Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the evidence against the accused was reliable, the alibi was not proved, procedural delays were not fatal, and therefore the convictions stand.

Summary

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Munshi Prasad and others for murder, finding the prosecution’s evidence trustworthy and the defence’s alibi unsubstantiated because the alleged distance of 400‑500 yards did not render the accused’s presence at the crime scene impossible. The Court held that discrepancies between the inquest report and the post‑mortem report were not fatal and did not create a reasonable doubt. It ruled that the non‑production of a basic information sheet did not warrant an adverse inference, and that delays in filing the FIR and in sending the FIR report to the magistrate, when explained plausibly, were not fatal to the prosecution case. The Court emphasized that interested witnesses’ testimony, if credible, cannot be rejected merely on the basis of their interest, and that minor inconsistencies in witness statements do not justify overturning a conviction. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, confirming the life sentences imposed by the trial court.

Issues considered

The appellate court’s power to interfere with a murder conviction when the findings of fact are concurrent and not tainted by procedural vice.
Whether the defence alibi is viable given the distance between the alleged location of the accused and the crime scene.
Whether discrepancies between the inquest report and the post‑mortem report create a reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
Whether the failure to produce the basic information sheet (Sania) justifies an adverse inference against the prosecution.
Whether delay in filing the FIR under Section 154 CrPC vitiates the prosecution case.
Whether delay in dispatching the FIR report to the magistrate under Section 157 CrPC invalidates the trial.
Whether testimony of interested witnesses can be rejected solely on the basis of their interest.
Whether minor discrepancies in witness testimony affect the credibility sufficient to overturn a conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 157, s. 159, s. 161, s. 162, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 145, s. 155
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murderalibiFIR delayinquest reportpost‑mortem reportinterested witnessesevidence appraisalprocedural delaycriminal procedureconviction appeal

Judgment

MUNSHI PRASAD AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR

OCTOBER 10, 2001

[UMESH C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.) B

Code qf Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

Appeal against conviction-Offence of Murder-Concurrent finding of
.fact-lntetference-When called for-Held, when .finding su:ffers .from some
vice and violative qf.fundamental rules or there is de.finite procedural injustice C
which goes to the root of the prosecution case-Penal Code, 1860-Section
302.
Section 154-FIR-Delay in .filing-Effect qf-Held, delay not .fatal if
there is plausible explanation .for delay.
D
Section I 57-Delay in sending report qf FIR to Magistrate-F:ffect of-
Held, it would not vitiate trial if delay is reasonable and there is acceptable
explanation .for it.
Criminal Trial :

Technical plea-Trustworthy and credible evidence on record-Court E
>
convinced about trut~fulness of prosecution case-Helcl technicality ought not
to outweigh the course of justice !f technicality does not go to roiJt of
prosecution case.

Appreciation of Evidence-Principles-Interested Witness-Credibility
of evidence-Held, duty qf court to be more careful in scrutiny of evidence F
qf such witnesses-{fevidence .found trustworthy, rejection not justifiable-
Minor variations and discrepancies in evidence-Effect of-Held, court should
not reject such evidence if not affecting the core of prosecution case-
Treatment qf witnesses-Held, defence witnesses entitled to equal respect and
treatment as that of prosecution. G
Post-mortem report and Inquest report-D{fference between-Held,
discrepancy between them neither.fatal nor even a suspicious circumstance-
Both reports cannot be termed basic or substantive evidence.

Words & Phrases-'Alibi'-Meaning of in common parlance.
H
25
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Prosecution alleged that informant (PWl) ·and his brother, the
deceased, were returning to their village o_n bicycles, when they were
surrounded by appellants-accused who were armed and hiding in bushes
and sugar cane fields. However, informa~t extricted himself and ran away
from the place of incident raising an alarm and witnessed the assault and
B killing of his brother by the appellants from some distance. Other witnesses
(PW1-PW4) also arrived at the place of incident and saw the appellants
running away from the place of incident. Trial court convicted the
appellants for committing murder and sentenced them to rigorous
imprisonment for life which was upheld in appeal by the "High Court.
Hence the present appeals by the accused persons.
c
Appellants contended that specific evidence tendered by defence
witnesses presented an alibi in their favour; that there is some difference
between inquest report... '
and post-mortem report creating suspicious
circumstance warranting a benefit of doubt in their favour; that adverse
D presumption should have been drawn against the prosecution for non •
production of sariah being the basic information sheet; that delay in filing
FIR was·fatal to prosecution case; that it was a case of blind murder not
witnessed by any person, prosecution case is fabricated and they have been
falsely implicated by reason of enmity and hostile relationship between the
family of informant and the appellants; that PWs 1 to 5 _are interested
E witnesses as they belong to the same village and are related to each other;
that no independent witnesses have been examined; and that delay in
sending FIR to Magistrate under Section 157 of Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 vitiated the trial.

F Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : L lt is now a well-settled principle of law, that in an appeal
against conviction for the offence of murder, Supreme Court would be
rather slow to intervene, in the event of there being a concurrent finding ·
of fact, tiriless of course', the finding ·reached suffers from some vice ancl
G thus violative of fundamental rules or even a definite procedural injustice
going to the root of the prosecution case. [29-H; 30-A]
'--
Arjun Marik and others ~. State of 13ihar, [1994] Suppl. 2 SCC 372,
relied on.

H 2.1. The word 'alibi', a latin expression means and implies in
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE 27
common acceptation 'elsewhere'. It is a defence based on the physical A
impossibility of participation of a cdme by an accused in placing the latter
in a location other than the scene of crime at the relevant time, shortly
put the presence of the accused elsewhere when an offence was committed.
Distance thus would be a material factor in the matter of acceptability
of the plea of alibi. [30-C; D; F]
B
2.2. In the instant_ case, the place of occurrance was 400-500 yards
from the place of Panchayat. A distance of 400-500 yards cannot possibly be
said to be 'presence elsewhere' - it is not an impossibility to be at the place
of occurrence and also at the panchayat meet, the distance being as notic~d
above. The evidence on record itself negates the plea of alibi. [31-D; E] C
> Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of UP., AIR (1981) SC 911, relied on.

- 3. There is some difference between the inquest report and the post-
mortem report having due regard to the injuries as found on the body of the
deceased. A mere omission of a pa~icular injury or indication therein of an D
ad~itional one cannot however invalidate the prosecution case. Preparation
of an inquest report is a part of the investigation within the meaning of the
Criminal Procedure Code and neither the inquest report nor the post-mortem
a
report can be termed to be basic evidence or s~bstantive evidence and
discrepancy occurring therein can neither be termed to be fatal nor even a
E
suspicious circumstance, which would warrant a benefit to the accused and
the resultant dismissal of the prosecution case. It is the doctor's statement in
Court, which has the credibility of a substantive evidence and not the post-
mortem report. [31-H; 32-A; 34-E; F]

Balaka Singh_ and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1975) SC 1962, F
cited.

4. Non-production of a substantive piece of evidence can under certain
circumstances bring forth an adverse inference, but not in the present context.
Technicality ought not to outweigh the course of justice on the face of
trustworthy credible evidence on record and more so when the failure to G
produce does not go to the root of the prosecution case. [35-A]

5. It is well settled that mere delay in filing FIR cannot be said to
be fatal to a criminal prosecution. First Information Report cannot but
be termed to be the starting point and thus sets in motion a criminal
H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A prosecution. Strictly speaking it is of no consequence in the event the FIR
has been delayed with a plausible explanation though on the factual score
it is not even so. (35-B; C; 36-B]

Apren Joseph alias Current Kunjukw~ju & Ors. v. The State of Kerala,
AIR (1973) SC 1 relied on.
B
6.1. It is the predominant duty of Court to. be more careful in the
matter of scrutiny of the evidence of interested witnesses and if on such
a scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record is otherwise trustworthy,
question of rejection of the same on the ground of being interested
witnesses would not arise. It is the totality of the evidence, which matters
c and if the same creates a confidence of acceptability of such an evidence,
question of rejection on being ascribed as 'interested witness' would not
be justifiable. (40-F; G; H]

6.2. Records depict that PWs 1 and 2 are independent witnesses. The .....
D corss-examination of these two witnesses, though effected extensively, has
not. yielded any benefit to the appellants and the evidence remained t!)tally
unshaken and thus worthy of acceptance by a Court of law. The evidence
of PWs 3, 4 and 5 stands corroborated by two independent witnesses. The
evidence on record is worth its credence and trustworthy,. as such creates
a confidence in the mind of the Court. (38-B; D; E]
E
7. It is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity, which is
'required. If the evidence on record is otherwise satisfactory in nature and
can be ascribed to be trustworthy, an increase in number of witnesses
cannot be termed to be a requirement for the case~ (40-D; E]
F 8. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies
on trivial matters without affecting the. core of the prosecution case, ought
not to pr!)mpt the court to reject evidence in its entirety. If the general
tenor of.· the ~vidence given by the witness and the trial court upon
appreciation. of evide~ce forms opinion about the credibili~y thereof, in the
G normal circumstances the. Appellate. Court would not .be justified to review
it once ~ain ~ithout justifiable reasons. (38-F]

State o.f U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, [1985] 1 SCC SOS and Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana, (1999] 9 SCC S2S, relied on.

H 9. The evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 29
termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being A
examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal
respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility
and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses
.. at par with that of the prosecution-a lapse on the part of the defence
witness cannot be differentiated and be treated differently than that o( the
prosecutors' witnesses. [31-F; G] B

10. While it is true that Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 makes it obligatory on the Officer Incharge of the Police Station to
send a report of the information received to a Magistrate forthwith, but
that does not mean and imply to denounce and Cliscard an otherwise C
... positive and trustworthy evidence on record. Technicality ought not to
outweigh the course of justice- if the Court is otherwise convinced and has
come tO a conclusion as regards the truthfulness of the prosecution case,
mere delay, which can otherwise be ascribed to be reasonable, would not
by itself demolish the prosecution case. The statutory obligation warrants
utmost promptitude and in the event of availability of sotne explanation D
therefore, which is otherwise accept&!>le as well, question of prosecution
being traintcd would not arise. FIR set~nhe investigation rolling and in
the event of there being some delay somewhere and as noticed above with
the acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be said to vitiate the trial by
reason therefor. [42-G; ff; 43-A; 44-F; G] E
Shiv Ram and Am: v. State of U.P., [1998) 1 SCC 149 and State of
Kamataka v. Moin Patel and Ors., AIR (1996) SC 3041, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
491-492 of 2000. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.90 of the Patna High Court
in Crl. A.No. 590 and 686 of 1984.

R. Venkataramani and Satya Mitra Garg for the appellants.
G
Saket Singh for B.B. Singh for the Respondent

The Judgment of the Court was delivered b~

BANERJEE, J. It is now a well-settled principle of law, that in an app~al
against conviction for the offence of murder, Supreme Court would be rather H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A slow to int~rvene, in the event of there being a concurrent finding of fact, unless
of course, t.he finding reacf?ed · ~uffers from some vice and thus viOlative of
fundamental rules or even a definite procedural irijus.tice going to the root of
the prosecl1tion case. (See in this ~ontext, the decisi~n _of this Court i,ri Ar:jun
Marik and others V. Sfate of /Jihar, [i994] Suppl. 2 sec p.372. It is on this .
perspective that the pr~sent appeal against the.common judgment dated 28th
B
. July, 1999 passed by the High Court of Patna .
in .Crl.
.
A.No.
. .. .
590., of
"
1984•;:,and
.,

686 of 1984 shall have to be considered. Before adverting to the contentions
.in support of the appeal, in the·matter in issue_, a-note·of.caution,shall have
to be kept in mind, as has been administered by this Court from t~me to time,
that scrutiny of evidence in a murder trial should be effected with more than
c ordinary care so as not to affect 'dispassionate judicial scrutiny'.

The judgment under appeal stands criticised .on tqre~ major cou.nts: the
first of the three counts relate lo the plea of aljbi. The. word 'alibi', a L;;ttin
expression. means and implies in commqn acceptation 'elsewhere' : It is a
D defence based on the physical impos~ibility of Participatio~t of a crime by an
accused in placin,g t~e !atter i~ a. location o~her th~n the scene of crime <1:t the
relevant time, shortly, put the pr~sen_ce of the acc,:used elsewhere when an
~ffence was committed. This Court in Dudh Ncah Pandey v. ~tate ~! U.P., AIR
(1981) sec 9il has the following _to state in regard to the plea ~f .alibi :

E " ... The plea of alibi' postulates the physical impossib,ility of the
presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his
presence at other place. The plea can therefore succeed only if it is
shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he
could not be present at the place where the crime was committed ... "
F '
- Distance thus would be a material factor in the matter of acceptability of
the plea of alibi. Interestingly this plea as raised by Mr. Venkararamani, learned
senior counsel appearing in support of the appeai' has been by reason of specific
evidence as tendered before the Court by the defence witnesses. On assumption
of the factum of the evidence being oth.erwise truthful, there appears to be some
G difficulty, however, in the matter of acceptance of submission of Mr.
Venkataramani. The evidence on record as tendered by Raj Narain Prasad
(defence witness No. 2) was to the following effect .
.
"2. On 27.6.80 at 12 P.M. a panchayat was held in the garden of
Yogendra Prasad. I went to Panchayat and told .the head that I came
H
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [~ANERJEE, J.] 31
to know that a murder was committed in Nakka Tola. At that time A
it was not known to me as to who is murdered.

3. At that time there were Bose Sahib, Manglue Sahani, _Dasai Sahni,
Naga Me)lto, Hira Sahni, Multan Mian and Raghnath Mehto etc. in
the Panchayat.
.B
4. When I reported then they became worried and aU of them left
with Head ·11y1ukhiaji .. I also went.

5. On the western side of the road 25-30 yards towards East there
was a dead body in the sugar cane field. There I also asked the people
:bufI was not known as to who had killed.The dead body was at four-
c
. five hundred yards.from this place of panchayat, we staye4 there near
the dead body till 5-5, 112 o'cl~ck. Jamadar S~hib came there after,
we rea~hed there." (Emphasis suppiied).

Withotit attributing any motive and taking the evidence on its face value, D
therefore, it appears that the place of oc~urre'nce was at 400 - 500 yards from
the place of panchayat and it is on this piece of evidence, the learned Advocate
0

for the State heavi ly relied upon and contended.that the distance was far too
short so as to be an impossibility for the accused to be at the place of occurrence
. - we cannot but lend concurrence to such a submission : A distance of 400- E
500 yards cannot possjbly be said to bt'. 'presence elsewhere' - it is not an
impossibility to be at the place of occurr6nce and. also at the panchayat meet,
. the distance bei~g as noticed above : The evidence on record itself negates
the plea and we are thus unable to record our concurrence as regards
acceptance of the plea of alibi as raised in the appeal. Before drawing the
curtain on this score however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered F
by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason
of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence
- witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution.
The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to
the defence witnesses at par with that of the prosecution - a lapse on the part G
of the defence witness cannot be differentiated and be treated differently than
that of the prosecutors' witnesses.

Adverting to the second count of submissions raised by Mr Venkataramani,
it appears that there is existing-some difference between the inquest report and
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the post-mortem report havi1ig due regard to the injuries as found on the body
of the deceased. For convenience sake, the same .is tabulated· hereinbelow :

Inquest Report - ·Injuries noted Post Mortem Report - injuries noted

B 1. The nech cut with some sharp Externally :-
edged-weapon. The neck slightly
1. One incised wound on skull on left
attached to the body. F "'st ofthe ·
side 4" above left ear 8" x 2" x
neck cut.
Brain deep. There was clot under
2. On left side of the head, cut with scalp and brain. Left Parietal a part
c some sharp-edged weapon. of frontal and occipital bone were
cut. Brain matter· was lace.rated.
3. On the' left hand below the elbow
and forearm, cut.with some sharp-
Internally :- •
edged weapon. 2. One incised wound on the front of
neck cutting nuscles; trachea, large
D 4. On the left foot the wounds of vessels and nerves on both sides
spear at "three places. and oesophagus vertebrae
columnal {IV survical) and spinal
5. On the right foot three wounds
chord.
inflicted with a sharp edged
weapon. (j) One incised w_ound in.the front of
E left arm 3"x3"x muscle ·(I~p
6. A wound on . the ·cheek below
right.eye. (ii) One incised wound in.the back of
left arm 4"x3"x bone deep. All
mussels and both radium and ulna
were cut.
F
(iii) T_here were three penetrating
wounds on left shoulder 1-1/2" x
1-1/2" each (penetrating the
mussei.s upto bone.)
G (iv) Three incised wound on right
shoulder 2" x 1/2" x mussels deep
·each.
(v) One penetrating w0und below right
eye 1/2" x 112" x 1/2".
H
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 33
On the basis of the aforesaid, it has been rather emphatically contended A
in support of the appeal that by reason of the difference as noticed above,
between the inquest report and post-mortem report, the prosecution's case
suffers from a very serious suspicion warranting in any event a doubt in
favour of the accused persons. It is in support of the contention that Mr.
Venkataramani placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of
Balak.a Singh and others v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1975} SC 1962 wherein
B
this Court observed :

" ... In these circumstances, therefore, the High Court was fully
justified in holding that the omission of the names of the four accused
acquitted by the High Court in the inquest report was a very important C
circumstance which went in favour of the four accused. This omission
has a twofold reaction. In the first place it throws doubt on the
'• complicity of the four accused acquitted by the High Court and
secondly it casts serious doubt on the veracity and authenticity of the
F.l.R. itself. It is not understandable as to why the four accused who
are alleged to have taken an active part in the assault on the deceased D
were not at all mentioned in the inquest report and in the brief
statement of the very person who had lodged the F.l.R. four hours
before. Counsel for the State tried to justify this omission on the
ground that in the inquest report Ext. P.H. the names of all the nine
accused appear to have been mentioned at the top of that document. E
There is, however, no column for mentioning the names of the
J. accused and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Investigating
Officer to have mentioned the names of the accused in that particular
place.

Finally the Investigating Officer P.W. 23 Teja Singh admitted in F
his evidence that he had prepared the inquest report and that he had
read out the same to Banta Singh and Harnam Singh P.Ws. but later
tried to say that he did not read out the inquest report to Banta Singh
and Harnam Singh before getting their thumb impressions on the
inquest report. This circumstance speaks volumes against the G
prosecution case. If, therefore, it is once established that the names
of the four accused were deliberately added in the inquest report al
the instance of the prosecution there is no guarantee regarding the
truth about the participation in the assault on the deceased by the ...
appellants."
H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Let us, however, examine the omissions in either of the documents as
produced before the Court and consider for ourselves as to -whether there is
any material difference which would otherwise affect the trial by reason of
a doubt as regards the reliability of the prosecution case. Item Nos. 4 and 5
in the inquest report are the two basic items, which are said to be missirig in
· the post-mortem report; as such the contention of existence of suspicious nature
B
.of prosecution. We, however, cannot lend our concurrence thereto. There may
or may not be injuries on the left or the right foot but the fact remains that
there is no mention of the same in the post-mortem report - does it otherwise
affect the credibility of the prosecution case? Post-mortem report is prepared
by the doctor, who held the post-mortem examination on the body of the
c deceased Indrasan Prasad and his findings have been recorded therein. The
document by itself is not a substantive evidence but it is the doctor's statement
in Court, which has the credibility of a substantive evidence and not the report,
which in nom1al circumstance ought to be used only for refreshing memory
of the doctor witness or to contradict whatever he might say from the witness
•. D box. In thi.s context reference may be made to a decision of the Madras High
Court in Re. Ramaswami, AIR (1938) Madras 336. In the similar vein the
inquest report also cannot be tem1ed to be a basic or substantive evidence being
prepared by the police personnel being a non-medical man and at the earliest
stage of the proceedings. On the wake of the aforesaid, a mere omission of
a particular injury or indication therein of an additional one cannot however
E
invalidate the prosecution case. The evidential value of inquest report cannot
be P,laced at a level as has been so placed by the appellant. preparation of an
inquest report is a part of the investigation within ~e meaning of the Criminal
procedure Code and as noticed above neither the inquest report nor the post-
mortem report can be termed to be a basic evidence or substantive evidence
F and discrepancy occurring therein can neither be termed to be fatal nor even
a suspicious circumstance, which would warrant a benefit to the accused and
the resultant dismissal of the prosecution case. On the factual score Mr.
Venkataramani relied heavily on the evidence of PW-7 being the Jagdishpur
Police Camp-in-charge. In his evidence, PW-7 stated that the inquest report
G was prepared on the basis of the information contained in Sanah No. 306 and
since the Sanah has not been produced, it has been contended that Sanah being
.the basic information sheet, non-production thereof would entail the
consequences of adverse presumption as regards the involvement of the '
accused persons. Obviously, thus it has been contended· that nobody had any
·clue as to how the incident had occurred. Eloquent as always, Mr. Venkataramani
H
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 35
has, iri our view, over-emphasised the issue. Non-production of a substantive A
piece of evidence can under certain circumstances bring forth an adverse
inference, but not in the present context. Technicality ought not to outweigh
the course of justice on the face of trustworthy credible evidence on record
and more so when the failure to produce does not go to the root of the
prosecution case. Situations, obviously would entail such consequences but in
the present context, one cannot possibly stretch it that far.
B

Fabricated and delayed FIR as a matter of fact has been the basic
submission in support of the appeal. It is now, however, well settled and we
need not dilate on this score over again that mere delay cannot be said to be
fatal to a criminal prosecution. First Information Report cannot but be termed C
to be the starting point and thus sets in motion of a criminal investigation.
... In this context the.observation of this Court in Apren Joseph alias Current
Kunjukunju & others v. The State of Kerala, AIR (1973) SC 1 seems to be
rather apposite. In paragraph 11 of the report this Court stated as below :

"11. Now first information report is a report relating to the commission D
of an offence given to the poiice and recorded by it under Section
154, Cr.P.C. As observed. by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja,
ILR 1945 Lah l=AIR (1945) PC 18 the receipt and recording of
information report by the police is not a condition precedent to the
setting in motion of a criminal investigation. Nor does the statute E
provide that such information report can only be made by an
eyewitness. First information repmt under S. 154 is not even considered
a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate
or contrdict the infmmant's evidence in court. But this information
when recorded is the basis of the case set up by the informant. It is
very useful if recorded before there is time and opportunity to F
embellish or before the informant's the FIR, therefore, inevitably
gives rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the
possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its
effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version.
In our opinion, no duration of time in the abstract can be fixed as G
reasonable for giving information of a crime to the police, the question
of reasonable time being a matter for determination by the court in
each case. Mere delay in lodging the first infonnation report with the
police is, therefore, not necessarily, as a matter of law, fatal to the
prosecution. The effect of delay in doing so in the light of the H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A plausibility of the explanation forthcoming for such delay accordingly
must fall for consideration (Jn all the facts and circumstances of a
given case."

It is thus strictly speaking of no consequence in the e·vent the FIR has
been delayed with a plausible explanation though on the factual score it is not
B even so. Let us, therefore, refer to the factual score briefly at this juncture:

The occurrence in this case is said to have taken place on 27th June,
1980 at a place near village Jagdishpur, Nauka Tola, about 20 Kms. North-
East of the Police Station, Nau tan at about 3.00 PM in the afternoon. It appears
c that the informant Laxuman Prasad (PW5) had gone to Bettiah on the alleged
date of occurrence alongwith his brother Indrasan Prasad from where they had
returned by bus to Jagdishpur stand and after alighting from the bus, both of
them took tea near the bus stand and thereafter both of them started for their -..
village on bicycles. When they proceeded further, they saw Nathuni Prasad
(PW-3) and Bhagwat Prasad (PW-4) coming behind them at some distance.
D When the informant and his brother (deceased) came to a place at some
distance ahead of village Jagdishpur Nauka Tola, all of a sudden the accused
persons, namely, Nagendra Mabton @ Naga Mohton, Kamal Mabton, Raghu
Sah, Shankar Raut, Munshi Mabton, Ganga Bishun Mabton and Nathuni Raut
emerged from the bushes and fields of sugarcane nearby and they surrounded
E the informant and his brother. They had weapons like Bhala : Farsa and Dabia
in their hands. However, the informant as the evidence records, extricated
himself and started runnin~ away and raised alarm. He sto".'J at some distance
from the P.O. and saw that all the above named accused persons surrounded
his brother deceased Indrasan Prasad, who was also trying to run away.
According to the informant, Ganga Bishun Mabton and Nathuni Raut assaulted
F
the victim with Bhala on his back and Raghu Sah caught hold of the victim
by his waist and'felled him on the ground. Thereupon Munshi Prasad ordered
to kill him and Naga Mabton started hitting the victim with Dabia in his hand
when the victim was trying to wriggle out and other accused over-powered
him and his neck was cut. In the meanwhile, two other witnesses, i.e., Nathuni
G Prasad and Bhagwat Prasad also arrived and they saw the culprits running
away. Later, some other persons also arrived which included Laxmi Mabton
(PW-2) and Nayak Mabto(PW-1) and they also saw the culprits running away.
According to.the informant, the accused persons had previous enmity with the
family of the informant and, therefore they intercepted the brother of the
H informant and brutally killed him. After this incident the informant (PW-5)
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 37
went to the out-post at Jagdishpur where he met ASI Abhay Kumar Singh (PW- A
7) and gave his statement in the Fard Beyan which was recorded at 4.30 PM.
The ASI thereafter came to the P.O. and he prepared the inquest report and
,..
' sent the dead-body for Postmortem Examination who also inspected the P.Q.
and made some seizures and also recorded the further statement of tlw
informant. The Fard Beyan was sent to the Police Station at nautan from
Jagdishpur O.P. where the case was registered. However, the investigation was
B
taken up by the ASI Abhay Kumar Singh (PW-7) who did preliminary
investigation and subsequently he made over the charge to the Officer-in-
charge of nautan P.S. who on completing investigation submitted chargesheet
in the case. the deadbody was carried to M.G.K. Hospital by a constable No.
I- • 214 Bhuneshwar Singh and Dafadar and some others and there the Postmortem c
Examination over the dead-body was held by Dr. Ansuman Shukla (PW-6)
on 28th of June, 1980. Subsequently, the case, after the cognizance was taken,
" was committed to the court of Sessions. The session's case was registered an4
the sessions case was entrusted to Addl. Sessions Judge II, Bettiah where the
charges were framed against the accused persons on 16th of August, 1983 and D
after the evidence was recorded on behalf of the prosecution, the statements
of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and some
I
defence witnesses were also examined and the trial concluded.

Altogether seven appellants in both the appeals have been convicted and
have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life by the 2nd E
Additional Sessions Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah. An appeal thereform
however resulted in an Order of dismissal and hence the appeal before this
court upon grant of Special Leave.

It is on the above factual score, Mr. Venkataramani strongly contended .
that the proceedings initiated in the matter cannot but be ascribed to be a case F
of blind murder, which has not been witnessed by any person. It has been
contended that the prosecution story is a fabricated one as regards the
involvement of the accused persons and the case of blind murder has been
;. converted into one of the involvement of the accused by reason of enmity and
hostile relationship between the family of PW-5, the brother of the deceased G
and the accused persons. The enmity aspect will be dealt with at a later stage
in this Judgment but presently it would be convenient to not the submissions
in support of the appeal as regards the happenings of the event of blind murder-
the circumstances relied upon are, however, as follows :- (i) PWs 1 to 5 are
supposedly interest~d witnesses by reason of the factum that they belong to H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the same village and are related to each other. Strong criticism has been levelled
on the evidence of PWs. 3, 4 and 5, who claimed to be eye-witnesses and in
the similar vein criticism has also been levelled against the evidence of PWs.
l and 2, who claimed to have heard the shouting from a distance of about ~
..._
I
700 to 800 yards. Let us thus analyse the evidence of prosecution witnesses
B - records depict that PWs 1 and 2 are independent witnesses; who have stated
tha_t while they were proceeding towards Jagdishpur Market and when they
reached near the place of occurrence, they saw the appellants running away
with Dabia in t~eir hands and it is only on seeing the accused persons running
away with weapons, they came at the place of occuqence and saw the dead
body of the deceased lying there. It is this evidence which has been attributed
c to be highly improbable by Mr. Venkataramani since they were carrying a load
of about 15 Kgs. of vegetables on their shoulders - a rustic villager growing
vegetables and selling it to the market place obviously will carry the load. on
their shoulders. Weight of 15 Kgs. may be of some consequence to a
sophisticated city baboo but the same may not be so to a village peasant or
D even a trader. The cross-examination of these two witnesses, though effected
extensively, has not yjelded any benefit to the appellants and the evidence
remajned totally unshaken and thus worthy of acceptance by a Court of law.
The evidence ofl~Ws 3, 4 and 5 stands thus corroborated by two independent
witnesses and it is on the evidence of the other three prosecution witnesses,
E the main plank of submission of Mr. Venkataramani is that a contradiction in
the evidence is ·the only merit in the story made out by the prosecution.

Incidentally, be it noted that while appreciating the evidence of a witness,
minor discrepancies on trivial matters without affecting the core of the
prosecution case, ought not to prompt the court to reject evidence in its entirety.
F If the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and the trial court
upon appreciation of evidence forms opinion about the credibility thereof, in
the normal circumstances the Appellate Court would not be justified to review
it once again without justifiable reaons. It is the totality of the situtation, which
has to be taken note of, and we do not see any justification to pass a contra
4
G note, as well, on perusal of the evidence on record. In this context reference
may be made to two decisions of this Court. The first being the State of U.P.
v. M.K. Anthony, (198S] 1 SCC 505 as also a later one in the ~as~ of Leela
Ram v. State of Haryana, [1999] 9 SCC 525. Needless to record that difference
in some minor detail, which does not otherwise affect the core of the
H prosecution case, may be there but that by itself would not prompt the Court
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 39
to reject the evidence on minor variations and discrepancies. In Leela Ram A
(supra), this Court observed in paragraph 9 of the report :

"24. When an t;yewitness is examined at length it is quite possible
for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly
escape from making some discrepant detail. Perhaps an untrue witness
who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non- B
discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with
the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning
his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence C
of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness)
is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny."

This Court further observed : (SCC pp. 656 - 57, paras 25-27)

"25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out
D
contradictions from the previous statement of a witness for confronting
him during cross-examination. Merely because there is inconsistency
in evidence it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No
doubt Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeaching
the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. E
But a reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent
statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The
material portion of the section is extracted below :

'155. Impeaching credit of witness - The credit of a witness may be p
impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or with the
consent of the court, by the party who calls him (1) - (2).

(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of
his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;'
• G
26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the
evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction.
Only such of the inconsistent statement which is liable to be
'contradicted' would affect the credit of the witsess. Section 145 of
the Evidence Act also enables the cross-examiner to use any former H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to
'contradict' the witness the corss-examiner is enjoined to comply with
the fonnality prescribe!i therein. Section 162 of Code also permits the
cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the witness (recorded ~1
under Section 161 of the Code) for the only limited purpose i.e. to
'contradict' the witness.
B
27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the
particular version of the witness. Unless the former statement has the
potency to discredit the present statement, even if the latter is at
/variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to
C · ·contradict that witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR
. (1959) SC 1012".

The issue, therefore, is whether the evidence available on record is
otherwise trustworthy and an acceptable piece of evidence : in the contextual
facts the answer is in the affirmative and both the ti:ial court and the High Court
D
have also considered the same to be so.

(ii) A complaint focussed that except the interested witnesses none else
from the nearby residential areas have been examined - _this is so : It is the
quality of the evidence and not the quantity, which is required. The crux of
E the issue being has the prosectution been able to bring home the charges with
' . . the evidence available on record - if the evidence on record is otherwise
satisfactory in nature and can be ascribed to be trustworthy, an increase in
number of witnesses cannot be termed to be a requirement for the case. The
two independent witnesses have also been grouped in the group of interested
, witnesses, which is neither acceptable nor worthy of acceptance and in any
F
event the same does not have the support from the available records. Apart
there from PWs. 1, 2 and 3, they may be related to each other but that does
not mean and imply total rejection of the evidence : interested they may be
but in the event they are so"- it is the predominant duty of Court to be more
careful in the matter of scrutiny of the evidence of these interested witnesses
G and it on such a scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record is otherwise
trustworthy, question of rejection of the same on the ground of being interested
~itnesses would not arise. As noticed above, it is the totality of the evidence,
which matters and if the same creates a confidence of acceptablity of such
an evidence, question of rejection on being ascribed as 'interested witness'
H would not be justifiable. On the wake of the aforesaid thus the second plea
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 41

of rejection of evidence of prosecution witnesses cannot be sustained. A

(iii) It is on the third count that the appellants contended that since there
is no evidence on record to show that the accused person had the knowledge
about the movement of the deceased on that day, it is well~neigh impossible
to accept that any of the witnesses have really seen the occurrence, which has
led to the death of the deceased and the resultanc effect would be the entitlement B
of benefit of doubt in favour of the accused persons. On the nature of the
evidence as is available on record and as noted above, question of any
entitlement of benefit of doubt would not arise; The evidence on-record is '
worth its credence and trustworthy, as such creates a condifence in the mind
of the Court. C
(iv) On the next count it has been contended that since it was a market
day, it is highly improbable that the accused would have taken a risk of
committing the offence in the manner and at the place as stated by the
prosecution witnesses. We have already noticed hereinabove that the tenor of
evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses creates confidence in the mind D
of the Court by reaon wherefor the correctness of the statements made shall
have to be ascri15°"ed to them : as such whether the day was a market day or
not, it really does not make a dent to the prosecution case worthy of detailing
out.
E
(v) Lastly, the availability of the defence witnesses has been very
strongly argued and non-reliance thereon has been severly criticised by the
appellants. This aspect of the matter has already been dealt with while dealing
with the plea of alibi and as such we need not repeat ourselves. Suffice it to
record that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot outweigh
F
the trustworthiness of the prosecution witnesses.

Turning attention on to other counts of submission in support of the
appeal as regards false implication, the appellants contended that there has been
a series of litigation between the parties, in particular, PW-5 and as such the
accused persons were meant to suffer the litigation process in a heavy way G
: unfortunately, however, there is no evidence to the effect as is now being
stated before this Court. On the contrary the prosecutipn alleged a definite
motive and a grudge against the accused persons and the same would bl(
evident from the observations of the High Court in that regard. The High Court
in paragraph 16 of the Judgment stated as below :
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A "16. So for as the motive for occurrence is concerned, several
documents have been filed and it has been pointed out that because
there was a series of litigation between the two parties and in some
of the cases filed on behalf of the informant, some of the accused
...
and their relations were also convicted, they have grudge against the
family of the informant. It is, therefore, clear that the appellants in
B
this case had strong motive for committing the murder of the brother
of the informant in this case. However, it has been submitted on behalf
of the appellants that it is strange that when the informant himself
was the informant in the cases in which the appellants were either
convicted or they were facing trial and when the informant was also
c surrounded by them why did they spare the informant and killed his
brother. In this connection, it has been submitted on behalf of the State
that from the evidence of the informant (PW-5), it becomes clear that
when the accused persons were surrounding him alongwith his
brother deceased, he fled away from the ring of the accused persons:
D PW-5 has also clearly stated that when he ran to some distance he
stopped and started looking at the P.O. and he found that his brother
was surrounded and was being assaulted by the ~cused persons. It
appears that because of the smartness and presence of mind the
informant succeeded in extricating himself from the clutches of the
assailants and as his brother could not be so prompt in taking care
E
and he was surrounded and attacked. If the accused persohs had
grievance against the informant and his family, it is not surprising that
they chose the brother of the informant to kill him when t.lie informant
escaped. Therefore, there is nothing unnatural in it."

F By reason of the above, we are unable to record our concurrence in the
matter of even raising a plea of enmity by the defence. As a matter of fact
there is no evidentiary support as such the same does not call for a detailed
discussion in this Judgment.

In support of the appeal, a further submission has been niade pertaining
G to the First Information Report (FIR). On this score the appellants contended
that delayed receipt of the FIR in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate
cannot but be viewe\i with suspicion. While it is true that Section 157 of the
Code makes it obligatory on the Officer Incharge of the Police Station to send
a report of the information received to a Magistrate forthwith,_but that does
H not mean an imply to denounce and discard an otherwise positive and
MUNSHI PRASAD v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 43
trustworthy evidence on record. Technicality ought not to outweigh the course A
of justice - if the Court is otherwise convinced and has come to a conclusion
as regards the truthfulness of the prosecution case, mere delay, which can
otherwise be ascribed to be reasonable, would not by itself demolish the
prosecution case. The decision of this Court in Shiv Ram and another v. State
of U.P., [1998] 1 sec 149 lends support to the observation as above.
B
This Court further in State of Karnataka v. Main Patel and others, AIR
(1996) SC 3041 stated vis-a-vis the issue of delay in despatch ofFIR as below:

"The ·matter can be viewed from another angle also. It has already
been found by us that the prosecution case is that the FIR was C
promptly lodged at or about 1.30 AM and that the investigation started
on the basis thereof is wholly reliable and acceptable. Judged in the
context of the above facts the mere delay in despatch of the FIR -
and for that matter in receipt thereof by the Magistrate - would not
make the prosecution case suspect for as has been pointed out by a
three Judge Bench of this Court in Pala Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR D
(1972) SC 2679, the relevant provision contained in Section 157
Cr.P.C. regarding forthwith dispatch of the report (FIR) is really
designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation of a
cognizable offence so as to be able to control the investigation and
if necessary to give proper direction under section 159 Cr.P.C. and E-
therefore if in a given case it is found that FIR was recorded without
delay and the investigation started on that FIR then however, improper
or objectionable the delayed receipt of the report by the Magistrate
concerned, it cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation
was tainted and the prosecution unsupportable''. F

Let us, however, at this stage, consider the view as expressed by the
High Court in the matter under consideration. The High Court in paragraph
13 of the Judgment stated as below :

"13. It has been submitted on behalf of the STATE in this regard that G
it is clear from the evidence ofthe 1.0. (P.W. 7) that the informant
of this case had arrived at the out post at 4.30 PM and he had given
the statement which was recorded in the Fard Beyan (Ext. 1). This
fact was also noted in the station diary and thereafter the Investigating
Officer proceeding for the P.O. and it appear:> that he had prepared · H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the inquest report (Ext. 5) at 5.30 PM and has obtained the signatures
of the witnesses on it and then he sent the deadbody for Postmortem
Examination. He also made some seizures at the P.O. and prepared
the seizure list (Ext. 4) at the place of occurrence at 17 .15 hours and
he sent the deadbody for Postmortem Examination through a constable
by preparing a forwarding report (Ext. 6). Moreover, according to PW
B
7 he had made over charge of the investigation to another Police
Office PW 8 on 28th June 1980 and then on taking up the investigation
PW 8 Arun Kumar Singh had also inspected the P.O. and also
recorded the statments of PW 6. So, it is obvious that not only the
Fard Beyan was prepared; rather the entries were made in the station
c diary also at the Police Station and subsequently after taking over the
charge from the first 1.0. (PW-7), PW 8 also took up further
investigation on 28.6.1980. It is, therefore, clear that the investigation
was promptly taken up and the investigation promptly proceeded. It
is also significant to note that PW 8 happended to be the Officer
D Incharge of the Police Station and it was his duty to send the FIR
to court, but as he had proceeded for the place of occurrence on 28th
and he remained there till 29.6.80, as stated by him, the FIR could
not be dispatched iii time. In this view of the matter, simply because
the FIR in this case was received in the court of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate with delay it cannot be said that the FIR in this case is
E
not genuine or that it is tainted or that the prosecution case should
be viewed with suspicion."

As noticed above, the statutory obligation warrants utmost promptitude
and in the event of the delay not being unreasonable one and in the event of
F availability of some explanation therefore, which is otherwise acceptable as·
well, question of prosecution being tainted would not arise. FIR sets the
investigation rolling and in the event of there being some delay somewhere
and as noticed above with the acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be said
to vitiate the trial by reason therefor. On the wake of the aforesaid, we are
G thus unable to record our concurrence to the submissions in support of the
appeals.

The appeals thus have no mierit and hence are dismissed.

A.K.T. Appeals dismissed.