Supreme Court of India
MOHINDER KUMAR ETC. ETC.versusSTATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.
- Citation
- 1985 INSC 197
- Decided
- 18 September 1985
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- P N BHAGWATI
Holding
Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, as amended, is constitutionally valid and does not violate Article 14 or operate retrospectively.
Summary
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, as amended in 1978, which exempts buildings whose construction was completed on or after the Act’s commencement from its provisions for ten years. They argued that the provision creates an invidious classification between landlords and tenants of pre‑Act and post‑Act buildings, violating Article 14, and that it operates retrospectively, depriving tenants of vested rights. The Court held that the exemption is a reasonable legislative incentive to promote new construction and alleviate housing scarcity, and that a fixed ten‑year period is neither indefinite nor arbitrary. It further observed that the provision is prospective, not retrospective, and no vested right was created before the amendment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the validity of Section 1(3).
Issues considered
- The constitutionality of Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (as amended) under Article 14 of the Constitution
- Whether the provision operates retrospectively and infringes upon vested rights of tenants
Legislation cited
Subjects
Constitutional lawArticle 14DiscriminationRent controlLegislative incentiveRetrospective legislationVested rightsUrban housing
Judgment
859
MOHINOER KUMAR ETC, ETC. A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1985
[P.N. BHAGWATI, CJ., R.S. PATHAK AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.] B
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973,
section 1(3) - Validity of.
The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973
by Section 1(3) as amended by the Amending Act 1978 (Act 16 of c
1978) provides: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building
the construction of which is completed on or after the commence-
ment of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its
completion". ·
'i'he petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of D
Section 1(3) of the Act on the grounds: (i) that the provision
seeks to make an invidious distinction between buildings cons-
tructed before the commencement of this Act and buildings the
construction of which was completed on or after the commencement
of this Act and on the basis of this invidious distinction this
provision discriminates between the landlords and tenants of
buildings constructed before the Act and after the Act inasmuch E
as a landlord enjoys in case of buildings construction of which
is completed on or after the commencement of the Act an exemption
from the operation of the Act and the tenant in respect of such
building is denied the protection and the benefits of the Act for
a period of 10 years from the date of completion of the construc-
tion of the building, whereas the landlord of any building cons- F
tructed before the commencement of the Act does not enjoy any
such exemption and the tenant of such building enjoys the protec-
tion and all the benefits of the Act. Thus, the discrimination
between one class of landlords and their tenants and the other
class of landlords and their tenants on the basis of the time of
completion of the buildings is clearly arbitrary and is violative G
of Art. 14 of the Constitution; and (ii) that the retrospective
operation of the Act has the effect of taking away the vested
right of the tenant and 1D11St, therefore, be held to be illegal
and bad.
Dismissing the writ petitions, H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
A lllW>: l(i) Section 1(3) of the Act as amended by the
Alllending Act of 1978 (Act 16 of 1978) is constitutionslly valid.
kny iw:entive offered for the purpose of construction of new
buildingo with the object of easing the situation of scarcity of
accoaimodstion for ameliorating the conditions of the tenants,
cannot be said to be unreasonable, provided the nature end
B character .of the iucentive end the lleSSure of exemption allowed
are not otherwise unreasonable end arbitrary. The exemption to be
allowed lllUBt be for a reasonsble and a definite period. kn exemp-
tion for an indefinite period or a period which in the facts and
circumataucea of any particular case may be considered to be
unduly long, may be held to be arbitrary. The exemption 111USt
necessarily be effective from a particlllar date and lllU8t be with
c the object of promoting new constructions. In the instant case,
the provision for exemption from the operation of the llent
Control Legislation by way of incentive to persons with means to
construct new houses has been made in Section 1(3) of the Act by
the Legislature in the legitimate hope that construction .of new
buildings will ultimately result in mitigation of the hardship of
the tenants. Such iw:entive has a clear lleJW8 with the object to
D be achieved and cannot be considered to be unreasonable or arbi-
trary. With the coonencewmt of the Act, the proviaiona of the
Rent Act with all the restrictions and rigours beCOllle effective.
Buildings which have been constructed before the' caameucement of
the Act were already there and the question of any kind of
impetus or incentive to such buildings does not arise. The Legis-
E lature, therefore, very appropriately allowed the benefit of the
exsnption to the buildings, the construction of which c'"'""'ced
or was completed on or after the cC11111encemm>t of the Act. lbis
exemption in respect of buildings coming up or to come up on or
after the date of COllllll!QCement of the Act is likely to serve the
purpose of eucouraging new buildings to be constructed. There is
F therefore, nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in fixing the date
of """""1!cement of the Act frcxa which the exemption is to be
operative. [866 IHI]
(11) The exemption for a period of 10 years frcxa the opera-
tion of the Act allowed to buildings, the construction of which
G ccawnced or was completed 9n or after the date of c.-ncement
of the Act, is fair and reasonable. It is for a definite period
and that period of exemption cannot be considered to be too long;
and this exemption, the Legislature may be of the view, will
serve the purpose of eucouraging the construction of new build-
ings. It is for the Legislature to decide the period of exemption
H that my be allowed and to fix the date frcxa which the period of
MOHINDER KUMAR v. STATE 861
exemption should run. Thia will ordinarily be a matter of Legia- A
lative policy and this Court will not normally interfere unless
the Court is of the opinion thst the period of eamption or the
date from which the exemptiou. is to operate is unre&a0ll4ble · and
arbitrary. [867 A-CJ
2. The classification of buil.diup with reference to the B
elate of CO'D¥!1Cement of the Act, naely, buildings constructed
before the cagppnc•wmt of the Act a4 builcliDge the conatruction
of which was completed Oil or after the elate of the cagppncement
of the Act, has a rational buia 8lld hu a. clear llUll8 with the
object to be achieved. The claaaificatiou. of the laildlord and the
teuant of a house cODBtructed before the c - c - t of the Act c
and the laiidl.ord and tenant of a houae, the cov.atructiou. of which
c..-ncee or is completed on or i.fter the c-cement of the
Act, is clearly founded on an intelligible differentia which has
a rationel relation to the object and this clasaification does
not result in any invidious discrilllinatiou. between the classes of
landlords and tenants so classified. Thia classification ia not D
arbitrary and is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitutiou..
[867 C-EJ
3. The Section on its proper construction clearly indicates
that the section is not retrospective in operation. Merely
because the buildiuga the construction of which camnenced or was
completed after the date of commencement of the Act in 1973, ccme E
within the purview of the this. particular provision which was
introduced by amendment in 1978, tbe provisio.n does not become
retrospective. This provision operates prospectively and becomes
effective after its incorporation in the Act by the Amendment,
though the buildings completed on or after the com1mcement of
this Act in 1973 ere brought within the scOPf' of this Section. F
The argument that the tenants have acquired a vested right under
the Act prior to its amendment is without any substance. Prior to
the amenclme'1t of Section 1(3) by the Amending Act. of 1978, the
provision as it originally stood cannot be said to have conferred
any vested right on the tenants. [871 A-CJ
G
llotor Geuer!ll. Traders and Others v. State of Andbra l'l:adeah
and Ora., (1984] 1 s.c.c. 222, inapplicable.
If/a. Punjab Tin Supply Co. Q>e™Hgarh y, Central Goveni.at
.. and Ora., [l984j l s.c.c •. 206, relied upon.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 8367 and· 3939
H
etc. of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
A s.M. Ashri, l<akesh K. Kharma and Dr. Meera. Aggarwal for the
Petitioners.
G.K, Bansal a.nd Prem Malhotra for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AMARENDRA NATH S~> J, The constitutional validity of S.
1(3) of the llaryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
1973 has been challenged in these writ petitions. This question
-which is colllmon to all the writ petitions is the only question
which arises for consideration and these writ petitions are
accordingly being disposed of by this common judgment.
c
The question has been urged as a pure question of law. In
that view of the matter it does not become necessary to refer the
facts of any of the wirt petitions.
s. 1(3) as originally enacted in the Haryana Urban (Control
of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to for the
D sake of brevity as the Act) was in the following terms:
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to
(i) any residential building the construction of which
is completed on or after the commencement of this Act
E
for a period of ten years from the date of its
completion;
(ii) any non-residential building construction of
which is completed after the 31st March, 1962
(iii) a.~y rented land let out on or after 31st March
1%2.
This proviSion was amended by the Amending Act of 1978 (Act
lb of 1978) to read as follows:
G "(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building
the construction of which is completed on or after the
commencement of this Act for a period of ten years
trOm the date of its completion."
It is the validity of this amended provision which has been
H
questioned in 'these writ petitions.
MOtiINDER KIJMAR v. S'fATE [A.N.SEN, J.]. 863
The validity is challenged mainly on the following grounds: A
(1) The provision is arbitrary and is ·violative of
Art• 14 of the Constitution.
(2) In any event in so far as this provision operates
retrospectively and seeks to take away the vested B
rights of the petitioner under the Act, prior to this
amendment, the same must be held to be fllegal and
invalid.
The argument is that this: provision seeks to make an
invidious distinction between buildings constructed before the . c
comnencement of this Act and building the construction of which
was completed on or after the c011111encement of this Act and on the
basis of this invidious distinction this provision discriminates
between the landlords and tenants of buildings constructed before
the Act and after the Act. It is urged that on the basis of this
distinction between building constructed before and ·after the D
comnencement of the Act, a landlord enjoys in.case of the build-
ings construction of which is completed on or after the c011111ence-
ment of the Act . an exemption from the operation of the Act and
the tenant in respect of such building is denied the protection
and the benefits of the Act for a period of 10 years from the
date of completion of the construcUon of the building·, whereas
the landlord of any building constructed before the couunencement E
of the Act does not enjoy any such exemption and the tenant of
such building enjoys the protection and all the benefits of the
Act. ·It is submitted that this discrimination between one class
of landlords and their tenants and the other class of landlords
and their tenants on the basis of the time of completion of the
buildings is clearly arbitrary and is violative of Art. 14 of the F
Constitution. The submission is that Rent Control Legislation is
·enacted for the purpose of affording protection to the tenants
and the Act in question has also been passed for achieving the
same object. Reference in this connection is made to the State-
ment of Objects and Reasons for the passing of the Act and to the
Preamble of the Act. It is contended that ,this classification of G
buildings on the basis of the time of completion of cortstruction
has no reasonable nexus with the object to be achieved and may on
the contrary frustrate the purpose for which the Act has been
passed inasmuch as in respect of the buildings the construction
of which· was complet~d on or after the commencement of the Act,
.the tenants are denied the entire benefit and protectiori .of the H
.Act. It is· further contended -that the~e can be
no rational 'baSis
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS t1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
A
in fixing the period of the completion of the building with
reference to the date of commencement of the Act which received
the assent of the Governor on the 25th of Apr.il, 1973 and was
published in the Haryana Gazette on the 27th of April, 1973 and
also in prescribing a period of 10 years for exemption from the
ll operation of the Act for the buildings, the cunstruction of which
was completed on or after the commencement of the Act. This
discrimination, it. is submitted, is arbitrary and violative of
Art. 14 of the Constitution and in this connection reference has
been made to the decision of this Court in the case of llotor
General Ttadei:s awl Others · v. State of Aodhra Pradesh and Ors.
[1984] l s.c.c. 222, and also to the decision of this Court in
c the case of · M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co. O.!IJ!dlgarb v. Central
Govermelit and Ors. [1984] l s.c.c. 206.
The next contention is that the ilmended provision has been
given retrospective effect inasmuch as the amendment which was
introduced in 1978 has been made applicable to any building
construction of which was completed on or after the date of
D commencement of the Act in 1973 and the retrospective operation
of the Act has been effect of taking away the vested right of the
tenant and must, therefore, be held to be illegal and bad. It is
argued that s. 3(1) of the Act, as originally enacted was void
and unconstitutional inasmuch as ·-no period of exemption of any
building which may qualify for exemption had been fixed and it is
i,: well settled that an · indefinite or unlimited immunity to any
building, from the purview of the Act is arbitrary and unconsti-
tutional. The argument is that as the original provision
contained in s. 1(3) of the Act, prior to its amendment, was void
and unconstitutional, no building enjoyed any exemption from the
operation of the Act and the tenants of the buildings were enti-
F tled to the protection and the benefit of the Act and had
acquired a vested right to be governed by the provision of the
Act. lt is submitted that this vested right of the tenants is
sought to be interferred with by the amended s. 1 (3) which has
been made applicable to all the buildings construction of which
was completed on or after the date of commencement of. the Act.
G
We do not see any force in any of the contentions.
It.is true that Rent Control Legislation is usually enacted,
and the present Act was also passed, taking into account the
conditions prevailing in the State, to regulate the relationship
H between the landlord and the tenant in the larger interest of the
society and or affording protectiori to tenants against exploita-
MOHINDfill KUMAR v. STATE [A.N.SEN, J.j 865
'
A
tion by landlordo on account of shortage of acl:omodation. The
statement of Objects and Reasons for passing the Act recites -
"Certain provisions of the existing law are not con-
clusive to harmonious landlord tenant relationship
and also hamper rapid. urban develorment. In order/to B
remedy these defects and to entitle the tenants to the
amenities of Water supply, electricity ~ sewerage,
necessity of fresh legislation has been felt. Oppor-'·
tunity has also been taken to rationalise the basis
for determination of fair rent and to provide for
eviction of these tenants, who construct their own C
houses in the urban area concerned sufficeint for
their requirement."
The Preamble to the Act reads:-
"An Act to control the increase of rent of certain buildings D
and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas, and
the eviction of tenants therefrom.••
There cannot be any doubt that the paramount object of every
Rent Control Legislation including the present Act, is to provide
safeguards for tenants against expolitation·by landlords who see.~
to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of E
a large nlllllber of people looking for· a house on rent for
residence or business in the background of acute scarcity o{
accommodation is at the very root of the ·problem and i f houses
were freely available at reasonaHe rent, there would hardly be
any need for Rent Control Legislation. It is entirely for the
Legislature .to decide whether any measures, are to be adopted for F
remedying the situation and for ameliorating the hardship· of
tenants. The Legislature may very well coine to a conclusio;,_ that
it is the shortage of buildings which has resulted in.scarcity of
accommodation and has created a situation . where the demand for
accommodation is far in excess of the requisite·supply, and it is
because of such actue ~carcity of accoumodation the landlords.are G
in a position to exploit the situation to the serious detr.iment
of the tenants. The Legislature in its wisdom may properly
consider that in effecting an improvement of the situation and
. for mitigating the hardship of the tenanted class caused mainly
due to shortage of buildings, it will be ~roper · to encouriige
construction of new buildings, as coilstructl.on of new buildings H
will provide more accommodation; easing the situation to a .large
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
A extent, and will ultimately result in benefitting the tenants. As
in·view of the rigours of Rent Control Legislation, persons with
means may not be inclined to invest in construction of new
houses, the Legislature to attract investment in construction of
new houses may consider it reasonable to provide for adequate
incentives so that new constructions may come up. It is an ele-
B mentary law of economics that anybody who wants to invest his
money in any venture will expect a fair return on the investment
made. As acute scarcity of accODDnOdation is · to an extent
responsible for the landlord and tenant problem, a measure
adopted by the Legislature for seeking to meet the situation by
encouraging the construction of new buildings for the purpose of
mitigating the hardship of tenants must be considered to be a
c step in the right direction. The provision for exemption from the
operation of the Rent Control Legislation by way of incentive to
persons with means to construct new houses has been made in Sec.
1(3) of the Act by the Legislature in the legitimate hope that
construction of new buildings will ultimately result in mit.iga-
tion of the hardship of the tenants. Such incentive has a clear
nexus with the object to be achieved and cannot be considered to
D
be unreasonable or arbitrary. Any such incentive offered for the
purpose of construction of new buildings with the object of
easing the situation of scarcity of accommodation for ameliora-
ting the conditions of the tenants, cannot be said to be unrea-
sonable, provided the nature and character of the incentive and
the measure of exemption allowed are 'not otherwise unreasonable
and arbitrary. The exemption to be allowed must be for a reason-
able and a definite period. An exemption for an indefinite period
or a period which in the facts and ci.rcumstances of any parti-
cular case may be considered to be unduly long, may be held to be
arbitrary. The exemption must necessarily be effective from a
particular date and must be with the object of promoting new
constructions. With the commencement of the Act, the provisions
of the Rent Act with all the restrictions and rigours become
effective. Buildings which have been constructed before the
commencement of the Act were already there and the question of
any kind of impetus or incentive to such buildings does not
arise. The Legislature, therefore, very appropriately allowed the
G benefit of the exemption to the buildings, the construction of
which commenced or was completed on or after the commencement of
the Act· This exemption in respect of buildings coming up or to
come up on or after the date of commencement of the Act is likely
to serve the purpose of encouraging new buildings to be construc-
ted. There is therefore nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in
H fixing the date of commencement of the Act from which the exemp-
tion is to be operative.
MOHINOER KUMAR v; STATE [A.N.SEN, J.] 867
The exemption for a period of 10 years from the operation of A
the Act allowed to buildings, the construction of which coomenced
or was completed on or after the date of commencement of the Act,
is fair and reasonable. It is for a definite period and t.hat
period of exemption cannot be considered to be too long; and this
exemption, the Legislature may be of the view, will serve the
purpose of encourging the construction of new buildings. It is B
for the Legislature to decide the period of exemption that may be
allowed and to · fix the date from which . the period of exemption
should run. This will ordinarily be a matter of Legislative
police and this Court will not normally inte~fere unless the
Court is of the opinion that the period of exemption or the date
frcm which the exemption is to operate is unreasonable and C
arbitrary. The classification of buildings with reference to the
date of comnencement of the Act namely, buildings conatructed
before the comnencement of the Act and buildings the construction
of which was completed on or after the date of the commencement
of the Act, has a rational basis and has a clear i:iexus with the
object to be achieved. For the purpose of achieving the object D
and encouraging the construction of new houses with a view to
ameliorate the hardship of the tenants by reJiklving the scarcity
of accommodation, the classification of .the landlord and the
tenant of a house constructed before the commencement of the Act
and the landlord and tenant of a house, the construction of which
commences or ie completed on or after the comnencement ·of the
Act, is clearly founded on an intelligible dif£erentia which has E
a rational relation to the object and this· ciassification does
not result in any invidious discrimination between the classes of
landlords and tenants so classified. This classification is not
arbitrary and is·not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The decisions on which reliance has. been placed on behalf of F
the petitioners is indeed of no assistance. In the case of Motor
General Tr.wlers (supra), this Court had to consider the constitu-
tional validity of s. 32 {b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. This provision
exempted aU buildings constructed on or after August 26, 1957
from the operation of the Act. No period had been fixed for which G
this exemption.will be enjoyed by owners of buildings constructed
on or after 26th August, 1957 and the exemption appeared to be in
the nature of a permanent one. This Court after referring to
various authorities naturally declared the said provision to be
invalid, holding: .
H
"After giving our anxious consideration to the learned
arguments addressed before us, we are of the view that
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.R.
A
clause (b) of Section 32 of the Act should be declared
as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because
the continuance of that provision on the statute book
will imply the creation of a privileged class of land-
lords without any rational basis as the incentive of
B build which provided a nexus for a reasonable classi-
fication of such class of landlords no longer exists
by lapse of time in the case of the majority of such
landlords. There is no reason why after all these
years they should not be brought at par with other
landlords who are subject to the restrictions imposed
by the Act in the matter of eviction of tenants and
control ·of rents."
c
It is, however, to be noted that fois Court in this very
case observed at PP• 243 & 244 as follows:-
''We do relize the adverse effect of this decision on
many who may have recently built houses by spending
0 their life savings or by borrowing large funds during
these inflationary days at high rates of interest, on
the expectation and belief that they would not be
subjected to the restrictions imposed by the Act. The
incentive to build provides a rational basis for
classification and it is necessary, to the national
E
interest, that there should be freedom from restric-
tions for a limited period of time. It is always open
to the State Legislature or the State Government to
take action by amending the Act itself or under
Section 26 of the Act, as the case may be, not only to
provide incentive to persons who are desirous of
F building new houses, as it serves a definite social
purpose but also to mitigate the rigour to such class
of landlords who may have recently built their houses
for a limited period as it has been done in the Union
Territory of Chandigarh as brought out in our recent
jwlgment in l'lmjall Tin SUpply co. Dumd•garti v.
Central ~. The question whether new legisla-
G
tion should be initiated to exempt newly constructed
buildings for a limited period of time on the pattern
of similar legislation undertaken by different St.ates
or to exempt such class of buildings for a given
number of years from the provisions of the Act by the
H
issue of a notification under Section 26 of the Act is
one for the St.ate Government to decide."
MOHlNDER KllMAR v. STATE- [A.N.SEN, · J; j 869
A
In the other decision, namely l'lmjah tin Supply Co.
C>ynx!igarQ (supra), the validity of s. 3 of the East Punjab )lent
Restrictions Act, 1949 and all three notifications issued under
the said section provided for exemption of every . building
constructed in the urban ares of Charidigarh for a period of 5
years from the respective date applicable to. it from the .opera- B
tion of the Act came to be challenged. This Court upheld the
validity of s. 3 of the Act and the notifications impugned
observing:- ·· ·
"In the result we declare that ·Section 3 ·.of .the Act
and the notification .dated January 31, 1973 and the c
other notifications impugned in. these cases are valid
and effective. We further declare. that the exemption
granted by the notifica_tion ·dated January ..31, 1973
applies only to those · buildings _which are given
sewerage connection or electric connection or which
are occupied, as the case may be on or after January D
31, 1973 and not to those buildings which satisfied
any of the said conditions before January 31, 1973."
The following observations of the Court: at pp.· 216-17 may be
usefully noted : -
. . .
"The Preamble and the provisions ~fa statute· iio doubt E
assist the Court in finding out. itsobjett .. and Policy ·
but its object and policy rieed not always. be strictly
confined to its preamble.and the provisions contained
therein. The object and ·policy of the Act which is· now·'·
before us appears to be· slightly Wider: Jhan' some of
the key provisions of· the ·Act namely. fixation of ·fair F
rent and prevelltion of . Unreason.B:ble. ·: tiviC~io~·- ... _o_f
tenants.· The acute ·problem.of .shortage of urb.iri howi~
ing as we all·· know hits• . become ·.a permanent · feature
throughout india. It is on' acc~tillt of 'the shortagii of.
the number of houses ,in· urban area, ·as landlords get
an opportunity to explOit tenan~s who· are in neec! of · G
housing accommodation by cOinpt?lliug.theni to ellter'into
.unconscio\l&ble bi.rgains'. ·Tue.·ACt is passed as one of·
the measures taken to mitigate the hardscip caused .to
the tenants. The policy and object of ·t:he Act general~
' ly is rrltigation of the hardship of tenants. Su~h
mit_igation can be_ attained by several fileasures, one of. H
them ·being creatio·n of incentive · ·to Persons-_, Wii:h .
870 SUPRF.!IE COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
A
capital who are otherwise reluctant to invest in the
construction of new buildiugs in view of the chilliug .
effect of the rent control laws. As part of the said
scheme in order to persuade them to invest in the
construction of new buildings exemption is granted to
them from the operation of the Act for a short period
B.
of five years so that whatever may be the hardship for
the time beiug to the tenants of the new buildings,
the new buildiugs so constructed may after the expiry
of the Period of exemption be ·available for the pool
of housiug acCOOIDOdation . controlled by the Act. The
impugned notification is not, therefore, ultra vires
Section 3 of the Act as in · its true effect-;-IT
c advances the scheme, object and purposes of the Act
which are articulated in the preamble and the substan-
tive provisions of the Act. Moreover the classifica-
tion of buildiugs into exempted buildings and unexemp-
ted buildiugs brought about by the notification bears
a just and reasonable nexus to the object to be
achieved namely the creation of additional housiug
1
D
accOlllDodation to ineet the growiug needs of persons who
have no accOlllDodation to reside or to carry on l
business and it cannot be considered as discriminatory 4
or arbitrary or unreasonable in view of the shortness I
of the period of exemption available in the case of !
each exempted buildiug. The exemption granted for a
E
period of five years only serves as an incentive as
stated above and does not create a class of landlords
who are for ever kept outside the scope of the Act.
The notification tries to balance the interests of the
landlords on the one hand and of the tenants on the
other in a reasonable way. We do not, therefore, agree
F
with the submission that the notification either falls
outside the object and policy of the statute or is
discriminatory."
The aforesaid observations, in our view, clearly negative
the contentions raised by the petitioners and conclude the
G
question against them in so far as the validity of S. l ( 3) of the
Act on the grounds of arbitratiness and illegal discrimination is
concerned.
The other contention that this provision must be held to be
bad inasmuch as this. provision operates retrospectively and seeks
H
to take away the vested rights of the petitioners under the Act
MOHINDER KUMAR v. STATE [A.N.SEN, J.] 871
A
is equally without any merit. The section on its proper construc-
tion clearly indicates that the section is not retrospective in
operation. Merely because the buildings the construction of which
CODWmCed or was completed after the date of cOlllllellCement of the
Act in 1973, come within the purview of this perticular provision
which was introduced by amendment in 1978, the provision does not B
become retrospective. This provision operates prospectively and
becomes effective after its incorporation in the Act by the
amendment, though the buildings completed on . or after the
C011111Pncement.of this Act in 1973 are brought within the scope of
this Section. The argument that the tenants have acquired a
vested right under the Act prior to its amendment is without any C
substance. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3)· by the Amending
Act of 1978, the provision as it originally stood cannot be said
to have conferred any vested right on the tenants. The provision,
as it originally stood prior to its amendment, might not have
been constitutionally valid as the exemption sought to be granted
was for an indefinite period. ·That does not necessarily imply
that any vested right in any tenant was thereby created. The D
right claimed is thP. right to be governed by the Act prior to its
amendment. If the Legislature had thought it fit to repeal the
entire Act could the .tenant have claimed · any such right 1
Obviously, they could not have the question of acquiring any
vested rights really does not arise. Even if it could be said
that the tenants had acquired any right because of any invalidity
of the earlier provision before amendment, it is always open to E
the Legislature to remove any defect to make it valid. It is well
settled that if any provision made by the legislature is found
constitutionally invalid for some lacunae or ,othelwise such
provision can always be validated by rem0ving the defect or
lacuna by passing a validating Act• Validating Acts may be passed
and, in fact, are usually passed with retrospective effect to
remedy any situation which might have brought about as a result F
of the original provision being declared invalid, provided how-
ever the Validating Act sought to be passed is within the compe-
tence of the Legislature.
In the result, these writ petitions are all dismissed.
There shall, however, be no orde~ as to 'COsts. G
Petitions dismissed.
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