Holding

A criminal appeal cannot be posted unless the convicted appellant surrenders or obtains an exemption; Order XXI Rule 13A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 is mandatory and is not displaced by Section 9(4) of the Special Courts Act or Section 389(3) of the CrPC.

Summary

The appellants filed criminal appeals under Section 10 of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992, but had not surrendered to their sentences. The Court examined whether Order XXI Rule 13A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which requires surrender before an appeal can be posted, could be displaced by Section 9(4) of the Special Courts Act or by Section 389(3) of the CrPC. It held that the rule is mandatory and applies unless an exemption order is granted; the Special Court’s power to regulate its own procedure does not extend to Supreme Court proceedings, and Section 389(3) does not override the surrender requirement. The Court also warned that decisions rendered without reference to statutory bars are per incuriam and lack precedential value. Consequently, the appeals were ordered to be posted only after the appellants surrendered and filed proof of surrender, leading to dismissal of the pending appeals.

Issues considered

Whether Order XXI Rule 13A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 mandating surrender of a convicted appellant before registration of a criminal appeal applies to appeals under Section 10 of the Special Courts Act despite Section 9(4) granting the Special Court procedural autonomy.
Whether Section 389(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 overrides the surrender requirement under Rule 13A.
Whether a convicted appellant can file a criminal appeal as a matter of right without surrender or an exemption order.
Whether a judgment rendered without reference to mandatory statutory provisions is per incuriam and therefore not binding precedent.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 389(3)
Constitution of Indias. Article 134, s. Article 136, s. Article 141, s. Article 145
Supreme Court Rules, 1966s. Order XXI Rule 13A

Subjects

criminal appealsurrender requirementSupreme Court RulesOrder XXI Rule 13ASpecial Courts ActSection 9(4)Section 389 CrPCper incuriamprocedural complianceappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

A MA YURAM SUBRAMANIAN SRINIVASAN
v.
C.B.I.

JUNE 16, 2006

B (ARIJIT PASAYAT AND AL TAMAS KABIR, JJ.]

Supreme Court Rules, 1966--0rder XX/ Rule 13 A--Applicability-
Criminal Appeal-Surrender of appellant a pre-condition for registering
C appeal-Requirement of-Held: Criminal appeal cannot be posted unless proof
of surrender had been fi1rnished by the appellant who has been convicted-
The requirements of Rule I 3A are mandatory in character and have to be
complied with except when an order is passed for exemption from
surrendering- Section 9(4) ofSpecial Courts Act authorises only Special Court
to regulate the procedure before it and does not authorize to regulate the
D proceedings before Supr~me Court---Section 389 Cr.P.C does not have
overriding effect over the R.ule--Both are independent provisions and have! to
be considered on their own standing-Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating
to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992--Sections 9(4) and I 0---Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973--Section 389. •
E Constitution of India. 1950---Article 141--Doctrine ofprecedent-Held:
Where a decision has been rendered without reference lo statutory bars, the
same cannot have any precedent value and have to be treated as having been
rendered per incuriam_

Words and Phrases:
F
"lncuria"-Meaning of

Appellants filed an appeal in this Court under Section 10 of Special
Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992.
The Special Court had already suspended the sentence for a particular
G period. The Office Report pointed out that appellant in each appeal had
not surrendered and therefore in terms of Supreme Court Rules, 1966,
the criminal appeal could not be taken up. Appellants' case was that .
Supreme Court Rules had no application to the present case in view of

H 48
MA YURAM SUBRAMANIAN SRINIVASAN v. C.B.I. 49

~. special provision under Section 9(4) of the Act authorizing the concerned A
court to regulate its procedure. Appellants also relied on several orders
stating that in several appeals under Section 10 of the Act, this Court had
directed suspension of the substantive sentence during the hearing of the
appeal subject to furnishing of personal bond and had not required
surrender of the accused appellant.
B
Ordering that the appeals be posted only after filing of proof of
surrender of appellants, the Court

HELD: Per Arijit Pasayat, J:

1.1. Criminal Appeal cannot be posted unless proof of surrender has C
been furnished by the appellant who has been convicted. The requirements
of Order XXI Rule 13A of Supreme Co_urt Rules, 1966 are mandatory in
character and have to be complied with except when an order is passed
for exemption from surrendering. 154-E-F)

1.2. Under Section 9(4) of Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating D
to Transaction in Securities Act, 1992) Special Court is authorized to
formulate its own procedure to be adopted. That cannot do away with the
requirement stipulated under Order XXI Rule 13A. The rules have been
)
framed in exercise of powers conferred by Article 145 of the Constitution
and all other powers in this behalf, by this Court and the Rules have been E
made with the approval of the President. (54-G-H)

1.3. It is not correct to say that Order XXI Rule 13A cannot in any
way affect the powers available to Special Court under Section 9(4)
because Section 9(4) only permits the Special Court to regulate the
procedure before it. That in no way authorizes the Special Court to F
regulate the proceedings before this Court. 157-C-DJ

1.4. Section 389 (3) Cr.P.C. has application when there is a right of
appeal. Where prayer for grant of certificate of High Court to appeal in
this Court in terms of Article 134 A of the Constitution of India, 1950 or G
is made under Article 136 of the Constitution there is no right of appeal
involved. In such cases Section 389(3) has no application. But the position
is different when a case is covered under Article 134(1)(a) or Article
134(l)(b) being covered under Section 2 of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appeal Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. An appeal under
H
50 SUPREME COllRT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Section I 0 of Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transaction in
Securities Act, 1992 Act falls to the category of cases where there is a right
of appeal. 153-B-C; E-FJ

Ram Kumar Pande v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1975) SC
1252 and Chandra Mohan Tiwari and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
B (1992) SC 891, referred to.

1.5. The Special Court had granted protection for some periods by
suspending the sentence. It is the discretion of the Court whether to extend
that protection. But that, would be subject to the provisions of Order XXI
C Rule 13A. 157-BI

2. The effect of Order XXI Rule 13A of the Rules does not appear
to have been brought to the notice of the Court while dealing with the
application for stay of the judgment of the High Court in orders on whici1
reliance is placed by the appellants. Where in a case the decision has been
D rendered without reference to statutory bars, the same cannot have any
precedent value and shall have to be treated as having been rendered per
incuriam. 156-A-C]

State through SP. New Delhi v. Ratan Lal Arora, 120041 4 SCC 590,
relied on.
E
3. "/ncuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam
is taken to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed this
principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law",
is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, "in ignoratium of a statute or other
binding authority". Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by
F this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution, which
embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. 156-C-EI

State of UP. and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals ltd and Anr., J1991 I
4 SCC 139; Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of MP., 120041 7 SCC 558 and N.
Bhargavan Pillai (dead) by lrs. and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR (2004) SC
G 2317, relied on.

Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. ltd, [19441 2 All E.R. 293, referred
to.

Per Altamas Kabir: (concurring):
H
MAYURAM SUBRAMANIAN SRINIVASAN v. C.B.l. [PASAYAT, J.] 5I

Grant of bail in the appeal presupposes surrender by the convicted A
person. The provisions of Section 389 Cr.P.C. and that of the Supreme
Court Rules, 1966, are independent provisions and will have to be
considered on their own standing. It cannot be said that Section 389 (3)
Cr.P.C., has an overriding effect over the Supreme Court Rules and hence
once bail has been granted to a convicted person by the trial court, this B
Court cannot insist that he should surrender to the sentence in terms of
Rule 13A before his appeal can be registered. 158-A-B; 57-F]
i
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 685
of 2006.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.4.2006 of the Special Court at C
Bombay Constituted Under The Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating To
Transactions in Securities) Act 1992 in Special Case No. 4 of 1996.

WITH

Crl.A. No. 687 of 2006.
D

Crl. A. No. 688 of 2006 .
.)
Kamini Jaiswal, Shomila Bakshi and Rani for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. When the matter was placed for admission, the
office repo11 pointed out that the appellant in each Appeal has not surrendered
and therefore in terms of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (in short the 'Rules')
the Criminal Appeal cannot be taken up. It is pointed out that in each case F
an application has been filed for staying operation of the impugned judgment
and final order dated 12th April, 2006 passed by the Special Court at Bombay
constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transaction
in Securities) Act, 1992 (in short the 'Act') in Special Case No.4 of 1996
during the pendency of the appeal and to suspend the sentence of the appellant
~~~ G
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appeal is under
Section 10 of the Act and the learned Judge of the Special Court has suspended
the substantive sentence passed against each of the accused for a period of
10 weeks from the date of judgment. For that purpose each of the accused
executed fresh RR Bond. Time was granted for execution of the bond. It is H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A case of the appellants that the Rules have no application to the present case,
as there is a special provision i.e. Section 9(4) of the Act authorizing the
concerned Court to regulate its procedure, adopt such procedure as it may
deem fit consistent with the principles of natural justice. In exercise of that
power the operation of the sentence has been suspended. It is also pointed out
B that in several appeals under Section I0 of the Act, this Court has directed
suspension of the substantive sentence during the hearing of the appeal subject
to furnishing of personal bond and had not required surrender of the accused
appellant. Copies of several said orders have been placed on record.

Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the
C 'Code') permits a Court to suspend the sentence pending the appeal and for
release of the appellant on bail.

Section 389 so far as relevant reads as follows :

Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant
on bail.--{I) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate
D
Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the
execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended
and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on
his own bond.

E Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on
his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for
a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public
Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release:

F Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on
bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for
the cancellation of the bail.".

(2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court
may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by
G convicted person to a Coun subordinate thereto.

(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he
is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall-

(i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding three years, or
H
MA YURAM SUBRAMANIAN SRINIVASAN v. C.B.l. [PASA YAT, J.] 53
(ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted A
is a bailable one, and he is on bail,

order that the convicted person be released on bail unless there are
special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient
time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate
Court under sub-section (I), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, B
so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended."

Section 389 (3) has application when there is a right of appeal. Where
prayer for grant of certificate of High Court to appeal in this Court in terms
of Article 134(A) of the Constitution oflndia, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution')
or is made under Article l 36(A) of the Constitution there is no right of C
appeal involved. In such cases Section 389(3) has no application. Merely
because somebody intends to file application under Article 136 of the
Constitution and seek leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution,
Section 389J3) of the Code has no application. But the position is different
when a case· is· covered under Article 134(l)(a) or Article 134(1)(b) being D
covered under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal
Appeal Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 (in short the 'Enlargement Act'). In Ram
Kumar Pande v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR ( 1975) SC I026 it was
held that no certificate of High Court is required since an order for acquittal
had been converted into conviction under Section 302 and life sentence had
been imposed. The appeal in such a case was as a matter of right under the E
Enlargement Act. Similar view W'IS taken in Chandra Mohan Tiwari and
Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1992) SC 891. lt was held that under
Section 379 of the Code which is in line with Article 134 (l)(a) & (b) of the
Constitution, an appeal lies as of right to this Court in a case where High
Court has on appeal reversed the order of acquittal and has convicted and F
sentence the accused either to death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment
for a term of 10 years or more. An appeal under Section 10 of the Act falls
to the category of cases where there is a right of appeal.

We are not concerned with the question whether Section 9 of the Act
operates in a broader area than Section 389(3) of the Code. Question is G
whether the accused who prefers a Criminal Appeal though as a matter of
right has to first surrender or seek exemption from surrendering. Order XX!
Rule 13A of the Rules is relevant in this context. Order XX! deals with
Special Leave Petitions in criminal proceedings and Criminal Appeals. Order
XX! is a part of Part 11 of the Rules i.e. Appellate Jurisdiction. Sub part (A)
H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A relates to Civil Appeals whereas sub part (B) relates to Criminal Appeals.
Rule 13 A of Order XX l reads as follows :

'"Where the appellant has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, the petition of appeal shall state whether the appellant
has surrendered. Where the appellant has not surrendered to the
B sentence, the appeal shall not be registered, unless the Court, on a
written application for the purpose, orders to the contrary. Where the
petition of appeal is accompanied by such an application, the
application shall first be posted for hearing before the Court for orders."

Rule J3A was introduced by GSR 466 dated 22nd June, 1983 with
C effect from 2.7.1983.
Order XX! relates to Special Leave Petitions in Criminal proceedings
and Criminal Appeals. So far as Special Leave Petitions are concerned, Rule
6 application thereto is in almost identical language as that of Rule I3A. In
D both cases it is stipulated that unless the petitioner or the appellant as the case
may be has surrendered to the sentence, the petition/the appeal shall not be
registered and cannot be posted for hearing unless the Court on written
application for the purpose, orders to the contrary. In both cases it is stated
that where the petition/appeal is accompanied by such an application that
application alone shall be posted for hearing before the Court for orders.
E Therefore, the position is 1:rystal clear that the Criminal Appeal cannot be
posted unless proof of surrender has been furnished by the appellant who has
been convicted. It appears from the various orders which have been filed by
learned counsel for the appellant, the effect of Order XX! Rule I 3A has not
been dealt with. It may be that the provision was not brought to the notice
of the Bench. The requirements of Order XX! Rule 13A are mandatory in
F character and have to be complied with except w~en an order is passed for
exemption from surrendering.

Learned coumel for the appellant submitted that the Rule cannot be at
variance with the provisions of the Act more particularly in view of Section
G 9(4) of the Act. The stand is without any basis. Under Section 9(4) of the
Act, the Special Court is authorized to formulate its own procedure to be
adopted. That cannot do away with the requirement stipulated under Order
XXI Rule 13A. The rules have been framed in exercise of powers conferred
by Article 145 of the ConstitutioP and all other powers in this behalf, by this
Court and the Rules have been made with the approval of the President.
H ..
, MAYURAM SUBRAMANIAN SRINIVASAN v. CB.I. [PASA YAT, J.] 55

Article 145( 1) so far as relevant reads as follows: A
"145. Rules of court, etc.--{1) Subject to the provisions of any law
made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from lime to time, with
the approval of the President, make rules for regulating generally the
practice and procedure of the Court including-
B
(a) rules as to the persons practising before the Court,

(b) rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals and other matters
pertaining to appeals including the time within which appeals to the
Court are to be entered;

(c) rules as to the proceedings in the Court for the enforcement of any C
of the rights conferred by Part Ill;

(cc) rules as to the proceedings in the Court under [article 139A];

(d) rules as to the entertainment of appeals under sub-clause (c) of
clause (I) of article 134; D
(e) rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced
or order made by the Court may be reviewed and the procedure for
such review including the time within which applications to the Court
for such review are to be entered;
E
(t) rules as to the costs of and incidental to any proceedings in the
Court and as to the fees to be charged in respect of proceedings
therein;

(g) rules as to the granting of bail;

(h) rules as to stay of proceedings;
F

(i) rules providing for the summary determination of any appeal which
appears to the Court to be frivolous or vexatious or brought for the
purpose of delay;

G) rules as to the procedure for inquiries referred to in clause (I) of G
Article 317 ."

As noted above, there is no application made for exemption from
surrendering. Significantly, in the orders passed in the appeals referred to by
learned counsel for the appellants there is no reference to O~der XXI Rule H
13A.
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The effect of Order XX! Rule 13A of the Rules does not appear to have
been brought to the notice of the Court while dealing with the application for
stay of the judgment of the High Court in orders on which reliance is placed
by learned counsel for the appellants. The consequences which flow from
such non reference to applicable provisions have been highlighted by this
Court in many cases.
B
In State through S.P. New Delhi v. Ratan Lal Arora, [2004] 4 SCC 590
it was held that where in a case the decision has been rendered without
reference to statutory bars, the same cannot have any precedent value and
shall have to be treated as having been rendered per incuriam. The present
C case stands at par, if not, on a better footing. The provisions of Section 439
do not appear to have been taken note of.

"lncuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam is
taken to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed this principle
in relaxation of the rnle of stare decisis. The "quotable in law", as held in
D Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.. [1944) 2 All E.R. 293, is avoided and
ignored if it is rendered, "in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority".
Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting
Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution')
which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of Jaw. The above
position was highlighted in State of U.P. and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
E Ltd. and Anr., [1991) 4 sec 139. To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To
rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience. The posit:on was
highlighted in Nirmal' Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P., [2004] 7 SCC 558.

The question was again examined in N. Bhargavan Pillai (dead) by
F Lrs. And Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR (2004) SC 2317. It was observed in
para 14 as follows:

"14. Coming to the plea relating to benefits under the Probation Act,
it is to be noted that Section 18 of the said Act clearly rules out
application of the Probation Act to a case covered under Section 5(2)
G of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the accused-appellant's
plea relating to grant of benefit under the Probation Act. The decision
in Bore <Jowda 's case (supra) does not even indicate that Section 18
of the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific statutory
bar the view, 1ifany, expressed without analysing the statutory provision
cannot in our view be treated as a binding precedent and at the most
H
MA YURAM SUBRAMANIAN SRINIVASAN v. C.B.I. [AL TAMAS KABIR. J.] 57

is to be considered as having been rendered per incuriam. Looked at A
from any angle, the appeal is sans merit and deserves dismissal which
we direct."

The matter can be looked at from another angle. The Special Court had
granted protection for some periods by suspending the sentence. It is the
discretion of the Court whether to extend that protection. But that, in our B
view, would be subject to the provisions of Order XX! Rule 13A. May be
that in those cases relied by learned counsel for the appellants the discretion
has been exercised by extending the period fixed by the Special Court. But
that cannot have any precedent value, more particularly when it is relatable
to a mandatory requirement. Though it is the case of learned counsel for the C
appellant that Order XX! Rule I 3A cannot in any way affect the powers
available to Special Court under Section 9(4), there is no substance in th~
plea for the simple reason that Section 9(4) only permits the Special Court
to regulate the procedure before it. That in no way authorizes the Special
Court to regulate the proceedings before this Court.
D
In the aforesaid background it is directed that the appeals shall be
posted only after the appellants surrender and proof of surrender is filed.
Ordered accordingly.

ALTAMAS KABIR, J. I have had the privilege of going through the
judgment prepared by my learned brother and I fully agree with the reasoning E
and the ultimate decision rendered therein. I would, however, like to dilate
on one of the points urged by Ms. Jaiswal, which has been briefly touched
upon in the judgment.

It has been submitted that the statutory provisions of Section 389 (3)
Cr.P.C., has an overriding effect over the Supreme Court Rules and hence F
once bail has been granted to a convicted person by the trial court, this Court
cannot insist that he should surrender to the sentence in terms of Rule l 3A
before his appeal can be registered.

While such a submission is attractive, it does not stand scrutiny for the G
simple reason that Sub-section (3) of Section 389, Cr.P.C. empowers the trial
court to release a convicted perso~ on bail for such period as will afford him
sufficient time to present an appeal and obtain orders of the Appellate Court
under Sub-section (I), namely, release <;>n bail, and it is only for such period
that the sentence _of imprisonment shall be deemed to be suspended.
H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The basic fallacy of Ms. Jaiswal's submission is that it overlooks the
question that grant of bail in the appeal presupposes surrender by the convicted
person .

The provisions of Section 389 Cr.P.C. and that of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1966, are independent provisions and will have to be considered on
B their own standing.

The appeals can, therefore, be posted only after the appellants surrender
and proof of surrender is filed.
K.K.T. Appeals be posted only after the appellants
surender and proof or surender is filed.

'