Holding

Ticca Mazdoors are not regular workmen; the burden of proving 240 days of service rests on the workmen; the Tribunal erred in shifting the burden, drawing adverse inference, and ordering reinstatement, so its award is set aside.

Summary

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) terminated a group of temporary workers known as "Ticca Mazdoors" who had been employed between 1980 and 1982 after alleging they produced forged certificates; they were later acquitted in criminal trials. In 1987‑88 they sought re‑employment, were refused, and raised an industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal held they had completed 240 days of service, that the RBI had violated Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and ordered their reinstatement with back wages. The Karnataka High Court upheld the award. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that Ticca Mazdoors are not regular workmen, that the initial burden of proving 240 days of continuous service rests on the workmen, that the Tribunal wrongly shifted this burden to the employer, erred in drawing adverse inference from non‑production of attendance registers, and that an acquittal in criminal court does not bind the employer. Consequently, the Tribunal’s award was set aside and no reinstatement or back wages were ordered.

Issues considered

The legal status of Ticca Mazdoors under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the burden of proving 240 days of continuous service under Section 25B lies on the workmen or the employer.
The propriety of drawing an adverse inference from the employer's failure to produce attendance registers.
The effect of a criminal acquittal on the employer's obligation to reinstate the workmen.
Whether the Tribunal was justified in ordering reinstatement and back wages despite the respondents' temporary status and the settlement terms.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25B, s. 25F

Subjects

Industrial Disputes ActSection 25FTicca Mazdoortemporary workersburden of proofreinstatementback wagescriminal acquittaljudicial review

Judgment

MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE A
v.
S. MANI AND ORS.

MARCH 14, 2005

{N. SANTOSH HEGDE, B.P. SINGH AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

Labour Laws :

Industrial Disputes Act, I947

Sections 25F and 25B-Reinstatement-Respondent-workmen appointed
c
as "Ticca Mazdoors" (non-regular Mazdoors) in Reserve Bank of India(RBI)
not absorbed in regular service for alleged misconduct-Request for re-
employment not granted-Industrial dispute-Tribunal directed re-instatement
with full back wages on grounds that they had completed 240 days of service
and their terminations were brought about without compliance of S.25F-On D
facts, held : The findings of Tribunal are wholly perverse-It wrongly placed
the burden of proof on Appellant-employer for considering if Respondents
completed 240 days ofservice or not-It also erred in drawing adverse inference
against the Appellant for non-production ofattendance registers alone though
sufficient explanation therefor was given-Hence, case for judicial review E
made out-Direction for re-instatement for non-compliance with S.25F would
only restore to the workmen the same status as before termination-Respondents
would continue to be "Ticca Mazdoors" and cannot have any right to get
work-Moreover, direction of continuity of services per se would not br~"lg
them within purview of the settlement arrived at between RBI and the workers
federation for absorption of "Ticca Mazdoors "-Constitution ofIndia, I950- F
Article I 36.

Section 25B-Continuous service of240 days during period of 12 months
preceding the order of termination-Burden ofproof-Held: Initial burden is
on the workmen--Tribunal wrongly placed the burden ofproof on the employer
on the premise that it failed to prove its plea of abandonment of service by G
the workmen.

Misconduct-Effect of judgment of acquittal of accused-workmen in
criminal proceedings vis-a-vis the alleged misconduct-Held : The acquittal
797 H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A passed in favour of the workman by giving benefit of doubt per se would not
be binding upon the employer.

Respondents, appointed as Ticca Mazdoors in Appellant-bank
between March, 1980 and August, 1982, were not regularized in service
as regular Mazdoors for the alleged misconduct of producing forged and
B fabricated certificates at the time of interview. Criminal prosecutions
were launched against them for furnishing false certificates but they
stood acquitted. Subsequently, between 1987 and 1988, the Respondents
submitted fresh certificates and requested Appellant to re-employ them.
As the request was not accepted, an industrial dispute was raised. The
C Industrial Tribunal held that Respondents having completed 240 days of
service, and their terminations having been brought about without
complying wi~h the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, they were entitled to be reinstated·with full back wages. Writ
petitions against the order were dismissed by Single Judge of High Court.
Division Bench of the High Court modified the award of the Tribunal as
D also the Single Judge holding that the back wages be paid only from 23-
7-1993 and not from the date of retrenchment, but gave liberty to
Appellant to hold domestic enquiry against Respondents for the alleged
misconduct.

In appeal to this Court the Appellants contended that as the
E Respondents did not report for duty between December, 1982 and March,
1987, they must be held to have abandoned their services; that the
Tribunal erred in failing to consider the fact that the Respondents failed
to prove that they had completed 240 days of service during a period of
12 months preceding the order of termination, hence, the question of
F compliance of Section 25F of the Act did not arise at all and that in any
event, only because the Respondents allegedly completed 240 days of
work, the same by itself would not confer any right on them to be
regularized in service; that no adverse inference could have been drawn
against the Appellant for non-production of attendance register as
sufficient explanation therefor had been furnished; that the burden of
G proof in that behalf lay upon the Respondents .and that the action taken
by the Appellant was not wholly arbitrary so as to justify a direction for
reinstatement of the Respondents in service only on the ground that they
stood acquitted in the criminal cases.

Allowing the appeals, the Court
H
MANAGER, R.B.l., BANGALORE v. S. MANI 799

HELD : 1. Ticca Mazdoors are not regarded as regular Mazdoors. A
Their status is not higher than that of a temporary workman or a
probationer. The service of Ticca Mazdoors being not permanent in nature
can be dispensed with subject to compliance of the statutory or contractual
requirements, if any. [807-DI

Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. S.G. Kotturapp B
and Anr., [200513 SCC 409, relied on.

2.1. It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the
employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not he binding upon
th6 employer. The employer had no occasion to initiate departmental C
proceeding against the Respondents, who were not regularly employed.
[808-CJ .

Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, [19971 4 SCC 385);
Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Anr.,
[2004) 8 SCC 200 and Cho/an Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasa- D
mbandam, [2004110 SCALE 578, relied on.
2.2. From a perusal of a judgment passed in the criminal cases it
would appear that the contention raised herein by the Respondents that
they had never produced any transfer certificate at the time of interview
was not raised. If the contention of the Appellant as regard production of E
transfer certificates by the Respondents at the time of their interview
finds acceptance, then concededly the said certificates vis-a-vis the
certificates produced by the Respondents in the year 1987 are different
in several respects, including the name of the father and name of the
school, date of birth, etc. It is true that the certificates produced by them
in 1987 were found to be genuine but the same by itself would not lead to F
a conclusion, that the Respondents themselves did not produce the said·
certificates before the interview board or the same were manufactured
by the officers of the Reserve Bank of India. (807-G-H; 808-A-BJ
3.1. The initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show that
they ha<! completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal did not consider G
the question from that angle. It held that the burden of proof was upon
the Appellant on the premise that they have failed to prove their plea of
abandonment of service. [813-C)
3.2. Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman took an
oath to state that they had worked for 240 days. No document in support H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A of the said plea was prnduced. 1t is, therefore not correct to contend that
the plea raised by the Respondents herein that they have worked
continuously for 240 days was deemed to have been admitted by applying
the doctrine of non-traverse. In any event the con~ention of the
Respondents having been denied and disputed, it was obligatory on the
B part of the Respondents to add new evidence. The contents raised in the
letters of the Union dated 30th May, 1988 and 11th April, 1990 containing
statements to the effect that the workmen had been working continuously
for 240 days might not have been replied to, but the same is of no effect
as by reason thereof, the allegations made therein cannot be said to have
been proved particularly in view of the fact that the contents thereof
C were not proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-response to such
letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The Evidence Act
does not say so. The Appellant, theref~re, cannot be said to have admitted
that the Respondents had worked for more than 240 days. (811-B-E)

Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimani, [200213 SCC 25; Essen Deinki
D v. Rajiv Kumar, [2002) 8 SCC 400; Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v.
Siri Niwas, (2004) 8 SCC 195 and M.P. Electricity Boardv. Hariram, [2004)
8 sec 246, relied on.

3.3. MW3, the witness examined on behalf of the Appellant to prove
E production of the certificates by the Respondents had verified transfer -...,..,

certificates filed subsequently by the Respondents and the same were
found to be all genuine. He did not make any admission as regard the
continuous working of the Respondents for a period of more than 240
days nor is there even a suggestion to that effect on behalf of the
Respondents. (816-H; 817-A]
F
3.4. Appellant raised a specific plea denying or disputing the claim
of the Respondents that they had completed 24·0 days of work. Such a
plea having been raised both before the Industrial Tribunal as also before
the High Court, it cannot be accepted that the Appellant had abandoned
such a plea. (822-G I
G
3.5. The circumstances relied upon by the Tribunal are wholly
irrelevant for the purpose of considering P.S to whether the Respondents
have completed 240 days of service or not. A party to the lis may or may
not succeed in its defence. Only because the Appellant failed to prove the
plea of abandonment of service by the Respondents, the same in law
H cannot be taken to be a circumstance that the Respondents have proved
MANAGER, R.8.1., BANGALORE v. S. MANI 801
their case. Further, a party to the lis may be filing representations or A
raising demands, but filing of such representations or raising of demands
cannot be treated as circumstances to prove their case. (816-E-FJ

4. An adverse inference was drawn by the Tribunal for non-
production of the attendance register alone, and not for non-production ·
of the wage slips. Reference to 'other relevant documents' must be held B
to be vague as the Appellant had not been called upon to produce any
other document for the said purpose. Apparently the Triuunal considered
the matter solely from the angle that the Appellant has failed to prove its
plea of abandonment of service by the Respondents. In fact respondents
did not adduce any evidence whatsoever. Hence, in the facts and C
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in drawing an adverse
inference. (812-B-C; 813-B]

Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas., (2004) 8 SCC 195
and MP. Electricity Board v. Hariram, (2004] 8 SCC 246, relied on.
D
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1, referred to.

HD. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors., (1985) 4· SCC 201,
distinguished.

5. The findings of the Tribunal are wholly perverse. It apparently E
posed unto itself wrong questions. It placed onus of proof wrongly upon
the Appellant. Its decision is based upon irrelevant factors not germane
for the purpose of arriving at a correct finding of fact. It has also failed
to take into consideration the relevant factors. A case for judicial review,
thus, was made out. (817-C]
F
Cho/an Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, (2004) 10
SCALE 578, relied on.

6. Neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench adverted to the
question put in issue by the Appellant in its writ petition. The Division
Bench unfortunately in its judgment did not take into considerati.on the G
relevant questions and proceeded on a pre-supposition that the Bank
intended to re-instate the workmen. (818-B, E]

Chief General Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. General Secretary,
Reserve Bank Workers Organisation, (2001) 2 LLJ 487, referred to.
H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A 7.1. One of the terms of the settlement arrived at by and between
the Reserve Bank of India and the Reserve Bank Workers Federation
relates to regular full time or part time Ticcas, whether in regular full
time or part time employment, who have rendered continuous service of
three years or more as on 19th November, 1992 were entitled to be
B considered for absorption in the additional posts .that were required to be
created by reason of such settlement. Such settlement had been arrived
having regard to the fact that the same Ticca Mazdoors had been working
for a long time. (820-C]

7.2. Absorption of the Ticca Mazdoors in the services of the
C Appellant was not automatic. The concerned workmen were required to
fulfill the conditions laid down therefor. (820-DJ

MG. Datania and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr., [2004] IO
sec 459, referred to.
D 8. In law, 240 days of continuous service by itself does not give rise
to claim of permanence. A direction for reinstatement for non-compliance
of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act would·
restore to the workmen the same status which he held when terminated.
The Respondents would, thus, continue to be Ticca Mazdoors. They had
worked only from April, 1980 to December, 1982. They did not have any
E right to get work.. The direction of continuity of service per se would not
bring them within the purview of terms of settlement. [820-E; 821-C-D]

· Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers' Marketing FederatiOn
Ltd. and Anr. v. Employees' Union and Anr., [1994] Supp. 3 SCC 385;
Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. and Anr. v. Digambara Rao and Ors.,
F [2004] 8 SCC 262 and Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, UP. v. Anil Kumar
Mishra and Ors. etc., AIR (1994) SC 1638, relied on.

Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. S.G. Kotturapp
and Anr., [2005) 3 SCC 409; The State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara
G Money., [1976] 1SCC822; Managementof M/s .. Willcox Buckwell India Ltd
v. Jagannath and Ors., (1974] 4 SCC 850; L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive
Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr., [1982] 1 SCC 645;.Samishta Dube v.
City Board, Etawah and Anr., [1999) Lab. I.C. 1125 and Moolchand Kharati
Ram Hospital K. Union v. Labour Commissioner and Ors., (2000) 2 LLJ
1411, referred to.
H
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI 803
L
9. This Court has not laid down any principle having .universal A
application so that the Tribunals, or for that matter the High Court, or
this Court, may feel compelled to direct reinstatement with continuity o(
service and backwages. The Tribunal has some discretion in this matter.
Grant of relief must depend on the fact situation obtaining in a particular
case. The industrial adjudicator cannot be held to be bound to grant B
some relief only because it will be lawful to do so. [822-B-D]

Haryana State Coop. Land Dev. Bank v. Nee/am, JT (2005) 2 SC 60·0,
relied on.

10. The further contention raised by the Respondents that the order
passed by the Division Bench was a consent order is unacceptable. The C
Division Bench does not say so. Such a contention has been raised only
on the basis of a statement made by the Respondents in the counter-
affidavit wherein the reference had been made to one order of the Division
Bench asking the parties to make endeavour for settlement. No settlement
admittedly had been arrived at. A party to the lis, in absence of a statutory D
interdict, cannot be deprived of his right of appeal. The High Court has
passed the judgment upon consideration of the rival contentions raised at
the Bar. It arrived at specific findings on t:ie issues framed by it. It has,
for the reasons stated in its judgment, affirmed the findings of the
Industrial Tribunal as also the Single Judge. The impugned order of the
Division Bench, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to have been E
passed with consent of the parties. However, the opinion of the Tribunal
that the plea of abandonment of service by the Respondents in the facts
and circumstances of the case was wholly misconceived, is accepted.
(823-B-E]

CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6306-
F'
6316 of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.2002 of the Kamataka High
Court in W.A. No. 3700/99 and W.A. Nos. 5301-5310 of 1999.

Mahendra Am1nd, H.S. Parihar, Kuldeep Parihar and D.K. Sharma for G
the Appellant.

N.G. Phadke and S.N. Bhat for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.
-1:._
A S.B. SINHA, J. The Respondents herein were Ticca Mazdoors working
under the Appellant herein. Ticca Mazdoors are intermittently appointed by I~
the Reserve Bank of India whenever absence· of regular Class IV employees I
takes place. They are not engaged everyday or continuously. Their engagement I
depends upon the need of the Appellant. They are never regarded as regular J
B Mazdoors. Two waiting lists are maintained by the Appellant. The first waiting
list contains the names of such of them who may be appointed as regular
Mazdoors whereas the second list is maintained for those who are to be
engaged as Ticca Mazdoors. The name of the respondents figured in the
second list. They were appointed in the said category as Ticca Mazdoor
between the period 14th March, 1980 and 8th August, 1982 for the purpose
C of their appointment as regular Mazdoors. The Respondents herein, except
Respondent No. 6, were interviewed on different dates between January,
1982 and May, 1982. Allegedly, during interview, they produced transfer
certificates but their answers to the questions posed in this behalf were not
in conformity therewith, whereupon a verification was made and it was found
that the said certificates were forged and fabricated. Three first information ,.
D reports were lodged by the officers of the Appellant herein for furnishing
false certifications by the Respondents. In the criminal case, however, they
were acquitted by three different judgements passed on 20th April, 1987, 5th
August, 1987 and 24th September, 1987. Between October, 1987 and August,
1988, the Respondents submitted fresh school transfer certificates and
E requested the Appellant herein to reemploy them. As their request for
reemployment was not accepted, an industrial dispute was raised resulting in
a reference made by the Central Government for adjudication thereof to the
Central Government Industrial Tribunal,. Bangalore. The Industrial Tribunal
by an award dated 18.12.1997 held that the Respondents having completed
240 days of service; and their terminations having been brought about without
F complying. with the provisions of Section 25F ·of the Industrial Disputes Act,
and, thus, being illegal they were entitled to be reinstated in the Bank's
services as per the prevailing rules and conditions of the service with full
back wages.

G The Appellant herein filed a Special Leave Petition against the said
award which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to it to approach the
High Court. The Appellant filed writ petitions before the Karnataka High
Court. By an order dated 30th November, 1998, the writ petitions were
dismissed by the learned Single Judge whereagainst writ appeals were filed
by the Appellant which were marked as WA No. 3700 of 1999 and 5301 to
H 5310 of 1999. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 25th June, 2002,
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.) 805

the Division Bench allowed the said appeal in part modifying the award of A
the Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge to the effect that the back wages
be paid from 23rd July, 1993 instead of their respective dates of retrenchment.
The Division Bench, however, gave liberty to the Appellant to hold domestic
enquiry against the Respondents for the alleged misconduct committed by
them. The Division Bench in issuing the aforesaid direction inter a/ia held B
that as the Respondents were not regularized in services for the alleged
misconduct of producing false certificates, the same would amount to stigma
and loss of confidence of the Appellant in them.

Mr. Mahendra Anand, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant would contend that as the Respondents herein did not report C
for duty between December, 1982 and March, 1987, they must be held to
have abandoned their services.

The learned counsel would contend that the learned Tribunal committed
a serious error of law insofar as it failed to take into consideration the fact
that the Respondents were not able to prove that they had completed 240 D
days of service during a period of 12 months preceding the order of termination
and in that view of the matter the question of compliance of Section 25F of
the Industrial Disputes Act did not arise at all. Our attention was also drawn
i to the fact that during pendency of aforementioned industrial adjudication the
_I
management and the Union had arrived at a settlement pursuant whereto or
in furtherance whereof all posts had been filled up. In any event, it was E
urged, only because the Respondents have allegedly completed 240 days of
work, the same by itself would not confer any right on them to be regularized
in service. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Maharashtra State
Cooperative Cotton Growers' Marketing Federation Ltd. and Anr. v.
Employees' Union and Anr., [1994] Supp. 3 SCC 385. p
The learned counsel would submit that no adverse inference could have
been drawn for non-production of attendance register as sufficient explanation
therefor had been furnished. Reliance in this connection has been placed on
Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, [2004] 8 SCC 195.
G
It was further urged that the burden of proof in that behaff lay upon the
Respondents and in support thereof reliance has been placed on MP. Electricity
Board v. Hariram, [2004] 8 SCC 246.

The Tribunal, according to Mr. Anand, misdirected itself in passing the
impugned award insofar as it considered irrelevant factors and failed to take H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A into consideration the relevant facts. The learned counsel has further placed
before us some school transfer certificates produced by some of the
Respondents in December, 1982 and March, 1987 with a view to show· that
the action taken by the Appellant herein was not wholly arbitrary so as to
justify a direction for reinstatement of the Respondents in service only on the
B ground that they stood acquitted in the criminal cases. The judgments of the
criminal court having been rendered by giving benefit of doubt to the
Respondents herein, the learned counsel would submit, the same itself could
not have been a ground for grant of relief. Reliance in this connection has
been placed on Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, [1997] 4 SCC
385. ''
c Mr. N.G. Phadke, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents, on the other hand, supported the award of the Tribunal and
consequently the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the _Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court contending that

D (i) the Respondents' contentions that they continued in service, ,from
March 1980 to August 1982 as disclosed in their pleadings and representations,
having not been denied, the same must be held to have been admitted.

(ii) as the Appellant herein could not prove its case that the Respondents
had abandoned their services, the Tribunal rightly placed the onus of proof
E on it;

(iii) as despite an order made in this behalf the- Appellant did not ·
produce attendance registers, the impugned award could have been passed
upon drawing an adverse inference. Reli~nce in this behalf has been placed
on HD. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors., [1985) 4 SCC 201.
F
(iv) in any event, the Appellant never raised a contention that the
Respondents had not worked for more than 240 days during 'preceding 12
months.

(v) the order of the Division Berich being a consent order, no appeal
G lies thereagainst.
(vi) although by reason of the Respondents' being reinstated in service,
they would continue to have the status of Ticca Mazdoors, but having regard .
to the intervening circumstances, viz., the settlement arrived at by and between
H the Appellant and the Union, they would be entitled to be regularized in
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.] 807

services in tenns of the decision of this Court in Chief General Manager, A
Reserve Bank of India v. General Secretary, Reserve Bank Work~rs
Organisation, [2001] 2 LLJ 487; and

(vii) section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act being mand<}tory in
nature, the provisions thereof are required to be complied with even when the
workmen were employed as Badli Workers or Ticca Mazdoors as daily wag~r. B
Reliance in this behalf has been placed on The State Bank of India v. Shri
N. Sundara Money, [1976] l SCC 822, H.D. Singh (supra), Management 'of
Mis. Willcox Buckwell India Ltd v. Jagannath and Ors., [1974] 4 SCC 850,
L. Robert D 'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr., [1982]
1 SCC 645, Samishta Dube v. City Board, Etawah and Anr., (1999) Lab. I.C. C
- 1125 and Moolchand Kharati Ram Hospital K. Union v. Labour Commissioner
and Ors., (2000) 2 LLJ 1411.

STA TUS OF TICCA MAZDOORS :

As noticed hereinbefore, Ticca Mazdoors are not regarded as regular D
Mazdoors. Two waiting lists are maintained by the appellant. The first waiting
list contains the names of such Mazdoors who may be appointed as regular
Mazdoors whereas the second list is maintained for those who are to be
engaged as Ticca Mazdoors.

The service of Ticca Mazdoors being not permanent in nature can be E
dispensed with subject to compliance of the statutory or contractual
requirements, if any. Their statu~ is not higher than that of a temporary
workman or a probationer. (See Civil Appeal No. 4868 of 1999, Karnataka
State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. S.G. Kotturapp and Anr.,
disposed of on 3rd March, 2005)
F
:. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL :

The Appellant's contention as regard holding of interview of the
Respondents herein in December, 1982 and March, 1987 is not denied or
disputed. It is also further not in dispute that their educational qualifications
and other details were required to be verified. Institution of three criminal G
cases stands admitted. Before us a judgment passed in the criminal cases has
been produced, from· a perusal whereof it would appear that the contention
raised by the Respondents herein that they had never produced any transfer
• certificate at the time of interview was not raised. If the contention of the
Appellant as regard production of transfer certificates by the Respondents at H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R..

A the time of their interview finds acceptance, then concededly the said ·
certificates vis-a-vis the certificates produced by the Respondents in the year
1987 are different in several respects, including the name of the father and
name of the school, date of birth, etc. It is true that the certificates produced
by them in 1987 were found to be genuine but the same by itself would not
lead to a conclusion, as suggested by .Mr. Phadke, that the Respondents
B themselves did not produce the said certificates before the interview board or
the same were manufactured by the officers of the Reserve Bank of India.

It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the employees
by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer.
C The employer had no occasion to initiate departmental proceeding against the
Respondents. They were not regularly employed. They, according to the
Appellant, filed forged and fabricated documents and as such were not found
fit to be absorbed in regular service. The effect of a judgment of acquittal vis-
a-vis the alleged misconduct on the part of the workmen fell for consideration ~
I
before this Court in Bihari Lal Sidhana (supra) wherein it was held :
D
"5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court
but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated
into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to
take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken
into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central
E Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules or under the
Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the responde':lt had been
working as a temporary government servant before he was kept under
suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by
then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as
being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that
F
does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee
does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement.
As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent
authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is
required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action
G should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent
is only a temporary government servant, the power being available
under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent
authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the
employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service
a government servant accused of defalcation of public money.
H
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.) 809

Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity A
in misappropriation of public money."

Recently in Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhi/ Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
Sangh and Anr., [2004] 8 SCC 200, one of us, Santosh Hegde, J., speaking
for a 3-Judge Bench observed :
B
"25. The next contention addressed on behalf of the respondents is
that the Labour Court ought not to have brushed aside the finding of
the criminal court which according to the learned Single Judge
"honourably" acquitted the accused workmen of the offence before
it. We have been taken through the said judgment of the criminal

- court and we must record that there was such "honourable" acquittal
by the criminal court. The acquittal by the criminal court was based
on the fact that the prosecution did not produce sufficient material to
C

establish its charge which is clear from the following observations
found in the judgment of the criminal court :

"Absolutely in the evidence on record of the prosecution witnesses I D
have found nothing against the accused persons. The prosecution
totally fails to prove the charges under Sections 147, 353, 329 IPC."

26. Learned counsel for the respondents in regard to the above
contention relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Capt. M.
Paul Anthony. In our opinion, even that case would not support the E
respondents herein because in the said case the evidence led in the
criminal case as well as in the domestic enquiry was one and the .
same and the criminal case having acquitted the workmen on the very
same evidence, this Court came to the conclusion that the finding to
the contrary on the very same evidence by the domestic enquiry ' F
would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive. It is to be noted that
in that case the finding by the Tribunal was arrived at in an ex parte
departmental proceeding. In the case in hand, we have noticed that
before the Labour Court the evidence led by the management was
different from that led by the prosecution in the criminal case and the,
materials before the criminal court and the Labour Court were entirely G
different. Therefore, it was open to the Labour Court to have come
to an independent conclusion dehors the finding of the criminal
court..."

It was observed :
H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) 2 S.C.R.

A "From the above, it is seen that the approach and the objectives of the .
criminal proceedings and the disciplinary procee.dings are altogether
distinct and different. The observations therein indicate that the Labour ·
Court is not bound by the findings of the criminal court.''

In Cho/an Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, (2004) 10
B SCALE 578, this Court held :

"19. It is further trite that the standard of proof required in a domestic
enquiry vis-a-vis a criminal trial is absolutely different. Whereas in
the former 'preponderance of probability'. would suffice; in the latter,
'proof beyond all reasonable doubt' is imperative."
c
The contention that the Respondents had not produced such certificates -
or the same have been fabricated at the instance of some officers of the
Reserve.Bank of India, therefore, does not find our acceptance. It is rejected
accordingly.

D SECTION 25F OF THE INDUSTIRAL DISPUTES ACT :
)

The provisions contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act
are required to be complied with if the workmen concerned had completed
240 days of service in a period of 12 months preceding the order of termination.
The Tribunal admittedly based its decision on the following :
E ~

(i) The Appellant did not produce the attendance register.

(ii) There was circumstantial evidence to show that the Respondents
herein had made several representations between March, 1987 and
April, 1990. --..
F
(iii) The witness examined on behalf of the "Appellant MW3 conceded
that the workmen had worked for 240 days. . ,

The workmen raised a contention of rendering a continuous service
between April, 1980 to December, 1982 in their pleadings and representations.
G Admittedly, the Appellant herein in their rejoinder denied and disputed the
said facts stating :

"(i) as regards pat"agraph l, it is denied that the I Party has worked
continuously from April, 1980 to December, 1982. The factual position
is that the I party was engaged off and on from August 80 to January
H 83 depending upon the availability of casual vacancies on various
MANAGER, R ..B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, .I.] 811

dates and the need for engaging ticcas." A
The concerned workmen in their evidence did not specifically state that
they had worked for 240 days. They merely contended in their affidavit that
"they are reiterating their stand in the claim petition.

Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman, thus, took an oath B
to state that they had worked for 240 days. No document in support of the
said plea was produced. It is, therefore not correct to contend that the plea
raised by the Respondents herein that they have worked continuously for 240
days was deemed to have been admitted by applying the doctrine of non-
traverse. It any event the contention of the Respondents having been denied
and disputed, it was obligatory on the part of the "Respondents to add new C
evidence. The contents raised in the letters of the Union dated 30th May,
1988 and J.l th April, 1990 containing statements to the effect that the workmen
had been working continuously for 240 days might not have been replied to,
but the same is of no effect as by reason thereof, the allegations made therein
cannot be said to have been proved particularly in view of the fact that the D
contents thereof were not proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-
response to such letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The
Evidence Act does not say so.

The Appellant, therefore, cannot be said to have admitted that the
"Respondents had worked for more than 240 days. E
NON-PRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENTS :

It is no doubt true that the industrial tribunal by an order dated 12th
May, 1993 inter alia directed the Appellant to produce register of workmen
for the period between April, 1980 and December, 1982 in respect of the first F .
party workmen and attendance register. The Tribunal, however, in its award
noticed the explanation of the Appellant that the attendance registers being
old and hence could not be produced holding : ·

"Of course, it is true that the 2nd party had given an explanation
namely those attendance registers are very old and hence could not G
be produced. But this explanation cannot be acceptable, because as I
pointed out earlier, apart from the attendance registers, there may be
other relevant records to show that the I st parties either worked
continuously as alleged by the I st parties or only during the leave
vacancy with break of service." H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) 2 S.C.R.

A The learned Tribunal further held :

"Therefore, the materials placed before this Tribunal lead to the only
conclusion that the 2nd party is not in a position to prove their case
namely the concerned 1st parties 1 to I I had abandoned themselves
without any proper reasons.''
B
An adverse inference, therefore, was drawn for non-production of the
attendance register alone, and not for non-production of the wage-slips.
Reference to 'other relevant documents' must be held to be vague as the
Appellant herein had not been called upon to produce any other document for

c
the said purpose.

It appears that the learned Tribunal considered the matter solely from
the angle that the Appellant has failed to prove its plea of abandonment of
-
service by the Respondents.

The question came up for consideration before this Court recently in
D Siri Niwas (supra) wherein it was held :
"15 ... A Court of Law even in a case where provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party
despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same,
it would have gone against his contentions. The matter, however,
E would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is
withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of
evidence is always optional and one of the factors which is required
to be taken into consideration in the background of facts involved in
the. tis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because
F notwithstanding the intentional non-production, other circumstances
may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found
to be justifiable on some reasonable grounds.''

Referring to the decision of this Court in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj
Narain, [I 975] Supp SCC I, this Court observed :
G
"19. Furthermore a party in order to get benefit of the provisions
contained in Section 114(t) of the Indian Evidence Act must place
some evidence in support of his case. Here the Respondent failed to
do so."

H In Hariram (supra), this Court observed :
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.] 813

"11. The above burden. having not been discharged and the Labour A
Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial Court and the
High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an
adverse inference drawn erroneously."

As noticed hereinbefore, in this case also the Respondents did not
B
-
adduce any evidence whatsoever. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal erred in drawing an adverse inference.

BURDEN OF PROOF :

The initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show that they had
completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal did not consider the question C
from that angle. It held that the burden of proof was upon the Appellant on
the premise that they have failed to prove their plea of abandonment of
service stating :

"It is admitted case of the parties that all the lst parties under the
references CR No. l/92 to l l/92 have been appointed by the 2nd D
party as ticca mazdoors. As per the l st parties, they had worked
continuously from April, 1980 to December, 1982. But the 2nd party
· had denied the above said claim of continuous service of the l st
parties on the ground that the lst parties has not been appointed as
regular workmen but they were working only as temporary part time E
workers as ticca mazdoor and their services were required whenever
necessary arose that too on the leave vacancies of regular employees.
But as strongly contended by the counsel for the lst party, since the
2nd party had denied the above said claim of continuous period of
service, it is for the 2nd party to prove through the records available
with them as the relevant records could be available only with the F
2nd party."

The Tribunal, therefore, accepted that the Appellant had denied the
Respondents' claim as regard their continuous service.

In Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimani, [2002] 3 sec 25, it was G
stated :

"3 .. .In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on
the management without first determining on the basis of cogent
evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in
the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It
was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of
an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot
be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal tp come
to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days
B in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages'for 240 days or order
or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced
by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set
--
aside.

[See also Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, [2002] 8 SCC 400]
c
In Siri Niwas (supra), this Court held :

"The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act per se are not applicable
in an industrial adjudication. The general principles of it are, however
applicable. It is also imperative for the Industrial Tribunal to set: that
D the principles of natural justice are complied with. The burden of
proof was on the respondent herein to show that he had worked·for
240 days in preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment.
In terms of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an
order retrenching a workman would not be effective unless the
E conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. Section 25-F postulates
the following conditions to be fulfilled by employer for effecting a
valid retrenchment :

(i) one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment or wages in lieu thereof;
F
(ii) payment of compensation equivalent to fifteen days,
average pay for every completed year of continuous
service or any part thereof in excess of six months."

It was further observed :
G "14... As noticed hereinbefore, the burden of ·proof was on the
workman. From the Award it does not appear that the workman
adduced any evidence whatsoever in support of his contention that he
complied with· the requirements of Section 25B of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Apart from examining himself in support of his
H contention he did not produce or call for any document from the
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.] 815

office of the Appellant herein including the muster rolls. It is A
improbable that a person working in a Local Authority would not be
in possession of any documentary evidence to support his claim before
the Tribunal. Apart from muster rolls he could have shown the terms
and conditio:is of his offer of appointment and the remuneration
received by him for working during the aforementioned period. He
even did not examine any other witness in support of his case." B
Yet again in Hariram (supra), it was opined :

"I 0 ... We cannot but bear in mind the fact that the initial burden of
establishing the factu·m of their continuous work for 240 days in a
year rests with the respondent applicants. C
Mr. Phadke placed strong reliance on H.D. Singh (supra) to contend
that adverse inference was drawn therein for non-production of certain
documents. H.D. Singh (supra) was rendered on its own fact. In that ca$e, a
Special Leave Petition was entertained by this Court directly from the Award
passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Before this Court, both the parties filed D
affidavits and several documents. The workmen therein categorically disclosed
the number of days they had worked in each year. In that case the name of
the workman was struck off as he had allegedly concealed his educational
qualification; purportedly on the basis of a confidential circular issued by the
bank on June 27, 1976 to the effect that the matriculates will not be retained E
in the list. As the workman therein in reply to the letter of the Bank stated
that he was not a matriculate in 1974 and he passed the examination only in
1975, he was not given any work even after July, 1976 without issuing any
written notice terminating his services. Holding that the workman had been
retrenched from service, as noticed hereinbefore, affidavits of the l'arties
were filed and, thus, some evidence had been adduced. The number of actual F
days worked by the workman therein was also brought on records by the
Respondent. The said decision, thus, having been rendered in the fact situation
obtaining therein does not constitute a binding precedent.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.:
G
The Tribunal also relied upon some purported circumstantial evidence
to hold that the workmen had completed 240 days of work in the following
terms :

"That apart, the circumstantial evidence also would show that the H
816

--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 2 S.C.R.

A plea of the abandonment had been taken by the 2nd party only for the
sake of defence in this case and it is not a real one. In order to explain
the same when we perused the admitted documents Exs. Ml to M7
together with the admitted evidence of MW3 at para 5 of his
deposition, we would see that from 3.3.87 till 11.4.90 either almost
all the 1st parties before this Tribunal had continuously requested the
B management for their reinstatement alleging that they served in the
2nd party Bank continuously from April, 1980 to December, 1982.
They also pleaded the same in their respective claim petitions before
us. But the management as per Exs. M8 dated 8.5.1991 had not
denied the alleged claim of continuous service of the 1st parties at
c their earliest opportunity. But, on the other hand, Ex.MS would show
that for absorption of the 1st parties the 2nd party had put some other
conditions and demanded the 1st parties workmen for their signature
if they agreed for those conditions. If that be the case, it could be
seen that, at the earliest point of time, the 2nd party Bank had not
denied the said claim of continue service made by 1st parties. Hence,
D the documents Exs. Ml to M8 would also disqualify the 2nd party
from claiming said plea namely since because the l st parties had
worked temporarily that too only on leave vacancy they are not entitled
for any benefits under the provisions of the l.D. Act:"

It is difficult to accept the logic behind the said findings.
E
Only because the Appellant failed to prove their plea of abandonment
of service by the Respondents, the same in law cannot be taken to be a
circumstance that the Respondents have proved their case.

F The circumstances relied upon, in our opinion, are wholly irrelevant for
the purpose of considering as to whether the Respondents have completed
240 days of service or not. A party to the lis may or may not succeed in its
defence. A party to the lis may be filing representations or raising demands,
but filing of such representations or raising of demands cannot be treated as
circumstances to prove their case.
G
ADMISSION BY MW3

We have been taken through the deposition of Shri S. Nagarajan, MW3.
He was examined as a witness to prove production of the certificates by the
Respondents. He had verified transfer certificates filed subsequently by the
H Respondents and the same were found to be all genuine. He did not make any
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.] 817
admission as regard the continuous working of the Respondents for a period A
of more than 240 days nor is there even a suggestion to that effect on behalf
of the Respondents herein.

The Tribunal's findings are, thus, based on no evidence and must be
held to be irrational.
B
JUDICIAL REVIEW :

The findings of the learned Tribunal, as noticed herein before, are wholly
perverse. He apparently posed unto itself wrong questions. He placed onus
of proof wrongly upon the Appellant. His decision is based upon irrelevan~
factors not gennane for the purpose of arriving at a correct finding of fact. C
It has also failed to take into consideration the relevant factors. A case for
judicial review, thus, was made out.

In Cho/an Roadways Limited (supra), this Court held :

"34 ... In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal as D
also the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court misdirected themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose
unto themselves correct questions. It is now well-settled that a quasi-
judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to
arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to E
a wrong answer. In this case, further more, the misdirection in law
committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did
not apply the principle of Res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for
the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a
relevant factor and furthennore took into consideration an irrelevant
fact not gannane for detennining the issue, namely, the passengers of F
the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial
Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation
to a domestic enquiry, which in "preponderance of probability" and
applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for
judicial review was, thus, clearly made out."
G
The Appellant in para 13.14 of the writ petition contended :

"13.14 For that the Industrial Tribunal erred in holding that all the
Ticca Mazdoors are workmen as they have completed 240 days of
continuous service during the year 1980-1982, merely because the
H
·.
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 2 S.C.R.

A Petitioner could not produce the attendance registers for the relevant
period as the same being old, and destroyed after expiry of its stipulated
period of preservation of 5 years were not available with the Petitioner
Bank."

Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench adverted· to
B the said question at all. The learned Single Judge without considering the
contentions raised by the Appellant held :

"The Tribunal has extensively dealt with the points of dispute relating
to justification of the Bank in terminating the services of the workmen.
In paragraphs 16 to 49 the Tribunal has elaborately discussed facts,
c evidence and the material placed on record with reference to the case
laws relating to 'retrenchment'. In this view of the matter, it is wholly
unnecessary to refer Mr. Padke, learned counsel for respondents I to
11. The Tribunal has recorded a finding that the action of the Bank.
amoun~~ to retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act
and there is violation of mandatory requirement Section 25-F of the
Act. Therefore, this Court should not interfere with the findings of
fact recorded by the Tribunal."

The Division Bench unfortunately in its judgment did not take into
consideration the relevant questions. It proceeded on a pre-supposition that
E the Bank intended to reinstate the workmen. The Division Bench without any
detailed discussion observed :

"The submission of Mr. Kasturi, learned senior counsel for the Bank
has some force in so far as both the order of the Tribunal and the
learned Single Judge proceeded on the footings that the termination
F was contrary to Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute· Act."

Laying emphasis on the alleged right of the Respondents to be
· regularized in their services and denial thereof by the Appellant herein, the
Division Bench held that discontinuance of the workmen on the ground that
they filed forged certificates cast a stigma and, on that ground, it upheld the
G award of the learned Industrial Tribunal as also the judgment of the learned
Single Judge.

The Division Bench, however, relying on or on the basis of, the decision
of this Court in Chief General Manager, Reserve Bank ofIndia (supra) directed
H that the backwages shall be paid only from 23.7. I 993.
MANAGER. R'.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.] 819

EFFECT OF THE ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT : A
The terms and conditions of settlement by and between the Reserve
Bank oflndia and the Reserve Bank Workers Federation although not produced
before us, the same appear in a judgment of this Court in M.G. Datania and
Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr., [Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 1994,
disposed of on 28th November, 1995]; the re!evant portion whereof is as B
under :

"Terms of Settlement :

(i) The existing arrangement or practice of engaging persons on daily
wages purely on temporary and ad hoc basis in Class IV in various C
cadres shall be discontinued forthwith.

(ii) The leave reserve in the case of mazdoors employed in Cash
Department shall be increased from the existing level of 15% to 25%.

(iii) The leave reserve in other categories in Class IV shall be increased D
from the existing level of 15% to 20%.

(iv) The additional posts that may be created or may arise as a
consequence of paragraphs (ii) and (iii) above, together with existing
vacancies, if any, shall be utilized for giving (a) full time employment

- to part-time employees to the extent possible and (b) regular full-time E
or part-time employment, as the case may be, to the ticcas who have
rendered continuous service of three years or more as on 19th.
November, 1992. However, if the number of available vacancies at a
particular centre is less than the number of such ticcas at that centre
to be given regular full-time/ part - time appointments, the ticcas in
excess of the available vacancies at that centre shall have to move at F
their own cost to another centre where vacancies are available after
absorbing eligible ticcas at that centre on a returnable basis as and
when vacancies arise in the parent centre. Such repatriation being in
the nature of request transfer shall be at their own cost and also
subject to usual terms and conditions prescribed in respect of request G
transfers. Such of the ticcas who are not willing to the above
•• arrangements shall have no claim to be absorbed in the Bank .

(v) The Federation shall not under any circumstances insist on
engagement of ticcas on daily wage basis for carrying out Bank's
work smoothly and without any hindrance or disturbance in any H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A Section/De~,rtment including Cash Department of the Bank
irrespective of number of employees absent for any reason whatsoever.
In other words, not withstanding any absenteeism in Class IV cadre
(any group), the work of~he Bank shall be carried on by and with the
assistance of the employees present on any given day. If, however,
there is an increase in the Bank's normal work on a long term basis
B it would review the overall strength in Class IV cadre at the centre
concerned in the normal course."

One of the terms, therefore, postulates that regular full time or part time
Ticcas whether in regular full time or part time employment who have rendered
continuous service of three years or more as on 19th November, 1992 were
C entitled to be considered for absorption in the additional posts that were
'
required to be created by reason of such settlement. Such settlement had been
arrived having regard to the fact that the same Ticca Mazdoors had been
working for a long time.

D Absorption of the Ticca Mazdoors in the services of the Appellant was
not automatic. The concerned workmen were required to fulfill the conditions
laid down therefor.

Would by reason of the order of reinstatement, the status of the
Respondents change is, the question.
E
In law, 240 days of continuous service by itself does not gi've rise to
claim of permanence. Section 25F provides for grant of compen_sation if a
workman is sought to be retrenched in violation of the conditions referred to
therein. [See Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers' Marketing
Federation Ltd (supra). See also Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil
F Kumar Mishra and,.Ors., etc., AIR (1994) SC 1638.)

In A. Umarani (supra), this Court held :

"Regularisation, in our considered opinion, is not and cannot be the
mode of recruitment by any "State" within the meaning of Article
G 12 of the Constitution of India or any body or authority governed by
a Statutory Act or the Rules framed thereunder. It is also now well-
settled that an appointment made in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Statute and in particular ignoring the minimum
educational qualification and other essential qualification would be
wholly illegal. Such illegality cannot be cured by taking recourse to
H
MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI [SINHA, J.) 821

regularisation. (See State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma and Anr., A
[1996] 7 sec 562)."

Yet again, in Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. and Anr. v. Digambara
Rao and Ors., (2004] 8 SCC 262 this Court held :

"It may not be out of place to mention that completion of 240 days B
of continuous service in a year may not by itself be a ground for
directing an order of regularization. It is also not the case of the
Respondents that they were appointed in accordance with the extant
rules. No direction for regularization of their services was, therefore,
could be issued."
c
Furthermore, a direction for reinstatement for non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act would restore to the
workmen the same status which he held when terminated. The Respondents
would, thus, continue to be Ticca Mazdoors, meaning thereby their names
would continue in the second list. They had worked only from April, 1980
to December, 1982. They did not have any right to get work. The directioi:i E>
of continuity of service per se would not bring them within the purview of
terms of- settlement. Even in the case of a statutory corporation in S.G.
Kotturappa (supra), this Court observed :

"It is not a case where the Respondent has completed 240 days E
of service during the period of 12 months preceding such termination
as contemplated under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Badli workers, thus, did not acquire
any legal right to continue in service. They were not even entitled to
the protection under the Industrial Disputes Act nor the mandatory
requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes were required F
to be complied with before terminating his services, unless they
complete 240 days service within a period of twelve months preceding
the date of termination."

It was further held :
G
"The terms and conditions of employment of a Badli worker may
have a statutory flavour but the same would not mean that it is not
otherwise contractual. So long as a worker remains a Badli worker,
he does not enjoy a status. His services are not protected by reason
of any provisions of the statute. He does not hold a civil post. A
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) 2 S.C.R.

A dispute as regard purported wrongful tennination of services can be
raised only if such termination takes.place in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the statute governing the services. Services of a temporary
employee or a badli worker can be terminated upon compliance of
the contractual or statutory requirements."

B Mr. Phadke, as noticed hereinbefore, has referred to a large number of
decisions for demonstrating that this Court had directed reinstatement even
ifthe workmen concerned were daily wagers or were employed intermittently.
No proposition of law was laid down in the aforementioned judgments. The
said judgments of this Court, moreover, do not lay down any principle having
C universal application so that the Tribunals, or for that matter the High Court,
or this Court, may feel compelled to direct reinstatement with continuity of
service and backwages. The Tribunal has some d·iscretion in this matter.
Grant of relief must depend on the fact situation obtaining in a particular
case. The industrial adjudicator cannot be held to be bound to grant some
relief only because it will be lawful to do so.
D
In Haryana State Coop. Land Dev. Bank v. Nee/am, JT (2005) 2 SC
600, this Court observed :

"It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction
have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the parties.
E The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart
social justice to the workman but the same by itself would not mean ·
that irrespective of his conduct a workman would automatically be
entitled to relief. The procedural laws like estopp.el, waiver and
acquiescence are equally applicable to the industrial proceedings. A
person in certain situation may even be held to be bound by the
F doctrine of Acceptance Sub silentio."