Supreme Court of India
MANMOHAN SHARMAversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 240
- Decided
- 1 April 2014
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
The benefit of the prospective overruling in Kailash Chand Sharma's case is confined to the writ‑petitioners who approached the High Court before the judgment and cannot be extended to other appointees; therefore, the appellants are not entitled to regularisation, but may receive a one‑time age‑relaxation concession for future recruitment.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined whether the doctrine of prospective overruling applied in Kailash Chand Sharma's case— which struck down bonus marks based on domicile for primary school teacher appointments— could be extended to a large group of appointees who were not parties before the High Court. The appellants, whose services had been terminated on allegations of fraudulent appointments, contended that they were entitled to regularisation or at least relief similar to the writ‑petitioners. The Court held that the relief in Kailash Chand Sharma's case was expressly limited to those who had moved the High Court before the judgment and could not be broadened to Category I or Category II petitioners. Consequently, the termination orders were upheld, but the Court granted a one‑time concession of upper‑age‑limit relaxation for the affected teachers to participate in the next selection process. The Court also clarified that the benefit could not be extended to appellants like Danveer Singh who were not impleaded in the earlier proceedings.
Issues considered
- The scope of prospective overruling in Kailash Chand Sharma's case with respect to non‑writ‑petitioners.
- Whether termination of services of allegedly fraudulently appointed teachers is justified.
- Whether the appellants are entitled to regularisation of service.
- Whether a one‑time age‑relaxation concession is permissible for the affected appointees.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 142, s. Article 226, s. Article 32
Subjects
prospective overrulingbonus marksdomicileteacher appointmentsservice regularisationtermination of serviceage relaxationservice lawwrit petitionselection process
Judgment
[2014] 14 S.C.R. 1610
A MAN MOHAN SHARMA
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHANAND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4294 of 2014)
B
APRIL01,2014
[T. s. THAKUR AND c. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
Service Law: .
c basisAppointmenVSelection -Award of bonus marks on the
of domicile for appointment - Was held as
unconstitutional in Kailash Chand Sharma's case with
prospective affect except those who were party to that case -
Appointments made in compliance with Kailash Chand
Sharma's case - Later services of some of the appointees
0
terminated finding the same as fraudulent and not in
conformity with Kailash Chand Sharma's case - Writ
petitions challenging the termination order dismissed by High
Court - Held: The appellants who had not moved the Court
prior to the judgment in Kail ash Chand Sharma's case, were .
E not entitled to the benefit of Kailash Chand Sharma's case
-However, in view of the facts of the case, they are provided
one-time concession of relaxation of the upper age limit to
be considered in the next selection process.
F In compliance with the order in Kai/ash Chand
Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 562,
wherein it was held that award of bonus marks on the
basis of domicile for appointment of the primary school
teachers was not permissible, appointments were made.
G Later, the services of several persons were terminated
on the ground that they were fraudulently and irregularly
appointed as the same were not in confirmity with
Kailash Chand sharma's case.
H
1610
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1611
The writ petitions challenging the termination order A
were dismissed by High Court. Hence the present
appeals.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case this 8
Court invoked the doctrine of prospective overruling
which implies that the law declared by this _Court would
apply only to future selections and appointments.-
. Although the prospective overruling left the
appointments made before 18th November, 1999 c
untouched, the writ petitioners who had moved the High.
Court had to be considered afresh vis-a-vis candidates
appointed on or after 18th November, 1999 or those in
the select list without giving to such appointed/ selected
candidates the benefit of bonus marks under the D
Circular. Upon such consideration of the writ-petitioners,
if they were found to. be superior in merit than those
appointed after 18th November, 1999 they were to be
offered appointments, if necessary, by removing the
latter. [Para 16][1625-E-G]
E
1.2 The present appeals can be classified into two
categories, namely, Category I comprising the writ
petitions that were filed after 18th November, 1999 and
before 30th July, 2002 as was the position in Writ Petition
No.542 of 2000 filed under Article 32 and dismissed by F
this Court and Category II comprising writ petitions that
were filed after 30th July, 2002. .The benefit of the
judgment in Kai/ash chand Sharma's case cannot be
extended to either of the category. [Para 19][1627-C-E]
1.3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the G
appellants cannot be said to be entitled to the relief of
regularization of their services as prayed for by them.
Though the appellants had been appointed and have ·
served for nearly a decade, but there are allegations that
H
16.12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 14 S.C.R.
A such appointments were obtained fraudulently by mis·
representation of facts. Criminal cases have already
been registered against the appellants. (Para 27]
· (1631-D-E]
1.4. Since the appellants will be left without any
.B alternate avenues of employment at this stage of their
lives, subject to any finding that may be recorded by a
. compe~ent Court, as regards the alleged fraudulent
nature of the appointments secured by the appellants, it
is directed that such of the appellants as were appointed
C as teachers and as have now been terminated may be
givep a one-time concession of relaxation of the upper
age limit and considered in the next selection process
in relaxation of rules regarding such age limit prescribed
for appointment as teachers. The fresh appointment, if
D any, given to them pursuant to the age relaxation shall
stand terminated in case they 'are found guilty and
sentenced to. imprisonment in the criminal case
r'egi~tere.d against them for o.btaining a fraudulent
appointment. (Para 27](1631-G·H; 1632-A·C]
E
. 2. So far as the appellant in civil appeal arising out
of SLP No. 31818 of2012 is concerned, histermination
.was unjustified. Writ Petition filed by him was allowed
by the Single Judge of the High Court along with another
case by a common order dated 26th February, 2001. That
F order was challenged by the State in Writ Appeal but only
·qua other writ petitioners comprising the batch. The
order passed in the writ petition filed by the said
appellant never came under challenge before the
Division Bench of the High Court. Consequently. the
G order passed by the Division Bench did not pertain to
the said appellant nor was he impleaded as a party before
this Court in the appeals filed by the State. That being
so;the termination of his services on the basis that he
was not a writ-petitioner before the High Court was not
H justified. [Para 24](1630-A·D]
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1613
Kai/ash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and A
Ors. (2002) 6 sec 562; 2002 (1) Suppl. SCR
317; DeepakKumar Sutharv. StateofRajasthan
(1999) 2 Raj LR; Girdhar Kumar Dadhich and Anr.
v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 2 SCC 706: 2009 (1)
SCR 585; Madan Lal and Ors. v. State of J & K B
and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 486: 1995 (1) SCR 908;
Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
2014 (5) sec 782..:.. referred to.
Case Law Reference
c
2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 317 referred to Para 3
(1999) 2 Raj LR referred to Para 3
2009 (1) SCR 585 referred to Para 12
1995 (1) SCR 908 referred to Para 15 D
2014 (5) sec 782 referred to Para 2
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
4294 of 2014.
From the judgment and order dated 23.07 .2012 of the E
High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCSA No. 695 of 2012.
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 4295, 4296, 4297, 4298, 4299, 4300,
4301, 4302, 4303, 4322, 4323, 4324, 4325, 4326, 4327, F
4328-4329, 4330, 43.31, 4332, 4333, 4334-4337, 4338, 4304,
4305,4306,4307,4309,4310,4311-4312,4313,4314,4315,
4316, 4317, 4318, 4319-4320 and 4321of2014
Chandra Uday Singh, P.S. Patwalia, R.P. Bhatt, V. K.
Bali, Kavin Gulati and Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr.Advocates, G
Shiv Mangal Sharma, MG, Ms. Shobha, Ms. Jyoti Rana,
Prasanna Mohan, Nikhil Singhvi, Abhishek Gupta, Purushottam
Sharma Tripathi, S. K. Sinha, Aditya Soni, Ms. Christine A.
Kumar, Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan, Ravi Prakash,Ajit Kumar
H
1614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A Ekka, Chand Kiran, Murari Lal, Bhakti Vardhan Singh,
Shubhasis R. Soren, R.C. Kohli, Ankit Kohli, Ram Niwas, Lal
Pratap Singh, Vikram Singh Arya, Varun Gulia, Dr. Kailash
Chand, Kirpal Singh, Ranvir Singh, Ms. K. R. Chitra, Shree
Pal Singh, Mrs. Abhinandini Sharma, NishitAgrawal, Sitesh
B Narayan Singh, Shrey Kapoor, AkshatAnand, lrshad Ahmad,
Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Rahul Verma, Milind Kumar, Ms. Dibya
Dyuti Banerjee, Abhijit Sengupta, Ms. Archi Agni, S. K.
Sabharwal, N. K. Sharma, Salish Chand Gupta, Sarbendra
Kumar, Ms. Anukanksha Singh, Debasis Misra, Satish Kumar,
c K. Vijayan, K. Rajeev, Ujjwal Pandey, AnkurYadav, Ms. Asha
Gopalan Nair, Harinder Mohan Singh, Ms. Shabana, Rajni Kant
Avasthi, Ms. Shama Praveen, Rishi Matoliya,.Sarad Kr.
Singhania, Rajesh Singh, P. K. Jayakrishnan and M.M.
Kashyap, Advs., for the appearing parties.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T. S. THAKUR, J. 1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. The fate of these appeals by special leave, turn on a
E true and correct understanding of an order passed by this Court
in Kai/ash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
(2002) 6 sec 562. This Court was, in that case examining ·
whether award of bonus marks to candidates seeking
appointment as primary school teachers under Zila Parishads
F in the State of Rajasthan based on the domicile of the
candidates was legally permissible. Asimilar question was
earlier examined and answered in the negative by a Full Bench
of the High Court of Rajasthan in Deepak Kumar Suthar v.
State of Rajasthan (1999) 2 Raj LR 692 [W.P. (C) No.1917
G of 1995], which arose out of selection of Grade II and Ill
teachers borne in the State cadre under the administrative
control of the State Government. The High Court had in Deepak
Kumar's case (supra) held that although award of bonus
marks was not constitutionally valid, no relief could be given to
H
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1615
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
the writ-petitioners in that case as they did not stand a chance A
even if award of bonus marks to the successful candidate was
disregarded and inter se merit of the candidates determined
without taking such marks into consideration. The operative
· portion of the order passed in Deepak Kumar's case (supra)
is as under: B
"Instead of sending the matter to the appropriate Bench,
we think it proper to dispose of this petition with a
direction that no relief can be granted to the petitioners
as they could not succeed to get the place in the merit
_fist even by getting 10 bonus marks being residents of C
urban area, for which they are not certainly entitled. More
so, the petitioners have not impleaded any person from
the select list, not even the last selected candidate.
Thus, no relief can be granted to them in spite of the
. fact that the appointments made in conformity with the D
impugned circular have not been in consonance with
Jaw. However, we clarify that any appointment made
earlier shall not be affected by this judgment and it
would have prospective application."
E
4. When selection process for filling up posts of primary
school teachers in six different districts in the State of Rajasthan
commenced in the year 1998-99, award of bonus marks based
on the domicile of the candidates once again came under
challenge before the High Court. The immediate prov~cation F
1
for the challenge was provided by a Circular dated 1 o June,
1998 issued by the Department of Rural Development and
Panchayati Raj which prescribed the procedure to be followed
for making selections and appointments against the available
vacancies including the ITTelhod for determination of merit G
based on educational qualifications of the candidates and
award of bonus marks depending upon whether the candidates·
were domiciled in Rajasthan and residents of an urban or rural
area of the State. The circular said:
• H
,,
1616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A "This year, determination of merit has been amended
and determination of merit will be done as follows:
I.. Marks for educational qualification
SI. No. Qualification Weightage
B 1. Secondary 50%
Examination
2. Senior 20%
Secondary
Examination
c
3. STC/Bed 30%.
II. Fixation of bonus marks for domiciles
D SI. No. Qualification
Domiciles of 10 marks
Rajasthan
Resident of district 10 marks
E Resident of rural 5 marks
area of district
5. Some of the candidates who hailed from outside the
districts hence not eligible for the award of bonus marks filed
F writ petitions before Jhe High Court qf Rajasthan challenging
the circular in so far as the same .provided for the award of
bonus marks. Those petitions1When'7~ferred to a Full Bench
for an authoritative pronounceiH~i;{,<· n
,. 1• . .
8Ll1h1iinated
.·
,,_~ .. ·r
in the decision
of the High C_ourt in Kai/ash. <;:~~'!C!..~h~rma's case (supra)
G in which the High Court held that the question of constitutional
validity of the bonus marks wash61oh\l~( res integra in view
'- .. ,:·11~ •. ·.·'', Fj•I ·' :- '1t~
1
of the judgment of the first Full Bench'ih.,Deepak Kumar's
• • 1 · ·"f : ,., >I~~· :I." . -, . ·
case (supra). The second Full E:1~nch ·.ih Kai/ash Chand
Sharma's case (supra) ad:&aihgly 'disposed of the writ
H
MAN MOHAN SHARMA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1617
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
petitions challenging the circular and the award of bonus marks A
on the same terms as were stated in the order passed by the
first Full Bench in Deepak Kumar's case (supra). The Court
said:
''The Full Bench of this court in Full Bench reference in
Writ Petition No.1917195 has already answered the B
question that arises for consideration in these matters
also. These cases are to be disposed of for the very
reasons stated in the Full Bench judgment
aforementioned and in the same terms making it clear
that the employment in the case on hand relates to C
Panchayat as well as Education. Merely because the
employment relates to Panchayat, that does not make
any difference in the light of the Jaw laid down in the full
bench judgment aforementioned. Ordered accordingly."
D
(emphasis supplied)
6. It is evident that even when the Full Bench held the
award of bonus marks to be unconstitutional the writ- petitioners
in reality got no relief from the Court. The matter did not rest
there, forafterthe Full Bench judgment, one more batch of writ E
petitions came to be disposed of by a learned Single Judge
of the High Court by his order dated 26 February, 2001
directing preparation of ft fresh merit list of candidates
appointed on or before 21 s October, 1999 without regard to
bonus marks. An appeal filed by the State Government against F
that direction failed and was dismisse~ by a Division Bench
of the High Court by its order dated 13t April, 2001.
7. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Full Bench of
the High Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) the
writ-petitioners appealed to this Court. The State also filed G
an appeal against the judgment of the High Court directing
preparation of a fresh merit list. The civil appeals filed by
Kai lash Chand Sharma and others and that filed by the State
of Rajasthan in Naval Kishore's case were heard and
H
1618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A disposed of by this Court by an order dated 30th July, 2002
whereby this Court affirmed the view taken by the High Court
holding in no uncertain terms that the award of bonus marks or
weightage based on the place of residence or birth was not
legally permissible in the absence of any scientific study and
B considerations germane to the constitutional guarantee of
equality. Having said that, this Court examined whether the
judgment holding that the weightage/bonus marks is
constitutionally impermissible ought to be given prospective
effect so that appointments made prior to the second Full
c Benc~~udgment in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra)
i.e. 18 November, 1999 are left unaffected. This Court noted
that there were several instances where the past actions and
transactions including appointments and promotions though
made contrary to the law authoritatively declared by this Court
o were left untouched either on the principle of prospective
overruling or by invoking the powers of the Court under Article
142 of the Constitution. Invoking the doctrine of prospective
overruling this Court observed that selections and promotions
had in the past been made by awarding bonus marks to the.
E residents of the districts concerned and that award of such
weightage was upheld even by the High Court of Rajasthan.
This Court also noted that the law on the subject was during
the relevant period in a state of flux as was evident from a
review of the decisions rendered by the Rajasthan High Court
F from time to time. Taking note of these aspects this Court
recognised the need to balance competing claims by invoking
the doctrine of prospective overruling and confining the relief
to only the writ-petitioners who ha~hmoved to the High Court.
Appointments made on or after 18 November,~ 999 i.e. the
G date on which Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) was
decided by the High Court, alone were made subject to the
claims of the appellants. We shall presently refer to the
operative portion of the order passed by this Court in Kai/ash
Chand Sharma's case (supra) for as observed earlier, the
H controversy in this case rests entirely on a true and correct
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1619
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
interpretation of the said order. But before we do so, we A
consider it necessary to complete the factual narrative to place
the controversy before us in proper perspective.
8. In compliance with the directions issued by this Court
in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra), the State
Government issued an order dated 1otn October, 2002 B
whereby it identified cases in which the writ-petitioners had to
be considered for appointment as teachers vis-a-vis
candidates appointed or enlisted for appointment on or after
18th November, 1999. The State Government identified 23
different cases in which candidates were found eligible for such C
consideration. In the meantime, some of the candidates who
considered themselves eligible for consideration in terms of
the directions issued by this Court in Kai/ash Chand
Sharma's case (supra) issued notices to the State
Government threatening the latter with contempt proceedings D
for their failure to implement the directions issued by this Court.
The result was that several appointment orders came to be
issued in purported obedience of the directions issued by this
Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra).
E
9. The State Government during the period started
receiving complaints inter alia alleging that fraudulent and
irregular appointments in several districts of the State had been
made in breach of the spirit underlying the directions issued
by this Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra). F
Taking note of these complaigts, the State Government issued
a general order dated 23r April, 2005 asking the Chief
Executive Officers of the District Councils concerned to issue
show-cause notices to such fraudulently and irregularly
appointed candidates and to take action for termination of their G
services after affording them an opportunity of being heard in
the matter. Show-cause notices were accordingly issued to
the candidates who, according to the authorities concerned,
had been fraudulently appointed. Personal hearing was also
afforded to such affected candidates. Secretary to
H
1620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 14 S.C.R.
A Government, Department of Education, submitted a report
dated 4 April, 2011 stating thatthe directions issued by this
Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) were limited
to only such candidates as were parties before this Court. The
appointing officers were accordingly directed to take action
B and terminate the services of candidates who did not satisfy
that condition. Services of several such persons were
accordingly terminated, aggrieved whereof the affected
candidates approached the High Court by way of writ petitions
in which certain interim orders were also passed protecting
C such appointees from ouster.
10. In Suresh Chandra Sharma & Ors. v. State of
Rajasthan SLP No.~1377 of2009 arising out of a judgment
and order dated 25t March, 2009 passed by the High Court
of Rajasthan at Jaipur, the appellants had unsuccessfully
D claimed a mandamus from the High Court directing their
appointment. The appellants' case in that petition was that
although the relief granted by this Court in Kai/ash Chand
Sharma's case (supra) was limited to the writ-petitioners, a
large number of persons who were not covered by the order
E passed in that case were appointed as Assistant Teacher
Grade II in the Zila Parishad schools of different districts. On
behalf of the State it was submitted that while some persons
including those mentioned by the appellants were appointed
by the respondents, but such illegally appointed persons were
F sought to be removed by the State against which the aggrieved
persons had moved the High Court and secured interim orders
in their favour. Since the picture as to the total number of
persons appointed contrary to the directions issued by this
Court and the steps taken by the Government for removal of
G those responsible for making such appointments was not clear,
this Court directed the Secretary to the Government of
Rajasthan, In charge, Department of Education, to hold an
inquiry and submit a report as to the number of appointments
made contrary to the order of this Court in Kai/ash Chand
H
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1621
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
Sharma's case (supra) and to furnish particulars of such A
persons as had been appointed, the steps .taken by the
Government of Rajasthan for their removal and action, if any,
initiated against those responsible for making such
appointments.
11. When the matter came up again on 30th August, B
2012, the report of the Secretary to Government was filed and
it was submitted on behalf of the State Government that the
State Government had terminated the services of 50 persons
who were according to it illegally appointed as teachers. It was
also submitted that such employees had questioned the order C
of termination before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur
in writ petitions which are pending and in which the High Court
had passed various orders staying the operation of their
termination.
D
12. ltwas in the above backdrop that this Court requested
the High Court of Rajasthan to club the pending matters and
hear them on an early date. The High Court has accordingly
heard the matters and passed the orders appeals which are
separate but similar in impugned in these content. The High E ..
Court has dismissed the writ petitions filed by the candidates
who are said to have obtained fraudulent appointment orders
in their favour. The High Court has recorded a finding that those
appointed and removed in terms of the directions issued by
the State Government did not qualify for such appointment on F
a true and proper interpretation of the order passed by this
Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra). The High
Court has drawn support from the decision of this Court in
Girdhar Kumar Dadhich and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan
(2009) 2 sec 706, and found that the candidates concerned
had either suppressed or misrepresented material facts only G ·
to secure fraudulent appointments in their favour. Such
candidates were not, therefore, entitled to continue in service
nor were they entitled to any relief from the Court. The present
appeals assail the correctness of the said judgments and
H
1622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A orders of the High Court as already noticed above.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at
considerable length who were at pains to take us through the
judgment of this Court .in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case
(supra) over and over again. That was so because the
B entitlement of the appellants to any relief in these proceedings
depends entirely upon whether the same is permissible in terms
of the directions issued by this Court in Kai/ash Chand
Sharma's case (supra). As noticed earlier in Kai/ash Chand
Sharma's case (supra) this Court invoked the doctrine of
C prospective overruling primarily for two reasons. Firstly, this
Court observed that for nearly one decade selections had been
made by awarding bonus marks to residents of the districts
concerned and the rural areas falling therein which method
was upheld by the High Court in several decisions. Till the time
D the selection process in the present case was initiated and
completed these decisions were holding the field. The
correctness of those decisions was, however, doubted when
writ petitions filed by Kailash Chand Sharma and others came
up for hearing before a learned Single Judge with the result
E that the matters were referred to a larger Bench. By the time
the judgment in those writ petitions came to be delivered, the
selection list of candidates had been published in many
districts. The law was thus in a state of flux which justified
invocation of the doctrine of prospective overruling. This Court
F said:.
I
"In the present case, the legality of the selection process
with the addition of bonus marks could not have been
seriously doubted either by the appointing authorities
or by the candidates in view of the judicial precedents.
G A cloud was cast on the said decisions only after the
selection process was completed and the results were
declared or about to be declared. It is, therefore, a fit
case to apply the judgment of the Full Bench rendered
subsequent to the selection prospectively."
H
MANMOHAN.SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1623.
[T. S: THAKUR, J.]
14. The second reason which this Court gave for invoking A
the doctrine of prospective overruling was that all those
selected and appointed and selected for appointment on the
. basis of the impugned selection process had not been
impleaded as parties to the writ proceedings. This· Court
observed: B
"One more aspect which is to be taken into account is
that in almost all the writ petitions the candidates
appointed, not to speak of the candidates selected, were
not made parties before the High Court. Maybe, the
laborious and long-drawn exercise of serving notices C
on each and every party likely to be affected need not
have been gone through. At least, a general notice by
newspaper publication could have been sought for or
in the alternative, at least a few of the last candidates
selected/appointed could have been put on notice; but, D
that was not done in almost all the cases. · That is
the added reason why the judgment treading a new .
path should not as far as possible result in detriment
to the candidates already appointed. We are not so
much on the question whether the writ petitioners were E
legally bound to implead all the candidates selected/
appointed during the pendency of the petitions having
regard to the fact that they were challenging the
notification or the policy decision of general application;
but, we are taking this fact into consideration to lean . F
towards the view of the High Court that its judgment
ought to be applied prospectively, even if the non-
impleadment is not a fatal flaw."
15. This Court next examined the extent of prospectivity
that could be given to the declaration of law vis-a-vis the G
selection and appointment process under challenge. A three-
fold argument was noticed by this Court in that regard. Firstly,
the Court noted the contention that those selected and/or
appointed should remain unaffected of the law declared in
H
1624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) for it would be more
· rational and logical to apply the judgment to future selections. ·
The fortuitous circumstance of not being in a position to
securing appointment orders for a variety of administrative
reas~ns could not stand in the way of candidates already
B appointed or to be appointed after the date of the judgment.
The rival contention urged on behalf of the respondents that
there was no legal or '.ffilral justification for making further
appointments after 18 November, 1999 when Kai/ash
Chand Sharma's case (supra) was decided was also noticed
c by this Court. Reference was also made to the decision of this
Court in Madan Lal and Ors. v. State of J & K and Ors.
(1995) 3 SCC 486 and other cases relied upon by the selected
candidates in support of the contention that writ-petitioners
having taken a chance and participated in the s.election
o process could not turn around and question the said process
upon their failure to secure an appointment. It was in the
backdrop of all these submissions that this Court moulded the
relief suitably and issued directions. This Court, it is evident,
considered it just and proper to confine the relief only to such
E of the candidates as were writ-petitioners before the High Co~~
with a direction that appointments made on or after 18
November, 1999 in any of the districts shall remain subject to
the claims of su.ch appellants. Para 46 of the judgment of this
Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) which holds
F the key to several questions raised before us may, at this stage,
be extracted:
"46. Having due regard to the rival contentions
adverted to above and keeping in view the factual
scenario and the need to balance the competing claims
G in the light of acceptance of prospective overruling in
principle, we consider it just and proper to confine the
relief only to the petitioners who moved the High Court
and to make appointments made on or after 18-11-1999
in any of the districts sub}e.ct to the claims of the
H petitioners. Accordingly, we direct:
......
MAN MOHAN SHARMA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1625
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
1. The claims of the writ petitioners should be A
considered afresh in the light of this judgment vis-a-
vis the candidates appointed on or after 18-11-1999 or
those in the select list who are yet to be appointed. On
such consideration, if those writ petitioners are found to
have superior merit in case the bonus marks of 10% B
and/or 5% are excluded, they should be offered
appointments, if necessary, by displacing the
candidates appointed on or after 18-11-1999.
2. The appointments made up to 17-11-1999 need not
be reopened and reconsidered in the light of the law C
laid down in this judgment.
3. Writ Petition No. 542 of 2000 filed in this Court under
Article 32 is hereby dismissed as it was filed nearly one
year after the judgment of the High Court and no
0
explanation has been tendered for not approaching the
High Court under Article 226 at an earlier point of time."
16. A careful reading of the above leaves no manner of
doubt that (a) this Court invoked the doctrine of prospective
overruling which implies that the law declared by this Court E
would apply only to future selections and that although
prospective overJuling left appointments, (b) the appointments
madebefore18 November, 1999 untouched, the writ-
petitioners who. had moved the High Court" had to be
cogzidered afresh vis-a-vis candidates appointed on or after F
18t November, 1999 or those in the select list without giving
to such appointed/selected candidates the benefit of bonus
marks under the circular, and (c) that upon such consideration
of the writ-petitioners if they arff,found to be superior in merit
than those appointed after 18t November, 1999theyshall G
be offered appointments, if necessary, by removing the latter.
17. ltwas strenuously contended by learned counsel for
the appellants that the expression "the appellants who moved
the High Court" appearing in para 46 (supra) was wide enough
H
1626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2014] 14S.C.R.
A and actually covered not only such of the writ- petitioners as
had approached the High Court in the two batch of cases
decided by this Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case
(supra) but also all such candidates as may have filed writ
petitions at any time after 181h November, 1999 including those
B who filed such petition after 30'h July, 2002 when this C0~rt
decided the appeals in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's casb
(supra) and connected matters.
18. We find it difficult to accept th.at contention. There is
nothing in the judgment of this Court in Kai/ash Chand
C Sharma's case (supra) or the directions that were issued in
para 46 thereof to suggest that this Court was either conscious
of or informed of. pend ency of any writ petition filed before the
High Court after 18'h November, 1999. There is also nothing
to suggest that this Court intended the benefit granted in terms
D of direction (1) under para 46 to extend not only to the writ-
petitioners who had moved the High Court in Kai/ash Chand
· Sharma's case (supra) and in the writ petition filed by Naval
Kishore and others but the same has intended to benefit all
those who had or may have nibved the Hig~ Court at any point
E of time. On the contrary there is positive iiidication of the fact
that the Court did not intend to extend the benefit to any
appellant who had challenged the award of bonus marks and
the selection process on the basis thereof at any stage after
18'h November, 1999. This is evident from the fact that .Writ
F Petition No.542 of 2000 filed in this Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India was dismissed by this Court in terms
of direction (3) under para 46 on the'ground that the same had
been filed nearly one year after the judgment of the High Court.
The expression "as it has been filed after the judgment of the
G High Court" appearing in direction (3) under Para 46 clearly
suggest that for the grant of relief this Court had only petitions
filed before the judgment in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case
(supra) in mind and not those filed after 18'h November,
1999 when the said judgment was pronounced. The
H
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1627
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
observation of this Court that the writ-petitioners had offered A
no explanation for not approaching the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution at an earlier point of time too has two
distinct facets, namely, (1) that the writ-petitioners in Writ
Petition No.542 of 2000 should have ordinarily approached
the High Court and (2) They should have done so at an earlier B
point of time. The latter of these reasons again emphasized
the importance this Court attached to the delay in the filing of
the petitions in the matter of grant of relief for those who did
not challenge the selection process in good time were not
granted any relief. C
19. Judged in the above backdrop the present appeals
can be classified into two categories, namely, Category I
comprising writ petitions that were filed after 1B'h November,
1999 and before 30'h July, 2002 as was the position in Writ
Petition No.542 of 2000 filed under Article 32 and dismissed D
by this Court ind Category II comprising writ petitions that were
filed after 30t July, 2002. While there is nothing that could be
logically argued in regard to Category II cases for extending
the benefit of the Judgment in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case
(supra) to those cases, even in regard to Category I cases the E
judgment of this Court holds no hope for the appellants. All that
was contended by learned counsel for the appellants in
Category I cases was that writ petition in Naval Kishore
Sharma's batch was filed after the pronouncement of the Full
Bench judgment of the High Court in Kai/ash Chand F
Sharma's case (supra). Grant of benefit to appellants in Naval
Kishore Sharma's batch of writ petitions and refusal of a
similar treatment to the writ-petitioners who had similarly filed
their petitions no matter later in point of time would be unfair
and inequitable. They contended that the relief given by this G
Court to Naval Kishore Sharma and others (supra) ought
to be extended even to other similarly situated writ- petitioners
by construing the directions of this Court in Kai/ash Chand
Sharma's case (supra) liberally.
H
1628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A 20. There is, in our opinion, no merit in that contention
either. In Category I cases none of the writ petitions were filed
earlier than the date on which writ petition in Naval Kishore
Sharma's case (supra) was filed. At any rate, the argument
that some writ petitions had been filed around the same time
B when Naval Kishore Sharma's case (supra) was decided
(Tlay be no reason for us to enlarge the scope of the direction
issued in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) which is on
true a.nd proper,construction limited to t~e writ-petitioners who
had moved the High Court in those cases. We need to remind
c ourselves that we are not hearing a review petition in Kai/ash
Chand Sharma's case (supra) nor can we modify the order
passed in that case. What cannot be done directly by us, cannot
also be done indirectly by placing what is described as a liberal
interpretation by learned counsel for the appellants.
D 21. Mr. .Bali, learned counsel appearing for s.ome of the
appellants in Category II strenuously argued that although the
appellants in those cases were not writ"petitioners at any point
of time before the pronouncement of the judgment of this Court
in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra) some of the
E appellants could and were indeed appointed as teachers upon
consideration of their inter se m~rit vis-a-vis candidates who
had been appointed after 18t November, 1999. It was
submitted that the right of such candidates to make a grievance
against appointment of persons lower in merit with bonus
F marks awarded to them was not and could not be taken away
by the judgment of this Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's
case (supra). This would imply that even independent of the
said judgment if the writ-petitioners ~We higher in merit than
those appointed at any time after 18 . November, 1999, the
G appellants could make a grievance and seek redress from
the Government. Inasmuch as.such appointments have been
made in a few cases falling under Category II, the same could
not be faulted only because the writ petitions were filed after
the judgment in the Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra)
H was pronounced.
MAN MOHAN SHARMA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1629
[T. S. THAKUR, J.)
22. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Shiv Mangal A
Sharma, Additional Advocate General for the State of
Rajasthan submitted that the appointment of Category 11 cases
was clearly illegal and impermissible in the light of the judgment
of this Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra). The
contention that some of the appellants in· Category II were B
better in merit even without deletion of bonus marks was wholly
unsustainable and without any basis whatsoever. No such case
has been made out by the appellants in their respective writ
petitions. An affidavit filed by the State has, in that regard,
clarified the position that candidates falling in Category 11 not c
yet appointed are lower in merit with bonus marks loaded to
their merit than the last candidate appointed under the open
general category to which the appellants also belonged.
23. There is considerable merit in the contention urged
by Mr. Sharma. The case sought to be argued at the Bar D
was never set up in the writ petitions filed by the appellants
before the High Court. It was not even remotely suggested that
the appellants were appointed on account of their superior merit
without deletion of the bonus marks. Indeed if anyone with lesser
merit had been appointed writ-petitions challenging such E
appointment should have been filed quickly thereafter and not
belatedly as was the position in the instant case. That apart,
the affidavit filed by the respondents satisfactorily refutes the
contention urged at the Bar by Mr. Bali. The merit position
without deletion of bonus marks did not justify the appointment F
of anyone falling under Category II as ihey were all lesser in
merit than the last candidate appointed in the open general
category. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the
contention that the appointments of those falling under
Category II were justifiable on any ground independent of the G
directions issued by this Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's
case (supra). It is nQ,!eworthy that some of those appointed
had even filed affidavits stating that they were parties before
this Court which in fact was not the true position.
H
1630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A 24. On behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal arising out
of SLP No.31818 of 2012 it was argued that the termination
of the services was unjustified having regard to the fact that
the said appellantwas a writ-petitioner before the High Court
alongwith Naval .Kishore Sharma and others. Writ Petition
B No.2200 of 2000 filed by Danveer Singh was allowed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court f!!,long with Naval
Kishore's case by a common order dated 26 February, 2001.
That order was challenged by the State in Writ Appeal No.130
of 2001 but only qua other writ- petitioners comprising the
c batch. The order passed in the writ petition filed by Danveer
Singh never came under challenge before the Division Bench
of the High Court. Consequently the order passed by the
Division Bench did not pertain to the said appellant nor was
he imp leaded as a party before this Court in the appeals filed
D by the State. That being so, the termination of the services of
Danveer Singh on the basis that he was not a writ-petitioner
before the High Court was not justified argued the learned
counsel. It was contended that what was important was whether
the appellant was the writ-petitioner before the High Court out
E of which the judgment in Naval Kishore's case (supra) arose.
The fact that the State had not chosen to challenge the order
passed in favour of Danveer Singh could not place the said
appellant in a more disadvantageous position than those
against whom the State had filed the appeal first before the
F Division Bench of the High Court and later before this Court.
25. There is, in our opinion, considerable merit in the
submission made by learned counsel for the appellant Danveer
Singh. Even Mr. Mangal Sharma appearing for the respondent
fairly conceded that on a true and proper construction of the
G order of this Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma's case (supra),
the benefit of appointment to Danveer Singh could not be
denied merely because the order passed in his favour had riot
been assailed by the State or because he had not been
impleaded as respondent in the Supreme Court in the appeal
H
MANMOHAN SHARMAv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 1631
[T. S. THAKUR, J.]
filed by the State. The termination of services of Danveer Singh A
cannot in that view be sustained.
26. It was lastly contended by learned. counsei for the
appellants thPt ths appeiiants were appointed and have served
the sc:·,vo1s to which they have been posted for nearly a decade.
Their appointments having been made on a bona fide error in B
the interpretation of the order of this Court but so long as there
was no fraud played by the appellants there was nc •~ason
why they should be deprived of the benefit of s~.:;h a long period
of service. Altern2tive!v, it was submitted that since the
2ppel:ams have, by now, crossed the upper age limit for C
recruitment as teachers, this Court could consider issuing a
direction for consideration of their cases in future recruitments
in relaxation of the age bar.
27. The appellants had been appointed and have served 0
for nearly a decade but there are allegations that such
appointments were obtained by mis-representation of facts
and fraudulently. We do not consider it necessary to go into
that aspect as we are informed that criminal cases have
already been registered against appellants. Any observation E
made by us whether or not the appointments were obtained
by ~is-representation or by playing fraud upon the authorities
concerned is bound to cause serious prejudice to the
appellants. All that we need say is that in the facts and
circumstances of the case we do not consider the appellants F
to be entitled to the relief of reg1.1larization of their services as
prayed for by them. Having said that we cannot ignore the fact
that the appellants will be left without any alternate avenues of
employment at this stage of their lives. Subjec.t to any finding
that may be recorded by a competent Court, as regards the
alleged fraudulent nature of the appointments secured by the G
appellants, we direct that such of .the appellants as were
appointed as teachers and as have now been terminated may
be given a one-time concession of relaxation of the upper age
limit and considered in the next selection process in relaxation
H
1632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A of rules regarding such age limit prescribed for appointment
as teachers. We make it clear that the above shall be a one-
time relaxation for the appellants to try their luck in the next
selection process. The appellants or such of them as wish to
avail of this concession shall file an undertaking before the
B appointing authority concerned to. the effect that the fresh
appointment if any given to them pursuant' to the age relaxation
shall stand terminated in case they are found guilty and
sentenced to imprisonment in the criminal case registered
against them for obtaining a fraudulent appointment. Beyond
c that we do not consider the appellants to be entitled to any
relief from this Court. The appeals are with the above directions
disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.
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