Holding

The offence is not a continuing one; therefore, no part of the cause of action arose in Datia, and jurisdiction lies with the court at Jabalpur, warranting transfer of the case.

Summary

Manish Ratan and others were accused of dowry harassment and ill‑treatment of their wife, who lived in Jabalpur. The complainant lodged a FIR at Datia police, alleging that the offences occurred at Jabalpur, and the case was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia. The appellants challenged the jurisdiction, arguing that the offence was not a "continuing offence" under Section 178(c) of the CrPC. The Supreme Court held that the offence could not be deemed continuing merely because the complainant left her matrimonial home, and that no part of the cause of action arose within Datia’s territorial limits. Accordingly, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, transferred the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the alleged dowry harassment and ill‑treatment constitute a "continuing offence" under Section 178(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Whether the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Sections 177 and 178 of the CrPC.
Whether the case could be transferred to a court having proper jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 177, s. 178
Constitution of Indias. 142

Subjects

jurisdictioncontinuing offenceCrPC Section 177CrPC Section 178dowry harassmentArticle 142transfer of casecriminal procedure

Judgment

A MANISH RATAN AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF M.P. AND ORS

NOVEMBER I, 2006

B [S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.]

Code a/Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 177 and 178-Jurisdiction
of court to take cognizance of offence, where no part of cause of action has
C arisen-Held: Every offence should ordinarily be inquired into and tried by
Court within whose jurisdiction it is committed-On facts, no criminal case
alleging mal-treatment and dowry demand registered at the place of incident
but another local area-High Court holding that offence being a continuing
one, Court where no part of cause of action arose has the jurisdiction, not
correct-Offence cannot be a continuing one only because complainant was
D /meed to leave her matrimonial home-Jn the interest a/justice matter pending
transferred to the court where cause of action has arisen-Constitution of
India, 1950-Article 142.

Appellant No. 1 and rf:spondent No. 2 were living at their matrimonial
home at Jabalpur. Respondent No. 2's father lodged a complaint alleging that
E the appellant have been ill-treating his daughter and demar·ding dowry. It is
alleged that the next month respondent No. 1 was forced to leave her
matrimonial home. Thereafter, she lodged FIR against appellants at local area-
Datia and the incident was said to have taken place at Jabalpur. Criminal case
was registered. Appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Datia Court.
F Criminal revision application was dismissed on the ground that the offence
being a continuing one, Datia Court had jurisdictivn to take cognizance of
the offence. Hence, the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Com1

G HELD: 1.1. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ordains
that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within
whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Interpretation of the term
"ordinarily" will have to be considered having regard to the provisions
contained in Section 178 of the Code. (229-F-H]

H 226
MANISHRATANv. STATEOFM.P. [S.B. SINHA,J.] 227
1.2 Clause (c) of section 178, where offence is continuing one, and A
continues to be committed in more local areas than one, has been applied in
the instant case. No part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits
of the jurisdiction of the Datia Court Only because the complainant was forced
to leave her matrimonial home, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing
one. No criminal case was lodged at Jabalpur. The investigation of the case is B
complete. Thus, order of the High Court is set aside. Interest of justice would
be subserved, by transferring the criminal case pending in Court of Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur,
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution.
[230-A-B; 233-A-C]
State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr., [1972) 2 SCC 890; Y. C
Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr., [2004] 8
SCC 100 and Ramesh and Ors. v. State ofT.N, [2005] 3 SCC 507, relied on.

Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, [19971 5 SCC
30, referred to.
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 210 of
2000.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 1. 9 .1998 of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench, Gwalior in Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1998. E
S.S. Khanduja and Yash Pal Dhingra for the Appellants.

Vibha Datta Makhija and Uma Datta [N.P.] for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
S.B. SINHA, J. Application of Sections 177 and 178 of Code of Criminal
Procedure (Code) is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment
and order dated I.09. l 998 pas~ed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
Cr!. Revision No. 98 of 1998.

Appellant No. I was married with Meena, Respondent No. 2 herein at G
Niwari, Distt. Tikangarh. They were living at their matrimonial home at Jabalpur.
Allegedly, a complaint was lodged by father-in-law of Appellant No. I with
the police station, Jabalpur on 19.04.1997 alleging that the appellants have
been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry.

Meena allegedly lodged another First Information Report against the H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A appellants at the Police Station, Datia on 25.05.1997 whereupon a criminal case
was registered. In the said complaint, the place of incident was said to have
taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar Narbada Road, Jabalpur. The
period during which the incident took place was said to be before November,
1995 till 25.08.1997. It was alleged:

B "7. That during the time of Dusshera the complainant's husband
Manish, Father in law S.S. Rattan, Mother in law Smt. Kiran and sister
in law Menaka (Minni) illtreated her so much that she left her house
and saved her life by some means and reached in her Mama's house
at Bhopal and from there she reached her house and since then she
C has been staying with her father."

A criminal revision was filed by the appellants questioning the
jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia. By reason of the
impugned judgment, the said criminal revision application has been dismissed
opining that the offence being a continuing one, Datia Court had jurisdiction
D to take cognizance of the offence.

The High Court did not consider the question on the touchstone of
Sections 177 and 178 of the Code. It is interesting to note that while arriving
at the decision the High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in
Sujata Mukhe1jee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, [1997] 5 sq:; 30,
E stating:

" ... The High Court held that excepting against the husband, the
complaint against other respondents related to the incidents taking
place at Raigarh and as such, the criminal case on the basis of
complaint made by the appellant was not maintainable against the said
F other respondents at Raipur but it was maintainable so far as the
husband of the appellant was concerned. On these facts, the Apex
Court took the view that the complaint reveals a continuing offence
of the mat-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the
hands of all the accused respondents, and in such continuing offence,
on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other
G
occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. It was, therefore,
held that in view of clause (c) of Section 178 of Cr.P.C., the High Court
was not right. The order passed by the High Court was set aside and
the learned CJM, Raipur had jurisdiction to try the case. The facts of
the present case are different. There is nothing in the complaint to
H show that any mat-treatment was given to the complainant at Datia.
MANISH RATAN v. STATE OF M.P. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 229
The allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the mal-treatment A
was given within a specific period at Jabalpur. There is nothing to
show that any mal-treatment was given by any of the petitioners at
Datia and under these circumstances, this case of Sujata Mukherjee
does not help the learned counsel for the complainant in this case."

By a curious process of reasoning, however, it was held: B
" ... They demanded a sum of Rs. 7.00 lakhs and forced her to write a
letter to her parents in that regard. She was beaten and kept starving.
Somehow she managed to escape and went to her Mama's place at
Bhopal and from there she went to father's place and was living there.
Thus these facts go to show that she was forced to go to her father's C
place on account of the fact that she was mal-treated; as demand of
Rs. 7.00 lakhs was not fulfilled. As laid down in the aforesaid decision
of this Court, the word 'cruelty' is not only the physical cruelty, the
lady was forced to live at her father's place on account of the torture
of the inlaws and as such it can safely be said that there was also a D
mental cruelty. The cruelty and the terror of the in-laws continued
even at the place of the father where she was living. In this view of
the matter, it can safely be said that the harassment continued at the
place where she was residing with her father. In view of the provision
of Section 178 Cr.P.C., the offence may be inquired into and tried by
a Court where the physical harassment, marpeet had taken place i.e. E
the in-laws' place and also where the harassment continued i.e. the
place where she was residing. Thus in view of the law laid down by
this Court in the aforesaid authority with which I respectfully agree,
the Court at Datia had also jurisdiction to try the case."

It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within F
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia Court. Section 177 of the
Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

Interpretation of the term "ordinarily" will have to be considered having G
regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which reads as
under:

"178. Place of inquiry or trial.(a) When it is uncertain in which of
several local areas an offence was committed, or
H
A
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly
-
in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed
in more local areas than one, or

B (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,

it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any
of such local areas."

Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant
C case.
"
Whether the allegations made in the complaint petition would constitute
a continuing offence, thus, is the core question.

In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing
D one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.

In State ofBihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr., [ 1972] 2 SCC 890, it was
stated:

"A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and
is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all.
E It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or
comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty,
the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is
obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobediance
or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed.
F The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act
or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act
or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence
every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing
offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence
which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an
G act or omission is committed once and for all."

In Sujata Mukherjee (supra) this Court held the offence to be a
continuing one as specific allegations had been made against the husband
that he had also gone to Raipur where the complaint was filed and had
H assaulted the appellant therein. It was in the aforementioned fact situation,
MANISHRATANv. STATEOFM.P. [S.B. SINHA,J.] 231
this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the incident A
at Raipur was not an isolated event stating:

"At the hearing of these appeals, Mr Gambhir, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant, has submitted that it will be evident from
the complaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been
subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur B
and incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but
consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh.
Therefore, the High Court was wrong in appreciating the scope of the
complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated events
had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place C
at Raipur. Hence, the criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainable against the
respondent husband against whom some overt act at Raipur was
alleged. But such case was not maintainable against the other
respondents."
D
This Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein
held:

" ... We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the
appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing
offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in E
the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing
offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and
on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore,
clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly
attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High
Court and direct the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to F
proceed with the criminal case ... "

Sujata Mukherjee (supra) was distinguished by a Division Bench of
this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai ard
Anr., [2004] 8 sec l 00 where noticing the interpretation of the expression G
"cause of action", it was held that the expression "ordinarily" need not be
limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be
provided by law on consideration or m~y be implied from the provisions of
law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. In that case the
complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil
and went to Chennai and was staying there. Thus, having regard to the fact H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A that all allegations according to the complainant took place at Nagercoil, it
was held that the courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with
the matter. It was held:

"This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section
178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is
B different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband
on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband
and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations
about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an
offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section
l 78(c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be
c applied."

Yet again in Ramesh and Ors. v. State of TN., (2005] 3 SCC 507,
Abraham Ajith (supra) was followed by this Court stating:

"In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the
D question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail.
Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the
offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or
partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Trichy.
Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be
E said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost
all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting
additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home
at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable
property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to
Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts
F giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in
Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her
in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998,
there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case
she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles
G demanded.

Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the
offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused
mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Primafacie, there is nothing
in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting
H the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy."
MANISHRATANv. STATEOFM.P. [S.8. SINHA,J.]

The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present A
case.

Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged
at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fac~ that the investigation
of the case is complete.
B
We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be
subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of
our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct
transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do C
so.

Although the complainant has filed an application before us for
impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf. We,
therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to her.
Keeping in view of the fact tha• Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia, we D
would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate her in
the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

N.J. Appeal allowed.
E

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