Holding

There is no legal rule mandating corroboration of a handwriting expert’s opinion; such testimony may be acted upon if the expert’s reasons are persuasive and the court is satisfied of its reliability.

Summary

Murari Lal was convicted of murder and related offences on the basis of two key pieces of evidence: a wrist‑watch belonging to the deceased recovered at his instance, and a handwritten note found beside the dead body that a handwriting expert identified as being written by the appellant. The appellant contended that the expert's uncorroborated opinion should not have been acted upon and that the note could not be his because he was not a graduate. The Supreme Court held that there is no rule of law requiring mandatory corroboration of a handwriting expert's opinion; such evidence may be relied upon if the expert’s reasons are convincing and the court, under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, may compare the disputed writing with admitted specimens. The Court found the expert’s opinion reliable, noted the corroborative effect of the wrist‑watch, and rejected the appellant's explanations. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Issues considered

The admissibility and weight of uncorroborated opinion evidence of a handwriting expert.
Whether Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act permits the court to compare disputed handwriting with admitted specimens.
Whether the recovery of the deceased's wrist‑watch and the handwritten note sufficiently link the appellant to the murder.
Whether the educational claim in the note can be used to infer non‑authorship by the appellant.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 3, s. 45, s. 46, s. 73
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34, s. 380, s. 392, s. 394, s. 397, s. 457, s. 460

Subjects

handwriting expertopinion evidencecorroborationSection 73 Evidence Actmurder convictionforensic identificationexpert testimonycriminal law

Judgment

249

MURARI LAL S/o RAM SINGH A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
November 21, 1979
~ [R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 8
Evidence Act-Expert opinion-Testimony of handwriting expert-If could
) not be accepted without corroboration-Opinion evidence-Ur nature-
Explained.
The appellant was charged with the offence of committing the murder of the
deceased. The two vital pieces of evidence on which he was convicted were :
(1) recovery of a wrist watch which belonged to the deceased at the instance c
of the appellant and (2) a note written in pencil in1 Hindi! found by the side of
the deadman on the night of the occurrence stating "Though we OOve passed
B.A. we have not secured any employment because there is none to care. This
is the ronsequence".
He was convicted under s. 302, l.P.C. and sentenced to death. On appeal
the High Court altered the conviction from s. 302 to s. 302 read with s. 34, D
l.P.C.
Jn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that it
was not permissible in Jaw -to act upon uncorroborated opinion evidence of a
hand\vriting expert and that the High Court fell into a serious error in attempt-
ing to compare the writing with the admitted writing of the appellant; (2) the
appellant could not be the author of the note because while he was not even a
matriculate the author described himself as a graduate and that a murderer and E
robber would not have left behind a note of the kind found by the side of the
dead man.

Dismiising the appeal,
HELD: 1. An expert is no accomplice. There is no justification for con-
demning the opinion-evidence of an expert to the same class of evidence at> p
that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. The view occasionaly
expressed that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion
of an expert-handwriting expert or any other kind of expert-without substan-
tiaJ corroboration is not, because experts in: general, are unreliable witnesses, but
because all human j~dgment is fallible. The more developed and the more
perfect a science, the less the -c.hance of an incorrect opinion. The sc&nce of
identification of handwriting unlike the science of identification of finger prints G
which has attained near-perfection is not quite perfect and the risk is, therefore,
higher. Bnt that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of & handwriting ex-
pert as an invariabJe rule and issisting upon substantial corroboration in everv
case, howsoever the opinion n1ay be backed by the soundest of reasons. A~
export opinion llels to be tested by the· acceptability of ihe reasons given by him.
An expert depo<;e• and not decides. His duty is to furnish !he judge with
the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion so as e
to e110ble the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application
&f these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. [253 A-G]
17-868SCI/79
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R.

2. The1 e is no ru]e of h:1v.' nor any rule. of prudence which has crystallised
A
int0> a rule of 1aw that opinior~ evidence of ai hand-writing expert must n~ver be
acted upon unless substantially corroborated. But having due regard to the
iroperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach
should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed
and examined. All other relcva-nt evidence must be considered. In appropriate
cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion
8 are convincing and there is no reliable evidence tbrO\'Jing a doubt, the uncarro-
borated testimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted. There cano4tt be
an inflexible rule on a matter v. hich, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than o
1

question of testimonial weight. [258 A·D]
3. Section 73 of Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare dis·
puted writin2s with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing
J
is that of the pmon by whom it purports to have been written. If it is '
c hazardous to do so, it is one of the hazards to which a judge and litigant must
expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. In cases where both sidea
call experts it becomes the plain duty of the cou,rt to compare the writings and
come to its own conclusion. Where there are expett opinions, they will aid the
Court. Where there is none the Court will have to see\.:: guidance from some
authoritative text boot and the Court's own experience and knowledge.
[258 D-G]
D
Ram Chander v. U.P. State A.I.R. 1957 S.C.; lshwari Pra.~ad Mlsra v.
Mohammed Isa [1963] 3, S.C.R 722; Shashi Kumar v. Subhodh Kumar, A.LR.
1964 S.C. 529; Fak/iruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C.
1326=(1967) Cr!. L.J. 1197; Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Pw1;ab, A.I.R.
1977 S.C. 1091, referred to.
In the instant co.se the courts belov;' compared the disputed handwriting with
E the admitted writing of the appeHant and found, in conjunction with the opinion
of the expert, that the author of the note was the sarrie person. The appellant
was not able to say a \vord against the reasons given by the expert. [259 Al
(b) The note was designed to lay a false tra.il by making it appear that the
murder and the robbery were the handiwork 0f some frustrated a•fi. unem·
ployed graduates expressing their resentment against the world ·which had shown
p no regard for their existence. [259 C]
(c) Had the recovery of the wrist watch of the deceased in February, 1973
at the instance of the appellant been the only circumstance it would have been
difficult to link it with the murder which took place ten. months earlier in April,
1972. But there is the vital circumstance that a writing made by the appellant
was found on the table by the side of the deceased on the day of occurrence.
This circumstance, coupled with the recovery of the dead man's watch, was
G sufficie:nt to hold him guilty of the offence of which he had been convicteti.
[259 G]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 125
of 1975. .
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
15-1-1974 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
H 903/73.
R. L. Kohli, S. K. Gambhir and Miss B. Ramrakhiani for the
Appellant.
MURARILAL v. M.P. (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 25l

Ii. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl fcy- the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

• CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-Murari Lal, who- was accused No. 2 before
the Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, was convicted nuder s. 302 LP .C. and
" sentenced to death. He was also convicted under s. 460 read with B
~s. 34, 457, 380, 392, 394 and; 397 LP.C. but sentenced under s. 460
r~d with s. 34 and s. 394 read with s. 397 only to rigorous imprison-
, nt for a period of 7 years on each count. On appeal by )\1urari
and on reference by the learned Sessions !udge, the High Court
Madhya Pradesh altered the conviction from s. 302 LP .C. to s. 302
' read with s. 34 I.P.C. and substituted the sentence of imprisonment c
for life for the 'entence of death. Otherwise the appeal was dismissed.
Mucari Lal has preferred this appeal by special leave of this Court.

H. D. Sonawala (the deceased) used to live alone in one of the
two 'quarters' in the compound of the Parsi Dharamshala at Jabalpur..
He was the Area Organiser of Cherak Pharmaceuticals Company of D
Bombay. On the night of 12-7-1972 he went out to dinner at the
house of P.W. 2 and returned home at about midnight. He retired
~· for the night. Next morning, his driver PW 9 and hi~ servant P.W. 6
came to the house in the usual course to attend to their duties. The
gate was found locked. They called out their master but there was no
response. P.W. 6 who also had a key opened the lock and went bts1de. E
Sonawala was found murdered in his bed. A first information report
. was given at the police station Omli, Jabalpur. The Station House
/-Officer, P.W. 28, came to the scene, found things in the room strewn
. about in a pell-mell condition. He seized various articles. Ono of
the articles so seized was a prescription pad Ex. P. 9. On pages A
F
to F of Ex. P. 9, there were writings of the deceased but on page G,
~• there was a writing in Hindi in pencil which was as follows :
~ oftm:r 'f@ fi111ii' if;- ~ 1'('1 <frlf ofTo ~o •mr ~ I fio<: ·1ft 'lit{ ~!if
• ~!if .,~ ~ 1 'l'it 'far'ff f'f,.~'!T 1 ~are-.: ~ rmr
Translated into
G
~ English it means : "Though we have passed B.A., we have not secur-
• .~ any employment because there is none to care. This is the conse-
quence. sd/- Balle Sirigh." The dead body of Sonawala was sent to
the Medical Officer for post-mortem examination. There was an
, iicised wound on the neck 7!" long, the maximum width of which
was 2" of tissues and vessels upto the trachea were cut. Trachea was H
\, also cut. For several months after the discovery of the murder, the
investigation made no progress till 18-2"1973. , On that day pursuant
,.

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A to information received in connection with one other case of theft, in x ,
which one Roop Chand appeared to be involved, the Station House
Officer secured the presence of Petrick (A-1) and questioned. Petrick
made a statement and led them to his room from which two clwppers :
and as many as 234 items of stolen property were seized. We nuiy
mention that out of the 234 items so seized, only two were alleged to ..J
belong to Sonawala, one was a tic>-pin and the other was a cheque-
book. Thereafter, the house of Petrick's father Gabriel was also
searched and 310 items of stolen property were recovered, none d
which has anything to do with this case. On 19-2-73, Murari ~ .
'(A-2) said to be a friend of Petrick was questioned. He made--~ y.
stateinent and led them to the house o~ his maternal-uncle Suraj Prasad ,
c (A-4). Murari Lal asked his uncle to produce the wrist-watch, which
was done. The wrist-watch had some special characteristics o[ its
own and it was later duly identified by unimpeachable evidence as
belonging to the deceased. Specimen writings Ex. P. 41 to Ex. P. 54
of Murari Lal were obtained. They were sent to a handwriting and
D finger-print expert P.W.15 along with the prescription pad Ex. P. 9,
1

for his opinion. The expert gave his opinion that the writing in Hindi
at page G of Ex. P. 9 and the specimen writings of P. 41 to P. 54 were
made by the same person. Petrick, Murari Lal, Gabriel and Suraj ~
Prasad were tried by the learned Sessions Judge. Suraj Prasad was · ·
acquitted. Gabriel was convicted under s. 411. Petrick and Murari
E Lal were both convicted under s. 302 lP. C. and sentenced to death as
already mentioned. The sentence of death passed on Petrick and
Murari Lal was altered to imprisonment for life by the High Court. ,
Petrick has not further appealed but Murari Lal has. ~
The two vital circumstances against Murari Lal were: (1) the
F recovery of a wrist-watch which belonged to the deceased Sonawala
and (2) the writing in Hindi at page G of Ex. P. 9, which was found
to be in his handwriting indicating his presence in the house of the ,..,_
deceased on the night of the murder and hi~ participation in the com- ,.
mission of the offences. Shri R. C. Kohli, learned counsel for the •
appellant, argued that the recovery of the wrist-watch was too remote
G in point of time to connect the appellant with the crime. He further
argued that the High Court fell into a grave error in concluding that '
t'he writing at page.G of Ex. p. 9 was that of the appellant. He su1'- '
mitted that the evidence of P .W. 8 who claimed to be familiar with
the handwriting of the appellant was wholly unacceptable, that it was
not permissible in law to act upon the uncorroborated opinion-evidence ,
H of the expert P.W. 15 and that the High Court fell into a serious error
in attempting to compare the writing in Ex. P. 9 with the admitted )
writing of the appellant

- -·--.-· - -- ,.. _________ ._ -·
MURARILAL v. M.P. (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 253

We will first consider the argument, a stale argument often heard, A
' /. -~ particularly in criminal courts, that the opinion-e~dence of a ~d
writing expert should not be acted upon v.~thout subst:ilitial
corroboration. We shall presently point out how the argument
cannot be justified on principle or precedent. We begin with
observation that the expert is no accomplice. There is no
• justification for condemning his opinion-evidence to the same B
, class of evidence as that of an accomplice and insist upon corrobora-
tion. True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that
it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of
_ ~andwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion; of any
·~xpcrt, hilndwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because
· experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses-the quality of credibility
c
·.or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other wit-
nesses-, but because all human judgment is fallibl~ and ari exper'Cmay
go wrong because of some defect of observation, some .error of pre-
mises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed and the
more perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and 0
the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The
science of identification of finger-prints has attained near perfection
and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On
-'-).. the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly
so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a far cry from
doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert ru; an invariable rule alid E
insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the
opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair
::., to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat
/ ~him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by
the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and
not decides. His duty 'is to furnish the jndge with the necessary F
scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to
_ ·~ enable the judge to form his own independent judgment by the appli-
> cation of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence'. (vide Lord
Prer>ident Cooper in Dacie v. Edinbeagh Magistrate : 1953 S. C. 34
"!UOted by Professor Cross in his Evidence).
G
From the earliest times, courts have received the ~pinion of experts.
' .,•As long ago as 1553 it was said in Buckley v. Rice:Thomas(') :
"If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences
or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science
or faculty which it concerns. This is a commendable thing
B
in onr law. For thereby it appears that we do not dismiss
(I) [1954] I Plowden ll8.
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R.

.A all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them aud
encourage them as things worthy of commendation."

Expert testimony is made relevant by s. 45 ol' the' Evidence Act
and where the Court has' to form an opinion upon a point as to iden-
tity of handwriting, the opinion of a person 'specially skilled' 'in ques-
B
tions as to identity of handwriting' is expressly made a relevant fact.
There is nothing in the Evidence Act, as for example like illustration
(b) to s. 114 which entitles the Court to presume that an accomplice is •
unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particular~
which justifies the court in assuming that a handwriting expe.rt's op~. _
c nion is. unworthy of credit unless corroborated. 'fhe Evidence A·l~
itself (s. 3) tells us that 'a fact is said to be proved when, after ~on- ·
sidering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist
or CQnsiders its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition
that it exists'. It is uecessary to occasionally remind ourselves of this
D interpretation clause in the Evidence Act Jest we set an artificial stan-
dard of proof not warranted by the provisions of the Act. l'urther,
under s. 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence
of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had
to the common course of natural events, humao conduct, and publlc
and private business, in their relation to facts ol' the particular case.
E It is aslo to be noticed that s. 46 of the Evidence Act makes facts, not
otherwise relevant, relevant if they support or are inconsistent with ,
the opinions of experts, when such opinions are relevant. So, corro-
boration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on th0
opinion of handwriting expert and there need be no initial suspicion. .,-\___
But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corrobora-
F
tioD" of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but
nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supponed
by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroboratecL
The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwrit-
ing expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the
G opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to ac-
cept or reject it.

Apart from principle, let us examine if precedents justify inva.ri~.,~ · '
able insistence on corrobomtion. We have referred to Phipson on
Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe on Criminal Evidence, Archi-
B bald on Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice and Halsbury's
Laws of England but we were unable to find a single sentence hinting
at such a rule. We may now refer to some of the decisions of thfa
j.
MURARILAL v. M.P. (Chinnappa 'Reddy, J.) 2 55

Court. In Ram Chander v. U.P. State,(') Jagannatha Das, J. observ- A
ed : "It may be that normally it is not safe to treat expert evi-
dence as to handwriting as sufficient basis for conviction" (emphasis
ours) "May" and "normally" make 'our point about t11e absence oi an
inflexible rule. In Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammed Isa,(')
Gajendragadkar, J. observ£d : "Evidence given by experts can never
be conclusive, because after all it is opinion evidence", a statement B
which carries us nowhere on the question now under consideration.
Nor, can the statement be disputed because it is not so provided by
the Evidence Act and, on the contrary, s. 46 expressly makes opinion
evidence challengeable by facts, otherwise irrelevant. And as Lord
President Cooper observed in Davie v. Edinburgh Magistrate. :. "The
parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an
c
oracular pronouncement by an expert".
In Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar,(') Wanchoo, J., after notic-
ing various features, of the opinion of the expert said :
"We do not consider in the circumstances of this case
D
that the evidence of the expert is conclusive and can falsify
the evidence of the attesting witn~ses and aJso the circums-
tnaces which go to show that this will must have been signed
in 1943 as it purports to be. Besides it is necessary to
observe that expert's evidence as to handwriting is opinion
evidence and it can rarely, if ever take the place of substan- E
tive evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is usual to
see if it is corroborated eithe.r by clear direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. In the present case rhe probabili-
ties are against the expert's opinion and the direct testimony
of the two attesting witnesses which we accept is wholly in-
consistent with it". F
So, there was acceptable direct testimony which was destructive of
the expert's opinion; there are other features also which made the
expert's opinion unreliable. The observation regarding corroboration
must be read in that context and it is worthy of note that even so the
expresssion used was 'it is usual' and not "it is necessary'. G
In Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh,(') Hidayatullah, J.
said·:
"Both under s. 45 ands. 47 the evidence is an opinion, in
the former by. a scientific comparison and in the latter on the
(1) A.l.R. 1957s.c: 381 B
(2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 722.
(3) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 529.
(4) A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 1326-1967 Cr!. L.J. 1197.
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.Lt.

basis of familiarity xesulting from frequent observations and
experience. In. either case the Court must satisfy itself by such
means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One
such meaus open to the Court is to apply its own observation
to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with •
the disputed one, not to become an handwriting expert but
• to verify the premises of the expert in the one case and to
comparison depends on an analysis of the characteristics in
v

•
appraise the value of the opinion in the other case. This
the .admitted or proved writing and the finding of the same
characteristics in large measure in the disputed writing. In
c this way the opinion of the deponent whether expert or other
is subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start with.
becomes probative. Where an expert's opinion is given, the
Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert
come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that
th0 two writings are by the same person. This is not to
0 say that the Court mus~ play the role of an expert but to say
that the Court may accept the fact proved only when it has
satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept
the opinion whether of the expert or other witness."

These observations lend no support to any requirement as to cor•
E roboration of expert testimony. On the other hand, the [acts ·show
!hat the Court ultimately did act upon the uncorroborated testimony
of the expert though these Judges took the precaution of comparing
the writings themselves. ·

Finally, we come to Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab,\') upon

• which Sri R. C. Kohli, learned counsel, placed great reliance. It was
said by this Court :
" ...... but we think it would be extremely hazardous IO
condenm the appellant JUerely on the strength of opinion evi-
dence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that •
expert opinion mU5t always be received with great caution
G
and peahaps none so with more caution than the opinion
of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of preceden-
tial authority which holds that it is unsafe ~o base a convic-
tion solely on expert opinion without substantial corrobora-
tion. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has
H almost become a rule of law. It was held by this Cqurt in
Ram Chandra v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is
11) A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1091
MURARJLAL v. M.P. (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 257

unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis A
k>r conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by
other items of inteflllll and external c~idence. This Court
;again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad v. Md. Isa, AIR 1963
• SC 1728 that e.xpert evidence qf handwriting can never be
conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and this
view was reiterated in Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, B
AIR 1964 SC 529 where it was pointed out by this Court
that expert's evidence as to handwriting being opinion evi-
dence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evi-
dence and before acting on such evidence, it would be desi-
rable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This Court had
c
again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert
opinion in regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of
M.P., AJR 1967 SC 1326 and it uttered a note of caution
pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction
solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before D
acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to see
whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or
circumstantial."
}
!he above extracted passage, undoubtedly, contains some sweep-'
fog general observations. But we do not think that the observations E
were meant to be observations of general application or as laying down
any legal principle. It was plainly intended to be a rule of caution
.and not a rule of law as is clear from the statement 'it has almost
}
-- become a rule of law'. "Almost", we presume, means "not quite".
It was said by the Court there was a "profusion of precedential autho- •
rity" which insisted upon corroboration and reference was madtl to F
Ram Chandra v. StatE of U.P., Ishwari Prasad v. Mohammed Isa,
Shashi Kumar v. S11bodh Kunuir and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.
(supra). We have already discussed these cases and observed that
none of them supports the proposition: that corroboration must invariab- ·
1y be sought before opinion evidence can be accepted. There ap-
G
• ·pears to be some mistake in the last sentence of the above extracted
IJ.· passage because we are unable to find in Fakhruddin v. State of M. P.
··· (supra) any statement such as the one attributed. In fact, in that case,
. the learned Judges acted upon the sole testimony of the expert after
£atisfying themselves about the correctness of the opinion by comparing
the writings themselves. We do think that the ohservatiC111s in Magan H
B1ha1·i Lal v. State of Punjab (supra) must be understood as referring
to the facts of the pnrticular case.
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any
rule of prudenc<l which has crystallised into a rule of law, th.at 'opinion
evidence of a handwriting expert mnst never be acted npon, unless.-
substantially co1Toborated. But, having dne regard to the imperfect
nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach, •
as we indicated earlier. should be one of caution. Reasons for the>
B opinion must be carefuJly probed and examined. All other relevan~
evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration .
may be sought. in cases where the reasons for the opinion are ·con-
•
vincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the un-
corroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted~ _
c There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate r4-
analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have
said so much- because this is an argument frequently met with in sub-
ordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments-
of this Court are often flaunted.

The argument that the court should not venture to corppare writing~
D itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is
entirely without force. Sectiqn 73 of the Evidence Act expressly
enables the Court to compare dispnted writings with admitted or prov-
ed writings to ascertain whether a writing i!I that ol' the person by
whom it purports to have been written. . If it is hazardous to do so,
E as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which
judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes neces-
sary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and two-
voices of science -are heard. There may be cases where neither side- ,
calls an expert, being ill able to ·afford him. In all such cases, it ,..\__
becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come - ,
F to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to
the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert
opinions they will aid the Court Where there is none, the Court will
have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the·
Court's own experience and knowledge. Bnt discharge it must, its
plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence. We '
G may mention that Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar and Fakhrudtlin v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) were cases where the Court itself
compared the writings. ~. ,

Reverting to the facts of the case before us, Sri Kohli had not a
word of criticism to offer against the reasons given by the expert
8 P.W. 15, for his opinion. We have perused the reasons given by the •
expert as well as his cross-examination. Nothing .has been elicited.
to throw the least doubt on the correctness of the opinion. Both the
MURARILAL v. M.P. (Chinnappa Reddy, l.) 259

Sessions Court aud the High Cmurt compared the disputed writing at
page G in Ex. P. 9 with the admitted writings and found., in conjunc-
tion with the opinion of the expert, that the another was t)1e same per-
son. We are unable to find any ground for disagreeing with the find-
• ing.
We may at this juncture consider the argument of Sri Kohli that B
the internal evidence afforded by the document showed that the appel-
lant was not its author. He argued that the appellant was not even a
mntriculate whereas the author of the document" had described himself
as a graduate. And, what necessity was there for a murderer and
robber to write .a note like that, questioned Mr. Kohlic It appears
to us that the note was designed to lay a false trail by making it appear c:
that the murder and the robbery were the handiwork of some frustrat-
ed and unemployed young garduates, expressing their resentment
against the world which had shown no regard for their existence.
The other important circumstance against the appellant was the
recovery of the deceased's watch at the appellant's instance. That the )}.
deceased was the owner of the watch was not disputed before us. That
the watch was recovered at the instance of the appellant was also not
disputed before us. What was urged was that there was no reason to
reject the explanation given by the appellant in his statement under !.
313 Cr. P. C. that he had purchased the watch from Roop Chand.
Apart from his statement, there is nothing in the evidence to substan- E;
tiate his case. On the other hand, we think that, having come to
know that the statement of Roop Chand in connection with the in-
vestigation into another theft case had led the police to interrogate
Patrick, the appellant very cleverly tried to foist previous possessions
of the watch on Roop Chand. We are not prepared to accept t:ie
appellant's explanation. Even so, it was urged, the recovery was 'on F
remote in point of time to be linked with the robbery and the murder.
It is true that there was a considerable time-lag. We might hav(1
found it difficult to link the recovery of the watch with the robbery
and the murder had this been the only circumstance. But, we have
' the other vital circumstance that a writing made by the appellant was
left on the deceased's table that night. That circumstance coupled
• with the recovery of the dead man's watch ai thti instance of the appel-
' lant, are sufficient, in our opinion, in the absence of any acceptable
explanation, to hold the appellant guilty of the offences of which he
has been convicted. 'Die appeal is dismissed.

P. B. R. Appeal dismissed.