Holding

Termination of service without a statutory disciplinary inquiry is void, as any agreement contrary to the mandatory provisions of Section 3 of the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969 cannot be enforced, and the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner are amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Summary

Manmohan Singh Jaitla, a confirmed headmaster of an aided school in Chandigarh, and Amir Singh, a drawing teacher, were terminated by the school's Managing Committee invoking clauses of their employment agreements, without a disciplinary inquiry. Both appealed to the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner under Section 3 of the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969, but their appeals were rejected. The High Court dismissed their writ petitions, holding that the school was not an "other authority" under Article 12 and thus not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that Section 3 mandating an inquiry is a mandatory statutory provision that cannot be overridden by any private agreement, and that the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner are quasi‑judicial tribunals amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 227 and 32. Consequently, the termination orders were declared colourable, bad in law and set aside, with both employees reinstated with back wages.

Issues considered

Whether Section 3 of the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969, requiring a disciplinary inquiry before dismissal, is mandatory and cannot be displaced by a private agreement.
Whether the termination of service by the Managing Committee without such an inquiry amounts to a colourable exercise of power and is void.
Whether the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner, as statutory quasi‑judicial authorities, are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 227 and 32 of the Constitution.
Whether an aided school constitutes an "other authority" under Article 12 for the purpose of writ jurisdiction.
Whether the orders of termination can be set aside and the employees reinstated with back wages.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 227, s. Article 32
Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969s. 3, s. 3(1), s. 3(2), s. 3(3), s. 3(6)

Subjects

Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) ActSection 3disciplinary inquirytermination of servicewrit jurisdictionArticle 227Article 32colourable exercise of poweremployment agreement vs statutory provisionpublic aided school

Judgment

479

' -'
MANMOHAN SINGH JAITLA, ETC. ETC.
A
v.

THE COMMISSIONER. UNION TERRITORY
•
CHANDIGARH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

December 19, 1984 B
(D.A. DESAI AND V. KHALID, JJ.)

Punjab Aided Schools (Stc11rily of Service) Act, 1969-S. 3-
Holding of inquiry before di~missing an employee of an aided school j1 manda-
tory-S. 3 is beneficial provision-On appointment teacher asked to enter into
agreement with school management-Agreement in derogation of mandatory c
provision-Managing Committee terminated service of teacher without holding
inquiry by Invoking conditions of agreement-Whether amounts to colourable
exercise of power-~,Yhether o··der of termination of service bad aN.f ab lnitio
•old.

Constitution of India Art. 227-Scope of writ jurisdlctlon-Expres.~lon
'Tribunal' in Art. 227 cotnprehend~ Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner D
which are statutory quasi~judicfal authoritlcr under the Punjab Aided Schools.

• (Security of Ser>.Jice) Act, 1969-Deputy Commissioner and Commis3/oner are
amenable to the writ jurlsdiction.

Interpretation-Any agreement not in consonance with the statutory
provisions beneficial to a class in ni!ed of protection eannot be given effect to if
it stands in derogation of the mandatory provisions of the .<tatut•.
E

Section 3 of the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 19d9
('1969 >. ct' for short) provides that no employee shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry to be held in the manner
prescribed therein. Sub-sec. (2) provide~ that no order of dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank of an employee shall take effect uolos1 it has F
been confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner who may refuse to do so. if in
bis opinion, the provisions or sub-sec. ( 1) have not been complied with.
Sub-sec. (S) permits an aggrieved person to prer~r an appeal against any
decision or order of the Deputy Commissioner under the section to the Com-
mi11ion1r.

The appellant in the civil appeal wa:11 appointed as Headmaster of an G
aided school which received 9.5 percent of its expenses as grant from the
Government. As required by the conditions of his appointment, the appellant
catered into an agreement with the management of the school. The
appollant'a appointment was confirmed by the concerned authority. Tho
appellant was confirmed in his post aa the Headmaster The appellant was H
480 SUPREHB COURT RBPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.a.

A awarded a certificate of honour by the Chandigarh administration in token
of appreciation of the outstanding performance of the appellant. After the
term of the Managing Committee which appointed tho appellant expired
and the new Managing Committee took over, the services of the appellant
were terminated invoking the c·onditions of the agreement entered into by the
appellant. The appellant's appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and the
Commissioner wero turned down. The appellant's writ petition was dis.
missed by the High Court In //mine. The H:gh Court observed that as tho
school cannot be said to be 'other authority• under Art. 12 of the Constitu·
tion, it was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Hence
this appeal by Special Leave.

The petitioner in the writ petition was appointed as a Drawing
Teacher in' t 976. As required by the conditions of his appointment the
c petitioner entered into an agreement with the management. In 1983 the
petitioner's services were terminated invoking the conditions of the agree ..
meat. The petitioner approached the Deputy Commissioner and the
Commissioner withoiit success. Thereupon he filed the present writ petition
under Art. 32 or the Constitution. ,,
D Allowing both tho appeal and the writ petition,

HELD : Any agreement not in consonance with the statutor1 provi ..
sions beneficial to a .class in need of protection cannot be given effect to if
it stands in derogatioo of the mandatory provisions of the statate. Section
3 or tho 1969 Act makes it obligatory to bold a disciplinary inquiry before
an employee of an aided school can be either dismissed remo'fcd or reduced
E in rank. In order to circumvent this mandatory provision .. a resort to the
provisions of the agreement in the context of the fact that an inquiry was
•
commenced and given up clearly indicates the trae nature of the order as
well as colourable exercise of power. And this was done by the new
Managina Committee which appeared to be keCn to dispense with the service
of persons appointed :by the outgoing Managing Committee. Tb is smacks
of malafide. For these reasons the order of termination of service of the
F appellant is bad and ab inltlo void. [48SE·G] '

lhe High Court declined to grant any relief on the ground that an
aided school is not 'other authority' under Act. 12 of the Constitution and
is therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The
High Court clearly overlooked the point that Deputy Commissioner and
Commissioner are statutory authorities operating under the 1969, Act. Tbey
.ire quasi.judicial authorities and that was not disputed. Therefore, they
G will be comprehended in the expression 'Tribunal' as uSed in Art. 227 of
the Constitution which confers power of superintendence over an courts and
tribunals by the High Court throughout the territory in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. Obviously.. therefore, the decision of the statutory
quasi.judicial aUthorities which can be appropriately described as tribunal
',' will be subject to judicial review namely a writ of certiorari by the High
!~ Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution, The decision questioned before
~
:: the High Court was ~of the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner
!; e::icercising powers under Sec. 3 of the 1969 Act, And these statutory
H
i
~.
M.S, JAITLA v. UNION TERRITORY 481

• -> authorities are certainly amenab]e to the writ jurisdiction of the High A
Court. [48SG-H; 486A-C)

After the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ajay
Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc. the aided school receiving
9 S % of expenses by way of grant from the public excbequrer and whose

·- employees have received the statutory protection under the 1969 Act and
who are subject to the reg•_1lations made by the Education Department of
the Union Territory of Chandigarh as also the appointment of Headmaster
to be valid must be approved by the Director of Public Instructions, would
certainly be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the. High Court. [486C-D]
B

Ajay Ha•ia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc., [1981] 2 SCR
79, referred to.
c
The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner in terms held in both
the cases that because of the terms of the agreement entered into by each
of the teachers with the management of the school, it would not be open to
them to go behind the order and to find out the true nature or the order.
Now if the management of the school intends to circumvent tho mandatory
provisions of Sec. 3 of tho 1969 Act, it has merely to terminate the service
b1 giving one month's notice as provided in the agreement and the provi. D
sions controlling the arbitrary powers of the management to hire and fire
can be rendered nugatory. The Deputy Commissioner cannot take au cas 1
recourse becoming oblivious to his duties merely to pay lip sympathy to

-
the order made by the n1anagement and decline even to examine the allega 4

tion of nialafide as also the true natart: and character of the impugned
order. [484B-D]
E
CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2137 of
1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.2.83 of the ,Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 1086;83.

WITH
F
Writ Petition No. 11238 of 1983
Under Article 32 of the Constitution

K.G. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General and Vimal Dave
for the appellant in CA. No. 2137/84. G

K.G. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor Gencrol and Ms. Asha
Itani Jain for the petitioner in WP. No. 11238/83.

Prtthvl Raj and R.C. Pathak for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ff
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

A DESAI, J. Gum Nanak Khalsa High School ('School' for short)
an aided school and hence governed by The Punjab Aided Schools
~- .
I

(Security of Service) Act, 1969 ('1969 Act' for short) in its applica-.
tion to the Union territory of Chandigarh dispensed with the service
of the Headmaster of the School, appellant Shri Manmohan Singh
Jaitla, and the drawing teacher Amir Singh claiming to exercise
B power under an agreement executed by each of them with the
management of the school. Admittedly, the school receives 95% of
its expenses as grant from the Government and for contribution 5%
of the expenses claims thoroughly arbitrary powers to b.e presently
pointed out which appears to be anachronistic. The action of the
Managing Committee of the school in dispensing with the services
C. of both the aforementioned persons is questioned in these two
matters on more or less identical grounds and therefore they were
heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment .
•
In Re : C.A. No. 2137/84:
D Pursuant to an advertisement inviting application for the post
of Headmaster of the School, appellant-Shri Manmohan Singh
Jaitla applied for the same. He was interviewed on March 28, 1976

-
and on the iame day by the order of the same date, he was offered
the post of Headmaster in the school in the prescribed scale with
usual allowances sanctioned by the Education Department, Chandi-
E
garh Administration for grant-in-aid Schools. The order of appoint-
ment provided that the appointee will be on probation for a period
of one year and that he will be required to enter into an agreement
with the school. The appellant accepted the appointment order and
joined service. Ab required by the regulations of the Education
F Department of Chandigarh Administration, his appointment was
subject to confirmation by the Director of Public Instruction. The
confirmation was granted as per the order dated August 11, 1976. By
the resolution of the Managing Committee of the School dated
June2, 1977, the appellant was confirmed with effect from May 1, 1977
in his post as the Headmaster. In token of tb.e appreciation of the
outstanding performance of the appellant as Headmaster in the field
G of ~cademic work/co·curricular activities and administration during
the session 1980-81, he was awarded a certificate of honour by the
Finance and Education Secretary, Union Territory of Chandigarh,
on August IO, 1981. It appears that the term of the earlier Managing .
Committee expired and a new Managing Committee took over with
effect from March 24, 1982. On January 31, 1983, the Education
ff Managing Committee of the school informed the appellant that his
M.S. JA.ITLA ,, UNION TIRRITORY (Desai. J.) 483

c.ervices were no longer required with effect from that very day i.e. A
January ?I, 1983 and in terms of Condition No. (iii} of the agree-
ment entered into by him, he would cease to be in the employment
of the school and was directed to hand over charge to Mrs.
Gurcharan Kaur. The appellants application for relief to the

·-
Deputy Commissioner under sub·sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the 1969 Act
was turned down. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Commissio· B
ner, the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Har-
yana at Chandigarh under Art. 227 or the Constitution. The High
Court rejected the writ petition in limine but by a speaking order
observing that as the school cannot be said to be 'other authority'
under Art. 12 of the Constitution, it was not amenable to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court. Hence this appeal by special leave
c

In Re W. P. No. 11238/83:

Petitioner Amir Singh was appointed by the Managing Com-
mittee of the School on March 21, 1976 as a Drawing Teacher as per
the appointment order No 1265 dated March21, 1976. This appoint· D
ment was made upon an application made by the petitioner and
after he was interviewed by the concerned committee of the school.
The appointment order spells out some of the conditions of appoint-
ment, one of them may be noticed. The appointee bad to enter
into an agreement with the management with the management of
the school. The petitioner was informed by a letter dated February E
28, 1983 that as per the resolution adopted by the Managing Com-
mtitee of the school, it was resolved to terminate the service of the
petitioner as no longer required with effect from the fore-noon of
March 4, 1983 in terms of first part of clause (6) of the agreement
entered into between the petitioner and the Management. The
petitioner approached the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissio·
ner without success. Thereupon he filed present petition nnder
Art. 32 of the Constitution.

It is not in dispute that the school is governed by the 1969
Act. It is an aided school receiving aid from the State Government
G
to the tune of 95% of its expenses. Sec. 3 of the 1969 Act provides
that no employee shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
except after an inquiry to be held in the manner prescribed therein.
Sub-sec. (2) provides that no order of dismissal or removal or reduc-
tion in rank of an employee shall take effect unless it has been
confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner who may refuse to do so, if
in bis opinion, the provisions of sub-sec. (I) have not been complied
with. Sub-sec. (SJ permits an aggrieved person to prefer an appeal
-...
'i.

484 stJPllDlll COUl.T REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.

A against any decision or mder of the Deputy Commissioner under the
section within a period of thirty days to the Commissioner. Sub-
sec. (6) provides that the order of the Commissioner shall be final
and binding between the parties.

--
The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner in terms
B held in both the cases that because of the terms of the ag1 eement
entered into by each of the teachers with the management of the
school; it would not be open to them to go behind the order and to
find out the true nature of the order. It was also submitted on
behalf of the respondent that under the relevant regulations of the
Education Department of the Chandigarh Administration every
c employee of an aided school has to enter into an agreement with the
management of the school. Now if the management of the school
intends to circumvent the mandatory provisions of Sec. 3 of the 1969
Act, it has merely to terminate the service by giving one month's
notice as provided in the agreement and the provisions controlling
D the arbitrary powers of the management to' hire and fire can be ren-
dered nngatory. The Deputy Commissioner cannot take an easy
recourse becoming oblivious to his duties merely to pay lip sympa-
thy to the order made by the management and decline even to exa-
mine ihe allegation of malafide as also the true nature and character
of the impugned order. In the garb of enforcing a term of the
E agreement what was sought to be done in this case was to impose
the penalty of removal. And there is sufficient material on record
to show that the action was malafide.

Turning to the case of Manmohan Singh Jaitla, the Headmas-
ter, the facts hereinabove narrated would affirmatively show that he
was fully qualified ·and that he was appointed after interview and
F
selection. He was confirmed. He received a certificate of merit
from the Chandigarh Administration. The moment the Managing
Committee changed exposing the inter-se squabbles amongst persons
trying to usurp control of the management of the school, almost
wholly financed by the public exchequer, to wreck vengeance ai;ainst
those who were appointed by the outgoing management which may
G 'have been defeated at the hustings, the agreement was invoked and
the services terminated. Throwing out persons appointed by out-
going management is only one side of the coin. The moment the
vacancy occurs, nepotism or corruption will have field day. Since
the new managenie'nt took, over quietly within a few months, service
of the Headmaster was terminated on the ground that his service
H was. no longer required. We repeatedly asked Mr. Prithvi Raj,
M.S. JAITLA v. UNION TE!Ul.l'fORY (Desai, J.) 485

. -) learned counsel for the respondent-school management as to how
it would run a school without a Headmaster. We naggingly per-
A

sisted with the question as to why it became necessary, obviously in
the middle of the term or session on January 31, 1983, to dispense
with the service of a Head Master and a Drawing teacher on the
ground that they were no longer required. We waited for the answer
in vain. Obviously, there could be none and that provides proof,
if any was needed, to expose the chink in the cupboard revealing the
malafides of the newly elected Managing Committee. We cannot
efface the feeling that ignoring the meritorious service for a period of
seven years the service of the appellant was dispensed with for a
reason wholly untenable but only because he was appointed by the
outgoing Managing Committee ignoring that his appointment was c
confirmed by the competent authority of the Chandigarh Admins-

... tration. Coupled with this is the fact that a charge-sheet was served
on the appellant on April 9, 1979 •nd a disciplinary enquiry was
commenced by the school management. But the same was with-
drawn and the power to terminate the service under the agreement
was invoked and exercised. This gives a clear indication as to the D
punitive character of the order namely punishment for a possible
misconduct and also colourable exercise of power by resorting to
the agreement. Any agreement, not in consonance with the
statutory provisions beneficial to a class in need of protection
cannot be given effect to if it stands in derogation of the man-
datory provision• of the statute. Sec. 3 makes it obligatory to hold E
a disciplinary enquiry before an employee of an aided school can
be either dismissed, removed or reduced in rank. In order to
circumvent this mandatory provision, a resort to the provisions of the
agreement in the context of the fact that an enquiry was commenced
and given up clearly indicates the true nature of the order as well as
colourable exercise of power. And this was done by the new Manag- F
ing Committee which appeared to be keen to dispense with the
service of persons appointed by the outgoing Managing Committee
This smacks of malafide. For all these reasons the order of ter-
mination of service of the appellant H bad and ab initio void.

The High Court declined to grant any relief on the ground 0
that an aided school is not 'other authority' under Art. 12 of the
Constitution and is therefcre not amenable to the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court. The High Court clearly overlooked the point
that Depnty Commissioner and Commissioner are statutory antho-
rities operating under the 1969 Act. They are quasi-judicial autho-
rities and that was not disputed. Therefore, they will be comprehen- H
486 SUPRl!M.B COURT REPORTS [HISS] 2 s.c.1..

A ded in the expression 'Tnbunal' as used in Art. 227 of the
Constitution which confers power of superintendance over all
courts and tribunals by the High Court throughout the territory in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Obviously, therefore, the
decision of the statutory quasi-judicial authorities which can be
appropriately described as tribunal will be subject to judicial review
B namely a writ of certiorari by the High Court under A rt. 227 of
the Constitution. The decision questioned before the High Court
was of the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner exercising
powers under Sec. 3 of the 1969 Act. And these statutory autho-
rities are certainly amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court.
c The matter can be viewed from a slightly different angle as
well. After the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mu;ib Sehravardi &, Ors. etc.< 1 ) the aided
school receiving 95% of expenses by way of grant from the public
exchequer and whose employees have received the statutory protec-
D tion under the 1969 Act and who is subject to the regulations made
by the Education Department of the Union Territory of Chandigarh
as also the appointment of Head Master to be valid must be appro-
. ved by the Director of public Instructions, would cerlainly be amena-
ble to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court
unfortunately, did not even refer to the decision of the Constitution
E Bench in Ajay Basia's case rendered on November 13, 1980 while
disposing of tho writ petition in 1983. In Ajay Basia's case, Bhag.
wati, J. speaking for the Constitutiou Bench inter alia observed that
'the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost
entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indica- .'
tion of the corporation being impregnated with governmental
F character.' Add to this 'the existence of deep and pervasive State
control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a St~te
agency or instrumentality.' Substituting' the words 'public trust'
in place of the 'corporation' and the reasons will mutatis mutandis
apply to the school. Therefore, also the High Court was in error
in holding that the third-respondent school was not amenable to the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
G
It would thus appear that the order of termination of service
is unsustainable for more than one reason and therefore, the order of
termination of service No. 58/83/20 dated January ·31, 1983 is
quashed and set aside and the appellant Manmohan Singh Jaitla is
reinstated in service as the Headmaster of the school witl) continuity
"I~
H (1) [19s1) l s.c.R. 79.
it
..)
~
M.S. JAITLA v. UNION TERRITORY (Desai, J.) 487
in service and full back wages. If under the orders of this Court A
dated March 2, 1983, May 2, 1983 and subsequent orders, the
appellant-Headmaster is paid his monthly salary, credit shall be
11>.ten for the same.
Amir Singh, the Drawinr Teacher has met with the same fate.
He was appointed pursuant to his application for a vacant post of a
8
Drawing Teacher. Right from the iuception, be was a confirmed
hand in the sense that he was not put on probation. Suddenly, after
the new Managing Committee got into saddle, his service wa• ter-
minated with effect from March 4, 1983 on the ground that It was
no longer required. No attempt was made before us to sustain the
order on th's uutenablo ground. Therefore, the only distinguishable c
feature of this case with the ca.se of the Headmaster Manmohen
Singh Jaitla is that no charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner-

... Drawing Teacher. Save and except this difference, all the reasons
which weighed with us in qu•shing the order of termination of
service of Headmaster-Mr. Jaitla would mutatis mutandis apply to
the case of this Drawing Te".cher. I\> restate these reasons would D
merely ndd to the· length of this judgment. As a corollary, the rule
will have to be made absolute aftec quashing and setting aside the
order of termination of service dated February 28, 1983 and directing

... reinstatment of Drawing Teacher Amir Singh in service with conti-
nuity in service with full backwages .
E
Accordingly, C. A. No. 2137 /84 is allowed and the order
terminating the service of Headmaster Manmohan Singh Jaitla is
quashed and set aside as also the decisions of the Deputy Commis-
sioner and the Commissioner and the Judgment of the High Court
are quashed and set aside. The appellant Headmaster Shri Man-
mohan Singh Jaitla is reinstated in service with continuity in service
and full backwages subject to the fact that if backwages have been
paid under the orders of this Court, credit may be given for the
same.
Rule is made absolute in the writ petition filed by Drawing
Teache1 Amir Singh and the order terminating his service dated
February 28, 1913 is quashed and set aside as also the orders of the G
Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner and he is reinstated in
service with continuity in service with back-wages.
The respondent-School management shall pay the costs to
both the employees separately quantified in each case at Rs I, 500.

H.S.K. Petition and appeal allowed. H