MANISH TRIVEDIversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN

                   [2013] 12 S.C.R. 205


                      MANISH TRIVEDI                                  A
                               v.
                  STATE OF RAJASTHAN
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1881 of 2013)

                    OCTOBER 29, 2013
                                                                      B
          [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
             JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

    RAJASTHAN MUNICIPAL/TIES ACT, 1959:
                                                                      c
     s.87 of the Rajasthan Act rlw s.21, /PC and s.2(c)(viii) of
PC Act -- 'Public servant' - Appellant, a Municipal Councillor
and Member of Municipal Board - Held: Bys. 87 of Rajasthan
Municipalities Act, Legislature has created a fiction that every
Member of Municipal Board shall be deemed to be a public              D
servant within the meaning of s. 21, /PC - Thus, appellant is
a public servant within the meaning of s.21,IPC - Penal Code,
1860- s.21 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - s.2(c)(viii).

     PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988:
                                                                      E
     s.2(c)(viii) - 'Public servant' - Held: Act envisages
widening of the scope of definition of expression 'public
servant' -- It was brought in force to purify public administration
-- Legislature has used a comprehensive definition of 'public
servant' to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing              F
corruption among public servants -- Therefore, it would be
inappropriate to limit the contents of definition clause by a
construction which would be against the spirit of the statute -
Interpretation of statute.

     s.2(c)(viii) - 'Public servant' - Appellant a Municipal          G
 Councillor and Member of Municipal Board - Held: Is a public
 servant within the meaning of s.2(c) -- Clause (viii) of s.2(c)
 makes any person, who holds an office by virtue of which he

                                205                                       H
    206 .    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A is authorized or required to perform any public duty, to be a
  public seNant -- Word 'office' in the context would mean a
  position or place to which certain duties are attached and has
  an existence which is independent of the persons who fill it -
  - Councillors and Members of Municipal Board are positions
B under Rajasthan Municipalities Act -- They perform various
  duties which are in the field of public duty -- Rajasthan
  Municipalities Act, 1959 -- s.87-- Penal Code, 1860 - s.21.

        INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:

C      Legal fiction - Held: Legislature is competent to create a
  legal fiction -- A deeming provision is enacted for the purpose
  of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist
  -- When legislature creates a legal fiction, court has to
  ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after
D ascertaining this, to assume all those facts and consequences
  which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect
  to the fiction -- Legislature, while enacting s. 87 of Rajasthan
  Municipalities, has created a legal fiction for the purpose of
  assuming that the Members, otherwise, may not be public
E seNants within the meaning of s.21 /PC but shall be assumed
  to be so in view of legal fiction so created -- Rajasthan
  Municipalities Act, 1959 - s.87 -- Penal Code, 1860 - s.21.

        WORDS AND PHRASES:

F       'Office' - Connotation of Prevention of Corruption Act,
    1988.

        A charge sheet for offences u/ss 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w
  s.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was filed
G against the appellant, who at the relevant time was a
  Municipal Councillor and a Member of the Municipal
  Board. During the trial, the appellant filed an application
  before the trial court for dropping the proceeding, inter
  alia, contending that he being a Councillor did not come
H within the definition of 'public servant' and, as such, he         '


                                                                     I
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                 207


could not be put on trial for the offence charged. The trial     A
court rejected the prayer. The High Court also rejected
his petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                             B
    HELD: 1.1 Admittedly, the appellant is an elected
Councillor and a Member of the Municipal Board. Section
87 of the Act makes every Member to be public servant
within the meaning of s. 21, IPC. The legislature, while
enacting s.87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959          C
has created a legal fiction for the purpose of assuming
that the Members, otherwise, may not be public servants
within the meaning of s.21 of the Penal Code but shall be
assumed to be so in view of the legal fiction so created.
Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the       D
appellant is a public servant within the meaning of s.21
of the Penal Code. [para 14 & 15] [215-D, H; 216-A, C-D]

    1.2 Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction.
A deeming provision is enacted for the purpose of                E
assuming the existence of a fact which does not really
exist. When the legislature creates a legal fiction, the
court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is
created and after ascertaining this, to assume all those
facts and consequences which are incidental or
inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. [para   F
15] [216-A-C]

    1.3 Under the scheme of the Rajasthan Municipalities
Act it is evident that the appellant happens to be a
Councillor and a Member of the Board. Further in view            G
of language of s.87, he is a public servant within the
meaning of s.21 of the Penal Code. 'Public servant' has
been defined u/s 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, which is relevant in the instant case. Prosecution
under this Act can take place only of such persons, who          H
    208     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013) 12 S.C.R.


A come within the definition of public servant therein. The
  appellant is sought to be prosecuted under the
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and, therefore, to
  determine his status it would be necessary to look into
  its interpretation u/s 2(c) thereof, read with the provisions
B of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. [para 17] [216-F-G;
  217-A-C]

          State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakarrao, (2002) 7 SCC 636
    - relied on.

C       1.4 The 1988 Act envisages widening of the scope of
  the definition of the expression 'public servant'. It was
  brought in force to purify public administration. The
  legislature has used a comprehensive definition of
  'public servant' to achieve the purpose of punishing and
D curbing corruption among public servants. Therefore, it
  would be inappropriate to limit the contents of the
  definition clause by a construction which would be
  against the spirit of the statute. Bearing in mind this
  principle, there is no doubt that the appellant Is a public
E servant within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the Act. Clause
  (viii) of s.2(c) makes any person, who holds an office by
  virtue of which he is authorized or required to perform
  any public duty, to be a public servant. The word 'office'
  is of indefinite connotation and, in the present context, it
F would mean a position or place to which certain duties
  are attached and has an existence which is independent
  of the persons who fill it. Councillors and members of the
  Board are positions which exist under the Rajasthan
  Municipalities Act. It is independent of the person who
G fills it. They perform various duties which are in the field
  of public duty. It is, thus, evident that the appellant is a
  public servant within s.2(c)(viii) of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1988. [para 19] [219-H; 220-A-E]

     1.5 A Member of the Board, or for that matter, a
H Councillor per se, may not come within the definition of
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN              209


the public servant as defined u/s 21 of the Penal Code, A
but this does not mean that they cannot be brought in
the category of public servant by any other enactment.
Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act makes
Councillor and Member of Board come within a public
servant within the meaning of s. 21 of the Penal Code. B
 Besides, in the case in hand, the meaning of the
expression 'public servant' as defined u/s 2(c) of the
 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is significant and,
 therefore, decisions rendered by this Court while
 interpreting s. 21 of the Penal Code, which in substance c
 and content are substantially different than s. 2(c) of the
 1988 Act, shall have no bearing at all for decision in the
 instant case. [para 20 and 22) [220-G-H; 221-A, F-G]

                                                  =
    R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay 1984 (2) SCR 495 (1984)
2 SCC 183; Ramesh Ba/krishna Kulkarni v. State of D
                                      =
Maharashtra, 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 345 (1985) 3 SCC 606;
State of T.N. v. T. Thu/asingam, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 405 -
held inapplicable.

    1.6 As regards the decision of the single Judge of the    E
Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sumitra Kanthiya, it
has also not considered s.87 of the Rajasthan
Municipalities Act. The single Judge has also not at all
adverted to s.87 of 'the Rajasthan Municipalities Act as
also s. 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and,   F
therefore, the judgment rendered by the Rajasthan High
Court in Sumitra Kanthiya does not lay down the law
correctly and is, therefore, overruled. [para 22) [221-G-H;
222-C-D]

     Smt. Sumitra Kanthiya vs. State of Rajasthan, disposed   G
 of by Rajasthan High Court on 30.7.2008 - overruled.
                     Case Law Reference:
  1984 (2) SCR 495            held inapplicable para 8
                                                              H
    210       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A    1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 345 held inapplicable para 9

     1994 Supp (2) sec 405         held inapplicable para 10
     (2002) 1 sec 636              relied on            para 17

B       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1881 of 2013.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2013 of the
  High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Crl. Misc. Petition No.
C 1686 of 2009.

        Yashank Adiyaru, Arthi Bansal, Ajay Digpaul, N.
    Annapoorani for the Appellant.

          Milind Kumar for Respondent.
D
          The Judgment of the Court was deliverd by

       CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. The petitioner's
  challenge to his prosecution for an offence under Sections 7,
  13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
E Act has been turned down by the trial court and the said order
  has been affirmed by the High Court by its order dated 1st of
  March, 2013 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.
  1686 of 2009. It is against this order that the petitioner has
  preferred this special leave petition.
F         2. Delay condoned.

          3. leave granted.
       4. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise to the
  present appeal are that the appellant at the relevant time was
G a Councillor elected to the Municipal Council, Banswara and a
  Member of the Municipal Board. According to the prosecution,
  one Prabhu Lal Mochi lodged a report in '.he Anti-Corruption
  Bureau, inter alia, alleging that he had a shoe repair shop near
  the gate of Forest Department, Banswara and the employees
H
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                        211
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
of the Municipal Council had seized his cabin in the year 2000 A
rendering him unemployed. According to the allegation, he
applied for the allotment of a kiosk before the Municipal Council
but did not succeed. On enquiry the informant was told that it
is the appellant who can get the allotment made in his favour
and accordingly he contacted the appellant. It is alleged that B
the appellant demanded a sum of Rs. 50,000/- for getting the
 allotment done in his name and ultimately it was agreed that
 initially the informant would pay Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant and
 the rest amount thereafter. On the basis of the aforesaid
 information, according to the prosecution, a trap was laid and C
 the appellant was caught red-handed and a sum of Rs.
  5,000/- was recovered from him.

     5. After usual investigation, charge-sheet was submitted
against the appellant and he was put on trial. During the trial
evidence of one of the witnesses was recorded and thereafter, D
the appellant filed an application before the trial court for
dropping the proceeding, inter alia, contending that he being
a Councillor does not come within the definition of 'public
servant' and as such, he cannot be put on trial for the offence
under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the E
 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The trial court rejected the
 said prayer vide its order dated 13th of October, 2009. The
 appellant assailed this order before the High Court in an
 application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
 Procedure and the High Court by the impugned judgment has F
 rejected his prayer.

      6. It is against this order that the appellant is before us with
 the leave of the court.

       7. We have heard Mr. Yashank Adhiyaru, Senior Counsel             G
 for the appellant while respondent is represented by Mr. Milind
 Kumar.

      8. Mr. Adhiyaru submits that a Municipal Councillor is not
  a public servant and, therefore, his prosecution for the offence       H
    212      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 12 S.C.R.

A alleged is bad in law. According to him, for prosecuting an
   accused for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
   1988 the accused charged must be a public servant and the
   appellant not being a public servant cannot be prosecuted under
   the said Act. Further, for a person to have the status of a public
8 servant he must be appointed by the Government and must be
  getting pay or salary from the Government. Not only this, to be
  a public servant, such a person has to discharge his duties in
  accordance with the rules and regulations made by the
  Government. According to him, the appellant was elected as a
C Municipal Councillor and he does not owe his appointment to
  any governmental authority. Being a person elected by the
  people, the commands and edicts of a Government authority
  do not apply to him. In support of the submission he has placed
  reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of R.S. Nayak
  v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183. He has drawn our attention
D to the following passage from the said judgment.

        "41 ....... Whatever that may be the conclusion is
        inescapable that till 1964 at any rate MLA was not
        comprehended in the definition of 'public servant' in
E       Section 21. And the Santhanam Committee did not
        recommend its inclusion in the definition of 'public servant'
        in Section 21.

        42 ....... Now if prior to the enactment of Act 40 of 1964
        MLA was not comprehended as a public servant in
F       Section 21, the next question is: did the amendment make
        any difference in his position. The amendment keeps the
        law virtually unaltered. Last part of clause (9) was enacted
        as clause (12)(a). If MLA was not comprehended in clause
        (9) before its amendment and dissection, it would make
G       no difference in the meaning of law if a portion of clause
        (9) is re-enacted as clause (12)(a). It must follow as a
        necessary corollary that the amendment of clauses (9) and
        (12) by Amending Act 40 of 1964 did not bring about any
        change in the interpretation of clause (9) and clause (12)(a)
H
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                  213
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
    after the amendment of 1964 .......... .                      A
          Xxx                    xxx              xxx
           .......... Therefore, apart from anything else, on
    historical evolution of Section 21, adopted as an external
    aid to construction, one can confidently say that MLA was     B
    not and is not a 'public servant' within the meaning of the
    expression in any of the clauses of Section 21 IPC."

     9. Another decision on which the counsel has placed
reliance is the judgment of this Court in the case of Ramesh      C
Ba/krishna Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 3 SCC
606, and he has drawn our attention to Paragraph 5 from the
said judgment which reads as follows:

    "5. In view of this decision, therefore, we need not go to
                                                                   0
    the other authorities on the subject. Even so, we are of the
    opinion that the concept of a "public servant" is quite
    different from that of a Municipal Councillor. A "public
    servant" is an authority who must be appointed by
     Government or a semi-governmental body and should be
     in the pay or salary of the same. Secondly, a "public E
     servant" is to discharge his duties in accordance with the
     rules and regulations made by the Government. On the
     other hand, a Municipal Councillor does not owe his
     appointment to any governmental authority. Such a person
     is elected by the people and functions undeterred by the F
      commands or edicts of a governmental authority. The mere
      fact that an MLA gets allowance by way of honorarium
      does not convert his status into that of a "public servant".
      In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 the
      learned Judges of the Constitution Bench have referred to G
      the entire history and evolution of the concept of a "public
      servant" as contemplated by Section 21 of the IPC."

      10. Yet another decision on which counsel has placed
 reliance is the judgment of this Court in the case of State of   H
    214       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 12 S.C.R.

A TN. v. T Thu/asingam, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 405, and he has
  drawn our attention to Paragraph 76 from the said judgment
  which reads as follows:

           "76. The High Court was, however, right in acquitting
B         various Councillors of the charge under the Prevention of
          Corruption Act as they are not public servants, in view of
          the decision of this Court in Ramesh Balkrishna Kulkarni
          v. State of Maharashtra (1985) 3 SCC 606. The acquittal
          of the Councillors (A-75 to A-80 and A-82); Chairman and
          Member of the Accounts Committee (A-84 to A-86);
c         Members of the Works Committee (A-87); Members of the
          Education Committee (A-94 to A-96); Member of the Town
          Planning Committee (A-98) and Councillors (A-102 and A-
          104) under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption
          Act is thus upheld. However, their respective convictions
D         and sentences for other charges as found by the trial court
          are upheld and their acquittal by the High Court for those
          other charges was not justified. All the public dignitaries
          themselves had become the kingpin of the criminal
          conspiracy to defraud the Corporation of Madras."
E
      11. Counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on
  an unreported judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case
  of Smt. Sumitra Kanthiya vs. State of Rajasthan, disposed of
  on 30th of July, 2008 passed in Criminal Revision Petition No.
F 453 of 2008 and our attention has been drawn to the following
  passage from the said judgment:

             "In view of the above decision of the Hon'ble
       Supreme Court, the petitioners being municipal councillors
       are not public servant and charges framed against them
G      without giving them opportunity of hearing on 18.7.2007
       cannot be sustainable, specially when the State refused
       to sanction prosecution and the Anti Corruption
       Department submitted final report but the learned Judge

H
       took the cognizance overlooking the above legal aspects."
                                                                        ••
                                                                        "'
                                                                        '
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                    215
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
     12. Mr. Milind Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf        A
of the respondent State of Rajasthan, however, submits that the
appellant, undisputedly being the Municipal Councillor and a
Member of the Board, comes within the definition of public
servant and, hence, he cannot escape from the prosecution for
the offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act,        B
1988.

     13. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submission and we do not find any substance in the submission
of Mr. Yashank Adhiyaru and the authorities relied on are clearly     C
distinguishable.

     14. As stated earlier, it is an admitted position that the
appellant happens to be an elected Councillor and a Member
of the Municipal Board. Section 3(2) of the Act defines Board.
Section 7 provides for its establishment and incorporation and        D
Section 9 provides for composition thereof. Section 3(15)
defines 'Member' to mean a person who is lawfully a Member
of a Board. Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act,
1959 makes every Member to be public servant within the
meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and the same               E
reads as follows:

      "87. Members etc., to be deemed public servants.-(1)
      Every member, officer or servant, and every lessee of the
      levy of any municipal tax, and every servant or other
      employee of any such lessee shall be deemed to be a                 F
      public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the
      Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act XLV of 1860).

      (2) The word "Government" in the definition of "legal
      remuneration" in Section 161 of that Code shall, for the            G
      purposes of sub-section (1) of this section, be deemed to
      include a municipal board."

       15. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is
  evident that by the aforesaid section the legislature has created       H
    216       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A  a fiction that every Member shall be deemed to be a public
   servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal
   Code. It is well settled that the legislature is competent to create .
   a legal fiction. A deeming provision is enacted for the purpose
  of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist.
B When the legislature creates a legal fiction, the court has to
  ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after
  ascertaining this, to assume all those facts and consequences
  which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect to
  the fiction. In our opinion, the legislature, while enacting Section
C 87 has, thus, created a legal fiction for the purpose of assuming
  that the Members, otherwise, may not be public servants within
  the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code but shall
  be assumed to be so in view of the legal fiction so created. In
  view of the aforesaid, there is no escape from the conclusion
  that the appellant is a public servant within the meaning of
0
  Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.

          16. To put the record straight, we must incorporate an
  ancillary submission of Mr. Adhiyaru. He submits that 'Every
  member' used in Section 87 relates to such members who are
E associated with any 'lessee of the levy of any Municipal tax'.
  This submission has only been noted to be rejected. The
  expression 'Every member' in Section 87 is independent and
  not controlled by the latter portion at all and in view of the plain
  language of the section, no further elaboration is required.
F
         17. Under the scheme of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act
  it is evident that the appellant happens to be a Councillor and
  a Member of the Board. Further in view of language of Section
  87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, he is a public servant
G within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Had
  this been a case of prosecution under the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1947 then this would have been the end of the
  matter. Section 2 of this Act defines 'public servant' to mean
  public servant as defined under Section 21 of the Indian Penal
  Code. However, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
H



                                                                            I
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                    217
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
with which we are concerned in the present appeal, the term A
'public servant' has been defined under Section 2(c) thereof.
In our opinion, prosecution under this Act can take place only
of such persons, who come within the definition of public
servant therein. Definition of public servant under the
 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 21 of the Indian B
 Penal Code is of no consequence. The appellant is sought to
 be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
 and, hence, to determine his status it would be necessary to
 look into its interpretation under Section 2(c) thereof, read with
 the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. The view        c
 which we have taken finds support from the judgment of this
 Court in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakarrao, (2002) 7 SCC
 636, wherein it has been held as follows:

     "5. Unfortunately, the High Court in its order has not
     considered this question at all. It has proceeded on the        D
     assumption that Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code is
     the relevant provision for determination of the question
     whether the accused in the case is a public servant. As
      noted earlier, Section 21 IPC is of no relevance to consider
     the question which has to be on interpretation of provision     E
      of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
      read with the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra
      Cooperative Societies Act, 1960."

      18. Now we proceed to consider whether or not the              F
. appellant, a Councillor and the member of the Board, is a public
  servant under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
  1988. Section 2(c) of this Act reads as follows:

      "2. Definitions.-ln this Act, unless the context otherwise
      requires,-                                                     G

      (a)   xxx                    JOO(                    JOO(


      (b)   )()()(                 JOO(                    JOO(

                                                                      H
    218       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 12 S.C.R.


A         (c) " public servant" means,-

          (i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or
          remunerated by the Government by fees or commission
          for the performance of any public duty;
B         (ii) any person in the service or pay of a local authority;

          (iii) any person in the service or pay of a corporation
          established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act,
          or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by
c         the Government or a Government company as defined in
          section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);

          (iv) any Judge, including any person empowered by law
          to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any
          body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;
D
      (v) any person authorised by a court of justice to perform
      any duty, in connection with the administration of justice,
      including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner appointed
      by such court;
E
      (vi) any arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or
      matter has been referred for decision or report by a court
      of justice or by a competent public authority;

      (vii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he
F     is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an
      electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election;
      (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he
      is authorised or required to perform any public duty;
G
      (ix) any person who is the president, secretary or other
      office-bearer of a registered co-operative society engaged
      in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, receiving or
      having received any financial aid from the Central
      Government or a State Government or from any
H
   MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                    219
      [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
   corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial A
   or State Act, or any authority or body owned or controlled
   or aided by the Government or a Government company as
   defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
   1956);
                                                              B
   (x) any person who is a chairman, member or employee
   of any Service Commission or Board, by whatever name
   called, or a member of any selection committee appointed
   by such Commission or Board for the conduct of any
   examination or making any selection on behalf of such C
   Commission or Board;

   (xi) any person who is a Vice-Chancellor or member of any
   governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other
   teacher or employee, by whatever designation called, of
   any University and any person whose services have been           D
   availed of by a University or any other public authority in
   connection with holding or conducting examinations;

    (xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee
    of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other        E
    institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or
    having received any financial assistance from the Central
    Government or any State Government, or local or other
    public authority.

    Explanation 1.-Persons falling under any of the above sub-      F
    clauses are public servants, whether appointed by the
    Government or not.

    Explanation 2.-Wherever the words "public servant"
    occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in       G
    actual possession of the situation of a public servant,
    whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that
    situation."

     19. The present Act envisages widening of the scope of
the definition of the expression 'public servant'. It was brought   H
    220      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 12 S.C.R.


A  in force to purify public administration. The legislature has used
  a comprehensive definition of 'public servant' to achieve the
  purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among public
  servants. Hence, it would be inappropriate to limit the contents
  of the definition clause by a construction which would be
B against the spirit of the statute. Bearing in mind this principle,
  when we consider the case of the appellant, we have no doubt
  that he is a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c)
  of the Act. Sub-section (viii) of Section 2(c) of the present Act
  makes any person, who holds an office by virtue of which he is
c authorized or required to perform any public duty, to be a public
  servant. The word 'office' is of indefinite connotation and, in the
  present context, it would mean a position or place to which
  certain duties are attached and has an existence which is
  independent of the persons who fill it. Councillors and members
  of the Board are positions which exist under the Rajasthan
D Municipalities Act. It is independent of the person who fills it.
  They perform various duties which are in the field of public duty.
  From the conspectus of what we have observed above, it is
  evident that appellant is a public servant within Section 2(c)(viii)
  of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
E
        20. Now we revert to the authorities relied on by Mr.
  Adhiyaru i.e. R.S.Nayak (supra), Ramesh Balkrishna Kulkarni
   (supra) and T Thulasingam (supra). In all these decisions, this
  Court was considering the scope of Section 21 of the Indian
F Penal Code which defines 'public servant'. It was necessary to
  do so as Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
  defined 'public servant' to mean as defined under Section 21
  of the Indian Penal Code. A member of the Board, or for that
  matter, a Councillor per se, may not come within the definition
G of the public servant as defined under Section 21 of the Indian
  Penal Code but this does not mean that they cannot be brought
  in the category of public servant by any other enactment. In the
  present case, the Municipal Councillor or member of the Board
  does not come within the definition of public servant as defined
H under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, but in view of the
    MANISH TRIVEDI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                   221
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

legal fiction created by Section 87 of the Rajasthan                A
Municipalities Act, they come within its definition.

       21. It is an admitted position that in none of the aforesaid
judgments relied on by the appellant, this Court had considered
any provision similar to Section 87 of the Rajasthan B
 Municipalities Act and, therefore, those judgments cannot be
 read to mean that a Municipal Councillor in no circumstance
 can be deemed to be a public servant. Mr. Adhiyaru points out
 that provisions pari materia to that of Section 87 of the
 Rajasthan Municipalities Act did exist in the respective C
 enactments under consideration in these cases and, therefore,
 it has to be assumed that this Court, while holding that
  Municipal Councillors are not public servant, must have taken
  note of the similar provision. However, in fairness to him, he
  concedes that such a provision, in fact, has not been considered
  in these judgments. We are of the opinion that for ascertaining D
  the binding nature of a judgment, what needs to be seen is the
  ratio. The ratio of those cases is that Municipal Councillors are
  not public servants under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.
  But Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, as
  discussed above, make Councillor and member of Board a E
   public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian
   Penal Code. Hence, all the judgments of this Court referred to
   above are clearly distinguishable.

      22. Not only this, in the case in hand, we are concerned      F
 with the meaning of the expression 'public servant' as defined
 under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
 and, hence, decisions rendered by this Court while interpreting
 Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, which in substance and
 content are substantially different than Section 2(c) aforesaid,   G
 shall have no bearing at all for decision in the present case.
 As regards the decision of the learned Single Judge of the
 Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sumitra Kanthiya (supra),
 it has also not considered Section 87 of the Rajasthan
 Municipalities Act. In fact, to come to the conclusion that the        H
    222      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A Municipal Councillor would not come within the definition of
  public servant, it has mainly placed reliance on a judgment of
  this Court in the case of Ramesh Bafkrishna Kulkarni (supra).
  We have considered this judgment in little detail in the
  preceding paragraphs of the judgment and found the same to
B be distinguishable as the said decision did not consider the
  statutory provision in the present format. Further, the aforesaid
  case does not lay down an absolute proposition of law that
  Municipal Councillor in no circumstances can be treated as a
  public servant. The learned Judge has also not at all adverted
c to Section 87 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act as also
  Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and,
  hence, the judgment rendered by the Rajasthan High Court in
  Sumitra Kanthiya (supra) does not lay down the law correctly
  and is, therefore, overruled.
D         23. As the trial is pending since long, we deem it expedient
    that the learned Judge in seisin of the trial makes an endeavour
    to dispose of the trial expeditiously and in no case later than
    six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

E         24. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and
    it is dismissed accordingly.

    R.P.                                         Appeal dismissed.