Holding

A Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction when the claimant resides within its local limits, and an appellate court cannot overturn a jurisdictional finding absent a demonstration of prejudice.

Summary

Mantoo Sarkar, a migrant agricultural labourer originally from Pilibhit, was residing and working in Nainital when he was injured in a bus‑truck collision that occurred in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. The truck was insured by Oriental Insurance Company, which maintained a branch at Nainital. Sarkar filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) in Nainital under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, asserting that the Tribunal had jurisdiction because the insurer had a local branch and because Sarkar resided in Nainital at the time of the accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation, but the insurer appealed; the High Court held that the Tribunal lacked territorial jurisdiction and set aside the award. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act confers jurisdiction based on the claimant’s residence and the insurer’s branch, and whether an appellate court can entertain a jurisdictional objection without showing prejudice under CPC s.21. The Court held that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is broader than that of civil courts, the claimant’s residence determines jurisdiction, and no prejudice was shown; consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the Tribunal’s award restored.

Issues considered

The scope of territorial jurisdiction of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, particularly whether the claimant’s residence and the insurer’s branch confer jurisdiction.
Whether an appellate court may set aside a tribunal’s order on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction without a showing of prejudice under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 21
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 166, s. 169, s. 170
Suits Valuation Acts. 11

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Actterritorial jurisdictionMotor Accident Claims TribunalCode of Civil Procedureprejudiceresidenceinsurance claimappellate jurisdictionArticle 142

Judgment

[2008] 17 S.C.R. 753

MANTOO SARKAR A
v.
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 7318 of 2008)
DECEMBER 16, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.)

. .,., Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: s.166 - Territorial jurisdiction
- Accident took place in Bareilly - Claimant, a migraht -
labourer, originally resident of Pilibhit, was working and c
residing in Nainital during relevant period - Claim petition
filed before Tribunal, Nainital - Maintainability of - Held:
Maintainable - Jurisdiction of tribunal is wider than the civil
court - Residence of claimant relevant for determining
jurisdiction of tribunal - Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction. D
Appeal - On the ground of Jack of territorial jurisdiction
-(
of court below to pass the impugned order - Held: Not to be
entertained unless the appellant was able to show sufferance
of prejudice - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.21.
Appellant-claimant was travelling as a passenger in E
a bus belonging to Madhya Pradesh Road Transport
Corporation. The_ bus collided with a truck in the town of
Faridpur in the District of Uttar Pradesh and as a result,
the appellant suffered grievous injuries. The truck
belonged to respondent No. 2 and was registered at F
Faridabad. It WCl$ insured with respondent No. 1
Company, having branch office at Nainital. Appellant
underwent several operations. Before the accident,
appellant was working as a seasonal agricultural labourer
and residing at Piliphit in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He
filed a claim petition before MACT, Nainital, Uttranchal G
claiming Rs. 23.90 lakhs. The Tribunal held that since the
Insurance Company had a branch Office at Nainital, it had
territorial jurisdiction to determine the claim petition.
Accordingly,· it made an award of Rs. 2.40 lakhs. On
753 H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A appeal filed by respondent 1, High Court held that M~CT,
Nainital had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said
.,...,
claim petition. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a special
B
statute. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal having regard to
the terminologies used therein must be held to be wider
than the civil court. A claimant has a wide option.
Residence of the claimant also determines jurisdiction of ,
)"
the Tribunal. What would be a residence of a person
c would, however, depend upon the fact situation
obtaining in each case. Appellant was a resident of
Pilibhit, which is in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He being .....
a migrant labourer accepted job wherever he got and
resided there. He, admittedly, was working in Nainital
D district and residing there during the period
\
of accident.
The fact that he was thus a resident of Nainital in the State
of Uttaranchal was neither denied nor disputed. The High
Court unfortunately in its judgment did not assign
sufficient or cogent reason as to why the Tribunal,
Nainital committed illegality in holding that it had the
E
jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition. [Paras 10 and
13] [760-C-F]
2.1. No doubt, the Tribunal must exercise jurisdiction
having regard to the ingredients laid down under sub-
F section (2) of s.166 of the Act. In terms of s.169 of the Act,
the Tribunal, subject to any rules, may follow a summary
procedure. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ~

under the Act has a limited application but in terms of the
rules 'save and except' any specific provision made in
that behalf, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure'
G would apply. Even otherwise, the principles laid down in
the Code of Civil Procedure may be held to be applicable
in a case of this nature. [Para 14] [760-G-H; 761-A]
r
2.2. Ordinarily an appellate Court shall not, having

H
MANTOO SARKAR v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. 755
AND ORS.

regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of A
s.21 CPC, entertain an appeal on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction on the part of the court below
unless he has been prejudiced thereby. Other
respondents did not raise any question of jurisdiction.
Although one witness each, had been examined on 8
behalf of the truck owner and owner of the bus, neither
a question of lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised nor
the question of any prejudice had been argued. It is only
the first respondent who raised the question of territorial
jurisdiction. However, no prejudice was caused by the
claim petition being tried by the MACT Nainital. [Para 15] C
,,_ [761-A-C]
2.3. The liability of the Insurance Company arises for
the purpose of reimbursement of the amount of
compensation, found to be payable by the owner of the
vehicle insured. It is only in exceptional cases and as D
provided for under s.170 of the Act, that the insurance
company can defend a claim petition. Only on limited
grounds it may be permitted to question the quantum of
compensation. The Tribunal is a court subordinate to the
High Court. An appeal against the Tribunal lies before the E
High Court. The High Court, while exercising its appellate
power., would follow the provisions contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure or akin thereto. In view of sub-section
(1) of s.21, CPC, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of
the appellate court to pose unto itself the right question, F
Ji viz., whether the first respondent has been able to show
sufferance of any prejudice. If it has not suffered any
prejudice or otherwise no failure of justice had occurred,
the High Court should not have entertained the appeal on
that ground alone. [Paras 16 and 17] [761-D-G]
G
2.4. A decision rendered without jurisdiction would
be coram non juris. Objection in regard to jurisdiction
'"""( may be taken at any stage. A distinction, however, must
be made between a jurisdiction with regard to subject
H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary
jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former
a
category the judgment would be nullity, in the latter it
would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of claim. As
8 ! a matter of fact the civil court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the suit. If the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to
entertain a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act,
the Court should not have, in absence of any finding of
sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first
respondent, entertained the appeal. Furthermore in
C determining as to whether a part of cause of action has
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vis-a-
vi_.s1an appellate court a large number of factors may have
to be taken in consideration. [Paras 19] [762-G-H]
2.5. The appellant was a labourer. The justness or
D otherwise of the amount of compensation has not been
disputed. If the High Court judgment is to be complied
with, appellant would again have to initiate another
proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon or at Delhi or at
Jabalpur. The same evidence would have to be rendered
E once again. The question of fact which was required to
be determined in the proceeding before the Tribunal,
namely whether the driver of the truck or the driver of the
bus had been driving their respective vehicles rashly and
negligently would have to be determined afresh. The
F factual finding recorded is that the driver of the truck was
driving the truck rashly and negligently. In a case of this
nature, this court may even exercise extra ordinary
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142
of the Constitution shall be exercised or not would
G depend upon the fact of the each matter. Law in this case
does not come in the way of exercise of such jurisdiction.
[Paras 19 and 20] [765-D-F; 766-F-G] .r
Chief Engineer, Hyde/ Project v. Ravinder Nath (2008)
H 2 SCC 350; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR (1954) SC
MANTOO SARKAR v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. 757
AND ORS.

340; Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd. (2007) 5 A
SCC 591; Ambica Industries v. CCE (2007) 6 SCC 769; New
India Insurance Company v. Darshana Devi and others (2008)
7 SCC 416 and State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal (2002) 8 SCC
158, relied on.
Case Law Reference: B
(2008) 2 sec 350 relied on Para 18
AIR (1954) SC 340 relied on Para 18
(2007) 5 SCC 591 /relied on Para 19
(2007) 6 SCC 769 relied on Para 19
(2008) 7 SCC 416 relied on Para 19 c
(2002) 8 sec 158 relied on Para 20
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7318 of 2008.
From the Judgment and final Order dated 22.8.2006 of the D
High Court of Uttaranchal at Naintal in A.O. No. 442 of 2006.
Shailendra Singh, Kavita Sarin and Sudhir Nandrajog for
the Appellant.
Ashish Wad, Jayashree Wad, Sameer Akhyenkar and
Chirag Dave for M/s. J.S. Wad & Co. E
Joy Basu and B.K. Satija for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Interpretation and/or application of Section 166 (2) of F
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'
for the sake of brevity) in regard to territorial jurisdiction of a
Tribunal is the question involved herein.
The said question arises in the following factual matrix.
3. Appellant had been travelling as a passenger in a bus, G
bearing registration No.MP-04-7915, belonging to Madhya
Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. It met with an accident
in the town of Faridpur in the District of Uttar Pradesh having
collided with truck bearing No.HR-38-E-5554. Appellant
suffered grievous injuries. A First Information Report was H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A lodged against the driver of the said truck under Sections 279,
338 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code.
Indisputably the said truck belonged to respondent No.2
and was registered at Faridabad. It was insured with
respondent No.1-company. Appellant was working as a skilled
B migrant seasonal agricultural labourer. He had been earning his
livelihood at the relevant time by performing his job as a labourer
in the work of extracting sand gravel from a river named 'Hola
River' near Beri Pada, Lalkuan, Distt. Nainital, Uttaranchal. He
is said to have been living for a long time at Pilibhit in the State
c of Uttar Pradesh. Indisputably, after he remained in the district
Hospital at Bareilly as an indoor patient upto 28th July, 2003,
he was shifted to Prabhakar Hospital in Pilibhit. He underwent
several operations.
4. Appellant filed a claim petition before the Motor
0 Accident Claims Tribunal, Nainital (for short 'the Tribunal')
claiming a sum of Rs.23,90,000/- (Rupees twenty three lakh
ninety thousand only) alongwith interest @ 18% per annum {rom
the date of the accident till the date of actual payment.
5. Respondent No.1 has a branch office at Nainital.
E The conductor of the bus and the driver of the truck
examined themselves before the Tribunal as witnesses. No oral
evidence was, however, adduced on behalf of the first
respondent. One of the questions which, only the first
respondent raised and no other, was lack of territorial
F jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal.
The learned Tribunal inter alia on the premise that the
jurisdiction conferred on it, having regard to sub-section (2) of
Section 166 of the Act is wide and the insurance company
having a branch office at Nainital, it had territorial jurisdiction
G to determine the claim petition. It made an Award of
Rs.2,40,000/ (Rupees two lakh forty thousand only) in favour of
the claimant.
6. The High Court, however, on an appeal preferred -)'-
thereagaisnt by the first respondent, opined - ..
H
MANTOO SARKAR v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. 759
~ AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

"It is a well settled position of law that the claim petition A
can only be entertained and filed before a court having the
~
territorial jurisdiction to hear the matter. The claimant
cannot take the matter to different State on the pretext that
his case would be disposed of expeditiously in that State
or District without having the territorial jurisdiction. The 8
learned counsel for the claimants submitted that in case
the Court comes to the conclusion that the Tribunal, Nainital
had got no territorial jurisdiction to dispose of the matter,
'\( the claimants may be given liberty to file a fresh claim
petition be~ore the competent Tribunal."
c
...._
On the basis of the said finding it was held that Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Nainital had no territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the said claim petition.
7. Mr. Shailendra Singh, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant would contend that the High Court D
committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment
in so far as it failed to take into consideration the evidence of
the appellant (PW-1) wherein he clearly stated that he had been
working at Seri Pada, Lal-Kuan in the District of Nainital,
although he had not given his Lalkuan's address in his claim
petition having been doing his work as a labourer. The evidence e
of the said witness having been accepted by the learned
Tribunal, the High Court should not have interfered therewith.
8. Mr. Ashish Wad, learned counsel for the respondent, on
the other hand, would contend that the accident having taken
place at Bareilly, the bus belonging to Gwalior depot of the
F
Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, the office of the
owner of the truck being at Gurgaon, office of the insurance
company being at Delhi, the Tribunal at Nainital did not have
any territorial jurisdiction.
G
9. Section 166(2) of the Act reads as under :-
"166 - Application for compensation

... ~ (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made,
at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal
having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on
business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
defendant resides, and shall be.-in such form and contain
such particulars as may be prescribed:
B Provided that where no claim for compensation under
section 140 is made in such application, the application
shall contain a separate statement to that effect
immediately before the signature of the applicant."
• 10. The said Act is a special statute. The jurisdiction of
C the Tribunal h~ving regard to the terminologies used therein
must be held to be wider than the civil court.
A claimant has a wide option. Residence of the claimant
also determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
11. What would be a residence of a person would,
D however, depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case.
12. Appellant had been a resident of Pilibhit. It is in the
State of Uttar Pradesh. He being a migrant labourer accepts
job wherever he gets and resides there. He, admittedly, had
been working in Nanital district and residing there during the
E period of accident. The fact that he was thus a resident of
Nainital in the State of Uttaranchal is neither denied nor
disputed. ,~'''

13. The High Court unfortunately in its judgment did not
assign sufficient or cogent reason as to why the Tribunal
F committed any illegality in holding that he had the jurisdiction
to entertain the claim petition.
14. No doubt the Tribunal must exercise jurisdiction having
regard to the ingredients laid down under sub-section (2) of
Section 166 of the Act. We are not unmindful of the fact that in
, G terms of Section 169 of the Act, the Tribunal, subject to any
rules, may follow a summary procedure and the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure under the Act has a limited
application but, in terms of the rules 'save and except' any
specific provision made in that behalf, the provisions of the
H Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Even otherwise the
/
'~·
MANTOO SARKAR v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. 761
AND ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

principles laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure may be held A
to be applicable in a case of this nature.
15. We say so because ordinarily an appellate court shall
not, having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section
(1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entertain an
appeal on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part 8
of the court below unless he has been prejudiced thereby. Other
respondents did not raise any question of jurisdiction. Although
one witness each had been examined on behalf of the truck
owner and owner of the bus, neither a question of lack of
territorial jurisdiction was raised nor the question of any c
prejudice had been argued. It is only the first respondent who
raised the question of territorial jurisdiction. However, no
prejudice was caused to the appellant by the claim petition
being tried by the MACT at Nainital.
16. The liability of the insurance company arises for the o
purpose of reimbursement of the amount of compensation
found to be payable by the owner of the vehicle insured. It is
only in exceptional cases and as provided for under Section
170 of the Act, the insurance company can ·defend a claim
petition. Only on limited grounds it may be permitted to question E
the quantum of compensation.
17. The Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High Court.
An appeal against the Tribunal lies before the High Gour.. The
High Court, while exercising its appellate power, would follow
the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure or akin
thereto. In view of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of F
Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the
appellate court to pose unto itself the right question, viz., whether
the first respondent has been able to show sufferance of any
prejudice. If it has not s.uffered any prejudice or otherwise no
failure of justice had occurred, the High Court should not have G
entertained the appeal on that ground alone.
18. We, however, while taking that factor into consideration
must place on record that we are not oblivious of the fact that
a decision rendered without jurisdiction would be coram non
juris. Objection in regard to jurisdiction may be taken at any H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
~

A stage. (See Chief Engineer, Hyde/ Project v. Ravinder Nath ,
[(2008) 2 sec 350 ] ) wherein inter alia the decision of this )-•
Courtin·Kiran-Singh v. Chaman Paswan, [AIR 1954 SC 340]
was followed, statfng:
"26~ The Court also relied upon the· decision_ in Kiran Singh
8 v. Chaman Pawan [AIR 1954 SC 340] a·nd quqted .(in
Harshad Chiman ~al case {[(2005) 7 SCC 791]; SCC pp.
804-805, para 33} therefrom: {Kiran Singh case (supra),
AIR p.342, para 6 ..., ~-

'6 .... It is a fundamental principle well established
c that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction
is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up
whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced
or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and
even in collateral proceedings. A defect of
D jurisdiction, ... strikes at the very authority of the court
to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be
cured even by consent of parties." )<....

Though)n the aforementioned decision these observations
were made since the defendants before raising the
E objection to the territorial jurisdiction had admitted that the
court had the jurisdiction, the force of this decision cannot
be ignored and it has to be held that such a decree would
continue to be a nullity."
19. A distinction, however, must be made between a
F jurisdiction with regard
.. to subject matter of the, suit and that of
territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling .)I..

within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in
the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had
no jurisdiction ·ln relation to the subject _,rliatter of claim. As a
matter of fact the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
-G
suit. If the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain a claim
petition unde.r the Motor Vehicles Act, in our opinion, the Court
should not have, in absence of any fin,ding of sufferance of any .)-

prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the
~ppeal.
H
MANTOO SARKAR v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. 763 ·
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

In Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd., [(2007) · A
5 SCC 591], this Court has held :
"17. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot
be lost sight of. If the provisions contained in the Code of
Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if the Third
Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal had no jurisdiction, in view B
of the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, unless the respondent suffered any
prejudice, they could not have questioned the jurisdiction
of the court. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan this Court
held: (AIR p. 342, paras 6-7) c
'6 .... If the question now under consideration fell to
be determined only on the application of general
principles governing the matter, there can be no
doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was 'coram
non judice' and that its judgment and decree would 0
be nullities. The question is what is the effect of
Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this
position.
7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything
in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an E!
objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over
a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of
overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be
entertained by an appellate court, except as
provided in the section. Then follow provisions as F
to when the objections could be entertained, and
how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the
section has come in-and deservedly-for
considerable criticism; but amidst much that is
obscure and confused, there is one principle which
stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree G
passed by a court, which would have had no
jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for
overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to be treated
as, what it would be but for the section, null and void,
and that an objection to jurisdiction based on H
-764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with
under that section and not otherwise.
r---
The reference to Section 578, now Section 99 CPC,
in the opening words of the section is significant.
That section, while providing that no decree shall
B be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the
defects mentioned therein when they do not affect
the merits of the case, excepts from· its operation
defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives
no protection to decrees passed on merits, when ,.. ~

c the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as
a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with
a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was
enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction
of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation
shall not be entertained by an appellate court
D except in the manner and to the extent mentioned
in the section. It is a self-contained provision
complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction )c_,.

based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be
raised otherwise than in accordance with it.
E With reference to objections relating to territorial
jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code
enacts that no objection to the place of suing should
be allowed by an appellate or revisional court,
unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It
F is the same principle that has been adopted in
Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference '):
to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying
Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the
Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when
G a case had been tried by a court on the merits and
judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be
reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had
resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the )-
legislature has been to treat objections to
jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as
H
MANTOO SARKAR v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. 765
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

" """
technical and not open to consideration by an
appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice
on the merits. The contention of the appellants,
A

therefore, that the decree and judgment of the
District Court, Monghyr, should be treated -as a
nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the B
Suits Valuation Act.'"
Furthermore in determining as to whether a part of cause
of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
vis-a-vis an appellate court a large number of factors may have
to be taken in consideration. [See Ambica Industries v. CCE, c
(2007) 6 sec 769).
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the appellant
herein was a labourer. The justness or otherwise of the amount
of compensation has not been disputed before us. If the High
Court judgment is to be complied with, appellant would again D'
have to initiate another proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon
or at Delhi or at Jabalpur. The same evidence would have.to
be rendered once again. The question of fa_ct which was
required to be determined in the proceeding before the Tribunal,
namely whether the driver of the truck or the driver of the bus
had been driving their respective vehicles rashly and negligently E
would have to be determined afresh. The factual finding
recorded in this case is that the d'river of the truck was ·driving
the truck rashly and negligently. In our opinion, in a case of this
nature, we may even exercise our extra ordinary jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In New India F
Insurance Company v. Darshana Devi and others, [(2008) 7
SCC 416], this Court held:
"20. Having said so, we must take notice of the fact that
the deceased Baldev Singh was labourer. The Tribunal has
found that besides being a labourer, he also used to deal G
in Safeda wood. He was the owner of the 'Safeda' wood
which was being transported to the market for its sale. The
-(
first respondent, Darshana Devi, in her deposition, stated
that the deceased used to purchase wood from the State
of Himachal Pradesh on contract basis. Orily Gurdial Singh H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A and Ravinder Singh were accompanying him as labourer. ,
His income was assessed only at Rs. 2,400 per month."
21. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it
is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its
1
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
B Constitution of India. Even in Brij Mohan this Court held:
(SCC p. 64, paras 13-14,)
"13. However, Respondent 1 is a poor labourer. He had
suffered grievous injuries. He had become disabled to a
great extent. The amount of compensation awarded in his
c favour appears to be on a lower side. In the
aforementioned situation, although we reject the other
contentions of Ms lndu Malhotra, we are inclined to
exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India so as to direct that the award may
be satisfied by the appellant but it would be entitled to
D
realise the same from the owner of the tractor and the
trolley wherefor it would not be necessary for it to initiate
any separate proceedings for recovery of the amount as
provided for under the Motor Vehicles Act.
14. It is well settled that in a situation of this nature this
E Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India read with Article 136 thereof can issue
suit directions for doing complete justice to the parties."
20. Reliance, however, has been placed on a decisiqn of
F this Court in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal, [(2002) 8 SCC
158], to contend that this Court should not exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. )':.
Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution shall be exercised or not would depend upon the
fact of the each matter. Law in this case does not come in the
G way of exercise of such jurisdiction.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and
the order of the Tribunal is restored. The appeal is allowed with
costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.10,000/-.
H D.G. Appeal allowed.