MIS. OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. ETC. & ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA & ANR. ETC.

                     [2014] 9 S.C.R. 233

   MIS. OPERA HOUSE !:XPORTS LTD. ETC. & ORS.                 A
                             v.
              UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ETC.
        (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1451-1455 of 2014)
                       JULY 14, 2014
                                                              B
      [SUDHANS~        JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                   V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

     Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - s. 52 -
Appeal to appellate board - Cognizance in the matter taken C
within the sunset period - Adjudication proceedings carried
out under the provisions of FERA - Appeal against orders of
adjudicating officer to the appellate board filed beyond the
period of 90 days from the date of service of adjudication
order - Appellate tribunal dismissed the appeal on the o
ground that in view of s. 52(2), delay beyond the period of 90
days could not be condoned - Order upheld by the High Court
- Application of the provisions of FERA or Foreign Excharoge
Management Act, 1999 - Held: Under s. 52(2) of FEHA
appeal against order u/s 51 can be filed within 45 days from E
the date on which the order is served on the person -
Appellate board is also empowered under proviso to sub
              s.
section (2) of 52 to entertain any appeal even after expiry
of that period of 45 days but not after 90 days, from the date
subject to satisfaction that the appellant was prevented by
                                                               F
sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time - On facts,
delay in filing appeal is computed as 89 days - Therefore,
even uls 52 of FERA, the appellate board was empowered to
condone the delay, as the appeal was filed before 90 days
and not later than 90 days - Even otherwise appeal not barred
by limitation - Thus, orders passed by the tribunal and the G
High Court set aside -Matter remitted back to the tribunal.
    The question that arose for consideration in the
instant appeals is when the cognizance in the matter was
                             233                              H
   234       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A taken within the sunset period and the adjudication
  proceedings were carried out under the provisions of
  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), for the
  purpose of counting delay in appeals against orders of
  adjudicating- officer to the appellate Board, the provision
B of FERA or Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
  would apply.
         Allowing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. Sub Section (1) of Section 49 of Foreign
c Exchange Management Act, 1999 makes it clear that the
  Appellate Board constituted under Foreign Exchange
  Regulation Act, 1973 stood abolished w.e.f. 1.6.2000 i.e.
  the day FEMA came into force. Sub Section (3) of Section
  _49 of FEMA prohibits the Courts from taking cognizance
o of an offence under the repealed Act (FERA) and also
  prohibits the Adjudication Officer from taking notice of
  any contravention u/s 51 of the repealed Act (FERA) after
  the expiry of a period of 2 years from the date of the
  commencement of the Act. However, as per sub Section
E (4) of Section 49, subject to the provisions of sub Section
  (3) all the offences committed under the repealed Act shall
  continue to be governed by the provisions of the repealed
  Act (FERA) as if that Act had not been repealed. Sub
  Section 5 (b) of Section 49 further provides that any
  appeal preferred to the Appellate Board under sub
F Section (2) of Section 52 of the repealed Act but not
  disposed of before the commencement of FEMA shall
  stand transferred to and shall be disposed of by the
  Appellate Tribunal constituted under the FEMA. Sub
  Section (6) of Section 49 also specified that the general
G application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
  save as otherwise in sub Section (3) would not be
  affected. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides
  for a protection to any right, privilege, obligation or liability
   acquired or accrued under the enactment which has been
H repealed. This Court in Thirumalai Chemicals Limited's
 OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA               235


case noticed that u/s. 52(2) FERA (repealed Act), a delay       A
upto 90 days only was permissible whereas u/s. 19(2)
proviso of FEMA there is upper limit for condonation of
delay was not prescribed. [Para 10, 12] [242-F-H; 243-A-
D; 244-A]
                                                                B
     1.2. From s. 52(2) of FEMA it is clear that appeal
against order u/s 51 can be filed within 45 days from the
date on which the order is served on the person. The
appellate board is also empowered under proviso to sub
Section (2) of Section 52 to entertain any appeal even
after expiry of that period of 45 days but not after 90 days,   C
from the date aforesaid subject to satisfaction that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing
the appeal in time. The delay in filing appeal has been
computed as 89 days. Therefore, even u/s 52 of FERA the
appellate board was empowered to condone the delay,             D
as the appeal was filed before 90 days and not later than
90 days. Even otherwise appeal preferred by appellant
before the tribunal was n.ot barred by limitation. The
impugned judgment passed by the High Court and the
order passed by the tribunal cannot be upheld and are           E
set aside. The case is remitted back to the tribunal to
decide the same on merit. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 13, 14] [245-
8, G-H; 246-A, E; 245-A-B; 246-F]                     .

    Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v Union of India and Ors.      F
2011 (4) SCR 838:(2011) 6 SCC 739-Relied on.

                     Case Law Reference:
   2011 (4) SCR 838           Relied on         Para 13
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal            G
No. 1451-1455 of 2014.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 09.02.2011 in CRLA
No. 340/2009, 341 /2009, 342/2009, 343/2009, 344/2009 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.                               H
    236       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A       Soli J. Sorabjee, Aman Vachher, K.P. Mavi, Ashutosh
    Dubey, H. Sharma, Abhishek Choudhan and P.N. Puri for the
    Appellants.

        K. Radhakrishnan, Sunita Rani, A. Radhakrishnan, Naveen
B   Kumar, Sidhartha Panda, B. Krishna Prasad for the
    Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. Leave granted.
c      2. These appeals are directed against the common
  judgment dated 9th February, 2011 passed by the High Court
  of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.342 of 2009 etc.
  By the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the
  appeals preferred by the appellants herein and upheld the
D order passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange
  (hereinafter referred to as the, 'Tribunal') on the ground that the
  appeals were filed beyond the period of 90 days from the date
  of service of adjudication order.

E         3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

        The State Bank of India, Okhla.lndustrial Area, New Delhi
  by it$ XOS statement dated 21.01.1995 disclosed that the
  appellant"M/s Opera House Exports Ltd., D-12/2, Okhla
  Industrial Area, Phase-II, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as
F the, 'Company') did not realize substantial amount of its export
  bills and that the bills pending realization were for the period
  1991 to 1994. Since it was found that there was a prima facie
  case of violation of Section 18(2) & 18 (3) of the FERA by the
  Company, the respondent initiated inquiries against the
G Company with regard to the export bills pending realization,
  re¥ons for pendency and steps taken for realizing the said
  bills. During the course of investigatio~. a directive u/s 33(2)
  of FERA was issued to the Company on 23.02.1996 in
  response to which the Company requested for time till
H 14.04.1996 for furnishing the requisite details. It was alleged
    OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA                237
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

  that since no reply was furnished by the Company even by the        A
  said date summons was issued to the Directors of the
  Company on 16.05.1996, which also evoked no response from
  the Company. Summons was, therefore, issued to the
  Managing Director of the Company for his appearance on
  10.09.1996. Since there was no compliance of the same,              B
  another summons was issued for his appearance on
  30.09.1996. In response to the said summons, Mr. Sushi!
  Kumar, Managing Director of the Company vide letter dated
  28.09.1996, authorized Mrs. Rakesh Verma, General Manager
  (Finance) and Mr. Y.K. Jha, Manager (Export) to represent him       c
  in the matter. On 30.09.1996 Smt. Rakesh Verma, General
  Manager (Finance) attended the Directorate's Office and her
  statement was recorded u/s 40 of the FERA. She explained
  the matter and also furnished copy of a letter dated 30.04.1996
  from the State Bank of India (For short, 'SBI'), confirming         D
  realization of an amount of Rs.9,72,203/- pertaining to the
  exports made during the period 1992-1995.

       Thereafter, summons was issued to Mr. Sushi! Kumar
  again u/s 40 of the FERA for appearance on 19.08.1999. The
  Company vide letter dated 19.08.1999 informed that Mr. Sushi!       E
  Kumar had resigned from the post of Managing Director and
  Mr. Jitinder Kumar Sharma had taken over as Managing
  Director. The appellant vide letter dated 27.03.2000 again
1 requested RBI to write off and to issue necessary instruction
  to SBI. Thereafter summons were again issued u/s 40 of the          F
  FERA on 17.07.2000 to three Directors of the Company asking
1 them to appear on 30.07.2000. Simultaneously, enquiries u/s
  33 (2) of FERA were also made with the authorized dealers-
  SBI, Phase'-11; Okhla Industrial Area, New Delhi. The Bank vide
  letter dated 30.08.2000 submitted details of the export bills       G
  pending realization together with copies of relevant GR's. It w2~
  alleged that number of opportunities had been provided to the
  Company and its representatives to appear personally and
  explain the reasons for the outstanding export bills, steps taken
  for realization of the pending proceeds etc. But the Company        H
   238       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A did not avail those opportunities and failed to furnish any
   information. The SBI, Okhla Industrial Area, New Delhi by its
   XOS statement dated 30.08.2000 revealed that US$
   109353.88, Italian Lira 595200C, DM.2738842.85,
   FR.F.573129, UK Pounds 3302 and CHF.4354 equivalent to
s Rs.1,38,09,274/- was pending realization on account of exports
   made by the Company during th.~ period from 1991 to 1998.
   The Company was given number of opportunities b'ut did not
   furnish any evidence or explanations for having taken any steps
   for realization of the said export bills. Further, no
c correspondence was furnished for having taken any steps for
   obtaining extension from RBI for delay in realization of the
   proceeds. It was, therefore, found that the Company had
   contravened the provisions of Section 18(2) read with Central
   Government Notification Nos.F:l/67/EC/73-1&3, both dated
D 1.1.1974 and Section 18(3) of the FERA. Directors of the
   Company were found to have contravened the aforesaid
 , provisions of the FERA. Memorandum No.T-4/32-D/2001 was,
 'therefore, issued to the Cotnpany on 2.05.2001 for
   contravention of Section 18(2) read with Central Government
E Notification No.F.l/67/EC/73-1 &3, both dated 1.01.1974 and
    Section 18(3) of the FERA. A number of Directors of the
   Company were charged for said contraventions of the FERA.

       The Company filed interim reply dated 2.06.2001 and
  submitted that it was one of the leading exporters of high
F fashion readymade garments and it had exported garments
  worth more than Rs.235 crores during the last 8 years of
  business. The Company accepted that small amounts were
  pending realization in respect of exports made to various
  buyers. It was also submitted that the percentage of outstanding
G claims was negligible on comparing with the total exports made.
  The Company explained the detailed steps taken by it towards
  realization of proceeds.

      4. After personal hearing, the Enforcement Directorate
H passed the adjudication order on 11.10.2007 and held that the·
 OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA                239
     [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
charges of contravention of the provisions of Section 18(2) of     A
the FERA read with Central Government Notification Nos.F-1/
67/EC/73-1 & 3 both dated 1.01.1974 and Section 18(3) of the
FERA attributed against the Company was well founded and
established with material evidence substantiating the charges,
The Adjudicating Authority further imposed penalties on a          B
number of Directors of the Company.

     5. According to the company, it being aggrieved· by the
aforesaid adjudication order immediately approached Mr.
Vinod Sabhrawal, Advocate for filing an appeal before the
Tribunal. It was in mid of January, 2008 when the appellant C
asked for a copy of the appeal, the appellant got to know th~t
the appeal was not filed because of pre-occupation of Advocate
due to his wife's illness i.e. cancer. Thereafter, the appeals .
were prepared and filed by him before the Tribunal along 'with
an application for condonation of delay of about 40 days in filing D
the appeal, which occurred on account of unavoidable and
unforeseen circumstances. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal
on account of delay.                                       ·

     9: Against the said dismissal of appeal, the Company filed    E
appeals before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi bearing
Criminal Appeal Nos.340, 341, 342, 343 and 344 of 2009. The
 High Court by its order.dated 22.4.2010 admitted the matters
and issued notice. Thereafter, the High Court by impugned
·common judgment dated 9th February, 2011 dismissed the            F
same on the ground of limitation. Hence, this appeal.

     7. The Tribunal was of th~ opinion that in view of sub
Section (2) of Section 52 of the FERA, the delay beyond the
period of 90 days cannot be condoned. The Tribunal ·dismissed
the appeal with following observation:                             G'

     "12. In the light of above. discussions, these appeals when
     filed 90 days from the date of receipt of the impugned
     order has to be dismissed. The Tribunal is a creature of
     statute. Therefore, this. Tribunal cannot act beyond the      H
    240       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         statutory provisions. As a result the delay of exceeding
          period of 90 days cannot be condoned in view of
          legislative mandate couched in clear language.

        8. The High Court in an appeal filed by the appellants
    framed the following issues:
8
          "3. In t'1e above facts, the questions of law which needs
          to be redressed are (a) whether the appeals before the
          Tribunal against the order of the adjudicating authority
          dated 11th October, 2007 had to be treated by the
c         Tribunal under the provisions of FERA or FEMA? (b)
          whether Tribunal has power to condone the delay beyond
          the period of 90 days.?"
        Referring to sub Section (4) of Section 49 of FEMA, the
    High Court held:
D
         "7. In this case memorandum was issued to MIS Opera
         House Exports Ltd. On 2nd May, 2001 i.e. within sun set
         period. Order has been passed in the adjudication
         proceeding on 11th October, 2007 under the FERA after
E        cognizance had been taken under the provisions of
         FERA. In view of this, the correctness, legality and
         proprietary of the order passed by the adjudicating
         authority has to be challenged in continuation of the
         proceeding under the FERA and has to be adjudicated
F        under the provisions of FERA. In view of the cognizance
         having b·een taken within the sunset period and the
         adjudication proceeding carried out under the provisions
         of FERA, substantive provisions of FERA would alone be
       · applicable. Thus, the Tribunal was right in taking a view
         that the appeal filed before it was to be governed under
G        the provisions of FERA. Question (a) is answered
         accordingly."

      9. The FEMA was given effect from 1.06.2000 as a result
  whereof FERA stood repealed. Section 49 of FEMA reads as
H under:
OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA              241
    [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

 "49 (1) The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46          A
 of 1973 ) is hereby repealed and the Appellate Board
 constituted under sub- section (1) of section 52 of the
 said Act (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act) shall
 stand dissolved.
                                                                B
 (2) On the dissolution of the said Appellate Board, the
 person appointed as Chairman of the Appellate Board
 and every other person appointed as Member and
 holding office as such immediately before such date
 shall vacate their respective offices and no such
 Chairman or other person shall be entitled to claim any        C
 compensation for the premature termination of the term
 of his office or of any contract of service.

 (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
 for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance    D
 of an offence under the repealed Act and no adjudicating
 officer shall take notice of any contravention under
 section 51 of the repealed Act after the expiry of a period
 of two years from the date of the commencement of this
 Act.                                                           E

  (4) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (3) all
  offences committed under the repealed Act shall continue
  to be governed by the provisions of the repealed Act as
  if that Act had not been repealed.
                                                                F
  (5) ('Jotwithstanding such repeal, -

  (a) anything done or any action taken or purported to
  have been done or taken including any rule, notification,
  inspection, order or notice made or issued or any             G
  appointment, confirmation or declaration

  made or any licence, permission, authorization or
  exemption granted or any document or instrument
  executed or any direction given under the Act hereby
                                                                H
    242        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A         repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the
          provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done. or
          taken under the corresponding provision of this Act; ·

          (b) any appeal preferred to the Appellate Board under
          sub- section (2) of section 52 of the repealed Act but not
B
          disposed of before the commencement of this Act shall
          stand transferred to and shall be disposed of by

          the Appellate Tribunal constituted under this Act;

c         (c) every appeal from any decision or order of the
          Appellate Board under sub- section (3) or sub- section,
          (4) of section 52 of the repealed Act shall, if not filed
          before the commencement of this Act, be filed before the
          High Court within a period of sixty days of such
D         commencement:

          Provided that the High Court may entertain such appeal
          after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is
          satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
          cause from filing the appeal within the said period.
E
          (6) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3), the
          mention of particular matters in sub- sections (2), (4) and
          (5) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general
          application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
F         (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeal."

         10. Su~ection (1) of Section 49 of FEMA makes it clear
    that the Appellate Board constituted under FERA stood
    abolished w.e.f. 1.6.2000 i.e. the day FEMA came into force.

G      Sub Section (3) of Section 49 of FEMA prohibits the
  Courts from taking cognizance of an offence under the repealed
  Act (FERA) and also prohibits the Adjudication Officer from
  taking notice of any contravention u/s 51 of the repealed Act
  (FERA) after the expiry of a period of 2 years from the date of
H the commencement of the Act.
   OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA                   243
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOP[\QHAYA, J.]

      However, as per sub Section (4) of Section 49, subject to         A
 the provisions of sub Section (3) all the offences committed
 under the repealed Act. shall continue to be governed by the
 provisions of the repealed Act (FERA) as if that Act had not
 been repealed.
                                                                        B
      Sub Section 5 (b) of Section 49 further provides that any
 appeal preferred to the Appellate Board under sub Section (2)
 of Section 52 of the repealed Act but not disposed of before
 the commencement of FEMA shall stand transferred to and shall
 be disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the         C
 FEMA.

      Sub Section (6) of Section 49 also specifies that the
 general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
 1897 save as otherwise in sub Section (3) would not be
 affected. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides for a          D
 protection to any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired
 or accrued under the enactment which has been repealed.

      11. The main question that arises for consideration in
 these appeals is whether for the purpose of counting delay in
                                                                        E
 appeals against orders of adjudicating officer to the Appellate
 Board, the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
 1973 (for short, 'FERA') or Foreign Exchange Management
 Act, 1999 (for short, 'FEMA') shall apply.

       12. Similar question was considered by this Court in             F
  Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and others,
  (2011) 6 sec 739. In the said case, cause of action arose
  when FERA (repealed Act) was in force. Show cause notices
  were issued and penalty was imposed when FEMA was in
1 force. Against the same an appeal was preferred by the                G
· appellant. In the said case, the appellant Company preferred
· an appeal u/s 19(2) of FEMA against imposition of penalty,
  after about 185 days of imposition of penalty along with
  application for condonation of delay under proviso to sub
                                                                        H
    244        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A Section 19(2) of FEMA. This Court noticed that u/s 52 (2)
  FERA (repealed Act), a delay upto 90 days only was
  permissible whereas under Section 19(2) proviso of FEMA
  there is upper limit for condonation of delay was not prescribed.
  This Court held:
B
          "48. The above discussion will clearly demonstrate that
          Section 49 of FEMA does not seek to withdraw or take
          away the vested right of appeal in cases where
          proceedings were initiated prior to repeal of FERA on 1-
          6-2000 or after. On a combined reading of Section 49 of
c         FEMA and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it is
          clear that the procedure prescribed by FEMA only would
          be applicable in respect of an appeal filed underfEMA
          though the cause of action arose under FERA."in-tact,
          the time-limit prescribed under FERA was taken away
D         under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 19 and
          the Tribunal has been conferred with wide powers to
          condone delay if the appeal is not filed within forty-five
          days prescribed, provided sufficient cause is shown.
           Therefore, the findings rendered by the Tribunal as well
E         as the High Court that the Tribunal does not have
          jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the date
          prescribed under FERA is not a correct understanding
          of the law on the subject.

F         49. We, therefore, hold that the Appellate Tribunal can
          entertain the appeal after the prescribed period of 45 days
          if it is satisfied, that.there was sufficient cause for not filing
          the appeal within the said period. We are therefore
                               I
          inclined to set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal
          and the High Court and remit the matter back to the
G
          Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law on
          the basis of the findings recorded by us. We order
          accordingly."

          13. In view of decision of this Court in Thirumalai
H
  OPERA HOUSE EXPORTS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA                 245
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and others (supra) the           A
impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal as affirmed by the
High Court cannot be upheld and is fit to be set aside.

     14. Even otherwise appeal preferred by appellan"t before
the Tribunal was not barred by limitation.                           B

    15. Section 52 of FERA deals with appeal to Appellate
Board. Sub Section (2) therein prescribes period of limitation
and reads as under:

    "52. Appeal to Appellate Board-(1) ...                           c
    (2) Any person aggrieved by such order may, on
    payment of such fee as may be prescribed and after
    depositing-the sum imposed by way of penalty under
    section 50 and within forty- five days. from the date on
                                                                     0
    which the order is served on the person committing the
    contravention, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Board:

    Provided that the Appellate Board may entertain any
    appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty- five
    days, but not after ninety days, from the date aforesaid if      E
    it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
    cause from filing the appeal in time:

    Provided further that where the Appellate Board is of
    opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue             F
    hardship to the appellant, it may, in its own discretion,
    dispense with such a deposit either unconditionally or
    subject to such conditions as it may deem fit. . . . "

     From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that appeal
against order u/s 51 can be filed within 45 days from the date       G
on which the order is served on the person. The Appellate
Board is also empowered under proviso to sub Section (2) of
Section 52 to entertain any appeal even after expiry of that
period of 45 days but not after 90 days, from the date aforesaid
                                                                     H
    246          SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A   subject to satisfaction that the appellant was prevented by
    sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
           I
          ~ 6. The impugned order was passed by the Adjudicating
  AuWority on 11.08.2007. It is pleaded on behalf of the appellant
B anq' was not disputed by respondents that the said adjudication
  o~der was served on the appellant on 25.10.2007. Delay in filing
  appeal can be computed as follows:
          From the date of receipt (25.10.2007)
          of Adjudication order dated 11.10.2007
c         October, 2007               06

          November, 2007              30

          December, 2007              31
D         Jan~ary, 2008
          Appeal filed on 22.1.2008   22

          Total No.of days            89

E       Therefore, we hold that even u/s 52 of FERA the Appellate
    Board was empowered to condone{tie delay, as the appeal
    was filed before 90 days and not later than 90 days.

       17. For the reasons aforesaid, we have no other option
  but to set aside the impugned judgment dated 9th February,
F 2011 passed by the High Court and the order dated 24th March,
  2008 passed by the Tribunal. The case is remitted back to the
  Tribunal to decide the same on merit.

      18. The appeals are allowed with aforesaid observations
G and directions. No costs.
    Nidhi Jain                                       Appeals allowed.