Holding

The detention order is invalid because the annexed grounds are vague and irrelevant, violating Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

Summary

The petitioner, Mohammad Yousuf Rather, was detained under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. He challenged the detention on the ground that the annexed grounds were vague and irrelevant, thereby violating his constitutional right under Article 22(5) to be informed of the grounds and to make a representation. The Supreme Court examined the annexure, finding several paragraphs vague—lacking specific details of places, actions, and connections to the statutory definition of "acting in any manner prejudicial to public order"—and also irrelevant to the statutory criteria. The Court held that inclusion of even a single vague or irrelevant ground vitiates the detention order as it impinges on the detainee's right to make an effective representation. Consequently, the order of detention was declared invalid and the petitioner was released. The petition was allowed.

Issues considered

The adequacy and specificity of the grounds of detention under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.
Whether vague or irrelevant grounds infringe the detainee's right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to be informed and to make a representation.
Whether the inclusion of a vague or irrelevant ground vitiates a preventive detention order.
The distinction, if any, between a preamble and the substantive grounds of detention.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(d), s. Article 21, s. Article 22(4), s. Article 22(5), s. Article 22(6), s. Article 22(7), s. Article 32
Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978s. 8(3)(b), s. 8(a)(i)

Subjects

preventive detentionvaguenessirrelevant groundsArticle 22(5)Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Actconstitutional rightsrepresentation rightpublic order

Judgment

258

A MOHAMMAD YOUSUF RATHER
v. r
'
THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND ORS.
August 10, 1979
8 [R. S. SARKARIA, P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]

Jarnnzu & Ka.<ihmir Public Safety Act 1978 Sec. 8(a)(i), 8(3){b), Pream- I
ble-"Acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"- '
Mcaning-Scope of.

Constitution of Indio, Articles I9(I)(d), 21, 22(4)(5)(6)(7) and 32.
c
The petitioner challenged his detention under the Jammu & Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978. The grounds of detention were sent to hin1 by way of an
annexure to the District Magistrate's order of detention. The petitioner \Vas
informed that, if he so desired, he could make a representation to the Govern-
ment against the alleged order of detention.

'D It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that so1ue of the grounds of deten~
tion were so vague that he did not find it possible to exercise his fundait11ental
right of making a representation under article 22(5) of the Constitution and
that son1e of the grounds \.vere irrelevant for the purposes of n1aking an or<ler
under section 8.

HELD : The argument that only the '"prean1ble" of the order of detention
E \vas vague but not the grounds is not tenable. [264B]

"Preamble" has been defined "a.g an introductory paragarph or part in a
statute deed, or other document setting forth the grounds and intention of it".
The preamble thus betokens that which follows. The respondents' counsel did
not, however, find it possible to point out where the preamble could be said
to begin, or to finish, and which of the paragraphs could be said to constitute
'F the grounds of detention as such. [262 G-H, 263A]

This Court has disapproved of vagueness in the grounds of detention because
that impinges on the fundamental right of the detenu under article 22(5) of
the Constitution to make a representation against the order of detention when
tJ.1e grounds on which the: order· has been made or communicated to hiin. The
purpose of the requirement is to afford him the earliest opportunity of seeking
redress against the order of detention. But, as is obvious, that opportunity
cannot be said to be afforded when it is established tha-t a ground of detention
is so vague that he cannot possibly make an effective representation. Reference
made to paragraphs which were held to be vague. [263E, H, 264 B-D]

State of Bo1nbay v. Atma Rani Sridhar Vaidya (1951) S.C.R. 167, Iarapada
De and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, (1951) S.C.R. 212, Dr. Rain Krislian
Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi and Ors., (1953) S.C.R. 708, Shlbban Lal Saxena v.
H State of Uttar Pradesh [1954} S.C.R. 418, Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of
Bihar and Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 587, and Puslikar Mukher;ee and Ors. v. State
of West Bengal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635.
MOHD. YOUSUF V. J, & K. 259

It is equally \veil settled that a ground is said to be1 irrelevant when it has A.
no connection with the satisfaction of the authority n1aking the order of deten-
tion under the appropriate law and taking any such ground into consideration
vitiates the order of detention. It was held that irrelevant grounds were,
r nevertheless, taken into consideration for n1aking the impugned order, and that
was quite sufficient to vitiate it. [267A-B]
Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor, (1943) F.C.R. 49, Satya Brata Ghose
v. Mi·. Arif Ali, District Magistrate Shibsagar, Jorhat and Ors., (1974) 3 SCC 8
600, and K. Yadava Reddy and Ors. v. The Con11nissioner of Police, Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad aad Anr., I,L.R. 1972 Andhra Pradesh !025, affirmed.

Chinnappa Reddy, J. (Concurring)
HELD : A law providing for preventive detention and action taken under
such a laiw, to pass muster, have to satisfy the requiren1ents of both Articles 19 0
and 22 of the Constitution. [2680-E]

The interpretation of Article 22(5) consistently adopted by this Cou1t is,
perhaps, one of the outstanding contributions of the Court in the cause of
Hurnan Rights. The law is now well settled that a detenu bas two rights under
Article 22(5) of the Constitution (1) to be informed as soon as may be, of
the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds D.
which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and (2) to be
afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order
of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him
to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him.
The inclusion of an irreleva-nt or non·existent ground among other relevant
grounds is an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an
obscure or vague ground among other clear' and definite grounds is an infringe- E
n1ent of the second of the rights. In either case there is an invasion of the
Constitutional rights of the detenu entitling hin1 to approach the Court for relief.
The reason for saying that the inclusion of even a single irreleva·nt or obscure
ground among several relevant and clear grounds is: an invasion of the detenu's
constitutional right is that the Court is precluded from adjudicating upon the
sufficiency of the grounds and it cannot substitute its objective decision for the
subjectlve satisfaction of the detaining authority. [269A·D]

The argument that only that allegation which was the imn1ediate cause of
the order of detention was to be treated as the ground of detention and all
other allegations recited in the order of detention were to be treated as introduc·
tory and background facts cannot be accepted. The factual allegations con-
tained in the document supplied to the detenu as furnishing the g·round of
'1 detention cannot be- so dissected. The last straw which broke the camel's back G
does not make weightless the other loads on the camel's back. [269 G-H, 270E]

' .• .i
The expression 'Naxalite' conveys different meanings to different persons
depending on the class to which one belongs, his political hues and ideological
perceptions. It is as va•gue or as definite as all words describing ideologies
such as "democracy" etc. It is a label which 1nay be as misleading as any
other. [270F-G, 271A]

Expressions like 'revolt' and 'revolution' are flung by all and sund1y in all
manner of context and it is impossible to attach ooy particular significance tO
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ l 980] 1 S.C.R.
A ,the
. use, of such expre~s1ons."
· E~very turn against
· the establbh1nent is called
•
r
1evolt an~ every new idea rs labelled as 'revolutionary'. \Vithout specification
of the pa:ticnlar form of revolt and revolution \Vhich \\'a·s advocated. the ground
of detention must be held to be irrelevant and vague. [271 C-D] ~

A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88 R. C. Coopu· v.
Union of India, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530 distinguished.
B
•
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ P.etition No. 581 of 1979 "
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)
M. K. Ramamnurty, Ramesh Chand Pathak for the Petitioner.
c (Dr.) L. M. Singhvi, Altaf Ahmed and L. K. Pandev for the Res-
pondents. •

The Judgment of R. S. Sarkaria and P. N. Shinghal, JJ. was deli-
vered hy Shinghal, J. 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. gave a separate' Opinion.

D SHINGHAL J .,-This petition of Mohammad Yousuf Rather under
article 32 of the Constitntion challenges his detention under section 8
(a) (i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, herein-
after referred to as the Act. The order of detention has been made by
the District Magistrate of Anantnag on April 12, 1979, and it is not in
controversy that it has really been made under sub-section (2) of
E section 8 of the Act on the basis of the satisfaction provided for in
sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of that section. While
the petitioner has stated that he did not receive the order of detention,
and only the grounds of detention were communicated to him, his
learned counsel Mr. Ramamurthi has not raised any controversy on that
account. He has in fact given up several other points on which the
F writ petition has been filed, and has contended himself by putting his
argument's in two ways. Firstly he has •argued that some of the
grounds are so vague that the petitioner has not found it possible to
exercise his fundamen~al right of making a representation under article
22 (5) of the Constitution. Secondly he has argued that some of the
grounds are irrelevant for the purpose of making of an order under
G
section 8 of the Act. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a con-
sideration of these two points of controversy.
••
The grounds of detention have admittedly been sent to the peti- ~
tioner by way of an annexure to the District Magistrate's order
H No. 49-54/ST dated April 12, 1979. It has been srated therein that
the detention has been ordered on "the grounds specified in the An-
nexure ... which also contains facts relevant thereto," and the peti-
MOili>. YOUSUF v. .T. & K. (Shi11g/wl J.) 261

tioncr has been informed that he may make a representation to the A
• ·Government against the order of detention if he so desires. We
shall refer to the •annexure in a while, but it may be sta.ted here that
tbe counsel for the respondents has not found it possible to contend
r that no part thereof is vague. He has however tried to argue that the
.annexure contains a preamble as well as the grounds of detention, and
that the vagueness of the preamble could not possibly justify the argu- B
I ment that the grounds of detention arc also vague. Learned counsel
has tried to support his argument by reference to the decision of tbis
Court in Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of West Bengal and
<Jthers. (') The annexure re•ads as follows,-
"You are a die-hard N axalite and you are notorious for c
your activities which are proving prejudicial to the mainte-
nance of public order. You are in the habit of organising
meetings, secret as well •as public, in which you instigate the
people to create lawlessness which spreads panic in the minds
of a common people. You arc also reported to be in the
habit of going from one village to the other, with intent to D
compel the shopkeepers to close down their shops and parti-
cipa.fe in the meetings. You are reporte<l to have recently
started a campaign in villages, asking the inhabitants not to
sell their extra paddy crop to the Government and in case
they are compelled to do so, they should manhandle the E
Government officials deputed for the purpose of purchasing
shali on voluntary basis from the villagers.

On 9-2-79 you, after compelling the shopkeepers to close
down their shops, organised a meetig at Chowalgam and
asked the participants to lodge protests against the treatment
F
meted out to Shri Z. A. Bhutto, late Prime Minister of Pakis-
tan by General Zia.-Ul-Haq, in fact, you did not have any
sympathy for the late Prime Minister, but you did it with the
intent to exploit the situation and creafo lawlessness.
On 23-3-79 you presided over a meeting at Kulgam and
delivered a speech. Among other things, you passed deroga- G
tory remarks against Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, the Chief
Minister of the State and compared him with General Zia of
Pakistan, said that he (the Chief Minister) also wants to
become a dictator. You further stated that the Mulas of
Kashmir are preparing for distribution of sweets on the day
H
when Shri Bhutto is sent to gallows. You also stated that
(!) [1960] I S.C.R. 411.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A. the people of the State have been oppressed and blamed the
Chief Minister for their oppression. You asked the audience
to shun the life of dishonour and rise is revolt against oppres-
'
sion. You went to the extent of saying that India should
vacate the forcible occupation of the State, as the Kashmir l
question has not so far been settled. These irresponsible
8
utterances of you are likely to create feelings of hatred and
enmity which will ultimately disturb the public order.
On 29-3-1979 posters were found pasted on walls in
Kulgam area which were got published by the CPI (ML).
'
It was learnt that there was your hand in pasting these
c posters, the posters were captioned 'lnqalab ke bager koe ha!
nahin'. The contents of the poster, among other things,
revealed that it made a mention of plebiscite saying that the
demand was given up with ulterior motives. It further stated
that the people should prepare themselves for revolution.

D You were also noticed instigating the "Educational"
(sic) unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger
strike at Anantnag. I

E
On 4-4-1979 and 5-4-1979 after Mr. Z. A. Bhutto was
hanged, you were found leading the unruly mobs in different
villages and instigating them to set the house of J.E.I. worker
•
on fire. As a result of this instigation a number of houses
were set on fire, property looted and heavy damages caused
to the people at village Rarigam. In this connection a case
.
FIR No. 34/79 U/s 395, 436, 148, 307 etc. has been regis-
tered af Police Station Kulgam against you and others.
Property worth thousands has so far been recovered during
the investigation of this case.
Your activities are highly prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order and I am convinced that unless you are
detained, large scale disturbances resulting in wide spread
loss to the public and private property aITTd to the safety of
G peaceful citizens will occur." +
f
'Preamble' has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to
mean "a preliminary statement, in speech or writing; an introductory
paragraph, section, or clause; a preface, prologue, introduction." It
has further been defined there as "an introductory paragraph or part
H in a statute deed, or other document, setting forth the grounds and
intention of it." The preamble thus 'betokens that which follows. The
respondents' learned counsel has not however found it possible to point
• MOHD. YOUSUF v. J. & K. (Shinghal J.) 263

out where the pre-amble could be said to begin, or to finish, and which A
of the paragraphs could be said to constitute the grounds of detention
ns such.
As it is, in very first paragraph, which alone could be said lb be
in the nature of an introductory paragraph or a preliminary statement,
it has been stated, inter alia, that the petitioner was reported to have B
\ ·"recently" started a campaign in villages asking the inhabitants not to
,r
s.ell their extra paddy crop to the Government and to manhandle the
·Government officials in case they were compelled to do so. There is
however no mention, in any other part of the annexure, of the peti-
tioner's asking the inhabitants not to sell their paddy crop anywhere
else or to manhandle the Government officials deputed for its purchase. c
We are therefore unable to think that even the first paragraph is in the
nature of a preamble to what has been stated in the subsequent pam-
; graphs.

A reading of the first paragraph shows that it is vague in several
respects. It does not state the places where the petitioner is said to D
have organised the meetings, or the nature of lawles~ness instigated by
him. It does not also mention the names of the villages where he is
said to be in the habit of going for compelling the shopkeepers to close
down their shops and to participate in the meetings. So also, it does
not mention the villages where the petitioner was reported to have
"recently" started the campaign asking the inhabitants not to sell their E
extra paddy, or to manhandle the government ofrlcials. The para-
graph is therefore undoubtedly very vague.

But even if the first paragraph is left out of consideration on the
pretext that it is in the nature of a preamble, the fifth paragraph is quite
vague, for while it states that the petitioner was noticed instigating the F
educ•ated unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger str'ke
in Anantnag, the nature or the purpose of the alleged instigation has
·not been stated so that' it is not possible to appreciate whether it could
be said to fall within the mischief of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of
section 8 which defines what is meant by "acting in any manner pre-
G
}udici-al to the maintenance of public order" within the meaning of
clause (a) (i) of sub-section ( 1) of section 8. For instance, if it was
noticed that the petifoner was instigating the educated unemployed
youth to go on hunger strike for the purpose of pressing their demand
for employment, that' would not amount to acting in any manner pre-
judicial to the maintenance of public order as it would net be covered H
by •any of the four meanings assigned to that expression in clause (b)
.of sub-section (3) of section 8.
1
S-475SCf/79
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A The sixth paragraph is also vague, for while it states that the peti- I
tioner was found leading the unruly mobs in dillerent villages and insti-
gating them to set fire to the house of the worker of Jamaiat-e-Islami
the names of those villages und the name of the owner of burnt heuse
have not been state<\. •
It is obvious ther~fore that the above grounds of detention are
vague. This Court has disapproved of vagueness in the grounds of
detention because that impinges on the fundamental right of the deteau
under article 22(5) of the Constitution to make a representation against
the order of detention when the grounds on which the order has been
made are communicated to him. The purpose of the requirement is
,C
to afford him the earliest opportunity of seeking redress against the
order of detention. But as is obvious, that opportunity cannot be said
to be afforded when it is established that a ground of detention is so
vague that he cannot possibly make an effective representation. Refer-
ence in this connection may be made to this Court's decision in State
D of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') where the guarantee of
article 22(5) has been characterised as an elementary right of a citizen
in a free democratic state, and it has been held that if a ground of deten-
tion is not sufficient to enable the detained person to make a represen-
tation at the earliest opportunity, it must be held that his fundamental
right in that respect has been infringed inasmuch as the material con-
E " veyed to him does not enable him to make the representation. So as
the aforesaid grounds of detention are vague, the petitioner is entitled
to an order of release for that reason alone. It is true that, as has been
held in Naresh Chandra Ganguli's case, (supra) "vagueness" is a re-
lative term, and varies according to the circumstances of each case, but
if the statement of facts contains any ground of detention which is such
F " that it is not possible for the detenu to clearly understand what exactly
is the allegation against him, and he is thereby prevented from making
an effective representation, it does not require much argument to hold
that one such vague ground is sufficient to justify the contention that
his fundamental right under clause (5) of article 22 of the Constitution
"has been violated and the order of detention is bad for that reason alone.
G
Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in
Tarapada De and others v. The State of West Bengal('), Dr. Ram
Krishan Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi and other(') Shibban Lal Saxena
v. State of Uttar Pradesh(4) Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State vf
(!) [19511 S.C.R. 167.
e (2) [1951J s.c.R. 212.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 708.
(4) [1954] S.C.R. 418.
MOHD. YOUSUF v. J. & K. (Shinghal J.) 265

Bihar('), Motilal Jain v. State of Bilw and others( 2 ) and Pushkar A
Mukherjee and others v. State of West Bengal( 8 ).
It has next been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that at least five of the grounds of detention are irrelevant.

It has been stated in paragraph 2 of the grounds of detention that B
after compelling the shopkeepgs to close down their shops on Febru-
ary 9, 1979, the petitioner organised a meeting at Chowalgam and
asked the participants to lodge a protest against the treatment meted
out to Shri Z. A. Bhutto, and. that while in fact the petitioner did not
have any sympathy for the late Prime Minister of Pakistan, he did it
with the intention of exploiting the situation and to create lawlessness. c
We have made a reference to clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section
8 of the Act which defines what is meant by "acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" in .sub-section (1) of
)
that section, but the ground mentioned in the second paragraph does
not fall within the purview of any of the four clauses of clause (b) as
I)
it does pot state that the petitioner promoted, propagated, or attempted
to create feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of
religion, race, caste, community, or region, or that he made preparations
for using or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, inciting, provok-
ing, or otherwise abetting the use of force in a manner which disturbed
or was likely to disturb the public order within the meaning of sub-
clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (b). As is obvious, the remaining two E
sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) can possibly have no application to the alle-
gation in paragraph 2. The ground contained in that paragraph was
therefore clearly irrelevant for the satisfaction of the District Magis-
trate in making an order of detention under section 8(2) of the Act.

Then it has been stated in paragraph 3 that the petitioner presided
p
over a meeting at Kulgam and delivered a speech where, among other
things, he passed "derogatory remarks against Sheikh Mohd. Abdnllah,
the Chief Minister of the State and compared him with General Zia
of Pakistan, and said that he (the Chief Minister) also wants to become
a dictator." That allegation also does not fall within any of the four
•, sub-clauses of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 8, as it does
hot refer to the promoting or propagating or attempting to create feel-
ings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of religion, race,
• caste, community or region or making of preparations for using or at-
' tempting to use, or ~sing, or instigating, inciting, provoking or other-
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 505. H:
(2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 587.
(3) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635.
2 60 SliPREME COURT REPORTS l l 980) 1 S.C.R.

A wise abetting the use of force i"n any manner whatsoever. For this
allegation also, the remaining two •uh-clauses are of no relevance.
What has been alleged is that the petitioner stated in his speech at the •
Kulgam meeting that the poople of the State had been oppressed, that
he blamed the Chief Minister for their oppression, and that he asked
his audience to "shun the life of dishonour and rise in revolt agafust l
B oppression." It has not ken stated that the petitioner thereby pro-
moted, propagated or attempted to create feelings of enmity or hatred
or disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or re-
gion, or that he instigated or incited or provoked tho audience to use
force. Peaceful and lawful revolt, eschewing violence, is one of the
c well known modes of seeking redress in this country. A substantial
part of the statement of facts mentioned in paragraph 3 of the grounds
of detention is therefore irrelevant and can not justify the ord~r of
detention under section 8 of the Act.
It has been stated in paragraph 4 that a poster was found pasted on
walls in Kulgam area on March 29, 1979, in the pasting of which the
D petitioner had a hand. The poster was captioned "Inqilab kei baghllir
koi ha1! nahin", and it mentioned that the demand for plebiscite was
given up with ulterior motives. It further said that the people should
prnpare themselves for revolution. But even if it were assumed that
the petitioner had hand in pasting the pester, which is alleged to have
E been published by the CPI (ML), it cannot be said that he thereby
acted in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, for
his alleged action did not fall within the purview of any of the sub-
clauses of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act Apart
from the fact that it has not been stated that the poster promoted, or
propagated or attempted to create feelings of enmity or hatred or di•-
F harmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community etc., it has alse>
not been stated that the poster instigated, incited, provoked or otherwise
abetted the use of force so as to amount to acting in any manner pre-
judicial to the maintenance of public order. As has been stated, a
revolution can be brought about by peaceful and lawful means, and
askrng tho people to prepare themselves for it cannot be a ground of
G detention U:nder section 8.

We have made a reference to paragraph 5 of the grounds of deten-
tion, which states that the petitioner was noticed instigating the educated
unemployed youth who had gone on hunger strike at Anantnag, to show
the vagueness of that ground. It may further be stated that it is ,
H quite an irrelevant ground also, because any such instigation could
not be said to fall within the purview of clause (b) of sub-section (3)
of sec'!ion 8.
MOHD. YOUSUF v. J, & K. (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 267

It is well settled that a ground is said to be irrelevant when it has A
• no connection with the satisfaction of the authority making the order
of detention under the appropriate law. It nevertheless appears that
the aforesaid irrelevant grounds were take'n into consideration for mak-
ing the impugned order, and that is quite sufficient to vitiate it. Re-
ference in this connection may be made to the decisions in Keshav Tal-
B
pade v. The King Emperor('), Tarapada De and others v. State of
West Bengal (supra), Shibban Lal Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and others (supra), Pushkl1J' Mukherjee and others v. S!ate of West
Bengal (supra), Sa.tya Brata Ghose v. Mr. Arif Ali, District Magistrate,
Sibasagar, Jorhat and others( 2 ) and to K. Yadava Reddy and others
v. The Commissioner of Police, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, and ano- c
ther('). It has been held there that even if one of the grounds of
deten'ion is irreievant, that is sufficient to vitate the order. The rea-
son is that it is not possible to assess In what manner and to what
extent that irrelevant gronnd operated on the mind of the appropriate.
authority and contributed to provide the satisfaction that it was neces-
sary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting D
in any man'ner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
It is obvious that th•o detention of the petitioner was illegal, and
that is why we made an order on August 3, 1979 for his release.

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-A good deal of vehement argument was
E
advanced by Dr. Singhvi to sustain lhe order of detention and this has
led me to add this brief note to the opinion of my brother Shinghal, J .,
with whose conclusions I agree.
The Constitution of India recognizes preventive detention as a neces-
sary evil, but, nonetheless, an evil. So we have, by constitutional
mandate, circumscribed the making of laws providing for preventive F
detention. While Article 22 Clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) expressly
deal with pre\"~ntive detention, Article 21 provides that no person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law and Article 19(1) (d) guarantees to citizens the
•i right to mov·~ freely throughout the territory of India subject to rea-
G
sonable restrictions made in the i'nterests of the general public as men-
tioned in Article 19(5). At one time it was thought that Article 22
I • was. a complete code in regard to laws providing for proventive deten-
~
tion and that the validity of an order of detention should be determined
strictly according to the terms and "within the four cor'ners of that
(1) (1943] F.C.R. 49. H
E2l [1974] 3 s.c.c. 600.
(3) I. LR. (1972) Andhra Pradesh 1025.
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) l S.C.R.

A article". It was held in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras( 1), that
a detenu may not claim that the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 ( 1) •
( d) was infringed by his detention, and that the validity of the law
providing for preventive detention was not to be tested in the light of
the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed thereby on the freedom "1
of movement, nor on the ground that his right to personal liberty was
B infringed otherwise than according to procedure established by Jaw.
A theory was evolved that the nature and extent of the Fundamental
Rights was to be measured by the object and form of the State action
and not by the operation of the State action upon the rights of the indi-
vidual. This has now been shown to be wrong. In R. C. Cooper
c v. Union of India( 2 ) the Full Court opted for a broader view and it
was held that it was not the object of the authority making the law
impairing the right of the citizen, nor the form of action takeR that
determined the protection the citizen could claim; it was the effect of
the law and of the action upon the right which attracted the jurisdiction
of the Court to grant relief. So, in that case, they rejected the sub-
D mission that Article 31 (2) was a complete code in relation to the in-
fringement of the right to property by compulsory acquisition and the
validity of the law was not to be tested in the light of the reasonableness
of the restrictions imposed thereby. So it follows that a law providing
for preventive detention and action taken under such a Jaw, to pass
muster, have now to satisfy the requirements of both Article~ 19 and
22 of the Constitution.

We are primarily concerned in this case with Article 22(5) which
is as follows :
"When any person is detained in pursuance of an order
F made und·~r any law providing for preventive detention, the
authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, commwii.-
cate to such person the grounds on which the order has been
made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of makibg
a representation against the order".
The extent and the content of Article 22 ( 5) have been the iYbject
G
matter of repeated pronouncements by this Court (Vide, State of Bom- t
•
bay v. Atmaram('), Dr. Ramkrishna Bharadwaj v. State of Delhi('),
Shibbanlal Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh(•), Dwarkadas Bhatia. v. .J
(I) [19501 S.C.R. 88. '
• (2) [1970] (3) SCR 530 .
(3) [1951) SCR 167.
(4) [1953] SCR 708.
5)[ 1954] SCR 418.
MOHD. YOUSUF v. J. & K. (Chinnappa Reddy J.) 269

Stille of Jammu & Kashmir('). The interpretation of Article 22(5), A
cohsistently adopted by this Court, is, perhaps, one of the outstanding
contributions of the Court in the cause of Human Rights. The law
' is now well settled that a detenu has two rights under Article 22 ( 5)
t of the Constitution : (1) To be informed, as soon as may be, of the
grollllds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds
B
which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and
(2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient
particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being
cO'llsidered may obtain relief to him. The inclusion of an irrelevant
-0r non-existent ground among other relevant grounds is an infringement c
-0f the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground
among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second
j
of the rights. In either case there is an invasion of the Constitutional
rights of the detenu entitling him to approach the Court for relief. The
reason for saying that the inclusion of even a single irrelevant or obs-
cure ground among several relevant and clear grounds is an invasion of D
the detenu's constitutional right is that the Court is precluded from
adjudicating upon the sufficiency of the grounds and it cannot substi-
tute its objective decision for the subjective satisfactiO'll of the detaining
authority.
Dr. Singhvi very strenuously submitted that the first paragraph of
E
the 'grounds' supplied to the petitioner was of an introductory nature,
that Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 referred to the events which furnished
the background and that th., penultimate paragraph alone contained
the grounds of detention as such. He submitted that it was permissible
to separate the introduction and the recrtal of events constituting the
background from the grounds of detention and if that was done it F
would be apparent that the order of detention suffered from no infirmity.
He sought to draw support for his submission from the decision in
Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of West Bengal and others(2).
It is impossible to agree with the submission of Dr. Singhvi. The
annexure to the order of detention detailing the grounds of detention
• ( has been fully extracted by my learned brother Shinghal, J. we are un-
G
able to see how factual allegations such as those contained in the para-
.. graphs 1 to 5 of the grounds of detention can be said to be merely in-
troductory or as constituting the background. In Naresh Chandra
Ganguly v. State of West Bengal( 2 ) what was read by the Supreme
Court as the 'preamble' was the recital in terms of Section 3 ( 1) H
(I) [!956] SCR 948.
(2) [19601 I S.C.R. 411.
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS Ll 9SO] 1 S.C.R.

A clauses (a) and (b) of the Preventive Detention Act, namely, that
the detenu was being detained in pursuance of a detention order made-
in exercise of the power conferred by Section 3 of the Prewntive De· •
tention Act on the ground that the detenu was acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by thi:'
particulars given thereafter. The particulars given in the subsequent
B paragraphs, the Court said, constituted the grounds. We do not under·
stand Naresh Chandra Ganguly v. The State of West Bengal(') as
laying down that it is permissible to dissect or trisect the grounds of
dete'n'ion into introduction, background and 'grounds' as such. There
is no warrant for any such division.
c The distinction made in Naresh Chandra Ganguly's (supra) case
between tho 'preamble', meaning thereby the recital in terms of the
statutory provision and the 'grounds' meaning thereby the conclusions
of fact which led to the passing of the order of detention does not justi-
fy any distinction being made between introductory facts, background-
facts, and 'grou'nds' as such. All allegations of fact which have led
D to the passing of the order of detention are 'grounds of detention'. If
such allegations are irrelevant or vague the detenu is entitled to be
released.
The attempt of Dr. Singhvi was to treat that allegation which accor-
ding to him was the immediate cause of the order of detention as th•o
E only ground of detentio\1 and all other allegations earlier made as
were introductory and background facts. We are unable to so dissect
the factual allegations mentioned in the document supplied to the
detenu as furnishing the grounds of detention. The last straw which
breaks a camel's back does not make weightless the other loads on
the camel's back.
F The grounds of detention begin with the statement that the detenu
is a 'die-hard Naxalite'. Dr. Singhvi described a Naxalite as a 'votary
of change by resort to violence and urged that as the meaning ascribed
to the expression by the daily press (Marxist Exclamation : the Capi-
talist Press !) . Many may not agree with Dr. Singhvi. Some think
of Naxalites as blood-thirsty monsters; some compare thern to Joan of
G
Arc. It all depends on the class to which one belongs, one's politi- •
cal hues and ideological perceptions.) At one stage of the argument
Dr. Singhvi himself described a Naxalite as an 'ideological revolution-
'
ary'. The detenu himself apparently thought that it meant no more" •
than that he was a believer in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and so he
B affirmatively declared that he was a firm believer in that ideology aµol
was proud of that fact. Though he did urge that the expression
(l) [196011 S. C.R. 411.
I

MOHD. YOUSUF v. J. & K. (Chinnappa Reddy!.) 271

Naxalite connoted a person who sought change through violent means, A
Dr. Singhvi had, nltimately, to confess that the expression 'Naxalite'
was as definite or as vague as all words describing ideologies, such as
• democracy etc., were. It is enough to say that it is just a label which
• can be as misleading as any other and is, perhaps, used occasionally
for that very purpose. B

• Jn the third paragraph of the grounds of detention it is said that
the detenu made a speech in which he asked his audience to shun the
life of dishonour and rise in revolt against oppression. In the fourth
paragraph he is stated to be responsible for posters bearing the caption
"No solution without revolution". · It is also stated that the posters
asked the people to prepare themselves for revolution. Now, expres- c
sions like 'revolt' and 'revolution' are flung about by all and sundry in
all manner of context and it is impossible to attach any particular signi~
ficance to the use of such exprossions. Every turn against the. esta-
blishment is called 'revo:t' and every hew idea is labelled as 'revolution-
ary·'. If the mere use of expressions like 'revolt' and 'revolutioll' are
I>
to land a person behind the bars what would be the fate of all our
legislators ? It all depends on the context in which the expressions
· are used. Neither paragraph three nor paragraph four of the grounds
of detention specifies the particular form of r2volt or revolution which
the detenu advocated. Did he incite people to violence? What
words did he emp!oy ? · What, then, is the connection between these E
grounds and "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
the public order" ? There is no answer to be gleaned from the
grounds reci~cd in paragraphs three and four which must therefore, be
held to be both irrelevant and vague.
in paragraph five it is said that the detenu instigated educated F.•
unemployed youth to go on a hunger strike. A hunger strike, in our
country, is a well known form of peaceful protest but it is difficult to
connect it with public disorder. We consider this ground also to be
vague. and irrelevent. The allegation that the detenu made deroga-
to~y· remarks about Shri Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Chief Minister
,. of Kashmir, and compared him with General Zia of Pakistan appears G
' to _iis, again, to be entirely irrelevant. I do not think it is necessary
to refer to all the grounds in any further detail as that has been done
.. by ·my, brother Shinghal, J. · ·

N. K.A. Petition allowed.
.. ,·_
~.. .- ..