Supreme Court of India

MRS. R.D. BHATIAversusSMT. RAJINDER KAUR AND ORS.

Citation: 1996 INSC 1019
Decided: 10 September 1996
Disposal: Disposed off
Bench: A M AHMADIS P BHARUCHAFAIZAN UDDIN

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary committee erred and the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of professional misconduct, thereby setting aside the suspension order.

Summary

The appellant, an advocate, was suspended for two years by the Bar Council of India on a complaint that she colluded with the opposing party and other lawyers to set aside an ex‑parte decree, allegedly acting as a mediator and misappropriating Rs. 3,500. The disciplinary committee relied on the complainant's affidavit, accepting her claim that the advocate had not been properly explained the contents and that she had not received the money. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the affidavits, receipts and court records, finding that the complainant herself admitted the advocate acted only as a mediator and that the money was duly received and acknowledged. The Court held that the evidence did not meet the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard required for disciplinary action and that the committee had mis‑appreciated the facts, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Court set aside the Bar Council's order, allowed the appeal and disposed of the Special Leave Petition without ordering costs.

Issues considered

Whether the evidence against the advocate established professional misconduct beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the advocate colluded with the opposing party and other counsel to set aside the ex‑parte decree.
Whether the advocate failed to remit the Rs. 3,500 received from the defendant to the client.
Whether the disciplinary committee erred in accepting the complainant's affidavit without proper translation and explanation.
Whether the suspension under the Advocates Act, 1961 was justified.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 33, s. 36(B), s. 38(3)(c), s. 39, s. 39(B)(g), s. 43(B)

Subjects

professional misconductadvocate disciplineevidence standardBar Council of Indiasuspensionex‑parte decreecollusionmediation

Judgment

A MRS. R.D. BHATIA
v.
SMT. RAJINDER KAUR AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1996

B (A.M. AHMADI, CJ., S.P. BHARUCHA AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.]

Advocates Act, 1961:

Sections 36 (B), 38(3)(c) and 43 (Br-Gross Professional misconduct
C alleged against advocate-Bar Council of India suspending the advocate from
the rolls for two years and to pay costs to complainant-On appeal, held:
Evidence of complainant shaky and unacceptable-All aspects not properly
appreciated by the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council-17ms resulting in
miscaniage of justice-Hence set aside.
D Respondent no. 1 filed a complaint before the Bar Council of
Maharashtra at Bombay alleging that while conducting her case, the
appellant had committed acts of gross professional misconduct by going
hand in glove with the defendant from behind the curtain and in
collusion and conspiracy with two other Advocates, by not contesting the
E suit against the defendant :liligently and properly with the intention to
cause loss and harm to her. The Bar Council of Maharashtra could not
dispose of the complaint within one year as required by Section 36 (B)
of the Advocates Act 1961. Therefore, the case was transferred to the
Bar Council of India and it took the view that the appellant committed
F professional misconduct ancl passed an order suspending her for two
years, with costs to be paid to the complainant. The Review preferred
by the appellant was also dismissed, leading to the present appeal and
special leave petition.

On March 21, 1996, this Court passed an order setting aside the
G
order of the Bar Council of India, and disposing of these matters.

Giving reasons in support of the order dated March 21, 1996, this
Court

H HELD : 1. The allegation made by the complainant respondent
742
R.D. BHATIA v. RAJINDER KAUR 743

against the appellant is that in or about the month of September, 1988 she A
engaged the appellant as her counsel to represent her in the execution case,
when she was introduced to the appellant by somebody. The respondent
has alleged that she had :;igned the Vakalatnama in favour of the appellant
for presenting it in the Court but it was not presented by the appellant till
30.1.1987 and on the contrary got appointed two Advocates on her behalf B
without the knowledge of the respondent No. 1. It has been alleged in the
complaint that the appellant collected for different dates, in all amounting
to.Rs. 3500 towards the part payment of the decretal amount from the
defendent, but the appellant did not pay the same to her inspite of her
insistance to pay the said amount to her. The complainant respondent C
No.1 has further alleged that the appellant in collusion and conspiracy
with the two Advocates,played a dirty game to get the ex-parte decree set
aside by malpractices by remaining behind the curtain with an intent to
cause loss and harm to her and to the advantage· of the defendant by
illegally and wrongfully consenting to set aside the ex-parte decree without D
her knowledge and consent. The affidavit filed in reply to the Notice of
Motion, respondent No. 1 has refuted the allegations made against the
appellant and has made a categorical statement that the appellant was
only acting as a mediator to settle the dispute between respondent No. 1
(plaintiff) and the defendant and in pursuance of the settlement the total E
payment of Rs. 3800 was made towards the decretal amount. She has also
categorically stated that the appellant was not her advocate at that point
of time and that the appellant had filed her appearance in the City Civil
Cour.t only on 29.1.1997. This statement clearly falsifies the alleg:..tion of
the complainant-respondent No. 1 that she had engaged the appellant as
her counsel in the month of September, 1986 but the appellant presented F
the Vakalatnama on 30.1.1987. The Disciplinary Committee has very lightly
brushed aside the aforementioned statement of respondent No. 1 in her
own affidavit on the ground that this affidavit was filed in English by the
appellant without reading over and explaining the contents thereof to the
respondent No. 1 in any langnage other than English. The Committee thus G
accepted the bald statement of the respondent No. 1 as true, contrary to
the Committee's own observations with regard to the demeanour of the
complainant/respondent No. 1 reading of the observations of the Commit-
tee go to show that the complainant-respondent No. 1 not only could read
and understand English to a certain extent but she could speak as well. H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A That being so the Committee was not right in accepting the statement of
respondent that the contents of her affidavit dated 16.2.1987 were not read
over and explained to her. This is patently incorrect statement and appears
to be an after thought. [750-G-H; 751-A-H; 752-A-D]

B 2. As regards the allegation of non-payment of Rs. 3500 which was
received by the appellant from the defendant towards part payment of the
decretal amount, reference could be made to another affidavit of the
complainant respondent No. 1 dated 8.11.1987 filed in the City Civil Court,
Bombay. In paragraph 5 of the said affidavit respondent No. 1 has
categorically stated that the said amount of Rs. 3500 was received by her
C from the appellant who at the time was acting as a mediator to settle the
claim. In addition to this the aforesaid payment of Rs. 3500 is further
established from the receipt dated 29.8.1987 executed by respondent No. 1
acknowledging the payment of Rs. 3500 to her by the appellant of which
she received from the defendant towards the settlement of the case. Thus
D the allegation regarding the non-payment of the said amount is totally
false. [752-E-GJ

3. Though the ex-parte decree in favour of the respondent was set
aside by the City Civil Court, Bombay with the consent of Advocates for
E parties, by order dated 8.8.1987 but strangely enough the plaintiff·
respondent neither made any application to the City Civil Court object-
ing to the setting aside of the ex-parte decree by consent of counsel for
parties nor made any allegation of malafides against any of his counsel
representing her in the said Court nor any ~ppeal/revision was filed
against the said order agitating that the said order setting aside ex-parte
F decree was obtained illegally and without her consent by the counsel
representing her. Further it may be pointed out that though the
allegation of respondent No. 1 was that the two Advocates in collusion
with the appellant and the defendant got the said ex-parte decree set
aside but strangely enough the respondent No. 1 appointed one of the
G said two Advocates to represent her in the High Court of Bombay also
in the appeal against the order dated 18.2.1988 passed by the City Civil
Court directing respondent No. 1 to deposit/ refund the amount of Rs.
3500 which is said to have been paid to her by the defendant as the
ex-parte decree was set aside. The said Vakalatnama duly signed by
H respondent No. 1 is on record. The said appeal was dismissed by the
R.D. BHATIAv. RAJINDER KAUR (FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 745

High Court by order dated 19.4.1988 In which he has been described as A
the Advocate for respondent No. 1. If according to the respondent No.
1, the Advocates had acted in collusion with other Advocates and the
opposite party against the interest of respondent No. 1 in getting the
ex-parte decree set aside ~y was he again chosen to represent the
_, respondent No. 1 in the appeal filed before the High Court. This simply B
goes to show that the allegation of misconduct and collusion made
against the appellant are only after-thought for which there was no basis
at all. There is further material on record to show that the two
Advocates were appearing on her behalf in the City Civil Court on
various dates but respondent No. 1 at no stage objected· to their C
appearance on her behalf either before or after the setting aside ex-parte
decree. On a close scrutiny of the evidence and the material on record
it can hardly be said that the respondent No. 1 has been able to prove
the allegations beyond all reasonable doubt. The evidence of the com-
plainant herself is very shaky and unacceptable. It is unfortunate that D
all these aspects of the matter have not been properly· appreciated by
the Dis~iplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India which has
resulted Into miscarriage of justice. [753-B-H; 754-A-B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.135 (NM)
~~- E
Froln the Judgment and Order dated 28.3.92 of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India in B.C.l.{J'.R. Case No. 100 of
1990.

WITH F
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 356 of 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.10.92 of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India in R.P. No. 2 of 1992.
; G
A.H. Desai and A.M. Khanwilkar with 1 him for the Appel-
lant/Petitioner.

Rajeev Sharma, (Ms. Biraj Tiwari) (NP) for the Respondent No. 1.

V.B. Joshi, Alok Singh and Umesh Bhagwat for Respondent No. 3. H

•
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAIZAN UDDIN, J. 1. The appellant who is an advocate has
preferred this appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act against the
order dated March 28, 1992 passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the
Bat Council of India in BCl/TR Case No. 100 of 1990 suspending the
B
appellant on the roll of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa for a
period of two years with a further direction to pay a sum of Rs. 1500 as
costs to the complainant-respondent No. 1 herein in exercise of its powers
under Section 39(B)(g) read with Section 39 as well as Section 43(B) of
the Advocates Act 1981. The said appellant has also filed the Special Leave
C Petition referred to above against the order dated October 18, 1982 dis-
missing the review petition filed by the appellant against the said order
dated March 28, 1982.

. 2. This appeal was heard and disposed of by us on March 21, 1996
D by passing the following order :

"We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as
the respondent-original complainant at some length. For reasons
which we will state hereafter, we allow the appeal and set aside
the order for the Bar Council of India holding the appellant guilty
E of misconduct, in view of our decision to set aside the view taken
by the Bar Council of India against the appellant the Special Leave
Petition which arises out of the rejection of the review application
does not survive. Both the matters will, therefore, stand disposed
of accordingly. We, however, make no order as to costs."
F
We, therefore, set out the following reasons in support of our said order
dated March 21, 1998.

3. Before we proceed to give reasons in support of our order referred
to above allowing the appeal, it would be appropriate to briefly narrate the
G facts:

Smt. Rajinder Kaur, the original complainant/respondent No. 1
herein had instituted a money suit in the Bombay City Civil Court against
one Smt. Virgillia D'Souza for recovery of a sum of Rs. 12,000 due under
H a bill of exchange. The respondent No. 1 was represented by Advocate

•
R.D.BHATIAv. RAJINDERKAUR[FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 747

Mr. Mirchandani (since deceased) in the said suit. An ex-parte decree A
was passed on December 14, 1984 in favour of the respondent No. 1 and
against the defendant Mrs. Virgillia D'Souza. The appellant who is
enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Maharashtra since 1981
and mainly practising in Co-operative Courts was introduced with the
mother of respondent No. 1 in August, 1986 by one Mrs. Deshpande, B
advocate. The respondent No. 1 alongwith her mother are said to have
met the appellant in the City Civil Court, Bombay when the appellant
was required to identify the respondent No. 1 in the execution proceed-
ings of the ex-parte decree obtained on December 11, 1994 in which the
moveables belonging to Mrs. D'Souza were attached. It is said that said C
Mrs. D'Souza obtained the address of the appellant from the Bailiff
working in the Office of the Sherif of Bombay approached the appellant
offering to pay the decretal amount by instahnents. According to the
appellant a meeting was held in his office on September 24, 1986 in the
presence of the respondent No. 1, her mother and said Ms. D'Souza D
wherein the parties reached to an agreement for payment of the decretal
.:>'. amount by instalments and a sum of Rs. 500 was paid towards the decretal
amount, to the appellant. The appellant's further case is that in pursuance
of the agreement to pay the decretal amount by instahnents the respon-
dent No. 1 requested the Sherif of Bombay to remove the Watchmen E
from the property of Mrs. D'Souza but the attachment may be continued.
According to the appellant the receipt of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 500
and a further payment of Rs. 1000 paid by Mrs. D'Souza were recorded
in the execution proceedings which were signed by the respondent No. 1
on being identified by the appellant. On November 27, 1986 a further F
sum of Rs. 1000 was paid by Mrs. D'Souza towards the decretal amount,
the receipt of which was again recorded in the execution proceedings.

4. Thereafter Mrs. D'Souza took out a Notice of Motion for setting
aside the ex-parte decree obtained against her by the respondent No. 1 G
with the allegations that no writ of summons was served on her in the
suit in which ex-parte decree was passed and that t]:ie appellant had
committed extortion in respect of the amounts paid by her and referred
to above. According to the appellant it is at this stage that she filed her
Power and appeared for the reGpondent for the first time on January 30, H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A 1987 without charging any fee from the respondent No. 1. According to
the appellant the respondent No. 1 herein herself had filed an affidavit
Annexure H-1 in reply to the Notice of Motion for setting aside the ·
ex-parte decree controverting and refuting all the allegations made against
""
the appellant. According to the appellant since Mrs. D'Souza made "'
B allegations against her, the appellant thought it fit to witl].draw herself
from the proceedings after April 30, 1987. She, therefore, file,d an affidavit
Annexure-J denying the allegations against her and orally requested the
Court to permit her to Withdraw her appearance from the Court in the
matter. According to the appellant one Mr. Ladiwala, Advocate tendered
c his appearance on behalf of the respondent No. 1 without charging any
fee .. Mr. Ladiwala appeared and also filed rejoinder of the respondent
No.:.1 duly signed by the respondent herself. Ultimately the City Civil
Court Court by its order dated June 9, 1987 set aside the ex- parte decree
passed on December 14, 1984 by the consent of parties advocates. The
D appellant passed over the sum of Rs. 3500 on August 20, 1987 to the
respondent No. 1 which was paid to her by Mrs. D'Souza as part payment
of the decretal amount against a receipt for the same. The City Civil K
!
Court by its order dated February 18, 1988 directed the respondent No.
1 to refund/deposit in the Court the said. sum of Rs. 3500 which was paid
E by Mrs. D'Souza towards the ex-parte decree which was set aside. Th~
respondent preferred an appeal before the Bombay High Court repre-
sented by Advocate Shri Ladiwala against the order of the City Civil
Court dated February 18, 1988 directing her to deposit a sum of Rs. 3500
.,,,,,..~

in Court. The said appeal was converted into a revision and the same
F was qismissed by the High Court on April 10, 1980. Thereafter the
respondent No. 1 took time from the City Civil Court on July 4, 1988 to
change her counsel Shri Ladiwala and on August 10,1988 Mr. Munshi,
Advocate is said to have appeared alongwith the respondent No. 1 for the
respondent No. 1 in the City Civil Court, Bombay on which date the
G defendant Mrs. D'Souza was granted unconditional leave to defend the suit.
5. The respondent No. 1 then filed a complaint under Section 33 --
of .the Advocates Act (hereinafter the Act) before the Bar Council of
Maharashtra at Bombay alleging that while conducting her case the
appellant had committed acts of gross professional misconduct by going
H
R.D. BHATIA v. MRS. RAJiNDER KAUR [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.) 749

hand in glove with the defendant Mrs. D'Souza from behind the curtain A
and in collusion with and conspiracy of advocates Mr. Ladiwala and Mr.
Munshi by not contesting the suit against Mrs. D'Souza diligently and ·
; properly with the intention to cause loss and harm to respondent No. 1
herein. As the Bar Council of Maharashtra could not dispose of the
complaint filed by the respondent No. 1 against the appe!lant within one B
year as required by Section 36(B) of the Act, the same was transferred
to the Bar Council of India and this is how the Bar Council of India was
seized of the matter and placed before its Disciplinary Committee for
disposal of the complaint filed by the respondent No. 1, Smt. Rajinder
Kaur. The said Committee framed the following issues : c
(1) Whether on 16.2.1987, the respondent appeared in the Court
on behalf of the complainant and later on got appointed Shri
Ladiwala and Shri Munshi, Advocates on behalf of complainant
without her knowledge?
D
(2) Whether Shri Ladiwala and Shri Munshi, Advocates on the
instructions and in collusion with the respondent did not properly
contest the case of the complainant in the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay?
E
(3) Whether the respondent colluded with the defendant in the
said case in either contesting the case or by getting appointed Shri
Ladiwala and Shri Munshi?

{4) Whether the respondent has committed any act of professional
F
misconduct? If so, its effect?

By the consent of parties the complaint made by the complainant respon-
dent No. 1 and the written statement filed by the appellant were respec-
tively treated as their evidence-in- chief and each party was allowed to
cross examine its opponent. Thus, there is solitary evidence of complainant G
respondent No. 1 and the appellant in addition to certain documents on
the basis of which the Committee proceeded to record its findings··'?!). the
issues referred to above. After analysing the evidence and the documents
on record the Committee took the view that the appellant Advocate was
guilty of professional misconduct and, therefore, answered issues Nos. 1 H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A and 3 in affirmative against the appellant and in favour of the complainant
respondent No. 1. But as regards issue No. 2 the Committee answered in
negative for· the reasons that Advocates Shri Ladiwala and Shri Munshi
were not before the Committee. On these findings the Committee took the
view that the appellant committed professional misconduct and, therefore,
B passed the impugned order dated March 28, 1992 suspending the appellant
for two years and to pay a sum of Rs. 1000 as cost. The review preferred
by the appellant against the said order was also dismissed by order dated
October 18, 1992 against which this appeal and the Special Leave Petition
as referred to above have been directed.

c 6. Before we embark upon a scrutiny to examine the correctness of
the impugned judgment, it may be stated that it is a cardinal principle
of law that in cases of misconduct or allegations of any guilt against any
person involving his indictment or infliction of punishment the evidence
adduced should be of such a character and intrinsic value which may not
D admit any element of a reasonable doubt about alleged misconduct or
guilt. In other words the evidence should be beyond all reasonable doubt.
That being so, since the provisions of Section 39 of the Advocates Act
entail the punishment including removal of the name of the Advocate
against whom the allegation of misconduct is made, from the rolls of the
E Bar Council and suspension from practising for such period as may be
deemed fit by the Disciplinary Committee, the evidence adduced should
be of such a character which may be beyond all reasonable doubt about
the alleged professional misconduct. We shall, therefore, examine the
evidence and the material on record to see whether the same establishes
F the allegation of misconduct against the appellant beyond all reasonable
doubt.

7. First of all we shall scrutinize the evidence in relation to issue
No. 1 as framed by the Disciplinary Committee and its finding in the
G affirmative. The allegation made by the complainant respondent against
the appellant is that in or about the month of September, 1988 she
engaged the appellant as her counsel to represent her in the execution
case, when she was introduced to the appellant by somebody. The
respondent has alleged that she had signed the Vakalatnama in favour of
H the appellant for presenting it in the Court but it was not presented by
R.D. BHATIA v. MRS. RAJINDER KAUR [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 751

the appellant till 30.4.1997 and on the contrary got appointed Shri A
Ladiwala and Shri Munshi, Advocates on her behalf without the
knowledge of the respondent No. 1. It has been alleged in the complaint
that the appellant collected a sum of Rs. 500 on 24.4.1988, Rs. 1500 on
7.10.1988 and a further sum of Rs. 1500 on 10.11.1986 (in all Rs. 3500)
towards the part payment of the decretal amount from the defendant B
Mrs. D'Souza, but the appellant did not pay the same to her inspite of
her insistence to pay the said amount to her. The complainant respondent
No. 1 has further alleged that the appellant in collusion and conspiracy
with the two advocates, namely, Shri Ladiwala and Shri Munshi played a
dirty game to get the ex-parte decree set aside by malpractices by C
remaining behind the curtain with an intent to cause loss and harm to
her and to the advantage of the defendant Mrs. D'Souza by illegally and
wrongfully consenting to set aside the ex-parte decree without her
knowledge and consent. In this connection we may first of all refer to
the affidavit Annexure H- 1 dated 18.2.1987 filed by the complainant- D
respondent No. 1 Smt. Rajinder Kaur herself in reply to the Notice of
Motion taken out by the defendant Mrs. Virgillia D'Souza, in paragraph
C of the affidavit referred to above the respondent No. 1 has refuted the
allegations made against the appellant and has made a categorical
statement that the appdlant was only acting as a mediator to settle the E
dispute between the respondent No. 1 as plaintiff and Mr. D'Souza as
defendant and in pursuance of the settlement the total payment of Rs.
3500 was made towards the decretal amount. In the same paragraph 6
the respondent No. 1 Smt. Rajinder Kaur has categorically stated that
the appellant Mrs. Bhatia was not her advocate at that point of time and F
that the appellant had filed her appearance in the City Civil Court only
on 29.1.1997. This statement clearly falsifies the allegation of the com-
plainant-respondent No. 1 that she had engaged the appellant as her
counsel in the month of September, 1988 but the appellant presented the
Vakalatnama on 30.1.1987. The Committee has very lightly brushed aside G
the aforementioned statement of respondent No. 1 in her own affidavit
on the ground that this affidavit was filed in English by the appellant O
without reading over and explaining the contents thereof to the respon-
dent No. 1 in any language other than English. The Committee thus
accepted the bald statement of the respondent No. 1 as true, contrary to H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A the Committee's own observations with regard to the demeanour of the
complainant/ respondent No. 1 in paragraph 7 of the impugned order
wherein the Committee has made following observations :

"Though the evidence was given by C in Hindi, English translation
of which was recorded by this committee, we have marked the
B demeanour of "C" and found to a certain extent C- understands
English and eve11 speaks some words in English at least to get and
give the sense respectively, though she may not be able to have and
give a complete picture in English."

c (emphasis supplied)

A reading of the aforementioned observations of the Committee go to show
that the complainant-respondent No. 1 not only could read and understand
English to a certain extent but she could speak as well. That being so the
D Committee was not right in accepting the statement of respondent that the
contents of her affidavit dated 16.2.1987 were not read over and explained
to her. This is patently incorrect statement and appears to be an after
thought.

8. As regards the allegation of non-payment of Rs. 3500 which was
E received by the appellant from defendant Mrs. D'Souza towards the part
payment of the decretal amount we may refer to another affidavit of the
complainant respondent No. 1 dated 8.11.1987 filed in the City Civil Court,
Bombay. In paragraph 5 of the said affidavit the respondent No. 1 has
categorically stated that the said amount of Rs. 3500 was received by her
p from the appellant who at the time was acting as a mediator to settle the
claim, in addition to this the aforesaid payment of Rs. 3500 is further
established from the receipt Annexure 'L' dated 29.8.1987 executed by the
respondent No. 1 acknowledging the payment of Rs. 3000 to her by the
appellant which she received from Mrs. Virgillia D'Souza towards the
settlement of the case. Thus the allegation regarding the non-payment of
G the said amount is totally false.

9. This brings us to the allegation of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1
-
that the advocates Shri Ladiwala and Shri Munshi were appointed by the
appellant to represent the respondent No. 1 without her knowledge and
H consent who in collusion and conspiracy with the appellant remained
R.D. BHATIA v. MRS. RAJINDER KAUR [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 753

behind the curtain and wrongfully agreed to set aside the ex-pa1te decree A
in order to cause loss to the respondent No. 1 and ·undue benefit to the
defendant Mrs. D'Souza. We find that this allegation too is without any
foundation or any material on record. The material on record pr.:sents a
contrary picture, it may be pointed out that though 'the ex-parte decree in
favour of the respondent was set aside by the City Civil Court, Bombay, B
with the consent of advocates for parties, by order dated 2.6.1987 but
strangely enough the plaintiff-respondent neither made any application to
the City Civil Court objecting to the setting aside of the ex-pane decree by
consent of counsel for parties nor made any allegation of malafides against
any of his counsel representing her in the said Court nor any ap-
peal/revision was filed against the said order agitating that the said order C
setting aside ex-pane decree was obtained illegally and without her consent
by the counsel representing her. Further it may be pointed out that though
the allegation of respondent No. 1 was that the advocates Shri Ladiwala
and Shri Munshi in collusion with the appellant and the defendant Mrs.
D'Souza got the said ex-parte decree set aside but strangely enough the D
respondent No. 1 appointed Shri Ladiwala, Advocate to represent her in
the High Court of Bombay also in ~he appeal against the order dated
19.2.1988 passed by the City Civil Court directing the respondent No. 1 to
deposit/refund the amount of Rs. 3500 which is said to have been paid to
her by the defendant Mrs. D'Souza as the ex-pane decree was set aside. E
• The said Vakalatnama duly signed by the respondent No. 1 Smt. Rajinder
Kaur appointing Shri Ladiwala a& her advocate to represent her in the High
Court is to be found at page 179 of this appeal record. The said appeal
was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 19.4.1988 in which Shii
Ladiwala has been described as the advocate for the respondent No. 1. If F
according to the respondent No. 1 advocate Shri Ladiwala had acted in
collusion with other advocates and the opposite party against the interest
of respondent No. 1 in getting the ex-pane decree set aside why was he
again chosen to represent the respondent No. 1 in the appeal filed before
the High Court. This simply goes to show that the allegation of misconduct
and collusion made against the appellant are only after-thought for which G
there was no basis at all. There is further material on record to show that
the advocates Shri Ladiwala and Shri Munshi were appearing on her behalf
in· the City Civil Court on various dates but the respondent No. 1 at no
stage objected to their appearance on her behalf either before or after the
setting aside ex-pane decree. On a close scrutiny of the evidence and the H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A material on record it can hardly be said that the respondent No. 1 has been
able to prove the allegations beyond all reasonable doubt. The evidence of
the complainant herself is very shaky and unacceptable. It is unfortunate
that all these aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by
the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India which has resulted
B into miscarriage of justice. It was for these reasons that after hearing the
learned counsel for parties on March 21, 1996 we were convinced that th·e
impugned order could not be sustained for the reasons that we have given
herein before. The appeal and the Special Leave Petition already stand
disposed of by our order dated March 21, 1996 and we support the same
with the aforementioned reasons.
c
G.N. Appeal and Petition disposed of.

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