Holding

The presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 cannot be invoked unless the prosecution proves the receipt was not a lawful fee, and in the presence of reasonable doubt the accused must be acquitted.

Summary

The appellant, a Sub‑Registrar, was convicted under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for allegedly receiving Rs 60 as illegal gratification for issuing certified copies of sale deeds. The prosecution set up a trap and caught him taking the money, but the appellant claimed the amount was an advance fee lawfully required under the Maharashtra Registration Manual. The Supreme Court held that the word “gratification” under Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act means receipt for personal pleasure or satisfaction and that the presumption of law under that section can be invoked only if the prosecution proves the receipt was not a lawful fee. Since the prosecution failed to disprove that the money could have been a legitimate advance, reasonable doubt existed. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

Issues considered

The meaning of “gratification” under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
Whether the legal presumption under Section 4(1) applies when the prosecution has not proved the receipt was not a lawful fee.
The effect of reasonable doubt on the presumption and on the accused’s liability.
The relationship between the presumption under Section 4(1) and the discretionary presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 161
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 4(1), s. 5(1)(d), s. 5(2)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 20

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actgratificationlegal presumptionreasonable doubtpublic servantadvance feeSection 4(1)Section 114 Evidence Actacquittal

Judgment

A MOHMOODKHAN MAHBOOBKHAN PATHAN
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

FEBRUARY 3, 1997

B [M.M. PUNCHHI AND KT. THOMAS, JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: Section 4( I).

Presumption-Arising of-Gratification-Held: It arose only when
C prosecution proved that what was received· was "gratification ''-Word
"gratification" denoted acceptance of something to the pleasure or satisfaction
of the recipient-If there was reasonable doubt that what was received by the
accused was towards lawful charges he was entitled to benefit of doubt-
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, S.20-Evidence Act, 1872, S.114--Penal
D Code, 1860, S.161.

Words and Phrases:

"Gratification''-Meaning of-Jn the context of S.4(1) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947.
-
E The appellant-accused was convicted under Section 161 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5(2) read with Section S(l)(d) of the Preven-
tion of Corruption Act, 1947 for receiving a sum of R~. 60 as illegal
gratification. The appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 on each count. The High Court
F confinned the conviction and sentence. Hence this appeal.

According to the prosecution, the appellant was a Sub-Registrar. The
appellant's official duties included, among other things, receiving appHca-

G
tions for certified copies of registered documents and issuance of such
copies. The complainant was in need of certified copies of three sale deeds.
....
When he approached the appellant he was told to submit necessary ap-
plications on stamp paper and to pay an amount of Rs. 20 for each certified
copy. The complainant reported the matter to the Anti Corruption Bureau.
A trap was arranged to catch the appellant red-handed. The complainant
went to the office of the appel\ant and presented the applications for copies
H of the saie deeds, which he required and then he paid Rs. 60 to the
830
M.M. PATHANv. STATE 831

appellant. As soon as the appellant put the amount in his shirt pocket, the A
complainant transmitted a signal to the waiting anti corruption squad and

- they rushed to th_e office and caught him red-handed.

The appellant contended tJiat he received the amount as advance
money, which he was required to collect as per the Rules in force. The
appellant's further case was that before he could make any entry in the B
books he was caught by the anti corruption officials on the premise that
he received illegal gratification from the complainant. The appellant's
contention was rejected by the trial court as well as by the High Court.
Hence this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
c
HELD: 1.1. The primary condition for acting on the legal presump·
tion under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is that
the prosecution should have proved that what the accused received was
gratification. The word "gratification" is not defined in the Act. The word D
"gratification" is used in Section 4(1) to denote acceptance of something to
the pleasure or satisfaction of the recipient. If the money paid is not for
personal satisfaction 'or. pleasure of the recipient it is not gratification in
the sense it is used in the Section. Unless the prosecution proves that the
money paid was not towards any lawful collection or legal remuneration E
the court cannot take recourse to the presumption of Jaw contemplated in
Section 4(1) of the Act, though the Court is not precluded from drawing
appropriate presumption of fact as envisaged in Section 114 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 at any stage. [834-D-FJ

Oxford Advanced Learner's _Dictionary of Cwrent English, referred to. F

-1.2. In the instant case, when the appellant told the complainant that

-
he had to bear Rs. 20/- per copy, the mere fact that he did not use the word
"advance" is hardly sufficient to conclude that what he required was not
the advance amount which he was legally obliged to collect from the
complainant. Similarly the act bf keeping the amount in his pocket is not G
decisive to conclude that it was intended for him. Perhaps that could have
been the mode of his keeping the money safe till that day's amount was
closed. Moreover, as soon as the appellant collected the amount the signal
was transmitted by the complainant, which was immediately followed up
as members of the anti corruption squad rounded him up. Hence there H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 1 S.C.R.
A would not have been sufficient interval for the appellant to make entries

-
in the Register or to prepare the receipt. For the above reasons there is a
reasonable doubt that what the appellant collected from the complainant
could have been the charges which he was lawfully obliged to collect from
any person applying for three copies or the sale deeds. In such a situation
B it is only just and fair t.hat benefit of the aforesaid doubt is extended to
the appellant. Therefore, the conviction and sentence passed on the appel-
lant by the courts below must be set aside. [836-B-F]

Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1964) SC
575, relied on.
c CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
381of1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.2.90 of the Bombay High
Court in Crl. A. No. 129 of 1988.
D
Dr. R.B. Masookar and K.L. Taneja for the Appellant.

S.M. Jadhav for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E THOMAS, J. Appellant was a Sub-Registrar in the Registration
Department under Maharashtra Government. The Special Judge at Latur
convicted him under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section
5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short) for
receiving a sum of Rs. 60 as illegal gratification from one Shesherao Patil
F (PW-1). Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 on each court. High Court of Bombay
(Aurangabad Bench) confirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed
the appeal filed by the appellant.

The official duties of the Sub-Registrar included, among other things,
G receiving applications for certified copies of registered documents and
issuance of such copies. Appellant was Sub-Registrar of Nilanga Sub
Registry office. PW-1 Shesherao Patil, an employee of postal department, -I
was in need of certified copies of three sale deeds. When he approached
the appellant he was told to submit necessary applications on stamp paper
H and to pay an amount of Rs. 20 for each certified copy. PW-1 reported the
M.M.PAUIANv,STATE[K T.UIOMAS,J.] 833
matter to the Anti Corruption Bureau. A trap was arranged to catch the A
appellant red-handed. On 8.8.1986 PW-1 went to the office of the appellant
and presented the applications for copies of the sale deeds which he
required and then he paid Rs. 60 to the appellant. As soon as appellant
put the amount in his shirt pocket PW-1 transmitted a signal to the waiting
anti corruption squad and they rushed to the office and caught him
B
red-handed. These are the facts found against the appellant.

There is no scope for any dispute that appellant received the amount
of Rs. 60 from PW-1. In fa~t learned counsel for the appellant did not
dispute the aforesaid finding. The stanf] of the appellant is that he received
the amount as advan~e money which he was required to collect as per the C
Rules in force. His further case is that before he could make any entry in
the books he was caught by the anti corruption officials on the premise that
he received illegal gratification from PW-1.

Appellant, when questioned by the trial judge under Section 313 of
the rode of Criminal Procedure stated, inter alia, thus : "On 7.8.19R6 the D
complainant came to my office and told me that he required copies of three
sale deeds. I had asked him to submit three applications in writing and
bring Rs. 20 for each copy to be paid in advance. On 8.6.1986 the com-
plainant gave me applications and paid Rs. 20 for each copy. Thus in all
he paid Rs. 60. I was about to issue receipt but just then people rushed E
into my office and therefore I could not issue receipts." His contention was
repelled by the trial jpdge as well as by the High Court. Learned single
Judge of the High Court while confirming the conviction and sentence has
mainly relied on the presumption of law envisaged in Section 4(1) of the
Act.
F
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both courts failed
to take into account certain broad probabilities in this case and it resulted
in the wrong conclusion that he received the amount as illegal gratification.

The presumption of law contemplated in Section 4(1) of the Act is
in para materia the same as the legal presumption mentioned in Section G
20(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 4( 1) of the Act
enjoins that upon proof of a certain premise "it shall be presumed, unless
the contrary is proved that" he accepted the gratification as a motive or
reward etc. If the primary condition specified in the sub-section is satisfied .
by the prosecution the court is legally bound to proceed on the footing that H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 1 S.C.R.

A the public servant/accused has accepted the gratification as a motive or
reward for doing any official work in exercise of official functions. The
burden stands shifted to the accused to prove the contrary. But such
shifting would not become necessary until prosecution proves that what the
accused has accepted was gratification. Of course the court can draw
B presumptions on premises even de hors Section 4(1) of the Act because
Section 114 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to do so. But the
difference between the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act
and the legal. presumption under Section 4( 1) of the Act is that under the
former it is only discretionary for the court to draw presumptions as the
court can as well decline from c\oin:g so, but under Section 4(1) it is
C incumbant on the court to proceed on the presumption as the burden
stands transferred to the accused to prove the contrary. (Vide Dhanvantrai
Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1964) SC 575).

_ The primary condition for acting on the legal presumption under
D Section 4(1) of the Act is that the prosecution should have proved that
what the accused received \\as gratification. The word "gratification" is not
defined in the Act. Hence it must be understood in its literal meaning. In
the Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary of Current English, the word
"gratification" is shown to have the meaning "to give pleasure or satisfaction
to". The word "gratification" is used in Section 4(1) to denote acceptance
E of something to the pleasure or satisfaction of the recipient. If the money
paid is not for personal satisfaction or pleasure of the recipient it is not
gratification in the sense it is used in the section. In other words unless the
prosecution proves that the money paid was not towards any lawful collec-
tion or legal remuneration the court cannot take recourse to the presump-
tion of law contemplated in Section 4(1) of the Act, though the Court is
F
not precluded from drawing appropriate presumption of fact as envisaged
in Section 114 of the Evidence Act at any stage.

Here the crucial question, in the light of the defence adopted, is
whether the amount of Rs. 60 paid by PW-1 was for the personal satisfac-
G tion or pleasure of the appellant. If there is reason to doubt whether the
money was received as lawful collection the benefit of it cannot be denied
to the appellant.

In dealing with the crucial question we have to bear in mind/ certain
H broad aspects in th.is case. First is that appellant has been consistently
M.M.PATHANv. STATE[K.T. THOMAS,J.] 835

maintaining the stand that as per the Rules governing issuance of certified A
copies from a sub Registry office an applicant has to pay some charges the
amount of which depends upon the length of manuscripts to be copied,
besides a fee for search. Secondly, PW-1 Shesherao Patil himself admitted
that when he submitted applications for certified copies he was not aware
about the charges required for each copy. In his own words - "when I
B
submitted application for copies I was not aware about the charges re-
quired for each copy. As the accused demanded Rs. 20 for each copy I felt
that he was demanding a bribe." So it was only the surmise of PW-1 and it
was not what appellant told him. The third feature is, when applications
were presented the appellant asked PW-1 to pay Rs. 20 for each copy and
when the money was given the appellant counted it in the presence of all C
those who were present then and he kept it in his pocket.

In the above context we may examine the relevant Rules of the
Maharashtra Registration Manual. Rules 345 to. 355 pertain to "Searches
and inspections, and grant of copies, etc." The material words in Rule 346 D
are these : "When an application for copy is tende. ed, the applicant should
be required to deposit in advance an amount sufficient to cover the search
fee for the whole period mentioned in the application." Rule 347(iv) reads
thus : "When an application for copy is presented personally and the fees
are paid, the probable date on which the copy will be ready for delivery
and the Serial No. of application should be endorsed on the receipt and E
on the counterfoil." Rule 348(i) - "A Register of fees paid or of deposit or
payment in lump made by applicants either personally or by Money Order
on account of searches and copies should be maintained in form Appendix
XXXIX in every office." .
F
A reading of the above rules indicates that if appellant had made
entries regarding amount collected from PW-1 in the Register prescribed
and if he had prepared a receipt acknowledging payment of the amount 20
per copy, there would not have been any scope for a contention that the
amount paid was for gratification of the appellant.
G
Learned single Judge of the High Court .highlighted three main
)
reasons for repelling the plea of the appellant. First is, there is no evidence
to show that appellant talked anything to PW-1 ab.out any advance. Second
is, appellant put the amount in his pocket instead of keeping it in the
drawer. Third is, appellant did not issue any receipt, and on the contrary H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 1 S.C.R.
A appellant told PW- 1 to come to the office on the next Monday or Tuesday
to collect the copies. On the above reasons learned single Judge concluded
that the amount was not paid towards any legal charges.

A closer scrutiny of the evidence unfurls a different profile on every
one of those three reasonings. When the Sub-Registrar told the applicant
B that he had to bear Rs. 20 per copy, the mere fact that he did not use the
word "advance" is hardly sufficient to conclude that what he required was
not the advance amount which he was legally obliged to collect from the
applicant. Similarly the act of keeping the amount in his pocket is not
decisive to conclude that it was intended for himself. Perhaps that could
C have been the mode of his keeping the money safe till that day's amount
was closed. The third reason cannot be used against the appellant because
as soon as appellant collected the amount the signal was transmitted by
PW-1 which was immediately followed up as members of the anti corrup-
tion squad rounded him up. Hence there would not have been sufficient
interval for the appellant to make entries in the Register or to prepare the
D receipt. Evidence shows that appellant told PWl to come to the offic: '-\
again on the next Monday or Tuesday only as an answer to the querry made
by PWl as to when he was to go there again for collecting the certified
copies.

E For the above reasons we entertain a reasonable doubt, on the
admitted facts, that what appellant collected from PW-1 could have been
the charges which he was lawfully obliged to collect from any person
applying for three copies of the sale deeds. In such a situation it is only
just and fair that benefit of the aforesaid doubt is extended to the appellant
albeit the last stage of this litigation.
F
We, therefore, upset the conviction and sentence passed on the
appellant and acquit him of the offences charged. His bail bond will stand
discharged.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.