MULAKALA MALLESHWARA RAO & ANR.versusSTATE OF TELANGANA & ANR.

                  [2024] 8 S.C.R. 739 : 2024 INSC 639

                   Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr.
                                   v.
                      State of Telangana & Anr.
                      Criminal Appeal No. 3599 of 2024
                                 29 August 2024
              [J.K. Maheshwari and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

                             Issue for Consideration
       The complaint, which set in motion the Criminal Law, was at the
       instance of Respondent No.2-complainant, who filed the same
       against the former in-laws of his elder daughter, for not returning
       the ornaments (gold) which he had given at the time of her marriage
       with their son. The sum and substance of the present dispute lie
       in the father’s right over the gifts, i.e.,‘stridhan’ given by him to his
       daughter at the time of marriage.

                                    Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 –
       s.6 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Power of Attorney
       Act, 1882 – s.5 – The complainant lodged FIR under Section
       406 IPC pertaining to the return of the jewellery which he had
       given to his daughter at the time of her marriage as ‘stridhan’,
       but entrusted it to her-in laws (present-appellants) – Whether
       the father i.e., the complainant herein, had any locus to file
       the First Information Report which has led to the present
       proceedings keeping in view that the same was affected by
       delay and laches, thereby expressly being non-maintainable –
       Whether the High Court was correct in refusing to exercise its
       inherent power in quashing the proceedings under the CrPC:
       Held: The jurisprudence as has been developed by Supreme
       Court is unequivocal with respect to the singular right of the female
       (wife or former wife) as the case may be, being the sole owner
       of ‘stridhan’ – It has been held that a husband has no right, and
       it has to then be necessarily concluded that a father too, has no
       right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable of
       making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of


* Author
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       her ‘stridhan’ – As noted, the FIR was registered under Section
       406 IPC which prescribes a punishment for a criminal breach of
       trust – The very first ingredient itself is not made out, for there
       is no iota of proof on record to show that the complainant had
       entrusted the ‘stridhan’ of his daughter to the appellants which
       allegedly was illegally kept by them – That apart, the second
       ingredient, i.e., the dishonest misappropriation or conversion for
       own use, also stands unfulfilled, for there is nothing on record
       to substantiate that the complainant’s daughter’s former in-laws
       converted the ‘stridhan’ allegedly kept in their custody, for their
       own use, more so, when the parties in matrimony had never
       ever raised ‘stridhan’ as an issue either in the subsistence of the
       marriage or thereafter, especially during the time of settlement
       of all issues – Apart from a statement of the complainant that
       the ‘stridhan’ is with the former in-laws of his daughter, there
       is nothing on record to substantiate the factum of possession
       actually being with the appellants – Furthermore, the action being
       initiated more than 5 years after the divorce of the complainant’s
       daughter and also 3 years after her second marriage had taken
       place, demonstrates the same to be hopelessly belated in
       time – The FIR, which culminated in the present proceedings,
       was lodged in 2021, whereas the matrimonial relations between
       the complainant’s daughter and her former husband ended in
       2015 – She subsequently got remarried in 2018 – Then, on
       what grounds does the complaint file the subject FIR in the year
       2021, is entirely unexplained – That apart, these proceedings
       have been initiated in the face of the Separation Agreement
       entered into by the parties to the marriage at the time of
       dissolution, that too, without any express authorization by the
       daughter of the complainant – Thus, the charge under Section
       6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is not made out and therefore,
       fails – Consequently, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that
       the proceedings initiated by the complainant (CC No.1369/2022)
       against the present appellants have to be quashed and set aside.
       [Paras 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20]

                               Case Law Cited
       Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [1985] 3 SCR 191 : (1985) 2 SCC
       370; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [1996] Supp. 10
       SCR 347 : (1997) 2 SCC 397; Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy & Anr. v.
       Sudha Seetharam & Anr. [2019] 2 SCR 185 : (2019) 16 SCC 739;
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                            741

     Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr.


     Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh & Ors. [2010]
     10 SCR 16 : (2010) 8 SCC 775 – relied on.
     Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 609;
     Mala Kar v. State of Uttarakhand 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1049;
     State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992)
     Supp. 1 SCC 335; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
     Chandrojirao Angre [1988] 2 SCR 930 : (1988) 1 SCC 692;
     Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 4 SCR
     1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401; Peethambaran v. State of Kerala [2023]
     4 SCR 1144 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553; Bobbili Ramakrishna
     Raja Yadad & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2016] 1 SCR 103 :
     (2016) 3 SCC 309; Rohtash & Anr. v. State of Haryana [2019] 16
     SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 554 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Hindu Succession
     Act, 1956; Power of Attorney Act, 1882.

                             List of Keywords

     Section 406 of Penal Code, 1860; Section 6 of Dowry Prohibition
     Act, 1961; Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 5
     of Power of Attorney Act, 1882; Father’s right over the gifts, i.e.,
     ‘stridhan’; Delay and laches; Entrustment of property; Dishonest
     misappropriation or conversion for own use; Divorce; Matrimonial
     relations; Re-marriage.

                            Case Arising From

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3599
     of 2024

     From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2022 of the High Court
     for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 11528 of 2022

                         Appearances for Parties

     D. Mahesh Babu, Shishir Pinaki, Dhanaeswar Gudapalli, Ms. Mallika
     Das, Amber Jain, Devjee Mishra, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Ms. Devina Sehgal, Dhananjay Yadav, Vikas Mehta, Advs. for the
     Respondents.
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                         Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                      Judgment
       Sanjay Karol, J.
       Leave Granted.
2.     The present appeal is directed against an order of the High Court
       for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad dated 22nd December, 2022
       passed in Criminal Petition No.11528 of 2022, whereby the High
       Court refused to quash proceedings arising out of C.C.No.1369 of
       2022 on the file of XXVIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at
       Hayathnagar, under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601
       and Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
3.     Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows :
       3.1 The complaint, which set in motion the Criminal Law, was at
           the instance of one Padala Veerabhadra Rao (Respondent
           No.2 referred to as the complainant herein), who filed the same
           against the former in-laws of his elder daughter, namely, Padala
           Sujana Sheela Kumar (referred to as the daughter) for not
           returning the ornaments (gold) which he had given at the time
           of her marriage with their son. The marriage was solemnized
           on 22nd December, 1999.
       3.2 Undisputably, the marriage was unsuccessful and after a period
           of approximately 16 years, the complainant’s daughter on 14th
           August, 2015 filed for divorce in the United States of America.
           The decree of divorce was granted by mutual consent by the
           Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, on 3rd February,
           2016. At that time, all possessions, material and financial, were
           settled between the parties by way of the Separation Agreement.
           Hence, all issues arising out of matrimony stood closed as the
           daughter got remarried in the U.S.A. in May, 2018.
       3.3 Much thereafter, the complainant lodged FIR No.32 of 2021
           dated 15th January, 2021, under Section 406 IPC pertaining to
           the return of the jewellery which he had given to his daughter
           at the time of her marriage as ‘stridhan’, but entrusted it to
           her-in laws (present-appellants)


1    ‘IPC’ for brevity
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                           743

      Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr.


       3.4 It is necessary to record the complainant’s version of events. At
           the time of getting his daughter married in the year 1999, he had
           given 40 Kasula gold and other articles. Thereafter, the newly
           married couple migrated to the U.S.A where the complainant’s
           daughter was continually tortured, due to which the complainant’s
           wife was severely disturbed and eventually passed away on 6th
           June, 2008. His daughter and son-in-law got their divorce in
           the year 2016, after 16 years of marriage. Such articles given
           to his daughter during the marriage were entrusted at that time
           to the in-laws i.e., the appellant Nos.1 and 2.
       3.5 Whereafter, the complainant’s daughter got remarried in the year
           2018 for which purpose the complainant had travelled to the
           U.S.A. Upon returning therefrom, allegedly he made requests
           to the former in-laws of his daughter (appellants herein) to
           return the articles entrusted to them. Such requests remained
           unheeded with the articles yet to be recovered.
       3.6 In the course of investigation, notice dated 16th June, 2022,
           under Section 41(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732
           was sent to Mulakala Malleshwara Rao (Appellant No.1, the
           father-in-law of the complainant’s daughter). He denied all
           allegations and contended that the complaint has been filed
           with an intent to cause harassment.
       3.7 Upon completion of the investigation, the final report under
           Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed under the Sections noted above.
       3.8 The appellant No.1, aggrieved thereby filed a petition for
           quashing of the charges, under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4.     The High Court found the allegations made in the charge-sheet,
       prima facie to be triable. As such, the prayer to exercise such powers
       was rejected.
5.     In the above context, the short point for consideration is whether
       the father i.e., the complainant herein, had any locus to file the First
       Information Report which has led to the present proceedings keeping
       in view that the same was affected by delay and laches, thereby
       expressly being non-maintainable? Contingent to the answer to this



2    ‘Cr.P.C.’ for brevity
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       question would be, whether the High Court was correct in refusing
       to exercise its inherent power in quashing the proceedings under
       the Cr.P.C.
6.     The sum and substance of the present dispute lie in the father’s right
       over the gifts, i.e.,‘stridhan’ given by him to his daughter at the time
       of marriage. The generally accepted rule, which has been judicially
       recognized, is that the woman exercises an absolute right over the
       property. We may refer to Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar,3 wherein
       a Bench of three Judges observed :
             “6. To the same effect is Maine’s Treatise on Hindu Law
             at p.728. The characteristics of Saudayika have also been
             spelt out by Mulla’s Hindu Law at p. 168 (Section 113)
             which gives a complete list of the stridhan property of a
             woman both before and during coverture, which may be
             extracted thus:
             “113. Manu enumerates six kinds of stridhana :
             1. Gifs made before the nuptial fire, explained by Katyayana
             to mean gifts made at the time of marriage before the fire
             which is the witness of the nuptial (adhyagni).
             2. Gifts made at the bridal procession, that is, says
             Katyayana, while the bride is being led from the residence
             of her parents to that of her husband (adhyavanhanika).
             3. Gifts made in token of love, that is, says Katyayana,
             those made through affection by her father-in-law and
             mother-in-law (pritidatta), and those made at the time of her
             making obeisance at the feet of elders (pada-vandanika).
             4. Gifts made by father.
             5. Gifts made by mother.
             6. Gifts made by a brother.
             7. It is, therefore, manifest that the position of stridhan
             of a Hindu married woman’s property during coverture is
             absolutely clear and unambiguous; she is the absolute



3    [1985] 3 SCR 191 : (1985) 2 SCC 370
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                              745

     Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr.


            owner of such property and can deal with it in any manner
            she likes — she may spend the whole of it or give it away
            at her own pleasure by gift or will without any reference
            to her husband. Ordinarily, the husband has no right or
            interest in it with the sole exception that in times of extreme
            distress, as in famine, illness or the like, the husband can
            utilise it but he is morally bound to restore it or its value
            when he is able to do so. It may be further noted that this
            right is purely personal to the husband and the property so
            received by him in marriage cannot be proceeded against
            even in execution of a decree for debt.”
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
     The position of the wife or woman being the sole authority in respect
     of ‘stridhan’ stands emphatically stated in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
     Kumar Bhada 4 in the following terms:
            “9. A woman’s power of disposal, independent of her
            husband’s control, is not confined to saudayika but extends
            to other properties as well. Devala says: ‘A woman’s
            maintenance (vritti), ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains
            (labha), are her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive
            right to enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except
            in distress….’ In N.R. Raghavachariar’s Hindu Law —
            Principles and Precedents (8th Edn.), edited by Prof. S.
            Venkataraman, one of the renowned Professors of Hindu
            Law, at para 468 deals with ‘Definition of Stridhana’. In
            para 469 dealing with ‘Sources of acquisition’ it is stated
            that the sources of acquisition of property in a woman’s
            possession are: gifts before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts
            subsequent to marriage, etc. Para 470 deals with ‘Gifts to a
            maiden’. Para 471 deals with ‘Wedding gifts’ and it is stated
            therein that properties gifted at the time of marriage to the
            bride, whether by relations or strangers, either Adhiyagni
            or Adhyavahanika, are the bride’s stridhana. In para 481
            at p. 426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the
            bride by her husband or father constitute her stridhana
            property. In para 487 dealing with ‘powers during coverture’


4   [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 347 : (1997) 2 SCC 397
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             it is stated that saudayika meaning the gift of affectionate
             kindred, includes both Yautaka or gifts received at the time
             of marriage as well as its negative Ayautaka. In respect
             of such property, whether given by gift or will she is the
             absolute owner and can deal with it in any way she likes.
             She may spend, sell or give it away at her own pleasure.
             10. It is thus clear that the properties gifted to her before
             the marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving
             farewell or thereafter are her stridhana properties. It is
             her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own
             pleasure. He has no control over her stridhana property.
             Husband may use it during the time of his distress but
             nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same
             or its value to his wife. Therefore, stridhana property does
             not become a joint property of the wife and the husband
             and the husband has no title or independent dominion
             over the property as owner thereof.”
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
       Pratibha Rani (supra) stands followed recently in Maya Gopinathan
       v. Anoop S.B.5
       Noticeably, the position of law has remained consistent throughout
       since 1985, till date, regarding the sole authority of the woman in
       respect of her ‘stridhan’ as has also been held recently in Mala Kar
       v. State of Uttarakhand ,6 wherein a decree of divorce stood passed
       inter se the parties on 18th October 2014, and FIR was filed on 6th
       April 2015, the appellant’s request for the respondent to pay a sum
       of Rs.10 Lakhs in full and final settlement of all claims, including
       ‘stridhan’ was accepted, and the former husband was directed to
       pay such amount.
7.     As evidenced from the above, the jurisprudence as has been
       developed by this Court is unequivocal with respect to the singular
       right of the female (wife or former wife) as the case may be, being
       the sole owner of ‘stridhan’. It has been held that a husband has no
       right, and it has to then be necessarily concluded that a father too,


5    2024 SCC OnLine SC 609
6    2024 SCC OnLine SC 1049
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                          747

     Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr.


     has no right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable
     of making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of
     her ‘stridhan’.
8.   We also notice Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which
     talks about a Hindu female being the absolute owner of property.
     It reads:
           “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
           property.—(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
           whether acquired before or after the commencement of
           this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not
           as a limited owner.
           Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both
           movable and immovable property acquired by a female
           Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in
           lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift
           from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at
           or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or
           by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner
           whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as
           stridhana immediately before the commencement of this
           Act. …”
                                                (Emphasis Supplied)
9.   It is undisputed that action was initiated for securing possession of
     the articles and ornaments after a passage of more than 20 years
     since the date of marriage and five years after the settlement of all
     marital issues at the time of divorce and that too, not by the former
     wife, i.e., the complainant’s daughter, but by the complainant himself.
     This coupled with the fact that there is no authorization on the part
     of the complainant’s daughter in his favour to initiate proceedings
     for recovery of ‘stridhan’ exclusively belonging to her, beckons the
     question on the basis of which the complainant has initiated the
     present proceedings.
10. We find that the law provides for a situation where a woman may,
    in law, grant a person of her choosing the authority to do any act
    which she may herself execute. Section 5 of the Power of Attorney
    Act, 1882, provides as under:-
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              “5. Power-of-attorney of married women.—A married
              woman, of full age, shall, by virtue of this Act, have
              power, as if she were unmarried, by a non-testamentary
              instrument, to appoint an attorney on her behalf, for the
              purpose of executing any non testamentary instrument or
              doing any other act which she might herself execute or
              do; and the provisions of this Act, relating to instruments
              creating powers-of-attorney shall apply thereto.
              This section applies only to instruments executed after
              this Act comes into force.”
       It cannot be disputed that no such power of attorney, within the
       meaning of this Act, stood executed by the complainant’s daughter,
       in favour of her father, respondent No.2.
11. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the grounds under which
    the exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been held
    to be justified. The locus classicus on this issue is State of Haryana
    v. Bhajan Lal 7 which considers Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
    Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre,8 and has been subsequently
    referred to and relied upon in Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of
    Maharashtra;9 and Peethambaran v. State of Kerala.10 The factors
    to be considered are well enumerated requiring no reiteration here.
12. In particular, the second factor enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra)
    is that the FIR or any other document enclosed therewith does
    not disclose a cognizable offence; and the seventh factor, which
    stipulates that where a criminal proceeding is initiated with manifest
    mala fides, ulterior motives or with a view to spite, are important in
    the present facts.
13. As noted above, the FIR was registered under Section 406 IPC which
    prescribes a punishment for a criminal breach of trust. Section 405
    defines the said offence and provides for the ingredients that are
    required to be fulfilled for the offence to be made out.



7    [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 335
8    [1988] 2 SCR 930 : (1988) 1 SCC 692
9    [2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401
10   [2023] 4 SCR 1144 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                          749

      Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr.


      This Court in Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy & Anr. v. Sudha Seetharam
      & Anr.11 identified the ingredients required for a charge under Section
      406 to be justified:
             “13. A careful reading of Section 405 shows that the
             ingredients of a criminal breach of trust are as follows:
             13.1. A person should have been entrusted with property,
             or entrusted with dominion over property;
             13.2. That person should dishonestly misappropriate or
             convert to their own use that property, or dishonestly use
             or dispose of that property or wilfully suffer any other
             person to do so; and
             13.3. That such misappropriation, conversion, use
             or disposal should be in violation of any direction of
             law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
             discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has
             made, touching the discharge of such trust.”
14. In view of the facts of this case, the very first ingredient itself is
    not made out, for there is no iota of proof on record to show that
    the complainant had entrusted the ‘stridhan’ of his daughter to the
    appellants which allegedly was illegally kept by them.
      That apart, the second ingredient, i.e., the dishonest misappropriation
      or conversion for own use, also stands unfulfilled, for there is nothing
      on record to substantiate that the complainant’s daughter’s former
      in-laws converted the ‘stridhan’ allegedly kept in their custody, for
      their own use, more so, when the parties in matrimony had never
      ever raised ‘stridhan’ as an issue either in the subsistence of the
      marriage or thereafter, especially during the time of settlement of
      all issues.
15. Another ground on which the charge fails is that, apart from a
    statement of the complainant that the ‘stridhan’ is with the former
    in-laws of his daughter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the
    factum of possession actually being with the appellants. In Bobbili
    Ramakrishna Raja Yadad & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,12


11   [2019] 2 SCR 185 : (2019) 16 SCC 739
12   [2016] 1 SCR 103 : (2016) 3 SCC 309
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       this Court has held that giving dowry and traditional presents at the
       time of the wedding does not raise a presumption that such articles
       are thereby entrusted to the parents-in-law so as to attract the
       ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
16. As such, insofar as Section 406 IPC is concerned, the instant case
    would fall under the second factor enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra),
    where no cognizable offence is visible on the face of the record.
    Furthermore, the action being initiated more than 5 years after the
    divorce of the complainant’s daughter and also 3 years after her
    second marriage had taken place, demonstrates the same to be
    hopelessly belated in time.
17. We may further observe that the object of criminal proceedings is to
    bring a wrongdoer to justice, and it is not a means to get revenge or
    seek a vendetta against persons with whom the complainant may
    have a grudge. The principle in law that delay in filing the FIR has
    to be satisfactorily explained and does not need any reiteration. In
    the present case, the record is entirely silent on that aspect. It is
    also to be noted, in the FIR the authorities are requested to take
    action against the appellant for not returning the gifts given by the
    complainant to his daughter at the time of the marriage, however,
    in the charge-sheet such a complaint turns into a demand of dowry
    and being pressured into incurring expenses for marriage related
    functions. The question that is to be answered is that when the point
    of genesis is separate and distinct, how does the end result turn into
    something that is entirely foreign to the point of genesis?
18. An additional aspect is to be taken note of. The FIR, which culminated
    in the present proceedings, was lodged in 2021, whereas the
    matrimonial relations between the complainant’s daughter and her
    former husband ended in 2015. She subsequently got remarried in
    2018. Then, on what grounds does the complaint file the subject FIR
    in the year 2021, is entirely unexplained. It has been observed in
    Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh & Ors.13 that:
             “…. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be
             permitted to give vent by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction
             of the criminal Court. The Court proceedings ought not to


13   [2010] 10 SCR 16 : (2010) 8 SCC 775
[2024] 8 S.C.R.                                                              751

      Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr.


             be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment
             or prosecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged
             clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a
             private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party
             in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may
             take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of
             law in the facts and circumstances of that case”.
      Kishan Singh (supra) was recently referred to and followed in
      Rohtash & Anr. v. State of Haryana.14
19. That apart, these proceedings have been initiated in the face of the
    Separation Agreement entered into by the parties to the marriage at
    the time of dissolution, that too, as already recorded supra without
    any express authorization by the daughter of the complainant. It
    categorically records as under:
             “3. …
             e. Personal Belongings, Furniture & Household Goods:
             The parties have agreed upon a division of their furniture,
             furnishings, household goods, appliances, equipment,
             silverware, china, glassware, books, works of art and other
             household and personal property items presently held by
             one or both of the parties.
             Each party hereby relinquishes all right, title and interest
             in and to all household goods, furniture and personal
             properties awarded to the other party.”
      Clause 6 of the Separation Agreement is of import in the present
      controversy:
             “6. RELEASES
             Each of the parties hereto does hereby release and
             discharge the other from any and all other claims, causes
             of action whether at law or in equity, dower, both in real and
             personal property, both under the statutes and common
             law, and all other charges of every kind, character or nature
             which either of the parties does now or might have against


14   [2019] 16 SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 554
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               the other arising in any manner whatsoever, except as
               are herein specifically reserved to the parties, or as may
               be derived by either party to effectuate and maintain the
               terms of this Agreement.”
       Further, clause 8 of the Separation Agreement records the full division
       of the property between the parties in the following terms:
               “8. FULL DIVISION OF PROPERTY
               The parties represent to the Court that this Agreement fully
               disposes and divides all the marital property of the parties
               and that there is no further property which this Court must
               divide. Further, the parties represent and warrant that they
               have each disclosed to the other all of their respective
               property interests in their respective Statement of Property
               filed in this cause.”
20. In view of the above, we also hold that the charge under Section 6
    of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is not made out and therefore, fails.
    Consequently, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the
    proceedings initiated by the complainant (CC No.1369/2022) against
    the present appellants have to be quashed and set aside. Any action
    commenced as a result thereof is bad in law. The questions raised
    in this appeal are answered accordingly.
21. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. The impugned judgment
    dated 22nd December 2022 in Criminal Petition No. 11528 of 2022
    between the self-same parties, the complaint stands quashed and
    set aside. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



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           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan