MAQBOOLversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

                         [2018] 12 S.C.R. 885                             885


                             MAQBOOL                                      A
                                  v.
      THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1143 of 2018)
                       SEPTEMBER 07, 2018                                 B
   [KURIAN JOSEPH AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
      Penal Code, 1860 – ss.326A and 326B – Offence under,
whether attracted, if the injury in an acid attack is simple – Plea of
appellant for discharge u/s.326A on the ground that the injury
                                                                          C
caused was simple as per the medical report hence, he cannot be
charged u/s.326A, rejected – Propriety of – Held: It is not the
percentage or gravity of injury, which makes the difference – Be it
simple or grievous, if the injury falls under the specified eight types
u/s.326A on account of use of acid, the offence u/s.326A is
attracted – Merely because the title to s.326A speaks about               D
grievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the
Section that the injuries caused should be invariably grievous –
s.326B would be attracted in case the requirements specified are
met on an attempted acid attack – Appeal dismissed – The Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.
                                                                          E
     Penal Code, 1860 – ss.326A and 326B – Difference between
– Discussed.
       Interpretation of Statutes – Title of the provision and its
contents – Conflict between – Held: Title to the provision need not
invariably indicate the contents of the provision – In the event of a     F
conflict between the plain expressions in the provision and the
indicated title, the title cannot control the contents of the provision
– Title is only a broad and general indication of the nature of the
subject dealt under the provision.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                    G
      HELD: 1.1 Section 326A, IPC carries title of “voluntarily
causing grievous hurt by use of acid” whereas Section 326B, IPC
does not carry any such indication in the title regarding the
nature of injury as grievous. But, both the Sections provide for
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886            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2018] 12 S.C.R.


A     eight types of injuries - (i) permanent damage, (ii) partial
      damage, (iii) deformity, (iv) burns, (v) maiming,
      (vi) disfigurement, (vii) disability or (viii) grievous hurt. The first
      seven of the injuries referred to in the Sections are classified
      based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas the eighth
      one is on the gravity of the effect. Under Sections 326A and 326B,
B
      grievous hurt is only one among the eight injuries. In view of the
      explanation under Section 326B, the resultant damage or
      deformity under 326A or 326B is not required to be irreversible.
      The other seven injuries may be either simple or grievous. The
      nature of injury being simple or grievous, is irrelevant for
C     distinguishing between Section 323, Section 326 and Section 326A
      of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of IPC. If the
      injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among the
      specified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple or
      grievous, the special provisions are attracted. [Paras 6, 7]
      [890-E-H; 891-A]
D
             1.2 The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B
      of IPC is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. The
      resultant injury has made the offence more serious with a
      mandatory minimum punishment of ten years which may extend
      to imprisonment for life and, in either case, with a fine. The fine
E     is mandatory and the quantum should be just and reasonable in
      the sense that it should be, in any case, sufficient to meet the
      medical expenses for the treatment of the victim. Therefore, the
      second proviso under Section 326A requires that the fine
      imposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, the
F     mere act of throwing or attempt to throw or attempt to
      administer or attempt to use any other means with the intention
      of causing any of the injuries referred to in the Section, is to be
      visited with a mandatory minimum imprisonment of five years,
      which may extend to seven years and fine. Thus, merely
      because the title to Section 326A of IPC speaks about grievous
G     hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the Section that
      the injuries caused should be invariably grievous. Even if the
      seven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and under Section 326B
      the mere act of throwing or attempt, as indicated in the Section,
      would attract the offence. [Paras 8, 9] [891-B-D]
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 MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER                         887


      1.3 The title to the provision need not invariably indicate      A
the contents of the provision. If the provision is otherwise clear
and unambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On the
contrary, if the contents of the provision are otherwise
ambiguous, an aid can be sought from the title so as to define the
provision. In the event of a conflict between the plain
                                                                       B
expressions in the provision and the indicated title, the title
cannot control the contents of the provision. Title is only a broad
and general indication of the nature of the subject dealt under
the provision. [Para 10] [891-E-F]
      1.4 It is not the percentage or gravity of injury, which makes
the difference. Be it simple or grievous, if the injury falls under    C
the specified types under Section 326A on account of use of acid,
the offence under Section 326A is attracted. Section 326B would
be attracted in case the requirements specified are met on an
attempted acid attack. [Para 16] [894-A-B]
      1.5 The observations and findings in the present Judgment        D
are only for the purpose of reaching the conclusion as to whether
charge under Section 326A of IPC has been correctly framed and
whether the trial court committed an error in rejecting the
application for discharge under Section 326A of IPC. All other
aspects would remain to be considered during the trial which           E
shall be conducted uninfluenced by any of the observations on
the merits of the matter. [Para 17] [894-C-D]
      Laddu Ram v. State of Rajasthan [Criminal
      Miscellaneous Petition No. 681 of 2017 decided on
      06.02.2017 by Rajasthan High Court] ; M. Siluvai                 F
      Murugan @ Murugan v. State 2018 SCC OnLine Mad
      2332 – overruled.
      Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Another v. Rawatmal
      Dugar (2004) 4 SCC 766 : [2004] 3 SCR 1130 ;
      Union of India (UOI) and Another v. National                     G
      Federation of the Blind and Others (2013) 10 SCC
      772 : [2013] 9 SCR 1023 – relied on.



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888            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 12 S.C.R.


A                               Case Law Reference
            [2004] 3 SCR 1130              relied on            Para 11
            [2013] 9 SCR 1023              relied on            Para 11


B           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 1143 of 2018
             From the Order dated 19.07.2018 of the High Court of Judicature
      at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 2231 of 2018
            L. B. Rai, Askari Husain, Saurav Singhla, Kartik Rai, Shankar
C
      Divate, Advs. for the Appellant.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
            2. In an acid attack, if the injury is simple, whether an offence
D
      under Section 326A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as
      ‘IPC’) is attracted, is the main question for consideration in this case.
      And if the injury is only simple, whether charge can be framed under
      Section 326B is the incidental issue.
            3. Section 326A was introduced by The Criminal Law
E
      (Amendment)Act, 2013 pursuant to the recommendations contained in
      the Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law,
      popularly known as J.S. Verma Committee Report. The pre-amended
      provision covering such injuries is Section 326. To quote:
            “326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
F           weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for
            by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any
            instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which,
            used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means
            of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any
G           corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or
            by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human
            body to inhale, to swallow, or to re-ceive into the blood, or by
            means of any animal, shall be pun-ished with 1[imprisonment for
            life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
            may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
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 MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER                                889
                   [KURIAN, J.]

      4. “Grievous hurt” is defined under Section 320 of IPC and “hurt”       A
under Section 319 of IPC. To quote:
      “319. Hurt.—Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity
      to any person is said to cause hurt.”
      “320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only are
      designated as “grievous”:—                                              B

          First     — Emasculation.
          Secondly — Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
          Thirdly — Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear,
                                                                              C
          Fourthly — Privation of any member or joint.
          Fifthly   — Destruction or permanent impairing of the
                      powers of any member or joint.
          Sixthly    — Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
          Seventhly— Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.              D

          Eighthly — Any hurt which endangers life or which
                     causes the sufferer to be during the
                     space of twenty days in severe bodily
                     pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.”
                                                                              E
      5. Injuries caused or attempted to be caused by use of acid, have
been, under the amendment, categorized differently as separate or
special offences under Sections 326A and 326B of IPC:
      “326A. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid,
      etc.-Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity            F
      to, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of
      the body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on
      or by administering acid to that person, or by using any other
      means with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he
      is likely to cause such injury or hurt, shall be punished with
      imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be        G
      less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
      and with fine;
           Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet
      the medical expenses of the treatment of the victim;
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890             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 12 S.C.R.


A                    Provided further that any fine imposed under this section
             shall be paid to the victim.”
             “326B.Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid.-
             Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or
             attempts to administer acid to any person, or attempts to use any
B            other means, with the intention of causing permanent or partial
             damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or
             disability or grievous hurt to that person, shall be punished with
             imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
             less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and
             shall also be liable to fine.
C
                   Explanation I.—For the purposes of section 326A and this
             section, “acid” includes any substance which has acidic or corrosive
             character or burning nature, that is capable of causing bodily injury
             leading to scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanent
             disability.
D
                  Explanation 2.— For the purposes of section 326A and this
             section, permanent or partial damage or deformity shall not be
             required to be irreversible.”
              6. Section 326A carries title of “voluntarily causing grievous hurt
E     by use of acid” whereas Section 326B does not carry any such
      indication in the title regarding the nature of injury as grievous. But on
      closer analysis, it can be seen that both the Sections provide for eight
      types of injuries - (i) permanent damage, (ii) partial damage,
      (iii) deformity, (iv) burns, (v) maiming, (vi) disfigurement, (vii) disability
      or (viii) grievous hurt.
F
             7. The first seven of the injuries referred to in the Sections are
      classified based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas the
      eighth one is on the gravity of the effect. Under Sections 326A and
      326B, grievous hurt is only one among the eight injuries. In view of the
      explanation under Section 326B, the resultant damage or deformity
G     under 326A or 326B is not required to be irreversible. The other seven
      injuries may be either simple or grievous. The nature of injury being
      simple or grievous, is irrelevant for distinguishing between Section 323
      and Section 326A of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of
      IPC. If the injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among
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    MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER                               891
                      [KURIAN, J.]

the specified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple or            A
grievous, the special provisions are attracted.
        8. The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B of IPC
is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. The resultant injury
has made the offence more serious with a mandatory minimum
punishment of ten years which may extend to imprisonment for life and,          B
in either case, with a fine. The fine is mandatory and the quantum should
be just and reasonable in the sense that it should be, in any case,
sufficient to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim.
Therefore, the second proviso under Section 326A requires that the fine
imposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, the mere act
of throwing or attempt to throw or attempt to administer or attempt to          C
use any other means with the intention of causing any of the injuries
referred to in the Section, is to be visited with a mandatory minimum
imprisonment of five years, which may extend to seven years and fine.
       9. Thus, merely because the title to Section 326A of IPC speaks
about grievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the           D
Section that the injuries caused should be invariably grievous. Even if
the seven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and under Section 326B the
mere act of throwing or attempt, as indicated in the Section, would
attract the offence.
        10.The title to the provision need not invariably indicate the          E
contents of the provision. If the provision is otherwise clear and
unambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On the contrary, if the
contents of the provision are otherwise ambiguous, an aid can be sought
from the title so as to define the provision. In the event of a conflict
between the plain expressions in the provision and the indicated title, the     F
title cannot control the contents of the provision. Title is only a broad and
general indication of the nature of the subject dealt under the provision.
       11. We are benefitted with two precedents in this regard -
(i) Raichurmatham Prabhakar and another v. Rawatmal Dugar1
and (ii) Union of India (UOI) and another v. National Federation                G
of the Blind and others2.
      12. In Raichurmatham Prabhakar (supra), it was held by the
Court at paragraph-14 of the judgment as follows:
1
    (2004) 4 SCC 766
2
    (2013) 10 SCC 772
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892            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 12 S.C.R.


A                     “14. The view is now settled that the headings or titles
            pre-fixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to in
            construing an Act of the legislature. But conflicting opinions have
            been expressed on the question as to what weight should be
            attached to the headings or titles. According to one view, the
            headings might be treated as preambles to the provisions
B
            following them so as to be regarded as giving the key to opening
            the mind of the draftsman of the clauses arranged thereunder.
            According to the other view, resort to heading can only be taken
            when the enacting words are ambiguous. They cannot control the
            meaning of plain words but they may explain ambiguities.
C           (See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,
            9th Edn., 2004, pp.152,155). In our opinion, it is permissible to
            assign the heading or title of a section a limited role to play in the
            construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and
            general indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt with
            thereunder. The heading or title may also be taken as a
D
            condensed name assigned to indicate collectively the
            characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment
            underneath; though the name would always be brief having its
            own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain language of
            the provision and the meaning of the heading or title, the heading
E           or title would not control the meaning which is clearly and plainly
            discernible from the language of the provision thereunder.”
      13.    In National Federation of the Blind (supra):
                 “44. It is settled law that while interpreting any provision of
            a statute the plain meaning has to be given effect and if language
F           therein is simple and unambiguous, there is no need to traverse
            beyond the same. Likewise, if the language of the relevant
            section gives a simple meaning and message, it should be
            interpreted in such a way and there is no need to give any weightage
            to headings of those paragraphs. This aspect has been clarified in
G           Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax
            and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment is
            relevant which reads as under:
            “13. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read
            anything into a statutory provision which is plain and
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 MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER                                 893
                   [KURIAN, J.]

      unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The               A
      language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
      legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that
      the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by
      the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed
      and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should
                                                                               B
      be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand
      said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the
      purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co.
      v. Yensavage.) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip
      Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama and Padma Sundara
      Rao v. State of T.N.””                                                   C
       14. In the present case, the appellant sought discharge under
Section 326A of IPC on the ground that the injury caused was simple as
per the medical report. The trial court rejected the application and the
same has been upheld by the High Court. Learned Counsel for the
appellant has submitted that even if the entire prosecution story is           D
accepted to be true and correct, no grievous hurt has been caused to the
victim since the injuries are reported to be simple, and hence, he cannot
be charged under Section 326A. Reliance is sought to be placed on two
decisions, one of the High Court of Rajasthan in Laddu Ram v. State of
Rajasthan decided on 06.02.2017 in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition             E
No. 681 of 2017 and the other of the High Court of Madras in
M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan v. State decided on 30.07.2018 in
Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2016 (2018 SCC OnLine Mad 2332).
       15. In Laddu Ram (supra), the High Court of Rajasthan has taken
the view that the injury caused being simple in nature, Section 326A of        F
IPC is not attracted but only Section 326B of IPC would apply. Similarly,
the High Court of Madras in M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan
(supra) held that if the injury caused by use of acid is simple in nature,
there cannot be any conviction under Section 326A of IPC. In M. Siluvai
Murugan @ Murugan (supra), though the High Court has analysed
the legal position correctly, it has unfortunately committed a patent error    G
in taking note of the nature of injury as simple and altering the conviction
to Section 326B of IPC on the ground that the injury as per medical
report was simple being chemical injury at twelve per cent.

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894             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2018] 12 S.C.R.


A            16. As we have already discussed above, it is not the percentage
      or gravity of injury, which makes the difference. Be it simple or
      grievous, if the injury falls under the specified types under Section 326A
      on account of use of acid, the offence under Section 326A is attracted.
      Section 326B would be attracted in case the requirements specified are
      met on an attempted acid attack. Therefore, both the High Court of
B
      Rajasthan in Laddu Ram (supra) and High Court of Madras in
      M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan (supra) do not lay down the correct
      position of law and they are overruled.
             17. The appeal is hence dismissed. However, we make it clear
      that the observations and findings in this Judgment are only for the
C     purpose of reaching the conclusion as to whether charge under Section
      326A of IPC has been correctly framed and whether the trial court
      committed an error in rejecting the application for discharge under
      Section 326A of IPC. All other aspects would remain to be considered
      during the trial which shall be conducted uninfluenced by any of the
D     observations on the merits of the matter.


      Divya Pandey                                               Appeal dismissed.



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