MANISH GOELversusROHINI GOEL

                     [2010] 2 S.C.R. 414


A                        MANISH GOEL
                                 v.
                         ROHINI GOEL
          (Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2954 of 2010)
                       FEBRUARY 5, 2010
B
         [AFTAB ALAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

        Constitution of India, 1950:

c      Article 136 - Scope of - Application u/s 13-B(1) of Hindu
  Marriage Act for divorce by mutual consent pending before
  Family Court - Application to waive statutory period of six
  months rejected - Petition under Article 136 primarily on the
  ground that since relief could not be granted by any other
0 Court, there was no occasion for petitioner to approach High
  Court - HELD: The power under Article 136 cannot be used
  to short circuit the· legal procedure prescribed in overriding
  power- The Supreme Court generally does not permit a party
  to by-pass the normal procedure of appeal or reference to
  High Court unless a question of principle of great importance ·
E arises - It has to be exercised exceptionally and with caution
  and only in an extra-ordinary situations - More so, such power-
  is to be exercised taking into consideration the well
  established principles which govern the exercise of overriding
  constitutional powers - In the instant case, there has been no
F obstruction to the stream of justice nor has there been injustice
  to the parties, which is required to be eradicated by Supreme
  Court by grant of equitable relief- Petition does not raise any
  question of general public importance - Petition dismissed.

G       A nil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009) 10 SCC 415;
    Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
    West Bengal AIR 1955 SC 65; The Union of India v.
    Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. AIR 1959 SC 1362; Murtaza & Sons

H                               414
           MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL                   415


& Anr. v. Nazir Mohd. Khan & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 668; Sirpur       A
Paper Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad
AIR 1970 SC 1520; The Municipal Corporation, Bhopal v.
Misbahul Hasan & Ors. AIR 1972 SC 892; Delhi Judicial
Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of
Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1991 SC 2176; Tirupati Balaji              B
Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2004
SC 2351; and F.G.P. Ltd. v. Saleh Hooseini Doctor (2009)
10 SCC 22~; Union oflndia & Ors. v. Kamai/ Singh (1995) 2
sec 728, relied on.
     Article 142 - Scope of - Petitions for divorce and divorce C
by mutual consent pending before Family Courts -
Application to waive statutory period of six months rejected -
In the petition under Article 136, prayer for exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 142 made to grant divorce - HELD:
 Generally, no Court has competence to issue a direction D
contrary to law nor the Court can direct an authority to act in
contravention of the statutory provisions - The courts are
meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or
directions which are contrary to what has been injected by law
- In exercise of the power under Article 142, Supreme Court E
generally does not pass an order in contravention of or
ignoring the statutory provisions nor the power is exercised
merely on sympathy - In the instant case, none of
contingencies, which may require the Court to exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142, has been brought F
out - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - ss. 12 and 13-8(1).

    Ramesh Chander v. Savitri AIR 1995 SC 851; Kanchan
Devi v. Promod Kumar Mittal AIR 1996 SC 3192; Anita
Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal (1997) 11 SCC 490; Ashok G
Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri AIR 1997 SC 1266; Kiran v.
Sharad Dutt (2000) 10 SCC 243; Swati Verma v. Rajan
Verma AIR 2004 SC 161; Harpit Singh Anand v. State of
West Bengal (2004) 10 SCC 505; Jimmy Sudarshan Purohit

                                                                H
    416     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 2 S.C.R.

A   v. Sudarshan Sharad Purohit (2005) 13 SCC 410; Durga P.
    Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy AIR 2005 SC 3297;; Naveen
    Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1675; Sanghamitra Ghosh
    v. Kaja/ Kumar Ghosh (2007) 2 SCC 220; Rishikesh Sharma
    v. Saroj Sharma (2007) 2 SCC 263; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya
B   Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511; and Satish Sitole v. Ganga AIR
    2008 SC 3093; and Laxmidas Morarji (dead) by L.Rs. v.
    Behrose Darab Madan (2009) 10 SCC 425, referred to.

         Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002) 10 SCC 194;
C   Chetan Dass v. Kam/a Devi AIR 2001 SC 1709; and Vishnu
    Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379; State of
    Punjab & Ors. v. Renuka Sing/a & Ors (1994) 1 SCC 175;
    State of UP. & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors. AIR 1996 SC
    2173; Union of India & Anr. v. Kirfoskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd.
    AIR 1996 SC 3285; Vice Chancellor, University of Allahabad ·
D   & Ors. v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra & Ors. (1937) 10 SCC
    264; and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v.
    Ashrafulla Khan & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 629; Prem Chand Garg
    & Anr. v. Excise Commissioner, UP. & Ors. AIR 1963 SC
    996; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.
E   AIR 1998 SC 1895; and E.S.P. Rajaram & Ors. v. Union of
    India & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 581; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
    & Anr. (1988) 2 SCC 602; Bonkya alias Bharat Shivaji Mane
    & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1995) 6 SCC 447; Common
    Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India & Ors. AIR
F   1999 SC 2979; M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Hwyana AIR 2000
    SC 168; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors. AIR 2000 SC
    1997; State of Punjab & Anr. v. Rajesh Syal (2002) 8 SCC
    158; Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy & Ors.
    (2004) 1 SCC 347; Textile Labour Association v. Official
G   Liquidator AIR 2004 SC 2336; State of Kamataka & Ors. v.
    Ameerbi & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 681; Union of India & Anr. v.
    Shardindu AIR 2007 SC 2204; and Bharat Sewa Sansthan
    v. U.P. Electronic Corporation Ltd. AIR 2007 SC 2961; Teri
    Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT. Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130,
H relied on.
            MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL                     417

    Administration of Justice:                                     A
     Abuse of process of Court - Petition for divorce pending
before competent court at Gurgaon in Haryana - Meanwhile,
another petition for divorce by mutual consent filed in Family
Court in Delhi - Application for waiving statutory period of six   8
months having been rejected, petition under Article 136 filed
- HELD: Petitioner could not explain as to how the case for
divorce could be filed before the Family Court, Delhi during
the pendency of the case for divorce before the Gurgaon Court
- Such a procedure adopted by the petitioner amounts to
abuse of process of the court - Petitioner has approached the      C
different forums for the same relief merely because he is very
much eager and keen to get the marriage dissolved
immediately even by abusing the process of the Court -
Petition dismissed - Practice and Procedure - Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 - ss. 12 and 13-8(1) - Constitution of          D
India, 1950 - Articles 136 and 142.

    Jai Singh v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 898; and Dr.
Buddhi Kata Subbarao v. K. Parasaran & Ors. AIR 1996 SC
2687, relied on.                                                   E

     Aw~dh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR 1996 SC 122;
and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India (2007) 6 SCC 120,
referred to.

                     Case Law Reference:                           F
    (2009) 10 sec 415          relied on             para 2
    AIR ·19sfsc 65.            relied on             para 4
    AIR 1959 SC 1362          relied on              para 4        G
    AIR 1970 SC 668           relied on              para 4
    AIR 1970 SC 1520          relied on              para 4


                                                                   H
    418      SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A         AIR 1972 SC 892     relied on          para 4
          AIR 1991 SC 2176    relied on          para 4
          AIR 2004 SC 2351    relied on          para 4
          (2009) 1o sec 223   relied on          para 4
B
          (1995) 2 sec 128    relied on          para 4
          AIR 1995 SC 851     referred to        para 6
          AIR 1996 SC 3192    referred to        para 6
c
          (1997) 11 sec 490   referred to        para 6
          AIR 1997 SC 1266    referred to        para 6
          (2000) 1o sec 243   referred to        para 6
D         AIR 2004 SC 161     referred to        para 6
          (2004) 1o sec 505   referred to        para 6
          (2005) 13 sec 410   referred to        para 6

E         AIR 2005 SC 3297    referred to        para 6
          AIR 2006 SC 1675    referred to        para 6
          (2007) 2 sec 220    referred to        para 6
          (2007) 2 sec 263    referred to        para 6
F
          (2007) 4 sec 511    referred to        para 6
          AIR 2008 SC 3093    referred to        para 6
          (2002) 1o sec 194   relied on          para 7
G
          AIR 2001 SC 1709    relied on          para 8
          (2009) 6 sec 379    relied on          para 9
          (1994) 1 sec 11s    relied on          para 10
H
     MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL        419


AIR 1996 SC 2173    relied on     para 10    A

AIR 1996 SC 3285    relied on     para 10

(1997) 10 sec 264   relied on     para 10

AIR 2002 SC 629     relied on     para 10    B
AIR 1963 SC 996     relied on     para 10

AIR 1998 SC 1895    relied on     para 11

AIR 2001 SC 581     relied on     para 11
                                             c
(1988) 2 sec 602    relied on     para 12
1995) 6 sec 447     relied on     para 12
AIR 1999 SC 2979    relied on     para 12
AIR 2000 SC 168     relied on     para 12    D

AIR 2000 SC 1997    relied on     para 12
(2002) 8 sec 158    relied on     para 12
(2004) 1 sec 347    relied on     para 12    E
AIR 2004 SC 2336    relied on     para 12

(2001) 11 sec 681   relied on     para 12

AIR 2007 SC 2204    relied on     para 12
                                             F
AIR 2007 SC 2961    relied on     para 12

(2004) 2 sec 130    relied on     para 13

(2009) 10 sec 425   referred to   para 14
                                             G
1977 SC 898         relied on     para 16

AIR 1996 SC 122     referred to   para 16
                                             ,•,
(2001) 6 sec 120    referred to   para 16
                                             H
    420      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A         AIR 1996 SC              relied on              para 17

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP Civil No. 2954
    of 2010.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 1.12.2009 of the
B Hemani Malhotra Addi. District Judge, 04 (West), Tis Hazari
  Courts, Delhi in HMA No. 457 of 2009.

        Pradeep Kr. Arya, Dushyant Swaroop, Sanjay Kumar
    Visen for the Petitioner.
c         The Order of the Court was delivered by

                                ORDER

         DR. 8.5. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This case reveals a very sorry
D   state of affairs that the parties, merely being highly qualified,
    have claimed even to be higher and above the law, and have
    a vested right to use, misuse and abuse the process of the
    Court. Petitioner, the husband, possesses the qualifications of
    CA, CS and ICWA, while the proforma respondent-wife is a
E   Doctor (M.D., Radio-Diagnosis) by profession. The parties got
    married on 23rd July, 2008 in Delhi. Their marriage ran into
    rough weather and relations between them became strained
    immediately after the marriage and they are living separately
    since 24.10.2008. Petitioner-husband filed a Matrimonial Case
F   under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter
    called as "the Act") for annulment of marrii:lge before a
    competent Court at Gurgaon. The respondent-wife, Smt. Rohini
    Goel filed a petition under Section 12 r/w Section 23 of the
    Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the competent Court at
    Delhi. An FIR was also lodged by her against petitioner-
G   husband and his family members under Sections 498-A, 406
    and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 at PS Janakpuri, New Delhi.

       2. It is stated at the Bar that by persuasion of the family
    members and friends, the parties entered into a compromise
H
              MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL                        421
                 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 and prepared a Memorandum of Understanding dated                       A
 13.11.2009 in the proceedings pending before the Mediation
 Centre, Delhi by which they agreed on terms and conditions
 incorporated therein, to settle all their disputes and also for
 dissolution of their marriage. The parties filed an application
 under Section 13-8(1) of the Act before the Family Court, i.e.         B
 ADJ-04 (West) Delhi seeking divorce by mutual consent. The
 said HMA No.456 of 2009 came before the Court and it
 recorded the statement of parties on 16.11.2009. The parties
 moved another HMA No. 457 of 2009 to waive the statutory
 period of six months in filing the second petition. However, the       c
 Court rejected the said application vide order dated 1.12.2009
 observing that the Court was ·not competent to waive the
 required statutory period of six months under the Act and such
 a waiver was permissible only under the· directions of this Court
 as held by this Court in Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009)           D
 10 SCC 415. Hence, this petition.

        3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there
··is no prohibition in law in entertaining the petition under Article
  136 of the Constitution against the order of the Family Court
  and in such an eventuality, there was no occasion for the             E
  petitioner to approach the High Court as the relief sought herein
  cannot be granted by any court other than this Court. Thus, the
  petitioner has a right to approach this Court against the order
  of the Family Court and the petitioner cannot be non-suited on
  this ground alone.                                                    F

      4. Article 136 of the Constitution enables this Court, in its
 discretion to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,
 decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or
 matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory        G
 of India.

       Undoubtedly, under Article 136 in the widest possible
 terms, a plenary jurisdiction exercisable on assuming appellate
 jurisdiction has been conferred upon this Court. However, it is
 an extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in the       H
    422      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 2 S.C.R.


A   Court with implicit trust and faith and thus, extra ordinary care
    and caution has to be observed while exercising this
    jurisdiction. There is no vested right of a party to approach this
    Court for the exercise of such a vast discretion, however, such
    a course can be resorted to when this court feels that it is so
B warranted to eradicate injustice. Such a jurisdiction is to be
    exercised by the consideration of justice and call of duty. The
    power has to be exercised with great care and due
    consideration but while exercising the power, the order should
    be passed taking into consideration all binding precedents
c   otherwise such an order would create problems in the future.
    The object of keeping such a wide power with this Court has
    been to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by
    decisions of courts below. More so, there should be a question
    of law of general public importance or a decision which shocks
    the conscience of the court are some of the prime requisites
0
    for grant of special leave. Thus, unless it is shown that
    exceptional and special circumstances exist that substantial and
    grave injustice has been done and that the case in question
    presents features of sufficient gravity warranting. review of the
E . decision appealed against, such exercise should not be done.
    The power under Article 136 cannot be used to short circuit the
    legal procedure prescribed in overriding power. This Court
    generally does not permit a party to by-pass the normal
    procedure of appeal or reference to the High Court unless a
    question of principle of great importance arises. It has to be
F exercised exceptionally and with caution and only in such an
    extra-ordinary situations. More so, such power is to be
    exercised taking into consideration the well established
    principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional
    powers (vide Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner
G of Income Tax, West Bengal AIR 1955 SC 65; The Union of
    India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. AIR 1959 SC 1362; Murtaza
    & Sons & Anr. \f. Nazir Mohd. Khan &0rs. AIR 1970 SC 668;
    Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax,
    Hyderabad AIR 1970 SC 1520; The Municipal Corporation,
H Bhopal v. Misbahul Hasan & Ors. AIR 1972 SC 892; Delhi
           MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL                       423
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Judicial Service Ass'Ociation, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State     A
of Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1991 SC 2176; Tirupati Balaji
Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2004
SC 2351 ; and F. G. P. Ltd. v. Saleh Hooseini Doctor (2009) 10
sec 223).
                                                                    B
    5. In Union of India & Ors. v. Kamai/ Singh (1995) 2 SCC
728, this court while dealing with the similar issue held as
under:

    "It is true that this Court when exercises its discretionary
    power under Article 136 or passes any order under Article       C
    142, it does so with great care and due circumspection.
    But, when we are settling the law in exercise of this court's
    discretion, such law, so settled, should be clear and
    become operational instead of being kept vague, so that
    it could become a binding precedent in all similar cases        D
    to arise in future."

     6. It has been canvassed before us that under Article 142
of the Constitution, this Court is competent to pass any order
to do complete justice between the parties and grant decree         E
of divorce even if the case may not meet the requirement of
statutory provisions. The instant case presents special features
warranting exercise of such power.

      We are fully alive of the fact that this court has been
exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution for      F
dissolution of marriage where the Court finds that marriage is
totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has
broken down irretrievably, even if the facts of the case do not
provide a ground in law on which the divorce could be granted.
Decree of divorce has been granted to put quietus to all            G
litigations between the parties and to save them from further
agony, as it is evident from the judgments in Romesh Chander
v. Savitri AIR 1995 SC 851; Kanchan Devi v. Promod Kumar
Mittal AIR 1996 SC 3192; Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal
(1997) 11 SCC 490; Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaverl AIR             H
    424      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A 1997 SC 1266; Kiran v. Sharad Dutt (2000) 10 SCC 243; Swati
  Verma v. Rajan Verma AIR 2004 SC 161; Harpit Singh Anand
  v. State of West Bengal (2004) 10 SCC 505; Jimmy
  Sudarshan Purohit v. Sudarshan Sharad Purohit (2005) 13
  SCC 41 O; Ourga P. Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy AIR 2005
B SC 3297;; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1675;
  Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kaja/ Kumar Ghosh (2007) 2 SCC
  220; Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma (2007) 2 SCC 263;
  Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 ; and Satish
  Sitole v. Ganga Al R 2008 SC 3093.
c        However, these are the cases, where this Court came to
    rescue the parties on the ground for divorce not provided for
    by the legislature in the statute.

       7. In Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002) 10 SCC
D 194, this Court while allowing a transfer petition directed the
  court concerned to decide the case of divorce by mutual
  consent, ignoring the statutory requirement of moving the motion
  after expiry of the period of six months under Section 13-8(2)
  of the Act.
E
         8. In Anil Kumar Jain (supra), this Court held that an order
    of waiving the statutory requirements can be passed only by
    this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the
    Constitution. The said power is not vested with any other court.

F      9. However, we have also noticed various judgments of this
  Court taking a contrary view to the effect that in case the legal
  ground for grant of divorce is missing, exercising such power
  tantamounts to legislation and thus transgression of the powers
  of the legislature, which is not permissible in law (vide Chetan
G Dass v. Kam/a Devi AIR 2001 SC 1709; and Vishnu Dutt
  Sharma v. Manju Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379).

       10. Generally, no Court has competence to issue a
  direction contrary to law nor the Court can direct an authority
H to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts
            MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL                     425
               [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders A
or directions which are contrary to what has been injected by .
law. (Vide State of Punjab & Ors. v. Renuka Sing/a & Ors
(1994) 1 SCC 175; State of UP. & Ors. v. Harish Chandra &
Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2173; Union of India & Anr. v. Kirloskar
Pneumatic Co. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 3285; Vice Chancellor, B
University of Allahabad & Ors. v. Or. Anand Prakash Mishra
& Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 264; and Karnataka State Road
Transport Corporation v. Ashrafulla Khan & Ors. AIR 2002 SC
629).

    11. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prem Chand C
Garg & Anr. v. Excise Commissioner, UP. & Ors. AIR 1963 •
SC 996 held as under:

    "An order which this Court can make in order to do
    complete justice between the parties, must not only be        D
    consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
    Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the
    substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws."

      The Constitution Benches of this Court in Supreme Court     E
Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1998 SC 1895;
and E.S.P. Rajaram & Ors. v. Union oflndia & Ors. AIR 2001
SC 581 held that under Article 142 of the Constitution, this
Court cannot altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a
statute and pass orders concerning an issue which can be
                                                                  F
settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute.
It is not to be exercised in a case where there is no basis in
law which can form an edifice for building up a superstructure.

      12. Similar view has been reiterated in A.R. Antulay v.
R.S. Nayak & Anr. (1988) 2 SCC 602; Bonkya alias Bharat           G
Shivaji Mane & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1995) 6 SOC
44 7; Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India
& Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2979; M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana
AIR 2000 SC 168; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors. AIR 2000
SC 1997; State of Punjab & Anr. v. Rajesh Syal (2002) 8.          H
    426       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A SCC 158; Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy & Ors.
  (2004) 1 SCC 347; Textile Labour Association v. Official
  Liquidator AIR 2004 SC 2336; State of Kamataka & Ors. v.
  Ameerbi & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 681; Union of India & Anr. v.
  Shardindu AIR 2007 SC 2204; and Bharat Sewa Sansthan v.
B U.P. Electronic Corporation Ltd. AIR 2007 SC 2961.

        13. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT. Chandigarh (2004)
    2 SCC 130, this Court held as under:

          "36 ..... sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground
C         for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants
          miserably fail to establish a legal right. ... despite an
          extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article
          142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would
          not pass an order which would be in contravention of a
D         statutory provision."

         14. In Laxmidas Morarji (dead) by L.Rs. v. Behrose Darab
    Madan (2009) 10 SCC 425, while dealing with the provisions
    of Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court has held as under:
E
          " .... The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is a
          constitutional power and hence, not restricted by statutory
          enactments. Though the Supreme Court would not pass
          any order under Article 1"42 of the Constitution which would
F         amount to supplanting substantive law applicable· or
          ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the
          subject, at the same time these constitutional powers
          cannot in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions.
          However, it is to be made clear that this power cannot be
G         used to supplant the law applicable to the case. This
          means that acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court
          cannot pass an order or grant relief which is totally
          inconsistent or goes against the substantive or statutory
          enactments pertaining to the case. The power is to be
H         used sparingly in cases which cannot be effectively and
            MANISH GOEL v. ROHINI GOEL                        427
               [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     appropriately tackled by the existing provisions of law or       A
     when the existing provisions of law cannot bring about
     complete justice between the parties." (Emphasis added)

     15. Therefore, the law in this regard can be summarised
to the effect that in exercise of the power under Article 142 of
                                                                      8
the Constitution, this Court generally does not pass an order
in contravention of or ignoring the statutory provisions nor the
power is exercised merely on sympathy.

      16. The instant case requires to be examined in the light
of aforesaid settled legal propositions. Parties got married on       C
23. 7.2008 and as they could not bear each other, started living
separately from 24.10.2008. There had been claims and
counter claims, allegations and criminal prosecution between
them. Petitioner approached the Competent Court at Gurgaon
for dissolution of marriage. Admittedly, that case is still pending   D
consideration. Parties filed the petition for divorce by mutual
consent only in November 2009 before the Family Court, Delhi.
Learned counsel for the petitioner could not explain as to how
the case for divorce could be filed before the Family Court,
Delhi during the pendency of the case for divorce before the          E
Gurgaon Court. Such a procedure adopted by the petitioner
amounts to abuse of process of the court. Petitioner has
approached the different forums for the same relief merely
because he is very much eager and keen to get the marriage
dissolved immediately even by abusing the process of the              F
Court. In Jai Singh v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 898, this
Court while dealing with a similar issue held that a litigant
cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same
matter at the same time. This judgment has subsequently been
approved by this Court in principle but distinguished on facts        G
in Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR 1996 SC 122;
and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India (2007) 6 SCC 120.

    17. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran & Ors.
AIR 1996 SC 2687, this Court has observed as under:-
                                                                      H
    428       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A          "No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court
           time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in
           the manner he wishes. However, access to justice should
           not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and
           frivolous petitions."
8
        18. Even otherwise, the statutory period of six months for
  filing the second petition under Section 13-8(2) of the Act has
  been prescribed~ for providing an opportunity to parties to
  reconcile and withdraw petition for dissolution of marriage.
C Learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to advance
  arguments on the issue as to whether, statutory period
  prescribed under Section 13-8(1) of the Act is mandatory or
  directory and if directory, whether could be dispensed with even
  by the High Court in exercise of its writ/appellate jurisdiction.

D      Thus, this is not a case where there has been any
  obstruction to the stream of justice or there has been injustice
  to the parties, which is required to be eradicated, and this Court
  may grant equitable relief. Petition does not raise any question
  of general public importance. None of contingencies, which
E may require this Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction
  under Article 142 of the Constitution, has been brought to our
  notice in the case at hand.

           19. Thus, in view of the above, we do not find any
    justification to entertain this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
F
    R.P.                                           Petition dismissed.