Holding

The Court declined to decide the substantive issue and referred the question of prior sanction for pre‑cognizance investigation under s.156(3) to a larger bench, while striking off the first respondent from the parties.

Summary

The appellant filed a complaint under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 alleging corruption in a drinking‑water project and sought investigation and FIR registration against several public servants, including the first respondent who was incorrectly described as Principal Secretary, PHED. The Special Judge dismissed the complaint for lack of prior sanction under PC Act s.19, relying on Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa. The appellant challenged the requirement of prior sanction before a magistrate can order investigation under CrPC s.156(3). The Supreme Court examined the distinction between pre‑cognizance investigation (s.156(3)) and post‑cognizance proceedings (s.190, s.202) and noted a split of opinion in earlier judgments. The Court held that the substantive question of whether prior sanction is required at the s.156(3) stage must be decided by a larger bench, and ordered that the first respondent be struck off from the parties, while leaving the matter open for further consideration. The application was allowed and the issue was referred to a larger bench.

Issues considered

Whether prior sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is required before a magistrate can direct investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 when a public servant is implicated.
Whether ordering investigation under Section 156(3) amounts to taking cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190 CrPC.
Whether the procedural requirements of Chapter 14 CrPC (sanction) can be imported into Chapter 12 CrPC (pre‑cognizance investigation).

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155, s. 156(1), s. 156(3), s. 190, s. 197, s. 200, s. 202
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 19(1), s. 19(3)

Subjects

Pre‑cognizance investigationSection 156(3) CrPCPrior sanctionPrevention of Corruption ActPublic servantCognizanceMagistrateLarger bench referralCriminal Procedure

Judgment

696 [2018]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 3 S.C.R. 696 [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A MANJU SURANA
v.
SUNIL ARORA & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2018)
B MARCH 27, 2018
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19 – Previous sanction
necessary for prosecution – Allegation of corruption in respect of
a public servants – Prior sanction for prosecution – Requirement
C
of, before setting in motion even the investigative process u/s. 156(3)
Cr.P.C – Held: Question would be whether in cases of the P.C. Act,
a different import has to be read qua the power to be exercised
u/s. 156(3) – Whether on account of s.19(1), the scope of inquiry u/
s. 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be said to be one of taking ‘cognizance’
D thereby requiring the prior sanction in case of a public servant –
Prior sanction to prosecute a public servant for offences under the
P.C. Act is a provision contained under Chapter 14 Cr.P.C. – Thus,
it has to be seen whether such a purport can be imported into
Chapter 12 Cr.P.C. while directing an investigation u/s. 156(3)
Cr.P.C., merely because a public servant would be involved – In
E
view of the complexity arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C.
Act offences read with the Cr.P.C., matter referred to larger Bench –
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 156(3).
Referring the matters to larger Bench, the Court
F HELD: 1.1 There is no doubt that even at the stage of
156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, while directing
an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the
Magistrate. Thus, it may not be an acceptable proposition to
contend that there would be some consequences to follow, were
the Magistrate to act in a mechanical and mindless manner. That
G cannot be the test. [Para 33] [713-F]
1.2 The question would be whether in cases of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, a different import has to be
read qua the power to be exercised under Section 156(3) of the
Cr.P.C., i.e., can it be said that on account of Section 19(1) of the
H
696
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 697

P.C. Act, the scope of inquiry under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. A
can be said to be one of taking ‘cognizance’ thereby requiring
the prior sanction in case of a public servant. It is trite to say that
prior sanction to prosecute a public servant for offences under
the P.C. Act is a provision contained under Chapter 14 of the
Cr.P.C. Thus, it has to be seen whether such a purport can be
B
imported into Chapter 12 of the Cr.P.C. while directing an
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., merely because
a public servant would be involved. [Para 34] [713-G; 714-A-B]
1.3 It was observed in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya
Pradesh that even at a pre-cognizance stage under Section 156(3)
of the Cr.P.C., it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to C
register an FIR and that even if the Magistrate does not say in
so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3)
of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the
officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding
the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that D
police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter
XII of the Code only thereafter. The apprehension expressed by
ASG arises from these observation. [Para 35] [714-C-D]
1.4 The complete controversy referred to aforesaid and the
conundrum arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C. Act E
offences read with the Cr.P.C. is, thus, required to be settled by
a larger Bench. [Para 36] [714-E]
Crl.M.P. 161/2015 IN SLP (Crl.) No. 5838/2014.
2.1 In the present Special Leave Petition, notice was
issued to the respondents, except respondent No. 4. Since the F
proceedings before the Magistrate at the threshold were directed
to be kept in abeyance without notice to the respondent, and
thereafter the revision petition was dismissed in limine by the
High Court, the occasion f or respondent No.1 to have
knowledge of the proceedings did not arise. Respondent No.1 G
sought deletion from the array of parties in these proceedings as
he has been wrongly arrayed as a party. The said plea is
predicated on the averments in the complaint itself, which seeks
to make a grievance over the actions of the Principal Secretary,
Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED) in which
H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A capacity respondent No.1 is stated to have been arrayed. It is
averred in the application that respondent No.1 was serving as a
Secretary and Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister and not
as Principal Secretary, PHED. In fact, the officer working as the
Principal Secretary, PHED has not been arrayed as a respon-
dent. There is no allegation made against the Secretary/Principal
B
Secretary to the Chief Minister. The allegation is of collusion of
the respondents. [Paras 38 and 39] [714-G-H; 715-A-B]
2.2 No doubt the process under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is
only one of investigation. The larger question, of whether any
such direction can be issued without prior sanction has been
C referred to a larger bench. Were the appellant to succeed and
were the matter to go back to the Magistrate and the Magistrate
after application of mind forms an opinion to direct investigation
by the police, it would be always open to the Magistrate to include
the name of respondent No.1 if such material is found against
D him. [Para 46] [716-D-E]
2.3 Merely because the appellant has roped in respondent
No.1 in the complaint is not sufficient ground to allow his name
to be included as such. The complaint is categorical – the role of
Secretary, PHED and the Principal Secretary has been questioned.
E That is the mindset with which the complainant knocked the doors
of the criminal courts. There was no allegation in respect of any
role played by the Secretary/Principal Secretary to the Chief
Minister. It cannot be said to be a mere mis-description of name,
which can be corrected. It cannot be the stand of the appellant
that willy-nilly somehow, respondent No.1 must remain arrayed
F as an accused in those proceedings, even though the proceedings
before the Magistrate are at the stage of only whether there
should be a direction for investigation or not. It is not that every
officer in the Government has to be arrayed in respect of any
role performed or not. The mere presence in one meeting of
G respondent No.1 and that too when he was not a signatory and
really had no role to play in that capacity, as apparent from the
minutes, cannot be now used to justify his name being included
as an accused. This is clearly an afterthought. It is not for the
appellant to question as to which officer should or should not be
present. [Para 47] [716-F-H; 717-A]
H
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 699

2.4 Respondent No.1 needs to be struck off from the array A
of parties both in the present proceedings and consequently in
the complaint. However, it is made clear that if a situation arises
where investigation is directed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and
some material comes to light to array respondent No.1 as an
accused, the order would not come in the way. [Para 48] [717-B]
B
Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC 705 :
[2013] 9 SCR 869 ; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC
559 : [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 135 ; L. Narayana Swamy
v. State of Karnataka (2016) 9 SCC 598 : [2016] 5
SCR 683 ; R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. [1951] SCR
312 ; Gopal Marwari v. Emperor AIR 1943 Pat 245 ; C
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR 1950 Cal
437 ; Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC
986 ; Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah [1964] 5 SCR 37 ;
Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B. (1973) 3 SCC D
753 : [1973] 2 SCR 66 ; Devarapally Lakshminarayana
Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252 :
[1976] Suppl. SCR 524 ; Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh
(1977) 4 SCC 459: [1978] 1 SCR 615 ; Srinivas
Gundluri v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn.
(2010) 8 SCC 206 : [2010] 9 SCR 278 ; Subramanian E
Swamy v. CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682 : [2014] 6 SCR 873 ;
Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668 :
[2007] 9 SCR 1113 ; State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh
(2009) 6 SCC 372 : [2009] 8 SCR 85 ; Ramdev Food
Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2015) 6 SCC F
439 : [2015] 5 SCR 283 ; Suresh Chand Jain v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2001) 2 SCC 628 : [2001] 1 SCR
257; Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan (2006) 1 SCC 627:
[2006] 1 SCR 1 – referred to.
Case Law Reference G
[2013] 9 SCR 869 referred to Para 5
[1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 135 referred to Para 6
[2016] 5 SCR 683 referred to Para 8
H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A [1951] SCR 312 referred to Para 18
AIR 1943 Pat 245 referred to Para 18
AIR 1950 Cal 437 referred to Para 18
AIR 1961 SC 986 referred to Para 19
B [1964] 5 SCR 37 referred to Para 20
[1973] 2 SCR 66 referred to Para 21
[1976] Suppl. SCR 524 referred to Para 22
[1978] 1 SCR 615 referred to Para 23
C
[2010] 9 SCR 278 referred to Para 24
[2014] 6 SCR 873 referred to Para 25
[2007] 9 SCR 1113 referred to Para 27
[2009] 8 SCR 85 referred to Para 28
D
[2015] 5 SCR 283 referred to Para 32
[2001] 1 SCR 257 referred to Para 32
[2006] 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 32
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
E
No. 457 of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2014 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in S. B. Cr. Revision Petition
No. 341 of 2014
F WITH
Criminal Appeal No.458 of 2018.
Prashant Bhushan, Rohit Kumar Singh, Shakti Vardhan, Advs.
for the Appellant.
Tushar Mehta, ASG, Shiv Mangal Sharma, S. S. Shamshery, Ajay
G
Kapur, AAGs, Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv., H. D. Thanvi, Rishi Matoliya, Anirudh
Singh, Milind Kumar, Satya Mitra Garg, Anchit Sharma, Ms. Dipika Kalia,
Kprish Seth, Nachiketa Joshi, Rajeev Sharma, Merusagar Samantaray,
Gautam Jha, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advs. for the
Respondents.
H
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 701

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.457 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5838 of 2014)
1. Leave granted.
B
2. The question of law sought to be raised in the appeals is as to
whether prior sanction for prosecution qua allegation of corruption in
respect of a public servants is required before setting in motion even the
investigative process under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’).
3. In Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2018 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) C
No.5838 of 2014), the appellant submitted a complaint before the
Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act, Jaipur Metropolitan City,
Jaipur) under Sections 7 & 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act’) and Sections 420, 467, 468 &
471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 D
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’). The appellant sought investigation
of offences and registration of an FIR against the accused persons.
The first respondent arrayed as an accused before the Special Judge as
“Principal Secretary to the Government P.H.E.D. Chief Minister” is the
first respondent before us, the other persons arrayed as accused before
the Special Judge, being the Superintending Engineer, Chief Engineer, E
ex Chief Minister (as she then was), ex Minister of P.H.E.D., Finance
Secretary, Deputy Accountant General and P.S.L. Company through its
Managing Director are also before us, as the Respondents. It is alleged
in the complaint that in the drinking water project Nos.1 to 8, a
conspiracy was hatched for fulfilling the personal vested interest by way F
of a tender procedure, which caused loss to the Government fund. The
last and the 8th accused was stated to be given the advantage for personal
interest. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present controversy
to get into the detailed facts but suffice to say that as per the allegations
of the appellant, there was a shortage of budget for running the projects
and the report of respondent No.1, then the Principal Secretary, dated G
20.4.2008 was liable to be perused. In order to make payments for the
outstanding and running projects, the Chief Secretary, accused No.1, is
stated to have written a proposal to the Finance Department but the
Finance Secretary expressed his inability for making available such huge
amounts. The fund was stated to have been digressed. H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A 4. It is extremely relevant to note that from the facts, which have
now come to light, respondent No.1 herein was neither holding the post
of the Principal Secretary of the P.H.E.D nor the Chief Secretary at the
relevant stage of time and the description of his office is consequently
not correct. The first respondent was actually holding the post of
Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister.
B
5. The Special Judge closed the complaint in terms of order dated
4.2.2014 on account of the fact that the accused persons arrayed as
respondents are either public servants or have remained as public
servants and no prior sanction has been granted by the competent
authority under Section 19 of the PC Act read with Section 197 of the
C Cr.P.C. To support this conclusion, reliance was placed on the judgment
of this Court in Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa1 opining that no complaint
could be forwarded for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
nor could any proceedings be initiated under Sections 202 & 202 of the
Cr.P.C. in the absence of such sanction. It was, thus, observed that
D further proceedings in the case would be conducted on the filing of
sanction.
6. The appellant preferred a revision petition against this order,
which has been dismissed by the detailed impugned order dated
30.4.2014. The order really refers to various judicial pronouncements
E and then concludes that in view of the judgment in Anil Kumar v. M.K.
Aiyappa2 and P. Nallammal v. State3 both for the reasons of absence
of any sanction, as also the revision petition being directed against an
interlocutory order, the petition was not maintainable. Thereafter the
present Special Leave Petition has been filed.

F 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant sought to question the view taken in Anil Kumar4 and in L.
Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka 5 following the earlier
judgment. The sub-stratum of the argument is that the requirement of
G prior sanction for prosecution against the public servant would arise only
when cognizance is taken, while no such sanction was required at the
1
(2013) 10 SCC 705
2
supra
3
(1999) 6 SCC 559
4
supra
5
(2016) 9 SCC 598
H
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 703
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

stage of setting into motion an investigation under Section 156(3) of the A
Cr.P.C.. It was, thus, contended that the observations in these two
judgments are per incuriam or in conflict with the long line of earlier
judgments on the question as to when the cognizance can be stated to
have be taken. Mr. Bhushan drew our attention to Section 19(1) of the
PC Act, which reads as under:
B
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution -
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable
under section 7, 10, 11, 13 and15 alleged to have been committed
by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with C
the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save
by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that
Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with
the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by D
or with the sanction of the State Government, of that
Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to
remove him from his office.”
E
9. He sought to emphasise that the bar is to the court taking
“cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction”.
10. We may next refer to Chapter XIV of the Cr.P.C., which is
under the heading “Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings”.
Section 190 states as to when cognizance would be taken and is
F
reproduced for convenience as under:
“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.- (1) Subject to
the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class,
and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in
this behalf under sub-section (2 ), may take cognizance of any
offence- G

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such
offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A (c) upon information received from any person other than a
police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has
been committed.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate
of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1 ) of
B such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.”
11. Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. under the same chapter prescribes
a pre-condition of obtaining sanction before the court takes cognizance
against a public servant. The relevant portion reads as under:
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.- (1) When
C any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant
not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the
Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction-
D (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may
be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central
Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may
E be, was at the lime of commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:
Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a
person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a
Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the
F Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for
the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the
expression “Central Government” were substituted.”
12. Once cognizance is taken the procedure is triggered off under
Chapter XV with the heading “Complaints to Magistrates”. It would be
suffice to reproduce Section 200 as under:
G
“200. Examination of complainant.- A Magistrate taking
cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath
the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance
of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed
by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
H
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 705
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate A
need not examine the complainant and the witnesses—
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to
another Magistrate under section 192: B
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to
another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the
complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-
examine them.”
13. The Magistrate, if he thinks fit, may postpone the issue of C
process against the accused to inquire the case himself or direct an
investigation post taking cognizance, as per Section 202, which is
reproduced herein under:
“202. Postponement of issue of process.- (1) Any Magistrate,
on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised D
to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under
section 192 , may, if he thinks fit [and shall in a case where the
accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he
exercises his jurisdiction], postpone the issue of process against
the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an
E
investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person
as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding:
Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made-
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained
F
of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the
complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been
examined on oath under section 200 .
(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he G
thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath:
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence
complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he
shall call upon the complainant to produce all hi s witnesses and
examine them on oath.
H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person
not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all
the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a
police station except the power to arrest without warrant.”

14. Keeping in mind the aforesaid provisions, we now turn to
B Chapter XII with the heading “Information to the Police and their powers
to investigate”. Section 156 forms a part of this Chapter and reads as
under:

“156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable cases.-
C (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the
order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a
Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of
such station would have power to inquire into or try under the
provisions of Chapter XIII.

D (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any
stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one
which such officer was not empowered under this section to
investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such
E an investigation as above-mentioned.”

15. The relevant provision is Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. where
a Magistrate is empowered to make an order of investigation in terms of
sub-sections (1) & (2).
F
16. It is, thus, the submission of Mr. Prashant Bhushan that there
is a distinction between the investigation carried out at pre-cognizance
stage, which would not face the requirement of a prior sanction qua a
public servant, as against a post-cognizance proceeding which needs
prior sanction. We may also notice that in terms of sub-section (4) of
G Section 5 of the PC Act, for the proceedings before a Special Judge
under the PC Act, the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate.

17. In the aforesaid context, he referred to a catena of judgments.
We have analyzed those and some other cases dealing with the issue.
H
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 707
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

Judgments on the nature of proceedings being an inquiry under A
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.:
18. In R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.6, a three Judges Bench of this
Court, in the inception years of this Court, referred to Gopal Marwari
v. Emperor7qua the observations that the word ‘cognizance’ indicates
the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an B
offence. This was different from initiation of proceedings. The word
‘cognizance’ was somewhat of an indefinite import and perhaps not
used exactly in the same sense. Thereafter it proceeded to notice the
observations of Das Gupta, J. in Superintendent and Remembrancer
of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee8 where
observations were made to the effect that what is taking cognizance has C
not been defined in the Cr.P.C., but it could be said that any Magistrate
who has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a) of
the Cr.P.C. must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the
petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a
particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter D
– proceedings under Section 200 and thereafter under Section 202.
However, when the Magistrate applies his mind, not for the purpose of
proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for some
other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a
search warrant for the purposes of the investigation, he could not be
said to have taken cognizance of offence. The Supreme Court gives its E
imprimatur to these observations.
19. Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam9 (three Judges Bench),
the decision in R.R. Chari10 was followed.
20. Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah11 (three Judges Bench), F
the decision in R.R. Chari12 was followed.
21. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B.13 (three Judges
Bench), it was sought to be canvassed that the investigation by the police

6
1951 SCR 312
7
AIR 1943 Pat 245
G
8
AIR 1950 Cal 437
9
AIR 1961 SC 986
10
supra
11
(1964) 5 SCR 37
12
supra
13
(1973) 3 SCC 753 H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A being one ordered by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under Section
156(3) of the Cr.P.C., that investigation was part of the proceedings of
the Court. This plea was rejected inter alia on the ground that the
police authorities have, under Sections 154 & 156 of the Cr.P.C., a
statutory right to investigate into a cognizable offence without requiring
any sanction from a judicial authority. Secondly, for taking cognizance
B
under Section190(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C., a Magistrate must not only have
applied his mind but must have done so for purposes of proceeding
under Section 200 and the provisions following that Section. The
application of mind only for ordering investigation under Section 156(3)
or issuing a warrant for purposes of investigation could not be said to
C have taken cognizance of the offence.
22. Devarapally Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana
Reddy14 (three Judges Bench) – Mr. Prashant Bhushan referred to the
aforesaid judgment for analysis of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. In para
13, it has been observed that when a Magistrate receives a complaint he
D is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint,
disclose the commission of an offence. Only if he forms an opinion that
the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding
of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will
be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate
from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the
E duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course
as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. Thereafter
in paras 14 & 17, it has been observed as under:
“14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by “taking
cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within the contemplation
F of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code.
But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading
of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which
Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be
instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the
G offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can
be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1).
Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the
offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case
including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted,
14
H (1976) 3 SCC 252
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 709
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the A
Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint,
the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding
under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV to
the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the
offence within the meaning to Section 190(1) (a). If, instead of
B
proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of
his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a
search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering
investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be
said to have taken cognizance of any offence.”
…. …. …. …. …. C

“17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption :
“Information to the Police and their powers to investigate”; while
Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading: “Of
complaints to Magistrates”. The power to order police
investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to D
direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate
in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at
the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage
when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the
case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable E
offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the
Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under
Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and
embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not
competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail
of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made F
under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a
peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their
plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an
investigation embraces the entire continuous process which
begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends G
with a report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other
hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has
been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter
XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to

H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the
Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the
limits circumscribed by that section an investigation “for the
purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding”. Thus the object of an investigation under Section
202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the
B
Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a
complaint before him.”
23. In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh15 (two Judges Bench) – cited
before us, it was observed that Sections 190 and 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
are mutually exclusive and work in totally different spheres. Thus, even
C if a Magistrate receives a complaint under Section 190, he can act under
Section 156(3) provided that he does not take cognizance. Chapter 14
deals with post cognizance stage while Chapter 12, so far as the
Magistrate is concerned, deals with pre-cognizance stage, that is to say
that even when a Magistrate starts acting under Section 190 and the
D provisions following, he cannot resort to Section 156(3). Thus, Section
202 would apply only in cases where the Magistrate has taken
cognizance and chooses to inquire into the complaint either himself or
through any other agency. Before proceeding to do so, there may be a
situation where the Magistrate, before taking cognizance himself, chooses
to order a pure and simple investigation under Section 156(3) of the
E Cr.P.C.
24. Srinivas Gundluri v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction
Corpn.16 (two Judges Bench) – The Magistrate in the case had merely
allowed the application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) of
the Cr.P.C. and sent the same along with its annexure for investigation
F by the police officer and that was held not to have amounted to having
taken cognizance.
25. Subramanian Swamy v. CBI17 (five Judges Bench) – It was
observed that Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. enables an officer in charge
of a police station to investigate a cognizable offence. Insofar as
G non-cognizable offences are concerned, it was found that the police
officer by virtue of Section 155 Cr.P.C. can investigate it after obtaining
appropriate orders from the Magistrate having power to try such case
15
(1977) 4 SCC 459
16
(2010) 8 SCC 206
17
H (2014) 8 SCC 682
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 711
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

or commit the case for trial regardless of the status of the officer A
concerned. In view thereof, the scheme of Sections 155 and 156 of the
Cr.P.C. was held to indicate that the local police may investigate a
senior government officer without previous approval of the Central
Government.
The Constitution Bench while dealing with the inquiry and B
investigation under the P.C. Act held that there was no basis to classify
the two sets of public servants differently on the ground that one set of
officers is decision-making officers and not the other set of officers.
26. Despite the aforesaid catena of judgments, a different path
has been traversed in two judgments of this Court where the offences C
alleged are under the P.C. Act read with the I.P.C.
27. In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa18 (two Judges Bench), the
Court proceeded to examine whether the Magistrate, while exercising
his powers under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., could act in a mechanical
or casual manner and go on with the complaint after getting the report. D
In that context, a reference was made to an earlier judgment in Maksud
Saiyed v. State of Gujarat19 case, where it was observed that there
was a requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before
exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Thereafter
the Bench proceeded to draw a conclusion that a Special
Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) of the E
Cr.P.C. against a public servant without a valid sanction order.
28. The Bench further proceeded to examine whether the order
directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. would amount
to taking cognizance of the offence since a contention was raised that
the expression “cognizance” appearing in Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act F
would have to be construed as post-cognizance stage and not
pre-cognizance stage and therefore, the requirement of sanction does
not arise prior to taking cognizance of the offences of the P.C. Act.
Insofar as the expression ‘cognizance’, which appears in Section 197 of
the Cr.P.C. was concerned, a reference was made to the judgment in G
State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh20. In that case it was observed that
the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is

18
supra
19
(2008) 5 SCC 668
20
(2009) 6 SCC 372 H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A provided by Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. and so far as the public servant
was concerned this was clearly barred by Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.
unless the sanction was obtained from the appropriate authority. After
referring to certain other judgments on the issue of purport and meaning
of the word ‘cognizance’, it was concluded that ‘cognizance’ has a wider
connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance
B
of the offence.
29. The Bench proceeded to discuss Section 19(1) of the P.C.
Act as also Section 19(3) of the P.C. Act, which reads as under:
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—
C …. …. …. …. ….
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall
be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision
D on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless
in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground
E of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the
authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity
has resulted in a failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other
ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation
to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or
F
other proceedings.”
30. It was sought to be contended that the requirement of
sanction was only procedural in nature and hence directory or else
Section 19(3) of the P.C. Act would be rendered otiose. This contention
was not found acceptable as sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the P.C.
G Act had an object to achieve, which applied only in circumstances where
a Special Judge had already rendered a finding, sentence or order. This
would not mean that the requirement to obtain sanction was not a
mandatory requirement. In the absence of prior sanction, it was
observed, that the Magistrate cannot order investigation against a public
H servant even while invoking power under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 713
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

31. L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka21 (two Judges A
Bench) – The judgment in Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa 22 was
followed. After discussing various other pronouncements, it was
concluded that even while directing an inquiry under Section 156(3) of
the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the complaint and
therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter.
B
32. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General sought
to canvas the view taken in the last two judgments referred to aforesaid
to submit that application of mind was necessary to exercise power
under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and that credibility of information
was to be weighed before ordering investigation (Ramdev Food
Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat23). It was, thus, submitted that C
allegation against a public servant under the P.C. Act offences are
technical in nature and would require a higher evaluation standard and
thus the Magistrates ought to apply their mind before ordering
investigation against public servant. The consequences of starting
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it was submitted, would D
result in the police registering an FIR (Suresh Chand Jain v. State of
Madhya Pradesh24 and Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan25). Thus, a
situation may arise where a Magistrate may exercise his power under
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. in a routine manner resulting in an FIR
being registered against a public servant, who may have no role in the
allegation made. E
33. We have examined the rival contentions and do find a
divergence of opinion, which ought to be settled by a larger Bench.
There is no doubt that even at the stage of 156(3), while directing an
investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate.
Thus, it may not be an acceptable proposition to contend that there would F
be some consequences to follow were the Magistrate to act in a
mechanical and mindless manner. That cannot be the test.
34. The catena of judgments on the issue as to the scope and
power of direction by a Magistrate under Chapters 12 & 14 is well
established. Thus, the question would be whether in cases of the P.C.
G
Act, a different import has to be read qua the power to be exercised
21
(2016) 9 SCC 598
22
supra
23
(2015) 6 SCC 439
24
(2001) 2 SCC 628
25
(2006) 1 SCC 627 H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., i.e., can it be said that on account
of Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act, the scope of inquiry under Section
156(3) of the Cr.P.C. can be said to be one of taking ‘cognizance’ thereby
requiring the prior sanction in case of a public servant? It is trite to say
that prior sanction to prosecute a public servant for offences under the
P.C. Act is a provision contained under Chapter 14 of the Cr.P.C. .
B
Thus, whether such a purport can be imported into Chapter 12 of the
Cr.P.C. while directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the
Cr.P.C., merely because a public servant would be involved, would beg
an answer.
35. The apprehension expressed by the learned ASG possibly arises
C from the observations in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya
Pradesh26 followed in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan 27. Thus, the
observations are to the effect that even at a pre-cognizance stage under
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is open to the Magistrate to direct the
police to register an FIR and that even if the Magistrate does not say in
D so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the
Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in
charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable
offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could
take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.
36. The complete controversy referred to aforesaid and the
E conundrum arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C. Act offences
read with the Cr.P.C. is, thus, required to be settled by a larger Bench.
37. The papers may be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice
of India for being placed before a Bench of appropriate strength.
Crl. M.P. 161/2015 in SLP (Crl.) No.5838/2014
F 38. We have passed a detailed order making a reference to a
larger Bench insofar as the main matter is concerned. It may be noticed
that in the present Special Leave Petition, notice was issued to the
Respondents, except Respondent No. 4. Since the proceedings before
the Magistrate at the threshold were directed to be kept in abeyance
G without notice to the Respondent, and thereafter the revision petition
was dismissed in limine by the High Court, the occasion for
Respondent No.1 to have knowledge of the proceedings did not arise.
Respondent No.1 seeks deletion from the array of parties in these
proceedings as he has been wrongly arrayed as a party.
26
supra
H 27
supra
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 715
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

39. The aforesaid plea is predicated on the averments in the com- A
plaint itself, which seeks to make a grievance over the actions of the
Principal Secretary, Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED)
in which capacity respondent No.1 is stated to have been arrayed. It is
averred in the application that respondent No.1 was serving as a
Secretary and Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister and not as
B
Principal Secretary, PHED. In fact, the officer working as the Principal
Secretary, PHED has not been arrayed as a respondent. There is no
allegation made against the Secretary/Principal Secretary to the Chief
Minister. The allegation is of collusion of the respondents.
40. In terms of the averments in the application, respondent No.1
sought to point out that there are only two references to him as accused C
No.1 - Para 4(iv) and Para 8. These are in the context of inviting tenders,
shortage of budget for running the current projects and the report of
stated accused No.1 as the Principal Secretary. The second reference
is to the stated accused No.1 as the Chief Secretary, who wrote a
proposal to the Finance Department whereupon the Finance Secretary D
expressed his inability for making available such a huge amount. Once
again, respondent No.1 was not holding the post of the Chief Secretary
nor is the Chief Secretary then arrayed as a party.
41. Our attention was also drawn to the notings file, which are of
the Chief Engineer (SP) and approved by the Secretary, PHED and the E
Hon’ble Minister, PHED. It is, thus, alleged that respondent No.1 was
neither involved with the decision making process nor he held any of the
two posts.
42. The application is sought to be opposed and a counter
affidavit was filed by the appellant. It is stated that respondent No.1 is F
trying to take undue advantage of the inadvertent mistake of the
appellant in mentioning his correct designation while filing the criminal
complaint. It is alleged that respondent No.1 was very much involved
with the decision making process. In any case the merit of the
complaint of the appellant is yet to be examined.
G
43. On 20.2.2018, we had issued directions for the appellant to
place on record the material placed before the Magistrate in support of
the complaint indicating the alleged involvement of respondent No.1. In
response thereto, a supplementary affidavit was filed by the appellant.
On this behalf a file noting of 9.5.2008 is referred to. The discussion
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.

A was with regard to the funding of the same project and the presence of
respondent No.1 is noted though undisputedly the minutes are not signed
by him while they are signed by other officers. It has been averred that
since the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister had no role to play in
the discussion, why was he/respondent No.1 present?
B 44. We may also note the submission of learned counsel
for respondent No.1 that in case a situation arises where the Magistrate
has to proceed on the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and
during investigation some material is found, the counsel cannot really
object to the inclusion of the name of respondent No.1 at that stage.
However, inclusion at this stage is stated to be without any material
C facts and is an embarrassment, considering the constitutional position
held by respondent No.1.
45. We have given a thought to the respective pleas of the parties.
46. No doubt the process under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is
D only one of investigation. The larger question, of whether any such
direction can be issued without prior sanction has been referred to a
larger bench. Were the appellant to succeed and were the matter to go
back to the Magistrate and the Magistrate after application of mind forms
an opinion to direct investigation by the police, it would be always open
to the Magistrate to include the name of respondent No.1 if such material
E is found against him.
47. Merely because the appellant has roped in respondent No.1 in
the complaint is not sufficient ground to allow his name to be included as
such. The complaint is categorical – the role of Secretary, PHED and
the Principal Secretary has been questioned. That is the mindset with
F which the complainant knocked the doors of the criminal courts. There
was no allegation in respect of any role played by the Secretary/Principal
Secretary to the Chief Minister. It cannot be said to be a mere
mis-description of name, which can be corrected. It cannot be the stand
of the appellant that willy-nilly somehow, respondent No.1 must remain
G arrayed as an accused in those proceedings, even though the
proceedings before the Magistrate are at the stage of only whether there
should be a direction for investigation or not. It is not that every officer
in the Government has to be arrayed in respect of any role performed or
not. The mere presence in one meeting of respondent No.1 and that too
when he was not a signatory and really had no role to play in that capacity,
H
MANJU SURANA v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. 717
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

as apparent from the minutes, cannot be now used to justify his name A
being included as an accused. This is clearly an afterthought. It is not
for the appellant to question as to which officer should or should not be
present.
48. We are, thus, of the view that respondent No.1 needs to be
struck off from the array of parties both in the present proceedings and B
consequently in the complaint. We, however, make it clear that if a
situation arises where investigation is directed under Section 156(3) of
the Cr.P.C. and some material comes to light to array respondent No.1
as an accused, our order would not come in the way.
49. The application is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to C
bear their own costs.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.458 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1092 of 2015)
50. Leave granted.
D
51. The matter is referred to a larger Bench along with SLP (CRL.)
No.5838/2014 in terms of the judgment passed today.

Nidhi Jain Matters referred to larger Bench.
E

F

G

H