection between the accident ,.
~
causing death of the workman and the vehicle and, therefore,
neither the insurer nor the insured had any liability to pay any
compensation. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the
insurer holding that there was no casual connection and
H
MALLIKARJUNA G. HIREMATH V. BRANCH MANAGER, 325
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.& ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.]

therefore the insurance company was not liable. Further, the High A
Court granted the liberty to recover the compensation awarded
from the appellant.
4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the death had not been occasioned during and
in course of employment. It is also not in dispute ttiat the vehicle 8
was the subject of insurance and the risk of the driver was
covered under the policy. The High Court accepted that the driver
did not die as a result of an accident involving the vehicle. But
the vehicle was taken by the deceased in the course of
employment at the behest of the present appellant to the temple. C
The ultimate question according to the High Court was when
the driver was taking a bath at the pond and gone there, the
death had occurred out of an accident arisen out of and in the
course of his employment.The High Court noted that there was
no casual connection between the accident causing the death D
and the vehicle. The High Court also noted that since there was
no such casual connection, the insurer would not be liable in
.
~
terms of the policy as the vehicle which was the subject matter
of insurance was not involved in the accident and the insurer
had no liability. E
'
-I
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. After having
held that there was no casual connection between the death
and the employment of the workman and after exonerating the
insurer, the High Court should not have directed claimant to F
recover the amount from the present appellant.

6. Learned counsel for the insurer submitted that it has no
liability in view of what is stated in Section 147 (1 )(b) (i) of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short 'M.V. Act').
G
7. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent No.2.

8. Section 3(1} of the Act which is relevant for the purpose
of this case reads as follows:-

"3. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. - H
...

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, his
employer shall be liable to pay compensation in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter :
. Provided that the employer shall not be so liable - (a) in
B respect of any injury which does not result in the total or
partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding
three days;
(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or
c permanent total disablement, caused by an accident which
is directly attributable to - (i) the workman having been at
the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or
(ii) the willful disobedience of the workman to an order
expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the
D purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or
(iii) the willful removal or disregard by the workman of any
safety guard or other device which he knew to have been
provided for the purpose of securing the safety of •
E
workmen." t
9. Under Section 3(1) it has to be established that there
'
was some casual connection between the death of the workman
and his employment. If the workman dies a natural death ~
·..:.,
becau~e of the disease which he was suffering or while suffering
F from a particular disease he dies of that disease as a result of
wear and tear of the employment, no liability would be fixed upon
the employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or
has accelerated the death, or if the death was due not only to
the disease but also the disease coupled with the employment,
G then it can be said that the death arose out of the employment
and the employer would be liable.
10. The expression "accident" means an untoward mishap
which is not expected or designed. "Injury" means physiological
injury. In Fenton v. Thorley & Co. Ltd. (1903) AC 448, it was
H observed that the expression "accident" is used in the popular
MALLIKARJUNA G. HIREMATH V. BRANCH MANAGER, 327
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.& ANR. [DR. ARIJlT PASAYAT J.]

and ordinary sen~e of the word as denoting an unlooked for A
mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed.
The above view of Lord Macnaghten was qualified by the
speech of Lord Haldane A.C. in Trim Joint District. School Board
of Management v. Kelly (1914) A.C. 676 as follows:
"I think that the context shows that in using the word 8
"designed" Lord Macnaghten was referring to designed
by the sufferer".
11. The above position was highlighted by this Court in·
Jyothi Ademma v. Plant Engineer. Nellore and Anr. (2006 (5) c
sec 513).
12. This Court in ESI Corpn. v. Francis De Costa (1996
(6) SCC 1) referred to, with approval, the decision of Lord Wright
in Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig (1940 AC 190)
wherein it was held: (All ER p. 563) D
"Nothing could be simpler than the words 'arising out
of and in the course of the employment'. It is clear
that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What
arises 'in the course' of the employment is to be
distinguished from what arises 'out of the E
• employment'. The former words relate to time
conditioned by reference to the man's service, the
latter to causality. Not every accident which occurs to
a man during the time when he is on his
employment-that is, directly or indirectly engaged F
on what he is employed to do-gives a claim to
compensation, unless it also arises out of the
employment. Hence the section imports a distinction
whiGh it does not define. The language is simple and
unqualified." G
-•
.

13. We are not oblivious that an accident may cause an
internal injury as was held in Fenton (Pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co.
Ltd. (1903 AC 443) by the Court of Appeal:
"I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the H
328 ,• SUPREME COl'.JRT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.
)

""·
A expression 'accident' is used in the popular and
ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-
for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected
or designed."
Lord Lindley opined:
B
"The word 'accident' is not a technical legal term with
a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but
with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means
any unintended and unexpected occurrence which
'c produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote
any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart
Ii
from its cause; and if the cause is not known the loss f-
or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident.
The word 'accident' is also often used to denote both
the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to
D
discriminate between them. The great majority of
what are called accidents are occasioned by
carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often
important to distin-guish careless from other
unintended and unexpected events."
E
14. There are a large number of English and American
decisions, some of which have been taken note of in ESI
Corpn. 's case (supra) in regard to essential ingredients for such
finding and the tests attracting the provisions of Section 3 of the
F Act. The princi_ples are:
(1) There must be a causal connect.ion between the injury
and the accident and the accident and the work done in
the course of employment.
(2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the
G
work and the resulting strain which contributed to or
aggravated the injury.
(3) If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater
probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work
H contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would
MALLIKARJUNA G. HIREMATH V. BRANCH MANAGER, 329
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.&ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.]

be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same A
would depend upon the fact of each case.
15. An accident may lead to death but that an accident
had taken place must be proved. Only because a death has
taken place in course of employment will not amount to accident.
In other words, death must arise out of accident. There is no B
presumption that an accident had occurred.
16. In a case of this nature to prove that accident has taken
place, factors which would have to be established, inter alia,
are: c

'
\,
( 1) stress and strain arising during the course of
employment,
(2) nature of employment,
D
... ~
(3) injury aggravated due to stress and strain.
17. In G.M., B.E.S.T. Undertaking v. Agnes (1964 (3) SCR
930) referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jenkins
v. Elder Dempster Lines Ltd. (1953 (2) All ER 1133) this Court
opined therein that a wider test, namely, tha! there should be a
E

• .. ,..>
nexus between accident and employment was laid down. It also
followed the decision of this Court in Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Co.
v. Bai Valu Raja (AIR 1958 SC 881)
18. In Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. (P} Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohd.
lssak (1969 (2) SCC 607), this Court held: F
"5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must
arise both out of and in the course of employment.
The words 'in the course of the employment' mean
'in the course of the work which the workman is
employed to do and which is incidental to it'. The G
words 'arising out of employment' are understood to
mean that 'during the course of the employment, injury
has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties
of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty
owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A workman would not otherwise have suffered'. In other
words there must be a causal relationship between
the accident and the employment. The expression
'arising out of employmenf is again not confined to
the mere nature of the ·employment. The expression
B applies to employment as such-to its nature, its
conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by
reason of any of those faders the workman is brought
. within tt:ie zone of special danger the injury would be
one. ~hich arises 'out of employment'. To put it
c differently if the accident had occurred on account of
a risk which is an incident of the employment, the
claim for compensation must succeed, unless of
course the workman has exposed himself to an
added peril by his own imprudent act."
D 19. The above position was again highlighted in
Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali
and Anr. (2007 (11) sec 668). ·
20. It is the specific case of the claimants that on
30.J 1.2000 the .deceased vyho was driving the vehicle on the
E - direction of the i·nsured had gone to Gurugunta from Siraguppa.
There he had gone to a temple and was sitting on the steps of
the pond in the temple and he slipped and fell into.the water and
died due to drowning. This according to us is not sufficient in
view of the legal principles delineated above to fasten liability
F on either the insurer or the insured. The High Court was not
justified in holding that the present appellant was liable to pay
compensation. - -
21. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
. ' ,
. I

G

D.G. Appeal allowed.

H