Holding

Abstaining from voting cannot be construed as support for an impeachment motion; such abstention does not count towards the two‑thirds majority required under Article 124(4).

Summary

Ms. Lily Thomas, an advocate, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a declaration that any member of the Lok Sabha who abstains from voting on a motion of impeachment of a Supreme Court judge should be deemed to have supported the motion, thereby satisfying the majority requirement of Article 124(4). She argued that impeachment is a judicial function and that abstention amounts to an abdication of judicial power which the Court could rectify. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the impeachment process, the right to vote, and the procedural provisions for voting in the Lok Sabha. It held that abstaining or refusing to vote is a legitimate exercise of the optional right to remain neutral and cannot be construed as support for the motion. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as it conflicted with the explicit language and purpose of Article 124(4).

Issues considered

Whether abstention from voting on an impeachment motion in the Lok Sabha can be deemed as support under Article 124(4) of the Constitution.
Whether the right to vote includes a right to remain neutral and whether neutrality can be treated as a vote in favour of the motion.
Whether the impeachment process is judicial in character such that abstention constitutes an abdication of judicial power.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 124(4)
Judges Enquiry Act

Subjects

impeachmentSupreme Court judgeArticle 124(4)abstentionvoting rightsparliamentary procedurejudicial powerconstitutional law

Judgment

MS. LILY THOMAS, ADVOCATE A
v.
·, SPEAKER, LOK SABHA AND OTHERS

AUGUST 24, 1993

IR.M. SAHA! AND N.P. SINGH, .I.I.] B

Constitution of India !95!}--A1tic/e 124(4)-vflhether abstaining from
1 ·oting by a n1en1bcr of Parlianzent, on 1notion for ini11caclunent against a
s·upren1e Court sitting judge, could be dee111cd to be a suppotting vote--
IM1ethcr the 1ight to vote includes the 1ight to rc111ain neutral-Whether e.J.:ercise C
of right to vote on n1otion for in1peach111ent i.r judicial in character and lherc-
/(>re refusal of 1nen1bc1:v or their abstaining fron1 voting being abdication of
ncrcise of judicial power could be set 1ighl judicially, assuming that the
ahstainers, fronz voting had voted in favour of the nzotion.

D
• The petitioner had tiled nTit petition under Article 32 of the Con-
stitution of India, seeking declaration that the motion of imf)eachment,
moved in Lok Sabha, against a sitting judge of this Court, seeking to
remove him from otlice, may be deemed to have been carried under Article
124(4) of' the Constitution, by support of majority of' the members, assum-
ing that the members, who abstained from voting had supported the E
n1otion. The petitioner urged that jurisdiction of Parlia1nent while exercis-
ing right to vote on impeachment motion is judicial in character and
• therefore, refusal of niembers or their abstaining from voting, was abdica-
tion of exercise of judicial power, which could be set right judicially,
assuming that such members voted in favour of the motion. The petitioner F
contended that Parliament is constitutionally obliged either to support or
oppose the motion and that silence or acquiescence amounted to accep-
tance or approval.

Dismissing the writ petition, this Court
G
HELD : l. That proceedings for impeachment partake of judicial
character, because it is removal after inquiry and investigation. The
statutory process starts when the speaker exercises duty under the Judges
Enquiry Act and comes to an end when the Con1rnittee appointed by the
speaker submits its report. The debate on the motion thereafter in the H
791
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993[ SUPP. 1 S.C.K

A Parliament, the discussion and voting is more political in nature.
[794-A-B]
'
Sub Committee on Judicial Accountabili0' v. Union of India anti
Others, [1991] 4 SCC 699, relied on.

B 2. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion. The right to volt'
means right to exercise in favour or against the motion or resolution and
implies the right to remain neutral as well. Conceptually it is not aligning
with either view. [794-C] r
3. Article 124(4) of the Constitution does not exclude neutrality or
C abstaining from voting. Halsbury's Laws of England also indicate that the
right to vote is optional. When a person entitled to vote participates in
discussion but abstains from voting, it is neither neutrality nor expression
of view one way or the other. Yet it is legitimate and valid. If non exercise
of right by a member, though present, amounts to support, it shall
D frustrate the entire removal process based on exercise of the right. '
[794-E, Fl
4. The procedure of voting in Lok Sabha also recognises that a
member may abstain from voting. Abstaining or refusal to express opinion
by casting of vote cannot be construed as deemed support of the motion.
E The language of Article 124(4), the purpose of its enactment, the objective
behind it, do not warrant such construction. [795-D]

M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher; Practice and Procedure of Parliament,
referred to.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 543of1993.
F
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

Petitioner in person.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
R.M. SAHA!, J. The petitioner, a practising advocate of this Court,
has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking decla-
ration that the Motion of Impeachment against Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami,
a sitting judge of this Court moved in the Lok Sabha seeking to re~ovc
H him form the office of Judge, should be deemed to have been carried by
THOMAS v. SPEAKER. LOKSABHA[SAHAI,J.] 793

construing the expression, support of the majority in Article 124( 4) in such A
a manner that any member who abstained from voting should be deemed
to have supported the Motion. It was also claimed that this Court may
recommend for repeal of Article 124(4) of the Constitution as it has been
rendered unworkable and non-functional and be substituted by an ap-
propriate provision. Reliance was placed on Halsbury's Laws of England
Vol. 10 and it was urged that although the Parliament was not strictly
B
speaking a judicial body but its jurisdiction while exercising the right of
vote on an Impeachment Motion is judicial, and, therefore, the refusal of
I he .members or their abstaining form voting was an abdication of exercise
of judicial power which may be set right judicially by assuming that those
who ·abstained from voting should be deemed to have voted in favour of c
I he Motion. The petitioner urged that silence. or acquiescence amounts to
acceptance or approval, therefore, a member of Parliament who under the
procedure did not cast his vote obviously was not against the Motion, and,
I herefore, he should be deemed to have supported it. She urged that
L' nited States there is specific provision permitting such abstention but in
D
;1hscncc of any such power a memhcr of the Parliament is constitutionally
nbliged either (o support or oppose a Motion. Once he did not oppose it
he should be deemed to have supported it.

Article 124( 4) is extracted below :
E
"124(4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from
his office except by an order of the President passed after an
address by each House of Parliament supported by majority of the
total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has F
been presented to the President in the same session for such
removal on the ground of proved n1isbehaviour or incapacity. 11

In Sub-Committee Oil Judicial Accou!ltability v. Unioll of India & others,
119911 4 SCC 699, the Constitution Bench after detailed discussions of
analogous provision in other constitutions .and practice prevalent in dif- G
ferent countries observed at page 731 that, 'the constitutional scheme for
removal of a judge, seeks to achieve a judicial blend of the political and
judicial process'. The Bench held that the constitutional process upto the
point of adn1ission of Motion, constitution of Committee and recording of
lindings by the Comn1ittcc \Vere not proceedings in the Houses of Parlia- H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A ment. Jn our opinion proceedings for impeachment partake of judicial <
character because . it is removal after inquiry and investigation. The
statutory process appears to start when the Speaker exercises duty under
the Judges Enquiry Act and comes to an end once the Committee ap-
pointed by the Speaker submits the report. The debate, on the motion
B thereafter in the Parliament the discussion and the voting appear more to
be political in nature. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by the
person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question. In I
Black's Law Dictionary it is explained as, 'the expression of one's will,
preference, or choice, formally manifested by member of a legislative or
deliberative body, or of a constituency or a body of qualified electors, in
C regard to the decision to be made by the body as a whole upon any
proposed measure or proceeding or in passing laws, rules or rq,'lllatiom.
or the selection of an officer or representative'. Right to vote means righl
to exercise the right in favour of or against the motion or resolution. Such
a right implies right to remain neutral as well. 'Neutral' means, 'indifferenl,
D unbiased, impartial, not engaged on either sidc'.-Conccplually it is not
aligoing with either view. But what happens where a person entitled to VOi l'
on a resolution participates in discussion but abstains from voling. It i,
neither neutrality nor expression of opinion one way or the other. Yet it is
legitimate and valid. Jn removal of an elected representative by vote ol
no-confidence neutrality, partiaJ or complete, is not unknown. A construc-
E tion as suggested by the petitioner would lead to uncertainty as if non-ex-
ercise of right by a member, even though present, amounts to support it
shall frustrate the entire removal process based on exercise of the right.

Article 124(4) does not exclude neutrality or abstaining from voting.
F Use of the expression, 'n0t less than two-thirds of the members present
and voting' in the Article implies that the Motion shall be carried only if
the requisite numbers CA'!Jrcsscd their opinion by casting vote in suppot l
of the Motion. One may be present and yet not voting. A reading of
paragraph 1163 of Vol. 34 of Halsbury's Laws of England indicates that ~
when division becomes necessary then the Speaker directs, those in support
G to go in the right lobby and those who oppose in left lobby. And, 'the
members who take part in it pass through one or other of the lobbies, give
their names to the clerks who sit at desks, and are counted by the tellers
as they leave the respective lobbies. After al least six minutes have elapsed
since the order for clearing the lobbies, the Speaker orders the doors giving
H access to the lobby lo be locked. When all members who wish to record
THOMAS v. SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SAHAI, J.] 795

their votes have passed out of the two lobbies and been counted, the four A
tellers go to the table of the House; they then report the numbers of the
division which are announced from the chair'. The use of the word 'wish'
indicates that the right to vote is optional. The procedure of going into
lobbies apply to those who wish to vote. In 'Practice and Procedure of
Parliament' by M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher the procedure of voting in
Lok Sabha is described thus,
B

"Under the automatic vote recorder system, each member casts his
vote from the seat allotted to him by pressing the requisite button
provided for the purpose. A push button set containing a pilot light
and three push buttons - a green button for A YES', a red button C
for 'NOES' and a black button for 'ABSTAIN'- together with a
push switch suspended by a wire, is provided at the seat of each
member. 11

The voting procedure thus itself recognises that a member may abstain
from voting. Therefore, abstaining or refusal to express opinion by casting D
vote in favour of or against the Motion cannot be construed on any rule of
construction or constitutional interpretation as deemed support of the
motion. The language of the Article, the purpose of its enactment, the
objective behind it do not warrant such construction. When the Constitu-
tion mandates that a judge can be removed for proved wisbehaviour or E
incapacity only when out of the members present two-third express their
opinion in favour of such a Motion by exercising their right of voting then
there is no scope for assumed vbting or assumed expression of opinion by
invoking the principle that silence amounts to acquiescence in favour of
the Motion. The submission made by the petitioner is contrary to explicit
language of the Article and inherent philosophy of Parliamentary F
sovereignty.

Consequently, the petition fails and is dismissed.

J.S.G. Petitions dismissed.