MANOJ & ORS.versusSTATE OF HARYANA

                    [2013] 7 S.C.R. 505


                      MANOJ & ORS.                               A
                              v.
                   STATE OF HARYANA
            (Criminal Appeal No.1853 of 2012)
                       JULY 9, 2013.
                                                                 B
             [T.S.THAKUR AND SUDHANSU
              JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.)

    PENAL CODE, 1860:
                                                                 c
      ss. 304-B and 498-A - Conviction and sentence awarded
by courts below - Held: Death by bum injuries was caus£td
otherwise than in normal circumstances - Deceased was, soon
before her death, subjected to cruelty and harassment by
appellants for dowry - Prosecution has proved beyond             0
reasonable doubt that appellants are guilty of offences
punishable ulss 304-B and 498-A - As regards plea for
reduction of sentence, High Court has already reduced the
life sentence awarded by trial court u/s 304-B to 10;years RI,
which calls for no interference.
                                                                 E
    EVIDENCE ACT, 1872:

     s.32 - Dying declaration - Statement recorded by doctor,
who conducted medico legal examination - Held: The dying
declaration recorded by doctor was also signed by husband        F
of deceased - There is nothing to suggest that any relation of
deceased was present to influence the doctor.

     The marriage of appellant no. 1 was solemnized with
the daughter of the complainant (PW-9) on 6.5.2000 .. On
14.4.2005, she was taken to the hospital with burn               G
injuries. She died in the hospital the same day. On the
complaint of PW-9, an FIR was registered against the
husband of the deceased, his parents and his brother's
wife. The complainant stated that in spite of having given
                           505                                   H
    506      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013) 7 S.C.R.


A sufficient dowry, the accused harassed and tortured his
  daughter by raising a further demand of a motor-cycle;
  that his daughter told him in the hospital that on the date
  of incident her mother-in-law (appellant no. 2) called her
  in her room, where her husband (appellant no. 1) poured
B kerosene on her and latter's brother's wife (appellant no.
  3) lit a match stick and set her on fire. The trial court
  convicted appellants nos. 1 to 3 u/ss 304-B and 498-A IPC
  and sentenced each of them to life sentence and three
  years RI under the two counts, respectively. The father-
C in-law of the deceased was acquitted. The trial court
  further held that the charges u/ss 302 and 406 read with
  s.34 IPC were not proved. On appeal, the High Court
  upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence of life
  imprisonment u/s 304-B to 10 years RI.
D         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 If the declaration is made voluntarily and
  truthfully by a person who is physically in a condition to
  make such statement, then there is no impediment in
E relying on such a declaration. In Ashok Kumar's case,
  this Court noticed that if it was a case of death by burning,
  entries of injury report in the bed head ticket could be
  construed as dying declaration. [para 13-14] [514-C-D;
  515-0]
F       Ashok Kurr:iar v. State of Rajasthan 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR
    401 = (1991) 1 SCC 166; Kanaksingh Raisingh Rav v. State
    of Gujarat (2003) 1 sec 73 - relied on.

       1.2 In the instant case, the doctor (PW~4) who
G conducted medico-legal examination and recorded the
  statement of the deceased, specifically deposed that the
  deceased told him that she was called inside and the
  door was latched from inside. Kerosene oil was sprinkled
  upon her and her Jethani had ignited the fire by the match
H stick. Her husband and mother-in-law were also involved
      MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA                  507


in it. This dying declaration (Ext.PF) was also signed by      A
appellant no.1 which indicates that he was presen.t when
statement was recorded. There is nothing on the 'record
to suggest that any of the relation of the deceased was
present to influence PW-4. [para 11 and 15) [513-A-C; 516-
D-E]                                                           B
    1.3 Admittedly, the death of the deceased ·is caused
by burns i.e. otherwise than under normal circumstances,
within seven years of her marriage. In view of the
evidence on record both the courts below have come to
the definite conclusion that the deceased was soon             C
before her death, subjected to cruelty and harassment by
her husband and his relatives in connection with demand
for dowry. Therefore, all the ingredients are present to
convict the appellants u/s· 304-8, IPC. The prosecution
also proved beyond reasonable doubts that the                  D
appellants are guilty of the offence punishable u/s 498-
A, IPC. The Sessions Judge has recorded cogent and
convincing reasons for convicting the appellants for the
offences u/ss 304-8 and 498-A IPC. [para 17-19) [516-F;
517-D-F]                                                       E
     1.4 The Sessions Judge specifically held that the
prosecution miserably failed to prove its case against all
the four accused for the offence punishable u/ss 302 and
406 r/w s. 34 IPC and, therefore, all the four accused were    F
acquitted of the said offence. No appeal has been
preferred by the complainant or the State against the
acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable u/
ss 302 and 406 r/w s.34 IPC. The finding of Sessions
Judge having reached finality, the question of altering the    G
sentence u/s 304-B to s.302 does not arise. [para 22) [518-
B-D]

    Muthu Kutty and Another v. State by Inspector of Police,
                                      =
Tamil Nadu 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 222 (2005) 9 SCC 113 -
referred to.                                                   H
    508      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 7 S.C.R.

A      1.5 As regards the plea of the appellants to reduce
  the sentence u/s 304-8 IPC, it is significant to note that
  the appellants were sentenced for life for the offence
  punishable u/s 304-E IPC, by the trial court. The High
  Court has already considered the facts and
B circumstances of the case and reduced the sentence
  from life imprisonment to 10 years, which calls for no
  interference. [para 23] [518-E-F]
                          Case Law Reference:
          (2003) 1 sec 73               relied on        para 13
c
          1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 401       relied on        para 14
          2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 222       referred to ·    para 21
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1853 of 2012.
0
        From the Judgment and Order dated 15.02.2012 of the
    High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal
    No. 897-08/06.
          Rishi Malhotra for the Appellants.
E
        Roopansh Purohit, AAG, Dr. Monika Gusain for the
    Respondent.             ·
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. The
F appellants in this case were found guilty of offence punishable
  under Sections 498-A and 304-B Indian Penal Code {for short,
  "IPC"} by the Sessions Judge, Bhiwani. They were sentenced
  to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section
  304-B IPC and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
G years, besides, payment of fine of Rs.5,000/- each and in
  default of which to undergo further imprisonment for a period
  of six months for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. Their
  appeal against the said judgment and conviction to the High
  Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh got dismissed except
H with a modification in the sentence of imprisonment from
        MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA                      509
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

imprisonment for life to imprisonment for 10 years for the           A
offence under Section 304-B IPC.
      2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 14.4.2005 on
receipt of a telephonic message from the lncharge, Police Post,
General Hospital, Bhiwani regarding admission of Meena Devi
wife of Manoj Kumar (appellant no.1) resident of Village 8
Hetampura in burnt cond!tian, ASI Chattarmal (PW-11) of P.S.
Sadar,Bhiwani along with other police officials reached the said
hospital and collected medical ruqa (memo) alongwith medico-
legal report of injured Meena. After obtaining the opinion of the
Doctor regarding fitness of the injured to make statement when C
he brought the Duty Magistrate to record her statement in the
hospital, the Doctor had already referred her to PGIMS Rohtak.
Thereafter, he alongwith Magistrate reached PGIMS, Rohtak
and collected two medical r;.iqas from lncharge, Police Post,
PGIMS Rohtak out of which one was regarding death of Meena. D
Then he reached in the gallery of emergency ward where
complainant Vedpal (PW-9) met him and got recorded his
statement (Ex.PA). It is alleged by the complainant-Vedpal (PW-
9) that he had one daughter and two sons. His daughter was
married with Manoj (appellant no.1) son of Mahabir about five E
years earlier (the actual date of marriage found to be 6.05.2000).
to the incident that had occurred on 14.04.2005. He further
stated that in the marriage of his daughter, he had given dowry
beyond his financial capacity. However, his daughter on her
 return from her matrimonial home for the first time told him that .. F
 her in-laws were not satisfied with the dowry articles that were
given in marriage. The complainant had given double bed, T.V.,
fridge, cooler, sofa set, almirah, 21 utensils and clothes etc.,
 besides, Rs.210.0/- in cash. When the daughter of the
 complainant (PW-9) went to her matrimonial home for the G
 second time, his son-in-law Manoj (appellant no.1); the mother-
 in-law of his daughter namely Chameli Devi (appellant no.2),
the father-in-law namely Mahabir (since acquitted) and Jettiani
(husband's elder brother's wife) of his daughter namely Suman
 (appellant no.3) raised a demand for a motor cycle and started
                                                                     H
    510     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A torturing her (beating) for this. Therefore, Meena Devi
  (deceased) started living with him (complainant). She stayed
  with her father (complainant) for fourteen months. About ten
  months earlier from the date of incident that occurred on
   14.04.2005, the complainant (PW-9) made his daughter
8 understand and sent her back in the presence of panchayat of
  Hetampura and Sant Mann Singh s/o Chandu Ram r/o Hissar.
  However, even then the accused were demanding a motor cycle
  and kept troubling his daughter for dowry. On 14.04.2005; at
  about 8.00 a.m, Mahabir informed him on telephone from the
c Hospital at 8hiwani that Meena Devi (deceased) had been
  admitted in the Government Hospital, 8hiwani with burn injuries.
  On receiving this information, the complainant (PW-9) and
  Dayanand s/o Jogi Ram and his brother Shamsher reached the
  Hospital at 8hiwani. There they came to know that Meena Devi
D (deceased) had been referred to PGIMS, Rohtak. Then they all
  reached PGIMS, Rohtak where he met his daughter in the
  emergency ward of PGIMS, Rohtak. His daughter told him that
  in the morning on that day, her mother-in-law namely Chameli
  Devi (appellant no.2) had called her in the room and her
E husband Manoj (appellant no.1) poured kerosene oil on her and
  her husband's elder brother's wife (Jethani) namely Suman
  (appellant no.3) lit a matchstick and set her on fire on account
  of which she got burnt. After sometime Meena Devi (deceased)
  while she was under treatment breathed her last. It it alleged
  by the complainant (PW-9) that on account of greed of dowry,
F his daughter Meena Devi (deceased) had been set on fire by
  pouring kerosene oil on her by her husband Manoj (appellant
  no.1 ), mother-in-law Chameli Devi (appellant no.2) and
  husband's elder brother's wife (Jethani) Suman (appellant no.3)
  after colluding with each other. He further requested for action
G being taken against the accused.
       3. On the basis of such complaint FIR No.103 dated
  14.4.2005 under Sections 304-8/498-A/406/34 IPC was
  registered. Subsequently, on the basis of above allegations, all
H the four accused were charged under Section· 304-8 in
         MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA                     511
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
   alternative under Sections 302, 498-A and 406 r/w Section 34      A
~· of the IPC to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
      4. All together eleven witnesses were produced by the
 prosecution in support of their case. Exhibits were proved
 through the prosecution witnesses. Defence also produced two
 witnesses in its favour.                                            B
      5. The Sessions Judge, Bhiwani by judgment dated
 4.09.2006 acquitted Mahabir father-in-law of the deceased and
 held the appellants guilty for the offence under Sections 498-A
 and 304-B of the IPC. The Sessions Judge further held that the
 prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against all      C·
 the four accused for the offence under Sections 302 and 406
 r/w Section 34 IPC and, hence, all the four accused were
 acquitted for the said offence.
      6. An appeal was preferred by the appellants against the       D
 judgment passed by the Sessions Judge, Bhiwani and another
 appeal was preferred by the complainant-Ved Pal (PW-9)
 against acquittal of Mahabir. By impugned judgment dated
 15.02.2012 the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and
 Haryana at Chandigarh dismissed the appeal preferred by Ved         E
 Pal-complainant(PW-9). The judgment passed by the Sessions
 Judge was affirmed with the modification in the sentence of
  imprisonment, the appeal preferred by the appellants was also
 dismissed.
      7. In this appeal, learned counsel appearing for the           F
 appellants contended that in view of severity of burn injuries of
 the deceased she could not have been in a fit state of mind or
 condition to make a dying declaration. The said dying
 declaration is purported to be made in presence of Dr.
 Rajender Rai (PW-4). In absence of any other material to            G
 corroborate the same, the dying declaration should not be relied
 upon.
      8. It was submitted that PW-7, the Police Inspector who
 had prepared a report under Section 173 Cr.PC, in his
 statement admits that there was no mention of the statement         H
    512     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 7 S.C.R.


A of the deceased allegedly recorded by the Doctor at the time
  of her MLR. Even under Section 313 Cr.PC, no question was
  ever put to the accused with regard to his signing of the said
  MLR in question. The said dying declaration raises suspicion
  and doubt. It may not be an absolute proposition of law that a
B dying declaration should be recorded by a Magistrate but if in
  a given case, there is ample time and opportunity, the services
  of a Magistrate should be called upon in order to lend credence
  to the said dying declaratid'n. The 1.0 (PW-11) has stated that
  after reading of the statement Ex.PF, he did not approach the
c deceased to verify from her if she had made such statement
  or not.
       9. Per contra, according to counsel for the prosecution, the
  dying declaration recorded by Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW-4), Medical
  Officer is reliable. There is nothing on record to suggest that
D Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW-4) is an unreliable witness. To the
  contrary, he is a natural witness and his testimony has not been
  shaken during a long cross examination. The theory of tutoring
  is also ruled out in the present case as the accused persons
  only were present with the deceased during that time and none
E of the family members of the deceased were present when the
  dying declaration was recorded by the Doctor. The husband
  (appellant no.1) Manoj has also affixed his signature on the MLR
  on which the dying declaration was recorded by the Doctor. The
  evidence of PW-4 is trustworthy, cogent and reliable.
F       10. Further according to the learned counsel for the
  prosecution an alternate charge under Section 302 shall be
  framed in addition to Section 304-8 and in view of dying
  declaration of the deceased, which has been believed by both
  the courts below. A grave error of law has been committed by
G the trial Court as well as the High Court by not convicting the
  accused persons under Section 302. It was submitted that this
  is a fit case wherein this Court may exercise its extraordinary
  powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and shall
  consider alte(ing the conviction from Section 304-8 to Section
H 302 IPC.
       MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA                    513
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
      11. Coming to the evidence of Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW-4) who    A
conducted medico-legal examination and recorded the
statement of the deceased, we find that he specifically deposed
that the deceased Meena was brought to the Hospital with the
history of burns. Kerosene like smell was present. Smell was
also present in the clothes. On examination she was conscious.     B
There were superficial to deep burns about 100% with in a
duration of 12 hours. Dr. Rajender Rai (PW-4) stated that the
deceased told him that she was called inside and the door was
latched from inside. Kerosene oil was sprinkled upon her and
her Jethani Suman had ignited the fire by the match stick. Her     c
husband and mother-in-law were also involved in it. After
recording the statement of the deceased, he signed it. The
statement was again read over to the patient by him in Hindi.
She stated Yes. He again asked the patient whether the above
statement was correct and she again stated Yes. He again           D
signed the endorsement and put the time of 7.55 a.m. He
prepared MLR including statement of the patient recorded by
him in his handwriting and his endorsement. He further stated
that he had sent ruqa (Ex.PG) to the lncharge, Police Post,
General Hospital, Bhiwani at 8.00 a.m. Therefore, Chhattarmal      E
ASI of P.S. Sadar, Bhiwani moved application Ex.PH before
him asking his opinion regarding fitness of Meena Devi to
make statement, on which, hl3 opined vide endorsement Ex.PH/
 1 at 8.45 a.m that she was fit to make statement and thereafter
he referred the patient to PGIMS, Rohtak vide endorsement
Ex.PH/2. He had recorded the statement of deceased Meena           F
Ex.PF correctly without any addition thereto and on the basis
of whatever had been stated before him.
     12. The Defence had tried to make a futile effort to prove
that Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW-4) was an interested witness             G
because cousin of the deceased and his wife were posted in
the same Hospital and, thus, undue influence was exercised
upon him by them but it was not believed by both the courts in
absence of any evidence on the file that alleged cousin of the
deceased and his wife were posted in Government Hospital,          H
    514       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A   Bhiwani at the time the deceased was medico-legally
    examined at 7.30 a.m on 14.4.2005. Contrary to it, evidence
    was brought on record that aforesaid cousin of the deceased
    and his wife were posted in some private nursing home in
    Siwani, which was about 70 kilometers away from Bhiwani.
B
        13. There is another glaring factor in the present case
  which proves that Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW-4) was not under
  influence of anyone because had it been, he or investigating
  officer Chhattarmal (PW-11) might not have made any effort to
  call the Magistrate for recording the statement of the deceased.
C The law is well settled that if the declaration is made voluntarily
  and truthfully by a person who is physically in a condition to
  make such statement, then there is no impediment in relying
  on such a declaration. Such view was taken by this Court in
  Kanaksingh Raisingh Rav v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 1 SCC
D 73 wherein this Court held:
          "5 ........ The question then is, can a conviction be based
          primarily on the dying declaration of the deceased in this
          case? In this regard we do not think it is necessary for us
          to discuss the cases cited by the learned counsel which
E         are noted hereinabove because, in our opinion, the law is
          well settled i.e. if the declaration is made voluntarily and
          truthfully by a person who is physically in a condition to
          make such statement, then there is no impediment in
          relying on such a declaration. In the instant case, the
F         evidence of PW 5, the doctor very clearly shows that the
          deceased was conscious and was medically in a fit state
          to make a statement. It is because of the fact that a Judicial
          Magistrate was not available at that point of time, he was
          requested to record the statement, which he did. His
G         evidence in regard to the state of mind or the physical
          condition of the deceased to make such a declaration has
          not been challenged in the cross-examination. Thai being
          so, it should be held that the deceased was in a fit state
          of mind to make a declaration as held by the courts below.
H         The next question for our consideratiori is whether this
       MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA                      515
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
    statement is voluntary and truthful. It is not the case of the   A
    defence that when she made the statement either she was
    surrounded by any of her close relatives who could have
    prompted her to make an incorrect or false statement. In
    the absence of the same so far as the voluntariness of the
    statement is concerned, there can be no doubt because            B
    the deceased was free from external influence or pressure.
    So far as the truthfulness of the statement is concerned,
    the doctor (PW 5) has stated that she has made the said
    statement which, as noted above, is not challenged in the
    cross-examination. The deceased in her brief statement           c
    has, in clear terms, stated that because of the quarrel
    between her and the accused, the accused had poured
    kerosene and set her on fire which, in our opinion, cannot
    be doubted ......... "
     14. In Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 1 SCC          D
166 this Court noticed that if it was a case of death by burning,
entries of injury report in the bed head ticket can be construed
as dying declaration. In the said case this Court held:
    "11. Entries in the injury report which have been construed
    as dying declaration b~ the two courts below were severely       E
    criticised and it was submitted that although dying
    declaration was admissible in evidence and conviction
    could be recorded on it without. corroboration yet the
    circumstances in which it was recorded created doubt if it
    was genuine. The High Court for very good reasons                F
    rejected similar arguments advanced before it. We also
    do not find any substance in it. When the deceased was
    examined by Dr Temani he having found her condition to
    be serious immediately sent message to the police station
    and also requested for arranging for recording of the dying      G
    declaration. This is corroborated by the entry in the record
    of the police station. But the Inspector of Police came after
    11.00 when the injection of morphine had already been
    administered to lessen the agony of the patient who
    thereafter became unconscious. She was, however, as              H
    516       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 7 S.C.R.

A         indicated earlier conscious between 10.00 to 11.00 during
          which period the bed head ticket was written by Dr
          Saxena and the entries were made on the injury report.
          The judge did not doubt the recording on the bed head
          ticket that the deceased complained of misbehaviour by
B         her brother-in-law. Even the learned counsel could not point
          out any infirmity or reason ~o discard it except that by mere
          word, brother-in-law it was not established that it was
          appellant, i.e. the effort was to make out a case of doubt.
          That could have been possible if that entry could have
c         stood alone. But it stands not only corroborated but
          clarified by identifying the appellant by entry in injury report
          as the brother-in-law who was responsible for this crime.
          We perused the injury report and we could not find any
          reason to doubt its authenticity."
D       15. What we find in the present case is that the dying
  declaration (Ext.PF) which was recorded by Dr.Rajinder Rai
  (PW-4) was also signed by Manoj (appellant no.1) which
  indicates that appellant No.1 was present when statement was
  recorded. Nothing on the record to suggest that any of the
E relation of the deceased was present to influence Dr. Rajinder
  Rai (PW-4).
         16. Thus, we find that there is no infirmity in the finding of
    the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High Court.
F      17. Admittedly, the death of Meena Devi (deceased) is
  caused by burns i.e. otherwise than under normal circumstances
  within seven years of her marriage. The complainant (PW-9)
  father of the deceased has stated that at the time of marriage
  he had given double bed, sofa set, T.V., cooler and other
  domestic articles, besides, gold ornaments of 4 tolas, 21
G utensils and Rs.2100/- in cash. However, his daughter told him
  that her in-laws were not satisfied with those articles. When his
  daughter visited her matrimonial home for the second time, all
  the accused started taunting her and harassing her raising
  demand for a motor cycle. She was turned out of her
H
        MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA                    517
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
matrimonial home after giving beatings. Thereafter, she started     A
living with him (PW-9) and stayed with him for 14 months. Then
he convened a panchayat consisting of Sant Man Singh,
Krishan of Hetampura and others i.e. his brother Satyawan and
his brotherhood from village Khera. In that panchayat, the
accused assured not to harass Meena in future and then              B
accused Mahabir and Chameli came to take her away and she
was accordingly sent to her matrimonial house about 10 months
prior to her death. After four days, they again started harassing
her by demanding motor cycle and continued beating her. His
brother Satpal (PW-10) has also corroborated his deposition.        c
No mitigating circumstances are found on record to disbelieve
their statements.
      18. In view of such evidence on record both the courts have
come to definite conclusion that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and his          D
relatives in connection with demand for dowry. Therefore all the
ingredients are present to convict the appellants under Section
304-B of the IPC. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubts that the appellants are guilty for the offence under
Section 498-A of the IPC.                                           E
    19. In these circumstances, we find that the Sessions
Judge has recorded cogent and convincing reasons for
convicting the appellants for the offences under Sections 304-
B and 498-A IPC.
                                                                    F
    20. So far as conviction of the appellants under Section
302 IPC, as suggested by counsel for the State,. we find no
wrong to alter the conviction to Section 302 IPC.
     21. In Muthu Kutty and Another v. State by Inspector of
Police, Tamil Nadu (2005) 9 SCC 113 this Court held that            G
when it was found that the accused were responsible for setting
the deceased on fire and causing her death, Section 302
instead of Section 304-B was attracted. On facts, no prejudice
would be caused to accused-appellants of the said case if the
                                                                    H
    518      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A   conviction is altered to Section 304 Pt. II on the basis of
    conclusions arrived at by the trial court as they were originally
    charged for offence punishable under Section 302 alongwith
    Section 304-B IPC.
        22. In the present case, we have noticed that after
8 appreciation of evidence, learned Sessions Judge by judgment
  dated 4.9.2006 specifically held that the prosecution has
  miserably failed to prove its case against all the four accused
  for the offence under Sections 302 and 406 r/w Section 34 IPC
  and, hence, all the four accused were acquitted under the said
C offence. Against the acquittal of Mahabir Singh the complainant
  (PW-9) filed an appeal which has been dismissed by the
  impugned judgment. No appeal has been preferred by the
  complainant or the State against the acquittal of all the accused
  for the offences under Section 302 and 406 r/w Section 34 IPC.
D The finding of Sessions Judge having reached finality, the
  question of altering the present sentence under Section 304-B
  to Section 302 does not arise.
       23. Lastly, it was submitted on behalf of the appellants to
  consider reducing the sentence awarded to the appellants from
E 10 years to 7 years which is the minimum sentence prescribed
  under Section 304-B IPC considering the facts and
  circumstances of the case. In the present case we find that the
  appellants were-sentenced for life for the offence under Section
  304-B IPC by the trial Court and the High Court already
F conside·red the facts and circumstances of the case and
  reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to 10 years.
      24. We find no other circumstances to reduce it to
  minimum sentence of seven years. In absence of merit, the
G appeal is dismissed.
        25. Bail bonds of the appellant nos. 2 and 3 are cancelled.
    Appellant nos. 2 and 3 are directed to be taken into custody to
    serve out remainder of the sentence.

H R.P.                                          Appeal dismissed.