Holding

A Judicial Magistrate may, before taking cognizance, order investigation under Section 156(3) and direct the police to register an FIR, and the petition filed is a complaint; therefore the High Court’s order was erroneous.

Summary

Mohd. Yousuf filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging forgery and fraud, prompting the magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR and investigate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The police filed a charge‑sheet, after which Afaq Jahan (respondent No. I) moved the High Court under Section 482 to quash the FIR, charge‑sheet and the magistrate’s order. The High Court held that the magistrate lacked power to order FIR registration and set aside the charge‑sheet. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a judicial magistrate, before taking cognizance, may order investigation under Section 156(3) and may direct the police to register an FIR; such direction is lawful and the petition before the magistrate qualifies as a "complaint" under the CrPC. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of an offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC and direct registration of an FIR.
Whether the petition filed before the magistrate constitutes a "complaint" within the meaning of the CrPC.
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the charge‑sheet on the ground of lack of magistrate’s jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 156(3), s. 173, s. 190, s. 200, s. 202, s. 2(d)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

Section 156(3)magistrate powersinvestigationFIR registrationcognizancecomplaintCriminal Procedure Codequash petitionSection 482

Judgment

'X,.
MOHD. YOUSUF A
v.
SMT. AFAQ JAHAN AND ANR.

JANUARY 2, 2006

[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B
-,
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

Section 156 (3)--Complaint before Magistrate-Before taking cognizance
of the offence, direction by Magistrate to police to register FIR and investigate c
the case-Propriety of-Held: It is not i//ega/ for a Judicial Magistrate to
order investigation of a case before taking cognizance of the same-Jn order
to enable the police to investigate, it is open to Magistrate to direct the police
to register FIR while directing investigation.

Sections 156 (3) and 202-Power of Magistrate to direct-Under both D
the provisions-Difference between-Discussed.

Words & Phrases: 'Complaint '-Meaning of in the context of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Appellant filed an application before Chief Judicial Magistrate E
(CJM). CJM directed the Police to register FIR and investigate the case.
In compliance of the order, Police registered FIR and investigated the
matter. After investigation charge sheet was filed by the Police. Respondent
No. I filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR,
the charge sheet and the order of the CJM directing investigation. High
F
Court quashed the charge sheet on the ground that the CJM had no power
to order registration of the case.

In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that order of High Court
was contrary to law and on misreading of the provisions under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. G
_l Respondent No. l contended that the order of High Court was in
keeping with the scope and ambit of Section 156(3); and that the
application of appellant made to CJM was not a complaint in strict sense
of the term.
H
(

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] I S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: I. I. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the
offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he
does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not
taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the
B police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police
to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. Even if a Magistrate
does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer
in charge of the police station to register the FIR regardi!1g the cognizable
offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take
C further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. only thereafter.
16-E, GI

Suresh Chand Jain v. State of MP. and Anr., (2001 f 2 SCC 628; Gopal
Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr., AIR (1961) SC 986 and
D Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhayadas v. The State of West Bengal, AIR
(1959) SC 1118, referred to.

1.2. Chapter XII of Cr. P.C. contains provisions relating to
"information to the police and their powers to investigate", whereas
Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating
E to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking
cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two
chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be
a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within
Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate
cognizable offences. True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also
F refers to the power of a Magistrate to "direct an investigation by a police
officer". But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from
the investigation contemplated in Section 156 Cr.P.C. (5-D-FI

1.3. The investigation contemplated in Chapter XII can be
commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that
G does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under
Section 156 (3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such
investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section
172 Cr.P.C. But when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter
XII, he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. But a Magistrate
H need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance
i

MOHD. YOUSUF v. AFAQ JAHAN [PASA YAT, J.] 3
of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow A
the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. A reading of Section
202 (I) Cr. P.C. makes the position clear that the investigation referred
to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an
investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person.
Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether B
or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further.
(5-G, H; 6-A-CI

2. It cannot be said that the petition filed by the appellant was not a
complaint in strict sense of the term. The nomenclature of a petition is
inconsequential. There is no particular format of a complaint. A petition C
addressed to the Magistrate containing an allegation that an offence has
been committed, and ending with a prayer that the culprits be suitably
dealt with, as in the instant case, is a complaint. (12-G; 13-8, q

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 2 of
2006. l)

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.03.2003 of the Allahabad High
Court at Lucknow Bench in Crl. M.C. No. 649/2000.

Mr. Samir Ali Khan and Mr. Amit Kumar for the Appellant.
E
Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Mr. Arohi Bhalla
and Mr. Garvesh Kumar _for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
F
Challenge in this Appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench .. The respondent No. I
filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(in short the 'Code') to quash the direction given to register F.1.R., charge
sheet filed after investigation as well as the cognizance taken by the learned G
Chief Judicial Magistrate (in short CJM) Raebareli. By order dated 13.7.1998
learned CJM had directed the police to register and investigate the case. On
19.7.1998 on the basis of the order passed by learned CJM police registered
FIR No. 830 of 1998 for alleged commission of offences punishable under
Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the
H
(

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] I S.C.R.

A IPC).
Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:

Appellant received a notice dated 18.1.1996 from the Union Bank of
India, Raebareli asking him to pay back the loan amount with interest
B amounting to Rs.1,25,421/-. Appellant was shown to be a guarantor for the
loan taken by respondent no. I on 30.12.1994. Appellant was surprised to
receive the notice as he had never stood as guarantor for any loan. He made
enquiry from the Bank and came to know that the respondent No. 1 had
forged some documents in conspiracy with her husband Zahiru! Islam. An
C affidavit purported to have been signed by the appellant was filed with the
bank to make him the second guarantor. Appellant had never signed the
document and his signature was forged. A writ petition was filed before the
Allahabad High Court to quash the notice issued by the Bank. The writ
petition was dismissed giving liberty to the appellant to seek appropriate
remedy. On 13.7.1998 an application was filed before learned CJM alleging
O commission of offences by the named accused persons. Learned CJM directed
the police to register and investigate the case. As noted above, on the basis
of order of learned CJM the FIR was registered. The essence of the grievance
of the appellant was that the accused persons with the help of the bank
manager made forged signature of the appellant in the agreement form and
an affidavit to show him as a guarantor. After investigation charge sheet was
E filed by the police on 13.9.1999. On 24.5.2000 respondent no. I filed the
application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the FIR, the charge
sheet and the order of learned magistrate by which he had taken cognizance,
and the order directing the police to register the case under Section 156(3)
of the Code. By the impugned order the High Court quashed the charge sheet
F on the ground that the magistrate had no power to order registration of the
case.

In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted·
that the order of the High Court is clearly contrary to law and on misreading
of the provisions contained in Section 156(3) of the Code. Learned counsel
G for the respondent No. I on the other hand submitted that the true scope and
ambit of Section 156(3) of the Code has been kept in view by the High Court
and the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. Learned counsel
for the State supported the stand of the appellant.

In order to appreciate rival submissions Section 156 of the Code needs
H to be quoted; the same reads as follows:
.
MOHD. YOUSUF v. AFAQ JAHAN (PASAYAT, J.] 5
"156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable cases. - (I) A
Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a
Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would
have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter
XIII.
B
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any
stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which
such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an
investigation as above mentioned." c
Section 156 falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of police
officers to investigate cognizable offences. Investigation envisaged in Section
202 contained in Chapter XV is different from the investigation contemplated
under Section 156 of the Code.
D
Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to "information to
the police and their powers to investigate", whereas Chapter XV, which
contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a
Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on
a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different E
facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed
by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the
police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202, which ·
falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to "direct
an investigation by a police officer". But the investigation envisaged in Section
202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the F
Code.

The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of
the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation
would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in
charge of a 1Jolice station, of the substance of the information relating to the G
commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can
end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173
of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced
by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean
that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) I S.C.R.

A be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only
with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant
point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter
XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence.

But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes
B to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence
he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A
reading of Section 202( I) of the Code makes the position clear that the
investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can
direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any
C other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide
whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can
be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202( I) i.e.

"or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such
other person as be thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or
D not there is sufficient ground for proceeding".

This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed
in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.

The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking
E cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of
the Code. lfhe does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because
he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of
enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct
the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all
registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of
F the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a
book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section
154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while
directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should
be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to
G register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint
because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter
XII of the Code only thereafter.

The above position was highlighted in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of
MP. and Anr., (2001] 2 SCC 628.
H
~
I

MOHD. YOUSUF v. AFAQ JAHAN [PASA YAT . .I.) 7
In Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr., AIR ( 1961) A
SC 986 it was observed as follows:

"When the complaint was received by Mr. Thomas on August 3,
1957, his order, which we have already quoted, clearly indicates that
he did not take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint
but had sent the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code to the B
Officer lncharge of Police Station Gauhati for investigation. Section
.•. 156(3) states "Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may
order such investigation as above-mentioned". Mr. Thomas was
certainly a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section
190 and he was empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon C
receiving a complaint. He, however, decided not to take cognizance
but to send the complaint to the police for investigation as Sections
147, 342 and 448 were cognizable offences. It was, however, urged
that once a complaint was filed the Magistrate was bound to take
cognizance and proceed under Chapter XVI of the Code. It is clear, D
however, that Chapter XVI would come into play only if the Magistrate
had taken cognizance of an offence on the complaint filed before
him, because Section 200 states that a Magistrate taking cognizance
of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant
and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath and the substance of the
examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the E
complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. If the
Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint
filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the complainant on
oath and the witnesses present at the time of the filing of the complaint.
We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that. once a F
complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the
facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence.
We are unable to construe the word 'may' in Section 190 to mean
'must'. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable
offences may well justify a Magistrate in s~nding the complaint, under
Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why G
the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty
to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police.
On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may
exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence.
If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided H
by Chapter XVI of the Code. Numerous cases were cited before us
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) I S.C.R.

A in support of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. Certain
submissions were also made as to what is meant by "taking
cogniz.ance." It is unnecessary to refer to the cases cited. The following
observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta in the case of Superintendent
and Remembrancer of legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar
Banerjee, AIR (1950) Cal 437
B
"What is taking cogniz.ance has not been defined in the
Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to
define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said
that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under
Section 190( I )(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only
c have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must
have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way
as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-
proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry
and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his
D mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent
sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other
kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing
a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot
be said to have taken cognizance of the offence".

E were approved by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1951] SCR 312. It would be clear from the observations of Mr.
Justice Das Gupta that when a Magistrate applies his mind not for the
purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but
for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under
Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of
F investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any
offence. The observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta above referred to
were also approved by this Court in the case of Narayandas
Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1959) SC
1118. It will be clear, therefore, that in the present case neither the
G Additional District Magistrate nor Mr. Thomas applied his mind to
the complaint filed on August 3, 1957, with a view to taking
cogniz.ance of an offence. The Additional District Magistrate passed
on the complaint to Mr. Thomas to deal with it. Mr. Thomas seeing
that cognizable offences were mentioned in the complaint did not
apply his mind to it with .a view to taking cognizance of any offence;
H
-J,

MOHD. YOUSUF v. AFAQ JAHAN [PASA YAT. J.J 9
on the contrary in his opinion it was a matter to be investigated by A
the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The action of Mr. Thomas
comes within the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta. In these
circumstances, we do not think that the first contention on behalf of
the appellants has any substance."

In Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. The State of West Bengal B
Al R ( 1959) SC 1118 it was observed as under:
... "On 19.9.1952, the appellant appeared before the Additional District
Magistrate who recorded the following order:-

"He is to give bail of Rs.50,000 with ten sureties of Rs. c
5,000 each. Seen Police report. Time allowed till 19th November,
1952, for completing investigation."

On 19.11.952, on perusal of the police report the Magistrate allowed
further time for investigation until January 2, 1953, and on that date
time was further extended to February 2, 1953. In the meantime, on D
January 27, 1953, Inspector Mitra had.been authorized under s.23(3)(b)
of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to file a complaint.
Accordingly, a complaint was filed on February 2, 1953. The
Additional District Magistrate thereon recorded the following order:

"Seen the complaint filed to day against the accused E
Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas under section 8(2) of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with section 238 thereof
read with Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act and Notification
No. F.E.R.A. 105/51 dated the 27th February, 1951, as amended,
issued by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 8(2) of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Seen the letter of authority. F
To Sri M. N. Sinha, S. D.M. (Sadar), Magistrate Ist class (spl.
empowered) for favour of disposal according to law. Accused to
appear before him."

Accordingly, on the same date Mr. Sinha then recorded the following
order:- G
"Accused present. Petition filed for reduction of bail.
-~
Considering all facts, bail ·granted for Rs. 25,000 with 5 sureties.
~
To 26.3.1952 and 27.3.1952 for evidence."
It is clear from these orders that on 19.91952, the Additional District H
I

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 I S.C.R.

A Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence because he had
allowed the police time till November 19, 1952, for completing the
investigation. By his subsequent orders time for investigation was
further extended until February 2, 1953. On what date the complaint
was filed and the order of the Additional District Magistrate clearly
indicated that he took cognizance of the offence and sent the case for
B trial to Mr. Sinha. It would also appear from the order of Mr. Sinha
that if the Additional District Magistrate did nut take cognizance, he
certainly did because he considered whether the bail should be reduced
and fixed the 26th and 27th of March, for evidence. It.was, however,
argued that when Mitra applied for a search warrant on September,
c I 6, 1952, the Additional District Magistrate had recorded an order
thereon, "Permitted. Issue search warrant." It was on this date that the
Additional District Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. We
cannot agree with this submission because the petition of Inspector
Mitra clearly states that "As this is non-cognizable offence, I pray
that you will kindly permit me to investigate the case under section
D 155 Cr.P.C." That is to say. that the Additional District Magistrate
was not being asked to take cognizance of the offence. He was merely
requested to grant permission to the police officer to investigate a
non-cognizable offence. The petition requesting the Additional District
Magistrate to issue a warrant of arrest and his order directing the
E issue of such a warrant cannot also be regarded as orders which
indicate that the Additional District Magistrate thereby took cognizance
of the offence. H was clearly stated in the petition that for the purposes
of investigation his presence was necessary. The step taken by
Inspector Mitra was merely a step in the investigation of the case. He
had not himself the power to make an arrest having regard to the
F provisions of s. 155(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In order
to facilitate his investigation it was necessary for him to arrest the
appellant and that he could not do without a warrant of arrest from
the Additional District Magistrate. As already stated, the order of the
Additional District Magistrate of September 19, 1952, makes it quite
clear that he was still regarding the matter as one under investigation.
G
It could not be said with any good reason that the Additional District
Magistrate had either on September 16, or at any subsequent date
upto February 2, 1953, applied his mind to the case with a view to
issuing a process against the appellant. The appellant had appeared
before the Magistrate on February 2, 1953, and the question of issuing
H summons to him did not arise. The Additional District Magistrate,
-{.
'

MOHD. YOUSUF v. AFAQ JAl-IAN [PASAYA T. J.] 11
however, must be regarded as having taken cognizance on this date A
because he· sent the case to Mr. Sinha for trial. There was no legal bar
to the Additional District Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence
on February 2, 1953, as on that date Inspector Mitra's complaint-was
one which he was authorized to make by the Reserve Bank under s.
23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. It is thus clear to B
us that on a proper reading of the various orders made by the
..
-
Additional District Magistrate no cognizance of the offence was taken
unt.il February 2, 1953. The argument that he took cognizance of the
offence on September 16, 1952, is without foundation. The orders
passed by the Additional District Magistrate or\ September 16, 1952,
September 19, 1952, November 19, 1952, and January 2, 1953, were C
orders passed while the investigation by the police into a non-
cognizable offence was in progre~s. If at the end of the investigation
no complaint had been filed again.>! the appellant the police could
have under the provisions of s. 169 of the Code released him on his
" executing a bond with or without sureties to appear if and when so
required before the Additional District Magistrate empowered to take D
cognizance of the offence on a police report and to try the accused
or comtnit him for trial. The Magistrate would not be required to pass
any further orders in the matter. If, on the other hand, after completing
the investigation a complaint was filed, as in this case, it would be the
duty of the Additional District Magistrate then to enquire whether the E
complaint had been filed with the requisite authority of the Reserve
Bank as required bys. 23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act. It is only at this stage that the Additional District Magistrate
would be called upon to make up his mind whether he would take
cognizance of the offence. If the complaint was filed with the authority
of the Reserve Bank, as aforesaid, there would be no legal bar to the F
Magistrate taking cognizance. On the other hand, if there was no
proper authorization to tile the complaint as reqllired by s. 23 the
Magistrate concerned would be prohibited from taking cognizance.
In the present case, as the requisite authority had been granted by the
Reserve Bank on January 27, 1953, to file a complaint, the complaint G
filed on February 2, was one which complied with the provisions of
s. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Additional
District Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence which. indeed,
he did on that date. The following observation by Das Gupta, J., in
the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West
Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerii. A.LR. (1950) Cal. 437] was approved H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) I S.C.R.

A by this Court in the case of R. R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1951] S.C.R. 312]:-
"What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the
Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to
define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said
B that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under
section 190( I )(a) Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only
have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must
have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way
as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter -
proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry
c and report under section 202. When the magistrate applies his
t

mind 11ot for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent
section.s of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other
kind, e.g., ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing
a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot
D be said to have taken cognizance of the offence."

It is, however, argued that in Chari's case this Court was dealing with
a matter which came under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It seems
to us, however, that that makes no difference. It is the principle
which was enunciated by Das Gupta, J., which was approved. As to
E when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to
define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search warrant
for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that
purposes cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which
cognizance was taken of an offence. Obviously, it is only when a
F Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under s.
200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal
Procedure or under s. 204 of Chapter XVII of the Code that it can be
positively stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken
cognizance."
G A faint plea was made by learned counsel for the respondent No. I that
the petition filed by the appellant was not a complaint in strict sense of the
term. The plea is clearly untenable. The nomenclature of a petition is
inconsequential. Section 2(d) of the Code defines "complaint" as follows:

'"Complaint' means any allegation orally or in writing to a Magistrate.
H
MOHD. YOUSUF v. AFAQ JAHAN [PASA Y AT . .I.] 13
with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, A
whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not
include a police report.

Explanation:- A report made by a police officer in a case which
discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable
offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by B
whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant."

There is no particular format of a complaint. A petition addressed to
the magistrate containing an allegation that an offence has been committed,
and ending with a prayer that the culprits be suitably dealt with, as in the
instant case, is a complaint. C
In view of the aforesaid position in law, order passed by the High Court
is clearly unsustainable and is quashed. The appeal is allowed.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.