Holding

A compromise decree cannot be challenged by a fresh suit; the only remedy is a recall application, and the appellants' suit is barred by Order 23 Rule 3A, Order 2 Rule 2, and res judicata.

Summary

The appellants, sons of Tirakappa Gurusiddappa Malagi, challenged a compromise decree dated 18 January 2000 that partitioned seven acres of land among their father, uncles, and grandfather, alleging that their father was coerced into the settlement and that the land was not ancestral joint family property. The trial court and High Court dismissed the appellants' suit, holding that the land was purchased with family funds and thus formed part of the joint family property, and that the decree could not be contested by a fresh suit. The Supreme Court affirmed that a compromise (consent) decree cannot be set aside by a fresh suit; the only remedy is a recall application under Order 23 Rule 3A of the CPC. Since the appellants' father never filed such a recall and the decree was never appealed, the suit is barred by Order 23 Rule 3A, Order 2 Rule 2, and principles of res judicata. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower courts' decisions.

Issues considered

Whether a fresh suit can be filed to challenge the legality of a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3A of the CPC.
Whether the seven acres of land constitute joint family property or non‑ancestral property.
Whether the appellants can invoke res judicata or constructive res judicata to relitigate the partition of the suit property.
Whether the appropriate remedy for contesting a consent decree is a recall application rather than a fresh suit.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 23 Rule 3, s. Order 23 Rule 3A, s. Order 2 Rule 2, s. Section 96(3)
Contract Act, 1872

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether a fresh suit can be filed to challenge a compromise decree. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Suit seeking partition claiming that the suit property is not ancestral property – Held, the suit property purchased by funds in the name of the father of the appellant is joint family property – The appellants contended that since the suit property is not an ancestral property, it cannot be partitioned amongst their father, grandfather and father’s brothers – The Appellants further

Subjects

Recall applicationCompromise decreeCode of Civil ProcedureOrder 23 Rule 3AJoint family propertyAncestral propertyConsent decreeFresh suitConstructive res judicataRes judicata

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1409 : 2025 INSC 517

Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr.
v.
Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead through Lrs)
(Civil Appeal No. 5373 of 2025)
21 April 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether a fresh suit can be filed to challenge a compromise decree.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Suit seeking partition
claiming that the suit property is not ancestral property –
Held, the suit property purchased by the grandmother using
family funds in the name of the father of the appellant is
joint family property – The appellants contended that since
the suit property is not an ancestral property, it cannot be
partitioned amongst their father, grandfather and father’s
brothers – The Appellants further contended that since the
suit property was not taken into consideration during the
partition in the year 1974, the grandfather of the appellants
filed a suit seeking partition in which the suit property was
equally divided amongst the appellant’s father, his brothers
and appellant’s grandfather, which was decreed by way of a
compromise decree whereby the appellant’s father received
his part of his share – Subsequent to the same, the appellants
herein challenged the compromise decree stating that the
compromise entered into between the parties, including their
father is fraught with coercion:
Held: The appellants have failed to prove that the suit property is
not an ancestral property – Although suit property was purchased
in the name of the appellant’s father, it was purchased from the
family funds and thus, it is a joint family property. [Para 7]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 23 Rule 3A – Fresh suit
cannot be filed to challenge a compromise decree:
Held: The compromise decree was never challenged by the
appellants’ father – The appellants filed a fresh suit seeking

* Author
1410 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

cancellation of the compromise decree and further seeking partition
of the suit property – The challenge of the said compromise
decree is that the appellants’ father was coerced by his brothers
and father to enter into the said compromise – The compromise
decree cannot be challenged by filing a fresh suit as there is a
bar on filing a fresh suit challenging the consent decree on the
ground of the legality of the compromise under Order 23 Rule 3A
of the CPC. [Paras 9,11]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The remedy against
compromise decree is to file an application to recall the
compromise decree:
Held: Even if it is accepted that the father of the appellants was
coerced by his brothers and father (appellants’ grandfather) to
enter into a compromise, which led to the passing of the consent
decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid remedy – The appellants’
father should have filed a recall application – If the appellant’s
father never questioned the compromise decree by way of a recall
application, the appellants cannot now question the same. [Para 12]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 2 Rule 2 – Bar on the
appellants to raise the claim:
Held: The appellant’s suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as
it did not include all the properties which were part of their earlier
suit – The present suit is also hit by constructive res judicata as
the appellants cannot reagitate their claim regarding the partition
of the suit property, which has already been partitioned. [Para 14]

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Recall application; Compromise decree; Code of Civil Procedure;
Order 23 Rule 3A; Joint family property; Ancestral property; Consent
decree; Fresh suit; Constructive res judicata.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5373 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.09.2022 of the High Court
of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in RFA No. 1295 of 2007
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1411

Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr. v.
Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead through Lrs)

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
C.M. Angadi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Sanket M. Yenagi, Nikhil Jain, Chinmay Deshpande, Anirudh
Sanganeria.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of pure civil proceedings initiated at
the hands of the present appellants in the year 2003. The appellants
filed a suit for declaring a compromise decree entered into between
the respondents (defendants) as null and void, and not binding on
the appellants. Additionally, the appellants also sought partition of a
certain share in the ancestral property, which was in the possession
of the defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit of the appellants
vide order dated 02.03.2007. Thereafter, the appellants filed the first
appeal before the High Court, which has also been dismissed by
the impugned order dated 23.09.2022.
3. Since the present matter concerns various suits, we would like to
state the facts of the matter in short and the same are as follows:
(a) In 1974, a family partition takes place between brothers and their
father, i.e. appellants’ father, his five brothers and appellants’
grandfather, and the family property was partitioned which was
registered.
(b) Thereafter, in the year 1998, the appellants filed a suit (O.S
No.219/1998) against their father and mother seeking partition
and division of ancestral property by metes and bounds.
However, during the pendency of this suit, the grandfather of
the appellants filed a different suit (O.S No.58/1999) for partition
in which his six sons, including appellants’ father, were a party.
In that, it was stated that a part of the joint family property
(7 acres of land) was mistakenly left out of the 1974 partition.
1412 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Vide order dated 18.01.2000, Trial Court passed a decree based
on a compromise between the defendants under which that 7
acres of land was equally divided amongst the appellants’ father,
his five brothers and appellants’ grandfather. Consequently, 1
acre out of the 7 acres fell to the share of the appellants’ father.
(c) Taking into consideration the compromise decree dated
18.01.2000, the Trial Court, vide order dated 02.08.2002,
decreed the appellants’ partition suit (O.S No.219/1998), and the
appellants together received half of the share of their father’s
property. Consequently, both cases were decided. The 1999
suit was decided on 18.01.2000 by a decree of compromise
and later the 1998 suit was decided on 02.08.2002 based on
the decree of compromise passed in 1999 suit.
(d) From here, the main dispute arises. In 2003, the appellants
filed the present suit (No.1/2003) seeking a declaration that
the compromise decree dated 18.01.2000 is null and void as,
according to the appellants, the 7 acres of land was their father’s
property and not the ancestral property. Thus, the appellants’ claim
that they are entitled to half of the 7 acres of land (hereinafter
referred to as ‘suit property’). This is the suit with which we are
dealing in the present appeal. This suit of the appellants was
dismissed by the Trial Court, and then the first appeal filed by the
appellants has also been dismissed by the High Court vide the
impugned order dated 23.09.2022. Now, appellants are before us.
4. It is the case of the appellants that they are the sons of Tirakappa
Gurusiddappa Malagi, who had colluded with his father (appellants’
grandfather) and brothers (appellants’ uncles) to deprive the appellants
of their rights. Appellants contend that the suit property (7 acres of
land) was purchased by their grandmother in the name of their father
when he was a minor and thus, suit property was rightly not included
in the 1974 partition. However, according to the appellants, their
father, in collusion with his father and brothers, got the suit property
partitioned by a compromise decree, and this has led to the reduction
of the appellants’ share in the suit property. They further argue that
the compromise decree should be set aside as they were never made
a party to that suit in which the compromise decree was passed.
5. On the contrary, the other side would argue that the appellants’
interest was represented by their father in the suit in which the
compromise decree was passed. It has also been argued that the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1413

Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr. v.
Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead through Lrs)

Trial Court and High Court were correct in holding that the appellants’
suit was barred by principles of res judicata as well as under Order
2 Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’).
6. We have heard both sides and perused the material before us.
7. There are concurrent findings of the Courts below against the appellants.
The appellants vehemently argue that since the suit property is not
an ancestral property, it cannot be partitioned amongst their father,
grandfather and father’s brothers. However, the appellants miserably
failed to prove that the suit property is not a part of the ancestral
property. After going through the records, we are of the considered
view that the Trial Court correctly concluded that although the suit
property was purchased in the name of the appellants’ father, it was
purchased from the family funds and, thus, it is a joint family property.
8. Since the suit property was not taken into consideration during
the partition in the year 1974, the grandfather of the appellants
filed a suit seeking partition in which the suit property was equally
divided amongst the appellants’ father, his brothers and appellants’
grandfather. The appellants’ interest was represented by their father,
and pursuant to the compromise decree, the appellants’ father
received his part of the share. Subsequently, as per the decree dated
02.08.2002 passed in Suit no.219/1998 filed by the appellants, the
appellants have also been held jointly entitled to a half share of their
father’s share of the suit property. In other words, appellants were
jointly held entitled to 0.5 acres of land. We are unable to understand
how the appellants can claim it to be an act of fraud.
9. Through the decree dated 02.08.2002 passed in suit (No.219/1998)
filed by the appellants, the entire share of the appellants’ father, which
he had received in the 1974 partition and by compromise decree,
was further partitioned amongst the appellants and their father.
This decree was never challenged by the appellants. Nevertheless,
they filed a fresh suit in the year 2003 seeking cancellation of the
compromise decree and further seeking partition of the suit property.
The appellants’ ground for challenging the said compromise decree
is that the appellants’ father was coerced by his brothers and father
to enter into the said compromise.
10. Let us discuss the law governing a consent decree. Order 23 Rule 3
of CPC, which deals with compromise decree, reads as follows:
1414 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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“3. Compromise of suit.— Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in
writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant
satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of
the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such
agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and
shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it
relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-
matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the
same as the subject-matter of the suit:
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied
by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been
arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no
adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding
the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded,
thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is
void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872
(9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the
meaning of this rule”
Thus, a reading of the above provision makes it clear that before
passing a decree on the basis of a compromise, the Court has to
satisfy itself that the suit has been adjusted by a lawful compromise.
Once the Court passes a compromise decree after such a satisfaction,
the decree cannot be challenged in an appeal as no appeal lies
against a compromise decree.1
11. Also, a compromise decree cannot be challenged by filing a fresh
suit as there is a bar on filing a fresh suit challenging the consent
decree on the ground of the legality of the compromise under Order
23 Rule 3A of CPC, which reads as follows:
“3-A. Bar to suit.— No suit shall lie to set aside a decree
on the ground that the compromise on which the decree
is based was not lawful.”

1 Section 96(3) of CPC: No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1415

Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr. v.
Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead through Lrs)

12. The only remedy against a compromise decree is to file a recall
application. This Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh,
(2006) 5 SCC 566 summed up the position of law as follows:
“17. The position that emerges from the amended
provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree
having regard to the specific bar contained in Section
96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the
court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule
1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a
compromise decree on the ground that the compromise
was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is
valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which
passed the consent decree, by an order on an application
under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent
decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the
court which recorded the compromise and made a decree
in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise.
In that event, the court which recorded the compromise
will itself consider and decide the question as to whether
there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because
a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties
superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The
validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity
of the agreement or compromise on which it is made…”
(Emphasis Provided)

Thus, even if we accept the contention of the appellants that their
father was coerced by his brothers and father (appellants’ grandfather)
to enter into a compromise, which led to the passing of the consent
decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid remedy. In that situation, the
appellants’ father should have filed a recall application before the
1416 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Court that had passed the decree. The appellants’ father has never
done so! Moreover, he had admitted the consent decree and never
questioned its validity.
13. Additionally, the appellants’ argument that the suit property is not a
joint family property but was purchased by their grandmother in the
name of the appellants’ father and that he is now trying to deprive the
appellants from the suit property as their relations have turned sour,
is of no help to them. This is because if the appellants’ grandmother
had purchased the suit property in the name of the appellants’ father,
and it is not a part of the ancestral property then in that case it would
be the property of the appellants’ father as of now, since he is alive,
and he is at full liberty to dispose of the same as per his wishes.
Be that as it may, if the father of the appellants has no grievance
against the consent decree, then we are unable to understand how
the appellants can be allowed to challenge it.
14. In any case, the appellants’ case has no merits. The appellants’ suit
is also barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC as it did not include all
the properties which were part of their earlier suit. The present suit
is also hit by the principles of res judicata or by constructive res
judicata as the appellants cannot re-agitate their claim regarding the
partition of the suit property, which has already been partitioned as
a result of previous litigations. The Trial Court and High Court have
dealt with these issues in detail. We are not required to go into the
same as we have already given our reasons above for holding that
the appellants’ suit is bereft of any merits.
15. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned
order dated 23.09.2022 passed by the High Court. Accordingly, this
appeal is dismissed.
16. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
17. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Mukund P Unny, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Kanu Agarwal, Adv.)