MANISH SISODIAversusDIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

                 [2024] 8 S.C.R. 1061 : 2024 INSC 595

                             Manish Sisodia
                                    v.
                       Directorate of Enforcement
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 3295 of 2024)
                                09 August 2024
               [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Appellant was incarcerated for around 17 months, trial yet to
       commence. Bail denied. Whether the trial court and the High Court
       correctly considered the observations made by this Court with
       regard to right to speedy trial and prolonged period of incarceration.
       The claim of the appellant was rejected applying the triple test
       contemplated under Section 45, Prevention of Money Laundering
       Act, 2002. Whether the right to bail in cases of delay coupled with
       incarceration for a long period should be read into Section 439,
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 45 of the PMLA.
       Whether the appellant was deprived of his right to speedy trial and
       if entitled to grant of bail.

                                   Headnotes†
       Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.45 – Code of
       Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Delhi’s Excise Policy Cases,
       irregularities alleged in the framing and implementation –
       Cases by CBI and ED, appellant arrested – Previously two
       rounds of litigation, present is the third round – Incarceration
       for a long period – Delay in trial, bail rejected – Right to
       bail – Right to speedy trial – Right to bail in cases of delay
       coupled with incarceration for a long period, if should be read
       into Section 439 CrPC, 1973 and Section 45 of the PMLA:
       Held: Yes – Right to bail in cases of delay coupled with incarceration
       for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations,
       should be read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of the
       PMLA – It is the basic right of the person charged of an offence
       and not convicted that he be ensured and given a speedy trial –
       When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to
       the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons would


* Author
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    exercise the power to grant bail – Provisions of Section 45 of
    the PMLA would not come in the way of consideration of the
    application of the appellant for grant of bail – On account of a
    long period of incarceration for around 17 months and the trial
    even not having been commenced, the appellant was deprived
    of his right to speedy trial – On facts, in view of the first order
    of this Court, the appellant was entitled to renew his request –
    493 witnesses were named in the ED and the CBI matter –
    The case involves thousands of pages of documents and over
    a lakh pages of digitized documents – There is not even the
    remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future –
    Appellant would be deprived of his fundamental right to liberty
    under Article 21 if kept behind the bars for an unlimited period of
    time in the hope of speedy completion of trial – Impugned judgment
    of the High Court quashed and set aside – Appellant granted
    bail in both ED and the CBI case on the conditions imposed.
    [Paras 37-39, 43, 49, 54, 58]
    Criminal Law – Right to fair trial – Right of the accused to
    inspect documents including “un-relied upon documents”:
    Held: Accused has the right to fair trial, cannot be denied the right
    to have inspection of the documents including the “un-relied upon
    documents”. [Para 47]
    Bail – To be granted as a rule, jail is exception – Non-
    observance by Courts, deprecated:
    Held: Bail is not to be withheld as a punishment – Trial courts
    and High Courts play safe in matters of grant of bail and the
    principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times,
    followed in breach – It is high time that the trial courts and the
    High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and
    jail is exception”. [Para 53]
    Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) – Preliminary objection as
    regards the maintainability of the second set of SLPs – Delhi’s
    Excise Policy Cases, irregularities alleged in the framing and
    implementation – Cases by CBI and ED, appellant arrested –
    Previously two rounds of litigation, present is the third round
    before this Court – In earlier rounds of litigation, liberty was
    granted to the appellant to move a fresh application for bail
    in case of change in circumstances or in case the trial was
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                           1063

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


     protracted – Preliminary objection was raised as regards
     the maintainability of the present appeals on account of the
     second order of this Court, contending that the second set
     of SLPs cannot be filed to challenge the order of the High
     Court when the earlier SLPs arising out of the same order
     were disposed of:
     Held: Rejected – This Court was concerned about the prolonged
     period of incarceration suffered by the appellant – Assurance
     was given by the prosecution that the trial shall be concluded
     by taking appropriate steps within next 6-8 months however, far
     from the trial being concluded within a period of 6-8 months, it is
     even yet to commence – Liberty was granted to the appellant to
     revive his prayer after filing of the chargesheet – Relegating the
     appellant to again approach the trial court and thereafter the High
     Court when they have already taken a view would be an empty
     formality – Right to speedy trial is a fundamental right within the
     broad scope of Article 21 – Liberty reserved by this Court vide its
     second order, to revive the request of the appellant was a liberty
     given by this Court to revive his prayer afresh after filing of the
     final complaint/charge-sheet – Undisputedly, the present appeals
     were filed after the final complaint/charge-sheet were filed by the
     respondents. [Paras 29, 32, 43]

                             Case Law Cited
     Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Others [2000]
     Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; P. Ponnusamy v. State
     of Tamil Nadu [2022] 15 SCR 265 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC
     1543; Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Others v. Union of India
     and Others [2022] 6 SCR 382 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929;
     Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024] 6 SCR 666 :
     (2024) SCC OnLine SC 934; Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of
     Enforcement (SLP (Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024 dated 30.07.2024);
     Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and Another
     (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1693; Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others
     v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 2 SCR
     371 : (1978) 1 SCC 240; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v.
     State of Punjab [1980] 3 SCR 383 : (1980) 2 SCC 565; Hussainara
     Khatoon and Others (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [1979] 3
     SCR 169 : (1980) 1 SCC 81; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [2021]
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    1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central
    Bureau of Investigation and Another [2022] 10 SCR 351 : (2022)
    10 SCC 51 – referred to.

                                List of Acts

    Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Code of Criminal
    Procedure, 1973; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal
    Code, 1860.

                             List of Keywords

    Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Triple
    test under Section 45, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002;
    Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Article 21 of
    the Constitution of India; Delhi’s Excise Policy Cases; Incarceration
    for a long period; Prolonged period of incarceration; Trial delayed;
    Delay in trial; Right to speedy trial; Bail rule, jail exception; Right
    to fair trial; Right to Life and Personal Liberty; Second set of
    Special Leave Petitions (SLPs); Preliminary objection; Inspection
    of documents; Un-relied upon documents.

                            Case Arising From

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3295
    of 2024

    From the Judgment and Order dated 21.05.2024 of the High Court
    of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No. 1557 of 2024

    With

    Criminal Appeal No. 3296 of 2024

                         Appearances for Parties

    Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Vikram Chaudhari, Sr. Advs., Vivek Jain,
    Mohd. Irshad, Amit Bhandari, Karan Sharma, Rajat Jain, Sadiq Noor,
    Mohit Siwach, Shailesh Chauhan, Advs. for the Appellant.

    Suryaprakash V. Raju, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Zoheb
    Hussain, Annam Venkatesh, Vivek Gaurav, Hitarth Raja,
    Ms. Abhipriya, Ms. Sweta Desai, Vivek Gurnani, Ms. Aakriti Mishra,
    Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                      1065

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                               Judgment
     B.R. Gavai, J.
1.   Leave granted. Appeals heard on merits.
2.   The present appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 21st
     May 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
     Delhi at New Delhi in Bail Application Nos. 1557 and 1559 of 2024,
     thereby rejecting the said applications filed by the present appellant
     for grant of bail. The aforesaid two applications were filed seeking
     bail in connection with ED Case No. HIU-II/14/2022 registered
     against the appellant by the Directorate of Enforcement (for short,
     ‘ED’) and First Information Report (FIR) No. RC0032022A0053
     of 2022 registered against the appellant by the Central Bureau of
     Investigation (for short, ‘CBI’).
3.   FIR No. RC0032022A0053 of 2022 came to be registered by the
     CBI on 17th August 2022, and ED Case No. HIU-II/14/2022 came to
     be registered by the ED on 22nd August 2022.
4.   Since both the cases arise out of similar facts, the latter being the
     predicate offence and the former being a case registered on the
     basis of the predicate offence, both these appeals are heard and
     decided together.
     FACTS IN BRIEF:
5.   The present case travelled two rounds before the trial court, the
     High Court and this Court. This is now the third round before this
     Court wherein the appellant is seeking bail in connection with the
     aforesaid two cases.
6.   On the basis of a letter dated 20th July 2022 addressed by Shri
     Vinai Kumar Saxena, the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, alleging
     irregularities in the framing and implementation of Delhi’s Excise
     Policy for the year 2021-22, the Director, Ministry of Home Affairs
     had directed an enquiry into the said matter vide Office Memorandum
     dated 22nd July 2022. On 26th February 2023, the appellant came to
     be arrested by the CBI. Subsequently, the appellant was arrested
     by the ED on 9th March 2023.
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7.   After investigation, CBI filed charge-sheet on 25th April 2023 for the
     offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A, 8 and 12 of the Prevention
     of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘PC Act’) read with Sections 420,
     201 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). Upon
     completion of investigation, the ED filed a complaint under Section 3
     of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, ‘PMLA’)
     on 4th May 2023.
8.   The first application for regular bail of the appellant in CBI matter came
     to be rejected by the High Court on 30th May 2023. Subsequently, the
     first application for regular bail of the appellant in ED matter came
     to be rejected by the High Court on 3rd July 2023. This Court, vide
     common order dated 30th October 2023 (hereinafter referred to as
     “the first order of this Court”) rejected the regular bail applications
     of the appellant in the CBI matter and the ED matter, with certain
     observations which we will refer to in the subsequent paragraphs.
9.   Subsequently, in view of the liberty granted by this Court, the
     appellant filed second bail application before the trial court on 27th
     January 2024. In the said proceedings, the appellant was granted
     interim protection. However, by an order dated 30th April 2024, the
     trial court rejected the said bail application on the ground that there
     was no change in the circumstances.
10. The appellant thereafter filed second bail application before the
    High Court on 2nd May 2024. Vide impugned judgment and order
    dated 21st May 2024, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
    rejected the said bail application also.
11. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant had approached this Court by
    filing Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 7795 and 7799 of 2024.
12. The matter was heard on 4th June 2024. This Court, in the said
    order (hereinafter referred to as “the second order of this Court”)
    recorded the submissions of the learned Solicitor General that the
    investigation would be concluded and final complaint/charge-sheet
    would be filed expeditiously and at any rate on or before 3rd July 2024
    and immediately thereafter, the trial court would be free to proceed
    with the trial. This Court recorded the submissions made by the
    learned Solicitor General and observed that having regard to the fact
    that the period of “6-8 months” fixed by this Court by order dated
    30th October 2023 had not yet come to an end, disposed of the said
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                          1067

                Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


     petition with liberty to revive his prayer afresh after filing of the final
     complaint/charge-sheet.
13. Accordingly, after filing of the final complaint/charge-sheet, the
    appellant has approached this Court by way of the present appeals.
    This Court, vide order dated 16th July 2024 had issued notice. In
    response thereto, counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the
    ED as well as the CBI opposing the present appeals.
     SUBMISSIONS:
14. We have extensively heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior
    Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Suryaprakash
    V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG) appearing on
    behalf of the respondents.
15. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the learned
    ASG that the appellant cannot be permitted to file second set of
    SLPs to challenge the order of the High Court dated 21st May 2024
    when the earlier SLPs arising out of the same order were disposed
    of. He submitted that the liberty granted by this Court vide order
    dated 4th June 2024 has to be construed as a liberty to apply to
    the trial court afresh. It is submitted that, only after the appellant
    approaches the trial court and in the event he does not succeed
    before the trial court, thereafter he approaches the High Court
    and in the event he also does not succeed before the High Court,
    then only he would be entitled to approach this Court. He therefore
    submitted that the present appeals deserve to be rejected thereby
    relegating the appellant to approach the trial court afresh. To buttress
    his submission, Shri Raju relied on the judgment of this Court in
    the case of Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and
    Others.1
16. The said preliminary objection has been opposed by Dr. Singhvi,
    learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
    contending that this Court had specifically, vide its first order dated
    30th October 2023, granted liberty to the appellant to move a fresh
    application for bail in case the trial does not conclude within next
    6-8 months and also in case the trial is protracted and proceeds at



1   [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359 : 2000 INSC 339
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     a snail’s pace in next three months. He submitted that, admittedly,
     the trial has not been concluded within a period of 6-8 months from
     the date of the first order of this Court. He further submitted that the
     record would show that the trial was protracted and proceeded at
     a snail’s pace in the period of three months after the first order of
     this Court was passed. He submitted that the second order of this
     Court clearly reserves the right of the appellant to revive the request
     afresh after filing of the final complaint/charge-sheet as assured by
     the learned Solicitor General. Dr. Singhvi therefore prays for rejection
     of the preliminary objection.
17. On merits, Dr. Singhvi submitted that this Court, vide its first order
    dated 30th October 2023, has given various findings in favour of the
    appellant. It is submitted that, a perusal of the same would clearly
    reveal that at number of places, this Court has given findings which
    would show that the respondents have not been in a position to
    make out a prima facie case. Dr. Singhvi further submitted that a
    perusal of the record would reveal that even the investigation in
    the case is not complete. He therefore submitted that unless the
    investigation is complete, the trial cannot proceed. He submitted
    that three more supplementary complaints have been filed on
    10th May 2024, 17th May 2024 and 20th June 2024 in the ED matter
    and as on 27th July 2024, there were 40 persons who have been
    arrayed as accused in the proceedings with more than 8 complaints.
    He further submitted that, in the ED matter, the ED has cited 224
    witnesses and produced 32,000 pages of documents. He further
    submitted that, in the CBI matter, the CBI has cited 269 witnesses
    and produced around 37,000 pages of documents. It is therefore
    submitted that in all there are 493 witnesses, excluding the ones in
    the 4th Supplementary Charge-sheet filed by the CBI, who will have
    to be examined and that in total the documents are running into
    around 69,000 pages.
18. Dr. Singhvi submitted that the ED has deliberately concealed the
    documents it acquired during investigation by putting documents
    exculpating the accused persons in the category of “un-relied upon
    documents”. It is submitted that, as such, it was necessary for the
    appellant to inspect such “un-relied upon documents”. He further
    submitted that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the ED
    and the CBI in producing the list of “un-relied upon documents”.
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1069

                Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


19. Dr. Singhvi submitted that, taking into consideration the voluminous
    number of witnesses and documents, there is no possibility of the
    trial seeing the light of the day and therefore the appeals filed by
    the appellant deserve to be allowed.
20. Shri Raju vehemently opposed the present appeals. He submitted
    that this Court, in its first order, after enumerating various factors
    on merits of the matter in paragraph 25 has held that the Court
    was not inclined to accept the prayer for grant of bail. It is therefore
    submitted that the appeals of the present appellant on merits were
    specifically rejected.
21. Shri Raju further submitted that, though the Court granted liberty to file
    a fresh application in the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 29,
    it was held that the same would be considered by the trial court on
    merits without being influenced by the dismissal of the earlier bail
    applications including the said first order. It is therefore submitted
    that the trial court as well as the High Court were required to take
    into consideration the merits of the matter. However, the present
    appellant opposed the consideration of the application on merits
    and insisted on consideration of the application only on the ground
    of delay in trial. It is therefore submitted that both the courts have
    rightly considered the merits of the matter and after considering the
    merits, found that the appellant was not entitled to grant of bail. He
    submitted that no interference would be warranted.
22. Shri Raju submitted that the trial court and the High Court have
    specifically come to a finding that the appellant has delayed the
    pre-charge proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of
    Section 207 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’).
    He submitted that more than hundred applications have been filed out
    of which many are under Section 207 Cr.P.C. These applications have
    been filed only for the purpose of delaying the trial. It is submitted
    that though in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of
    P. Ponnusamy v. State of Tamil Nadu,2 such applications could have
    been filed only after framing of the charges, the same have been
    intentionally filed at a pre-charge stage of the trial, so as to delay
    the framing of the charges. He submitted that though the appellant



2   [2022] 15 SCR 265 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1543 : 2022 INSC 1175
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     is entitled to file an application for discharge, the same has not been
     filed only in order to protract the trial. He submitted that the totality
     of the circumstances would reveal that it is the appellant who has
     been protracting the trial. It is submitted that as the appellant himself
     is responsible for protracting the trial, he cannot be permitted to take
     the benefit of the same.
23. The learned ASG submitted that unless the triple conditions as
    stipulated under Section 45 of the PMLA are satisfied, no person
    accused of an offence shall be released on bail. It is submitted that,
    in the present case, this Court itself by the first order has found that
    the appellant was not entitled for bail on merits and as such, the
    second condition stipulated under Section 45 of the PMLA that there
    are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such
    offence, would not be satisfied in the present case.
24. The learned ASG further submitted that the appellant is a very
    influential person having occupied the office of Deputy Chief
    Minister of Delhi when the crime was committed. He submitted that
    if the appellant is released on bail, there is every possibility of him
    influencing the witnesses or tampering with the evidence.
25. Dr. Singhvi, in rejoinder, has submitted that the contention that the trial
    is being delayed due to the applications being filed by the appellant
    under Section 207 Cr.P.C. is totally incorrect. He submitted that the
    said applications were required to be filed since the prosecution had
    not placed on record the documents exculpating the accused persons
    by placing the same in the category of “un-relied upon documents”.
    He submitted that in order to avail the right of a fair trial and in
    adherence to the principles of natural justice as encapsulated in
    Section 207 Cr.P.C., the appellant was forced to file such applications.
    However, each of these applications were vehemently opposed by
    the prosecution. It is submitted that the said material ought to have
    been placed on record by the prosecution themselves, however, for
    the reasons best known to the prosecution, they have not done so.
    He submitted that the appellant has filed only 14 applications in ED
    case and 13 applications in CBI case and that all these applications
    have been allowed by the learned trial judge. He lastly submitted that
    even as per the prosecution, if the entire “un-relied upon documents”
    are to be supplied in digital form, it will take a long time. To support
    his submission, Dr. Singhvi places reliance on the compliance report
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                             1071

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


     dated 7th May 2024 filed by the Assistant Director of ED which would
     fortify this position.
     CONSIDERATION OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:
26. We will first deal with the preliminary objection of the learned ASG
    with regard to the filing of the second set of appeals before this
    Court challenging the order of the High Court dated 21st May 2024
    i.e., on the point of maintainability.
27. Undisputedly, the appellant had earlier challenged the same order
    dated 21st May 2024 vide SLP (Criminal) Nos. 7795 and 7799 of
    2024. On doing so, a Division Bench of this Court passed the order
    dated 4th June 2024. It will be apposite to refer to the observations
    made by this Court in the said order, which read thus:
           “Though, elaborate arguments have been made, we do
           not propose to go into the said arguments or dwell upon
           it and then record our reasons for the simple reason that
           Co-ordinate Bench while dismissing the appeals vide order
           dated 30.10.2023, as noticed hereinabove has granted
           liberty to the appellant, i.e., the petitioner herein to move
           a fresh application for bail by placing reliance on the
           assurance given on behalf of the prosecution that they
           would conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within
           next 6-8 months and as such the liberty was extended to
           the petitioner herein to move a fresh application in case of
           change in circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted
           and proceeds at a snail’s pace in next three months. It
           was also observed that if such an application is filed in the
           aforesaid circumstances, the same would be considered
           by the trial court on merits without being influenced by
           the dismissal of the earlier bail application including the
           judgment of this Court.
           Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General on instructions
           would submit that the investigation would be concluded and
           final complaint/charge sheet would be filed expeditiously
           and at any rate on or before 03.07.2024 and immediately
           thereafter, the trial court will be free to proceed with trial.
           In the light of the said submissions made and having
           regard to the fact that the period of “6-8 months” fixed by
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          this Court by Order dated 30.10.2023 having not come to
          an end, it would suffice to dispose of these petitions with
          liberty to the petitioner to revive his prayer afresh after
          filing of the final complaint/Charge-sheet as assured by
          learned Solicitor General. Needless to state that in the
          event of such an application being filed, the same would
          be considered on its own merits as already observed by
          this Court vide paragraph 29 (supra). Contentions of both
          parties kept open.
          Accordingly, these petitions stand disposed of. All pending
          applications consigned to record.”
28. Before considering the submissions of the learned ASG with regard
    to maintainability of the present appeals on account of the second
    order of this Court, it will be apposite to refer to certain observations
    made by this Court in its first order, which read thus:
          “26. However, we are also concerned about the prolonged
          period of incarceration suffered by the appellant –
          Manish Sisodia. In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate
          of Enforcement (2020) 13 SCC 791, the appellant
          therein was granted bail after being kept in custody for
          around 49 days [P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau
          of Investigation (2020) 13 SCC 337], relying on the
          Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia
          and Others v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565, and
          Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation
          (2012) 1 SCC 40, that even if the allegation is one of
          grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should
          be denied in every case. Ultimately, the consideration
          has to be made on a case to case basis, on the facts.
          The primary object is to secure the presence of the
          accused to stand trial. The argument that the appellant
          therein was a flight risk or that there was a possibility of
          tampering with the evidence or influencing the witnesses,
          was rejected by the Court. Again, in Satender Kumar
          Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another
          (2022) 10 SCC 51, this Court referred to Surinder Singh
          Alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab (2005) 7
          SCC 387 and Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1073

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


           (1977) 4 SCC 291, to emphasise that the right to speedy
           trial is a fundamental right within the broad scope
           of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Vijay Madanlal
           Choudhary (supra), this Court while highlighting the
           evil of economic offences like money laundering, and its
           adverse impact on the society and citizens, observed that
           arrest infringes the fundamental right to life. This Court
           referred to Section 19 of the PML Act, for the in-built
           safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officers to
           ensure fairness, objectivity and accountability. [See also
           Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Ors. 2023 SCC
           OnLine SC 1244] Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra),
           also held that Section 436A of the Code can apply to
           offences under the PML Act, as it effectuates the right to
           speedy trial, a facet of the right to life, except for a valid
           ground such as where the trial is delayed at the instance
           of the accused himself. In our opinion, Section 436A
           should not be construed as a mandate that an accused
           should not be granted bail under the PML Act till he has
           suffered incarceration for the specified period. This Court,
           in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra
           and Others (2021) 2 SCC 427, held that while ensuring
           proper enforcement of criminal law on one hand, the court
           must be conscious that liberty across human eras is as
           tenacious as tenacious can be.
           27. The appellant – Manish Sisodia has argued that given
           the number of witnesses, 294 in the prosecution filed by the
           CBI and 162 in the prosecution filed by the DoE, and the
           documents 31,000 pages and 25,000 pages respectively,
           the fact that the CBI has filed multiple charge sheets, the
           arguments of charge have not commenced. The trial court
           has allowed application of the accused for furnishing of
           additional documents, which order has been challenged
           by the prosecution under Section 482 of the Code before
           the High Court. It was stated at the Bar, on behalf of
           the prosecution that the said petition under Section 482
           will be withdrawn. It was also stated at the Bar, by the
           prosecution that the trial would be concluded within next
           six to eight months.
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        28. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an
        offence should not become punishment without trial. If the
        trial gets protracted despite assurances of the prosecution,
        and it is clear that case will not be decided within a
        foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious.
        While the prosecution may pertain to an economic offence,
        yet it may not be proper to equate these cases with
        those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten
        years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and
        Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape,
        dacoity, kidnaping for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither
        is this a case where 100/1000s of depositors have been
        defrauded. The allegations have to be established and
        proven. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with
        incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature
        of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the
        Code and Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that
        the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the
        basic right of the person charged of an offence and not
        convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial.
        When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable
        to the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons,
        may well be guided to exercise the power to grant bail.
        This would be truer where the trial would take years.
        29. In view of the assurance given at the Bar on behalf of
        the prosecution that they shall conclude the trial by taking
        appropriate steps within next six to eight months, we give
        liberty to the appellant – Manish Sisodia to move a fresh
        application for bail in case of change in circumstances, or
        in case the trial is protracted and proceeds at a snail’s pace
        in next three months. If any application for bail is filed in
        the above circumstances, the same would be considered
        by the trial court on merits without being influenced by
        the dismissal of the earlier bail application, including the
        present judgment. Observations made above, re.: right to
        speedy trial, will, however, be taken into consideration. The
        appellant – Manish Sisodia may also file an application for
        interim bail in case of ill health and medical emergency
        due to illness of his wife. Such application would be also
        examined on its own merits.”
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                       1075

                Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


29. A perusal of the aforesaid would reveal that this Court was concerned
    about the prolonged period of incarceration suffered by the appellant.
    After considering various earlier pronouncements, this Court
    emphasised that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right within
    the broad scope of Article 21 of the Constitution. Relying on Vijay
    Madanlal Choudhary and Others v. Union of India and Others,3
    this Court observed that Section 436A Cr.P.C. should not be construed
    as a mandate that an accused should not be granted bail under the
    PMLA till he has suffered incarceration for the specified period. This
    Court recorded the assurance given by the prosecution that they
    shall conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within next 6-8
    months. This Court, after recording the said submissions, granted
    liberty to the appellant to move a fresh application for bail in case
    of change in circumstances or in case the trial was protracted and
    proceeded at a snail’s pace in next three months. This Court observed
    that if any application was filed, the same would be considered by
    the trial court on merits without being influenced by the dismissal
    of the earlier bail applications including its own judgment. It further
    observed that the observations made regarding the right to speedy
    trial will be taken into consideration.
30. Since the trial proceeded at a snail’s pace in the period after three
    months of the first order of this Court, the appellant filed the second
    application for bail before the trial court. The same came to be rejected
    by the trial court on 30th April 2024. It can thus be seen that it took
    a period of almost three months for the trial court to decide the said
    application. By the time the appellant approached the High Court, a
    period of more than six months had elapsed from the date on which
    the first order of this Court was passed. The same also came to be
    rejected on 21st May 2024.
31. When the appellant approached this Court in the second round and
    when the second order was passed by this Court on 4th June 2024,
    a period of 7 months and 4 days had elapsed from the date of the
    first order of this Court. However, this Court took into consideration
    the statement of the learned Solicitor General that the investigation
    would be concluded and final complaint/charge-sheet would be
    filed expeditiously and at any rate on or before 3rd July 2024 and


3   [2022] 6 SCR 382 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 : 2022 INSC 756
1076                                                           [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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     thereafter, the trial court would be free to proceed with the trial. It,
     after observing that “having regard to the fact that the period of 6-8
     months fixed by this Court in its first order having not come to an
     end”, disposed of the petitions with liberty to the appellant to revive
     his prayer afresh after filing of the final complaint/charge-sheet.
32. It could thus be seen that this Court had granted liberty to the appellant
    to revive his prayer after filing of the charge-sheet. Now, relegating
    the appellant to again approach the trial court and thereafter the
    High Court and only thereafter this Court, in our view, would be
    making him play a game of “Snake and Ladder”. The trial court and
    the High Court have already taken a view and in our view relegating
    the appellant again to the trial court and the High Court would be
    an empty formality. In a matter pertaining to the life and liberty of
    a citizen which is one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by
    the Constitution, a citizen cannot be made to run from pillar to post.
33. A careful reading of the second order of this Court dated 4th June
    2024 would show that this Court recorded that they did not propose
    to go into the arguments or dwell upon it in view of the liberty granted
    in the first order of this Court. Thereafter, this Court noticed the
    assurance of the learned Solicitor General that the investigation
    would be concluded and final complaint/charge-sheet would be filed
    at any rate on or before 3rd July 2024. This Court further observed
    in its second order that since the period of 6-8 months fixed by it in
    its first order had not come to an end, it was inclined to dispose of
    this petition with liberty to the appellant to revive his prayer. It will
    be a travesty of justice to construe that the carefully couched order
    preserving the right of the appellant to revive his prayer for grant of
    special leave against the High Court order, to mean that he should
    be relegated all the way down to the trial court. The memorable
    adage, that procedure is a hand maiden and not a mistress of justice
    rings loudly in our ears.
34. In this respect, we may also gainfully refer to one of the recent
    pronouncements by a bench of this Court to which one of us
    (B.R. Gavai, J.) was a member in the case of Prabir Purkayastha
    v. State (NCT of Delhi),4 which reads thus:



4   [2024] 6 SCR 666 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 934 : 2024 INSC 414
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                             1077

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


           “21. The Right to Life and Personal Liberty is the most
           sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed under Articles
           20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Any attempt to
           encroach upon this fundamental right has been frowned
           upon by this Court in a catena of decisions. In this regard,
           we may refer to following observations made by this Court
           in the case of Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala3:—
           “7. The life and liberty of an individual is so sacrosanct that
           it cannot be allowed to be interfered with except under the
           authority of law. It is a principle which has been recognised
           and applied in all civilised countries. In our Constitution
           Article 21 guarantees protection of life and personal liberty
           not only to citizens of India but also to aliens.””
35. In our view, the liberty reserved by this Court vide its second order,
    to revive the request of the appellant will have to be construed as
    a liberty given by this Court to revive his prayer afresh after filing of
    the final complaint/charge-sheet. Undisputedly, the present appeals
    have been filed after the final complaint/charge-sheet has been filed
    by the respondents. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to
    entertain the preliminary objection and the same is rejected.
     CONSIDERATION AS TO WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS
     ENTITLED FOR BAIL:
36. Having rejected the preliminary objection, we will proceed to consider
    as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
    the appellant is entitled to grant of bail or not.
37. Insofar as the contention of the learned ASG that since the conditions
    as provided under Section 45 of the PMLA are not satisfied, the
    appellant is not entitled to grant of bail is concerned, it will be apposite
    to refer to the first order of this Court. No doubt that this Court in
    its first order in paragraph 25, after recapitulating in paragraph 24
    as to what was stated in the charge-sheet filed by the CBI against
    the appellant, observed that, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the
    Court was not inclined to accept the prayer for grant of bail at that
    stage. However, certain paragraphs of the said order cannot be read
    in isolation from the other paragraphs. The order will have to be read
    in its entirety. In paragraph 28 of the said order, this Court observed
    that the right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for
1078                                                         [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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     a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be
     read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of the PMLA. The Court
     held that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the
     basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted
     that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. It further observed that
     when the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the
     accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, would be guided
     to exercise the power to grant bail. The Court specifically observed
     that this would be true where the trial would take years. It could
     thus clearly be seen that this Court, in the first round of litigation
     between the parties, has specifically observed that in case of delay
     coupled with incarceration for a long period and depending on the
     nature of the allegations, the right to bail will have to be read into
     Section 45 of PMLA.
38. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramkripal Meena v.
    Directorate of Enforcement 5 was considering an application of the
    petitioner therein who was to receive a bribe of rupees five crore and
    from whom, an amount of Rs.46,00,000/- was already recovered.
    In the said case, the petitioner was arrested on 26th January 2022
    in connection with FIR No. 402/2021 registered against him for the
    offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 120B of IPC and
    Section 4/6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair
    Means) Act, 1992. He was released on bail by this Court vide order
    dated 18th January 2023. Thereafter, the petitioner was arrested by
    the ED on 21st June 2023. The Court observed thus:
             “7. Adverting to the prayer for grant of bail in the instant
             case, it is pointed out by learned counsel for ED that the
             complaint case is at the stage of framing of charges and
             24 witnesses are proposed to be examined. The conclusion
             of proceedings, thus, will take some reasonable time. The
             petitioner has already been in custody for more than a
             year. Taking into consideration the period spent in custody
             and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within
             a short span, coupled with the fact that the petitioner is
             already on bail in the predicate offence, and keeping in
             view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,


5   SLP(Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024 dated 30.07.2024
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                          1079

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


           it seems to us that the rigours of Section 45 of the Act
           can be suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty to the
           petitioner. Ordered accordingly.”
39. In the light of the specific observations of this Court in paragraph
    28 of the first order, we are not inclined to accept the submission
    of the learned ASG that the provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA
    would come in the way of consideration of the application of the
    appellant for grant of bail.
40. From the first order of this Court, it would be clear that an assurance
    was given at the Bar on behalf of the prosecution that they shall
    conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within next 6-8 months.
    In view of the said statement, this Court did not consider the
    application of the appellant for bail at that stage, however, granted
    liberty to the appellant to move a fresh application for bail in case
    of change in circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted and
    proceeded at a snail’s pace in next three months. Though, this Court
    observed that if any application for bail was filed on the grounds
    mentioned in paragraph 29, the same would be considered by the
    trial court without being influenced by the dismissal of the earlier bail
    applications including the present judgment, however, it clarified that
    the observations made by the Court with regard to right to speedy
    trial would be taken into consideration. The liberty was also granted
    to the appellant to file an application for interim bail in case of ill-
    health and medical emergency due to illness of his wife.
41. A perusal of the impugned judgment and order would reveal that
    though the learned Single Judge of the High Court has dismissed the
    applications for bail on merits, on medical grounds, it has permitted
    the appellant to visit his residence to meet his wife in custody once
    every week.
42. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court expected the trial to be
    concluded within a period of 6-8 months. The liberty was reserved
    to approach afresh if the trial did not conclude within the period of
    6-8 months. The liberty was also granted in case the trial proceeded
    at a snail’s pace in next three months.
43. A perusal of the material placed on record would clearly reveal that
    far from the trial being concluded within a period of 6-8 months, it
    is even yet to commence. Though in the first order of this Court,
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     liberty was reserved to move afresh for bail if the trial proceeded at
     a snail’s pace within a period of three months from the date of the
     said order, the commencement of the trial is yet to see the light of the
     day. In these circumstances, in view of the first order of this Court,
     the appellant was entitled to renew his request. When the appellant
     renewed his request, the learned Special Judge (trial court) as well
     as the High Court was required to consider the said applications in
     the light of the observations made by this Court in paragraphs 28
     and 29 of the first order. In paragraph 29 of the first order, this Court
     specifically observed that though the observations on the aspect of
     merit were not binding, the observations of right to speedy trial were
     required to be taken into consideration.
44. The learned Special Judge and the learned Single Judge of the
    High Court have considered the applications on merits as well as
    on the grounds of delay and denial of right to speedy trial. We see
    no error in the judgments and orders of the learned Special Judge
    as well as the High Court in considering the merits of the matter. In
    view of the observations made by this Court in the first order, they
    were entitled to consider the same. However, the question that arises
    is as to whether the trial court and the High Court have correctly
    considered the observations made by this Court with regard to right to
    speedy trial and prolonged period of incarceration. The courts below
    have rejected the claim of the appellant applying the triple test as
    contemplated under Section 45 of the PMLA. In our view, this is in
    ignorance of the observations made by this Court in paragraph 28
    of the first order wherein this Court specifically observed that right
    to bail in cases of delay coupled with incarceration for a long period
    should be read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of the PMLA.
45. The trial court, in its order, has held that the appellant individually
    and along with different accused persons have been filing one or
    the other applications/making oral submissions frequently. It further
    observed that some of them were frivolous. It was observed that
    this was apparently done as a concerted effort for accomplishing the
    shared purpose of causing delay in the matter. The trial court therefore
    rejected the contention of the appellant that he had not contributed
    to delay in proceedings or that the case has been proceeding at
    a snail’s pace. However, in the very subsequent paragraph i.e.,
    paragraph 80, the court observed that, in order to avoid any delay
    and considering the time being taken by the counsel for the accused
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                         1081

              Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


     in inspecting the “un-relied upon documents”, it had vide order dated
     18th April 2024 put a query to the prosecution if the entire “un-relied
     upon documents” can be provided to the accused persons in a
     digitized form. It further recorded that the ED accepted the suggestion
     that it would expedite the proceedings. However, some time was
     sought to consider the same. A perusal of the compliance report filed
     by the Assistant Director of ED dated 7th May 2024 which could be
     found at page 757 of the paperbook, would reveal that the Cyber
     Lab has informed that it would take 70-80 days to prepare one copy
     (cloning) of the data contained in the said unrelied digital devices.
46. It could further be seen that, though it has been submitted on behalf
    of the ED that hundreds of applications have been filed for supply of
    “un-relied upon documents”, the record would not substantiate the
    said position. Though various applications have been filed by different
    accused persons, insofar as the present appellant is concerned, he
    has filed only 13 applications in the CBI matter and 14 in the ED
    matter. It would reveal that some of the applications are for seeking
    permission to meet his wife or permission to file vakalatnama, to put
    signature on the documents, seeking permission to sign a cheque
    etc. Most of the applications are for supply of missing documents
    and legible copies under Section 207/208 Cr.P.C. Some of the
    applications are for inspection of the “un-relied upon documents”.
    It is pertinent to note that all these applications have been allowed
    by the learned trial court. It is further pertinent to note that some of
    these orders were also challenged before the High Court wherein
    stay was granted. However, a statement was made on behalf of the
    prosecution before this Court when the first order was passed that
    the said petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C would be withdrawn.
    The said statement is recorded in paragraph 27 of the first order
    of this Court. We may state that, when we specifically asked the
    learned ASG to point out any order wherein the learned trial judge
    found any of the applications of the appellant to be frivolous, not a
    single order could be pointed out.
47. In that view of the matter, we find that the finding of the learned trial
    judge that it is the appellant who is responsible for delaying the trial is
    not supported by the record. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
    endorses the finding of the trial court on the ground that the accused
    persons have taken three months’ time from 19th October 2023 to
    19th January 2024 for inspection of “un-relied upon documents” despite
1082                                                         [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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     repeated directions from the learned trial court to conclude the same
     expeditiously. It is to be noted that there are around 69,000 pages of
     documents involved in both the CBI and the ED matters. Taking into
     consideration the huge magnitude of the documents involved, it cannot
     be stated that the accused is not entitled to take a reasonable time
     for inspection of the said documents. In order to avail the right to fair
     trial, the accused cannot be denied the right to have inspection of the
     documents including the “un-relied upon documents”.
48. It is further to be noted that a perusal of the second order of this
    Court would itself reveal that this Court recorded the submissions of
    the learned Solicitor General, which were made on instructions, that
    the investigation would be concluded and final complaint/charge-sheet
    would be filed expeditiously and at any rate on or before 3rd July 2024.
    Accordingly, 8th charge-sheet has been filed on 28th June 2024 by the
    ED. It could thus be seen that, even according to the respondents,
    the investigation was to be concluded on or before 3rd July 2024.
    In that view of the matter, we find that the contention raised by the
    learned ASG is self-contradictory. If the investigation itself was to
    conclude on or before 3rd July 2024, the question is how could the
    trial have commenced prior to that? If the investigation itself was to
    conclude after a period of 8 months from the date of the first order of
    this Court, there was no question of the trial being concluded within
    a period of 6-8 months from the date of the first order of this Court.
    We find that both the High Court and the trial court have failed to
    take this into consideration.
49. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration running for
    around 17 months and the trial even not having been commenced,
    the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial.
50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial and the right
    to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of these rights, the trial
    court as well as the High Court ought to have given due weightage
    to this factor.
51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider an application for bail
    in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra
    and Another 6 wherein the accused was prosecuted under the


6   [2024] 7 SCR 992 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                             1083

                 Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


      provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court
      surveyed the entire law right from the judgment of this Court in the
      cases of Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others v. Public Prosecutor,
      High Court of Andhra Pradesh,7 Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and
      Others v. State of Punjab,8 Hussainara Khatoon and Others (I) v.
      Home Secretary, State of Bihar,9 Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb10
      and Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation
      and Another.11 The Court observed thus:
             “19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the
             court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect
             the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
             as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
             State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
             the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
             serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective
             of the nature of the crime.”
52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in Gudikanti
    Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus:
             “10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts
             and the High Courts of what came to be observed by this
             Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High
             Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote:
                 “What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants
                 reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial
                 custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord
                 Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
                     “I observe that in this case bail was refused for
                     the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed
                     on the, magistracy of the country that bail is not
                     to be withheld as a punishment, but that the
                     requirements as to bail are merely to secure
                     the attendance of the prisoner at trial.””


7    [1978] 2 SCR 371 : (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1977 INSC 232
8    [1980] 3 SCR 383 : (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 INSC 68
9    [1979] 3 SCR 169 : (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1979 INSC 34
10   [2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713 : 2021 INSC 50
11   [2022] 10 SCR 351 : (2022) 10 SCC 51 : 2022 INSC 690
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53. The Court further observed that, over a period of time, the trial courts
    and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law
    that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience,
    we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts
    attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail
    is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach.
    On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and
    shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions
    thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial
    courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail
    is rule and jail is exception”.
54. In the present case, in the ED matter as well as the CBI matter,
    493 witnesses have been named. The case involves thousands of
    pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents.
    It is thus clear that there is not even the remotest possibility of the
    trial being concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the
    appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time in the
    hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive his fundamental
    right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. As observed time
    and again, the prolonged incarceration before being pronounced
    guilty of an offence should not be permitted to become punishment
    without trial.
55. As observed by this Court in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu
    (supra), the objective to keep a person in judicial custody pending
    trial or disposal of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the
    prisoner at trial.
56. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots in the society.
    There is no possibility of him fleeing away from the country and not
    being available for facing the trial. In any case, conditions can be
    imposed to address the concern of the State.
57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG regarding
    the possibility of tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to be
    noted that the case largely depends on documentary evidence
    which is already seized by the prosecution. As such, there is no
    possibility of tampering with the evidence. Insofar as the concern
    with regard to influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said
    concern can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon
    the appellant.
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1085

                Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement


     CONCLUSION:
58. In the result, we pass the following order:
     (i)     The appeals are allowed;
     (ii)    The impugned judgment and order dated 21st May 2024 passed
             by the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application Nos. 1557 and
             1559 of 2024 is quashed and set aside;
     (iii) The appellant is directed to be released on bail in connection
           with ED Case No. HIU-II/14/2022 registered against the appellant
           by the ED and FIR No. RC0032022A0053 of 2022 registered
           against the appellant by the CBI on furnishing bail bonds for
           a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- with two sureties of the like amount;
     (iv) The appellant shall surrender his passport with the Special Court;
     (v)     The appellant shall report to the Investigating Officer on every
             Monday and Thursday between 10-11 AM; and
     (vi) The appellant shall not make any attempt either to influence
          the witnesses or to tamper with the evidence.
59. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above
    terms.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey