Holding

The NEET and related statutory provisions are constitutionally valid as reasonable restrictions that do not violate Articles 19(1)(g) and 30, and the right to administer minority institutions is subject to such regulation.

Summary

The petitioners, a group of unaided minority medical and dental colleges, challenged the validity of the NEET (National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test) notifications issued by the Medical Council of India and Dental Council of India, arguing that the uniform entrance examination violated their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1) and 30 of the Constitution. The Court examined the constitutional framework, including the amendments to Section 10D of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Dentists Act, 1948, and considered the extensive jurisprudence on minority rights, the doctrine of reasonable restriction, and the proportionality test. It held that the NEET regime is a permissible regulatory measure aimed at ensuring merit, transparency, and curbing malpractices in professional education, and does not infringe the minority institutions' right to administer their colleges. The Court emphasized that Article 30 is not absolute and may be subject to reasonable regulations in the national interest. Consequently, the NEET notifications and the statutory provisions were upheld. The petitions were dismissed and the cases were disposed of.

Issues considered

The NEET notifications violate fundamental rights of unaided minority institutions under Articles 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1) and 30.
Whether Section 10D of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Dentists Act, 1948, authorising a uniform entrance test, is ultra vires the Constitution.
Whether the State may impose reasonable restrictions, including a common entrance test, on minority institutions' admission procedures.
Whether the doctrine of proportionality and the triple test (fair, transparent, non‑exploitative) justify the NEET regime.

Legislation cited

Subjects

NEETArticle 30Minority institutionsUniform entrance testReasonable restrictionProportionalityProfessional educationRegulationMedical Council of IndiaDental Council of India

Judgment

516 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 5 S.C.R. 516 [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(Transferred Case (Civil) No. 98 of 2012)
B APRIL 29, 2020
[ARUN MISHRA, VINEET SARAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Education/Educational Institutions – National Eligibility-cum-
Entrance Test (NEET) if violates fundamental rights guaranteed
C u/Arts.19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1) & 30 – Notifications issued by Medical
Council of India (MCI) and Dental Council of India (DCI) – NEET
introduced for admission to MBBS course, Post- graduate course,
BDS, MDS – Initially notifications were quashed – However, the
said judgment was later recalled – During the pendency of petitions,
s.10D, 1956 Act providing for uniform entrance examination for
D undergraduate and post-graduate level has come into force – s.10D,
1948 Act containing similar provisions w.r.t uniform entrance
examination has also been inserted – Held: Notifications questioned
and the amendment made to s.10D as introduced in the 1956 Act
and regulations as amended by MCI and similar provisions inserted
E in 1948 Act & Regulations, cannot be said to be violating the rights
of the unaided/aided minority to administer institutions
u/Arts.19(1)(g) & 30 r/w Arts. 25, 26 & 29(1) by prescribing the
uniform examination of NEET for admissions in the graduate and
postgraduate professional courses of medical as well as dental
F science – Provisions of the Act and regulation cannot be said to be
ultra vires the rights guaranteed u/Art. 30(1) r/w Arts. 19(1)(g), 14,
25, 26 & 29(1) – It is open to provide regulatory mechanism for
admission for such courses as held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation – A
decision has been taken to regulate admission in professional
colleges on national basis to wipe out corruption and various evils
G from the system – There cannot be any exemption, otherwise, there
would be no end to such claims and multiple examinations – Minority
and private institutions have to admit students based on merit in the
permissible category, based on NEET as per procedure prescribed
under the Act and Regulations – Rights u/Art.19(1)(g) are not
H
516
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 517
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

absolute and are subject to reasonable restriction in the interest of A
student’s community to promote merit, recognition of excellence, and
to curb the malpractices – Uniform Entrance Test qualifies the test
of proportionality and is reasonable – Constitution of India – Arts.
14, 19(1)(g), 19(6), 25, 26 & 29(1), 30, 46, 47, 51A(j) – Indian
Medical Council Act, 1956 – s.10D – Regulation on Graduate B
Medical Education, 1997 – Dentists Act, 1948 – s.10D – Post
Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 – Regulations on
Graduate Medical Education (Amendment) 2010 (Part II) – Post-
Graduate Medical Education (Amendment) Regulation, 2010 (Part-
II) – Regulations on Graduate Medical Education (Amendment)
2017 – Maharashtra Unaided Private Professional Educational C
Institution (Regulation of Admissions & Fees) Act, 2015.
Disposing of the matters, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The notifications, which are questioned in the
matters and the amendment made to Section 10D as introduced D
in the Act of 1956 and regulations as amended by the MCI and
similar provisions inserted in the Dentists Act & Regulations,
cannot be said to be taking away the rights of the unaided minority
institutions or private institutions of making admission in any
manner as it is permissible to provide regulatory mechanism at
the national level and the entrance test applies even to All India E
Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) – the most reputed Institute
of India. It is open to provide the regulatory mechanism for
admission for such courses as held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation the
qualification and conditions of eligibility in the interest of academic
standards can be provided, and there could be regulatory F
measures for ensuring educational standards and maintaining
excellence in the matter of professional institution. Thus, the
decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation rendered by 11-Judge Bench
is juxtaposedto the submission raised on behalf of petitioners. In
P.A. Inamdar, the Court laid down the triple test of a fair,
G
transparent and non-exploitative mechanism and if the admission
procedure adopted by private institution does not satisfy all or
any of the triple tests, it held that the admission procedure can
be taken over by the State substituting its process. This aspect
was gauged in Modern Dental College and Research Centre in a
broader perspective considering prevailing situation of capitation H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A fee and education becoming saleable commodity. A decision has
been taken to regulate admission in professional colleges on
national basis so as to wipe out the corruption and various evils
from the system. Even, the NEET has been made applicable to
such premier institution like All India Institute of Medical
B Sciences (AIIMS) and so many others. The decision has been
taken considering the overall national scenario, there cannot be
any exemption, otherwise, there would be no end to such claims
and multiple examinations. It would not be possible to eradicate
evils. Overall derogatory situation which prevailed before
introduction of NEET cannot be restored. Still, there are several
C loopholes, which are to be plugged in the admission procedure.
Unscrupulous practices are being adopted by private colleges of
not admitting students sponsored by centralised counselling
committee.The minority and private institutions have to admit
students based on merit in the permissible category, based on
D NEET as per procedure prescribed under the Act and
Regulations. [Paras 35, 37 and 38][610-G-H; 611-A-F]
T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka
and Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR
587; P. A. Inamdar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra
E and Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 537 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR
603; Modern Dental College and Research Centre and
Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (2016) 7
SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579 – followed.
1.2 The notifications issued, amendment made to Section
F 10D of the Act of 1956 and regulations framed by MCI and similar
provisions for dental courses providing for NEET cannot be said
to be impinging upon the rights of the minority and the provisions
of the Act and regulations framed by MCI under the Act of 1956,
in DCI Act and regulations are required to be observed by each
and every institution. The regulatory measures under the Act/
G Regulations cannot be said to be averse to the interest of such
institutions, and such reasonable measurescan be carved out.
They do not impinge upon the rights of institutions guaranteed
under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25 and 30 of the Constitution of India.
There is no reason why conditions for the welfare of students
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 519
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

and teachers should not be made, but any law or rule or regulation A
that would put the educational institutions run by the minorities
at a disadvantage when compared to the institutions run by the
others will have to be struck down. The law of the land includes
rules and regulations that must apply equally to the majority as
well as minority institutions. The minority institutions must be
B
allowed to do what non-minority is permitted to do. They have to
comply with the conditions of recognition, which cannot be such
as to whittle down the right guaranteed under Article 30 of the
Constitution. [Paras 41, 42][614-B-C, F-H]
1.3 The NEET has been prescribed by the Legislature in
the larger public interest that has to prevail. The provisions found C
to be reasonable conditions of recognition/affiliation are binding
for the very existence of all such institution whether they are run
by majority or minority failing which they cannot exists and impart
education. The conditions are reasonable and cannot be said to
be taking away any of the constitutional rights of minority D
institutions, they are reasonable, fair and intended to bring
transparency in the professional education imparted by
institutions. They are applicable for all institutions alike minorities
are not placed on a disadvantageous platform. There is no doubt
as to the concept of limited Government and least interference
is welcomed, but in which field and to what extent balancing with E
the larger public and national interest is required. The individual
autonomy, rights, and obligations are to be free from official
interference except where the rational basis for intrusion exists.
The Constitution provides a limitation on the power of the State
to interfere with life, liberty, and rights, however, the concept of F
limited government cannot be extended to a level when it defeats
the very national interest. The maladies with which professional
education suffers in this country are writ large. The regulatory
framework created by the MCI/ DCI is concomitant of conditions,
affiliation and recognition, and providing central examination in
the form of NEET cannot be said to be violative of the rights G
under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30. The regulatory framework is not
restrictive, but caters to the effective enjoyment of the rights
conferred under the aforesaid provisions. The provisions qualify
the doctrine of proportionality considered in Modern Dental
College and Research Centre. What has been held therein for State H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A level examination holds good for NEET also. The prescription of
NEET is definitely in order to improve the medical education,
co-related to the improvement of public health, thus, it is a step-
in furtherance of the duty of the State enshrined in the Directive
Principles of the State Policy contained in Article 47 of the
Constitution of India. Similarly, Article 46 aims at promotion of
B
educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, and other weaker sections. By prescription of
one equivalence examination of NEET, the interest of their merit
is also equally protected and its aims of preventing various
malpractices, which crept into system and prevent economic
C exploitation by selling seats with which maladythe professional
medical education system suffered. Article 51A(j) deals with the
duty to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and
collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher
levels of endeavour and achievement. For that purpose,
recognition of merit is necessary, and one has to be given a full
D
opportunity in pursuit of his/her aim. The prescription of NEET
is to provide equal opportunity and level launching platform to
an individual to perform his duty as enshrined under Article 51A(j).
Thus, there is no violation of the aforesaid provisions as argued
by appellants, rather action is in furtherance of the constitutional
E aims and directions to achieve intendment of Article 51A(j) and
is in the national interest. [Paras 46-48][618-C-G; 619-A-E]
1.4 In view of the law laid down in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, it
is apparent that NEET/common entrance test is a devise to
standardise and computing equivalence between different kinds
F of qualifications. It does not interfere with the rights of the unaided
minority institutions as it has been imposed in national interest
considering the malpractices of granting illegal admission by
virtually selling the seats in derogation to rights of meritorious
students. The charitable activity of education became a saleable
commodity and prerogative of wealthy persons and poor students
G were forced to get education funded from Banks making it difficult
for them to come out of tentacular octave of interest. They are
exploited in bud before they bloom into flower. The ill-reputation
developed by MCI forced to change its entire structure. The
national interest requires further improvement in the system to
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 521
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

eradicate evils from the system. The situation is still grim and A
require to be dealt with firm hand and steely determination. Thus,
it is apparent that the provisions in question which have been
incorporated in the Act relating to Medical/Dental education, the
Government, MCI and DCI cannot be said to be an invasion of
the fundamental rights. The intendment is to ensure fairness in
B
the selection, recognition of merit, and the interests of the
students. In the national interest, educational institutions are
basically for a charitable purpose. By and large, at present
education is devoid of its real character of charity, it has become
a commodity. To weed out evils from the system, which were
eating away fairness in admission process, defeating merit and C
aspiration of the common incumbent with no means, the State
has the right to frame regulatory regime for aided/ unaided
minority/ private institutions as mandated by Directives
Principles, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The first step
has been taken to weed out the evils from the system, and it
D
would not be in the national interest to step back considering the
overall scenario. If the old system is reverted to, posterity is not
going to forgive us. Still, complaints are galore that merit is being
ignored by private institutions; there is still a flood of litigation.
It seems that unfettered by a large number of regulatory
measures, unscrupulous methods and malpractices are yet being E
adopted. Building the nation is the main aspect of education, which
could not be ignored and overlooked. They have to cater to
national interest first, then their interest, more so, when such
conditions can be prescribed for recognition, particularly in the
matter of professional education. The learned counsel argued
F
that it is open to some of the institutions to impose higher
standards of merit. Firstly, conditions of affiliation are binding
apart from that, it is found that when it comes to national standards
and the objects sought to be achieved by NEET, to conduct
individual examinations by some institutions cannot be permitted.
The system is not yet out of clutches of unscrupulous devices G
and dubious means are adopted to defeat merit, the interest of
education would further suffer and very purpose of centralised
examination would be defeated. It is not possible to prescribe
further examination over and above NEET that cannot be said to
be workable, no exemption can be granted from NEET,
H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A considering the objective with which it has been introduced. The
uniform Entrance Examination cannot be said to be unreasonable
regulatory framework. Considering the terms and conditionsfor
affiliation and recognition for professional medical and such other
professional courses are binding, and no relaxation can be
permitted in the conditions. [Paras 53, 55 and 57][621-C-E;
B
G-H; 622-A-D, F-H; 623-A]
1.5 Rights under Articles 19(1)(g)and 30 read with Articles
25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India do not come in the
way of securing transparency and recognition of merits in the
matter of admissions. It is open to regulating the course of study,
C qualifications for ensuring educational standards. It is open to
imposing reasonable restrictions in the national and public
interest. The rights under Article 19(1)(g) are not absolute and
are subject to reasonable restriction in the interest of the student’s
community to promote merit, recognition of excellence, and to
D curb the malpractices. Uniform Entrance Test qualifies the test
of proportionality and is reasonable. The same is intended to
check several maladies which crept into medical education, to
prevent capitation fee by admitting students which are lower in
merit and to prevent exploitation, profiteering, and
commercialisation of education. The institution has to be a capable
E vehicle of education. The minority institutions are equally bound
to comply with the conditions imposed under the relevant Acts
and Regulations to enjoy affiliation and recognition, which apply
to all institutions.In case they have to impart education, they are
bound to comply with the conditions which are equally applicable
F to all. The regulations are necessary, and they are not divisive or
disintegrative. Such regulatory measures enable institutions to
administer them efficiently. There is no right given to
maladminister the education derogatory to the national interest.
The quality of medical education is imperative to sub-serve the
national interest, and the merit cannot be compromised. The
G Government has the right for providing regulatory measures that
are in the national interest, more so in view of Article 19(6) of
the Constitution of India. The rights of the religious or linguistic
minorities under Article 30 are not in conflict with other parts of
the Constitution. Balancing the rights is constitutional intendment
H in the national and more enormous public interest. Regulatory
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 523
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

measures cannot be said to be exceedingthe concept of limited A
governance. The regulatory measures in question are for the
improvement of the public health and is a step, in furtherance of
the directive principles enshrined in Articles47 and 51(A)(j) and
enable the individual by providing full opportunity in pursuance
of his objective to excel in his pursuit. The rights to administer
B
an institution under Article 30 of the Constitution are not above
the law and other Constitutional provisions. Reasonable
regulatory measures can be provided without violating such rights
available under Article 30 of the Constitution to administer an
institution. Professional educational institutions constitute a class
by themselves. Specific measures to make the administration of C
such institutions transparent can be imposed. The rights available
under Article 30 are not violated by provisions carved out in
Section 10D of the MCI Act and the Dentists Act and Regulations
framed by MCI/DCI.The regulatory measures are intended for
the proper functioning of institutions and to ensure that the
D
standard of education is maintained and does not fall low under
the guise of an exclusive right of management to the extent of
maladministration. The regulatory measures by prescribing
NEET is to bring the education within the realm of charity which
character it has lost. It intends to weed out evils from the system
and various malpractices which decayed the system. The E
regulatory measures in no way interfere with the rights to
administer the institution by the religious or linguistic minorities.
Resultantly, there is no violation of the rights of the unaided/
aided minority to administer institutions under Articles19 (1)(g)
and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of
F
India by prescribing the uniform examination of NEET for
admissions in the graduate and postgraduate professional courses
of medical as well as dental science. The provisions of the Act
and regulation cannot be said to be ultra vires or taking away the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India under Article
30(1) read with Articles 19(1)(g), 14, 25, 26 and 29(1). G
[Paras 58-60][623-B-H; 624-A-F]
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and Anr. v. State
of Gujarat and Anr. (1974) 1 SCC 717 : [1975] 1 SCR
173; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi (1992)
1 SCC 558 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121 – followed. H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Association
v. Union of India and Others (1986) 4 SCC 707 : [1987]
1 SCR 238; Bihar State Madarasa Education Board,
Patna v. Madarasa Hanfia Arabic College, Jamalia and
Others (1990) 1 SCC 428 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 399;
Brahmo Samaj Education Society v. State of West Bengal
B
(2004) 6 SCC 224 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 214; Sindhi
Education Society and Anr. v. Chief Secretary,
Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (2010) 8 SCC
49 : [2010] 8 SCR 81; Secretary, Malankara Syrian
Catholic College v. T. Jose and Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 386
C : [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 644 – relied on.
Sankalp Charitable Trust and Anr. v. Union of India
and Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 487; Gobind v. State of Madhya
Pradesh and Anr. (1975) 2 SCC 148 : [1975] 3 SCR
946; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC
D 1: [2017] 10 SCR 569; Islamic Academy of Education
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC
697 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 474; Christian Medical
College Vellore v. Union of India (2014) 2 SCC 305 :
[2013] 7 SCR 908; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Jainarayan Chouksey and Ors. (2016) 9 SCC 412; State
E of Maharashtra v. D.Y. Patil Vidyapeeth and Ors. (2016)
9 SCC 401; Dar-us-Salam Educational Trust and Ors.
v. Medical Council of India and Ors. (2017) 6 SCALE
320; Yatin kumar Jasubhai Patel and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 1 : [2019] 12 SCR
F 848; Re The Kerala Education Bill 1957 AIR 1958 SC
956 : [1959] SCR 995; Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and
Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr. [1963] 3 SCR 837;
Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and
Ors. AIR 1969 SC 465 : [1969] 2 SCR 73; The Gandhi
Faiz-e-am College, Shahjahanpur v. University of Agra
G and Anr. (1975) 2 SCC 283 : [1975] 3 SCR 810; Sk.
Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania
High Madrasah and Ors. (2020) 1 SCALE 345;
Chandana Das (Malakar) v. State of West Bengal and
Ors. (2015) 12 SCC 140 : [2014] 13 SCR 796; Faculty
H Association of All India Institute of Medical Sciences v.
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 525
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Union of India and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 246 : [2014] A
14 SCR 1634; Dr. Preeti Srivastava and Anr. v. State of
M.P. and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 120 : [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR
249 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2016) 7 SCC 487 referred to Para 15 B

[2016] 3 SCR 579 followed Para 15
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587 followed Para 15
[1975] 3 SCR 946 referred to Para 15
C
[2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 15
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 474 referred to Para 15
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 603 followed Para 15
(2016) 7 SCC 487 referred to Para 17
D
[2013] 7 SCR 908 referred to Para 17
(2016) 9 SCC 412 referred to Para 17
(2016) 9 SCC 401 referred to Para 17
(2017) 6 SCALE 320 referred to Para 17
E
[2019] 12 SCR 848 referred to Para 17
[1959] SCR 995 referred to Para 20
[1963] 3 SCR 837 referred to Para 21
[1969] 2 SCR 73 referred to Para 21 F
[1975] 1 SCR 173 followed Para 22
[1975] 3 SCR 810 referred to Para 23
[1987] 1 SCR 238 relied on Para 24
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 399 relied on Para 25 G
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121 followed Para 26
(2020) 1 SCALE 345 referred to Para 26
[2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 214 relied on Para 28
[2010] 8 SCR 81 relied on Para 30 H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A [2014] 13 SCR 796 referred to Para 30
[2014] 14 SCR 1634 referred to Para 39
[1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 249 referred to Para 39
[2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 45
B [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 644 relied on Para 49
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transferred Case (Civil)
No. 98 of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.2012 of this Hon'ble
Court passed in Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 365 of 2012.
C
With
Transferred Case (Civil) Nos. 102, 99, 104, 105, 107, 108, 119,
120, 125-127, 110, 111, 112, 113-114, 115-116, 117-118, 123-124, 128-
130, 131, 132-134, 138-139, 142, 144, 145 of 2012, 5, 2, 3, 4, 7, 1, 8, 9, 10,
D 11, 12-13, 16, 14-15, 23-24, 19, 20, 21-22, 17, 18, 25, 28-29, 48, 49, 39, 40,
42, 41, 43, 44, 46, 45, 47, 37-38, 30, 31-32, 33-36, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63-65,
66-69, 70-71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 108 of 2013, 25 of 2019, Writ Petition. (Civil)
Nos. 443, 750 of 2016, Special Leave Petition.(C) No. 28223 of 2016.
Vikas Singh, R. Venkataramani, Jayanth Muthraj, Sr. Advs., Gaurav
E Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Ms. Deepeika Kalia, V.G.
Pragasam, Prabu Ramasubramanian, S. Manuraj, Yashraj Singh Bundela,
Praveen Vignesh, M. Yogesh Kanna, S Raja Rajeshwaran, Karthik
Rajendran, Ms. Uma Prasuna Bachu, Rohit Rathi, Ms. Sheena Taqui,
Ms. Bina Gupta, Kshitij Vaibhav, K.S.T. Thambi Pillai, Hitesh Kumar
Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Miria Jasmin, Samrat Shinde, Sachin Patil,
F Anil Kumar Mishra, Idrish Mohammed, Supantha Sinha, A.K. Mishra,
G.N. Reddy, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, A.P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Rupesh
Kumar, Mrs. Pankhuri Shrivastava, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma,
V.N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Md. Apzal Ansari, Amol Chitale,
Ms. Pragya Baghel, P.V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T.P., Bineesh K., Mukund
G P. Unny, Ashwini Kumar Singh, M/s. India Law, Mahesh Thakur,
Ms. Sheffali Chaudhary, Mrs. Vipasha Singh, Dr. Sushil Balwada,
Ramesh Allanki, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Ms. Savita Devi, N.V.R.S.S.S.
Vara Prasad, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Ganni Krishna, R. Radha Krishna,
Ms. Shilp Gupta, C.S.N. Mohan Rao, Anil Kumar Mishra-I, Shivaji M.
Jadhav, Ashwarya Sinha, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Mrs. Bina Gupta,
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 527
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Ramesh Babu M.R., Rakesh K. Sharma, A
Dushyant Parashar, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Ms. Udita Singh, Vivek Singh,
A. Venayagam Balan, Alok Shukla, M/s. Arputham Aruna and Co., E.R.
Kumar, Krishna Srinivasan, Ms. Geeti Aara, Udayaditya Banerjee,
Sudipto Sircar, Bhav Ratab, Ms. Tanya Chaudhry, Raghav Bansal,
Ms. Nitika Pandey, M/s. Parekh & Co., Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Amit
B
Anand Tiwari, Ms. Shakun Sharma, K.K. Singh, Ms. Mary Mitzy, Ms.
E.R. Sumathy, M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co., K.K. Mani, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Vipin Kumar Jai, Ms. Binu Tamta,
Ms. Rekha Pandey, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal,
M.Y. Deshmukh, Amit Kumar, Ms.Sushma Suri, T.C. Sharma, Prashant
Bhushan, Mrs. Vaijayanthi Girish, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Nishant C
Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, K.V. Vijayakumar, B. Balaji, Gopal Singh,
Kaushik Poddar, R. Chandrachud, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Astha
Tyagi, Ms. Farah Fathima, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARUN MISHRA, J. D

1. Most of the cases have a chequered history. Initially, petitioners
have questioned four notifications - two notifications dated 21.12.2010
issued by Medical Council of India (for short, ‘the MCI’) and other two
notifications dated 31.5.2012, issued by Dental Council of India (for short,
‘the DCI’). The MCI by virtue of Regulations on Graduate Medical E
Education (Amendment) 2010, (Part II) notified by the Government of
India, amended theRegulationson Graduate Medical Education,
1997.Similarly, the other notification issued by MCIcalled “Post-Graduate
Medical Education (Amendment) Regulation, 2010 (Part-II)” to amend
the Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000. The regulations F
came into force on their publication in the Official Gazette. The other
two notifications dated 31.5.2012 issued by DCI were relating to admission
in the BDS and MDS courses.
2. The MCI issued notifications in exercise of power conferred
by Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the G
Act of 1956’). The amendments were made in the Regulation on Graduate
Medical Education, 1997. The change was made in Clause 5 in Chapter
II of the Regulations. Clause 5 provided for procedure for selection
thus:

H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A “6. In Chapter II, Clause 5 under the heading “Procedure for
selection to MBBS Course shall be as follows” shall be substituted
as under:
(i) There shall be a single eligibility-cum-entrance examination,
namely, ‘National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test for admission to
B MBBS course’ in each academic year. The overall
superintendence, direction, and control of the National Eligibility-
cum-Entrance Test shall vest with the Medical Council of India.
However, the Medical Council of India, with the previous approval
of the Central Government, shall select organisation(s) to conduct
‘National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test for admission to MBBS
C course.
(ii) In order to be eligible for admission to MBBS course for a
particular academic year, it shall be necessary for a candidate to
obtain minimum of 50% (fifty percent) marks in each paper of
National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test held for the said academic
D year. However, in respect of candidates belonging to the Scheduled
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the Other Backward Classes,
the minimum percentage shall be 40% (forty percent) in each
paper, and in respect of candidates with locomotory disability of
lower limbs, the minimum percentage marks shall be 45% (forty-
E five percent) in each paper of National Eligibility-cum-Entrance
Test:
Provided when sufficient number of candidates belonging to
respective categories fail to secure minimum marks as prescribed
in National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test in any academic year
F for admission to MBBS course, the Central Government in
consultation with the Medical Council of India may at its discretion
lower the minimum marks required for admission to MBBS course
for candidates belonging to respective categories and marks so
lowered by the Central Government shall be applicable for the
said year only.
G
(iii) The reservation of seats in medical colleges for respective
categories shall be as per applicable laws prevailing in States/
Union Territories. An all India merit list as well as State-wise
merit list of the eligible candidates shall be prepared on the basis
of the marks obtained in National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 529
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

and candidates shall be admitted to MBBS course from the said A
lists only.
(iv) No candidate who has failed to obtain the minimum eligibility
marks as prescribed in sub-clause (ii) above shall be admitted to
MBBS course in the said academic year.
(v) All admissions to MBBS course within the respective categories B
shall be based solely on marks obtained in the National Eligibility-
cum-Entrance Test.”
(emphasis supplied)
3. Similarly, amendments to the Post Graduate Medical Education C
Regulations, 2000 were made. The relevant portion of the amendments
made are extracted hereunder:
“No. MCI. 18(1)/2010-Med./49070. — In exercise of the powers
conferred by Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956
(102 of 1956), the Medical Council of India with the previous D
approval of the Central Government hereby makes the following
regulations to further amend the ‘Postgraduate Medical Education
Regulations, 2000’, namely:
1. (i). These Regulations may be called ‘the Postgraduate Medical
Education (Amendment) Regulations, 2010 (Part II)’.
E
(ii) They shall come into force from the date of their publication
in the Official Gazette.
2. In the ‘Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000’,
the following additions/ modifications/ deletions/ substitutions, shall
be as indicated therein: F
3. Clause 9 under the heading ‘SELECTION OF
POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS’ shall be substituted as under:
“9. Procedure for selection of candidate for Postgraduate
courses shall be as follows:
G
(i) There shall be a single eligibility-cum-entrance examination,
namely, National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test for admission
to Postgraduate Medical Courses in each academic year. The
overall superintendence, direction and control of National
Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test shall vest with Medical Council
H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A of India. However, the Medical Council of India, with the
previous approval of the Central Government shall select
organisation(s) to conduct National Eligibility-cum-Entrance
Test for admission to Postgraduate courses”’.”
4. Similar notifications were issued by DCI providing for procedure
B for selection of candidates for MBBS Course and Post-graduate Course
and also for BDS and MDS.Thus, National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test
(for short, ‘the NEET’) for admission to the MBBS course and the
Post-graduate course and similarly for BDS and MDS came to be
introduced. Now the statutory provisions underSection 10D of the Act
of 1956 providing for uniform entrance examination for undergraduate
C and post-graduate level which came into force on 24.5.2016. Section
10D is extracted hereunder:
“10D.Uniform entrance examination for undergraduate and
post-graduate level.—There shall be conducted a uniform
entrance examination to all medical educational institutions at the
D undergraduate level and post-graduate level through such
designated authority in Hindi, English and such other languages
and in such manner as may be prescribed and the designated
authority shall ensure the conduct of uniform entrance examination
in the aforesaid manner:
E Provided that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any
court, the provisions of this section shall not apply, in relation to
the uniform entrance examination at the undergraduate level for
the academic year 2016-17 conducted in accordance with any
regulations made under this Act, in respect of the State
F Government seats (whether in Government Medical College or in
a private Medical College) where such State has not opted for
such examination.”
(emphasis supplied)
Section 10D of the Dentists Act, 1948,containing similar provisions
G with respect of uniform entrance examination hasalso been inserted,
same is extracted hereunder:
“10D. Uniform entrance examination for undergraduate and
post-graduate level.—There shall be conducted a uniform
entrance examination to all dental educational institutions at the
H undergraduate level and post-graduate level through such
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 531
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

designated authority in Hindi, English and such other languages A
and in such manner as may be prescribed and the designated
authority shall ensure the conduct of uniform entrance examination
in the aforesaid manner:
Provided that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any
court, the provisions of this section shall not apply, in relation to B
the uniform entrance examination at the undergraduate level for
the academic year 2016-17 conducted in accordance with any
regulations made under this Act, in respect of the State
Government seats (whether in Government Dental College or in
a private Dental College) where such State has not opted for
such examination.” C

5. The Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997 have
also been amended by Regulations on Graduate Medical Education
(Amendment) 2017. The admission to the medical course eligibility criteria
has been prescribed by amended Clause 4. Following has been substituted:
D
“3. In Clause 4, under the heading Admission to the Medical
Course-eligibility criteria, and in sub-clause 4 (1) & (1A), the
following shall be substituted:
4. Admission to the Medical Course-Eligibility Criteria: No
candidate shall be allowed to be admitted to the Medical Curriculum E
proper of first Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery
course until he /she has qualified the NationalEligibility Entrance
Test, and he/she shall not be allowed to appear for the National
Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test until:
(1) He/she shall complete the age of 17 years on or before F
31stDecember of the year of admission to the MBBS.
(1A) He/She has obtained a minimum of marks in National
Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test as prescribed in Clause 5 of Chapter
II.”
(emphasis supplied) G
In Chapter II, Clause 5 under the heading “Procedure for
selection to MBBS” has been substituted by MCI in 2017 as under:
“7. In Chapter-II, Clause 5 under the heading “Procedure for
selection to MBBS course shall be as follows” shall be substituted
as under:- H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A “Procedure for selection to MBBS course shall be as
follows:”
(1) There shall be a uniform entrance examination to all medical
educational institutions at the undergraduate level namely ‘National
Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test for admission to MBBS course in
B each academic year and shall be conducted under overall
supervision of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare,
Government of India.
(2) The “designated authority” to conduct the ‘National Eligibility-
Cum- Entrance Test’ shall be the Central Board of Secondary
C Education or any other body/organization so designated by the
Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India, in
consultation with the Medical Council of India.
(3) The language and manner of conducting the ‘National
Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test’ shall be determined by the
D “designated authority” in consultation with the Medical Council
of India and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Government of India.
(4) In order to be eligible for admission to MBBS Course for a
academic year, it shall be necessary for a candidate to obtain
E minimum of marks at 50thpercentile in ‘National Eligibility-cum-
Entrance Test to MBBS course’ held for the said academic year.
However, in respect of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, the minimum marks
shall be at 40thpercentile. In respect of candidates with benchmark
disabilities specified under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
F Act, 2016, in terms of Clause 4(3) above, the minimum marks
shall be at 45th percentile for General Category candidates and
40th percentile for SC/ST/OBC candidates. The percentile shall
be determined on the basis of highest marks secured in the All-
India common merit list for admission in ‘National Eligibility-cum-
G Entrance Test for admission to MBBS course.
Provided when sufficient number of candidates in the respective
categories fail to secure minimum marks as prescribed in National
Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test held for any academic year for
admission to MBBS Course, the Central Government in
consultation with Medical Council of India may at its discretion
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 533
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

lower the minimum marks required for admission to MBBS Course A
for candidates belonging to respective categories and marks so
lowered by the Central Government shall be applicable for the
said academic year only.
(5) The reservation of seats in Medical Colleges for respective
categories shall be as per applicable laws prevailing in States/ B
Union Territories. An All India merit list as well as State/Union
Territory-wise merit list of the eligible candidates shall be prepared
on the basis of marks obtained in ‘National Eligibility-cum-Entrance
Test and candidates shall be admitted to MBBS course from the
said lists only.
C
(6) No candidate who has failed to obtain the minimum eligibility
marks as prescribed in Sub-clause (4) above shall be admitted to
MBBS course in the said academic year.
(7) No authority/institution shall admit any candidate to the MBBS
course in contravention of the criteria/procedure as laid down by D
these Regulations and/or in violation of the judgments passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of admissions. Any candidate
admitted in contravention/violation of aforesaid shall be discharged
by the Council forthwith. The authority/institution which grants
admission to any student in contravention /violation of the
Regulations and/or the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme E
Court, shall also be liable to face such action as may be prescribed
by the Council, including surrender of seats equivalent to the extent
of such admission made from its sanctioned intake capacity for
the succeeding academic year/years.
(8) All admission to MBBS course within the respective categories F
shall be based solely on the marks obtained in the ‘National
Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. Initially, the matters filed in 2012-2013 were heard by a Bench
G
of three Judges, and the matters were decided vide judgment and order
dated 18.7.2013. As per the majority opinion,the petitions were allowed.
The notifications issued by MCI and DCI providing for NEET were
quashed. However, the admissions, which were made, were not interfered
with. Review petitions were filed, which were entertained and were
ultimately allowed on 11.4.2016, and judgment dated 18.7.2013 was H
recalled.
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 7. In Writ Petition (C) No.443 of 2016, prayer has been made to
protect the rights of the petitioner-institutions guaranteed under Articles
14, 15, 25, 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India.In Writ Petition (C)
No.750 of 2016, prayer is made to direct the respondents to conduct
centralized counselling for admission to all Graduate Medical and Dental
Courses throughout the country. In Transferred Case (C) No.25 of 2019,
B
it is stated that vires of the provisions of Maharasthra Unaided Private
Professional Educational Institution (Regulation of Admissions & Fees)
Act, 2015, applying them to Unaided Private MinorityProfessional
Educational Institutions are bad in law. In S.L.P. (C) No.28223 of 2016,
provisions have been questioned on the ground that they cannot take
C away the rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 read with
Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India.
8. Initially, the questionswere raised that MCI and DCI could not
have introduced NEET as the same offends the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Article19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and the
D rights of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice as guaranteed under Article 30
Constitution of India. Thus, subordinate legislation couldnot have
overriding effect over the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
25, 26, 29(1), and 30 of the Constitution of India. Now the amendment
made could not take away or abridge the aforesaid rights of minorities.
E The right to admit students is one of the fundamental rights, thus, rider of
clearing NEET examination could not have been imposed.
9. It was urged on behalf of petitioners that the impugned
notifications violate the fundamental rights of an unaided minority
institution to “establish and administer educational institutions of their
F choice” protected under Article 30 read with Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution of India, which includes the right to admit students of their
own choice. The doctrine of limited Government provides that a citizen’s
liberty and autonomy is the central notion of the Constitution of India
and there is an inherent limitation on the State’s involvement in matters
G of admissions of students. The NEET prescribes no alternative to the
institution, impinges upon the fundamental rights of an unaided minority
institution to establish and administer educational institution of their choice.
10. It was furtherurged on behalf of petitioners that State has no
power to compel an unaided minority institution to admit students through
H a single centralized national examination such as NEET. The unaided
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 535
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

minority professional colleges have the fundamental rights to choose the A
method and manner in which to admit its students, subject to satisfying
the triple test of having a fair, transparent, and non-exploitative process.
11. It was also argued on behalf of petitioners that they have a
time-tested admission procedure without any complaints. Their process
is fair and transparent, and they have a fundamental right to protect B
autonomy and reputation by continuing to admit students using their
admission process. The NEET cannot be the only parameter to determine
the merit of a student. Some of the institutions are providing best medical
professional by having their procedure for admission. They have
fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30(1) of the Constitution
to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution. The State, while C
imposing reasonable restrictions, can fix the threshold criterion of merit,
but cannot restrict the petitioners from having any additional criteria of
merit over and above the threshold fixed by the State. The restriction
violates the test of proportionality.
12. The petitioners have also referred to the existing D
positionconcerning centralised examination for professional courses in
India and internationally,to hold entrance examination cannot be
compulsion, it has to be voluntarily. They have relied upon Common
Law Admission Test (CLAT) - a system of examination for admission in
the Law Colleges. Reference has also been made to the admission E
process followed in Indian Institute of Technology (IITs), National
Institute of Technology (NITs) and Indian Institute of Management
(IIMs). NEET is the first of its kind, both in India and globally, where all
institutions are compelled by the State to follow a single admission
procedure. Some of the institutions are having an excellent record. They
follow the gurukul tradition. With the introduction of NEET in 2016-17, F
institutions have been compelled to admit students through NEET instead
of their method. Some of them have the All India Entrance Test. They
have their unique procedure of admission for MBBS as well as Post
Graduation. The system of examination of some of the institutions is
wider on All India Basis, and they test general ability also, whereas, in G
NEET, evaluation is based on three subjects, namely, Physics, Biology,
and Chemistry. They have an elaborate procedure of the assessment,
and they do not admit students only based on their theoretical knowledge.
Some of them are the best medical educational institutions in the country.
There is not even a single allegation of maladministration against some
H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A of the reputed institutions. The principles, which govern the selection,
are eligibility, suitability, and distributive justice. The selection of candidates
is an important factor to the medical colleges to suit their requirements
in a particular field.
13. There are various issues which have arisen according to the
B admission given for post-graduate examination after the introduction of
NEET. Now, in some of the specialised institutions, they are not getting
good doctors to take care of patients, for example, in the Oncology
Department. Some of the candidates are not able to bear the burden of
the procedure and have expressed their inability to go with very sick
patients. Some of them were not able to undertake procedures in a sterile
C manner to avoid infections. Similar is the position in other super-speciality
departments. There are complaints of lack of clinical competence among
students admitted to speciality courses like general medicine.
14. The petitioners further submitted that they have a fundamental
right to admit students of their own choice under Article 30 of the
D Constitution. It is submitted that the admission procedure adopted by
them passes the triple test, i.e., fair, transparent, and non-exploitative.
Various orders were passed by this Court recognising fair method adopted
in individual institutions while admitting students through their admission
procedure as apparent from interim orders passed in the years 1993,
E 1994, 1995, and 1998.
15. This Court on 28.4.2016 passed an order in Sankalp
Charitable Trust and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (Writ Petition
(C) No.261 of 2016), in which it was clarified that order passed in the
said matter shall not affect the hearing of the petitions. Most of petitions
F remained pending after recall of the order earlier passed by this Court.As
per appellants, the ratio laid down in Modern Dental College and
Research Centre and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.,
(2016) 7 SCC 353, is not applicable. While deciding the said case, this
Court did not deal with the rights of unaided minority institutions. A Division
Bench of Madras High Court held that the procedure of admission of
G some of the institutions is fair, transparent and non-exploitative. Reliance
has been placed on the T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka and Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 481 to contend that State have
minimal interference and if possible, to be made only to maintain academic
standards. The right to admit students is one of the fundamental rights
H recognized by this Court. The challenge in Modern Dental College
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 537
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

and Research Centre (supra) was to the State level examination, i.e., A
the Common Entrance Test (CET). The holding of NEET would not be
in the interest of the academic standard of premier medical institutions
in the country. The change in admission procedure of students would
result in a sharp decline in the current standards of excellence in education
maintained at the institution, that would not be in public interest. The
B
admission procedure followed by petitioners is head and shoulders above
the NEET. The concept of limited government has also been relied upon
by referring to the decisions in Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh
and Anr., (1975) 2 SCC 148 and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India,
(2017) 10 SCC 1. Reliance has also been placed on the Islamic Academy
of Education and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC C
697 and P.A. Inamdar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.,
(2005) 6 SCC 537.
16. It was argued that provisions of the MCI and DCI Acts and
regulations which have been amended during the pendency of the
petitions cannot take away the right of the institutions to admit their D
students under Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the prescription
of NEET cannot be said to be permissible for the institutions in question.
17. On behalf of respondents, reliance has been placed on Sankalp
Charitable Trust and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2016) 7 SCC
487, Modern Dental College and Research Centre (supra) and P.A. E
Inamdar (supra). It was also argued that Section 10D has been inserted
in the Act of 1956 it provides that there shall be a uniform common
entrance conducted by the designated authority. The main reasoning of
this Court in Christian Medical College Vellore v. Union of India,
(2014) 2 SCC 305, which decision has been recalled, was that uniform
common entrance examination could not be introduced by way of F
subordinate legislation and under the Act of 1956 and MCI had no power
to conduct the said examination. After the introduction of Section 10D,
both the said lacunas have been plugged. The introduction of NEET is
constitutionally valid. In Modern Dental College and Research Centre
(supra), the Court considered the question of conduct of examination by G
private medical colleges in the State of Madhya Pradesh for admitting
students in their colleges. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.
JainarayanChouksey and Ors., (2016) 9 SCC 412, while deciding the
contempt petition it was observed that judgment dated 2.5.2016 passed
in the case of Modern Dental College and Research Centre
H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (supra),held that admission should be made through a centralised
procedure to be conducted by the State Government. The Court again in
the State of Maharashtra v. D.Y. Patil Vidyapeeth and Ors., (2016) 9
SCC 401, decided on 28.9.2016 reiterated that the decision in Modern
Dental College and Research Centre (supra) makes it unequivocally
clear that centralised counselling is an adjunct and part of the uniform
B
common entrance test. The notifications were also challenged by minority
institutions, deemed Universities, and other private institutions by filing
writ petitions in this Court. The Court in the judgment dated 9.5.2017 in
Dar-us-Salam Educational Trust and Ors. v. Medical Council of
India and Ors., (Writ Petition (C) No.267 of 2017), observed that
C common counselling did not in any manner affect the right of minority
institutions to admit students of their minority community. As such, their
right to admit students of their community was fully protected. The
institutions were entitled to fill students of minority quota in their respective
medical colleges. NEET is a qualifying examination to determine merit
and also ensure fair procedure and equality of opportunity that most
D
meritorious candidates get admitted in the medicine and dental courses.
Reliance has been placed on YatinkumarJasubhai Patel and Ors. v.
State of Gujarat and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 1, in which the Court
considered the question of institutional preference/reservation after
introduction of NEET, and observed that introduction of NEET did not
E affect 50% State quota seats in PG medicine course. It may be filled
based on institutional reservation.
18. The primary issue is whether by providing centralised
examination system – NEET for admission to MBBS, PG, BDS and
MDS by virtue of the provisions made in the Act and regulations, there
F is violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(g), 25,
26, 29(1) and 30 of the Constitution of India.
19. We first advert to take note that various decisions rendered
by this Court in respect of the right of minority as stated under Article 30
of the Constitution of India.
G 20. In ReTheKerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956,
question arose concerning right of the Government to prescribe
qualification to be possessed by the incumbents for appointment as
teachers in aided or recognized schools. The State Public Service
Commission was empowered to select candidates for appointment as
H teachers in Government and aided schools. The Court opined that minority
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 539
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

cannot ask for the aid or recognition for an educational institution without A
competent teachers and fair standards. The choice does not necessarily
militate against the claim of the State to insist on reasonable regulations
to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided or even recognized.
The Court held thus:
“(29) Their grievances are thus stated: The gist of the right of B
administration of a school is the power of appointment, control,
and dismissal of teachers and other staff. But under the said Bill
such power of management is practically taken away. Thus the
manager must submit annual statements (Cl. 5). The fixed assets
of the aided schools are frozen and cannot be dealt with except
with the permission of the authorised officer (Cl. 6). No educational C
agency of an aided school can appoint a manager of its choice
and the manager is completely under the control of the authorised
officer, for he must keep accounts in the manner he is told to do
and to give periodical inspection of them and on the closure of the
school the accounts must be made over to the authorised officer D
(Cl. 7). All fees etc. collected will have to be made over to the
Government (Cl. 8(3)). Government will take up the task of paying
the teachers and the non-teaching staff (Cl. 9). Government will
prescribe the qualification of teachers (Cl. 10). The school
authorities cannot appoint a single teacher of their choice, but
must appoint persons out of the panel settled by the Public Service E
Commission (Cl. 11). The school authorities must provide amenities
to teachers and cannot dismiss, remove, reduce, or even suspend
a teacher without the previous sanction of the authorised officer
(Cl. 12). ……
(31) We are thus faced with a problem of considerable complexity F
apparently difficult of solution. There is, on the one hand the minority
rights under Art. 30(1) to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice and the duty of the Government to
promote education, there is, on the other side the obligation of the
State under Art. 45 to endeavour to introduce free and compulsory G
education. We have to reconcile between these two conflicting
interests and to give effect to both if that is possible and bring
about a synthesis between the two. The directive principles cannot
ignore or override the fundamental rights but must, as we have
said, subserve the fundamental rights. We have already observed
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A that Art. 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities, (1) to establish
and (2) to administer educational institutions of their choice. The
right to administer cannot obviously include the right to
maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition
for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings,
without any competent teachers, possessing any semblance of
B
qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of
teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of
the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right
to administer an educational institution of their choice does not
necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in
C order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations
to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided. Learned
Attorney-General concedes that reasonable regulations may
certainly be imposed by the State as a condition for aid or even
for recognition......Clauses 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 20 relate
to the management of aided schools. Some of these provisions,
D
e.g., 7, 10, 11(1), 12(1)(2)(3) and (5) may easily be regarded as
reasonable regulations or conditions for the grant of aid. Clauses
9, 11(2) and 12(4) are, however, objected to as going much beyond
the permissible limit. It is said that by taking over the collections
of fees etc., and by undertaking to pay the salaries of the teachers
E and other staff the Government is in reality confiscating the school
fund and taking away the prestige of the school, for none will
care for the school authority. Likewise Cl. 11 takes away an
obvious item of management, for the manager cannot appoint any
teacher at all except out of the panel to be prepared by the Public
Service Commission which, apart from the question of its power
F
of taking up such duties, may not be qualified at all to select
teachers who will be acceptable to religious denominations and in
particular sub-cl. (2) of that clause is objectionable for it thrusts
upon educational institutions of religious minorities teachers of
Scheduled Castes who may have no knowledge of the tenets of
G their religion and maybe otherwise weak educationally. Power of
dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, or suspension is an index of
the right of management, and that is taken away by Cl. 12(4).
These are, no doubt, serious inroads on the right of administration
and appear perilously near violating that right. But considering
that those provisions are applicable to all educational institutions
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 541
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

and that the impugned parts of Cls. 9, 11 and 12 are designed to A
give protection and security to the illpaid teachers who are engaged
in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes,
we are prepared, as at present advised, to treat these clauses 9,
11(2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations which the State may
impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their
B
educational institutions. We, however, find it impossible to support
Cls. 14 and 15 of the said Bill as mere Regulations. The provisions
of those clauses may be totally destructive of the rights under
Art. 30(1). It is true that the right to aid is not implicit in Art. 30(1)
but the provisions of those clauses, if submitted to on account of
their factual compulsion as condition of aid, may easily be violative C
of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the State
of Kerala recognizes that Cls. 14 and 15 of the Bill may annihilate
the minority communities’ right to manage educational institutions
of their choice but submits that the validity of those clauses is not
the subjectmatter of question 2. But, as already explained, all newly
D
established schools seeking aid or recognition are, by Cl. 3(5),
made subject to all the provisions of the Act. Therefore, in a
discussion as to the constitutional validity of Cl. 3(5) a discussion
of the validity of the other clauses of the Bill becomes relevant,
not as and by way of a separate item but in determining the validity
of the provisions of Cl. 3(5). In our opinion, sub-cl. 3 of Cl. 8 and E
Cls. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 being merely regulatory do not offend
Art. 30(1), but the provisions of sub-cl. (5) of cl. 3 by making the
aided educational institutions subject to Cls. 14 and 15 as conditions
for the grant of aid do offend against Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied) F
21. In Rev. SidhajbhaiSabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay
and Anr., (1963) 3 SCR 837, the Court again considered the matter and
observed that educational institutions cater to the needs of the citizens
or section thereof. Regulation made in the real interests of efficiency of
instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order, and the G
like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictive
on the substance of the right, which is guaranteed, they secure the proper
functioning of the institution in the matter of education. It was also
observed that regulation must satisfy a dual test-the test of reasonableness
and that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and
H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A is conducive to making the institution a capable vehicle of education for
the minority community or other persons who resort to it. In Rev. Father
W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 465, the
Court observed thus:
“8. In our opinion, the width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut down
B by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29(1) is based.
The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities
to conserve their language, script, or culture. The former is a
special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of
their choice. This choice is not limited to institution seeking to
conserve language, script, or culture, and the choice is not taken
C away if the minority community having established an educational
institution of its choice also admits members of other communities.
That is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article
30(1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied.
The two articles create two separate rights, although it is possible
D that they may meet in a given case.”
22. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and Anr. v.
State of Gujarat and Anr., (1974) 1 SCC 717, a college was run by the
minority. A Bench of 9-Judges of this Court considered the question
whether Sections 40 and 41 of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 violated
E Section 30, which provided all colleges within the University area would
be governed by the statutes of the University which may provide for
minimum educational qualifications for teachers and tutorial staff. The
University may approve the appointments of teachers to coordinate and
regulate the facilities provided and expenditure incurred. The Court
opined that regulation which serves the interests of the teachers are of
F paramount importance in good administration,education should be a great
cohesive force in developing integrity of the nation, thus:
“19. The entire controversy centres round the extent of the right
of the religious and linguistic minorities to administer their
educational institutions. The right to administer is said to consist
G of four principal matters. First is the right to choose its managing
or governing body. It is said that the founders of the minority
institution have faith and confidence in their own committee or
body consisting of persons elected by them. Second is the right to
choose its teachers. It is said that minority institutions want teachers
H to have compatibility with the ideals, aims, and aspirations of the
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 543
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

institution. Third is the right not to be compelled to refuse admission A
to students. In other words, the minority institutions want to have
the right to admit students of their choice subject to reasonable
regulations about academic qualifications. Fourth is the right to
use its properties and assets for the benefit of its own institution.
20. The right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to B
administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute
right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory
measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character
and content of minority institutions, similarly, regulatory measures
are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient, and sound
administration. Das, C.J., in the Kerala Education Bill C
case(supra) 1959 SCR 995: AIR 1958 SC 956, summed up in one
sentence the true meaning of the right to administer by saying
that the right to administer is not the right to mal-administer.
30. Educational institutions are temples of learning. The virtues
of human intelligence are mastered and harmonised by education. D
Where there is complete harmony between the teacher and the
taught, where the teacher imparts and the student receives, where
there is complete dedication of the teacher and the taught in
learning, where there is discipline between the teacher and the
taught, where both are worshippers of learning, no discord or E
challenge will arise. An educational institution runs smoothly when
the teacher and the taught are engaged in the common ideal of
pursuit of knowledge. It is, therefore, manifest that the appointment
of teachers is an important part in educational institutions. The
qualifications and the character of the teachers are really
important. The minority institutions have the right to administer F
institutions. This right implies the obligation and duty of the minority
institutions to render the very best to the students. In the right of
administration, checks, and balances in the shape of regulatory
measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers
and their conditions of service. The right to administer is to be G
tempered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth
administration. The best administration will reveal no trace or colour
of minority. A minority institution should shine in exemplary
eclectism in the administration of the institution. The best
compliment that can be paid to a minority institution is that it does
not rest on or proclaim its minority character. H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 31. Regulations which will serve the interests of the students,
egulations which will serve the interests of the teachers are of
paramount importance in good administration. Regulations in the
interest of efficiency of teachers, discipline, and fairness in
administration are necessary for preserving harmony among
affiliated institutions.
B
46. The ultimate goal of a minority institution too imparting general
secular education is advancement of learning. This Court has
consistently held that it is not only permissible but also desirable to
regulate everything in educational and academic matters for
achieving excellence and uniformity in standards of education.
C
47. In the field of administration it is not reasonable to claim that
minority institutions will have complete autonomy. Checks on the
administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the
administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic
needs of the institution. The right of a minority to administer its
D educational institution involves, as part of it, a correlative duty of
good administration.
90. We may now deal with the scope and ambit of the right
guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 30. The clause confers a right
on all minorities, whether they are based on religion or language,
E to establish and administer educational instructions of their choice.
The right conferred by the clause is in absolute terms and is not
subject to restrictions, as in the case of rights conferred by Article
19 of the Constitution. The right of the minorities to administer
educational institutions does not, however, prevent the making of
F reasonable regulations in respect of those institutions. The
regulations have necessarily to be made in the interest of the
institution as a minority educational institution. They have to be so
designed as to make it an effective vehicle for imparting education.
The right to administer educational institutions can plainly not
include the right to maladminister. Regulations can be made to
G prevent the housing of an educational institution in unhealthy
surroundings as also to prevent the setting up or continuation of
an educational institution without qualified teachers. The State
can prescribe regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution.
Prescription of standards for educational institutions does not
H militate against the right of the minority to administer the institutions.
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 545
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, A
discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order, and the like
may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions
on the substance of the right, which is guaranteed: they secure
the proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational
[see observations of Shah, J. in Rev. SidhajbhaiSabhai(supra),
B
[(1963 3 SCR 837]p. 850]. Further, as observed by Hidyatullah,
C.J. in the case of Very Rev. Mother Provincial (supra) [(1971)
1 SCR 734], the standards concern the body politic and are dictated
by considerations of the advancement of the country and its people.
Therefore, if universities establish syllabi for examinations, they
must be followed, subject, however, to special subjects which the C
institutions may seek to teach, and to a certain extent, the State
may also regulate the conditions of employment of teachers and
the health and hygiene of students. Such regulations do not bear
directly upon management as such, although they may indirectly
affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate education, educational
D
standards, and allied matters cannot be denied. The minority
institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of
excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise
of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow the general
pattern. While the management must be left to them, they may be
compelled to keep in step with others. E
92. A regulation which is designed to prevent maladministration
of an educational institution cannot be said to offend Clause (1) of
Article 30. At the same time, it has to be ensured that under the
power of making regulations, nothing is done as would detract
from the character of the institution as a minority educational F
institution or which would impinge upon the rights of the minorities
to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
The right conferred by Article 30(1) is intended to be real and
effective and not a mere pious and abstract sentiment; it is a
promise of reality and not a teasing illusion. Such a right cannot
be allowed to be whittled down by any measure masquerading as G
a regulation. As observed by this Court in the case of Rev.
SidhajbhaiSabhai (supra) [(1963 3 SCR 837], regulations which
may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action
as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed
to making the institution while retaining its character as minority H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation
must satisfy a dual test — the test of reasonableness, and the test
that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution
and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of
education for the minority community or other persons who resort
to it.
B
94. If a request is made for the affiliation or recognition of an
educational institution, it is implicit in the request that the educational
institution would abide by the regulations which are made by the
authority granting affiliation or recognition. The said authority can
always prescribe regulations and insist that they should be complied
C with before it would grant affiliation or recognition to an educational
institution. To deny the power of making regulations to the authority
concerned would result in robbing the concept of affiliation or
recognition of its real essence. No institution can claim affiliation
or recognition until it conforms to a certain standard. The fact
D that the institution is of the prescribed standard indeed inheres in
the very concept of affiliation or recognition. It is, therefore,
permissible for the authority concerned to prescribe regulations
which must be complied with before an institution can seek and
retain affiliation and recognition. Question then arises whether
there is any limitation on the prescription of regulations for minority
E educational institutions. So far as this aspect is concerned, the
authority prescribing the regulations must bear in mind that the
Constitution has guaranteed a fundamental right to the minorities
for establishing and administering their educational institutions.
Regulations made by the authority concerned should not impinge
F upon that right. Balance has, therefore, to be kept between the
two objectives, that of ensuring the standard of excellence of the
institution and that of preserving the right of the minorities to
establish and administer their educational institutions. Regulations
which embrace and reconcile the two objectives can be considered
to be reasonable.”
G
(emphasis supplied)
The Court held that it is permissible for the State to prescribe
qualifications for teachers. It observed:
“176. Recognition or affiliation is granted on the basis of the
H excellence of an educational institution, namely, that it has reached
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 547
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the educational standard set up by the university. Recognition or A
affiliation is sought for the purpose of enabling the students in an
educational institution to sit for an examination to be conducted
by the university and to obtain a degree conferred by the
university.For that purpose, the students should have to be coached
in such a manner so as to attain the standard of education
B
prescribed by the university. Recognition or affiliation creates an
interest in the university to ensure that the educational institution
is maintained for the purpose intended and any regulation which
will subserve or advance that purpose will be reasonable and no
educational institution established and administered by a religious
or linguistic minority can claim recognition or affiliation without C
submitting to those regulations. That is the price of recognition or
affiliation: but this does not mean that it should submit to a regulation
stipulating for surrender of a right or freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution, which is unrelated to the purpose of recognition or
affiliation. In other words, recognition or affiliation is a facility
D
which the university grants to an educational institution, for the
purpose of enabling the students there to sit for an examination to
be conducted by the university in the prescribed subjects and to
obtain the degree conferred by the university, and therefore, it
stands to reason to hold that no regulation which is unrelated to
the purpose can be imposed. If besides recognition or affiliation, E
an educational institution conducted by a religious minority is
granted aid, further regulations for ensuring that the aid is utilized
for the purpose for which it is granted will be permissible. The
heart of the matter is that no educational institution established by
a religious or linguistic minority can claim total immunity from
F
regulations by the legislature or the university if it wants affiliation
or recognition, but the character of the permissible regulations
must depend upon their purpose. As we said, such regulations will
be permissible if they are relevant to the purpose of securing or
promoting the object of recognition or affiliation. There will be
borderline cases where it is difficult to decide whether a regulation G
really subserves the purpose of recognition or affiliation. But that
does not affect the question of principle. In every case, when the
reasonableness of a regulation comes up for consideration before
the Court, the question to be asked and answered is whether the
regulation is calculated to subserve or will in effect subserve the
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A purpose of recognition or affiliation, namely, the excellence of the
institution as a vehicle for general secular education to the minority
community and to other persons who resort to it. The question
whether a regulation is in the general interest of the public has no
relevance if it does not advance the excellence of the institution
as a vehicle for general secular education as, ex-hypothesi, the
B
only permissible regulations are those which secure the
effectiveness of the purpose of the facility, namely, the excellence
of the educational institutions in respect of their educational
standards. This is the reason why this Court has time and again
said that the question whether a particular regulation is calculated
C to advance the general public interest is of no consequence if it is
not conducive to the interests of the minority community and those
persons who resort to it.
197. On the second question, I have nothing significant to add to
what has fallen from My Lord the Chief Justice. I am in entire
D agreement with the view that, although, Articles 29 and 30 may
supplement each other so far as certain rights of minorities are
concerned, yet, Article 29 of the Constitution does not, in any
way, impose a limit on the kind or character of education which a
minority may choose to impart through its Institution to the children
of its own members or to those of others who may choose to send
E their children to its schools. In other words, it has a right to impart
a general secular education. I would, however, like to point out
that, as rights and duties are correlative, it follows, from the extent
of this wider right of a minority under Article 30(1) to impart even
general or non-denominational secular education to those who
F may not follow its culture or subscribe to its beliefs, that, when a
minority Institution decides to enter this wider educational sphere
of national education, it, by reason of this free choice itself, could
be deemed to opt to adhere to the needs of the general pattern of
such education in the country, at least whenever that choice is
made in accordance with statutory provisions. Its choice to impart
G an education intended to give a secular orientation or character to
its education necessarily entails its assent to the imperative needs
of the choice made by the State about the kind of “secular”
education which promotes national integration or the elevating
objectives set out in the preamble to our Constitution, and the best
H way of giving it. If it is part of a minority’s rights to make such a
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 549
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

choice, it should also be part of its obligations, which necessarily A
follow from the choice to adhere to the general pattern. The logical
basis of such a choice is that the particular minority Institution,
which chooses to impart such general secular education, prefers
that higher range of freedom where, according to the poet
Rabindranath Tagore, “the narrow domestic walls” which
B
constitute barriers between various sections of the nation will
crumble and fall. It may refuse to accept the choice made by the
State of the kind of secular education the State wants or of the
way in which it should be given. But, in that event, should it not be
prepared to forego the benefits of recognition by the State? The
State is bound to permit and protect the choice of the minority C
Institution, whatever that might be. But, can it be compelled to
give it a treatment different from that given to other Institutions
making such a choice?
221. Evidently, what was meant was that the right to exclusive
management of the institution is separable from the right to D
determine the character of education and its standards. This may
explain why “standards” of education were spoken as “not part
of management” at all. It meant that the right to manage, having
been conferred in absolute terms, could not be interfered with at
all although the object of that management could be determined
by a general pattern to be laid down by the State, which could E
prescribe the syllabi and standards of education. Speaking for
myself, I find it very difficult to separate the objects and standards
of teaching from a right to determine who should teach and what
their qualifications should be. Moreover, if the “standards of
education” are not part of management, it is difficult to see how F
they are exceptions to the principle of freedom of management
from control. Again, if what is aimed at directly is to be distinguished
from an indirect effect of it, the security of tenure of teachers and
provisions intended to ensure fair and equitable treatment for them
by the management of an institution would also not be directly
aimed at interference with its management. They could more G
properly be viewed as designed to improve and ensure the
excellence of teachers available at the institution, and, therefore,
to raise the general standard of education. I think that it is enough
for us to distinguish this case on the ground that the provisions to
be interpreted by us are different, although, speaking for myself, I H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A feel bound to say, with great respect, that I am unable to accept
every proposition found stated there as correct. In that case, the
provisions of the Kerala University Act 9 of 1969, considered
there were inescapable for the minority institutions which claimed
the right to be free from their operation. As I have already
observed, in the case before us, Section 38-B of the Act provides
B
the petitioning College before us with a practically certain mode
of escape from the compulsiveness of provisions other than
Sections 5, 40, and 41 of the Act if claims made on its behalf are
correct.
232. Even if Article 30(1) of the Constitution is held to confer
C absolute and unfettered rights of management upon minority
institutions, subject only to absolutely minimal and negative controls
in the interests of health and law and order, it could not be meant
to exclude a greater degree of regulation and control when a
minority institution enters the wider sphere of general secular and
D non-denominational education, largely employs teachers who are
not members of the particular minority concerned, and when it
derives large parts of its income from the fees paid by those who
are not members of the particular minority in question. Such greater
degree of control could be justified by the need to secure the
interests of those who are affected by the management of the
E minority institution and the education it imparts but who are not
members of the minority in management. In other words, the
degree of reasonably permissible control must vary from situation
to situation. For the reasons already given above, I think that,
apart from Sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act, which directly and
F unreasonably impinge upon the rights of the petitioning minority
managed college, protected by Article 30(1) of the Constitution, I
do not think that the other provisions have that effect. On the
situation under consideration before us, the minority institution
affected by the enactment has, upon the claims put forward on its
behalf, a means of escape from the impugned provisions other
G than Sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act by resorting to Section 38B
of the Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. In The Gandhi Faiz-e-am College, Shahjahanpur v.
H University of Agra and Anr., (1975) 2 SCC 283, the Court considered
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 551
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

whether statute framed by University of Agra infringed fundamental A
rights of the minority community and observed thus:
“16. The discussion throws us back to a closer study of Statute
14-A to see if it cuts into the flesh of the management’s right or
merely tones up its health and habits. The two requirements the
University asks for are that the managing body (whatever its name) B
must take in (a) the Principal of the College; (b) its seniormost
teacher. Is this desideratum dismissible as biting into the autonomy
of management or tenable as ensuring the excellence of the
institution without injuring the essence of the right? On a careful
reflection and conscious of the constitutional dilemma, we are
inclined to the view that this case falls on the valid side of the C
delicate line. Regulation which restricts is bad, but regulation which
facilitates is good. Where does this fine distinction lie? No rigid
formula is possible, but a flexible test is feasible. Where the object
and effect is to improve the tone and temper of the administration
without forcing on it a stranger, however superb his virtues be, D
where the directive is not to restructure the governing body but to
better its performance by a marginal catalytic induction, where
no external authority’s fiat or approval or outside nominee is made
compulsory to validate the Management Board but inclusion of
an internal key functionary appointed by the autonomous
management alone is asked for, the provision is salutary and saved, E
being not a diktat eroding the freedom of the freedom.”
(emphasis supplied)
The majority negated the challenge. It was held that regulation
which restricts is bad, but provision which facilitates is good. F
24. In Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Association
v. Union of India and others, (1986) 4 SCC 707, question arose whether
teachers and other employees working in an unaided school were entitled
to same pay-scale, allowances, and benefits. The Court allowed the
petition and opined thus: G
“16. The excellence of the instruction provided by an institution
would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and
in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contentment of
the teachers. Conditions of service pertaining to minimum
qualifications of teachers, their salaries, allowances and other
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A conditions of service which ensure security, contentment and
decent living standards to teachers and which will consequently
enable them to render better service to the institution and the
pupils cannot surely be said to be violative of the fundamental
right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The
management of a minority Educational Institution cannot be
B
permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by
Article 30(1) of the Constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees
any more than any other private employee. Oppression or
exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is
bound to lead, inevitably, to discontent and deterioration of the
C standard of instruction imparted in the institution affecting adversely
the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education
for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The
management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion
of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies
the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object
D
of Article 30(1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle
of education.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In Bihar State Madarasa Education Board, Patna v.
E MadarasaHanfia Arabic College, Jamalia and others, (1990) 1 SCC
428, the Court held that minorities have the right to establish and administer
educational institution of their own choice. Still, they have no right to
maladminister, and the State has the power to regulate the management
and administration of such institutions in the interest of educational need
and discipline of the institution. The Court held thus:
F
“6. The question which arises for consideration is whether Section
7(2)(n) which confers power on the Board to dissolve the
Managing Committee of an aided and recognised Madarasa
institution violates the minorities constitutional right to administer
its educational institution according to their choice. This Court
G has all along held that though the minorities have right to establish
and administer educational institution of their own choice but they
have no right to maladminister and the State has power to regulate
management and administration of such institutions in the interest
of educational need and discipline of the institution. Such regulation
H may have indirect effect on the absolute right of minorities but
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 553
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

that would not violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution as it is the A
duty of the State to ensure efficiency in educational institutions.
The State has, however, no power to completely take over the
management of a minority institution. Under the guise of regulating
the educational standards to secure efficiency in institution, the
State is not entitled to frame rules or regulations compelling the
B
management to surrender its right of administration. In State of
Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, (1970) 2 SCC 417, Section
63(1) of the Kerala University Act, 1969 which conferred power
on the government to take over the management of a minority
institution on its default in carrying out the directions of the State
Government was declared ultra vires on the ground that the C
provisions interfered with the constitutional right of a minority to
administer its institution. Minority institutions cannot be allowed
to fall below the standard of excellence on the pretext of their
exclusive right of management but at the same time their
constitutional right to administer their institutions cannot be
D
completely taken away by superseding or dissolving Managing
Committee or by appointing ad hoc committees in place thereof.
In the instant case Section 7(2)(n) is clearly violative of
constitutional right of minorities under Article 30(1) of the
Constitution insofar as it provides for dissolution of Managing
Committee of a Madarasa. We agree with the view taken by the E
High Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. In St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1
SCC 558, concerning admission process adopted by aided minority
institutions, various questions were raised thus: F

“41. It was contended that St. Stephen’s College after being
affiliated to the Delhi University has lost its minority character.
The argument was based on some of the provisions in the Delhi
University Act and the Ordinances made thereunder. It was said
that the students are admitted to the University and not to the G
College as such. But we find no substance in the contention. In
the first place, it may be stated that the State or any instrumentality
of the State cannot deprive the character of the institution, founded
by a minority community by compulsory affiliation since Article
30(1) is a special right to minorities to establish educational H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A institutions of their choice. The minority institution has a distinct
identity and the right to administer with continuance of such identity
cannot be denied by coercive action. Any such coercive action
would be void being contrary to the constitutional guarantee. The
right to administer is the right to conduct and manage the affairs
of the institution. This right is exercised by a body of persons in
B
whom the founders have faith and confidence. Such a
management body of the institution cannot be displaced or
reorganised if the right is to be recognised and maintained.
Reasonable regulations however, are permissible but regulations
should be of regulatory nature and not of abridgment of the right
C guaranteed under Article 30(1).
60.The right to select students for admission is a part of
administration. It is indeed an important facet of administration.
This power also could be regulated but the regulation must be
reasonable just like any other regulation. It should be conducive
D to the welfare of the minority institution or for the betterment of
those who resort to it. The Bombay Government order which
prevented the schools using English as the medium of instruction
from admitting students who have a mother tongue other than
English was held to be invalid since it restricted the admission
pattern of the schools [State of Bombay v. Bombay Education
E Society,(1955) 1 SCR 568]. The Gujarat Government direction to
the minority run college to reserve 80 per cent of seats for
government selected candidates with a threat to withdraw the
grant-in-aid and recognition was struck down as infringing the
fundamental right guaranteed to minorities under Article 30(1) of
F the Constitution [Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay, (1963)
3 SCR 837]. In Rt. Rev. Magr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala,
(1979) 1 SCC 23, the denial of permission to the management of
a minority school to admit girl students was held to be bad. The
Regional Deputy Director in that case refused to give sanction
for admission of girl students on two grounds: (i) that the school
G was not opened as a mixed school and that the school has been
run purely as a boys school for 25 years; and (ii) that there was
facility for the education of girls of the locality in a nearby girls
school which was established by the Muslims and was also a
minority institution. This Court noted that the Christian community
H in the locality wanted their girls also to receive education in the
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 555
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

school maintained specially by their own community. They did not A
think it in their interest to send their children to the Muslim girls
school run by the other minority community. The withholding of
permission for admission of girl students in the boys minority school
was violative of Article 30(1). It was also observed that the rule
sanctioning such refusal of permission crosses the barrier of
B
regulatory measures and comes in the region of interference with
the administration of the institution, a right which is guaranteed to
the minority under Article 30(1). The Court restricted the operation
of the rule and made it inapplicable to the minority educational
institution. In Director of School Education, Government of
T.N. v. Rev. Brother G. Arogiasamy,AIR 1971 Mad 440, the C
Madras High Court had an occasion to consider the validity of an
uniform procedure prescribed by the State Government for
admission of candidates to the aided training schools. The
government directed that the candidates should be selected by
the school authorities by interviewing every candidate eligible for
D
admission and assessing and awarding marks in the interview.
The marks awarded to each candidate in the interview will be
added to the marks secured by the candidate in the SSLC public
examination. On the basis of the aggregate of marks in the SSLC
examination and those obtained at the interview the selection was
to be made without any further discretion. The High Court held E
that the method of selection placed serious restrictions on the
freedom of the minority institution to admit their own students. It
was found that the students of the minority community could not
compete with the students belonging to other communities. The
applications of students from other communities could not be
F
restricted under law. The result was that the students of minority
community for whose benefit the institution was founded, had
little chance of getting admission. The High Court held that the
government order prescribing the uniform method of selection
could not be applied to minority institutions.
78. Having set the scene, we can deal with the provisions of G
Articles 29(1) and 30(1) relatively quickly. Under Article 29(1)
every section of the citizens having a distinct language, script or
culture of its own has the right to conserve the same. Under Article
29(1), the minorities — religious or linguistic — are entitled to
establish and administer educational institutions to conserve their H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A distinct language, script or culture. However, it has been consistently
held by the courts that the right to establish an educational institution
is not confined to purposes of conservation of language, script or
culture. The rights in Article 30(1) are of wider amplitude. The
width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut down by the considerations
on which Article 29(1) is based. The words “of their choice” in
B
Article 30(1) leave vast options to the minorities in selecting the
type of educational institutions which they wish to establish. They
can establish institutions to conserve their distinct language, script
or culture or for imparting general secular education or for both
the purposes. (See: Father W. Proost v. State of Bihar, (1969) 2
C SCR 73,Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat,
(1974) 1 SCC 717; and Kerala Education Bill case, 1959 SCR
995.)”
(emphasis supplied)
The decision in St. Stephen’s College (supra) has been analysed
D by my esteemed brother Lalit, J. in Sk. Md. Rafique v. Managing
Committee, ContaiRahamania High Madrasah and Ors., 2020 (1)
SCALE 345, thus:
“28. In St. Stephen’s College vs. University of Delhi, (1992) 1
SCC 558 a Bench of five Judges of this Court had an occasion to
E consider the admission process adopted by two aided minority
institutions viz. St. Stephen’s College at Delhi and Allahabad
Agricultural Institute at Naini. The factual context as summed-up
in the majority judgment authored by Shetty, J., was as under:
“68. It is not in dispute that St. Stephen’s College and Allahabad
F Agricultural Institute are receiving grant-in-aid from the
government. St. Stephen’s College gives preference to Christian
students. The Allahabad Agricultural Institute reserves 50 per
cent of the seats for Christian students. The Christian
students admitted by preference or against the quota reserved
G are having less merit in the qualifying examination than the
other candidates. The other candidates with more merit are
denied admission on the ground that they are not Christians.
69. It was argued for the University and the Students Union
that since both the institutions are receiving State aid, the
institutional preference for admission based on religion is
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 557
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

violative of Article 29(2) of the Constitution. The institutions A
shall not prefer or deny admission to candidates on ground of
religion. For institutions, on the other hand, it was claimed that
any preference given to the religious minority candidates in
their own institutions cannot be a discrimination falling under
Article 29(2). The institutions are established for the benefit
B
of their community and if they are prevented from admitting
their community candidates, the purpose of establishing the
institutions would be defeated. The minorities are entitled to
admit their candidates by preference or by reservation. They
are also entitled to admit them to the exclusion of all others
and that right flows from the right to establish and administer C
educational institutions guaranteed under Article 30(1).”
28.1. The majority judgment dealt with the submissions raised by
the institution as under:
“80. Equally, it would be difficult to accept the
second submission that the minorities are entitled to D
establish and administer educational institutions for their
exclusive benefit. The choice of institution provided in
Article 30(1) does not mean that the minorities could establish
educational institution for the benefit of their own community
people. Indeed, they cannot. It was pointed out in Re, Kerala E
Education Bill that the minorities cannot establish educational
institution only for the benefit of their community. If such was
the aim, Article 30(1) would have been differently worded and
it would have contained the words “for their own community”.
In the absence of such words it is legally impermissible to
construe the article as conferring the right on the minorities to F
establish educational institution for their own benefit.
81. Even in practice, such claims are likely to be met with
considerable hostility. It may not be conducive to have a
relatively homogeneous society. It may lead to religious bigotry
which is the bane of mankind. In the nation building with secular G
character sectarian schools or colleges, segregated faculties
or universities for imparting general secular education are
undesirable and they may undermine secular democracy. They
would be inconsistent with the central concept of secularism
and equality embedded in the Constitution. Every educational H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A institution irrespective of community to which it belongs is a
‘melting pot’ in our national life. The students and teachers are
the critical ingredients. It is there they develop respect for, and
tolerance of, the cultures and beliefs of others. It is essential
therefore, that there should be proper mix of students of
different communities in all educational institutions.”
B
***
28.3. The majority Judgment, then, considered the matter from
the perspective of “Rights of Minorities and Balancing Interest” and
observed:
C “101. Laws carving out the rights of minorities in
Article 30(1) however, must not be arbitrary, invidious or
unjustified; they must have a reasonable relation between the aim
and the means employed. The individual rights will necessarily
have to be balanced with competing minority interests. In
D Sidhajbhai case (1963) 3 SCR 837 the government order
directing the minority run college to reserve 80 per cent of seats
for government nominees and permitting only 20 per cent of seats
for the management with a threat to withhold the grant-in-aid
and recognition was struck down by the Court as infringing the
fundamental freedom guaranteed by Article 30(1). Attention may
E also be drawn to Article 337 of the Constitution which provided a
special concession to Anglo-Indian community for ten years from
the commencement of the Constitution. Unlike Article 30(2) it
conferred a positive right on the Anglo-Indian community to get
grants from the government for their educational institutions,
F but subject to the condition that at least 40 per cent of annual
admission were made available to members of other communities.
102. In the light of all these principles and factors, and in view of
the importance which the Constitution attaches to protective
measures to minorities under Article 30(1), the minority aided
G educational institutions are entitled to prefer their community
candidates to maintain the minority character of the institutions
subject of course to conformity with the University standard. The
State may regulate the intake in this category with due regard to
the need of the community in the area which the institution is
intended to serve. But in no case such intake shall exceed 50 per
H cent of the annual admission. The minority institutions shall make
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 559
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

available at least 50 per cent of the annual admission to members A
of communities other than the minority community. The admission
of other community candidates shall be done purely on the basis
of merit.”
28.4. It was also observed that regulations which serve the interest
of students and teachers and preserve the uniformity in standards of B
education amongst the affiliated institutions could validly be made. The
relevant discussion in para 59 was as under:
“59. The need for a detailed study on this aspect is indeed not
necessary. The right to minorities whether religious or linguistic, to
administer educational institutions and the power of the State C
to regulate academic matters and management is now fairly well
settled. The right to administer does not include the right to
maladminister. The State being the controlling authority has right
and duty to regulate all academic matters. Regulations which will
serve the interests of students and teachers, and to preserve the
uniformity in standards of education among the affiliated institutions D
could be made. The minority institutions cannot claim
immunity against such general pattern and standard or against
general laws such as laws relating to law and order, health,
hygiene, labour relations, social welfare legislations, contracts, torts
etc. which are applicable to all communities. So long as the basic E
right of minorities to manage educational institution is not taken
away, the State is competent to make regulatory legislation.
Regulations, however, shall not have the effect of depriving the
right of minorities to educate their children in their own institution.
That is a privilege which is implied in the right conferred by
Article 30(1).” F

28.5. The dissenting opinion of Kasliwal, J. quoted a passage
from the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) touching upon the matter
in issue as under:-
“137. These were Articles 23(1) on the one hand and 23(3)(a) G
and 23(3)(b) on the other hand in the Draft Constitution. Firstly,
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said in relation to draft Article 23(2)
corresponding to the present Article 28 of the Constitution that
even in relation to Articles 30 and 29 the State was completely
free to give or not to give aid to the educational institutions of the
religious or linguistic minorities. He said: H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A “Now, with regard to the second clause I think it has not been
sufficiently well understood. We have tried to reconcile the
claim of a community which has started educational institutions
for the advancement of its own children either in education or
in cultural matters, to permit to give religious instruction in such
institutions; notwithstanding the fact that it receives certain aid
B
from the State. The State, of course, is free to give aid, is free
not to give aid; the only limitation we have placed is this, that
the State shall not debar the institution from claiming aid under
its grant-in-aid code merely on the ground that it is run and
maintained by a community and not maintained by a public
C body. We have there provided also a further qualification, that
while it is free to give religious instruction in the institution and
the grant made by the State shall not be a bar to the giving of
such instruction, it shall not give instruction to, or make it
compulsory upon, the children belonging to other communities
unless and until they obtain the consent of the parents of
D
these children. That, I think, is a salutary provision. It performs
two functions...
Shri H.V. Kamath: On a point of clarification what about
institutions and schools run by a community or a minority for
its own pupils — not a school where all communities are mixed
E but a school run by the community for its own pupils?
The Hon’ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: If my friend, Mr. Kamath
will read the other article he will see that once an institution,
whether maintained by the community or not, gets a grant, the
condition is that it shall keep the school open to all communities.
F That provision he has not read.”
138. He reaffirmed the freedom of the State to give or not to
give aid to these schools when directly referring
to draft Article 23 which is the precursor of the present
Articles 29 and 30 as follows (VII CAD 923):
G
“I think another thing which has to be borne in reading
Article 23 is that it does not impose any obligation or burden
upon the State. It does not say that, when for instance the
Madras people come to Bombay, the Bombay Government
shall be required by law to finance any project of giving
H education either in Tamil language or in Andhra language
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 561
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

or any other language. There is no burden cast upon the A
State. The only limitation that is imposed by Article 23 is
that if there is a cultural minority which wants to preserve
its language, its script and its culture, the State shall not by
law impose upon it any other culture which may be either
local or otherwise.”
B
And, went on to observe that once an institution was receiving
aid, “it must abide by the rigor of Article 29(2) in the matter of
admission of students in the college” and “as already held by
me, St. Stephen’s College and Allahabad Agricultural Institute
are not entitled to claim any preferential right or reservation in
favour of students of Christian community as they are getting C
grant-in-aid and as such I do not consider it necessary to labour
any more on the question of deciding as to what percentage
can be considered as reasonable.”
(emphasis supplied)
D
The Court held that the choice of institution does not mean that
the minorities could establish educational institution for the benefit of
their own community people. In ReTheKerala Education Bill (supra),
it was considered and observed that the minorities cannot establish
educational institution only for the benefit of their community. Every
educational institution, irrespective of community to which it belongs, is E
a ‘melting pot’ in our national life and that there should be mixing up of
students of different communities in all educational institutions. The intake
for the community cannot exceed 50% of the annual admission, which is
to be provided to other than the minority community. The admission
should be made purely on the basis of merit. F
27. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), decided by Bench of 11
Judges of the Court,on consideration of the rights under Article 30 of the
Constitution of India, held thus:
“3. The hearing of these cases has had a chequered history. Writ
Petition No. 350 of 1993 filed by the Islamic Academy of Education G
and connected petitions were placed before a Bench of five Judges.
As the Bench was prima facie of the opinion that Article 30 did
not clothe a minority educational institution with the power to adopt
its own method of selection and the correctness of the decision
of this Court in St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi,
H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (1992) 1 SCC 558, was doubted, it was directed that the questions
that arose should be authoritatively answered by a larger Bench.
These cases were then placed before a Bench of seven Judges.
The questions framed were recast and on 6-2-1997, the Court
directed that the matter be placed before a Bench of at least
eleven Judges, as it was felt that in view of the Forty-second
B
Amendment to the Constitution, whereby “education” had been
included in Entry 25 of List III of Seventh Schedule, the question of
who would be regarded as a ”minority” was required to be
considered because the earlier case-law related to the pre-
amendment era, when education was only in the State List. When
C the cases came up for hearing before an eleven-Judge Bench,
during the course of hearing on 19-3-1997, the following order
was passed:
“Since a doubt has arisen during the course of our arguments
as to whether this Bench would feel itself bound by
D the ratio propounded in —Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In
Re, AIR 1958 SC 956 and Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College
Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717it is clarified
that this sized Bench would not feel itself inhibited by the views
expressed in those cases since the present endeavour is to
discern the true scope and interpretation of Article 30(1) of
E the Constitution, which being the dominant question would
require examination in its pristine purity. The factum is
recorded.””
38. The scheme in Unni Krishnan case, (1993) 1 SCC 645 has
the effect of nationalizing education in respect of important features
F viz. the right of a private unaided institution to give admission and
to fix the fee. By framing this scheme, which has led to the State
Governments legislating in conformity with the scheme, the private
institutions are indistinguishable from the government institutions;
curtailing all the essential features of the right of administration of
G a private unaided educational institution can neither be called fair
nor reasonable. Even in the decision in Unni Krishnan case it
has been observed by Jeevan Reddy, J., at p. 749, para 194, as
follows:
“194. The hard reality that emerges is that private educational
H institutions are a necessity in the present-day context. It is not
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 563
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

possible to do without them because the governments are in A
no position to meet the demand — particularly in the sector of
medical and technical education which call for substantial
outlays. While education is one of the most important functions
of the Indian State it has no monopoly therein. Private
educational institutions — including minority educational
B
institutions — too have a role to play.”
40. Any system of student selection would be unreasonable if it
deprives the private unaided institution of the right of rational
selection, which it devised for itself, subject to the minimum
qualification that may be prescribed and to some system of
computing the equivalence between different kinds of qualifications, C
like a common entrance test. Such a system of selection can involve
both written and oral tests for selection, based on principle of
fairness.
45. In view of the discussion hereinabove, we hold that the decision
in Unni Krishnan case, (1993) 1 SCC 645 insofar as it framed D
the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing of the
fee, was not correct, and to that extent, the said decision and the
consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE, the Medical Council
of India, the Central and State Governments etc. are overruled.
50.The right to establish and administer broadly comprises the E
following rights:
(a) to admit students;
(b) to set up a reasonable fee structure;
(c) to constitute a governing body; F
(d) to appoint staff (teaching and non-teaching); and
(e) to take action if there is dereliction of duty on the part of
any employees.
53. With regard to the core components of the rights under Articles G
19 and 26(a), it must be held that while the State has the right to
prescribe qualifications necessary for admission, private unaided
colleges have the right to admit students of their choice, subject to
an objective and rational procedure of selection and the compliance
with conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A of students belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting
them freeships or scholarships, if not granted by the Government.
Furthermore, in setting up a reasonable fee structure, the element
of profiteering is not as yet accepted in Indian conditions. The fee
structure must take into consideration the need to generate funds
to be utilized for the betterment and growth of the educational
B
institution, the betterment of education in that institution and to
provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. In any
event, a private institution will have the right to constitute its own
governing body, for which qualifications may be prescribed by the
State or the university concerned. It will, however, be objectionable
C if the State retains the power to nominate specific individuals on
governing bodies. Nomination by the State, which could be on a
political basis, will be an inhibiting factor for private enterprise to
embark upon the occupation of establishing and administering
educational institutions. For the same reasons, nomination of
teachers either directly by the department or through a service
D
commission will be an unreasonable inroad and an unreasonable
restriction on the autonomy of the private unaided educational
institution.
68. It would be unfair to apply the same rules and regulations
regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional
E institutions. It must be borne in mind that unaided professional
institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration while,
at the same time, they do not forego or discard the principle of
merit. It would, therefore, be permissible for the university or the
Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private
F unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection while, at
the same time, giving the management sufficient discretion in
admitting students. This can be done through various methods.
For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be reserved
for admission by the management out of those students who have
passed the common entrance test held by itself or by the State/
G university and have applied to the college concerned for admission,
while the rest of the seats may be filled up on the basis of
counselling by the State agency. This will incidentally take care of
poorer and backward sections of the society. The prescription of
percentage for this purpose has to be done by the Government
H according to the local needs and different percentages can be
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 565
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

fixed for minority unaided and non-minority unaided and A
professional colleges. The same principles may be applied to other
non-professional but unaided educational institutions viz. graduation
and postgraduation non-professional colleges or institutes.
71. While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be
permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by rules or B
regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be
granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with
the reservation policy of the State. The merit may be determined
either through a common entrance test conducted by the university
or the Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an
entrance test conducted by individual institutions — the method C
to be followed is for the university or the Government to decide.
The authority may also devise other means to ensure that admission
is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit.
In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the
Government or the university to provide that consideration should D
be shown to the weaker sections of the society.
90. In the exercise of this right to conserve the language, script or
culture, that section of the society can set up educational institutions.
The right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its
choice is a necessary concomitant to the right conferred by E
Article 30. The right under Article 30 is not absolute.
Article 29(2) provides that, where any educational institution is
maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds, no
citizen shall be denied admission on the grounds only of religion,
race, caste, language or any of them. The use of the expression
“any educational institution” in Article 29(2) would (sic not) refer F
to any educational institution established by anyone, but which is
maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds. In
other words, on a plain reading, State-maintained or aided
educational institutions, whether established by the Government
or the majority or a minority community cannot deny admission to G
a citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or language.
93. Can Article 30(1) be so read as to mean that it contains
an absolute right of the minorities, whether based on religion or
language, to establish and administer educational institutions in any
manner they desire, and without being obliged to comply with H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A the provisions of any law? Does Article 30(1) give the religious
or linguistic minorities a right toestablish an educational institution
that propagates religious or racial bigotry or ill will amongst the
people? Can the right under Article 30(1) be so exercised that it
is opposed to public morality or health? In the exercise of its right,
would the minority while establishing educational institutions not
B
be bound by town planning rules and regulations? Can
they construct and maintain buildings in any manner they desire
without complying with the provisions of the building bye-laws or
health regulations?
105. In Rev. SidhajbhaiSabhai v. State of Bombay, (1963) 3
C SCR 837, this Court had to consider the validity of an order issued
by the Government of Bombay whereby from the academic year
1955-56, 80% of the seats in the training colleges for teachers in
non-government training colleges were to be reserved for the
teachers nominated by the Government. The petitioners, who
D belonged to the minority community, were, inter alia, running a
training college for teachers, as also primary schools. The said
primary schools and college were conducted for the benefit of
the religious denomination of the United Church of Northern India
and Indian Christians generally, though admission was not denied
to students belonging to other communities. The petitioners
E challenged the government order requiring 80% of the seats to
be filled by nominees of the Government, inter alia, on the ground
that the petitioners were members of a religious denomination and
that they constituted a religious minority, and that the educational
institutions had been established primarily for the benefit of the
F Christian community. It was the case of the petitioners that the
decision of the Government violated their fundamental rights
guaranteed by Articles 30(1), 26(a), (b), (c) and (d), and 19(1)(f)
and (g). While interpreting Article 30, it was observed by this
Court at SCR pp. 849-50 as under:
G “All minorities, linguistic or religious have by Article 30(1)
an absolute right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice; and any law or executive direction
which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under
Article 30(1) would to that extent be void. This, however, is
not to say that it is not open to the State to impose regulations
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 567
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

upon the exercise of this right. The fundamental freedom is to A
establish and to administer educational institutions: it is a right to
establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions,
institutions which cater to the educational needs of the citizens,
or sections thereof. Regulation made in the true interests of
efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality,
B
public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such
Regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right
which is guaranteed: they secure the proper functioning of the
institution, in matters educational.”
106. While coming to the conclusion that the right of the private
training colleges to admit students of their choice was severely C
restricted, this Court referred to the opinion in Kerala Education
Bill, 1957 case, 1959 SCR 995, but distinguished it by observing
that the Court did not, in that case, lay down any test
of reasonableness of the regulation. No general principle on which
the reasonableness of a regulation may be tested was sought to D
be laid down in Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case, 1959 SCR
995 and, therefore, it was held in SidhajbhaiSabhai case, (1963)
3 SCR 837 that the opinion in that case was not an authority for
the proposition that all regulative measures, which were not
destructive or annihilative of the character of the institution
established by the minority, provided the regulations were in the E
national or public interest, were valid. In this connection it was
further held at SCR pp. 856-57, as follows:
“The right established by Article 30(1) is a fundamental
right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, it is not subject F
to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for
the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of
educational institutions of their own choice. The right is intended
to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called
regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority G
educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole.
If every order which while maintaining the formal character
of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is
held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest,
though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A guaranteed by Article 30(1) will be but a ‘teasing illusion’,
a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be
imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition
of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making
the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution
effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must
B
satisfy a dual test — the test of reasonableness, and the test
that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution
and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle
of education for the minority community or other persons who
resort to it.”
C 107. The aforesaid decision does indicate that the right under
Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from
making any regulation whatsoever. As already noted hereinabove,
in SidhajbhaiSabhai case, (1963) 3 SCR 837, it was laid down
that regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction,
D discipline, health, sanitation, morality and public order could be
imposed. If this is so, it is difficult to appreciate how the
Government can be prevented from framing regulations that are
in the national interest, as it seems to be indicated in the passage
quoted hereinabove. Any regulation framed in the national interest
must necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether run
E by the majority or the minority. Such a limitation must necessarily
be read into Article 30. The right under Article 30(1) cannot be
such as to override the national interest or to prevent the
Government from framing regulations in that behalf. It is, of course,
true that government regulations cannot destroy the minority
F character of the institution or make the right to establish and
administer a mere illusion; but the right under Article 30 is not so
absolute as to be above the law. It will further be seen that
in SidhajbhaiSabhai case, (1963) 3 SCR 837, no reference was
made to Article 29(2) of the Constitution. This decision, therefore,
cannot be an authority for the proposition canvassed before us.
G
119. In a concurrent judgment, while noting (at SCC p. 770, para
73) that ”clause (2) of Article 29 forbids the denial of admission
to citizens into any educational institution maintained by the State
or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, language or any of them”, Khanna, J. then examined
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 569
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Article 30, and observed at SCR p. 222, as follows: (SCC p. 770, A
para 74)
“74. Clause (1) of Article 30 gives right to all minorities,
whether based on religion or language, to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice. Analysing
that clause it would follow that the right which has been B
conferred by the clause is on two types of minorities. Those
minorities may be based either on religion or on language. The
right conferred upon the said minorities is to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice. The word
‘establish’ indicates the right to bring into existence, while the
right to administer an institution means the right to effectively C
manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. Administration
connotes management of the affairs of the institution. The
management must be free of control so that the founders or
their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit and in
accordance with their ideas of how the interest of the D
community in general and the institution in particular will be
best served. The words ‘of their choice’ qualify the educational
institutions and show that the educational institutions established
and administered by the minorities need not be of some particular
class; the minorities have the right and freedom to establish and
administer such educational institutions as they choose. Clause E
(2) of Article 30 prevents the State from making discrimination
in the matter of grant of aid to any educational institution on
the ground that the institution is under the management of a
minority, whether based on religion or language.”
120. Explaining the rationale behind Article 30, it was observed F
at SCR p. 224, as follows: (SCC p. 772, para 77)
“77. The idea of giving some special rights to the minorities is
not to have a kind of a privileged or pampered section of the
population but to give to the minorities a sense of security and
a feeling of confidence. The great leaders of India since time G
immemorial had preached the doctrine of tolerance and
catholicity of outlook. Those noble ideas were enshrined in the
Constitution. Special rights for minorities were designed not to
create inequality. Their real effect was to bring about equality
by ensuring the preservation of the minority institutions and by H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A guaranteeing to the minorities autonomy in the matter of the
administration of those institutions. The differential treatment
for the minorities by giving them special rights is intended to
bring about an equilibrium, so that the ideal of equality may not
be reduced to a mere abstract idea but should become a living
reality and result in true, genuine equality, an equality not merely
B
in theory but also in fact.”
121. While advocating that provisions of the Constitution should
be construed according to the liberal, generous and sympathetic
approach, and after considering the principles which could be
discerned by him from the earlier decisions of this Court, Khanna,
C J., observed at SCR p. 234, as follows: (SCC p. 781, para 89)
“The minorities are as much children of the soil as the majority
and the approach has been to ensure that nothing should be
done as might deprive the minorities of a sense of belonging,
of a feeling of security, of a consciousness of equality and of
D the awareness that the conservation of their religion, culture,
language and script as also the protection of their educational
institutions is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution.
The same generous, liberal and sympathetic approach should
weigh with the courts in construing Articles 29 and 30 as
E marked the deliberations of the Constitution-makers in drafting
those articles and making them part of the fundamental rights.
The safeguarding of the interest of the minorities amongst
sections of population is as important as the protection of the
interest amongst individuals of persons who are below the age
of majority or are otherwise suffering from some kind
F of infirmity. The Constitution and the laws made by civilized
nations, therefore, generally contain provisions for the
protection of those interests. It can, indeed, be said to be an
index of the level of civilization and catholicity of a nation as to
how far their minorities feel secure and are not subject to any
G discrimination or suppression.”
122. The learned Judge then observed that the right of the
minorities to administer educational institutions did not prevent the
making of reasonable regulations in respect of these institutions.
Recognizing that the right to administer educational institutions
H could not include the right to maladminister, it was held that
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 571
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

regulations could be lawfully imposed, for the receiving of grants A
and recognition, while permitting the institution to retain its
character as a minority institution. The regulation ”must satisfy a
dual test — the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is
regulative of the educational character of the institution and is
conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education
B
for the minority community or other persons who resort to it”.
(SCC p. 783, para 92) It was permissible for the authorities to
prescribe regulations, which must be complied with, before a
minority institution could seek or retain affiliation and recognition.
But it was also stated that the regulations made by the authority
should not impinge upon the minority character of the C
institution. Therefore, a balance has to be kept between the two
objectives — that of ensuring the standard of excellence of the
institution, and that of preserving the right of the minorities to
establish and administer their educational institutions. Regulations
that embraced and reconciled the two objectives could be
D
considered to be reasonable. This, in our view, is the correct
approach to the problem.
123. After referring to the earlier cases in relation to the
appointment of teachers, it was noted by Khanna, J., that the
conclusion which followed was that a law which interfered with a
minority’s choice of qualified teachers, or its disciplinary control E
over teachers and other members of the staff of the institution,
was void, as it was violative of Article 30(1). While it was
permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe
the qualifications of teachers, it was held that once the teachers
possessing the requisite qualifications were selected by the F
minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have
no right to veto the selection of those teachers. The selection and
appointment of teachers for an educational institution was regarded
as one of the essential ingredients under Article 30(1). The Court’s
attention was drawn to the fact that in Kerala Education Bill,
1957 case, 1959 SCR 995, this Court had opined that clauses 11 G
and 12 made it obligatory for all aided schools to select teachers
from a panel selected from each district by the Public
Service Commission and that no teacher of an aided school could
be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without the
previous sanction of the authorized officer. At SCR p.245, Khanna, H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A J., observed that in cases subsequent to the opinion in Kerala
Education Bill, 1957 case, (1959) SCR 995 this Court had held
similar provisions as clause 11 and clause 12 to be violative of
Article 30(1) of the minority institutions. He then observed as
follows: (SCC p. 792, para 109).
B “The opinion expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education
Bill, 1957, 1959 SCR 995, was of an advisory character and
though great weight should be attached to it because of its
persuasive value, the said opinion cannot override the opinion
subsequently expressed by this Court in contested cases. It is
the law declared by this Court in the subsequent contested
C cases which would have a binding effect. The words ‘as at
present advised’ as well as the preceding sentence indicate
that the view expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education
Bill, 1957 in this respect was hesitant and tentative and not a
final view in the matter.”
D 135. We agree with the contention of the learned Solicitor-
General that the Constitution in Part III does not contain or give
any absolute right. All rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution
are subject to at least other provisions of the said Part. It is difficult
to comprehend that the framers of the Constitution would have
E given such an absolute right to the religious or linguistic minorities,
which would enable them to establish and administer educational
institutions in a manner so as to be in conflict with the other Parts
of the Constitution. We find it difficult to accept that in the
establishment and administration of educational institutions by the
religious and linguistic minorities, no law of the land, even the
F Constitution, is to apply to them.
136. Decisions of this Court have held that the right to administer
does not include the right to maladminister. It has also been held
that the right to administer is not absolute, but must be subject to
reasonable regulations for the benefit of the institutions as the
G vehicle of education, consistent with national interest. General
laws of the land applicable to all persons have been held to be
applicable to the minority institutions also — for example, laws
relating to taxation, sanitation, social welfare, economic regulation,
public order and morality.
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 573
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

137. It follows from the aforesaid decisions that even though the A
words of Article 30(1) are unqualified, this Court has held that at
least certain other laws of the land pertaining to health, morality
and standards of education apply. The right under Article 30(1) has,
therefore, not been held to be absolute or above other provisions of
the law, and we reiterate the same. By the same analogy, there is
B
no reason why regulations or conditions concerning, generally,
the welfare of students and teachers should not be made applicable
in order to provide a proper academic atmosphere, as
such provisions do not in any way interfere with the right of
administration or management under Article 30(1).
138. As we look at it, Article 30(1) is a sort of guarantee or C
assurance to the linguistic and religious minority institutions of their
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their
choice. Secularism and equality being two of the basic features
of the Constitution, Article 30(1) ensures protection to the linguistic
and religious minorities, thereby preserving the secularism of the D
country. Furthermore, the principles of equality must necessarily
apply to the enjoyment of such rights. No law can be framed that
will discriminate against such minorities with regard to the
establishment and administration of educational institutions vis-a-
vis other educational institutions. Any law or rule or regulation
that would put the educational institutions run by the minorities at E
a disadvantage when compared to the institutions run by the others
will have to be struck down. At the same time, there also cannot
be any reverse discrimination. It was observed in St. Xavier’s
College case, (1975) 1 SCR173 at SCR p. 192 that: (SCC p. 743,
para 9) F
“The whole object of conferring the right on minorities under
Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between the
majority and the minority. If the minorities do not have such
special protection they will be denied equality.”
In other words, the essence of Article 30(1) is to ensure equal G
treatment between the majority and the minority institutions. No
one type or category of institution should be disfavoured or, for
that matter, receive more favourable treatment than another.Laws
of the land, including rules and regulations, must apply equally to
the majority institutions as well as to the minority institutions. The H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A minority institutions must be allowed to do what the non-minority
institutions are permitted to do.
139. Like any other private unaided institutions, similar unaided
educational institutions administered by linguistic or religious
minorities are assured maximum autonomy in relation thereto; e.g.
B method of recruitment of teachers, charging of fees and admission
of students. They will have to comply with the conditions
of recognition, which cannot be such as to whittle down the right
under Article 30.
144. It cannot be argued that no conditions can be imposed while
C giving aid to a minority institution. Whether it is an institution run
by the majority or the minority, all conditions that have relevance
to the proper utilization of the grant-in-aid by an educational
institution can be imposed. All that Article 30(2) states is that on
the ground that an institution is under the management of a minority,
whether based on religion or language, grant of aid to that
D educational institution cannot be discriminated against, if other
educational institutions are entitled to receive aid. The conditions
for grant or non-grant of aid to educational institutions have to be
uniformly applied, whether it is a majority-run institution or a
minority-run institution. As in the case of a majority-run institution,
E the moment a minority institution obtains a grant of aid, Article 28 of
the Constitution comes into play. When an educational institution
is maintained out of State funds, no religious instruction can be
provided therein. Article 28(1) does not state that it applies only
to educational institutions that are not established or maintained
by religious or linguistic minorities. Furthermore, upon
F the receipt ofaid, the provisions of Article 28(3) would apply to all
educational institutions whether run by the minorities or the non-
minorities. Article 28(3) is the right of a person studying in a State-
recognized institution or in an educational institution receiving aid
from State funds, not to take part in any religious instruction, if
G imparted by such institution, without his/her consent (or his/her
guardian’s consent if such a person is a minor). Just as
Articles 28(1) and (3) become applicable the moment any
educational institution takes aid, likewise, Article 29(2) would also
be attracted and become applicable to an educational institution
maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. It was
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 575
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

strenuously contended that the right to give admission is one of A
the essential ingredients of the right to administer conferred on
the religious or linguistic minority, and that this right should not be
curtailed in any manner. It is difficult to accept this contention. If
Articles 28(1) and (3) apply to a minority institution that receives
aid out of State funds, there is nothing in the language of
B
Article 30 that would make the provisions of Article 29(2)
inapplicable. Like Article 28(1) and Article 28(3), Article 29(2)
refers to ”any educational institution maintained by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds”. A minority institution would fall
within the ambit of Article 29(2) in the same manner in which
Article 28(1) and Article 28(3) would be applicable to an aided C
minority institution. It is true that one of the rights to administer an
educational institution is to grant admission to the students. As
long as an educational institution, whether belonging to the minority
or the majority community, does not receive aid, it would, in our
opinion, be its right and discretion to grant admission to such students
D
as it chooses or selects subject to what has been clarified before.
Out of the various rights that the minority institution has in the
administration of the institution, Article 29(2) curtails the right to
grant admission to a certain extent. By virtue of Article 29(2), no
citizen can be denied admission by an aided minority institution on
the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. E
It is no doubt true that Article 29(2) does curtail one of the powers
of the minority institution, but on receiving aid, some of the rights
that an unaided minority institution has, are also curtailed by
Articles 28(1) and 28(3). A minority educational institution has a
right to impart religious instruction — this right is taken away by
F
Article 28(1), if that minority institution is maintained wholly out
of State funds. Similarly on receiving aid out of State funds or on
being recognized by the State, the absolute right of a minority
institution requiring a student to attend religious instruction is
curtailed by Article 28(3). If the curtailment of the right to
administer a minority institution on receiving aid or being wholly G
maintained out of State funds as provided by Article 28 is valid,
there is no reason why Article 29(2) should not be held to be
applicable. There is nothing in the language of Articles 28(1) and
(3), Article 29(2) and Article 30 to suggest that, on receiving aid,
Articles 28(1) and (3) will apply, but Article 29(2) will
H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A not. Therefore, the contention that the institutions covered by
Article 30 are outside the injunction of Article 29(2) cannot be
accepted.
151. The right of the aided minority institution to preferably admit
students of its community, when Article 29(2) was applicable, has
B been clarified by this Court over a decade ago in St. Stephen’s
College case, (1992) 1 SCC 558. While upholding the procedure
for admitting students, this Court also held that aided minority
educational institutions were entitled to preferably admit their
community candidates so as to maintain the minority character of
the institution, and that the State may regulate the intake in this
C category with due regard to the area that the institution was
intended to serve, but that this intake should not be more than
50% in any case. Thus, St. Stephen’s endeavoured to strike a
balance between the two articles. Though we accept the ratio of St.
Stephen’s which has held the field for over a decade, we have
D compelling reservations in accepting the rigid percentage stipulated
therein. As Article 29 and Article 30 apply not only to institutions
of higher education but also to schools, a ceiling of 50% would not
be proper. It will be more appropriate that, depending upon the
level of the institution, whether it be a primary or secondary or
high school or a college, professional or otherwise, and on the
E population and educational needs of the area in which the institution
is to be located, the State properly balances the interests of all by
providing for such a percentage of students of the minority
community to be admitted, so as to adequately serve the interest
of the community for which the institution was established.
F 152. At the same time, the admissions to aided institutions, whether
awarded to minority or non-minority students, cannot be at the
absolute sweet will and pleasure of the management of minority
educational institutions. As the regulations to promote academic
excellence and standards do not encroach upon the guaranteed
G rights Under Article 30, the aided minority educational institutions
can be required to observe inter se merit amongst the eligible
minority applicants and passage of common entrance test by the
candidates, where there is one, with regard to admissions in
professional and non-professional colleges. If there is no such
test, a rational method of assessing comparative merit has to be
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 577
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

evolved. As regards the non-minority segment, admission may be A
on the basis of the common entrance test and counselling by a
State agency. In the courses for which such a test and counselling
are not in vogue, admission can be on the basis of relevant criteria
for the determination of merit. It would be open to the State
authorities to insist on allocating a certain percentage of seats to
B
those belonging to weaker sections of society, from amongst the
non-minority seats.
Answers to eleven questions
Q. 1. ***
A. *** C

Q. 2. ***
A. ***
Q. 3.(a) ***
D
A. ***
Q. 3. (b) To what extent can professional education be treated as
a matter coming under minorities’ rights under Article 30?
A. Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. E
The use of the words “of their choice” indicates that even
professional educational institutions would be covered by Article
30.
Q. 4. Whether the admission of students to minority educational
institution, whether aided or unaided, can be regulated by the State F
Government or by the university to which the institution is affiliated?
A. Admission of students to unaided minority educational
institutions viz. schools and undergraduate colleges where the
scope for merit-based selection is practically nil, cannot be
regulated by the State or university concerned, except for providing G
the qualifications and minimum conditions of eligibility in the interest
of academic standards.
The right to admit students being an essential facet of the
right to administer educational institutions of their choice, as
contemplated under Article 30 of the Constitution, the State
H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Government or the university may not be entitled to interfere with
that right, so long as the admission to the unaided educational
institutions is on a transparent basis and the merit is adequately
taken care of. The right to administer, not being absolute, there
could be regulatory measures for ensuring educational standards
and maintaining excellence thereof, and it is more so in the matter
B
of admissions to professional institutions.
…
Q.5. (a) Whether the minorities’s rights to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice will include the procedure
C and method of admission and selection of students?
A. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method
of admission as well as selection of students, but such a procedure
must be fair and transparent, and the selection of students in
professional and higher education colleges should be on the basis
D of merit. The procedure adopted or selection made should not be
tantamount to maladministration. Even an unaided minority
institution ought not to ignore the merit of the students for
admission, while exercising its right to admit students to the colleges
aforesaid, as in that event, the institution will fail to achieve
excellence.
E

Q.5.(b) ***
A. ***

F
Q.5. (c) Whether the statutory provisions which regulate the
facets of administration like control over educational agencies,
control over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including
recognition/withdrawal thereof, and appointment of staff,
employees, teachers and principals including their service conditions
G and regulation of fees, etc. would interfere with the right of
administration of minorities?
A. So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of
administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority
educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 579
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the A
conditions of affiliation to a university or board have to be complied
with, but in the matter of day-to-day management, like the
appointment of staff, teaching and non-teaching, and administrative
control over them, the management should have the freedom and
there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a
B
rational procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking
disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself.
For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and
unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination
from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved, and in our
opinion, appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and till then, C
such tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the
rank of District Judge.
The State or other controlling authorities, however, can
always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other
conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed D
as a teacher or a principal of any educational institution.
Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for
teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State,
without interfering with the overall administrative control of the
management over the staff. E

Fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be
regulated but no institution should charge capitation fee.”
(emphasis supplied)
In T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), the Court held that some F
system of computing equivalence between different kinds of qualifications
like a common entrance test, would not be in violation of the rights
conferred.The unaided minority institutions under Article 30(1) of the
Constitution of India have the right to admit students, but the merit may
be determined by common entrance test and the rights under Article
G
30(1) is not absolute so as to prevent the Government from making any
regulations. The Government cannot be prevented from framing
regulations that are in national interest. However, the safeguard is that
the Government cannot discriminate any minority institution and put them
in a disadvantageous positionvis-à-vis to other educational institutions
and has to maintain the concept of equality in real sense. The minority H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A institutions must be allowed to do what non-minority institutions are
permitted.It is open to State/concerned bodies to frame regulations with
respect to affiliation and recognition, to provide a proper academic
atmosphere.While answering question no.4, it was held that the
Government or the University can lay down the regulatory measures
ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence and more so,
B
in the matter of admission to the professional institutions. It may not
interfere with the rights so long as the admissions to the unaided minority
institutions are on transparent basis and the merit is adequately taken
care of.
28. In Brahmo Samaj Education Society v. State of West
C Bengal, (2004) 6 SCC 224, the Court opined that State can impose such
conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of standards of
education and to check maladministration. The decision of T.M.A. Pai
Foundation (supra) was followed in which it was observed that the
State could regulate the method of selection and appointment of teachers
D after prescribing requisite qualifications for the same. In Brahmo Samaj
Education Society (supra), it was further opined that the State could
very well provide the basic qualification for teachers. The equal standard
of teachers has been maintained by the NET / SLET.
29. This Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra) also considered the
E difference between professional and non-professional educational
institutions, thus:
“104. Article 30(1) speaks of “educational institutions” generally
and so does Article 29(2). These articles do not draw any distinction
between an educational institution dispensing theological education
F or professional or non-professional education. However, the terrain
of thought as has developed through successive judicial
pronouncements culminating in Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC
481, is that looking at the concept of education, in the backdrop of
the constitutional provisions, professional educational institutions
constitute a class by themselves as distinguished from educational
G institutions imparting non-professional education. It is not necessary
for us to go deep into this aspect of the issue posed before us
inasmuch as Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481, has clarified
that merit and excellence assume special significance in the context
of professional studies. Though merit and excellence are not
H anathema to non-professional education, yet at that level and due
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 581
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

to the nature of education which is more general, the need for A
merit and excellence therein is not of the degree as is called for in
the context of professional education.
105. Dealing with unaided minority educational institutions, Pai
Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481, holds that Article 30 does not
come in the way of the State stepping in for the purpose of securing B
transparency and recognition of merit in the matter of admissions.
Regulatory measures for ensuring educational standards and
maintaining excellence thereof are no anathema to the protection
conferred by Article 30(1). However, a distinction is to be drawn
between unaided minority educational institution of the level of
schools and undergraduate colleges on the one side and institutions C
of higher education, in particular, those imparting professional
education, on the other side. In the former, the scope for merit-
based selection is practically nil and hence may not call for
regulation. But in the case of the latter, transparency and merit
have to be unavoidably taken care of and cannot be compromised. D
There could be regulatory measures for ensuring educational
standards and maintaining excellence thereof. (See para 161,
answer to Question 4, in Pai Foundation,(2002) 8 SCC 481.)
The source of this distinction between two types of educational
institutions referred to hereinabove is to be found in the principle
that right to administer does not include a right to maladminister. E

106. S.B. Sinha, J. has, in his separate opinion in Islamic Academy,
(2003) 6 SCC 697, described (in para 199) the situation as a
pyramid-like situation and suggested the right of minority to be
read along with the fundamental duty. Higher the level of education,
lesser are the seats and higher weighs the consideration for merit. F
It will, necessarily, call for more State intervention and lesser say
for the minority.
107. Educational institutions imparting higher education i.e.
graduate level and above and in particular specialised education
such as technical or professional, constitute a separate class. While G
embarking upon resolving issues of constitutional significance,
where the letter of the Constitution is not clear, we have to keep
in view the spirit of the Constitution, as spelt out by its entire
scheme. Education aimed at imparting professional or technical
qualifications stands on a different footing from other educational H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A instruction. Apart from other provisions, Article 19(6) is a clear
indicator and so are clauses (h) and (j) of Article 51-A. Education
up to the undergraduate level aims at imparting knowledge just to
enrich the mind and shape the personality of a student. Graduate-
level study is a doorway to admissions in educational institutions
imparting professional or technical or other higher education and,
B
therefore, at that level, the considerations akin to those relevant
for professional or technical educational institutions step in and
become relevant. This is in the national interest and strengthening
the national wealth, education included. Education up to the
undergraduate level on the one hand and education at the graduate
C and postgraduate levels and in professional and technical institutions
on the other are to be treated on different levels inviting not identical
considerations, is a proposition not open to any more debate after
Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481. A number of legislations
occupying the field of education whose constitutional validity has
been tested and accepted suggest that while recognition or
D
affiliation may not be a must for education up to undergraduate
level or, even if required, may be granted as a matter of routine,
recognition or affiliation is a must and subject to rigorous scrutiny
when it comes to educational institutions awarding degrees,
graduate or postgraduate, postgraduate diplomas and degrees in
E technical or professional disciplines. Some such legislations are
found referred in paras 81 and 82 of S.B. Sinha, J.’s opinion in
Islamic Academy, (2003) 6 SCC 697.”
Dealing with unaided minority educational institutions in T.M.A.
Pai Foundation (supra), the court observed that Article 30 does not
F come in the way of the State stepping in to secure transparency and
recognition of merit in the matter of admissions. Regulatory measures
for ensuring educational standards can be framed. In the case of
professional education, transparency and merit have to be unavoidably
taken care of and cannot be compromised.
G 30. In Sindhi Education Society and Anr. v. Chief Secretary,
Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 49, the Court
opined that measures to regulate the courses of study, qualifications, and
appointment of teachers, the conditions of employment are germane to
the affiliation of minority institutions. The Court held thus:

H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 583
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“47. Still another seven-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ahmedabad A
St. Xavier’s College Society, (1974) 1 SCC 717, was primarily
concerned with the scope of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution,
relating to the rights of minorities to impart general education and
applicability of the concept of affiliation to such institutions. Of
course, the Court held that there was no fundamental right of a
B
minority institution to get affiliation from a university. When a
minority institution applies to a university to be affiliated, it expresses
its choice to participate in the system of general education and
courses of instructions prescribed by that university, and it agrees
to follow the uniform courses of study. Therefore, measures which
will regulate the courses of study, the qualifications and appointment C
of teachers, the conditions of employment of teachers, the health,
hygiene of students and the other facilities are germane to affiliation
of minority institutions.
55. The respondents have placed reliance upon the law stated by
the Bench that any regulation framed in the national interest must D
necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether run by
majority or the minority. Such a limitation must be read into Article
30. The rule under Article 30(1) cannot be such as to override the
national interest or to prevent the Government from framing
regulations in that behalf. It is, of course, true that government
regulations cannot destroy the minority character of the institution E
or make a right to establish and administer a mere illusion; but the
right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law.
56. The appellant also seeks to derive benefit from the view that
the courts have also held that the right to administer is not absolute
and is subject to reasonable regulations for the benefit of the F
institutions as the vehicle of education consistent with the national
interest. Such general laws of the land would also be applicable to
the minority institutions as well. There is no reason why regulations
or conditions concerning generally the welfare of the students
and teachers should not be made applicable in order to provide a G
proper academic atmosphere. As such, the provisions do not, in
any way, interfere with the right of administration or management
under Article 30(1). Any law, rule or regulation, that would put the
educational institutions run by the minorities at a disadvantage,
when compared to the institutions run by the others, will have to
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A be struck down. At the same time, there may not be any reverse
discrimination.
92. The right under clause (1) of Article 30 is not absolute but
subject to reasonable restrictions which, inter alia, may be framed
having regard to the public interest and national interest of the
B country. Regulation can also be framed to prevent maladministration
as well as for laying down standards of education, teaching,
maintenance of discipline, public order, health, morality, etc. It is
also well settled that a minority institution does not cease to be so,
the moment grant-in-aid is received by the institution. An aided
minority educational institution, therefore, would be entitled to have
C the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group
and, at the same time, would be required to admit a reasonable
extent of non-minority students, to the extent, that the right in
Article 30(1) is not substantially impaired and further, the citizen’s
right under Article 29(2) is not infringed.”
D In Chandana Das (Malakar) v. State of West Bengal and Ors.,
(2015) 12 SCC 140, the Court observed that the Government can frame
the conditions of eligibility for appointment of such teachers,thus:
“21. It is unnecessary to multiply decisions on the subject for the
legal position is well settled. Linguistic institution and religious are
E entitled to establish and administer their institutions. Such right of
administration includes the right of appointing teachers of its choice
but does not denude the State of its power to frame regulations
that may prescribe the conditions of eligibility for appointment of
such teachers. The regulations can also prescribe measures to
F ensure that the institution is run efficiently for the right to administer
does not include the right to maladministration. While grant-in-aid
is not included in the guarantee contained in the Constitution to
linguistic and religious minorities for establishing and running their
educational institutions, such grant cannot be denied to such
institutions only because the institutions are established by linguistic
G or religious minority. Grant of aid cannot, however, be made
subservient to conditions which deprive the institution of their
substantive right of administering such institutions. Suffice it to
say that once Respondent 4 Institution is held to be a minority
institution entitled to the protection of Articles 26 and 30 of the
H Constitution of India the right to appoint teachers of its choice
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 585
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

who satisfy the conditions of eligibility prescribed for such A
appointments under the relevant rules is implicit in their rights to
administer such institutions. Such rights cannot then be diluted by
the State or its functionaries insisting that the appointment should
be made only with the approval of the Director or by following
the mechanism generally prescribed for institutions that do not
B
enjoy the minority status.”
31. In Modern Dental College and Research Centre (supra),
the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the provisions of Articles
19(1)(g), 19(6), 26 and 30 in relation to the right to freedom of occupation
of private unaided minority and non-minority educational institutions. This
Court observed that the activity of education is neither trade nor C
profession, i.e., commercialisation and profiteering cannot be permitted.
It is open to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of general
public. The education cannot be allowed to be a purely economic activity;
it is a welfare activity aimed at achieving more egalitarian and prosperous
society to bring out social transformation and upliftment of the nation. D
(a) This Court further opined that private unaided minority and
non-minority institutions have a right to occupation under Article 19(1),
the said right is not absolute and subject to reasonable restriction in larger
public interest of students community to promote merit, achieve excellence
and curb malpractices by holding common entrance test for admission E
and fee structure can undoubtedly be regulated in such institutions.
(b) This Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre
(supra) also held that unless the admission procedure and fixation of
fees are regulated and controlled at the initial stage, the evil of unfair
practice of granting admission on available seats guided by the paying F
capacity of the candidates would be impossible to curb. The Court also
noted the menace of the fee prevailing in the various educational
professional institutions and in the context of Articles 19(1)(g), 19(6), 30,
41and 47, and considering the Schedule VII, Entry 25 of List III and
Entry 63-66 of List I, this Court held that concerning “professional unaided
minority” and “non-minority institutions”, common entrance test has to G
be conducted by the State and regulation of the fee structure by it is
permissible. The Court took note of the large-scale malpractices,
exploitation of students, profiteering, and commercialisation and entrance
examination held by various institutions failing the triple test of having
fair, transparent, and non-exploitative process. The Court held that H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A reasonable restriction can be imposed to regulate admission and fee
structure. The Court also observed about statutory functioning of the
healthcare system in the country and the poor functioning of the MCI.
(c) The Court further considered the criteria of proportionality
and emphasised for proper balance between the two facets viz. the
B rights and limitations imposed upon it by a statute. The concept of
proportionality is an appropriate criterion.The law imposing restrictions
will be treated as proportional if it is meant to achieve a proper purpose.
If the measures taken to achieve such a goal are rationally connected to
the object, such steps are necessary. The Court considered the concept
of proportionality thus:
C
“57. It is well settled that the right under Article 19(1)(g) is not
absolute in terms but is subject to reasonable restrictions under
clause (6). Reasonableness has to be determined having regard
to the nature of right alleged to be infringed, purpose of the
restriction, extent of restriction and other relevant factors. In
D applying these factors, one cannot lose sight of the directive
principles of State policy. The Court has to try to strike a just
balance between the fundamental rights and the larger interest of
the society. The Court interferes with a statute if it clearly violates
the fundamental rights. The Court proceeds on the footing that
E the legislature understands the needs of the people. The
Constitution is primarily for the common man. Larger interest and
welfare of student community to promote merit, achieve excellence
and curb malpractices, fee and admissions can certainly be
regulated.

F 58. Let us carry out this discussion in some more detail as this is
the central issue raised by the appellants.
Doctrine of proportionality explained and applied
59. Undoubtedly, the right to establish and manage the educational
institutions is a fundamental right recognised under Article 19(1)(g)
G of the Act. It also cannot be denied that this right is not “absolute”
and is subject to limitations i.e. “reasonable restrictions” that can
be imposed by law on the exercise of the rights that are conferred
under clause (1) of Article 19. Those restrictions, however, have
to be reasonable. Further, such restrictions should be “in the interest
of general public”, which conditions are stipulated in clause (6) of
H
Article 19, as under:
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 587
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“19. (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall A
affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or
prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests
of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing
in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing
B
law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any
law relating to—
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or
business, or
C
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned
or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service,
whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or
otherwise.”
60. Another significant feature which can be noticed from the D
reading of the aforesaid clause is that the State is empowered to
make any law relating to the professional or technical qualifications
necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any
occupation or trade or business. Thus, while examining as to
whether the impugned provisions of the statute and rules amount
to reasonable restrictions and are brought out in the interest of the E
general public, the exercise that is required to be undertaken is
the balancing of fundamental right to carry on occupation on the
one hand and the restrictions imposed on the other hand. This is
what is known as “doctrine of proportionality”. Jurisprudentially,
“proportionality” can be defined as the set of rules determining F
the necessary and sufficient conditions for limitation of a
constitutionally protected right by a law to be constitutionally
permissible. According to Aharon Barak (former Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Israel), there are four sub-components of
proportionality which need to be satisfied [Aharon Barak,
Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation G
(Cambridge University Press 2012)], a limitation of a constitutional
right will be constitutionally permissible if:
(i) it is designated for a proper purpose;
(ii) the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation
H
are rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose;
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there
are no alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same
purpose with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally
(iv) there needs to be a proper relation (“proportionality
strictosensu” or “balancing”) between the importance of achieving
B the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing the
limitation on the constitutional right.
61. Modern theory of constitutional rights draws a fundamental
distinction between the scope of the constitutional rights, and the
extent of its protection. Insofar as the scope of constitutional rights
C is concerned, it marks the outer boundaries of the said rights and
defines its contents. The extent of its protection prescribes the
limitations on the exercises of the rights within its scope. In that
sense, it defines the justification for limitations that can be imposed
on such a right.

D 62. It is now almost accepted that there are no absolute
constitutional rights and all such rights are related. As per the
analysis of Aharon Barak, two key elements in developing the
modern constitutional theory of recognising positive constitutional
rights along with its limitations are the notions of democracy and
the rule of law. Thus, the requirement of proportional limitations
E of constitutional rights by a sub-constitutional law i.e. the statute,
is derived from an interpretation of the notion of democracy itself.
Insofar as the Indian Constitution is concerned, democracy is
treated as the basic feature of the Constitution and is specifically
accorded a constitutional status that is recognised in the Preamble
F of the Constitution itself. It is also unerringly accepted that this
notion of democracy includes human rights which is the
cornerstone of Indian democracy. Once we accept the aforesaid
theory (and there cannot be any denial thereof), as a fortiori, it
has also to be accepted that democracy is based on a balance
between constitutional rights and the public interests. In fact, such
G a provision in Article 19 itself on the one hand guarantees some
certain freedoms in clause (1) of Article 19 and at the same time
empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions on those
freedoms in public interest. This notion accepts the modern
constitutional theory that the constitutional rights are related. This
H relativity means that a constitutional licence to limit those rights is
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 589
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

granted where such a limitation will be justified to protect public A
interest or the rights of others. This phenomenon—of both the
right and its limitation in the Constitution—exemplifies the inherent
tension between democracy’s two fundamental elements. On the
one hand is the right’s element, which constitutes a fundamental
component of substantive democracy; on the other hand is the
B
people element, limiting those very rights through their
representatives. These two constitute a fundamental component
of the notion of democracy, though this time in its formal aspect.
How can this tension be resolved? The answer is that this tension
is not resolved by eliminating the “losing” facet from the
Constitution. Rather, the tension is resolved by way of a proper C
balancing of the competing principles. This is one of the expressions
of the multi-faceted nature of democracy. Indeed, the inherent
tension between democracy’s different facets is a “constructive
tension”. It enables each facet to develop while harmoniously
coexisting with the others. The best way to achieve this peaceful
D
coexistence is through balancing between the competing interests.
Such balancing enables each facet to develop alongside the other
facets, not in their place. This tension between the two
fundamental aspects—rights on the one hand and its limitation on
the other hand—is to be resolved by balancing the two so that
they harmoniously coexist with each other. This balancing is to be E
done keeping in mind the relative social values of each competitive
aspects when considered in proper context.
63. In this direction, the next question that arises is as to what
criteria is to be adopted for a proper balance between the two
facets viz. the rights and limitations imposed upon it by a statute. F
Here comes the concept of “proportionality”, which is a proper
criterion. To put it pithily, when a law limits a constitutional right,
such a limitation is constitutional if it is proportional. The law
imposing restrictions will be treated as proportional if it is meant
to achieve a proper purpose, and if the measures taken to achieve
such a purpose are rationally connected to the purpose, and such G
measures are necessary. This essence of doctrine of proportionality
is beautifully captured by Dickson, C.J. of Canada in R. v. Oakes,
(1986) 1 SCR 103 (Can SC) in the following words (at p. 138):
“To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures, responsible
for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve,
must be “of” sufficient importance to warrant overriding a
constitutional protected right or freedom … Second … the party
invoking Section 1 must show that the means chosen are
reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves “a form
B
of proportionality test…” Although the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances,
in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of
society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my
view, three important components of a proportionality test. First,
C the measures adopted must be … rationally connected to the
objective. Second, the means … should impair “as little as
possible” the right or freedom in question … Third, there must
be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which
are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and
the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient
D
importance”. The more severe the deleterious effects of a
measure, the more important the objective must be if the
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.”
64. The exercise which, therefore, is to be taken is to find out as
E to whether the limitation of constitutional rights is for a purpose
that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society and such
an exercise involves the weighing up of competitive values, and
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality i.e. balancing
of different interests.”
F (d) In Modern Dental College and Research Centre (supra),
the Court, while dealing with reasonable restriction on rights under Article
19 observed:
“65. We may unhesitatingly remark that this doctrine of
proportionality, explained hereinabove in brief, is enshrined in Article
G 19 itself when we read clause (1) along with clause (6) thereof.
While defining as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction, this
Court in a plethora of judgments has held that the expression
“reasonable restriction” seeks to strike a balance between the
freedom guaranteed by any of the sub-clauses of clause (1) of
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 591
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Article 19 and the social control permitted by any of the clauses A
(2) to (6). It is held that the expression “reasonable” connotes
that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of the
right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond
what is required in the interests of public. Further, in order to be
reasonable, the restriction must have a reasonable relation to the
B
object which the legislation seeks to achieve, and must not go in
excess of that object (see P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India,
(1982) 2 SCC 33). At the same time, reasonableness of a restriction
has to be determined in an objective manner and from the
standpoint of the interests of the general public and not from the
point of view of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed C
or upon abstract considerations (see Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v.
State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731). In M.R.F. Ltd. v. State of
Kerala, (1998) 8 SCC 227, this Court held that in examining the
reasonableness of a statutory provision one has to keep in mind
the following factors:
D
(1) The directive principles of State policy.
(2) Restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive
nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the
general public.
(3) In order to judge the reasonableness of the restrictions, E
no abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid
down so as to be of universal application and the same will vary
from case to case as also with regard to changing conditions,
values of human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing
conditions and the surrounding circumstances. F
(4) A just balance has to be struck between the restrictions
imposed and the social control envisaged by Article 19(6).
(5) Prevailing social values as also social needs which are
intended to be satisfied by the restrictions.
G
(6) There must be a direct and proximate nexus or
reasonable connection between the restrictions imposed and the
object sought to be achieved. If there is a direct nexus between
the restrictions, and the object of the Act, then a strong presumption
in favour of the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise.”
H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (e) Concerning necessity of regulatory framework, the Court
opined:
“85. No doubt, we have entered into an era of liberalisation of the
economy, famously termed as “globalisation” as well. In such an
economy, private players are undoubtedly given much more
B freedom in economic activities, as the recognition has drawn to
the realities that the economic activities, including profession,
business, occupation, etc. are not normal forte of the State and
the State should have minimal role therein. It is for this reason,
many sectors which were hitherto State monopolies, like telecom,
power, insurance, civil aviation, etc. have now opened up for private
C enterprise. Even in the field of education the State/Government
was playing a dominant role inasmuch as it was thought desirable
that in a welfare State it is the fundamental duty, as a component
of directive principles, to impart education to the masses and
commoners as well as weaker sections of the society, at affordable
D rates. It was almost treated as solemn duty of the Government to
establish adequate number of educational institutions at all levels
i.e. from primary level to higher education and in all fields including
technical, scientific and professional, to cater to the varied sections
of the society, particularly, when one-third of the population of the
country is poverty-stricken with large percentage as illiterate. With
E liberalisation, the Government has encouraged establishments of
privately managed institutions. It is done with the hope that the
private sector will play vital role in the field of education with
philanthropic approach/ideals in mind as this activity is not to be
taken for the purpose of profiteering, but more as a societal
F welfare.
86. It is, therefore, to be borne in mind that the occupation of
education cannot be treated on a par with other economic
activities. In this field, the State cannot remain a mute spectator
and has to necessarily step in in order to prevent exploitation,
G privatisation and commercialisation by the private sector. It would
be pertinent to mention that even in respect of those economic
activities which are undertaken by the private sector essentially
with the objective of profit-making (and there is nothing bad about
it), while throwing open such kind of business activities in the
hands of private sector, the State has introduced regulatory regime
H as well by providing regulations under the relevant statutes.
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 593
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

89. With the advent of globalisation and liberalisation, though the A
market economy is restored, at the same time, it is also felt that
market economies should not exist in pure form. Some regulation
of the various industries is required rather than allowing self-
regulation by market forces. This intervention through regulatory
bodies, particularly in pricing, is considered necessary for the
B
welfare of the society and the economists point out that such
regulatory economy does not rob the character of a market
economy which still remains a market economy. Justification for
regulatory bodies even in such industries managed by private
sector lies in the welfare of people. Regulatory measures are felt
necessary to promote basic well being for individuals in need. It is C
because of this reason that we find regulatory bodies in all vital
industries like, insurance, electricity and power,
telecommunications, etc.
90. Thus, it is felt that in any welfare economy, even for private
industries, there is a need for regulatory body and such a regulatory D
framework for education sector becomes all the more necessary.
It would be more so when, unlike other industries,
commercialisation of education is not permitted as mandated by
the Constitution of India, backed by various judgments of this Court
to the effect that profiteering in the education is to be avoided.”
E
(f) The Court heldthat the regulatory mechanism for centralised
examination is legal and constitutional and does not infringe on the
fundamental rights of the minority or non-minority to establish and
administer educational institutions. It observed:
“57. It is well settled that the right under Article 19(1)(g) is not F
absolute in terms but is subject to reasonable restrictions under
clause (6). Reasonableness has to be determined having regard
to the nature of right alleged to be infringed, purpose of the
restriction, extent of restriction and other relevant factors. In
applying these factors, one cannot lose sight of the directive
principles of State policy. The Court has to try to strike a just G
balance between the fundamental rights and the larger interest of
the society. The Court interferes with a statute if it clearly violates
the fundamental rights. The Court proceeds on the footing that
the legislature understands the needs of the people. The
Constitution is primarily for the common man. Larger interest and H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A welfare of student community to promote merit, achieve excellence
and curb malpractices, fee and admissions can certainly be
regulated.
“97. The very object of setting up institutions for the State is a
welfare function, for the purpose of excelling in educational
B standards. On the other hand, the primary motivation for private
parties is profit motive or philanthropy. When the primary
motivation for institutions is profit motive, it is natural that many
means to achieve the same shall be adopted by the private
institutions which leads to a large degree of secrecy and corruption.
As such, the mechanism of regulations as envisaged under the
C impugned laws is legal, constitutional, fair, transparent and uphold
the primary criteria of merit. The same does not infringe on the
fundamental rights of either the minorities or the non-minorities to
establish and administer educational institutions and must as such
be upheld as valid.”
D (g) The Court also took note of prevailing situation of corruption
in the field of education and commercialisation of education thus:
“68. We are of the view that the larger public interest warrants
such a measure. Having regard to the malpractices which are
noticed in the CET conducted by such private institutions
E themselves, for which plethora of material is produced, it is,
undoubtedly, in the larger interest and welfare of the student
community to promote merit, add excellence and curb
malpractices. The extent of restriction has to be viewed keeping
in view all these factors and, therefore, we feel that the impugned
F provisions which may amount to “restrictions” on the right of the
appellants to carry on their “occupation”, are clearly “reasonable”
and satisfied the test of proportionality.”
86. It is, therefore, to be borne in mind that the occupation of
education cannot be treated on a par with other economic
G activities. In this field, the State cannot remain a mute spectator
and has to necessarily step in in order to prevent exploitation,
privatisation and commercialisation by the private sector. It would
be pertinent to mention that even in respect of those economic
activities which are undertaken by the private sector essentially
with the objective of profit-making (and there is nothing bad about
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 595
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

it), while throwing open such kind of business activities in the A
hands of private sector, the State has introduced regulatory regime
as well by providing regulations under the relevant statutes.
96. As is evident from the facts mentioned by the State of Madhya
Pradesh in its reply filed in IA No. 83 of 2015, the Association of
Private Colleges has failed to hold their CETs in a fair, transparent B
and rational manner. The accountability and transparency in State
actions is much higher than in private actions. It is needless to say
that the incidents of corruption in the State machinery were brought
in the public eye immediately and have been addressed
expeditiously. The same could never have been done in case of
private actions. Even on a keel of comparative efficiency, it is C
more than evident that the State process is far more transparent
and fair than one that is devised by the private colleges which
have no mechanism of any checks and balances. The State
agencies are subject to the Right to Information Act, audit, State
Legislature, anti-corruption agencies, Lokayukta, etc. D
172. Maintenance and improvement of public health and to provide
health care and medical services is the constitutional obligation of
the State. To discharge this constitutional obligation, the State must
have the doctors with professional excellence and commitment
who are ready to give medical advice and services to the public at E
large. The State can satisfactorily discharge its constitutional
obligation only when the aspiring students enter into the profession
based on merit. None of these lofty ideals can be achieved without
having good and committed medical professionals.
190. For the foregoing discussion, I hold that the State has the F
legislative competence to enact the impugned legislation—the 2007
Act to hold common entrance test for admission to professional
educational institutions and to determine the fee and the High
Court has rightly upheld the validity of the impugned legislation.
Regulations sought to be imposed by the impugned legislation on
admission by common entrance test conducted by the State and G
determination of fee are in compliance of the directions and
observations in T.M.A. Pai, (2002) 8 SCC 481, Islamic Academy
of Education, (2003) 6 SCC 697 and P.A. Inamdar, (2005) 6
SCC 537. Regulations on admission process are necessary in the
larger public interest and welfare of the student community to H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A ensure fairness and transparency in the admission and to promote
merit and excellence. Regulation on fixation of fee is to protect
the rights of the students in having access to higher education
without being subjected to exploitation in the form of profiteering.
With the above reasonings, I concur with the majority view in
upholding the validity of the impugned legislation and affirm the
B
well-merited decision of the High Court.”
(h) The Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre
(supra) while considering the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra)
opined that Court did not give complete freedom to admit the students
and also as to fixation of fee. Admission has to be based on merit,
C particularly in professional educational institutions. This Court observed
thus:
“34. In the modern age, therefore, particularly after the policy of
liberalisation adopted by the State, educational institutions by private
bodies are allowed to be established. There is a paradigm shift
D over from the era of complete government control over education
(like other economic and commercial activities) to a situation
where private players are allowed to mushroom. But at the same
time, regulatory mechanism is provided thereby ensuring that such
private institutions work within such regulatory regime. When it
E comes to education, it is expected that unaided private institutions
provide quality education and at the same time they are given
“freedom in joints” with minimal Government interference, except
what comes under regulatory regime. Though education is now
treated as an “occupation” and, thus, has become a fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, at the
F same time shackles are put insofar as this particular occupation is
concerned which is termed as “noble”. Therefore, profiteering
and commercialisation are not permitted and no capitation fee
can be charged. The admission of students has to be on merit and
not at the whims and fancies of the educational institutions. Merit
G can be tested by adopting some methodology and few such methods
are suggested in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481,
which includes holding of CET. It is to be ensured that this
admission process meets the triple test of transparency, fairness
and non-exploitativeness.

H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 597
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

37. Insofar as the first part of the question is concerned, it does A
not pose any problem and the answer goes in favour of the
appellants. We may recapitulate here that Article 26 of the
Constitution gives freedom to every religious denomination or any
section thereof by conferring certain rights which include right to
establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable
B
purposes. Thus, insofar as religious denominations or any section
thereof are concerned, they were given right to establish and
maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes making
it a fundamental right. Likewise, Article 30 confers upon minorities
fundamental right to establish and administer educational
institutions. Insofar as Article 26 is concerned, it comes under the C
caption “Right to Freedom of Religion”. As far as Article 30 is
concerned, it is under the heading “Cultural and Educational
Rights”. Thus, rights of the minorities to establish and administer
educational institutions were always recognised as fundamental
rights. Further, the right of private unaided professional institutions
D
to establish and manage educational institutions was not clearly
recognised as a fundamental right covered under Article 19(1)(g)
and categorically rejected by the Constitution Bench of this Court
comprising of five Judges in Unni Krishnan, (1993) 1 SCC 645.
It was held in para 198 of the judgment that: (SCC p. 752)
“198. [w]e are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of E
reasoning in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala,
AIR 1957 SC 699, that imparting education cannot be treated
as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be
converted into commerce nor can petitioners seek to obtain
the said result by relying upon the wider meaning of F
“occupation”.”
38. In Unni Krishnan case, (1993) 1 SCC 645, this Court also
rejected the argument that the said activity could be classified as a
“profession”. However, the right of professional institutions to establish
and manage educational institutions was finally regarded as an G
“occupation” befitting the recognition of this right as a fundamental
right under Article 19(1)(g) in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC
481, in the following words: (SCC p. 535, para 25)
“25. The establishment and running of an educational institution
where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A administrative staff, and an activity is carried on that results in
the imparting of knowledge to the students, must necessarily
be regarded as an occupation, even if there is no element of
profit generation. It is difficult to comprehend that education,
per se, will not fall under any of the four expressions in Article
19(1)(g). “Occupation” would be an activity of a person
B
undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. The
abovequoted observations in Sodan Singh case, (1989) 4 SCC
155, correctly interpret the expression “occupation” in Article
19(1)(g).”
40. It becomes necessary to point out that while treating the
C managing of educational institution as an “occupation”, the Court
was categorical that this activity could not be treated as “business”
or “profession”. This right to carry on the occupation that
education is, the same is not put on a par with other occupations
or business activities or even other professions. It is a category
D apart which was carved out by this Court in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481. There was a specific purpose
for not doing so. Education is treated as a noble “occupation” on
“no profit no loss” basis. Thus, those who establish and are
managing the educational institutions are not expected to indulge
in profiteering or commercialising this noble activity. Keeping this
E objective in mind, the Court did not give complete freedom to the
educational institutions in respect of right to admit the students
and also with regard to fixation of fee. As far as admission of
students is concerned, the Court was categorical that such
admissions have to be on the basis of merit when it comes to
F higher education, particularly in professional institutions.”
(i) In Modern Dental College and Research Centre (supra),
the Court considered decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), and
observed that Government is permitted to frame regulations for unaided
private professional educational institutions, thus:
G “42. In order to see that merit is adjudged suitably and
appropriately, the Court candidly laid down that the procedure for
admission should be so devised which satisfies the triple test of
being fair, transparent and non-exploitative. The next question was
as to how the aforesaid objective could be achieved? For
H determining such merit, the Court showed the path in para 59 by
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 599
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

observing that such merit should be determined either by the marks A
that students obtained at qualifying examination or at CET
conducted by the institutions or in the case of professional colleges,
by government agencies. Para 59 suggesting these modes reads
as under: (T.M.A. Pai Foundation case,(2002) 8 SCC 481, SCC
p. 546)
B
“59. Merit is usually determined, for admission to professional
and higher education colleges, by either the marks that the
student obtains at the qualifying examination or school leaving
certificate stage followed by the interview, or by a common
entrance test conducted by the institution, or in the case of
professional colleges, by government agencies.” C

This paragraph very specifically authorises CET to be conducted
by government agencies in the case of professional colleges.
43. In order to ensure that the said CET is fair, transparent and
merit-based, T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481, also D
permitted the Government to frame regulations for unaided private
professional educational institutions. Paras 67 and 68 which permit
framing of such regulations are reproduced below: (SCC p. 549)
“67. We now come to the regulations that can be framed
relating to private unaided professional institutions. E
68. It would be unfair to apply the same rules and regulations
regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional
institutions. It must be borne in mind that unaided professional
institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration while,
at the same time, they do not forego or discard the principle of F
merit. It would, therefore, be permissible for the university or
the Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require
a private unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection
while, at the same time, giving the management sufficient
discretion in admitting students. This can be done through various
methods. For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can G
be reserved for admission by the management out of those
students who have passed the common entrance test held by
itself or by the State/university and have applied to the college
concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may be
filled up on the basis of counselling by the State agency. This
H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A will incidentally take care of poorer and backward sections of
the society. The prescription of percentage for this purpose
has to be done by the Government according to the local needs
and different percentages can be fixed for minority unaided
and non-minority unaided and professional colleges. The same
principles may be applied to other non-professional but unaided
B
educational institutions viz. graduation and postgraduation non-
professional colleges or institutes.”
44. A plea was raised by the appellants that by exercising the
power to frame regulations, the State could not usurp the very
function of conducting this admission test by the educational
C institutions. It was argued that it only meant that such a CET is to
be conducted by the educational institutions themselves and the
Government could only frame the regulations to regulate such
admission tests to be conducted by the educational institutions
and could not take away the function of holding CET.
D 45. This argument has to be rejected in view of the unambiguous
and categorical interpretation given by the Supreme Court in P.A.
Inamdar, (2005) 6 SCC 537, with respect to certain observations,
particularly in para 68 in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC
481. In this behalf, we would like to recapitulate that in T.M.A.
E Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481, a Bench of eleven Judges
dealt with the issues of scope of right to set up educational
institutions by private aided or unaided, minority or non-minority
institutions and the extent of government regulation of the said
right. It was held that the right to establish and administer an
institution included the right to admit students and to set up a
F reasonable fee structure. But the said right could be regulated to
ensure maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere
and infrastructure. Fixing of rigid fee structure, dictating the
formation and composition of a governing body, compulsory
nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or nominating
G students for admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.
However, occupation of education was not business but profession
involving charitable activity. The State can forbid charging of
capitation fee and profiteering. The object of setting up educational
institution is not to make profit. There could, however, be a
reasonable revenue surplus for development of education. For
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 601
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

admission, merit must play an important role. The State or the A
University could require private unaided institution to provide for
merit-based selection while giving sufficient discretion in admitting
students. Certain percentage of seats could be reserved for
admission by management out of students who have passed CET
held by the institution or by the State/University. Interpretation of
B
certain observations in para 68 of the judgment in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481, has been a matter of debate to
which we will advert to in detail hereinafter.
48. The matter was then considered by a larger Bench of seven
Judges in P.A. Inamdar, (2005) 6 SCC 537. It was held that the
two committees for monitoring admission procedure and C
determining fee structure as per the judgment in Islamic Academy
of Education, (2003) 6 SCC 697, were permissible as regulatory
measures aimed at protecting the student community as a whole
as also the minority themselves in maintaining required standards
of professional education on non-exploitative terms. This did not D
violate Article 30(1) or Article 19(1)(g). It was observed that:
(P.A. Inamdar case, (2005) 6 SCC 537, SCC p. 607, para 145)
“145. … Unless the admission procedure and fixation of
fees is regulated and controlled at the initial stage, the evil
of unfair practice of granting admission on available seats E
guided by the paying capacity of the candidates would be
impossible to curb.”
(emphasis supplied)
On this ground, suggestion of the institutions to achieve the purpose
for which committees had been set up by post-audit checks after F
the institutions adopted their own admission procedure and fee
structure was rejected. The committees were, thus, allowed to
continue for regulating the admissions and the fee structure until
a suitable legislation or regulations were framed by the States. It
was left to the Central Government and the State Governments G
to come out with a detailed well-thought out legislation setting up
a suitable mechanism for regulating admission procedure and fee
structure. Para 68 in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, (2002) 8 SCC
481, was explained by stating that observations permitting the
management to reserve certain seats were meant for poorer and
H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A backward sections as per local needs. It did not mean to ignore
the merit. It was also held that CET could be held, otherwise,
merit becomes a casualty. There is, thus, no bar to CET being
held by a State agency when the law so provides.”
(j) The Court held that entrance examination is a regulatory
B measure and does not infringe on the rights of the institutions. It opined:
“49. Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that
the private medical colleges had absolute right to make admissions
or to fix fee is not consistent with the earlier decisions of this
Court. Neither merit could be compromised in admissions to
C professional institutions nor capitation fee could be permitted. To
achieve these objects it is open to the State to introduce regulatory
measures. We are unable to accept the submission that the State
could intervene only after proving that merit was compromised or
capitation fee was being charged. As observed in the earlier
decisions of this Court, post-audit measures would not meet the
D regulatory requirements. Control was required at the initial stage
itself. Therefore, our answer to the first question is that though
“occupation” is a fundamental right, which gives right to the
educational institutions to admit the students and also fix the fee,
at the same time, scope of such rights has been discussed and
E limitations imposed thereupon by the aforesaid judgments
themselves explaining the nature of limitations on these rights.
55. It would be necessary to clarify the position in respect of
educational institutions run by minorities. Having regard to the
pronouncement in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481,
F with lucid clarifications to the said judgment given by this Court in
P.A. Inamdar, (2005) 6 SCC 537, it becomes clear that insofar as
such regulatory measures are concerned, the same can be adopted
by the State in respect of minority-run institutions as well. Reliance
placed by the appellants in St. Stephen’s College v. University
of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558, may not be of much help as that
G case did not concern with professional educational institutions.
67. Undoubtedly, right to establish and administer educational
institutions is treated as a fundamental right as it is termed
“occupation”, which is one of the freedoms guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(g). It was so recognised for the first time in T.M.A.
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 603
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481. Even while doing so, this A
right came with certain clutches and shackles. The Court made it
clear that it is a noble occupation which would not permit
commercialisation or profiteering and, therefore, such educational
institutions are to be run on “no profit no loss basis”. While
explaining the scope of this right, right to admit students and right
B
to fix fee was accepted as facets of this right, the Court again
added caution thereto by mandating that admissions to the
educational institutions imparting higher education, and in particular
professional education, have to admit the students based on merit.
For judging the merit, the Court indicated that there can be a
CET. While doing so, it also specifically stated that in case of C
admission to professional courses such a CET can be conducted
by the State. If such a power is exercised by the State assuming
the function of CET, this was so recognised in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481 itself, as a measure of
“reasonable restriction on the said right”. Islamic Academy
D
of Education, (2003) 6 SCC 697, further clarified the contour of
such function of the State while interpreting T.M.A. Pai
Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481,itself wherein it was held that
there can be committees constituted to supervise conducting of
such CET. This process of interpretative balancing and
constitutional balancing was remarkably achieved in P.A. Inamdar, E
(2005) 6 SCC 537, by not only giving its premature to deholding
(sic imprimatur to the holding) of CET but it went further to hold
that agency conducting the CET must be the one which enjoys
the utmost credibility and expertise in the matter to achieve
fulfilment of twin objectives of transparency and merit and for
F
that purpose it permitted the State to provide a procedure of holding
a CET in the interest of securing fair and merit-based admissions
and preventing maladministration.”
This Court also considered the balancing of rights even if there is
a violation of fundamental rights of the appellants to admit students by
Central Examination Test by State. It held as under: G

“92. In this sense, when imparting of quality education to cross-
section of the society, particularly, the weaker section and when
such private educational institutions are to rub shoulders with the
State managed educational institution to meet the challenge of the
H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A implementing ambitious constitutional promises, the matter is to
be examined in a different hue. It is this spirit which we have kept
in mind while balancing the right of these educational institutions
given to them under Article 19(1)(g) on the one hand and
reasonableness of the restrictions which have been imposed by
the impugned legislation. The right to admission or right to fix the
B
fee guaranteed to these appellants is not taken away completely,
as feared. T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481, gives
autonomy to such institutions which remains intact. Holding of
CET under the control of the State does not impinge on this
autonomy. Admission is still in the hands of these institutions. Once
C it is even conceded by the appellants that in admission of students
“triple test” is to be met, the impugned legislation aims at that.
After all, the sole purpose of holding CET is to adjudge merit and
to ensure that admissions which are done by the educational
institutions, are strictly on merit. This is again to ensure larger
public interest. It is beyond comprehension that merely by assuming
D
the power to hold CET, fundamental right of the appellants to
admit the students is taken away. Likewise, when it comes to
fixation of fee, as already dealt with in detail, the main purpose is
that the State acts as a regulator and satisfies itself that the fee
which is proposed by the educational institution does not have the
E element of profiteering and also that no capitation fee, etc. is
charged. In fact, this dual function of regulatory nature is going to
advance the public interest inasmuch as those students who are
otherwise meritorious but are not in a position to meet unreasonable
demands of capitation fee, etc. are not deprived of getting
admissions. The impugned provisions, therefore, are aimed at
F
seeking laudable objectives in larger public interest. Law is not
static, it has to change with changing times and changing social/
societal conditions.”
(k) The Court held that MCI Actand the rules prescribed reasonable
restrictions under Article 19(6),thus:
G
“53. After referring to paras 136 and 137 in P.A. Inamdar, (2005)
6 SCC 537, it was observed: (Assn. of Private Dental case, 2009
SCC OnLine MP 760, SCC OnLine MP paras 34 & 37)
“34. It will be thus clear from paras 136 and 137 of the judgment
H in P.A. Inamdar, (2005) 6 SCC 537, quoted above, that
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 605
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

admissions to private unaided professional educational A
institutions can be made on the basis of merit of candidates
determined in the common entrance test followed by centralised
counselling by the institutions imparting same or similar
professional education together or by the State or by an agency
which must enjoy utmost credibility and expertise and that the
B
common entrance test followed by centralised counselling must
satisfy the triple test of being fair, transparent and non-
exploitative. Thus, the judgments of the Supreme Court in T.M.A.
Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481 and P.A. Inamdar, (2005)
6 SCC 537, permit holding of a common entrance test for
determination of merit for admission to private unaided C
professional educational institutions by the State as well as
any agency which enjoy utmost credibility and expertise in the
matter and which should ensure transparency in merit.
* * *
37. Sections 3(d), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act by providing that D
the common entrance test for determining merit for admissions
in the private unaided professional educational institutions by a
common entrance test to be conducted by the State or by an
agency authorised by the State do not interfere with the
autonomy of private unaided professional educational E
institutions, as such private professional educational institutions
are entitled to collect the fees from the students admitted to
the institutions on the basis of merit, appoint their own staff
(teaching and non-teaching), discipline and remove the staff,
provide infrastructure and other facilities for students and do
all such other things as are necessary to impart professional F
education to the students. Sections 3(d), 6 and 7 of the 2007
Act, therefore, do not impinge on the fundamental right to carry
on the occupation of establishing and administering professional
educational institutions as an occupation. The only purpose of
Sections 3(d), 6 and 7 of the 2007 Act is to ensure that students G
of excellence are selected on the basis of a common entrance
test conducted by the State or an agency authorised by the
State and that students without excellence and merit do not
make entry into these professional educational institutions
through malpractices and influence. As has been held both in
H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A the judgments in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, (2002) 8 SCC 481
and P.A. Inamdar, (2005) 6 SCC 537, the right of private unaided
professional educational institutions to admit students of their
choice is subject to selection of students on the basis of their
merit through a transparent, fair and non-exploitative procedure.
In our considered opinion therefore, Sections 3(d), 6 and 7 of
B
the 2007 Act do not in any way violate the fundamental right
of citizens guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to decide
whether the provisions of Sections 3(d), 6 and 7 of the 2007
Act are saved by Article 15(5) of the Constitution or by the
C second limb of Article 19(6) of the Constitution relating to the
power of the State to make a law for creation of monopoly in
its favour in respect of any service.””
32. In Sankalp Charitable Trust (supra), various orders passed
by this Court on different dates have been reported. This Court noted
D that NEET has been restored by judgment dated 11.4.2016 by which the
judgment and order in Christian Medical College, Velloreand others
was recalled. The respondents were directed to hold examination for
admission to MBBS and BDS courses for the academic year 2016-17.
The Court passed following order dated 28.4.2016:
E “10. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the respondents,
we record that NEET shall be held as stated by the respondents.
We further clarify that notwithstanding any order passed by any
court earlier with regard to not holding NEET, this order shall
operate. Therefore, no further order is required to be passed at
this stage.
F
11. It may be mentioned here that some learned counsel
representing those who are not parties to this petition have made
submissions that in view of the judgment passed in Christian
Medical College, Vellore v. Union of India, it would not be
proper to hold NEET and this order should not affect pending
G matters.
12. We do not agree with the first submission for the reason that
the said judgment has already been recalled on 11-4-2016 and
therefore, the Notifications dated 21-12-2010 are in operation as
on today.”
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 607
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

On 6.5.2016, the Court directed that no examination shall be A
permitted to be held for admission to MBBS or BDS studies by any
private college or association or any private/deemed university. Relevant
portion is extracted hereunder:
“23. In view of the request made by the learned Solicitor General,
hearing is adjourned to 9-5-2016. However, it is clarified that no B
examination shall be permitted to be held for admission to MBBS
or BDS studies by any private college or association or any private/
deemed university.
24. The issue with regard to those students, who had appeared or
who are due to appear in examinations conducted by the States in C
accordance with their State laws, shall be decided after hearing
the learned Solicitor General.”
On 9.5.2016, in the aforesaid matter, the Court considered various
applications filed by private medical colleges seeking clarification of order
dated 28.4.2016. This Court directed as under: D
“29. Medical Council of India (MCI) and Dental Council of India
(DCI) issued Notifications dated 21-12-2010, amending the
existing statutory regulations to provide for a single National
Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) for admission to the MBBS/
BDS course. The said Notifications were struck down in Christian E
Medical College, Vellore v. Union of India, (2014) 2 SCC 305.
The said judgment stands recalled vide order dated 11-4-2016 in
Medical Council of India v. Christian Medical College, Vellore,
(2016) 4 SCC 342.
32. In a recent Constitution Bench judgment dated 2-5-2016, in F
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P.,
(2016) 7 SCC 353, the stand of the private medical colleges
(including minorities) that conducting of entrance test by the State
violated the right of autonomy of the said colleges, has been
rejected. The State law providing for conducting of entrance test
was upheld, rejecting the contention that the State had no legislative G
competence on the subject. At the same time, it was held that the
admission involved two aspects. First, the adoption of setting up
of minimum standards of education and coordination of such
standards which aspect was covered exclusively by List I Entry
66. The second aspect is with regard to implementation of the
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A said standards which was covered by List III Entry 25. On the
said aspect, the State could also legislate. The two entries overlap
to some extent and to that extent List I Entry 66 prevailed over
the subject covered by Entry 25.
33. Prima facie, we do not find any infirmity in the NEET regulation
B on the ground that it affects the rights of the States or the private
institutions. Special provisions for reservation of any category are
not subject-matter of NEET nor are the rights of minority in any
manner affected by NEET. NEET only provides for conducting
entrance test for eligibility for admission to the MBBS/BDS course.
C 34. We thus, do not find any merit in the applications seeking
modification of the order dated 28-4-2016.”
33. In JainarayanChouksey(supra), the Court followed the
decision in Modern Dental College and Research Centre (supra) and
opined that the said decision encompasses not only the State-conducted
D centralised test but also State-conducted centralised counselling. This
Court issued a mandate for both the purposes, i.e., examination as well
as counselling and held:
“5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.
We observe that mandate of our judgment was to hold centralised
E entrance test followed by centralised State counselling by the State
to make it a one composite process. We, therefore, direct that
admission to all medical seats shall be conducted by centralised
counselling only by the State Government and none else.
6. If any counselling has been done by any college or university
F and any admission to any medical seat has been given so far, such
admission shall stand cancelled forthwith and admission shall be
given only as per centralised counselling done by the State
Government.”
34. In D.Y. Patil Vidyapeeth (supra), the Court again clarified
that the decision in Modern Dental College and Research Centre
G
(supra) encompasses not only centralised State-conducted test but also
centralised State-conducted counselling.
35. The MCI amended vide notification dated 10.3.2017 the
Regulation on Graduate Medical Education, 1997 and Post Graduate
Medical Education Regulations, 2000 providing for common counselling
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 609
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

for admission to MBBS and post-graduate medicine courses on the basis A
of NEET. The said notifications were challenged by minority institutions,
deemed universities, and other private institutions by filing a writ petition
before this Court. The Court vide order dated 9.5.2017 in Dar-us-Salam
Educational Trust and Ors. v. Medical Council of India and Ors.,
(Writ Petition (C) No.267 of 2017) opined that common counselling does
B
not in any manner affect the right of minority institutions to admit students
of their own minority community. The Court held thus:
“10. Common counselling conducted by the DGHS/State
Government will not in any manner affect the rights of minority
institutions to admit students of their respective minority community.
The minority quota seats, if any, in institutions run by minorities C
will be filled up by minority students only. Therefore, the rights of
minority institutions are fully protected. Needless to say this
arrangement will not apply to the States of Andhra Pradesh,
Telangana and Jammu & Kashmir. As far as the other States are
concerned, needless to say, this arrangement shall apply to all the D
colleges unless this Court has passed any different or separate
order.”
36. In YatinkumarJasubhai Patel (supra), the Court held that
introduction of NEET does not affect the 50% State quota seat in PG
medicine course. The Court also considered Section 10D of the Act of E
1956 and regulations as amended by MCI. It opined as under:
“9.4. However, it is the case on behalf of the petitioners that in
view of the introduction of the NEET Scheme and in view of
Section 10-D of the MCI Act, by which admissions are to be
given on the basis of merit in the NEET, such an “institutional F
preference” would not be permissible. It is required to be noted
that introduction of the NEET has, as such, nothing to do with any
preference/institutional preference, more particularly the
“institutional preference” as approved by this Court time and again.
The purpose and object of the introduction of NEET was to
conduct a uniform entrance examination for all medical educational G
institutions at the undergraduate level or postgraduate level and
admissions at the undergraduate level and postgraduate level are
to be given solely on the basis of the merits and/or marks obtained
in the NEET examination only. It is required to be noted that earlier
the respective universities including Gujarat University used to H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A hold examination for postgraduate admission to medical courses
and now instead of such tests by Gujarat University/universities
concerned, merit is to be determined on the basis of the NEET
examination results only and admissions are required to be given
on the basis of such merits or marks obtained in NEET. The only
obligation by virtue of introduction of NEET is that, once centralised
B
admission test is conducted, the State, its agencies, universities
and institutions cannot hold any separate test for the purpose of
admission to postgraduate and PG and diploma courses and such
seats are to be filled up by the State agencies, universities/
institutions for preparing merit list as per the score obtained by
C the applicants in NEET examination and therefore by introduction
of NEET, Section 10-D of the MCI Act has been amended,
consequently amendment to the Post-Graduate Education
Regulations, 2000, admission to postgraduate courses are made
providing for solely on the basis of the score secured by the
candidates seeking admission based on centralised examination
D
i.e. NEET.
9.5. Even while giving admissions in the State quota/institutional
reservation quota, still the admissions are required to be given on
the basis of the merits determined on the basis of the NEET
examination results. Under the circumstances, introduction of the
E NEET Scheme, as such, has nothing to do with the “institutional
preference”. Therefore, the change by introduction of the NEET
Scheme shall not affect the institutional preference/reservation
as approved by this Court from time to time in a catena of decisions,
more particularly the decisions referred to hereinabove. Under
F the guise of introduction of the NEET Scheme, the petitioners
cannot be permitted to re-agitate and/or reopen the issue with
respect to institutional preference which has been approved and
settled by this Court in a catena of decisions, more particularly
the decisions referred to hereinabove.”
G 37. The notifications, which are questioned in the matters and the
amendment made to Section 10D as introduced in the Act of 1956 and
regulations as amended by the MCI and similar provisions inserted in
the Dentists Act & Regulations, cannot be said to be taking away the
rights of the unaided minority institutions or private institutions of making
admission in any manner as it is permissible to provide regulatory
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 611
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

mechanism at the national level and the entrance test applies even to All A
India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) – the most reputed Institute
of India. It is open to provide the regulatory mechanism for admission
for such courses as held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) the
qualification and conditions of eligibility in the interest of academic
standards can be provided, and there could be regulatory measures for
B
ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence in the matter
of professional institution. Thus, the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation
(supra) rendered by 11-Judge Bench is juxtaposedto the submission raised
on behalf of petitioners.
38. In P.A. Inamdar (supra), the Court laid down the triple test of
a fair, transparent and non-exploitative mechanism and if the admission C
procedure adopted by private institution does not satisfy all or any of the
triple tests, it held that the admission procedure can be taken over by the
State substituting its process.This aspect was gauged in Modern Dental
College and Research Centre (supra) in a broader perspective
considering prevailing situation of capitation fee and education becoming D
saleable commodity. A decision has been taken to regulate admission in
professional colleges on national basis so as to wipe out the corruption
and various evils from the system. Even, the NEET has been made
applicable to such premier institution like All India Institute of Medical
Sciences (AIIMS)and so many others.The decision has been taken
considering the overall national scenario, there cannot be any exemption, E
otherwise, there would be no end to such claims and multiple
examinations. It would not be possible to eradicate evils. We cannot
restore overall derogatory situation which prevailed before introduction
of NEET. Still, there are several loopholes, which are to be plugged in
the admission procedure. Unscrupulous practices are being adopted by F
private colleges of not admitting students sponsored by centralised
counselling committee.The minority and private institutions have to admit
students based on merit in the permissible category, based on NEET as
per procedure prescribed under the Act and Regulations.
39. In Faculty Association of All India Institute of Medical G
Sciences v. Union of India and Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 246, concerning
issue of reservation in super-speciality, the Court opined:
“22. Although the matter has been argued at some length, the
main issue raised regarding reservation at the superspeciality level
has already been considered in Indra Sawhney case, 1992 Supp H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (3) SCC 217, by a nine-Judge Bench of this Court. Having regard
to such decision, we are not inclined to take any view other than
the view expressed by the nine-Judge Bench on the issue. Apart
from the decisions rendered by this Court in Jagadish Saran
case, (1980) 2 SCC 768 and Pradeep Jain case, (1984) 3 SCC
654, the issue also fell for consideration in Preeti Srivastava case,
B
(1999) 7 SCC 120, which was also decided by a Bench of five
Judges. While in Jagadish Saran case, (1980) 2 SCC 768 and in
Pradeep Jain case, (1984) 3 SCC 654, it was categorically held
that there could be no compromise with merit at the superspeciality
stage, the same sentiments were also expressed in Preeti
C Srivastava case, (1999) 7 SCC 120, as well.
23. In Preeti Srivastava case, (1999) 7 SCC 120, the Constitution
Bench had an occasion to consider Regulation 27 of the Post
Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh
Regulations, 1967, whereby 20% of seats in every course of study
D in the institute was to be reserved for candidates belonging to the
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or other categories of
persons, in accordance with the general rules of the Central
Government promulgated from time to time. The Constitution
Bench came to the conclusion that Regulation 27 could not have
any application at the highest level of superspeciality as this would
E defeat the very object of imparting the best possible training to
selected meritorious candidates, who could contribute to the
advancement of knowledge in the field of medical research and
its applications. Their Lordships ultimately went on to hold that
there could not be any type of relaxation at the superspeciality
F level.
24. In para 836 of the judgment in Indra Sawhney case, 1992
Supp (3) SCC 217, it was observed that while the relevance and
significance of merit at the stage of initial recruitment cannot be
ignored, it cannot also be ignored that the same idea of reservation
G implies selection of a less meritorious person. It was also observed
that at the same time such a price would have to be paid if the
constitutional promise of social justice was to be redeemed.
However, after making such suggestions, a note of caution was
introduced in the very next paragraph in the light of Article 15 of
the Constitution. A distinction was, however, made with regard to
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 613
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the provisions of Article 16 and it was held that Article 335 would A
be relevant and it would not be permissible not to prescribe any
minimum standard at all. Of course, the said observation was
made in the context of admission to medical colleges and reference
was also made to the decision in State of M.P. v. Nivedita Jain,
(1981) 4 SCC 296, where admission to medical courses was
B
regulated by an entrance test. It was held that in the matter of
appointment of medical officers, the Government or the Public
Service Commission would not be entitled to say that there would
not be minimum qualifying marks for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes candidates while prescribing a minimum for others. In the
very next paragraph, the nine-Judge Bench while discussing the C
provisions of Article 335 also observed that there were certain
services and posts where either on account of the nature of duties
attached to them or the level in the hierarchy at which they stood,
merit alone counts. In such situations, it cannot be advised to
provide for reservations. In the paragraph following, the position
D
was made even more clear when Their Lordships observed that
they were of the opinion that in certain services in respect of
certain posts, application of rule of reservation may not be
advisable in regard to various technical posts including posts in
superspeciality in medicine, engineering and other scientific and
technical posts.” E
(emphasis supplied)
The Court directed the Union of India to take appropriate steps in
accordance with views expressed in the case of Dr.Preeti Srivastava
and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 120.
F
40. In Re TheKerala Education Bill (supra), it was opined that
minority could not ask for aid and recognition of educational institution,
when such institutions are recognized it would be open to make the
institution retaining its character as effective as an educational institution
without destroying its minority character for the purpose as enshrined in
Article 30. The institution has to be an effective vehicle of education for G
all concerned.
41. In Gandhi Faiz-e-am College, Shahjahanpur (supra), it
was opined that regulation which imposes restrictions is bad; but regulation
which facilitates is good. We find that in Frank Anthony Public School
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Employees’ Association (supra) it has been observed that institution
has to be an effective vehicle of education for the minority community
or other persons who resort to it. There cannot be any complaint of
invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it
denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object.
The Court observed that minorities have no right to maladminister. The
B
notifications issued, amendment made to Section 10D of the Act of 1956
and regulations framed by MCI and similar provisions for dental courses
providing for NEET cannot be said to be impinging upon the rights of the
minority and the provisions of the Act and regulations framed by MCI
under the Act of 1956, in DCI Act and regulations are required to be
C observed by each and every institution. The regulatory measures under
the Act/ Regulations cannot be said to be averse to the interest of such
institutions, and such reasonable measurescan be carved out. They do
not impinge upon the rights of institutions guaranteed under Articles 14,
19(1)(g), 25 and 30 of the Constitution of India.
D 42. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), this Court opined that
State maintained or aided educational institutions, whether established
by the Government or the majority or a minority community cannot deny
admission to a citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or
language. While considering the issueIn Re TheKerala Education Bill
(supra), it was observed that the right of the private training colleges to
E admit students of their choice was severely restricted. It further observed
that the right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the
State from making any regulation whatsoever. The Government cannot
be prevented from framing regulations that are in the national interest.
This Court observed that it is difficult to comprehend that right to the
F religious or linguistic minorities are given by the Constitution, which would
enable them to establish and administer educational institutions in a manner
to conflict with the other Parts of the Constitution. There is no reason
why conditions for the welfare of students and teachers should not be
made, but any law or rule or regulation that would put the educational
institutions run by the minorities at a disadvantage when compared to
G the institutions run by the others will have to be struck down. The law of
the land includes rules and regulations that must apply equally to the
majority as well as minority institutions. The minority institutions must be
allowed to do what non-minority is permitted to do. They have to comply
with the conditions of recognition, which cannot be such as to whittle
H down the right guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution.
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 615
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

43. In Brahmo Samaj Education Society (supra), it was held A
that State could impose necessary conditions for proper maintenance of
standards of education and to check maladministration.
44. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that individual
autonomy is the concern of any Government. There should not be
interference to defeat the rights conferred by the Constitution. Reliance B
has been placed on Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) in
which this Court held:
“20. There can be no doubt that the makers of our Constitution
wanted to ensure conditions favourable to the pursuit of happiness.
They certainly realized as Brandeis, J. said in his dissent in C
Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438, 471, the significance of
man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect and that
only a part of the pain, pleasure, satisfaction of life can be found
in material things and therefore they must be deemed to have
conferred upon the individual as against the Government a sphere
where he should be let alone. D

21. “The liberal individualist tradition has stressed, in particular,
three personal ideals, to each of which corresponds a range of
‘private affairs’. The first is the ideal of personal relations; the
second, the Lockean ideal of the politically free man in a minimally
regulated society; the third, the Kantian ideal of the morally E
autonomous man, acting on principles that he accepts as rational.
[See Benn, “Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons” in J.
Pennock & J. Chapman. Eds., Privacy, Nomos XIII, 1, 15-16].”
23. Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any
system of limited Government, is protected in part under our F
Constitution by explicit constitutional guarantees. In the application
of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has
been but what may be. Time works changes and brings into
existence new conditions. Subtler and far reaching means of
invading privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street G
what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition of
privacy raises serious questions about the propriety of judicial
reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. Of course,
privacy primarily concerns the individual. It therefore relates to
and overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate
H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining
the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy
must also be placed in the context of other rights and values.
24. Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood,
B procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to the
question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give analytical
picture of the distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy.
Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying
principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a
C claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.
25. Rights and freedoms of citizens are set forth in the Constitution
in order to guarantee that the individual, his personality, and those
things stamped with his personality shall be free from official
D interference except where a reasonable basis for intrusion exists.
“Liberty against Government” a phrase coined by Professor
Corwin expresses this idea forcefully. In this sense, many of the
fundamental rights of citizens can be described as contributing to
the right to privacy.

E 26. As Ely says:
There is nothing to prevent one from using the word ‘privacy’ to
mean the freedom to live one’s life without governmental
interference. But the Court obviously does not so use the term.
Nor could it, for such a right is at stake in every case.[See The
F Wage of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ
920, 932].”
45. The reliance has also been placed on K.S. Puttaswamy and
Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., 2017 (10) SCC 1, the decision relating
to privacy in which this Court held:
G
“351. The Constitution of any country reflects the aspirations
and goals of the people of that country voiced through the language
of the few chosen individuals entrusted with the responsibility of
framing its Constitution. Such aspirations and goals depend upon
the history of that society. History invariably is a product of various
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 617
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

forces emanating from religious, economic, and political events1. A
The degree of refinement of the Constitution depends upon the
wisdom of the people entrusted with the responsibility of framing
the Constitution. The constitution is not merely a document signed
by 284 Members of the Constituent Assembly. It is a politically
sacred instrument created by men and women who risked lives
B
and sacrificed their liberties to fight alien rulers and secured
freedom for our people, not only of their generation but generations
to follow. The Constitution cannot be seen as a document written
in ink to replace one legal regime by another. It is a testament
created for securing the goals professed in Preamble2. Part III of
the Constitution is incorporated to ensure the achievement of the C
objects contained in the Preamble3. “We the People” of this
country are the intended beneficiaries4 of the Constitution. It must
be seen as a document written in the blood of innumerable martyrs
of Jalianwala Bagh and the like. Man is not a creature of the
State. Life and liberty are not granted by the Constitution.
D
Constitution only stipulates the limitations on the power of the
State to interfere with our life and liberty. Law is essential to
enjoy the fruits of liberty; it is not the source of liberty and
emphatically not the exclusive source.”

1
E
However, various forced which go into the making of history are dynamic. Those who
are entrusted with the responsibility of the working of the Constitution must necessarily
keep track of the dynamics of such forces. Evolution of science and growth of technology
is another major factor in the modern world which is equally a factor to be kept in mind
to successfully work the Constitution.
2
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
F
“91. … Our Preamble outlines the objectives of the whole Constitution. It expresses
“what we had thought of dreamt for so long”.” (SCC p.323, para 91).
3
Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re, AIR 1958 SC 956
“5. … To implement and fortify these supreme purposes set forth in the Preamble, Part
III of our Constitution has provided for us certain fundamental rights.” (AIR p. 965,
para 5). G
4
Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1956 SC 479
“23. After all, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted? What was the point of
making all this bother about fundamental rights? I am clear that the Constitution is not
for the exclusive benefit of governments and States; it is only for lawyers and politicians
and officials and those highly placed. It also exists for the common man, for the poor
H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 46. It was argued that certain colleges have produced doctors of
renowned fame, and they are an asset for India. There is no doubt about
it that doctors of international fame have been produced by various
institutions. They are an asset not only for India but also for the entire
humanity. They are pioneers in various fields of medical science such as
Oncology, Surgery, and other branches of medical science. But, when it
B
comes to the eradication of the malpractices that have crept into the
system, we have to take into consideration larger interest of the education
countrywide. The NEET has been prescribed by the Legislature in the
larger public interest that has to prevail. We find the provisions to be
reasonable conditions of recognition/ affiliation are binding for the very
C existence of all such institution whether they are run by majority or
minority failing which they cannot exists and impart education. The
conditions are reasonable and cannot be said to be taking away any of
the constitutional rights of minority institutions,they are reasonable, fair
and intended to bring transparency in the professional education imparted
by institutions. They are applicable for all institutions alike minorities are
D
not placed on a disadvantageous platform.
47. There is no doubt as to the concept of limited Government
and least interference is welcomed, but in which field and to what extent
balancing with the larger public and national interest is required. The
individual autonomy, rights, and obligations are to be free from official
E interference except where the rational basis for intrusion exists. The
Constitution provides a limitation on the power of the State to interfere
with life, liberty, and rights, however, the concept of limited government
cannot be extended to a level when it defeats the very national interest.
The maladies with which professional education suffers in this country
F are writ large. The regulatory framework created by the MCI/ DCI is
concomitant of conditions, affiliation and recognition, and providing central
examination in the form of NEET cannot be said to be violative of the
rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30. The regulatory framework is not
restrictive, but caters to the effective enjoyment of the rights conferred
under the aforesaid provisions. The provisions qualify the doctrine of
G
and the humble, for those who have businesses at stake, for the “butcher, the baker and
the candlestick maker”. It lays down for this land “a rule of law” as understood in the
free democracies of the world. It constitutes India into a Sovereign Republic and
guarantees in every page rights and freedom to the side by side and consistent with the
overriding power of the State to act for the common good of all.” (AIR p.487, para 23)

H [For convenience, citations have been renumbered.]
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 619
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

proportionality considered in Modern Dental College and Research A
Centre (supra). What has been held therein for State level examination
holds good for NEET also.
48. The prescription of NEET is definitely in order to improve
the medical education, co-related to the improvement of public health,
thus, it is a step-in furtherance of the duty of the State enshrined in the B
Directive Principles of the State Policy contained in Article 47 of the
Constitution of India. Similarly, Article 46 aims at promotion of educational
and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other
weaker sections. By prescription of one equivalence examination of
NEET, the interest of their merit is also equally protected and its aims of
preventing various malpractices, which crept into system and prevent C
economic exploitation by selling seats with which maladythe professional
medical education system suffered. Article 51A(j) deals with the duty to
strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity
so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and
achievement. For that purpose, recognition of merit is necessary, and D
one has to be given a full opportunity in pursuit of his/her aim. The
prescription of NEET is to provide equal opportunity and level launching
platform to an individual to perform his duty as enshrined under Article
51A(j). Thus, we find that there is no violation of the aforesaid provisions
as argued by appellants, rather action is in furtherance of the constitutional
aims and directions to achieve intendment of Article 51A(j) and is in the E
national interest.
49. In Secretary, Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose
and Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 386, Court considered T.M.A. Pai Foundation
(supra), and held that all laws made by the State to regulate the
administration of educational institutions and grant of aid will apply to F
minority educational institutions also, but dilution of right under Article
30 is not permissible. The right under Article 30 is not above the law.
The regulations or conditions concerning the welfare of the students and
teachers should be made applicable to provide a proper academic
atmosphere. G
50. In P.A. Inamdar (supra), the court opined that activities of
education are charitable. The educational institutions, both of a non-
minority and minority character, can be regulated and controlled so that
they do not indulge in selling seats of learning to make money. They can
be allowed to generate such funds as would be reasonably required to H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A run the institute and for its further growth. In P.A. Inamdar (supra), this
Court noted the difference between professional and non-professional
educational institutions. It observed that professional educational
institutions constitute a class by themselves and are distinguished from
educational institutions imparting non-professional education. With respect
to unaided minority educational institutions, Article 30 of the
B
Constitution does not come in the way of the State stepping in for the
purpose of securing transparency and recognition of merit in the matter
of admissions, and the conditions of recognition are binding on such
institutions. In P.A. Inamdar (supra), the Court opined that the admissions
based on merit were in the national interest and strengthening the national
C welfare.
51. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society (supra), the Court
held that minority institutions have a right to admit students of their choice
subject to reasonable restriction for the academic qualification and the
regulation, which will serve the interest of the students, can be imposed
D for ensuring efficiency and fairness. Education is vital for the nation; it
develops the ethos of the nation. Regulations are necessary to see that
there are no divisive or disintegrating forces in administration. It observed
that it is not reasonable to claim that minority institutions will have
complete autonomy. Some checks may be necessary and will serve the
academic needs of the institution. A correlative duty of good administration
E is attached to the right to administer educational institution. It was also
opined in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society (supra) in paragraph
19 quoted above that the State can prescribe regulations to ensure the
excellence of the institution that does not militate against the right of the
minority to administer the institutions. Such Regulations are not restrictions
F on the substance of the right, which is guaranteed; they secure the proper
functioning of the institution. The institution cannot be allowed to fall
below the standards of excellence under the guise of the exclusive right
of the management. Minorities are as much part of the nation as the
majority, and anything that impinges upon national interest must
necessarily in its ultimate operation affect the interests of all.
G
52. It was further opined in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College
Society (supra) in paragraph 94 quoted above that there are conditions
of affiliation or recognition of an educational institution, it is implicit in
the request for grant thereof that the educational institution would abide
by the regulations which are made by the authority granting affiliation
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 621
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

or recognition. When Government and MCI/DCI or concerned A
Universities grant affiliation and recognition, the institutions are bound
by the conditions prescribed for affiliation and recognition. It has also
been observed that recognition or affiliation creates an interest in
the university to ensure that the educational institution is maintained for
the purpose intended and any Regulation which will subserve or advance
B
that purpose will be reasonable and no minority institution established
and administered by a religious or linguistic minority can claim
recognition or affiliation without submitting to those regulations.
53. In view of the law laid down in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra),
it is apparent that NEET/common entrance test is a devise to standardise
and computing equivalence between different kinds of qualifications. It C
does not interfere with the rights of the unaided minority institutions as it
has been imposed in national interest considering the malpractices of
granting illegal admission by virtually selling the seats in derogation to
rights of meritorious students. The charitable activity of education became
a saleable commodity and prerogative of wealthy persons and poor D
students were forced to get education funded from Banks making it
difficult for them to come out of tentacular octave of interest. They are
exploited in bud before they bloom into flower. The ill-reputation developed
by MCI forced to change its entire structure. The national interest requires
further improvement in the system to eradicate evils from the system.
The situation is still grim and require to be dealt with firm hand and E
steely determination.
54. In Dr.Preeti Srivastava and Anr. v. State of M.P. and
Ors.(supra), it was opined that at super speciality level there cannot be
any reservation or lowering of the minimum qualifying marks. In Modern
Dental College and Research Centre (supra), considering various F
malpractices, it was observed that education is being used as exploitative
financial device. Education is not a commodity to be purchased by money
power and deserving one as per merit cannot be deprived of the right to
obtain it. The State cannot remain a mute spectator, and it must step in
to prevent exploitation. G
55. Thus, it is apparent that the provisions in question which have
been incorporated in the Act relating to Medical/Dental education, the
Government, MCI and DCI cannot be said to be an invasion of the
fundamental rights. The intendment is to ensure fairness in the selection,
recognition of merit, and the interests of the students. In the national H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A interest, educational institutions are basically for a charitable purpose.
By and large, at present education is devoid of its real character of
charity, it has become a commodity. To weed out evils from the system,
which were eating away fairness in admission process, defeating merit
and aspiration of the common incumbent with no means, the State has
the right to frame regulatory regime for aided/ unaided minority/ private
B
institutions as mandated by Directives Principles, Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution. The first step has been taken to weed out the evils
from the system, and it would not be in the national interest to step back
considering the overall scenario. If we revert to the old system, posterity
is not going to forgive us. Still, complaints are galore that merit is being
C ignored by private institutions; there is still a flood of litigation. It seems
that unfettered by a large number of regulatory measures, unscrupulous
methods and malpractices are yet being adopted. Building the nation is
the main aspect of education, which could not be ignored and overlooked.
They have to cater to national interest first, then their interest, more so,
when such conditions can be prescribed for recognition, particularly in
D
the matter of professional education.
56. In St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi (supra), it
was held that there has to be balancing of interest of rights of minorities.
It was observed that 50% of the annual admission has to be given to the
members of communities other than the minority community on the basis
E of merit. Regulations that serve the interest in standards of education
amongst the recognised institutions could validly be made. Such general
patterns and standards are the need, and such regulation shall not have
the effect of depriving the right of minorities to educate their children in
their own institution.
F 57. The learned counsel argued that it is open to some of the
institutions to impose higher standards of merit. Firstly, conditions of
affiliation are binding apart from that, we find that when it comes to
national standards and the objects sought to be achieved by NEET, to
conduct individual examinations by some institutions cannot be permitted.
G The system is not yet out of clutches of unscrupulous devices and dubious
means are adopted to defeat merit, the interest of education would further
suffer and very purpose of centralised examination would be defeated.
It is not possible to prescribe further examination over and above NEET
that cannot be said to be workable, no exemption can be granted from
NEET, considering the objective with which it has been introduced. We
H
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE ASSOCIATION 623
v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

find that the uniform Entrance Examination cannot be said to be A
unreasonable regulatory framework. Considering the terms and
conditionsfor affiliation and recognition for professional medical and such
other professional courses are binding, and no relaxation can be permitted
in the conditions.
58. Thus, we are of the opinion that rights under Articles B
19(1)(g)and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of
India do not come in the way of securing transparency and recognition
of merits in the matter of admissions. It is open to regulating the course
of study, qualifications for ensuring educational standards. It is open to
imposing reasonable restrictions in the national and public interest. The
rights under Article 19(1)(g) are not absolute and are subject to reasonable C
restriction in the interest of the student’s community to promote merit,
recognition of excellence, and to curb the malpractices. Uniform Entrance
Test qualifies the test of proportionality and is reasonable. The same is
intended to check several maladies which crept into medical education,
to prevent capitation fee by admitting students which are lower in merit D
and to prevent exploitation, profiteering, and commercialisation of
education. The institution has to be a capable vehicle of education. The
minority institutions are equally bound to comply with the conditions
imposed under the relevant Acts and Regulations to enjoy affiliation and
recognition, which apply to all institutions.In case they have to impart
education, they are bound to comply with the conditions which are equally E
applicable to all. The regulations are necessary, and they are not divisive
or disintegrative. Such regulatory measures enable institutions to
administer them efficiently. There is no right given to maladminister the
education derogatory to the national interest. The quality of medical
education is imperative to sub-serve the national interest, and the merit F
cannot be compromised. The Government has the right for providing
regulatory measures that are in the national interest, more so in view of
Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.
59. The rights of the religious or linguistic minorities under Article
30 are not in conflict with other parts of the Constitution. Balancing the G
rights is constitutional intendment in the national and more enormous
public interest. Regulatory measures cannot be said to be exceeding the
concept of limited governance. The regulatory measures in question are
for the improvement of the public health and is a step, in furtherance of
the directive principles enshrined in Articles 47 and 51(A)(j) and enable
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A the individual by providing full opportunity in pursuance of his objective
to excel in his pursuit. The rights to administer an institution under Article
30 of the Constitution are not above the law and other Constitutional
provisions. Reasonable regulatory measures can be provided without
violating such rights available under Article 30 of the Constitution to
administer an institution. Professional educational institutions constitute
B
a class by themselves. Specific measures to make the administration of
such institutions transparent can be imposed. The rights available under
Article 30 are not violated by provisions carved out in Section 10D of
the MCI Act and the Dentists Act and Regulations framed by MCI/
DCI.The regulatory measures are intended for the proper functioning of
C institutions and to ensure that the standard of education is maintained
and does not fall low under the guise of an exclusive right of management
to the extent of maladministration. The regulatory measures by prescribing
NEET is to bring the education within the realm of charity which
character it has lost. It intends to weed out evils from the system and
various malpractices which decayed the system. The regulatory measures
D
in no way interfere with the rights to administer the institution by the
religious or linguistic minorities.
60. Resultantly, we hold that there is no violation of the rights of
the unaided/aided minority to administer institutions under Articles19(1)(g)
and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1)of the Constitution of India by
E prescribing the uniform examination of NEET for admissions in the
graduate and postgraduate professional courses of medical as well as
dental science. The provisions of the Act and regulation cannot be said
to be ultra vires ortaking away the rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of India under Article 30(1) read with Articles 19(1)(g), 14,
F 25, 26 and 29(1). Accordingly, the transferred cases, appeal, and writ
petitions are disposed of.

Ankit Gyan Matters disposed of.

G

H