Holding

Where the prosecution evidence is wholly unreliable, a conviction under TADA cannot be sustained even if the conduct qualifies as a terrorist act.

Summary

The appellants were convicted under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and several sections of the Indian Penal Code for setting fire to a Hindu house after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, resulting in multiple deaths. The Supreme Court examined whether the act qualified as a "terrorist act" under TADA, whether the procedural requirements of Section 20‑A(1) and 20‑A(2) – prior approval and sanction – were complied with, and whether the eyewitness testimony was reliable despite delays and lack of a test identification parade. The Court held that the incident did constitute a terrorist act, that the investigation and sanction were valid because Section 20‑A(1) was not in force at the time of the occurrence, and that the sanction order showed proper application of mind. However, the Court found the prosecution’s eyewitness evidence wholly unreliable and lacking corroboration, rendering the convictions unsafe. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and ordered the release of the appellants.

Issues considered

The act of setting fire to a Hindu house after the Babri Masjid demolition – does it constitute a "terrorist act" within the meaning of TADA Section 3(h)?
Whether Section 20‑A(1) requiring prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police was complied with, given the provision became effective after the occurrence.
Whether the sanction under Section 20‑A(2) was valid, i.e., whether the sanctioning authority applied his mind to the material.
Whether the delay in recording statements of eyewitnesses and the absence of a test identification parade render the eyewitness testimony unreliable.
Whether the law of evidence appraisal differs for TADA cases as compared to ordinary criminal cases.
Whether conviction can be sustained on the basis of the contested eyewitness evidence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 9
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 326, s. 436
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 20-A(1), s. 20-A(2), s. 2(h), s. 3(h)

Subjects

terrorist actTADAsanction validityevidence reliabilityidentification paradecommunal violenceappellate reviewcriminal procedure

Judgment

A MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH AND ORS.
v.
ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA

APRIL 15, 1998

B [G.N. RAY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Criminal Law :

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Section
c 2(h).
'Terrorist act '-Meaning of-As a sequel to the demolition of Bahri
Masjid, the house of Hindus was set afire by members of the rival community
with the result that several persons were burnt alive-Held: 'Terrorist act'
produces a prolonged psychological effect on society, disturbs even the
D tempo and tranquillity of society and creates a sense of fear and insecurity
in the minds of a section of the society or society at large-Therefore, having
regard to the sensitive and tense atmosphere then prevailing in the society
and the real impact of the gruesome and atrocious activities on the society,
the aforesaid act amounted to a 'terrorist act'.
E
Section 20-A (1) (introduced w.e.f 22-5-1993)-District Superintendent
of Police (DSP) competent authority to accord approval for application of
TADA-Occurrence took place on 7-1-1993-Commissioner of Police
accorded approval for application of TADA-Validity of-Held: Occurrence
took place prior to coming into force of S. 20-A (1)-Hence, question of
F obtaining prior approval of DSP for application of TADA does not arise-
Even otherwise, the Commissioner of Police, on the basis of the report of
Senior Police Inspector of the concerned police station, had accorded
approval to apply TADA-Jn the circumstances of the case, there is no
infirmity with the investigation being proceeded under TADA, charges being
-
G framed therein and trial being held by the Designated Court.
Section 20-A (1)-Prosecution-Sanction for-Cognizance by court-
Condition precedent-Application of mind before according sanction-Valid
sanction-Held: If the sanction order shows that sanction was granted only +.
after consideration of relevant material then validity of such sanction order
H cannot be questioned on ground of non-application ·of mind-But if the
734
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA 735
sanction order does not clearly indicate application of mind, then prosecution A
---.{, is entitled to adduce evidence allude of the sanctioning authority, based on
which court can be satisfied about application of mind-The fact that sanction
was accorded on the very same day of receipt of relevant papers does not
indicate non-application of mind or invalidate sanction-Administrative Law.

Appreciation of evidence-Held: Law does not make a distinction in B
-< ,.( the matter of appreciation of evidence in a case under TADA or under normal
criminal law.

Criminal Trial :

Appreciation of evidence-Witness-Questioning of-By police-Delay c
in-Held: Delay in questioning the witness by itself does not render his
evidence unreliable-But while testing the credibility and assessing the
intrinsic worth of such evidence court should scrutinise it strictly-Non-
examination of a witness at the earliest point of time, though he was available
right from the time of occurrence, indicates callousness on the conduct of the
D
"' investigating agency.

Appreciation of evidence-Separation of-Chaff from grain-Duty of
court-Held: If the witness is wholly unreliable the question of corroboration
does not arise-Hence, the question of separating the chaff from grain also
does not arise-Unless the prosecution evidence conclusively establishes the E
offence conviction cannot be recorded on mere conjectures and hypothesis.

Evidence Act, 1872: Section 9.

Test Identification Parade-Necessity of-Accused was known to the
witness by face only and not by name-Accused was also shown to the F
witness during investigation-Held: Under such circumstances, evidence of
TI Parade can corroborate the evidence of identification in court-As the
accused was shown to the witness the so-called identification parade loses
its value and identification in court also becomes inconsequential.

The appellant-accused were convicted by the Designated Court for the G
offences under Sections 120-B and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 read with
.+
Section 3(2)(i) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1987, Section 302 IPC and read with Section 149 IPC, Section 436 IPC read
with Section 149 IPC, Sections 147 IPC and 148 IPC and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life. Hence this appeal.
H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A According to the prosecution on 7-1-1993, as a sequel to the demolition
of Bahri Masjid, the accused persons, who were Muslims, terrorised the r--
minority Hindus of the locality in consequence of which the Hindus remained
inside'their respective rooms in the chawl. One of the houses in which some
Hindus had taken shelter was set afire by the accused persons with the
result that several of them were burnt alive. The accused persons were
B arrested and approval of the Commissioner of Police was taken under Section
20-A(l) of TADA for investigation of the case. The Police Commissioner on
27-1-1993 gave the sanction for prosecution of the accused persons under
j..
--
Section 20-A(l) of TADA.

On behalf of the accused persons it was contended that the violence
c committed in the house of the Hindus was not a 'terrorist act' within the
meaning of Section 3(h) of TADA and, therefore, the provisions of TADA
would be inappl.icable; that the order passed by the Commissioner as well as
his evidence in court show that the sanction for prosecution was given
without application of mind and, therefore, it was invalid; that the competent
D authority for granting approval for investigation under Section 20-A(l) of
TADA was the District Superintendent of Police and not the Commissioner
of Police; that there was an inordinate delay in questioning the witnesses by
the police and, therefore, their evidence was untrustworthy and unreliable;
that the accused persons were known to the witnesses by name and not by
face; that the accuse persons were shown to the witnesses by the police
E during investigation; that there was no Test Identification Parade; and,
therefore, the identification of the accused persons by the witnesses in court
was of no consequence.

On behalf of the respo~dent-State it was contended that the testimony
of the witnesses could not b1~ held untrustworthy and unreliable merely on ....
F
the ground of delay in questioning them by the investigating agency; and that
although there were several omissions in the evidence of witnesses yet the
court should separate the chaff from the grain and decide if conviction could
be sustained based on the available grains.

G Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. It is not possible to give a precise definition of terrorism -"".

or to lay down what constitutes terrorism. But it may be possible to describe
it as use of violence when its most important result is not merely the
physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychological
H effect it produces or has the potential of producing on the society as a whole.
MOl!D. JQl:lAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 737

If the object of the activity is to disturb harmony of the society or to terrorise A
people and the society with a view to disturb the even tempo, tranquillity of
the sociei~, and a sense of fear and insecurity is created in the minds of a
section of the society or society at large then it will, undoubtedly, he hdd to
he a terrorist act. The question, therefore, docs not really hoil down to an
examination as to whether for the acth·itics, under the normal criminal law,
the accused 11ersons can he punished but to examine the real impact of such
B
gruesome and atrocious activities on the society at large or at least on the
section of the societ)'. (747-B-EJ

1.2. rf the case in hand is examined from the aforesaid stand point, on
the facts that shortly after the demolition of Bahri Masjid, a communal riot C
erupted and dul"ing that period in the locality in question which was
predominantly occupied hy Muslims, a chawl occupied hy Hindus who were
in minority was set to lire hy the people belonging to the rival community
and on account of such fire, several people were burnt alive, it is difficult
to accept the contention that the activities do not fall within the ambit of the
Terrorist and Disruptiw Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Judging from the D
atrocity of the activities and judging from the sensitive and tense atmosphere
prevailing in the town under which the acts were 11crpetrated resulting
ultimately in the death of several persons, the conclusion becomes irresistihle
that such activities has far reaching consequences and it affects the society
at large and the even tempo had been greatly disturbed and as such the E
provisions of TADA get attracted to such activities. [747-E-GJ

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharshtra, [1994J 4 SCC 602,
relied on.

2. Section 20-A(l) of TADA was brought on the statute book on 22- F
1-1993 and the said provision was not in existence on the date of the occurrence
on 7-1-1993 and consequently, the question of obtaining the prior aJ1J1roval
of the District Superintendent of Police hefore proceeding with the
I investigation into the offence under TADA does not arise. Even othenvise,
the Commissioner of Police by his Order dated 27-1-1993, on the basis of
the repo11 of the Senior Police lns11ector of the concerned police station, G
accorded approval to apply the provisions of TADA. There is, therefore, no
.+ infirmity with the investigation being proceeded under TADA, charges being
framed therein and trial being held by the Designated Court. (748-E-G]

Anirud~hinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC
302, relied on. H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A 3.1. When a statute requires a sanction of the competent authority as
a pre-condition for taking congnizance hy the Com1 and the relcyant sanction
order is produced which itself indicates the materials considered and then ~-
after applying mind, the sanctioning authority accorded sanction, the same
would he sufficient to hold that there is a valid section. Besides, when the
B sanction order it~elf is not sufficient to indicate that the sanctioning authority
applied his mind then the prosecution is entitled to adduce evidence alliunde
of the person who accorded sanction and that would be a ~ullicient compliance.
After going through the said evidence the court can come to the conclusion
that relevant materials were considered by the sanctioning authority
whereafter he accorded the sanction in question. [749-C-E]
C 3.2. In the case in hand if the order passed by the Commissioner of
Police sanctioning prosecution of the accused persons under TADA is
examined, it would be a11parent that the sanctioning authority clearly persued
the records of investigation and then on being sati~fied passed the impugned
order of the sanction. The sanctioning authority was examined as a witness
D in the court and his evidence clearly ~1ablishes that it is only after thoroughly
a11plying his mind to the relevant materials and the 11roposals, he accorded
sanction on being satisfied that a 111ima facie case exists against the accused
persons to 11roceed against them under TADA. It cannot, therefore, be said
that there has been no valid sanction as required under Section 20-A(l) of
TADA. There was no infirmity with the sanction accorded in the case and
E as such there was no illegality in taking cognizance and trying the accused
11ersons under TADA. [749-E-G]
4.1. Merely because a witness was examined after a considerable
period from the date of occurrence his evidence need not be discarded on that
ground alone but at the same time while testing the creibility and assessing
p the intrinsic worth of such witnesses the delay in their examination by the
police has to be borne in mind and their evidence would require a stricter "'
scrutiny before being accepted. [750-D]
4.2. When a witness who happens to be a resident of the locality where
the incident occurred and took active 11a11 in rescuing the injured persons
from the burnt house in the presence of the police and then accom11anied
G them to the hospital and was also available at the hospital when police had
come but for some mysterious reasons police did not choose to ask him
anything about the occurrence, then this conduct on the part of the + •
investigation is highly reprehensible and indicates the callousness on the
part of the investigating agency in carrying out the investigation in the case.
H (751-F-G]
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 739
5. If the witness knew the accused persons either by name or by face, A
question of police showing him the accused becomes irrelevant. If the witness
did not know the accused persons by name but can only identify from their
appearance then a test identification parade was necessary, so that the
substantive evidence in court about the identification, which is held after
fairly a long period, could get corroboration from the identification parade. B
But in this case the prosecution did not take any steps in that regard and
no test identification parade had been held. Then again if the police show the
accused persons in the police lock-up to the identifying witness then the so-
called identification loses its value, inasmuch as, it is only because of the
police showing the persons, the witness is being able to identify the alleged
accuse. If the accused has been shown to him in the course of investigation C
then the so-called identification in court is of no consequence and cannot
form the basis of convicting. Therefore, if the witness was called to the police
station while the accused persons were in police lock-up and the witness had
been given the opportunity of seeing those persons in the police lock-up then
the so-called identification made by the witness in court is of no significance.
[753-D-F; 757-G) D
6. It is true that in a country like India where it is difficult to find a
witness who has not made any embellishment or exaggeration and, therefore,
. in such a case court would be justified in separating the chaff from the grain
· and then act upon the grain. But where the evidence consists of only chaff,
as in the present case, question of separating chaff from the grain would not E
arise. Then again when all the eyewitnesses suffer from the same infirmities
the question of one corroborating the other would not arise. If a witness is
partly reliable and partly unreliable then one may look for corroboration to
the reliable part of the ocular version of a witness. But if a witness is wholly
unreliable the question of corroboration does not arise. Even though the F
present case was a ghastly one and on account of communal frenzy several
people belonging to one community were brunt alive by some others but
unless and until the prosecution evidence conclusively establishes those
others, as the perpetrators of the crimes, it is not possible for a court of law
to record conviction on mere conjectnres and hypothesis. [761-D-G[

7. The law does not make any distinction in the matter of appreciation
G
of evidence in a case under TADA or under normal criminal law. [761-A)

Dilawar Husssain v. State of Gujarat JT, (1990) 4 SC 282, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
97-100of1997. H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 2 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.96 of the Designated Court
in Bombay in TADA Special Case Nos. 35/93 @ 1194@ 37/94@ 17 of 1995. .,....._
P.C. Jain, A. Vachher and K.L. Mehta for Mis. K.L. Mehta, Co., for the
Appellants.

B M.S. Nargolkar, S.S. Shindhe and D.M. Nargolkar for the Respondents.

)>....
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PA TTANAIK, J. These appeals by the 11 accused persons under Section
19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive f_ctivities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter
c referred to as ' the TADA) are directed against the judgment dated 16.10.1996
passed by the Additional Judge, Designated Court for Greater Bombay in
TADA Special Case Nos, 35/93@ 1194, 37/94 and 17/95. These appellants and
six other stood charged under Sections 120(B), 147, 148, 149, 302, 326, 436,
506 1.P.C. and Section 3(2)(i) and (ii) of the TADA for the ghastly occurrence
D dated 7th of January, 1993, wherein six persons died out of bum injuries being
locked in a room and the room having been put to fire by putting petrol on ,,.,
it. The occurrence is a sequel to the demolition of Bahri Masjid at Ayodya.
Shortly after the demolition of the mosque at Ayodya communal riots erupted
all over the country including the city of Mumbai. When communal riots
erupted in the city in the suburban Jogeswari, an area known as Bandra plots
E was predominantly occupied by the Muslims and Hindus were in minority. A
number of Hindu families were staying in chawls known as Gandhi Chaw!,
Rajbhai Chaw!, Nail Chaw! etc. The accommodation usually consists of one-
room-tenements having one entrance door and the tenements are situated
adjacent to each other. The tragic incident occurred in the house of deceased
F Rajaram Bane who was residing in room no. 2 of Gandhi Chaw!. As stated
earlier the Hindu community being in minority, while a group of residents had
taken shelter in room no. 2 of Gandhi Chaw!, it is alleged that the Muslim
accused persons put petrol on the roof of said room no. 2 of Gandhi Cha\\ I
....
-
-,:::
and set it on fire and in course of occurrence Rajaram Bane, his wife Sulochana,
his neighbours Laxmi Bai Batalu and her daughter Kamla, one crippled girl by
G name Meenakshi Narkar and one Vandana Todkar died out of burn injuries.
It may be stated, out of these deceased persons Sulochana and Vandana were
removed to the hospital and they died in the hospital on 10th of January, 1993 .f -
and 16th of January, 1993, respectiveiy, while the rest died at the spot itself.
While the occurrence is undoubtedly a ghastly one and exhibits the brutality
H with which the members of one community attacked the members of another
,r
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANA!K. J.] 74 J
community at a point of time when people had been depraved of their sense A
of judgment and decency and when people had behaved like animals, the still
·---«: more painful is the manner in which the prosecuting agency picked up
indiscriminately people from one community as they were residing in the
locality and booked them under different sections of the Penal Code and the
TADA and ultimately the learned Designated Court convicted these 11 B
appellants and acquitted six other co-accused persons. This case exhibits not
only callousness on the part of the investigating agency and the cavalier
~ fashion with which the investigation proceeded but also the extent to which
the trial judge has been swayed away to record conviction without any legally
admissible trustworthy evidence. It would, therefore, be necessary for this
Court to scrutinise the evidence with care and caution and to find out as to C
whether notwithstanding the infirmities in the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses whether conviction of any of the accused appellants can at all be
sustained.

The prosecution case in brief is that on 7th of January, 1993 the accused
persons along with some other Muslims terrorised the minority Hindus of the D
locality in consequence of which the Hindus remained inside their respective
rooms in the Chaw!. The prosecution further alleged that these accused
persons came with deadly weapons in their hands at 9.30 p.m. and warned
the Hindus of the locality not to come out of their respective tenements as
otherwise they would be killed. The Hindus got frightened, and therefore, E
preferred to remain inside their respective houses. At 11.30 p.m. while the
Hindus had taken shelter in their respective tenements they could hear some
noise outside and then through the windows they could see that some of
these accused persons had sprinkled petrol/kerosene on the ota and door of
the room of Rajaram Bane and then set the said room to fire. As the room
had been closed from outside, the persons who were inside the room of F
Rajaram Bane shouted for help but none of the Hindu community could come
out, because of fear for their lives from the unruly Muslim accused persons
who had been armed with lethal weapons. Seeing the flames, however, the
police rushed to the spot and seeing the police the accused persons ran away.
After the police arrived at the spot the other Hindus who were living in their G
respective tenements and some of whom are the prosecution witnesses
mustered courage and came out and tried their best to extinguish fire. By the
time the fire could be extinguished and t!1e people were able to get into the
room, Rajaram Bane, his neighbour Laxmi Bai Batalu and her daughter Kam.la
and another crippled girl by name Meenakshi Narkar were found dead. Rajaram
Bane's wife Sulochana and another lady Vandana Todkar were alive but had H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORfS (1998) 2 S.C.R

A suffered serious burn injuries, and therefore, they were removed to the hospital.
Sulochana died in the hospital on 10. l.1993 and Vandana died on 16.1.1993
r~
in the hospital. The police then shifted the Hindu population of the local it)
to a nearby Municipal School and accommodated them in a room under strict
police vigilance. Vandana who "·as alive and had been removed to the Cooper
Hospital gave her statement on the basis of which CR No. 15 of 1993 in
B Jogeshwari Police Station was registered and police took up im estigation of
the said case. After the police officers of Jogeshwari Police Station had
~
proceeded with the investigation to some extent, the investigation was
entrusted to D.C.P (CID) who registered CR No. 14of1993. The approval of
the Police Commissioner was taken under Section 20A. (I), for investigation
c of the case, under TADA and after completion of the investigation sanction
of the Commissioner under Section 20A.(2) was obtained and charge sheet
was submitted against 14 accused persons in TADA Special Case No. 35 of
1993. Subsequent to the filling of the aforesaid charge sheet when accused
No. 15 was arrested a fresh charge sheet was filed against him in TAD<\.
Special Case No. 1to1994 and similarly Special Case No. 37of1994 was filed
D against accused No. 16 and Special Case No. 17 of 1995 was filed against
accused No. 17. The learned Designated Court framed charges against all the
17 accused persons under Sections 120 (P), 147, 143, 149, 302, 326, 436, 506
I.PC. and under Section 3(2)(i) and (ii) of the TADA. The accused persons
denied their complicity in the crime and took the stand that as the mvestigating
E agency failed to arrest the real culprit and a communal riot had erupted in the
area and some Hindus were burnt and ultimately died, the accused persons
who belonged to the Muslim community were residing in the locality were
arrested and were arrayed as accused persons. The defence also challenged
the validity of the sanction given by the Commissioner of Police.

F The learned designated court formulated 12 points for being answered
,J...
and then after analysis of the oral and documentary evidence on record as ...
well as the material produced came to hold that prosecution has proved valid
permission of the competent authority for applying the provisions of TADA
and valid sanction to prosecute the accused as required under Section 20A
I
of the Act. The learned court also came to hold that the accused persons Nos.
G L 2, 4. 7, 8, 9, IO, I I, 14, 15, and 17 struck terror in the minds of Hindus public
to adversely affect the disharmony amongst Hindus and Muslims and for that
purpose used explosives like petrol and kerosene and entered into a conspiracy +-
to c,ommit the terrorist act. It further came to hold that the said 11 accused
persons were the members of an unlawful assembly whose common object
H was to threat the Hindus to kill and further to strike terror in the minds of
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANAIK, J.] 743

Hindu persons with lethal weapons. It also came to hold that the 11 accused A
persons used force with the common object to kill the Hindus and committed
riot and while committing riot used deadly weapons like choppers and knives.
The designated court further held that the aforesaid 11 accused persons
being members of an unlawful assembly and in furtherance of their common
intention to kill the deceased knowingly burnt the house of Rajaram Bane with B
intention and knowledge that thereby they will cause the death of the deceased
and in the process committed murders of Rajaram Bane, Sulochana, Laxmi Bai,
Kamla, Meenakshi and Vandana. The learned designated court also came to
hold that the aforesaid 11 accused persons being members of an .unlawful
assembly committed terror in the minds of the Hindu public possessjng
swords, choppers. petrol and kerosene and burnt the house of Rajaran1 Bane C
after pouring kerosene and petrol on the house and set the said house on
fire. With these conclusions the aforesaid 11 accused persons having been
convicted and sentenced to difierent terms as hereinafter. The accused
appellants were convicted for the offences under Section 120 B read with
Section (3(2) (1) of TADA, under Section 149 !PC read with Section 3(2)(i) of
TADA, under Section 302 !PC read with Section 149 lPC, under Section 436 D
read with Section 149 !PC and under Sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal
Code. For such conviction they are sentenced to imprisonment for life and
to pay a fine of Rs. 500, in default to sufier R.I. for six months. The Designated
Court did not, however, award separate sentence for each of the offence. The
present appeal has been preferred against the aforesaid convictiol\ and E
sentence passed by the designated court. Be it be stated that out of 17
accused persons, who stood trial, 6 of them have been acquitted of all the
charges against them. The prosecution in support of its case ·examined several
witnesses of whom PWs 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10 are stated to be the eye-witnesses
to the crime. In coming to the conclusion that the prosecution case has been
established beyond reasonable doubt and it is these accused appellants who F
are the perpetrators of the crime the learned designated court examined the
evidence of the aforesaid 6 eye-witnesses and held them to be reliable and
on the basis of their identification of the accused persons in court convicted
those accused persons who could be identified by two or more witnesses. In
assessing the testimony of the aforesaid eye-witnesses and in deciding the G
question of the reliability of these witnesses the learned designated court has
examined whether it was at all possible for the witnesses to see the occurrence
•· + from the place where they alleged to have been seen, the inordinate delay in
their examination by the investigating officer under Section 161 Cr. P.C., their
non-disclosure of the incident to anybody else, and the fact that they were
admittedly residing in the locality where the occurrence took place. Having H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A examined the impugned judgment of the learned designated court, we find
that what persuaded the learned Judge to believe the testimony of these
witnesses is the fact that they are the residents of the locality and the
accused persons also belonged to the said locality and they know each other
well and as such there could not have been any mistaken identity of the
accused persons. The learned designated court, however. took the precaution,
B since large number of accused persons were involved, to hold that the
prosecution case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt against those
accused persons who have been identified by more than two eye witnesses
of the occurrence.

C Mr. Jain the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellants
contended before us that 1.he evidence of the so-called eye-witnesses examined
in this case b~· the prosecution is totally unworthy of credit and no credence
can be given to their testimony of account of several infirmities in the same.
According to the learned counsel the method adopted by the learned Judge
while the witnesses were being examined to get the accused persons identified
D is a peculiar one and, therefore, no reliance can be placed on such identification
in court after so many years of the occurrence. According to Mr. Jain, if the
witnesses really knew the accused persons being resident of the same locality
nothing stood in their way to name them and in case they did not know the
name but could identify them only on seeing them then in the absence of any
E earlier test identification parade and merely pointing out one or two persons
from amongst the 17 accused persons who stood tried it is not possible to
hold that in fact the accused persons were· duly identified by the witnesses
in court.

Mr. Jain also further urged that Vandana, the deceased, had categorically
F stated that some unknown Muslim people threw petrol on the house and set A

fire to the house. While in the hospital, she made a statement on 14.1.1993 ...
that she could see petrol being sprinkled on the roof and then the house
being set to fire but yet did not name any of the accused persons and on
the other hand stated that the faces of the accused persons were covered
G with napkins. Sulochana, the other deceased, was specifically asked as to
whether she could recognise any of the persons who set fire to the house,
she replied in the negative as the faces of the accused persons had been
covered with napkins. Naina as well as Sandeep and Sailesh who survived
in the incident were not examined by the prosecution and practically no
explanation has been offered. The eye-witnesses, who were examined, though
H stated in court that they knew the accused persons from the childhood or at
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF ~IAHARASHTRA jPAfTANAIK. J] 745

least for 25 years yet they did not know the names of the accused persons. A
Mr. Jain also severely commented upon the fact that the time of the incident
has been shifted from 12.30 in night to l l .30. which was necessary because
PW-7 in his evidence had indicated that he had learnt about the burning of
the room in the Chaw! at 11.00 p.m. So far as PW I and PW 9 are concerned.
according to Mr. Jain. it would be difficult for any person to see the incident B
from where they alleged to have seen in view of the existence of the cement
grill in their front. The learned counsel also contended that after the arrest
of the accused persons and before they were put to trial and the witnesses
were called upon to identify those accused persons on several occasions and
as such the witnesses had the opportunity of seeing them and in fact they
so deposed in their evidence in court. Mr. Jain also submitted that though C
several other independent witnesses from the adjacent locality were examined
by the prosecution in course of im·estigation but during trial those witnesses
were not produced. Even Smt. Sukesha Bane occupying room just opposite
to Rajaram Bane whose room was set to fire, though had been examined by
the police during im·estigation but was not examined during trial. This being
the nature of evidence of the eye-witnesses, Mr. Jain urged that conviction D
of the appellants on the basis of such infirm evidence is wholly unsustainable
and as such the appellants are entitled to be acquitted. Mr. Jain also urged
that the case in hand reveals a problem relating to ordinary criminal law and
alleged violence on the house of Rajaram Bane at Gandhi Chaw! on the
relevant date cannot be held to be a 'terrorist act' within the meaning of E
Section 3(h) of the TADA and, therefore, the provisions of TADA would be
wholly inapplicable. On the basis of the evidence of the Police Commissioner
and the sanction granted by the Commissioner the learned counsel urged that
there had been no application of mind by the Commissioner of Police to the
relevant materials and on the other hand the said Commissioner has
mechanically signed the order of sanction and as such the cognizance of the F
offence itself becomes vitiated as the provisions of Section 20A(2) must be
held not to have been complied with.

Mr. Nargolkar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent on
the other hand contended that a ghastly occurrence took place on the fateful G
night where several people were burnt alive and such a ghastly crime should
not go unpunished. According to the learned counsel, taking into account the
situation then prevalent arising out of demolition of Babri mosque. at Ayodya,
the delay caused in examining the witnesses by the investigating agency
cannot be held to be a ground for impeaching the testimony of the witnesses
in court. The learned counsel also urged that the so-called contradictions or H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 2 S.C.R.

A variance inter se between the witnesses have to be viewed from the stand
point that they were utterly stunned by the ferocity and ghastly act of the
accused persons and when near and dear ones were found to have been
burnt in their front, it is just possible that they have not been able to
remember the incident \Vith minute detail and on that score some variance is
reasonable but the witnesses can ·t be held to be untrustworthy on that score.
B Mr. Nargolkar further contended that the witnesses being sufficiently familiar
with the accused persons who were residing in the same locality, there cannot
be any doubt about their capacity to identify nor the identification made by
them in the court can be said to be infirm and, therefore, the learned designated
court rightly took the precaution and convicted only those persons who
C could be identified by two or more eye-witnesses to the occurrence. Mr.
Nargolkar also urged that the presence of the witnesses at the scene of
occurrence cannot be disputed as they were admittedly the residents of the
locality, opportunity on their part to see the accused persons was sufficient
as the activities continued for a fairly long period and, therefore, it was quite
natural for the witnesses to remember the role played by the accused persons
D and there is no justification to discard such trustworthy evidence. Judged
from this stand point the conviction recorded by the learned designated court
is unassailable. Mr. Nargolkar also submitted that the order of sanction prima
facie indicates clear application of mind of the sanctioning authority who
accorded the sanction after perusing all the relevant material. That apart, the
E sanctioning authority also deposed in court and indicated the materials
considered by him before according sanction and in this view of the matter
the challenge of the appellants to the validity of the order of sanction cannot
be sustained. According to tl1e learned counsel, Mr. Nargokar, the atrocities
and activities perpetrated by the accused persons at a point of time when the
communal riots had broken in this city of Bombay had such impact on the
F society that such activities cannot but be held to be 'terrorist activity' within
the ambit of TADA and as such the provisions of TADA have rightly been
applied. Mr. Nargolkar, lastly submitted that undoubtedly there are some
embellishments and omissions in the statements of the eye-witnesses made
-
in court from their statements made to the police during investigation but
G such omissions and embellishments are not in respect of the substratum of
the prosecution case and. therefore. the evidence of such witnesses cannot
be discarded as a whole. According to the learned counsel, court must in
such case separate the chaff from the grain and then on the grains available ..{ ~
would examine whether the conviction of the accused persons can be
sustained or not. In this view of the matter, it is contended by the learned
H counsel for the respondent that the appea I deserves to be dismissed.
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAllARASHTRA [PATTANAIK, J.J 747

In view of the rh·al submissions at the bar. the first question that arises A
for our consideration in whether the activities can be held to be 'terrorist
-.:: acti1·ities· so as to bring it within the pufl"ie11· of TADA. The expression
·terrorist act" has not been defined and. on the other hand. Section 2(h)
stipulates that it would have the same meaning as has been assigned to it
in sub-section (I) of Section 3. The expression ·terrorism· has not been B
defined under the Act and as has been held by this Court in the case of
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State o/Maharashtra, [ 1994] 4 SCC 602.
it is not possible to give a precise definition of terrorism or to lay down what
constituted terrorism. But the Court had indicated in the aforesaid decision
that it may be possible to describe it as use of violence when its most
important result is not merely the physical and mental damage of the victim C
but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or has the potential of
producing on the society as a whole. It has also been stated in the aforesaid
decision that if the object of the activity is to disturb harmony of the society
or to terrorise people and the society with a view to disturb even the tempo,
tranquillity of the society, and a sense of fear and insecurity is created in the
minds of a section of the society or society at large, then it will. undoubtedly, D
be held to be a terrorist act. The question, therefore, does not really boil down
to an examination as to whether for the activities, under the normal criminal
law, the accused persons can be punished but to examine the real impact of
such grnesome and atrocious activities on the society at large or at least on
the section of the society. If the case in hand is examined from the aforesaid E
stand point, on the facts that shortly after the demolition of Babri Masjid at
Ayodhya, a communal riot erupted in Mumbai and during that period in the
locality in question which was predominantly occupied by Muslims, a Chaw!
occupied by Hindus who were in minority was set to fire by the people
belonging to the rival community and on account of such fire, several people
were burnt alive, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Jain that the F
.. activities do not fall within the ambit to TADA. In our considered opinion,
judging from the atrocity of the activities and judging from the sensitive and
tense atmosphere prevailing in the town under which the acts were perpetrated
resulting ultimately in the death of several persons, the conclusion becomes
irresistible that such activities has far reaching consequences and it affects G
the society at large and the even tempo had been greatly disturbed and as
such the provisions of the Act get attracted to such activities.

The next question that arises for consideration is whether there has
been an infraction of sub-section (I) of Section 20(a) inasmuch as the competent
authority prescribed under the statute haye not exercised jurisdiction vested H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 2 S.C.R.
748
A in him and, on the other hand. an authority \\'ho was not competent has
accorded ~?pronli for application of the provisions. and as such entire
proceeding starting from inyestigation and culminating in cotl\'iction gets
yitiatcd. This contention of Mr. Jain i> mainly based upon the fact that though
under the provisions of TADA only the district Superintendent of Police
could accord approYal but in fact ii is the State Government who accorded
B apprO\·al and the Stale Government being not the prescribed authority under
the statute, investigation made must be held lo be without jurisdiction and
consequently the ultimate conviction cannot be sustained. Reliance has been
placed on the decision of this Court in the case ofAnirudhsinhji Karanshinhji
Jadeja and Am: v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302. In the said case, what
C has been held by this Court is that for invocation of the Act, the District
Superintendent of Police is the authority whose prior approval is condition
precedent and since the said statutory authority, who has been vested with
jurisdiction, did not exercise his discretion and, on the other hand. orders
were based at the behest of the higher authority, then in the eye of law, it
is to be held that the prescribed authority has not exercised discretion at all.
D On examining the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion
that the ratio of the aforesaid case has no application at all.

Firstly, Section 20A(l) was brought on the statute book by Central Act
43 of 1993 w.e.f. 22nd May, 1993 and said provision was not in existence on
E the date of the occurrence on 7th of January, 1993 and consequently, the
question of obtaining the prior approval of the District Superintendent of
Police before proceeding with the investigation into the offence under TADA
does not arise. EYen otherwise, the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay,
by his Order dated the 27th of Januaiy, 1993, on the basis of the report of
the Senior Police Inspector, Jogeshwari Police Station dated 13th of January,
F 1993, accorded approval to apply the provisions of TADA, in Jogeshwari
Police Station CR No. 15 of 1993 and we find no infirmity with the said Order.
In this view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the investigation
being proceeded under TADA, charges being framed therein and trial being
held by the designated Court, Mr. Jain's contention on this score, therefore,
G must be rejected.

The next question that arises for consideration is whether the sanction
accorded under Section 20A(2) is invalid. Undoubtedly, without the previous ~ ~
sanction of the Commissioner of Police no Court can take cognizance of any
offence under the Act. Mr. Jain docs not dispute that factually their exists and
H Order of the Commissioner of Police sanctioning the prosecution of the
_)>__.

MOHD. IQBAL M. SHA!hH v. STATE OF ~IAHARASHTRA IPATTANAIK, J.l 749

accused persons under TAD A but according to the learned Sr. Counsel. Mr. A
Jain. the said sanction is the outcome of total non-application of mind to the
rdevant materials and. therefore. cannot be held to be a valid sanction in the
eye of the law. It is. in this connection. Mr. Jain, the learned Senior Counsel.
took us through the order passed by the Commissioner of Police, Greater
Bombay. Shri A.S. Samra as well as his evidence in Court and from the fact B
that the day on which he received all the papers in course of investigation
together with the proposal for filling of the charges, he has accorded the
impugned sanction, exhibit total non-application of mind, and therefore, the
sanction accorded is vitiated. We are unable to accept this contention raised
by the learned counsel. The law is well settled that when a statute requires
a sanction of the competent authority as a pre-condition for taking cognizance C
by the Court and the relevant sanction Order is produced which itself indicated
the materials considered and then after applying mind, the sanctioning authority
accorded sanction, the same would be sufficient to hold that there is a valid
sanction. Besides, when the sanction order itself is not sufficient to indicate
that the sanctioning authority applied his mind then the prosecntion is entitled
to adduce evidence aliunde of the person who accorded sanction and that D
would be a sufficient compliance. After going through the said evidence, the
Court can come to the conclusion that relevant materials were considered by
the sanctioning authority whereafter he accorded the sanction in question. In
the case in hand if the Order passed by the Commissioner of Police
sanctioning prosecution of the accused persons under TADA is examined, it E
would be apparent that the sanctioning authority clearly perused the records
of investigation and then on being satisfied passed the impugned order of
the sanction. The sanctioning authority was examined as witness in the Court
and his evidence clearly establishes that it is only after thoroughly applying
his mind to the relevant materials and the proposals, he accorded sanction
on being satisfied that a prima facie case exists as against the accused F
persons to proceed against them under TADA. We are, therefore, unable to
accept the submission of Mr. Jain, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellants that there has been no valid sanction as required under Section
20A(2) of the Act and we sec no infirmity with the sanction accorded in the
case and as such there was no illegality in taking cognizance and trying the G
accused persons under TADA.

Let us now examine the reliability of the prosecution witnesses through
whom the prosecution has to establish that the case against the appellants
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. As has been stated earlier the six
witnesses who were supposed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence are H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C R.

A PWs 1, 2, 3, .4, 9 and 10. It is to be noticed that while PW 4 was examined
by the police on 17.1.1993 and PW 3 was examined by the police on 18.1.1993
y--
but PW 2 Surya Kant was examined on 25. 1.1993 and the three other eye-
witnesses were examined on 29.1.1993 while the occurrence was on 7.1.1993.
It is established from the prosecution evidence itself that these witnesses
were the inhabitants of Gandhi Chaw! where the ghastly incident occurred
B and immediately on the next day of the occurrence they were shifted to a local
school for safety and were staying there. Normally, therefore, there was no .-
)._
justification on the part of the investigating agency in not examining them for
this length of time. The only explanation offered by the investigating officer
is that on account of riot the police was busy with law and order problem but
c that problem did not continue for this length of time and in fact the
investigating officer has failed to indicate as to why the eye-witnesses though
available had not been examined till 29.1.1993. We are conscious of the fact
that merely because a witness was examined after a considerable period from
the date of occurrence his evidence need not be discarded on that ground
alone but at the same time while testing the credibility and assessing the
D intrinsic worth of such witnesses the delay in their examination by the police
'T
has to be borne in mind and their evidence would require a stricter scrutiny
before being accepted. We would, therefore, apply the test of stricter scrutiny
and consider the value of their evidence. It may be stated at this stage that
even though the statement of Vandana Todkar which was treated as FIR did
not reveal the name of any accused person and PW 4 - Mohinder Eknath was
E
the first eye-witness to be examined by the police on 17.1.1993 but much prior
to that date accused No. 1, accused No. 2 and accused No. 3 were arrested
by the police. PW 1 - Nitin Pandurang, in his evidence-in-chief has stated that
he could see through the window of his house that four persons were
sprinkling kerosene and petrol on the doors and the roof of the house of
F Rajaram Bane and those persons are : Sallo, Iqbal, Kalya Kasam and Langda
Bachchan. According to the witness he knew these four persons from his ""' ~

childhood and he could identify them in court. On being asked to identify
them he correctly identified accused Sallo and Iqbal. Thus, it appears that a
witness who was acquainted with the accused persons right from his childhood
though named four of them in the chief but could identify only two of them,
G namely, accused 9 and accused 1. This itself throws considerable doubt on
the reliability of the witness. The witness had further stated that when he saw
-( ~
the room occupied by his sister Vandana Todkar has been set to fire he came
out of his room and at that point of time he could see a person called
Tubelight Baba who was holding a chopper in his hand and Baba Rickshawala
H who was also holding a chopper in his hand and Musa was holding a Sword
~10HD. !(./HALM. SHAJKH 1·. ~TAT!:, OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANAIK, J.] 751

and several other persons had gathered there. In the court, the witness A
pointed out accused No. 8 as accused Hayatu and accused No. 7 as Musa.
The witness also identified accused Tubelight Baba. The witness pointed out
another accused and told his name as Salim Istriwala but he was actually
Shaikh Salim Babamiyan. The witness further stated that the person by named
Tubelight Baba was shown to him in the Crime Branch. If the accused has B
been shown to him in the course of investigation then the so-called identification
in court is of no consequence and cannot form the basis of conviction. It is,
of course, true that accused Nos. 7 and 8 have been correctly named and
identified by the witness in court but not the accused Shaikh Salim Babamiyan
as the name indicated by the accused was Salim Istriwala and there is no
material on record to indicate that Shaikh Salim Babamiyan was also being C
called as Salim Istriwala. It further appears that witness told in his evidence
that even he did not know the names, but the persons who were present at
the time of incident are also present in the court and then could point out
two persons who are accused Nos. 17 and 13. It may be stated that the
witness having not known these persons by name and there having not been
any test identification prade earlier by mere pointing in court after so many D
days, the said alleged identification cannot be pressed into service by the
prosecution. From lhe evidence of this witness it further transpires that after
the fire was extinguished he entered into the house of Rajaram Bane and took
out the injured persons at a point of time when the police was also present
and the injured persons were carried to the hospital through the Ambulance E
and he had accompanied the injured to the hospital and then he remained in
the hospital till next morning and police had come to the hospital but the
police never examined him or asked him anything about the occurrence. It is
really amazing to note that a witness who happens to be a resident of the
locality where the incident occurred and took active part in rescuing the
injured persons from the burnt house in the presence of the police and then F
accompanied them to the hospital and was also available at the hospital when
police had come but for some mysterious reasons police did not choose to
ask him anything about the occurrence. This conduct on the part. of the
investigation is highly reprehensible and indicates the callousness on the part
of the investigating agency in carrying out the investigation in the case. It G
is also revealed from the evidence of this witness that even though all the
accused persons were present while the witness was being examined but he
stated that accused Lengda Bachchan was not present in the court. In his
former statement made to the police he had omitted to state several aspects
and those omissions have been confronted to the witness to which he denied
and the investigating officer also had brought out as to what the witness H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) 2 S.C.R.

A stated in his examination under Section 161 Cr. P.C. and those material
omissions amount to contradiction and such contradiction makes the witness
untrustworthy. r-
According to PWl he saw the occurrence from the cement grill of the
window of his house but PW 6, the draftsman, who has been examined by
B the prosecution categorically stated in his evidence that if a person stands
inside the house of Nitin Gardi and tries to see through window of the house
then the house of Rajaram Bane will not be visible as the cement grill in the ~
house of Nitin Gardi has sufficient thickness and thereby obstruction is
caused. This statement of PW 6 makes it impossible for PW 1 to see the
C occurrence from inside his house as narrated by him in Court. PW 1 stated
in Court that police had recorded his statement immediately after the incident
but the said statement has not been produced by the prosecution. He
categorically stated in Court that he had stated to the police when examined
on 29th January, 1993, that he saw Rajaram Bane, Sulochna, Vandana,
Meenakshi and Laxmibai when they were burning with fire, but infact, he had
D not stated so in his earlier statement to the police and on being confronted
he states that the had not stated so. In Court the witness had stated that he ...,...
found Rajaram Bane dead when he entered the burnt house. Curiously enough
he had not stated so in his statement recorded by the police on 29th Januazy,
1993. Even in his earlier statement to the police he had not even stated about
E accused persons pouring kerosene on the house of Rajaram Bane and on
being confronted he states that he does not know as to why it has not been
mentioned in his earlier statement. In view of the aforesaid glaring infirmities
it would be unwise to rely on this witness and, therefore, his evidence cannot
be pressed into service by the prosecution for bringing home the charge
against the accused persons.
F
PW 2-Suryakant, was a resident in the room No. 5 of Gandhi Chaw!.
According to his evidence he saw from inside his house that accused Sallo
...
was holding a plastic cane containing Kerosene. But in the court when he was
asked to identify the said accused Sallo he went and pointed out one of the
accused persons in court who on enquiry revealed that his name is Khwaja
G Sattar Shaikh. It is really amazing that a person who claims to be an inhabitant
of the locality for long years and claims to have closed association with the
accused persons would make such a wrong identification and such wrong .k- ~
identification totally makes the witness unbelievable. Such erroneous
identification can be the result of the fact that he does not know the accused
H persons at all or that he was not present when the occurrence took place. The
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANAIK, J.) 753

witness, of course, correctly identified accused No. 4 Mohd. Yusuf Gui. He A
also stated that accused Baba Rickshawala was armed with Sallya (Iron Rod)
and on being asked to identi(y the said accused he pointed out to one person
who tole his name as Mohammed Jafar. There is no evidence to indicate that
Mohammed Jafar was also commonly called as Baba Rickshawala. Similarly,
he stated that accused Tubelight Baba was holding a sword and when he B
pointed out the person to whom he knew as Tubelight Baba that person
.) concerned revealed his name as Mustaque Yasin Khan. Prosecution has not
been able to establish any eyidence to indicate that Mustaque Yasin Khan
was also being called as Tubelight Baba. This witness correctly identified
accused Iqbal Hussain and accused Musa. But the question for consideration
would be whether any credence can be given to such identification. According C
to the witness he has been in the locality since 1972 and, therefore, he knew
the accused persons personally. If that is the correct state of affairs it is not
expected as to how he could commit mistake in identifying the accused Sallo
who was supposed to have played the key role of holding a plastic cane
containing kerosene and sprinkling kerosene. Evidence of this witness also
indicates that he had been called to the Police Station on several occasions D
and had been shown the accused persons. If the witness knew the accused
persons either by name or by face, question of police showing him the
accused persons becomes irrelevant. If the witness did not know the accused
persons by name but can only identify from their appearance then a test
identification prade was necessary, so that, the substantive evidence in court E
about the identification, which is held after fairly a long period, could get
corroboration from the identification parade. But unfortunately the prosecution
did not take any steps in that regard and no test identification prade had been
held. Then again if the police shows the accused persons in the police lock-
up to the identifying witness then the so-called identification loses its value,
inasmuch as, it is only because of the police showing the persons, the F
.. witness is being able to identify the alleged accused. It is further revealed
from the evidence of this witness that when the accused persons were
pouring kerosene on the house of Rajaram Bane the door was open and
Rajaram Bane later closed the door when the witness also closed the door of
his house, obviously, referring to the period when the accused came. This on G
the face of it is improbable inasmuch as if accused persons are seen to be
pouring petrol and kerosene on the roof of the house, where people has taken
shelter nobody would close the door so as to give opportunity to the accused
persons to achieve their goal ofburnmg the persons inside alive. On the other
hand the normal human conduct is that the persons would come out of the
house irrespective of the danger \Vhich they may face even coming out. If his H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S. C.R.

A statement to the police recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is compared with
the statement in court it appears that there has been material contradictions
and omissions which would make his statement wholly unbelievable and
unreliable. If, Gullu was holding a cane containing kerosene and poured
kerosene on the house of Rajaram Bane as stated by the witness in court
B there cannot be any possible explanation why that did not find place in his
earlier statement made to the police. The said statement made to the police
had been duly confronted and the witness merely admits the fact. Such a
glaring omission in the earlier statement of the witness in respect of the most
important aspect of Gullu's conduct unhesitatingly points out to the unreliability
-
of the witness. In the court the witness had stated that he could see the
C incident from the window of the house where he was staying but he did not
state so while being examined by the Police under Section 161 Cr.PC. It is also
interesting to note that while the witness in his statement under 161 had
stated that Sulochana, Vandana, Naina had several burn injuries and Sandeep
and Sailesh had minor burn injuries but in that court he stated that he saw
only one injured person - nan1e - Sulochana and on being confronted he
D stated that he cannot ascribe any reason as to why police had recorded such
incorrect statement. While according to this witness accused Sallo (A-9),
Gullu (A-4) were the persons who were pouring petrol and kerosene on the
roof of Rajaram Bane's room but according to PW 1 accused No. 1, accused
No. 17 and Langda Bachchan were pouring petrol and kerosene. According
E to this witness he had seen accused Baba Tubelight, Musa, Baba Rickshawala
sometimes in February 1993 in the Police Station while these people were in
the pofo..e lock-up but the case reveals that accused No. 14 Baba Tubelight
was arrested only on 23rd of July, 1993 five months after the witness saw him
in the police lock-up. Similarly, accused No. 11 was arrested on 20th April,
1993. No explanation is forthcoming as to why the accused persons had not
F been arrested even though they had been shown to the witness at the police
station much earlier. Then again Kasim Badshah, accused No. 17 was shown ..
to the witness on 20th of March, 1993 at the Police Station and the said
accused was arrested on 21st April, 1995 and when the witness was asked
to identify in court he even could not tell the said person was present in the
G court. The witness in his evidence has stated that he did not see who act,ually
lit match stick and put on fire the house of Bane but later he could only see
the fire. According to the witness on the very night of the incident at
Jogeshwari Police Station he had narrated the entire incident and the police
also reduced the same in writing but the said statement has not seen the light
in course of the criminal proceeding. In this state of affair, it is difficult to rely
H on any part of the statement of PW 2, who in our opinion is a wholly
MOHD. lQBAL M. SHAIKH 1•. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANA!K, J.] 755

unreliable witness. A
--...:' PW 3-Shivaji Shankar Todkar, is the husband of Vandana and his two
sons are Sandip and Sailesh. Vandana died on account of burn injury in
course of the incident. Admittedly, he was a resident of the locality. PW 1 is
the brother of his wife Vandana. He has deposed in court that on the night
of 7th January, 1993 the atmosphere was tense and the Muslim people were B
threatening the Hindus. He categorically stated that he would not be in a
-"(
position to tell the names of the persons who were threatening but he can
only identify them by faces and when the witness was asked .to identify the
persons who were threatening from amongst the persons in the dock he
pointed out at two accused persons who told their names as Mohammed
Iqbal, accused No. 1, and Moosa Yakub, accused No. 7. The value of such
c
identification will be discussed at a later stage but the redeeming feature is
that while this witness has been residing in the locality for fairly long period
and was oth.:rwise known to the accused persons and according to him
several accused persons were threatening in the locality before the actual
,... incident of setting fire, it is impossible to believe that even by facial D
identification he could only point out two of them. His evidence in court
discloses that while he was there in his house with his wife Vandana and the
two sons he heard a chaos and he found that accused persons are dissuading
them from sitting outside, and therefore, they all went inside their respective
rooms. At the next breath he stated that his wife took his two sons and all
E
three went inside the room of Rajaram Bane whereas the witness himself
stayed in the room of Chuahan, another person in the locality. This conduct
on the part of the witness is highly improbable inasmuch ·if he was scared to
remain alone with his family members in their own room and wanted to say
inside the neighbour's room then it is expected from all of them they would
remain together. Further if he was expecting trouble from accused persons as F
.. .... stated in his evidence it is highly improbable that he would leav.:: his wife and
children in one place and he himself would stay in some other room. The place
from where the witness has stated to have seen the occurrence is from inside
Chuahan's room though open place at upper portion of the door and he is
supposed to have stood over a stool and witnessed the occurrence. The
witness in his evidence has stated that he does not know the names of the
G
persons who were holding the petrol cane and on being asked to identify
~
them in court he stated that he would not be in a position to identify anybody
as all the persons were having similar appearance. According to this witness
after the fire was set in when police peoplr, arrived at the place occurrence
the accused persons ran away and at that point of time his wife Vandana and H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R

A two sons Sandip and Sailcsh as well as Naina Banc came from the back side
of the house of Rajaram Bane. He then entered inside the house of Rajaram
Bane and saw Sulochana Bane lying with burn injuries on the cot and he also r
saw R<tjaram Bane with flames all over the body. He further saw Kamala Bataln
and Laxmi Batalu were lying on the ground with burn injuries and Minakshi .
was lying in the bathroom with burn injury. This part of the evidence of this
B witness is totally at variance with the evidence ofNitin, PW 1, since according
to Nitin it is he who accompanied the injured persons to the Cooper Hospital )-.
'
'

by an Ambulance and no police man travelled in the Ambulance along with
the injured persons. He also stated in his evidence that Inspector Mahadik
showed him all t11e accused persons in the office of Crime Branch at Boribandar
c but he does not remember the name of any of these five persons. Even on
being asked by the court to identify those five persons he candidly stated
that he cannot identify anybody else excepting one person and that person
told his name to be Mohammed Iqbal. Thus, neither he know the name of
t110se five accused persons who were shown to him by the Inspector Milhadik
nor even was able to identify them in the court. It is interesting to note that
D he had deposed in his evidence that when the police was recording the
statement of the five accused persons shown to him but his statement was "'
not recorded at all and it is again two or two and a half month thereafter he
was called by the police to the office of Crime Branch at Andheri and then
his statement was recorded. In the cross-examination it has been elicited from
E this witness that house of Rajaram Bane is not visible from inside his house.
It was also elicited that when his wife and children went to the house of
Rajaram Bane being afraid of staying alone in their own house, he went to
the house of Chauhan as Chauhan had invited him for tea. This explanation
offered by the witness is hardly believable. He had indicated in his statement
recorded by the police that after he tried to extinguish the fire he learnt that
F his wife Vandana and two children and wife and daughter of Batalu were ,.
found insider the house of Rajaram Bane, whereas in his evidence in court
...
he gave a completely different picture and on being confronted he ~tated that
the statement recorded by the police is not correct. According to the witness
while he was in the Municipal School he was called to the Jogeshwari Police
G Station by a Police Officer and his statement was recorded but infact the 161
statement has been recorded by the Crime Branch. In view of the aforesaid
inherent improbabilities in the statement of the witness in the court and the
contradictions and omissions witness had made in his statement recorded by
the police no part of his evidence can be relied upon and it must be held that
-
H he is thoroughly an unreliable witness.
MOHD. IQBAL M. SIL\IHI v. STATf'. OF MAHARASHTRA IPATTA'.'JAIK, J. j 757

PW 4. another eye-witness to the occurrence was residing in room '.\lo. A
3 of Gandhi Chawl at the relevant point of time and he was there since 25
•""(
years. He deposed in court that on 7th of January, 1993 while he was sitting
on the ota in front of his house at 9.30 p. m. 15 persons came and threatened
them as to why they arc sitting outside. According to the witness the persons
were armed with swords, iron rods and choppers. He stated that the names
B
of those persons were Iqbal Madar, Shaikh, Kaliya Kasam, Langda Bachchan.
Sallo Sattar, lrfan Roshan Barafwala, Baba Tubelight, Baba Rickshawala, Salim
Istriwala, Gullu, HayattL Moosa and Salim Sagir Khan. But on being asked to
identify them in court, though he could correctly point out some but could
not correctly point out some others. The person whom he pointed out as
Baba Tubelight told his name as Mushtaque Yasin Khan; the person whom c
he pointed out as Salim lstriwala told his name as Salim Babumiyan Shaikh;
the person whom he pointed out as Hayatu told his name as Hayat Waris:
and there is no material to co-relate that these accused persons had nick name
by which the witness knew them. According to the witness the accused Noor
Mohammad Khan was spreading petrol on the door of Rajaram Bane but said D
~ Noor Mohammad Khan has already been acquitted. He also stated in his
evidence that he had been called to the office of the crime branch at Crawford
Market where Inspector Mahadik showed him four accused persons and they
were accused Iqbal Madar Shaikh and accused Gullu (accused No. I and 4
respectively). When he was asked to point out and identify the other accused
E
persons he could only point out two of them and not others. It is his
statement on court, he stated that he was called to the office of crime branch
at Crawford Market after one month where police showed him accused No.
14. Tubelight Baba and again about one or one and a half month after he was
called to the office of crime branch at Kandivali where police showed him
accused Mohammad Irfan Roshan Barafwala, who has been acquitted by the F
. "' learned trial judge. The witness further states that he was called to the office
of crime branch at Andheri where police showed him accused Salim Istriwala
and again 15 days thereafter he was shown someone of the accused persons
whose name he does not remembers. If the witness was called to the police
station while the accused persons were in police lock-up and the witness had G
been given the opportunity of seeing those persons in the police lock-up then
_..,.._ the so-called identification made by the witness in court is of no significance.
In cross-examination when this witness was confronted with his earlier
statement on account of material omissions and variations the witness
explained that what has been recorded in the earlier statement is not correct H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 2 S.C.R.

A and he does not know why the police has mentioned so. Even in the earlier
statement of this witness recorded on 17.1.1993 he had not stated that the
accused persons came to the Chaw! at 9.30 p.m. and went away and again
came at 11.00 p.m. though in court he has stated so and on being confronted
he replied that police has not erroneously recorded the same in the earlier
B st~tement. While other witnesses had stated that some of the accused persons
were sprinkling kerosene and petrol on the roof of Rajaram Bane's house this
witness introduced a story that kerosene cloth balls were being thrown on
the door and ota of Rajaram Bane's house. In his statement to the police
recorded on 17 .1.1993 he had categorically stated that when injured persons
were brought outside the house cf Rajaram Bane for the first time he came
c know that his sister Minakshi was also inside the house of Rajaram Bane
whereas in his evidence in court he categorically stated that he had not learnt
atlout the presence of his sister earlier and while extinguishing the fire he
knew the same and on being confronted with the earlier statement recorded
bY. the police he merely replied that the statement recorded by the police is
D itl;Correct. On being cross-examined as to why he has not stated to anybody
else that he saw the accused persons while putting the house to fire, he
answered that he was mentally confused and therefore did not approach
anybody and even did not tell the police even though police reached the spot
of occurrence soonafter. This witness in court had wrongly identified accused
E No. 2 by saying his name as Salim Khan Shabir. He was not able to identify
accused No. I and pointed out towards accused No. 5 on being asked to
identify accused No.1. According to him accused Noor Mohammad Khan was
spreading petrol from cane and said Noor Mohammad Khan has been
acquitted. In view of the aforesaid inherent inconsistency and improbability
in his evidence in court and in view of the fact that even those accused
F persons who could be correctly identified by the witness have been shown
ta him by the police on different occasions while the accused persons were
in the police lock-up and in view of the fact that he has not been able to
identify many of the accused persons even though he claims to be residing
irr the locality for 25 years and for other improbability in his evidence as
G discussed above it would be highly unsafe to rely en his evidence and in our
c<)nsidered opinion the witness must be held to be a wholly unreliable witness.

The next eye-witness is PW -9 , Laxmibai Gardi, who happens to be the
mother of Nitin as well as deceased Vandana. She frankly stated in court that
s!1e would not be able to identify any of the persons who were threatening
H in the locality much prior to the incident. She stated in court that she had
MOHD. IQBAL M. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANAIK, J.J 759

been called to the Andheri Police Station where she could identify two of the A
accused persons and one of them was Jada ·Karim but she was not able to
--x identify him in the court. According to her evidence though she had identified
4 of the accused persons at Borivli Police Station but neither she can tell th~r
names nor can she tell the court as to whether those accused persons are
present in the court. In her evidence in court she stated that these accused
B
persons were not threatening the Hindus during one month prior to the
incident which is at variance with the evidence of all other witnesses. She also
like other eye-witnesses stated that the crime branch police had shown her
3 or 4 accused persons on 22nd of March, 1997 but she was neither in ·a
position to identify them even by face nor could she tell their names. Sli.e
deposed in court that when the miscreants set fire to the house of Rajaram c
Bane her daughter Vandana was inside the house and she could hear ~er
voice who was shouting and calling her to save her. This statement can
hardly be believed in the scenario in which the room in question is alleged
to have been set afire. She also stated in her evidence that her daughter along
with her sons climbed up on the roof and jumped on the backside on the D
'r' ground at the back side of the house of Rajaram Bane. We fail to understand
how the witness could state so, when she was in her house. Coming to the
identity of the accused persons the witness candidly stated in court ·'I cannut
identify the persons who are present or were present at the time of incident
in the gang of 20 to 22 persons. Today I cannot identify the persons who were
E
threatening for about one month prior to the incident." According to the
witness though she had identified earlier accused Jada Karim in the office pf
the police at Andheri but in court she will not be in a position to identify the
said Jada Karim. This statement itself makes her wholly unreliable witness
inasmuch as if she knew Jada Karim and could identify on earlier occasion
A there was nor reason why she was not in a position to identify the accused F
.. in court. Then again the hole thorough which she stated to have seen the
occurrence was a cement grill window and the electric meter board had been
installed right on the front adjacent to the window and it would be diffic1,11t
for a person to see the occurrence in the house of Rajaram Bane through th~t
window. She had been confronted with her statement recorded on different G
occasions wherein there had been material omissions and she only states that
-~ the earlier statement is not correct and she has not stated so before the police.
She admitted that she learnt for the first time when Vandana and her tow sons
came before her after the fire took place that Vandana was inside the hou$e
of Rajaram Bane even though earlier she had stated that she could hear her H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A cries from inside the house of Rajaram Bane. On the aforesaid premises the
evidence of this witness does not inspire any confidence and we do not think
it is safe to rely on her testimony for convicting any of the accused persons.

The only other witness on which the prosecution relied upon to bring
B home the charge against the accused persons is Krishna 11.arishchandra Kate,
PW-10, who was also residing in Gandhi Chaw!. He is brother of PW 2 and
his statement was recorded by the police for the first time on 29th of January,
1993. He had stated in his evidence that he was called to the office of the
crime branch where police showed him 3 to 4 accused persons but he neither
known their names nor would be in a position to identify them in the court
C even by face. It is his further evidence that he was called upon by the police
15 days thereafter and he was shown another accused person but he docs
not remember the name of that accused person nor in a position to identify
him in court. He also staled that he was called to the Police Station at Kandivli
on 22.4.1993 where police showed him one accused but he does not know the
name of that accused person nor he can identify the same by face. Though
D in the Court he had stated that hetween 6th December, 1992 to 7th of January,
1993 the goondas of the locality were threatening them but he had not stated
so in his earlier statement made before the police. In the court he had also
stated that he had never made any complaint on that score before. On being
cross-examined he candidly admitted that he could not insert his head through
E the grill to see what is happening outside, and therefore, he climbed on a loft
and from there he could see the incident through !he window. But neither the
investigating officer nor any other person has stated about the existence of
such a loft. It was elicited in his cross-examination that he was sitting inside
the house from the time when the accused started pouring kerosene till the
accused went away is not correct. A scrutiny of his evidence clearly indicates
F that it bristles with inconsistencies and improbabilities and the witness has
contradicted from his statement made to the police which makes him thoroughly
unreliable and it is difficult for us to place any reliance on the testimony of
such witness.

G Mr. Nargolkar the learned senior counsel appearing for the State of
Maharashtra, however, contended that no doubt, there has been several
omissions on the part of the \\ilncsses in their statement under 161 but those
omissions would not impeach their evidence, in any manner, so far as, the
basic prosecution case is concerned and the case being one under TADA and
the circumstances under which the witnesses have given their evidence, the
H court would be justified in separating the chaff from the grain and on accepting
MOHD. IQBAL l\!. SHAIKH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PATTANAIK, J.] 761

the grain can base conviction in view of the corroboration it gets from other A
evidence. This submission of the learned counsel for the respondent suffers
----.::· from a misgiving as law does not make any distinction in the matter of
appreciation of evidence in a case under TAD A or under normal criminal law.
This question has been answered by this Court in a case in somewhat similar
circumstances in Dilawar Hussain v. The State of Gujarat & Am:, IT (1990) B
4 S.C. 282, wherein it has been observed :

Misgiving, also, prevailed about appreciation of evidence. Without
adverting to submissions suffice it to mention that credibility of
witnesses has to be measured with same yardstick, whether , it is an
ordinal)' crime or a crime emanating due to communal frenzy. Law does C
not make any distinction either in leading of evidence or in its
assessment. Rule is one and only one, namely, if depositions are
honest and true. Whether the witnesses, who claim to have seen the
incident in this case, withstand this test is the issue.

We are quite aware of the principle that in a country like India where D
it is difficult to find a witness who has not made any embellishment or
exaggeration, and therefore, in such a case Court would be justified in
separating the chaff from the grain and then act upon the grain. But where
the evidence consists of only chaff as in the present case, question of
separating chaff from the grain would not arise. Then again when all the eye- E
witnesses suffer from the same infirmities as has been discussed by us,
question of one corroborating the other would not arise,. If a witness is partly
reliable and partly unreliable then one may look for corroboration to the
reliable part of the ocular version of a witness. But if a witness is wholly
unreliable as has been assessed by us, the question of corroboration does F
not arise. It is no doubt tme that the incident with which we are concerned
in 'the present case was a ghastly one and one account of communal frenzy
several people belonging to one community were burnt alive by some others
but unless and until the prosecution evidence conclusively establishes those
others, as the perpetrators of the crimes, it is not possible for a court of law
to record conviction on mere conjectures and hypothesis. G

As we have discussed earlier the investigating agency merely on
suspicion have roped-in the persons belonging to the other community who
were residing in the locality and then somehow trying to get them identified
through the witnesses who belong to the community from where the people H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A were burnt alive and the learned Designated Court was swayP-d away by the
so-called evidence of identification and based the conviction. We have already
discussed as to how unreliable the evidence of these eye-witnesses and no
court on the basis of such unreliable evidence can base conviction, howsoever,
ghastly the crime may be. In the aforesaid premises we set aside the conviction
B ;md sentence passed by the learned Designated Court under the provisions
of TAD A as well as under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code and
direct that the appellants be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required
in any other case.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed.

I

•