Holding

Section 34 IPC applies where the prosecution proves a common intention, and the conviction of all five accused under s.302 read with s.34 is upheld.

Summary

The appellants, five men including Manik Das, were convicted of murder under IPC s.302 read with s.34 for assaulting Anil Das with spears, which led to his death. The prosecution relied on eye‑witness statements and a post‑mortem report that matched the witnesses' accounts, naming all five accused. The appellants contended that Section 34 IPC was inapplicable because their presence at the scene was not conclusively proved and some were not named in the FIR. The Supreme Court held that Section 34 is a rule of evidence establishing joint liability when a common intention is proved, and that presence need not be proved beyond doubt if the evidence shows participation. The Court affirmed that the eye‑witness testimony was clear, cogent, and sufficient to infer a common intention among the accused. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the life sentences upheld.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code applies when the presence of the accused at the scene is not directly proved.
Whether the prosecution can establish a common intention among all five accused based on eye‑witness testimony.
Whether persons not named in the FIR can be convicted under Section 34 IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 164
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murderjoint liabilitycommon intentionSection 34 IPClife imprisonmenteye‑witness testimonycriminal law

Judgment

MANIK DAS AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF ASSAM

MAY 31, 2007
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAY AT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 :

ss.302134-Murder-Joint liability-Trial court convicting ftve accused C
of the charge-High Court affirming conviction and life sentence-Held:
Essence of the liability is to be found in exercise of a common intention
animating the accused leading to doing of a criminal act in furtherance of
such intention-s.34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by a
·· particular accused himself-On facts, injuries found on post-mortem report
correspond to version given by eye-witnesses-Two eye witnesses categorically D
namedfour accused-One ofthem further named the fifth accused specifically-
It cannot be said that prosecution has failed to establish its case.

Appellants faced trial for the offence punishable under ss.302/34 IPC.
The prosecution case was that the five accused assaulted brother of the
complainant as a result of which he died. The trial court convicted the accused E
of the charge and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life. The High
Court having dismissed the appeals of the accused, they filed the instant
appeals.

It was contended for the appellants that in the instant cases. 34 lPC F
had no application as their presence at the place of occurrence was not
established, and in any event, those persons whose names did not figure in
the FIR should not have been convicted.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 34 IPC has b<en enacted on the principle of joint
G
liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of evidence
and does not create a substantive office. In order to bring home the charge of
common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct

863 H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 7 S.C.R.

A or circumstantial, that there was a plan or meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of
Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. fPara 711866-E, F, GI
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 109, relied on.
B 1.2. Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to
be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading
to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of
the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the
C accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same
manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a
case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual
members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of ali or
to prove exactly that part was taken by each of them. Section 34 is applicable
even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himse.lf. For
D applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of
tbe deceased. (Para ll f (867-D, E, F, GI

Ch.Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC
1899, relied on.
E 1.3. In the instant case, it is to be noted that the injuries found on post
mortem report correspond to the version given by the eye witnesses. Both
PWs 3 and 7 categorically named four persons. In addition PW 3 has named
the fifth accused. Though PW 7 has not named the fifth accused person
specifically, but he has stated about the presence of another accused. In that
F background it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to establish its
. accusations. Both the trial court and the High Court have analysed the
evidence in great detail and found the same to be clear and cogent.
fPara 11 and 121 (867-G; 868-Af

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1254 of2006.
G
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2006 of the High Court
of Assam at Guwahati in Crl. Appeal No. 246 of 2004.

Raj Shekhar Rao and Senthil Jagadeesan for the Appellants.

H
MANIKDASv. STATE OF ASSAM{PASAYAT, J.] 865
Avijit Roy (for Corporate Law Group) for the Respondent. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

..
' DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court dismissing the appeal filed
by the appellants. The appeal was directed against the judgment dated B
31.8.2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge convicting the
appellants for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in Short the 'IPC') and sentencing each to
undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- with default
stipulation.
c
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On 27th December, 2000, at about 11.00 a.m., one Probin Das, brother
of Anil Das (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') made a complaint to
the officer in charge of the Teok Police Station that at about 6 a.m. on the D
same day Shri Manik Das s/o Late Duti Das, Shri Bimal Das S/o Sh. Manik
and Das Shri Dipak Das s/o Shri Manik Das along with two others assaulted
his brother Shri Anil Das with spears thereby severely injuring him w:t-ile he
was ploughing the field. He also stated that deceased-Anil Das was taken to
the Kakajan hospital for treatment but he died there. AccOi dingly, a case no.
35/2000 dated 27.12.2000 was registered under Sections 147 and 302 IPC. E
3. On 4th January, 2001, nearly a week after the alleged incident, the
statements of Phukan Das (PW-1) and Kunmoni Borah (PW-7), the alleged
eyewitnessesm were recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Jorhat
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the' Cr.
P.C.). On 13th May, 2002 charge sheet No. 45 of2002 was filed against the F
appellant herein in respect of offences punishable under Sections 147 and 302
IPC. By order dated 27th October, 2003, the case was committed by the
learned SDJM(S), Jorhat, to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Jothat for trial
ofoffences under Sections 302 read with Section 147 IPC. On 13th November,
2003, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jorhat framed charge under G
Section 302 read with Section 34 !PC against the accused.

4. Trial Court, as noted above, convicted the accused, which was
affirmed by the High Court.

5. Primary stand of learned counsel for the appellants is that Section 34 H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 7 S.C.R.

A has no application to the facts of the case. In order to bring in application .
,-
of the said provision personal presence_of the accused at the place of
occurance has to be established. According to him this has not been done.
It is pointed out that PWs. 3 & 7 are stated to be eye witnesses and PWs.
5 & 6 are stated to be witnesses who saw accused persons running away
B from the place of occurance. Their presence was to be· established. This has
not been done. It ts submitted that the so called eye witnesses have stated
about the assaults made by the accused persons. Their statements were j'
recorded in terms of Sections 164 Cr. P.C. They are related to the deceased
and, therefore, their evidence has to be discarded . Though PW-3 named all
the accused persons, PW-I named only four of them. The post mortem report
C shows injuries at various parts of the body of the deceased. It is thus
submitted that Section :;4 has no application and in any event those persons
whose names did not figure in the FIR should not have been convicted .
...
6. In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the testimony
D of the eye witnesses is clear and cogent. Merely because they are realteCJ to
the deceased, that are related to the deceased, that cannot be a ground to
discard their evidence. There is no variation in the statements made during
investigation and the evidence in Court. PWs. 3 & 7 who are eye-witnesses
categorically described in detail the role of each of the accused persons.

E 7. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the
doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
F persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance
of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct
proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention
can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts
of the case and the proved proved circumstances. In order to bring home the
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence,
G whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all
the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with
the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true content of the
Section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the
H
MANIKDASv. STATEOFASSAM(PASAYAT.J.) 867
' - ., . position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually ·A
, by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC '
I 09, the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime
is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that
the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly
must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, B
but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision.
'1
8. As it originally stood the Section 34 was in the following tenns:

"When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such C
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done
by him alone."

9. In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words "in furtherance
of the common intention of all" after the word "persons" and before 1he word
"each", so as to make object of Section 34 clear. This position was noted in D
Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Privy Council 118.

10. The Section does not sat "the common intention of all", nor does
if say "and the intention common to all". Under the provisions of Section 34. ,
the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common
intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in E
furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles
enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302
read with Section, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which
caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him
alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult F
to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in
furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was
taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899, Section 34 is applicable even if no
injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section Q
34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.

11. It is to be noted that the injuries found on post mortem, report
correspond to the version given by the eye witnesses. Both PWs. 3 & 7
categorically named four persons. In addition PW 3 has named the fifth
H
..,
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A accused. Though PW 7 has not named the fifth accused persons specifically,
but he has stated about the presence of another accused .

.12. In that background it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed
to establish its accusations. Both the trial court and the High Court have
analysed the evidence in great 'detail and found the ·same to be clear and
B cogent. That being so there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly
dismissed.

A.K.T. Appeal dismissed.

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