Supreme Court of India
MANOJ H. MISHRAversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 227
- Decided
- 9 April 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S S NIJJAR
Holding
The removal of the appellant was not shockingly disproportionate, his admission cannot be rescinded, and he does not qualify as a bona‑fide whistle‑blower; therefore the appeal is dismissed.
Summary
Manoj H. Mishra, a tradesman and union leader at Kakrapar Atomic Power Project, wrote a letter to a newspaper describing a flood‑induced accident and alleging corruption. He was charged with unauthorised communication to the press, criticism of project management and breach of confidentiality, and admitted all charges before the enquiry officer, leading to his removal from service. The appellant argued that he was a whistle‑blower and that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate. The Supreme Court held that the admission was final, the punishment was not grossly disproportionate, and Mishra did not meet the high moral standards required of a bona‑fide whistle‑blower. The Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 to reopen the case and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- The propriety and proportionality of the removal of the appellant for unauthorised communication to the press.
- Whether the appellant qualifies as a bona‑fide whistle‑blower entitled to protection.
- Whether the enquiry proceedings could be reopened after the appellant’s admission of guilt.
- Whether the Supreme Court can invoke Article 136 to set aside the High Court’s decision in this context.
Legislation cited
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(c)
Subjects
whistleblowerdisciplinary actionremoval from serviceproportionalityconfidentialitylabour lawmisconductArticle 136extraordinary jurisdictionatomic power project
Judgment
[2013] 5 S.C.R. 770
A MANOJ H. MISHRA
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2969 of 2013)
APRIL 09, 2013
B
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND M.Y.EQBAL, JJ.]
Labour Law - Misconduct - Removal - Propriety -
Appellant, workman and trade union leader, at an Atomic
C power project - Accident at the project due to heavy rains -
Appellant wrote letter to Editor of a vernacular newspaper
narrating about the incident and also highlighting serious
lapses on the part of the project authorities in regard to
functioning of the project and the imminent danger to it -
D Removal of appellant on ground that he unauthorisedly
communicated to the Press, official information concerning
the project; made statement, which amounted to criticism of
the project management or casting of aspersion on the
integrity of its authorities and enabled the press to create a
E news story creating embarrassment to the project as well as
to the State authorities - Punishment imposed on the
appellant - Held: Was not disproportionate - Appellant
without any justification assumed the role of vigilante - Action
of appellant was not merely to highlight shortcomings in the
F organization - Appellant indulged in making scandalous
remarks by alleging that there was widespread corruption
within the organization - Such allegations clearly had a
deleterious effect throughout the organization apart from
casting shadows of doubts on the integrity of the entire project
G - Conduct of appellant did not fall within the high moral and
ethical standard required of a bona fide "whistle blower" -
Employees working within the highly sensitive atomic
organization are sworn to secrecy and have to enter into a
confidentiality agreement - Appellant failed to maintain the
H 770
· MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 771
standards of confidentiality and discretion as required - No · A
injustice much less any grave injustice done to the appellant.
Labour Law - Departmental Enquiry - Admission by
delinquent workman - Closure of enquiry proceedings -
Removal - Plea for re-opening of the enquiry - Rejected by 8
the Appellate as well as the Revisional Authority- High Court
declined to reopen thf:1 issue - On appeal, held: Once the
Enquiry Officer had declined to accept the conditional
admission made by the appellant-delinquent, it was open to
him to deny the charges - But he chose to make an C
unequivocal admi$sion, instead of reiterating his earlier
denial as recorded in preliminary hearing - Extraordinary
jurisdiction u/Article ·136 cannot be exercised for re-opening
the entire issue at this stage - Such power reserved to enable
the Supreme Court to prevent grave miscarriage of justice -
It is normally not exercised when the High Court has taken a D
view that is reasonably possible - On facts, appellant failed
to demonstrate any perversity in the decision rendered by the
High Court - He cannot now be permitted to resile from the
admission made before the Enquiry Officer - Constitution of
India, 1950 - Article 136. E
Corruption - Prevention of - Informer - "Whistle blower"
- Who is - Held: Every informer cannot automatically be said
to be a bonafide "whistle blower" - "Whistle blower" would be
a person who possesses the qualities of a crusader - His F
honesty, integrity and motivation should leave little or no room
for doubt - Primary motivation for action of a person to be
called a "whistle blower" should be to cleanse an organization
- It should not be incidental or byproduct for an action taken·
for some ulterior or selfish motive - On facts, the appellant- G
delinquent did not fulfill the criteria for being granted the status
of a "whistle blower".
The appellant was a workman at Kakarapar Atomic
Power Project (KAPP) at Surat, Gujarat. He was also the
Genera~ Secretary of the recognized trade Union of H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A KAPP. There was an accident at the said Atomic power
project due to heavy rains, when flood water entered into
it and more than 25 feet of the turbine adjacent to the
Nuclear reactors was submerged under water.
8 The appellant wrote a letter to the Editor of a
vernacular newspaper 'Gujarat Samachar' narrating
about the said incident and also highlighting serious
lapses on the part of the authorities in regard to
functioning of the project and the imminent danger to
C KAPP.
The respondent authorities placed the appellant
. under suspension, in contemplation of disciplinary
proceedings. The appellant was serv.nf with a charge
sheet for - a) unauthorisedly communicating to the Press,
D official information concerning the Kakrapar Atomic
Power Project; b) making statement, which amounted to
criticism of the Project management or casting of
aspersion on the integrity of its authorities; and c)
establishing contacts with the Press correspondent and
E feeding him with vital information which came into his ·
possession in the course of his duty as a workman in the
Project, and thereby enabling the press to create a news
story about the Project creating em~arrassment to the
Project as well as to the State authorities.
F The appellant categorically admitted all the charges
leveled against him before the Enquiry Officer. In view of
the admission, the Enquiry Officer closed the enquiry
proceedings. The charges were held to be proved
against the appellant. Acting on the enquiry report, the
G Disciplinary Authority ordered the removal of the
appellant from service of KAPP.
The order was upheld by the Appellate as well as the
Revisional authority. Thereafter, the order was challenged
H by way of a writ petition which was dismissed by· a Single
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 773
Judge of the High Court. LPA against the judgment of the A
Single Judge was dismissed by the Division Bench. All
these orders were challenged in the present appeal.
The question which arose for consideration in the
present appeal was whether the punishment imposed on 8
the appellant was shockingly disproportionate to the
misconduct.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. In view of the admissions made by the C
appellant, no evidence was adduced before the Enquiry
Officer by either of the parties. Once the Enquiry Officer
had declined to accept the conditional admission made
by the appellant, it was open to him to deny the charges.
But he chose to make an unequivocal admission, instead o
of reiterating his earlier denial as recorded in preliminary
hearing. The appellant cannot now be permitted to resile
from the admission made before the Enquiry Officer. The
plea to re-open the enquiry has been rejected by the
Appellate as well as the Revisional Authority. Thereafter, E
it was not even argued before the Single Judge. The
submission was confined to the quantum of punishment.
In LPA, the Division Bench declined to reopen the issue.
In such-circumstances, this Court is not inclined to
exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 for F
reopening the entire issue at this stage. Such power is
reserved to enable this Court to prevent grave
miscarriage of justice. It is normally not exercised when
the High Court has taken a view that is reasonably
possible. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any
perversity in the decisions rendered by the Single Judge G
or the Division Bench of the High Court. [Para 27] (792-
F-H; 793-A-B]
2.1. It cannot be said that the appellant was acting as
a "whistle blower". It is a matter of record that the H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
I A appellant is educated only upto 12th standard. He is
neither an engineer, nor an expert on the functioning of
=
•• the Atomic Energy Plants. Apart from being an insider,
the appellant did not fulfill the criteria for being granted
~• the status of a "whistle blower". One of the basic
B requirements of a person being accepted as a "whistle
blower" is that his primary motive for the activity should
be in furtheran~e of public good. In other words, the
· activity has to be undertaken in public interest, exposing
illegal activities of a public organization or authority. The
c conduct of the appellant does not fall within the high
moral and ethical standard that would be required of a
bona fide "whistle blower". [Paras 28, 33) [793-C; 797-C-
F]
2.2. The appellant without any justification assumed
D the role of vigilante. He was merely seeking publicity. The
newspaper reports as well as the other publicity
undoubtedly created a great deal of panic among the
local population as well as throughout the State of
Gujarat. Every informer cannot automatically be said to
E be a bonafide "whistle blower". A "whistle blower" would
~6e a person who possesses the qualities of a crusader.
· . His honesty, integrity and motivation should leave little
· or no room for doubt. It is not enough that such person
is from the same organization and privy to some
F information, not available to the general public. The
primary motivation for the action of a person to be called
a "whistle blower'' should be to cleanse an organization.
It should not be incidental or byproduct for an action
taken for some ulterior or selfish motive. [Para 34] [797-
G F-H; 798-A-B]
2.3. The action of the appellant was not merely to
highlight the shortcomings in the organization. The
appellant had indulged in making scandalous remarks by
alleging that there was widespread corruption within the
H organization. Such allegations would clearly have a
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 775
deleterious effect throughout the organization apart from A
casting shadows of doubts on the integrity of the entire
project It is for this reason that employees working within
the highly sensitive atomic organization are sworn to
secrecy and have to enter into a confidentiality
agreement. The appellant had failed to maintain the B
standard of confidentiality and discretion which was
required to be maintained. This is not a case of 'glaring
injustice'. The punishment imposed on the appellant is
not 'so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the
conscience' of this Court. No injustice much less any c
grave injustice has been done to the appellant. [Paras 35,
36] [798-B-E, F-G]
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes
Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 593: 1980 (2) SCR 146
- distinguished. D
Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 4 SCC
611: 1988 (1) SCR 512; Parivartan & Ors. vs. Union of India
& Ors. [Order of Supreme Court in W.P.(C) No.93 of 2004
alongwith W.P .(C)No.539 of 2003]; Indirect Tax Practitioners' E
Association vs. R.K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281 and R.K. Jain
vs. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119: 1993 (3) SCR 802 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference:
F
1980 (2) SCR 146 distinguished Para 18
1988 (1) SCR 512 referred to Para 20, 36
(201 O) 8 sec 281 referred to Para 21, 28
1993 (3) SCR 802 referred to G
Para 30
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2969 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 14.07.2009 of the High H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [:.!013] 5 S.C.R.
A Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in LPA No. 1041 of 2007 in
SCA No. 2115 of 1997.
Prashant Bhushan, Shamik Sanjanwala, Pyoli, Kailash
Pandey, K.V. Sreekumar for the Appellant.
B Pravin H. Parekh, Suman Yadav, Ritika Sethi, Abhishek
Vinod Deshmukh (for Parekh & Co.) for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J. 1. Leave granted.
c
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 14th July, 2009 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal
No.1041 of 2007 by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Gujarat at Ahmedabad confirming the judgment of the learned
D Single Judge dated 31st January, 2007 in Special Civil
Application No.2115 of 1997. On 11th May, 2010, this Court
issued notice limited to the question of award of punishment.
In the High Court, before the learned Single Judge, the learned
counsel for the appellant made only one submission that
E looking to the allegations and the charges proved against the
appellant and the penalty of removal imposed upon the
appellant is disproportionate to the misconduct. However, in the
Letters Patent Appeal, a draft amendment was moved by the
appellant seeking to challenge the order of removal from
F service on the ground that the acts committed by the appellant
did not constitute misconduct. The application for amendment
was rejected.
3. We may very briefly notice the relevant facts for deciding
the limited issue as to whether the punishment imposed on the
G appellant is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct.
4. On 14th October, 1991, the appellant, who had studied
upto 12th standard, was appointed as Tradesman/8 Class Ill
post at Kakarapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP) at Surat,
H
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 777
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Gujarat, a public sector enterprises. He was placed on A
probation for two years in accordance with the statutory rules.
It is his case that on completion of the probation period, he is
deemed to be confirmed w.e.f. 14th October, 1993. Thereafter,
on 17th December, 1993, he was elected as General Secretary
of the recognized Union of Class Ill and Class IV of KAPP, B
called Kakarapar Anumathak Karamchari Sangthan. It is the
claim of the appellant that until his resignation from the primary
membership of the aforesaid Union on 22nd September, 1995
at tile instance of the Mariaging Director of the Nuclear Power
Corporation (respondent No.2), he acted as the General c
Secretary of the Union. He was a popular Union leader who
always won elections. with more than 3/4th majority. On 3rd May,
1994, he was declared a protected workman along with others.
He claims that as the General Secretary of the Union, he was
very active and always made extra efforts to see that the D
genuine demands of the members of the Union are accepted
by the respondents. As a representative of the Union, he was
regularly in contact- with the Station Director, KAPP
(respondent No.4). As a consequence of the Union activities,
the relationship of the appellant with respondent No.4 were sour.
The appellant, however, maintained working relationship with E
the respondents. It is also the claim of the appellant that during
the monsoon season, there was heavy rain during the night of
15th June, 1994 and water at Kakarapar Dam had risen
beyond the danger level. As a result, the Dam authorities had
to open the flood gates. In normal circumstances, Kakarapar F
a
lake would receive the Dam water through canal which is an
interlink. The water of the lake is used by the respondents'
authorities for power generation. However, on the night of 15th
July, 1994, it was the flood water, which entered in the
Kakarapar lake and within no time it had also entered into the G
plant. Before the next morning, more than 25 feet of the turbine
which is adjacent to the Nuclear reactors was submerged under
· water. In fact, the entire record room and computer room were
washed away. That apart, some of the barrels containing
nuclear wastes were also washed away by the flood watet. On H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A 16th July, 1994, the respondent authorities declared an
emergency, and started taking preventive measures.
5. It is the claim of the appellant that questions were being
raised by many people as to why and how the flood water could
8 not be prevented from entering into the turbines and other areas
of the plant. Therefore on 18th June, 1994, the appellant wrote
a letter to the Editor, Gujarat Samachar, Surat narrating in the
Gujarati language about the aforesaid incident. A translated
copy of the letter has been placed at Annexure: P1 to the
C Special Leave Petition and reads as under :-
"Date: 18.06.1994
To,
The Editor,
Gujarat Samachar,
D Surat.
In the Kankarapar on 16.06.94 there was water filled
in, due to this reason about 25 to 30 feet water was filled
in the Kankarapar, due to this reason the machines lying
in the Atomic Centre shut down Unit No.1 several machines
E
have moved back, and if this same unit No.1 was in the
running condition then the situation would have been very
grave, the Unit No.2 is not yet started. On 16.06.94 night
there was water filled in the Pali Mahi Scheme, but some
engineers in the department who were present at night in
F Pali they did not find it important to take any action due to
this reason the water level went on rising slowly and the
situation became so worse that there was emergency
declared and the employees were sent away, the staff that
was left behind there was no proper facility for food and
G water made, the employees leader Manojbhai Mishra says
that all this is a result of grave corruptions. The department
has incurred expenses worth lakhs of rupees and several
big canals were made, but the same were not managed
properly therefore due to ... .illigible ... .field engineer
H section thousands of rupees were expended and in the
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 779
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
building the situation was very grave and due to this reason A
although there were thousand crores rupees expended on
motor, pump, piping all of which is drowned.
The employees leader Manojbhai Mishra has stated
that in the department there are no arrangements made 8
for meeting with the natural calamities, and as a result of
which this situation was created. Manojbhai Mishra has
further stated that this is not any cloth mill, sugar mill or any
paper mill but it is a valuable asset of the country of India
and it is an atomic reactor. Manojbhai Mishra says that a
high level committee inquiry should be immediately initiated C
in respect to the Kakarapar Atomic Centre and take strict
action against the erring officer, so that in future no such
accident may take place.
Thanking you, · D
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
[Manojbhai Mishra]
General Secretary Employee Uni.on"
E
6. The appellant points out that he did not disclose any
official information which he could have received during his
official duty. He claims that the facts narrated in the letter were
of public knowledge and a matter of public concern. This is
evident from the fact that every newspapers, politicians,
members of legislative assembly and other citizens expressed F
their concern regarding the safety of the nuclear project and as
to how the said incident could have happened. The appellant
had narrated the facts relating to the water logging so that in
future this type of incident may not occur. The appellant relies
on a newspaper Anumukti dated 22nd June, 1994 entitled G
"Paying the Price for Honesty and Courage". This article points
out that although mercifully no great disaster took place the
event did highlight the lax attitude towards safety of the nuclear
power plant authorities. The article points out some of the
glaring irregularities. After pointing out the irregularities, the H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A article concludes:-
"All this shows a criminal negligence on part of designers,
operations and regulators of nuclear power in the country.
And yet nobody is likely to suffer any adverse
consequences at all. Nobody except Shri Manoj Mishra -
B
the man who blew the whistle".
xx
"Mishra was immediately suspended from work for the
c crime of talking to the press and his suspension continues
even today, five months after the event. While all those who
displayed singular dereliction of duty continued merrily
along; the one man who put the interest of the country
above his own selfish interest has been made to suffer as
D an example to others that in the nuclear establishment the
only 'leaks' that matter are leaks of authentic information."
7. The appellant claims that it was only after the news was
published on the 22nd June, 1994 that people outside and
even the nuclear establishment in Bombay took cognizance of
E the event. The Station Superintendent made a "dash" to Surat
and issued a statement along with the District Collector of Surat
assuring all and sundry that all was well under control. The
appellant claims that his honest approach was, however, not
appreciated by the Management and in fact he was singled out
F for action, instead of taking action against erring officials on
account of negligence. He had only performed his duty in
alerting the authorities to the imminent danger to KAPP.
8. As a 'reward', the respondent authorities placed him
G under suspension by an order dated 5th July, 1994, in
contemplation of disciplinary proceedings for major penaity. On
4th August, 1994, the appellant was served with the following
charge sheet:-
"Article I: That Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning as
H Tradesman/B in the Kakrapar Atomic Power Project, vipe
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 781
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
his letter on 18-6-1994 to the Editor, 'Gujarat Samachar' A
newspaper, Surat, unauthorisedly communicated with the
Press.
Article II: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning
as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project, in the letter dated 8
18-6-1994 written by him to the Editor, Gujarat Samachar
made certain statement or expressed certain opinions,
which amounted to criticism of the Project management
or casting of aspersion on the integrity of its authorities.
Article Ill: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while C
functioning as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project,
though his letter dated 18-6-1994, he wrote to the Editor
of the Gujarat Samachar unauthorisedly communicated to
the Press official information concerning the Kakrapar
Atomic Power Project. D
Article IV: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while
functioning as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project
est~blished contact with a Press correspondent to feed
information enabling the press to create news story about E
the Project containing inflammatory and misleading
information causing embarrassment to, and damaging the
reputation of the Project and the NPCIL
Article V: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning
as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project, established F
contacts with the Press correspondent and fed him with
vital information which has come into his possession in the
course of his duty as Tradesman/B in the Project, enabling
the press to create a news story about the Project creating
embarrassment to the Project as swell as to the State G
authorities. Shri Manoj Mishra has thus committed breach
of oath of secrecy which he took at the time of joining the
Project."
9. The appellant appeared before the Enquiry Officer on
H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A 20th December, 1995, when his Defence Assistant (for short
'DA') made the following statement:-
"DA. Shri Manoj Mishra met M.D. on 18.12.95 regarding
the enquiry. He made appeal to M.D. on 22.9.95 and
referring to this Shri Mishra enquired with M.D. As to what
8
was his decision on his appeal. M.D. informed Shri Mishra
that a lenient view will be taken, if he accepts the charge.
I also met him today and he assured similarly to me also.
In view of the above facts, Shri Mishra admits all the
charges levelled against him and accordingly requests
c closure of the proceedings. We now request the 1.0. also
to take a lenient view of the case."
10. The Enquiry Officer, however, decl!ned to accept the
conditional admission with the following observations:-
D
"l. O. Such admissions in the inquiry are not valid. Your
meeting M.D. is an extraneous matter with which I am
Inquiry Officer is not concerned. Further I also would not
like you to admit the charges on reasons other than facts.
I therefore, request you to categorically tell me whether on
E
your own you admit the charges or not.·
11. In response to the aforesaid request of the Enquiry
Officer, the appellant, i.e., C.O. stated thus :-
F "C.O. I admit the charges. I request the inquiry to be
closed."
12. In view of the aforesaid admission, the Enquiry Officer
closed the enquiry proceedings. The charges were held to be
proved against the appellant. Acting on the aforesaid enquiry
G report by order dated 30th March, 1996, the Disciplinary
Authority ordered the removal of the appellant from service of
KAPP w.e.f. afternoon of 30th March, 1996. The appellant was
informed that an appeal lies against the aforesaid order with
the Station Director, KAPP within a period of 45 days from the
H
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 783
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
date of the issue of the order. The appeal filed by the appellant A
was dismissed. The appellant thereafter preferred a revision
application before respondent No. 3, which was also
dismissed.
13. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order by way
8
of a Special Civil Application No. 2115 of 1997. The aforesaid
writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge. The
appellant preferred LPA No. 1041 of 2007 against the
aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, which was
dismissed by the Division Bench on 14th July, 2009. All these C
orders have been challenged before this Court in the present
appeal.
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
15. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for 0
the appellant submitted that the appellant had only done his duty
as an enlightened citizen of this country. in highlighting the
serious lapses on the part of the authorities that could have
resulted in a catastrophic accident. Learned counsel pointed
out that seriousness of the accident which took place at KAPP E
is evident from the fact that it is mentioned in the Audit Report
submitted by the department of the Atomic Energy to the
Government on the safety of Indian Nuclear Installation. Learned
counsel further pointed out that power supply to the KAPP could
be restored only at 1510 hrs. on 16th June, 1994. Some part
of the plant could be restarted only on 17th June, 1994 at 10.25 F
am. The report clearly indicates that during the incident Site
Emergency was declared at 11.00 a.m. and terminated at 5.00
p.m. on 16th June, 1994. The Audit Report clearly indicates that
the valuable feedback arising out from the three incidents which
were reviewed, which indicated the incident at KAPS led to G
strengthening the design of the nuclear power stations in the
qountry. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, instead
of being punished, the appellant ought to have been rewarded
for doing his duty.as an enlightened citizen of this country.
Learned counsel further pointed out that once the internal H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A emergency had been declared, respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were
under obligation to alert the Collector and District Magistrate,
Surat, SOM of Vyara, Mar.dvi, Olpad, DSP (rural), Surat about
the emergency situation. However, the KAPP authority did not
alert the authorities of the district administration on 16th June,
B 1994. In fact the District Authority visited the site only on 23rd
June, 1994 after the new stories were published in the local
dailies on 22nd June, 1994. Mr. Prashant Bhushan has made
a reference to the letter dated 2nd July, 1994, in which the
Disciplinary Authority has informed the appellant that:
c "As a result of the appearing of the highly inflammatory
news stories in the press, the authorities of the District
Administration had to rush to the Plaint Site on 23.6.1994
to ascertain the veracity of the story and to take corrective
measures for removing the apprehensions 9aused all
D around on account of the news story. The project
authorities too had to rush to the District Headquarters on
23.6.1994 for taking appropriate immediate action to
issue clarificatory information to the Press. All these co.uld
have been avoided had Shri Manoj Mishra and his
E accomplices behaved themselves in the responsible
manner and desisted themselves from interacting with the
press and passed on distorted information.
Since the action on the part of Shri Manoj Mishra and his
F accomplices has caused serious difficulties to the various
authorities, apart from causing irreversible damage to the
reputation of the estciblishment and called in the question
the integrity of some of it.s own employees, the Di~trict
Administration Authorities have called upon the Project
Management to investigate into the entire episode and
G take action to bring to book the culprits."
16. Mr. Prashant Bhushan submitted that if the aim of the
appellant was to seek publicity, he could have gone to the press
on 16th June, 1994 or the latest on 17th June, 1994. The
H appellant only talked to the reporters when they were at plant
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 785
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
site to cover the situation. He had talked to the press in his A
capacity as the General Secretary of KAKS. Learned counsel
pointed out that the appellant only wrote to the letter dated 18th
June, 1994 to the Editor of Gujarat Samachar, when he saw
that the concerned authorities were acting negligently. Mr.
Bhushan further submitted that the appellant has been misled B
into admitting the charges levelled against him as he was
verbally assured by respondent No. 4 that he would be dealt
with leniently, if he admits all the charges. Keeping in view the
facts that the appellant had acted in the best interest of nuclear
facility and to prevent a catastrophic accident having disastrous c
result like Fukushima accident, the appellant could not be said
to be gu_ilty of any misconduct. Mr. Bhushan further submitted
that the information given by the appellant was not, in any
manner, confidential information to invite any Disciplinary
Proceedings or punishment. The appellant was, in fact, in the 0
position of a ''whistle blower'' and he is to be given full protection
by the Court. Learned counsel pointed out that .radio activity
would continue for a long time even after a nuclear reactor is
shut down, therefore, the fuel rods have to be kept cool for a
very long time and sometimes even for years. The incident E
which took place on the night of 15th June, 1994 was very
serious. The power failure could have had devastating effect.
Therefore, the civil authorities had to be alerted forthwith, as
the population in the entire area would have to be evacuated.
Instead of taking timely preventive measures, the atomic centre
merely tried to keep the incident concealed. Merely because F
the damage caused by the flood was ultimately controlled is not
a ground to conclude that it would not have led to a major
catastrophe. The appellant had only alerted the Civil Authorities,
which was required to be mandatorily done by the respondents,
under the rules. Mr. Bhushan reiterated that the description of G
the incident given by the authorities themselves clearly shows
that ultimately action was taken on a war footing to control the
flood situation at the site. Various officers were contacted and
it was on their action the situation was brought under control.
Learned counsel also reiterated the Extracts from Manual on H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A Emergency Preparedness for KAPS Volume I Part II, Page 3
and Action Plan for Site Emergency. He brought to our notice,
in particular, that on hearing the emergency signal and/or on
getting information of the same through telephone (or any other
.means), the Director shall immediately proceed to the main
B · control room. He is required to alert Collector and District
Magistrate, Surat, SOM of Vyara, Mandvi, Olpad, DSP (rural),
Surat. Under Clause 5 of the aforesaid extracts from Manual.
The authorities are required to depute one Assistant Health
Physicist to the assembly areas for general contamination and
c radiation checks. Arrangements have to be made for
transportation of injured person/persons to the Hospital after
providing First Aid. Arrangements had to .be made for
evacuation of the site personnel, if required. Since none of that
was being done, the appellant acted as a "whistle blower" and
alerted the Press.
0
17. Mr. Bhushan makes a reference to the letter dated 2nd
July, 1994 of the Senior Manager (P & IR) to the appellant as
President of KAKS in which it was alleged that "the story which
appeared i;n Gujarat Samachar created panic among the
E people residing in areas nearby the Project in particular and
the State of Gujarat in general as also the State Administration,
thereby causing spread of disinformation and bringing
disrepute to the Project, which was raised doubts about the
safety of the Project and integrity of the Project Authorities".
F
18. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the learned
Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have committed a
serious error in not accepting the plea of the appellant that the
punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct. Learned
G counsel submitted that when exercising the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is not
bound by any technicalities and is required to do substantial
justice where glaring injustice demands affirmative action. He
submitted that in the circumstances ends of justice would be
met in case the punishment of removal is substituted by the
H
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 787
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
punishment of stoppage of three increments without cumulative A
effect. He relies on Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Gujarat
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors., 1 in which this Court held
as under:-
"While the remedy under Article 226 is extraordinary and
8
is of Anglb-Saxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of
English processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the
lancet operates where injustice suppurates. While
traditional restraints like availability of alternative remedy
hold back the court, and judicial power should not ordinarily C
rush in where the other two branches fear to tread, judicial
daring is not daunted where glaring injustice demands
even affirmative action. The wide words of Articl~ 226 are
designed for service of the lowly numbers in their
grievances if the subject belongs to the court's province
and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process". D
19. Relying on the aforesaid observations, he submits that
the High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in
it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Singe
Judge, even having noticed the principle that the Court can E
interfere with .the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, if it
seems to be illegal er suffers from procedural impropriety or
is shocking to the judicial conscience of the Court, erroneously
failed to apply the same to the case of the appellant.
20. The punishment imposed on the appellant suffer from F
all the vices of irrationality, perversity and being shockingly
disproportionate and ought to have been set aside and
substituted by a lesser punishment. In support of the
submissions, he relies on Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India &
Ors., 2 in which this Court held as under:- G
"25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed
1. {19BO) 2 sec 593.
2. (1987) 4 sec s11. H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5. S.C.R.
A against a decision, but is directed against the "decision-
making process". The question of the choice and quantum·
of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It
B should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to
shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part
of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even
on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive
c province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court
even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,
then the sentence would not be immune from correction.
Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of
judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister
for the Civil Service9 Lord Diplock said:
D
"Judicial review has I think developed to a stage
today when, without reiterating any analysis of the
.steps by which the development has corne about,
one can conveniently classify under three heads the
E grounds on which administrative action is subject
to control by judicial review. The first ground I would
call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third
'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that
further development on a case by case basis may
F not in course of time add further grounds. I have in
mind particularly the possible adoption in the future
of the principle of 'proportionality' which rs
recognised in the administrative law of several of
our fellow members of the European Economic
G Community; .. ."
21. On the same proposition, the learned counsel has
relied on a number of judgments, but it is not necessary to make
a reference to them as the ratio of law laid down in the
aforesaid cases have only been reiterated. Learned counsel
H
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 789
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
submitted that on 21st April, 2004, Ministry of Personnel, Public A
Grievances and Pension issued a Notification for the protection
of "whistle blowers" in terms of the order of this Court in
Parivartan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C)
No. 93 of 2004 along with Writ Petition (C) No. 539 of 2003
recording the murder of Shri Satyendra Dubey. He also relied B
on judgment of this Court in Indirect Tax Practitioners'
Association Vs. R.K. Jain3 in support of his submission, that
the appellant had acted as "whistle blower" ought not to have
been punished.
22. Mr. Parekh seriously disputes the version of events as C
narrated by the learned counsel for the appellant. He submits
that on 16th June, 1994, as a result of the overflow, the flood
water entered into parts of the plants and, therefore,
precautionary actions were to be taken. Therefore, follow up
exercises were being diligently carried out when everyone was D
busy in tackling the situation to save Atomic Power Plant, the
appellant, using the official telephone contacted the following
members of the media:-
(i) 623375-The Editor, Gujarat Samachar, Surat E
'(ii) 20760- Shri Vilasbhai Soni, Press Reporter,
Sandesh, Vyare
(iii) 30225-Hasmuklal and Company, Sardar Chowk,
Bardoli. F
23. On 18th June, 1994, at about 11.30 a.m., the appellant
telephoned the pass section of CISF and told Mr. A. Srikrishna,
CISF Constable, that a person asking for him will come to pass
section. The Constable was told to tell the person to wait for G
the appellant. After the press reporter arrived, the appellant met
him in his official quarters. Thereafter, the appellant wrote the
letter to the Daily Gujarat Newspaper having the largest
. circulation in Gujarat. Relying on the aforesaid, the newspaper
3. (2010) s sec 2s1. H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A published the news. Soon thereafter on 22nd June, 1994,
another news story appeared in Gujarat Samachar with the title
that "Half of Gujarat would have exploded on June 15". In this
news story, it was stated that "at the same time chances of an
accident damaging not only Surat district but, the whole of
B Gujarat and being totally demolished within seconds have been
saved". According to Mr. Parekh, the aforesaid story contained
false and defamatory allegations of "blatant corruption going
on in the organization:. It gave fa/se_and distorted and
inflammatory information about the Project, raising serious
c doubts about the safety and security of the Nuclear Power Plant.
The aforesaid news story was capable of creating extreme
panic among the public of Gujarat. After satisfying himself with
the safety situations, the District Collector in his capacity as
Director of Site Emergency Plan of KAPS gave a press release
D to that effect. Similarly, the Station Director also issued a press
release to diffuse the panic situation created by the news item
released by the appellant in his own name and signature. These
clarifications were published in the Gujarat Samachar on 23rd
June, 1994. On 5th July, 1994, respondent No. 2 appoin~ed a
E Committee to investigate the role of the appellant behind the
aforesaid media reports. Based on the preliminary reports, the
Disciplinary Authority placed the appellant under suspension,
in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings to be initiated
against him for major penalty. The statement of imputation of
misconduct of misbehaviour in support of charges were served
F on the appellant on 4th August, 1994. An Inquiry Officer was
appointed on 26th December, 1994. At the primary hearing in
the enquiry, the appellant denied all the charges. His choice of
Mr. P.B. Sharma as Defense Assistant was accepted. He was
given inspection of all the documents, he was also asked to
G submit his list of witnesses. The appellant had stated that the
list of witnesses would be submitted after consulting his
Defense Assistant. On 9th October, 1995, the hearing of the
inquiry was adjourned on the ground that the appellant had
submitted an appeal to NPCIL. On 20th December, 1995, the·
H appellant admitted all the charges leveled against him in toto
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 791
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
and accordingly the inquiry was closed on such admission of A
the charges.
24. Mr. Parekh further submitted that the appellant having
admitted all the charges levelled against him can not be
permitted to resile from the same on the ground that any 8
assurance of leniency were made to him by the respondents.
He further submitted that the appellant has been non-suited at
every stage. Even this Court had only issued notice with regard
to the question of punishment. He points out that the appellant
is correct in saying that he is not an employee of a cloth mill or C
sugar mill, he was an employee of the highly sensitive Atomic
Centre. He was required to maintain highest degree of
confidentiality at the time of the incident. The appellant, instead ·
of assisting the control of flood situation, was busy giving
disinformation to the press. He submitted that under the rules
and regulations applicable at the Atomic Centre, press can not D
be contacted by any employee other than the Specified Officer.
This is so as the workers in the nuclear power facility are a
special category of employees. They are required to maintain
a very high standard with regard to confidentiality to prevent the
leakage of very sensitive information. Mr. Parekh emphatically E
denied the claim of the appellant that he is a "whistle blower".
At the time when the water was entering into the nuclear plant
the appellant made three telephone calls to the Media divulging
the information which he was not permitted to give. The
appellant had even informed the constable on duty to keep one F
of the news reporters outside on 18th June, 1994 when the
emergency was at its highest. Mr. Parekh further pointed out
that a mere perusal of the charges which have been admitted
by the appellant would clearly show that the punishment is not
only justified but in fact rather lenient. The respondents in fact G
had the option to prosecute the appellant but he has only been
proceeded against the departmentally. Mr. Parekh also
submitted that most of the submissions made by Mr. Bhushan
and the documents relied upon in support of the submissions
were never a part of the record before the High Court. H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A According to the learned senior counsel, the appellant does not
deserve any leniency and the appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
25. We have considered the submissions made by the
B learned counsel very anxiously.
26. We have noted in detail the submissions made by Mr.
Bhushan, though strictly speaking, it was not necessary in view
of the categorical admission made by the appellant before the
Enquiry Officer. Having admitted the charges understandably,
C the appellant only pleaded for reduction in punishment before
the High Court. The learned Single Judge has clearly noticed
that the counsel for the appellant has only submitted that the
punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct
admitted by the appellant. The prayer made by the appellant
D before the Division Bench in the LPA for amendment of the
grounds of appeal to incorporate the challenge to the findings
of guilt was rejected.
27. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge and the
E Division Bench have not committed any error in rejecting the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. We
are not inclined to examine the issue that the actions of the
appellant would not constitute a misconduct under the Rules.
In view of the admissions made by the appellant, no evidence
was adduced before the Enquiry Officer by either of the parties.
F Once the Enquiry Officer had declined to accept the conditional ·
admissions made by the appellant, it was open to him to deny
the charges. But he chose to make an unequivocal admission,
instead of reiterating his earlier denial as recorded in
preliminary hearing held on 26th December, 1994. The
G appellant cannot now be permitted to resile from the admission
made before the Enquiry Officer. The plea to re-open the
enquiry has been rejected by the Appellate as well as the
Revisional Authority. Thereafter, it was not even argued before
the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel had confined the
H submission to the quantum of punishment. In LPA, the Division
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 79·3
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Bench declined to reopen the issue. In such circumstances, we A
are not inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 136 for reopening the entire issue at this stage. Such
power is reserved to enable this Court to prevent grave
miscarriage of justice. It is normally not exercised when the High
Court has taken a view that is reasonably possible. The B
appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity in the
decisions rendered by the Single Judge or the Division Bench
of the High Court.
28. Having examined the entire fact situation, we are C
unable to accept the submission of Mr. Bhushan that the
appellant was acting as a "whistle blower". This Court in the
case of Indirect Tax Practitioners' Association (supra) has
observed as follows:-
"At this juncture, it will be apposite to. notice the growing D
acceptance of the phenomenon of whistleblower. A
whistleblower is a person who raises a concern about the
wrongdoing occurring in an organisation or body of
people. Usually this person would be from that same
organisation. The revealed misconduct may be classified E
in many ways; for example, a violation of a law, rule,
regulation and/or a direct threat to public interest, such as
fraud, health/safety violations and corruption.
Whistleblowers may make their allegations internally (for
example, to other people within the accused organisati~n) F
or externally (to regulators, law enforcement agencies, to
the media or to groups concerned with the i~sues)."
29. Before making the aforesaid observations', this Court
examined in detail various events which had taken place over
a long period of time in which, the respondent, Editor of the Law . G
Journal, Excise Law Times had participated. A Contempt
Petition was filed. by the appellant association against the
respondent on the ground that he wrote an editorial in the issue
dated 1st June, 2009 of the Journal, which amounted to criminal
contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act,. H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A 1971. In the editorial, the respondent appreciated the steps
taken by the new President of CESTAT to cleanse the
administration. However, at the same time, he highlighted the
irregularities in transfer and posting of some members of the
Tribunal. He had pointed out that one particular member, Mr.
B T.K. Jayaraman had been accommodated at Bangalore by
transferring another member from Bangalore to Delhi in less
than one year of his posting. Apart from this, he had also
criticized some of the orders passed by the bench comprising
of Mr. T.K. Jayaraman, which were adversely commented upon
c by the High Court of Karnataka and Kerala. In spite of this, the
appellant contended that, by highlighting the irregularities and
blatant favoritism shown to Mr. T. K~ Jayaraman, Mr. R.K. Jain
was trying to scandalize the functioning of CESTAT and lower
its esteem in the eyes of the public. It was pointed out that the
D article in which the aforesaid statements have been made, was
in breach of the undertaking filed in this Court in Contempt
Petition (Crl.) No. 15 of 1997. In these proceedings, the
respondent had given an undertaking on 25th August, 1998, to
abide by the advise given by his senior counsel that in future
whenever there are any serious complaints regarding the
E functioning of CEGAT, the proper course would be to first bring
those matters to the notice of the Chief Justice of India, and/or
the Ministry of Finance and await a response or corrective
action for a reasonable time before taking any other action.
During the pendency of the aforesaid contempt case, the
F respondent had written a number of detailed letters to the
Finance Minister and other higher authorities in the Government
of India highlighting the specific cases of irregularities,
malfunctioning and corruption in CESTAT. After the notice of
· contempt was discharged, the respondent wrote two more
G letters to the Finance Minister on the same subject and also
pointed out how the appointment and posting of Mr. T.K.
Jayaraman, Member CESTAT was irregular. He wrote similar
letters to the Revenue Secretary; President, CESTAT;
Registrar, CESTAT and the Central Board of Excise and
H Customs. Since no cognizance of the afore~aid letters were
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 795
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
·taken by any of the five authorities, the respondent wrote the A
editorial in which he made the comments, which led to the filing
of the Contempt Petition by the appellant.
30. This Court took notice of the conduct and the
credentials of the respondent. It is noticed that the respondent
is not a. novice in the field of Journalism. For decades, he had B
been fearlessly using his pen to highlight malfunctioning of
CEGAT and its successor CESTAT. In his letter dated 26th
December, 1991 written to the then Chief Justice of India, he
complained that CEGAT is without a president for last over six
months, which has adversely affected the functioning of the C
Tribunal. After an in depth analysis of the relevant constitutional
provisions, this Court gave certain suggestions for improving
the functioning of CEGAT and other Tribunals constituted under
Articles 323A and 3238. [See R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India,
(1993) 4 sec 119]. It was pointed out that the allegations made D
by Mr. R.K. Jain having regard to the working of CEGAT are
grave and the authorities can ill afford to turn a "Nelson's eye"
to those allegations made by a person who is fairly well
conversant with the internal working of the Tribunal.
31. After noticing the aforesaid observations in the earlier E
case, this Court in the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners'
Association (supra), pointed out that respondent was very
conscious of the undertaking filed in the earlier Contempt
Petition and this is the reason why before writing the editorial,
he sent several communications to the functionaries concerned,· F
to bring to their notice the irregularities in the functioning of
CESTAT. The Court notices that "The sole purpose of writing
those letters was to enable the authorities concerned to take
coffective measures but nothing appears to have been done
by them to stem the rot. It is neither the pleaded case of the G
appellant nor any material has been placed before this Court
to show that the Finance Minister or the Revenue Secretary,
Government of India had taken any remedial action in the
context of the issues raised by the respondent. Therefore, it
is not possible to hold the respondent guilty of violating the H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A undertaking given to this Court."
32. This Court upon meticulously taking note of the entire
fact situation observed that the editorial written by the
respondent was not intended to demean CESTAT as an
institution or to scandalize its functioning. Rather, the object of
B ·the editorial was to highlight the irregularities in appointment,
posting and transfer of members of CESTAT and instances of
abuse of the quasi judicial powers. It was further observed that
the editorial highlighted the unsatisfactory nature of the orders
passed by the particular bench of Mr. T.K. Jayaraman was a
c member. The orders had been set aside by the High Courts of
Karnataka and Kerala as well as by this Court. In these
circumstances, this Court observed:-
"38. It is not the appellant's case that the facts narrated in
the editorial regarding transfer and posting of the members
D of CESTAT are incorrect or that the respondent had
highlighted the same with an oblique motive or that the
orders passed by the Kamataka and Kerala High Courts
to which reference has been made in the editorial were
reversed by this Court. Therefore, it is not possible_ to
E record a finding that by writing the editorial in question, the
respondent has tried to scandalise the functioning of
CESTAT or made an attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice.
41. One of the most interesting questions with respect to
F internal whistleblowers is why and under what
circumstances people will either act on the spot to stop
illegal and otherwise unacceptable behaviour or report it.
There is some reason to believe that people are more likely
to take action with respect to unacceptable behaviour,
G within an organisation, if there are complaint systems that
offer not just options dictated by the planning and
controlling organisation, but a choice of options for
individuals, including an option that offers near absolute
confidentiality. However, external whistleblowers report
H misconduct on outside persons or entities. In these cases,
MANOJ H. MISHRA v UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 797
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
depending on the information's severity and nature, A
whistleblowers may report the misconduct to lawyers, the
media, law enforcement or watchdog agencies, or other
local, State, or federal agencies.
42. In our view, a person like the respondent can
appropriately be described as a whistleblower for the B
system who has tried to highlight the malfunctioning of an
important institution established for dealing with cases
involving revenue of the State and there is no reason to
silence such a person by invoking Articles 129 or 215 of
the Constitution or the provisions of the Act." C
33. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations are of no
avail to the appellant, It is a matter of record that the appellant
is educated only upto 12th standard. He is neither an engineer,
nor an expert on the functioning of the Atomic Energy Plants.
Apart from being an insider, the appellant did not fulfill the D
criteria for being granted the status of a "whistle blower". One
of the basic requirements of a person being accepted as a
"whistle blower" is that his primary motive for the activity should
· be in furtherance of public good. In other words, the activity has
to be undertaken in public interest, exposing illegal activities E
of a public organization or authority. The conduct of the
appellant, in our opinion, does not fall within the high moral and
ethical standard that would be required of a bona fide ''whistle
blower".
34. In our opinion, the appellant without any justification F
assumed the role of vigilante. We do not find that the
submissions made on behalf of the respondents to the effect
that the appellant was merely seeking publicity are without any
substance. The newspaper reports as well as the other publicity
undoubtedly created a great deal of panic among the local G
population as well as throughout the State of Gujarat. Every
informer can not automatically be said to be a bonafide "whistle
blower". A "whistle blower" would be a person who possesses
the qualities of a crusader. His honesty, integrity and motivation
should leave little or no room for doubt. It is not enough that such H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A person is from the same organization and privy to some
information, not available to the general public. The primary
motivation for the action of a person to be called a "whistle
blower" should be to cleanse an organization. It should not be
incidental or byproduct for an action taken for some ulterior or
B selfish motive.
35. We are of the considered opinion that the action of the
appellant herein was not merely to highlight the shortcomings
· in the organization. The appellant had indulged in making
scandalous remarks by alleging that there was widespread
C corruption within the organization. Such allegations would
clearly have a deleterious effect throughout the organization
apart from casting shadows of doubts on the integrity of the
entire project. It is for this reason that employees working within
the highly sensitive atomic organization are sworn to secrecy
D and have to enter into a confidentiality agreement. In our
opinion, the appellant had failed to maintain the standard of
confidentiality and discretion which was required to be
maintained. In the facts of this case, it is apparent that the
appellant can take no advantage of the observations made by
E this Court in the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners' Association
(supra). This now brings us to the reliance placed by the
appellant on the judgment in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes
Case (supra). In our opinion, the ratio in the aforesaid judgment
would have no relevance in the case of the appellant. We are
F not satisfied that this is a case of 'glaring injustice'.
36. In our opinion, the punishment imposed on the
appellant is not 'so disproportionate to the offence as to shock
the conscience' of this Court. The observations of this Court in
Ranjit Thakur (supra) are also of no avail to the appellant. No
G injustice much less any grave injustice has been done to the
appellant.
37. We see no merit in the appeal and the same is hereby
·dismissed.
H B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "whistleblower"Sign in to search