Holding

The Section 34 application is barred by limitation because the 30‑day condonable period expired on a court holiday and neither Section 4 of the Limitation Act nor Section 10 of the General Clauses Act can extend the filing time.

Summary

The appellants received an arbitral award on 14 February 2022 and were required to file a Section 34 application within three months, extended by a COVID‑19 order to 29 May 2022, with a further 30‑day condonable period ending on 28 June 2022. The 30‑day period fell during the Delhi High Court's summer vacation (04 June–03 July 2022), and the appellants filed the application on 04 July 2022, the first day the court reopened, together with a condonation plea. The High Court dismissed the application as barred by limitation, and the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the Limitation Act, 1963 and the General Clauses Act, 1897 could extend the time. The Court held that the Limitation Act applies to Section 34 proceedings, but Section 4 only benefits a party when the three‑month period expires on a court holiday; it does not aid when the 30‑day condonable period expires on a holiday, and consequently Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is excluded. Therefore, the Section 34 petition was filed beyond the permissible period and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to Section 34 proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and to what extent.
Whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to the three‑month limitation period only or also to the 30‑day condonable period under Section 34(3).
Whether, in view of the answer to the preceding issue, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies to the condonable period under Section 34(3).
Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition as barred by time.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 34, s. 34(3), s. 37, s. 43(1)
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 10
Limitation Act, 1963s. 12, s. 14, s. 17, s. 29(2), s. 3, s. 4-24, s. 5

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition filed by the appellants u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as barred by time; whether the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply to s.34 of to what extent; does s.4 of the 1963 Act apply to the 3-month limitation period or also to the 30-day condonable period in s.34(3); and will s.10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 apply to s.34(3) and in what manner. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 –

Subjects

Barred by time3-month limitation period30-day condonable periodExtension of limitationCOVID-19 pandemic orderCondonable periodCourt holidayGeneral Clauses ActLimitation ActArbitration proceedingsSection 4 Limitation ActSection 10 GCASection 34 Arbitration Act

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 729 : 2025 INSC 56

My Preferred Transformation &
Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2025)
10 January 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Pankaj Mithal*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition
filed by the appellants u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 as barred by time; whether the provisions of Limitation
Act, 1963 apply to s.34 of the 1996 Act and to what extent; does
s.4 of the 1963 Act apply to the 3-month limitation period or also
to the 30-day condonable period in s.34(3); and will s.10 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 apply to s.34(3) and in what manner.

Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 – Limitation
Act, 1963 – s.4 – Limitation period – Application, if barred by
limitation – Benefit of the additional 30 days under proviso to
s.34(3), which expired during vacation, if can be given when
the petition is filed immediately after reopening in exercise of
power u/s.4 of the Act, 1963 – Appellants received the arbitral
award on 14.02.2022 – 3-months limitation period for filing
the application u/s.34(3), after considering the extension of
limitation by operation of this Court’s COVID-19 pandemic
order, expired on 29.05.2022, on which date the court was
functioning – Further 30-day condonable period expired
on 28.06.2022, which fell during the High Court’s summer
vacation between 04.06.2022 and 03.07.2022 – Appellants
filed application u/s.34 on the first date of court’s reopening
on 04.07.2022, alongwith with the condonation application –
Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application u/s.34
and the Division Bench dismissed the application u/s.37 as
barred by limitation:

* Author
730 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Application u/s.34
is barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the condonable
period of 30 days, which conclusively and absolutely expired on
28.06.2022 – There is no wholesale exclusion of ss.4 to 24 of
the 1963 Act when calculating the limitation period u/s.34(3) –
s.4 applies to s.34(3) of the 1996 Act only to the extent when the
3-month period expires on a court holiday – It does not aid the
applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court
holiday – Furthermore, in view of the applicability of s.4 of the
1963 Act to s.34 proceedings, s.10 of the GCA does not apply
and will not benefit the applicant when the 30-day condonable
period expires on a court holiday – Thus, the judgment and
order passed by the High Court upheld – General Clauses Act.
[Paras 1.1, 37, 38]
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Period of limitation
prescribed for instituting a suit or filing an appeal or making an
application has to be distinguished from a condonable period which
cannot be made part of the period of limitation prescribed – As the
period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition u/s.34 expired on
a working day and not on a day on which the court was closed,
the appellants not entitled to file it on the re-opening of the court
after the summer vacation and as such the petition so filed was
patently barred by limitation – As the period of limitation prescribed
for filing a petition u/s.34 expired on 29.05.2022 whereas the petition
was preferred on 04.07.2022 much beyond the period of limitation
prescribed and the condonable period of 30 days stipulated under
the proviso to s.34(3), the petition u/s.34 was beyond time and
the delay could not have been condoned – No error or illegality
on part of the High Court in dismissing the petition. [Paras 15-17]

Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 4-24, 29(2) – Schedule to the
Limitation Act – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 –
s.43(1) – Limitations – Applicability of the Limitation Act to
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act:
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) s.29(2) of the
1963 Act stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes
a period of limitation that is different from the Schedule, s.3 of the
1963 Act shall apply as if such period is the one prescribed in the
Schedule – ss.4 to 24 shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local
law – Thus, s.29(2) imports the provisions of the Limitation Act to
special and local laws that prescribe a different period of limitation,
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 731

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

unless there is an express exclusion contained in such law –
s.43(1) of the 1996 Act fortifies the applicability of the Limitation
Act not only to court proceedings under the 1996 Act but also to
arbitrations – By virtue of s.29(2), the Limitation Act applies to
court proceedings under the ACA – Since the Limitation Act is only
applicable to court proceedings, s.43(1) is necessary to make it
applicable to arbitrations in the same manner as it applies to court
proceedings. [Paras 8, 10, 11]
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Limitation Act is
applicable to the arbitration proceedings as also to court proceedings
under the ACA – Limitation Act is based on public policy to bring
to an end the life of a dispute for which appropriate remedy has
not been availed within a time bound period. [Paras 8, 9]

Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 4-24, 29(2) – Schedule to the
Limitation Act – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 –
s.34(3) – Limitations – Applicability of the Limitation Act to
s.34(3):
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) As per s.29(2) of the
Limitation Act, the effect of there being a different limitation period
u/s.34(3) is that s.3 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings
u/s.34 of the ACA as if the 3-month limitation period is the period
prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act – Further, ss.4 to
24 of the Limitation Act apply to determine whether the application
is within the period of limitation, “insofar as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded” – Express reference to an
exclusion is not essential and the court can examine the language
of the special law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that
certain provisions of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded –
Furthermore, s.12 of the Limitation Act applies for the purpose
of calculating limitation u/s.34(3), and the same is not excluded
by the provisions of the ACA – s.14 of the Limitation Act also
applies to s.34(3), however, ss.5 and 17 of the Limitation Act are
inapplicable – There is no wholesale exclusion of the provisions of
the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation u/s.34(3).
[Paras 12-23]
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) By virtue of s.29(2)
of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or
application as contained in the Schedule of the Limitation Act stands
substituted by the period prescribed in s.34(3) for the purposes of
filing a petition u/s.34. [Para 11]
732 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation
Act, 1963 – s.4 – Expiry of prescribed period when court is
closed – Applicability of s.4:
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) s.4 applies to
s.34(3) of the 1996 Act – s.4 benefits a party only when the
“prescribed period’’-3-month limitation period u/s.34(3) expires on
a court holiday – In such a situation, the application u/s.34 will be
considered as having been filed within the limitation period if it is
filed on the next working day of the court – s.4 does not come to
the aid of the party when the 3-month limitation period expires on
a day when the court was working – 30-day condonable period
expiring during the court holidays will not survive and neither s.4,
nor any other provision of the Limitation Act, will inure to the benefit
of the party to enable filing of the s.34 application immediately
after reopening – Since s.4 applies to proceedings u/s.34, the
applicability of s.10 of the GCA stands excluded in view of the
express wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability of
the provision when the Limitation Act applies. [Paras 35.1-35.4]
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Appellants not
entitled to the benefit of s.4 to permit them to prefer the petition
on the re-opening of the court as the period of limitation prescribed
had not expired on the day when the court was closed. [Paras 11]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation
Act, 1963 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.10 – Applicability of:
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Statutory language
of the proviso to s.10 of the 1897 Act states that it does not apply
to “any act or proceeding” to which the Limitation Act applies – It
cannot be said that s.10 must apply to the 30-day period stipulated
in the proviso to s.34(3) – Considering that s.4 of the Limitation
Act applies to s.34 proceeding, the applicability of s.10 of the 1897
Act stands excluded in view of the express wording of its proviso
that excludes the applicability of the provision when the Limitation
Act applies. [Para 33]
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) s.10 permits the
filing of a petition on the re-opening of the court where the last
day of prescribed period for filing it falls or expires on the day on
which the court is closed – Proviso to s.10 in no uncertain terms
states that the provisions of s.10 shall not apply to any Act or
proceedings to which the Limitation Act applies – In proceedings
of arbitration as also to court proceedings under the A & C Act,
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 733

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

the Limitation Act squarely applies – Thus, by proviso to s.10 of
the 1897 Act, s.10 stands excluded and would not be attracted to
accord any benefit to appellants. [Para 14]

Judicial concern – Limitation statutes – Difficulties with current
legal position – Stringent construction and curtailment of
remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity
of an arbitral award – Need for addressal by the Parliament:
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Construction of
limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails remedy
available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral
award – Purpose of reading the Limitation Act alongside the 1996
Act is not to restrict the special remedy under the ACA, but to
enable exercise of such remedy in circumstances as contemplated
under the Limitation Act – Substantive remedies available u/ss.34
and 37 by their very nature, limited in their scope due to statutory
prescription – If this limited remedy is denied on stringent principles
of limitation, it would cause great prejudice and has the effect of
denying the remedy, and in the long run, it will have the effect of
dissuading contracting parties from seeking resolution of disputes
through arbitration, which is against public policy – It would be wrong
to confine the period of limitation to just 3 months by interpreting it
as the “prescribed period” and excluding the balance 30 days under
the proviso to s.34(3) as not being the prescribed period through
a process of interpretation – Applicability of provisions from ss.4
to 24 of the Limitation Act and the manner in which they apply are
at the doorstep of the court, rather than being determined by clear
and categorical statutory prescription – It is too late in the day to
hold that “express exclusion” will not include implied exclusion –
Legislature to take note of this position and bring about clarity and
certainty – Overbearing intellectualisation of the Act by courts has
become the bane of Indian arbitration – Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 – Limitation Act, 1963. [Paras 36, 36.1-36.6]

Legislation – Legislative reforms – Period of limitation –
Deviation therein and creation of confusion – Need for uniform
period of limitation:
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) Practically all new enactments are
deviating from the prescribed period of limitation as per the Schedule
of the Limitation Act and are generally prescribing its own period of
limitation as under the ACA itself – Statutes further provide that the
delay beyond a certain period cannot be condoned by the court –
734 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

This is in deviation to s.5 of the Limitation Act – Statutes ought not
to provide different period of limitation for instituting suit, preferring
appeal and making an application, rather all statutes should
stick to a uniform period of limitation – Courts to be empowered
to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown for not filing it
within the time prescribed rather than restricting the condonable
period to a fix period of 15 days or 30 days as provided in some
of the statutes – Deviation and restriction create confusion – Even
lawyers fails to notice that a different period of limitation has been
prescribed for preferring an appeal under a particular statute – In
genuine cases the litigant may not be able to approach the court
in time for cogent reasons beyond his control – Legislature ought
not to confine condoning the delay only for a prescribed period
and not beyond it – Rather to follow the principle of condoning
the delay as enshrined u/s.5 of the Limitation Act – This would not
only avoid a good case to be thrown out on the ground of limitation
but at the same time would bring about uniformity in law – Law
makers to keep this in mind while enacting new Acts and ensure
that uniform system is applied in all enactments – Limitation Act,
1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [Paras 18-21]

Case Law Cited
Sridevi Datla v. Union of India [2021] 13 SCR 282 : (2021) 5 SCC
321 – distinguished.
Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subhash
Projects & Marketing Limited [2012] 1 SCR 403 : (2012) 2 SCC
624; Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v.
Walchandnagar Industries Limited [2023] 4 SCR 361 : (2023) 8 SCC
453; State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers
Ltd. [2024] 7 SCR 1 : (2024) 7 SCC 257; In Re: Cognizance
of Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No 3
of 2020; Union of India v. Popular Construction [2001] Supp. 3
SCR 619 : (2001) 8 SCC 470; Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam
Polywood Products Pvt Ltd. [2020] 9 SCR 472 : (2021) 2 SCC
317; Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3814 – relied on.
H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh [1957] 1 SCR 208 :
1956 SCC OnLine SC 111; Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil
[1995] Supp. 6 SCR 421 : (1996) 1 SCC 169; Consolidated
Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department
[2008] 5 SCR 1108 : (2008) 7 SCC 169; Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 735

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [1995] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1995) 5
SCC 5; Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Excise & Taxation
Officer [2019] 13 SCR 534 : (2020) 17 SCC 692; State of Goa v.
Western Builders [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 288 : (2006) 6 SCC 239;
State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [2010] 4
SCR 46 : (2010) 4 SCC 518; Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation
of Delhi [1976] 2 SCR 260 : (1976) 1 SCC 392; Hukumdev Narain
Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [1974] 3 SCR 31 : (1974) 2 SCC 133;
Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt
Ltd. [2009] 4 SCR 1197 : (2009) 5 SCC 791; State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers [2010] 8 SCR 1025 :
(2010) 12 SCC 210; Gulbarga University v. Mallikarjun S. Kodagali
[2008] 11 SCR 703 : (2008) 13 SCC 539; Coal India Limited v.
Ujjal Transport Agency (2011) 1 SCC 117; Commissioner, Madhya
Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohanlal and Company [2016] 3 SCR
357 : (2016) 14 SCC 199; P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar [2018]
12 SCR 143 : (2019) 13 SCC 445 – referred to.

List of Acts
Limitation Act, 1963; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; General
Clauses Act, 1897.

List of Keywords
Barred by time; 3-month limitation period; 30-day condonable
period; Extension of limitation; COVID-19 pandemic order;
Condonable period; Barred by limitation; Court holiday; 30-day
condonable period expires on court holiday; Period of limitation;
Limitation; Arbitration proceedings; Court proceedings; Appropriate
remedy; Delay beyond 30 days; Expiry of prescribed period
when court is closed; Prescribed period; Re-opening of the
court; Addressal by Parliament; Express exclusion; Overbearing
intellectualisation; Uniform period of limitation; Condonation of
delay; Express exclusion of Limitation Act; Prescribed period of
limitation; Condonable period of limitation; Stringent interpretation
of Limitation Act.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.04.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO (OS) (COMM) No. 67 of 2023
736 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., Harsh Kaushik, Ms. Adrija Mishra,
Ms. Kanicka Mittal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Simhran Mehta, Syed Ahmed Naqvi, Yash Gupta, Ms. Aruna Gupta,
Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Table of Contents*

1. Introduction .......................................................................... 2
2. Facts .................................................................................... 4
3. Decision of the High Court under Section 34 and Section
37 of the ACA ...................................................................... 5
4. Submissions ......................................................................... 7
5. Issues ................................................................................. 12
6. Applicability of the Limitation Act to ACA ........................... 13
7. Applicability of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3) ............ 16
i. Section 5 of the Limitation Act ........................................ 18
ii. Section 12 of the Limitation Act ...................................... 20
iii. Section 14 of the Limitation Act ..................................... 20
iv. Section 17 of the Limitation Act ..................................... 22
v. Section 4 of the Limitation Act ........................................ 24
8. Applicability of Section 10 of the GCA ............................... 31
9. Summarising the Current Position of Law ......................... 32
10. Highlighting Certain Concerns with the Current Legal
Position ............................................................................... 33
11. Conclusion .......................................................................... 37

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 737

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

1. Introduction: Leave granted. Facts, to the extent that they are
relevant for determining the issue of limitation for filing an application
challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 19961 are as follows. The appellants received the
arbitral award on 14.02.2022. The 3-month limitation period for filing
the application under Section 34(3) of the ACA expired on 29.05.2022,
on which date the court was functioning, but closed after five days for
vacation commencing from 04.06.2022 to 03.07.2022. The application
under Section 34 was filed immediately on the court’s reopening, i.e.
04.07.2022. The High Court single judge under Section 34 and the
High Court division bench under Section 37 dismissed the petition
as barred by limitation. Under these circumstances, the issue before
us is whether the benefit of the additional 30 days under the proviso
to Section 34(3), which expired during the vacation, can be given
when the petition is filed immediately after reopening in exercise of
power under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 19632.
1.1 After considering Sections 34(3) and 43(1) of the ACA, Sections
4 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 10 of the General
Clauses Act, 18973, as well as precedents of this Court, we have
answered the question in the negative and have dismissed the
present appeal. While we have expressed certain concerns
regarding the curtailment of a precious remedy to challenge
an arbitral award due to a stringent construction of Section 4
of the Limitation Act vis-à-vis Section 34(3), we have held that
in light of the current position of law, the Section 34 application
preferred by the appellant is barred by limitation based on the
following conclusions:
(i) There is no wholesale exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act when calculating the limitation period under
Section 34(3) of the ACA.
(ii) Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of
the ACA only to the extent when the 3-month period expires
on a court holiday. It does not aid the applicant when the
30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

1 Hereinafter “ACA”.
2 Hereinafter “Limitation Act”.
3 Hereinafter “GCA”.
738 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(iii) In view of the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation
Act to Section 34 proceedings, Section 10 of the GCA
does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when
the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.
2. Facts: The detailed facts leading up to the present appeal are as
follows. The appellants entered into lease agreements with the
respondent, who is the owner of the property. Pursuant to certain
disputes, the respondent invoked arbitration and an arbitral award
dated 04.02.2022 was made in its favour. The appellants received
a scanned copy of the award by email on 04.02.2022 itself, and
later received a signed hard copy of the award on 14.02.2022, from
which day limitation must be calculated. The 3-month limitation period
under Section 34(3), after considering the extension of limitation by
operation of this Court’s order dated 10.01.2022 on account of the
COVID-19 pandemic,4 expired on 29.05.2022. The further 30-day
condonable period expired on 28.06.2022. This fell during the High
Court’s summer vacation between 04.06.2022 and 03.07.2022. The
appellants filed the Section 34 petition along with an application for
condonation of delay on the date when the court reopened, i.e.,
04.07.2022. It would also be relevant to note the notification dated
20.05.2022 of the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court as
per which 04.07.2022 would be considered the date of reopening
for calculating limitation. In the meanwhile, the respondent filed for
execution of the award.
3. Decision of the High Court under Section 34 and Section 37 of the
ACA: The Section 34 application was dismissed by the single judge by
order dated 07.02.2023 as being barred by limitation. The appellants
preferred an appeal under Section 37, which was dismissed by the
division bench by order dated 03.04.2024 that is impugned before
us. The reasoning of the High Court proceeds as follows:
3.1 The limitation period commenced from 14.02.2022, when the
appellants received a signed copy of the award. Under Section
34(3), an application to set aside the award must be made
within a period of 3 months from the receipt of the award, which
comes up to 14.05.2022. However, the High Court referred to

4 In Re: Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No 3 of 2020.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 739

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

this Court’s order dated 10.01.20225, which extended the period
of limitation in cases where the limitation expired between
15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022. The extended period of limitation
was 90 days from 01.03.2022, which expired on 29.05.2022.
The condonable period of 30 days expired on 28.06.2022, which
fell during the summer vacation. The application was filed on
the first date of reopening of the court, i.e., on 04.07.2022.
3.2 The High Court referred to this Court’s decision in Assam
Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subhash Projects
& Marketing Limited6, where it was held that Section 4 of the
Limitation Act applies only to cases where the “prescribed
period” of limitation expires on a date when the court is closed.
However, it does not apply when the 30-day condonable period
expires on a court holiday.
3.3 It further held that the notification dated 20.05.2022, which
permitted filing between 27.06.2022 to 02.07.2022 would not
impact the applicability of Section 10 of the GCA, as 04.07.2022
would be considered as the date of court reopening for the
purpose of limitation.
3.4 Finally, the High Court referred to this Court’s decision in
Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v.
Walchandnagar Industries Limited 7, which held that Section 10
of the GCA is inapplicable to the condonable period stipulated
in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the ACA. While noting the
submission of the learned counsel on an inconsistency in
Bhimashankar (supra) regarding the applicability of the Limitation
Act to Section 34(3), it held that nevertheless, the decision is
binding and unambiguous. Therefore, the High Court held that
it does not have the power to condone the delay in the present
case and dismissed the Section 37 appeal.
4. This Court, by its order dated 10.05.2024 issued notice on the
condition that the appellants must deposit Rs. 2 crores with the
Executing Court and also stayed the execution proceedings. The
deposit condition has been complied with by the appellants.

5 ibid.
6 (2012) 2 SCC 624
7 (2023) 8 SCC 453
740 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

5. Submissions: We have heard Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior
counsel for the appellants, and Mr. Simran Mehta, learned counsel
for the respondent. Mr. Kaul’s submissions proceed as follows:
5.1 First, referring to Union of India v. Popular Construction8 and its
reliance in Assam Urban (supra), he submitted that the Limitation
Act, including Section 4, does not apply to Section 34(3). Hence,
he submitted that there was no occasion for the Court in Assam
Urban (supra) to interpret Section 4 of the Limitation Act and
delve into the difference between the ‘‘prescribed period’’ and
the condonable period under Section 34(3).
5.2 Second, since the Limitation Act is excluded, Section 10 of the
GCA applies to Section 34(3), including when the condonable
period expires on a holiday. He relied on Sridevi Datla v.
Union of India9, where the benefit of Section 10 of the GCA
was extended to the party when the condonable period under
Section 16 of the NGT Act expired on a holiday and the appeal
was filed on the next working day. Additionally, he submitted
that the term ‘‘certain day’’ in Section 10 of the GCA gives it
wider import than Section 4 of the Limitation Act, and extends
its applicability to when the condonable period expires on a
court holiday.
5.3 Third, Mr. Kaul expressed doubt regarding the correctness of
Bhimashankar (supra), where Section 10 of the GCA was held
to be inapplicable to Section 34(3) as the Limitation Act applies.
He sought to highlight certain contradictions in the judgment
by referring to paras 54, 55 and 57. He submitted that while
paras 54 and 55 hold the Limitation Act to be inapplicable to
Section 34(3), the Court rejected the benefit of Section 10 of the
GCA in para 57 on the basis that the Limitation Act applies. In
this manner, the Court distinguished Sridevi Datla (supra) and
did not sufficiently deal with the reasoning there. Instead, the
Court relied on Assam Urban (supra), which did not consider
Section 10 of the GCA, and Sagufa Ahmed10, which did not
interpret Section 10 of the GCA sufficiently. He also submitted

8 (2001) 8 SCC 470
9 (2021) 5 SCC 321
10 Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Polywood Products Pvt Ltd, (2021) 2 SCC 317.
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that the observations of the Court in Bhimashankar (supra)
doubting Sridevi Datla (supra) on the ground that it did not deal
with Assam Urban (supra) are untenable as Section 10 of the
GCA was not under consideration in Assam Urban (supra).
5.4 The written submissions filed by the appellants adopt a slightly
different line of argumentation. It is submitted that Section 4 of
the Limitation Act does not apply to the proviso of Section 34(3),
since that is not the ‘‘prescribed period’’. Hence, relying on
Sridevi Datla (supra) and considering that Section 10 of the
GCA is a beneficial legislation,11 it is submitted that Section 10
of the GCA must apply to the proviso. Its inapplicability would
be oppressive and would render the 30-day condonable period
under Section 34(3) otiose when it expires on a court holiday,
leaving the party remediless.
6. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent, first referred to this
Court’s recent decision in State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors
and Engineers Ltd12 to submit that in identical facts, this Court followed
Assam Urban (supra) and held that Section 4 of the Limitation Act
only applies to the 3-month limitation period and not to the 30-day
condonable period under Section 34(3). These judgments, along
with Bhimashankar (supra), determine the issue.
6.1 Second, Mr. Mehta submitted that the entirety of Sections 4
to 24 of the Limitation Act are not excluded from applying to
Section 34 proceedings. He took us through certain portions
of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,
Irrigation Department13, which is a 3-judge bench decision,
to submit that Popular Construction (supra) only deals with
the exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this case,
Section 14 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable.
Similarly, he submitted that other decisions also apply Section 12
of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3). In the same vein, Section 4
of the Limitation Act also applies.

11 Relied on H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 111; Manohar Joshi v.
Nitin Bhaurao Patil, (1996) 1 SCC 169; and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,
Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169.
12 (2024) 7 SCC 257
13 (2008) 7 SCC 169
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6.2 Third, regarding the manner in which Section 4 of the
Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3), he submitted that
Sagufa Ahmed (supra) clearly distinguishes the prescribed
period and condonable period. The wording of Section 4 only
makes it applicable to the 3-month period and not the 30-day
condonable period, which cannot be extended any further.
He also submitted that Sridevi Datla (supra) did not notice
the distinction drawn in Sagufa Ahmed (supra) when applying
Section 10 of the GCA.
6.3 Fourth, he submitted that Section 10 of the GCA does not apply
to Section 34(3) as the Limitation Act applies. He also responded
to Mr. Kaul’s reliance on the words ‘‘certain day’’ in Section 10
of the GCA by submitting that they apply when a statute fixes
a particular day or date for performing some act, which is not
the case here. Therefore, the Section 34 application, which was
filed on the 126th day, was barred by limitation and the High
Court could not have condoned the delay through reference to
Section 10 of the GCA.
6.4 In the written submissions, the respondent has further submitted
that once Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section
34(3), the provision cannot be further split into individual
sections, sub-sections, and provisos to make Section 10 of
the GCA applicable. Moreover, Section 10 of the GCA cannot
be applied to the condonable period as that would amount
to reading the expression ‘‘prescribed period’’ in Section 10
as including the condonable 30-day period, which is contrary
to various judgments of this Court. Lastly, that Sridevi Datla
(supra) was decided in the context of Section 16 of the NGT
Act, while Assam Urban (supra), Bhimashankar (supra), and
Rajpath Contractors (supra) are specifically in the context of
Section 34(3).
7. Issues: Before proceeding with our analysis, it is necessary to frame
issues to systematically address the submissions of the learned
counsels and the questions of law arising in this case regarding the
applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and Section 10 of the
GCA to the condonable period under Section 34(3):
i. Do the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to Section 34
proceedings, and to what extent?
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ii. Does Section 4 of the Limitation Act apply to Section 34(3) as per
an analysis of the statutory scheme as well as precedents of this
Court on the issue? If Section 4 applies, does it apply only to the
3-month limitation period or also the 30-day condonable period?
iii. In light of the answer in (ii), will Section 10 of the GCA apply
to Section 34(3), and if so, in what manner?
The answers to these issues will determine whether the Section 34
application in the present case was filed within the condonable
period of 30 days.
8. Applicability of the Limitation Act to ACA: Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes
a period of limitation that is different from the Schedule, Section 3 of
the Limitation Act14 shall apply as if such period is the one prescribed
in the Schedule. Further, Section 4 to 24 shall apply insofar as, and to
the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law. Therefore, Section 29(2) imports the provisions of the
Limitation Act to special and local laws that prescribe a different
period of limitation, unless there is an express exclusion contained
in such law. Section 29(2) reads:
“29. Savings.—
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation different from

14 Section 3 of the Limitation Act reads:
“3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive),
every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall
be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) a suit is instituted,—
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is
made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the
court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit
and shall be deemed to have been instituted—
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is
pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made
in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is
presented to the proper officer of that court.”
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the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
9. The effect of Section 29(2) has been summarised by this Court in
Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil15 as follows:
“8. …A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its
applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing
the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements
have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said
provision.
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under
any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal
or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such
special or local law should be different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the
consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would
automatically follow. These consequences are as under:
(i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would
apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local
law was the period prescribed by the Schedule.
(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by
such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application
all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive)
would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

15 Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5, as affirmed in Bhakra Beas
Management Board v. Excise & Taxation Officer, (2020) 17 SCC 692, paras 13 and 14.
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10. Section 43(1) of the ACA fortifies the applicability of the Limitation Act
not only to court proceedings under the ACA but also to arbitrations.
It reads:
“43. Limitations.—(1) The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of
1963), shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings
in Court.”
11. This Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra)
considered the necessity of a provision in the nature of Section 43(1),
when Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act already makes Sections 4
to 24 of the Limitation Act applicable to special statutes, including
the ACA. It held that the ACA does not prescribe the period of
limitation for various proceedings under the Act, and deviates from
the Limitation Act in specific instances like Section 34(3) and Sections
43(2) to (4).16 By virtue of Section 29(2), the Limitation Act applies
to court proceedings under the ACA. The purpose of Section 43(1)
of the ACA is to extend the applicability of the Limitation Act to
arbitrations also, as these are private tribunals and not courts. Since
the Limitation Act is only applicable to court proceedings, Section
43(1) is necessary to make it applicable to arbitrations in the same
manner as it applies to court proceedings.17
12. Applicability of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3): Once it is clear
that the Limitation Act generally applies to arbitrations and court
proceedings under the ACA, it is necessary to consider its applicability
to Section 34 proceedings. Section 34(3) provides the limitation
period and condonable period to file a Section 34 application, and
it reads:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received the arbitral
award or, if a request had been made under section 33,
from the date on which that request had been disposed
of by the arbitral tribunal:

16 Consolidated Engineering (supra), para 42.
17 ibid, para 45.
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Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
13. From reading the provision, it is clear that an application to set aside
an arbitral award under Section 34 must be within 3 months from
the receipt of the award or the date of disposal of a request under
Section 33. This is the period of limitation.18 Further, the court may
exercise discretion to entertain the application, within a further period
of 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown, but not thereafter.19
14. As per Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the effect of there being
a different limitation period under Section 34(3) is that: Section 3 of
the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the
ACA as if the 3-month limitation period is the period prescribed in
the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Further, Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act apply to determine whether the application is within
the period of limitation, “insofar as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded.”
15. There are two aspects necessary for our consideration at this point:
first, the interpretation of “express exclusion”; and second, the extent
of such exclusion.
16. The mere prescription of a period of limitation that is different from the
Limitation Act, even if mandatory and compulsory, is not sufficient to
displace the applicability of the Limitation Act’s provisions.20 However,
an exclusion of the Limitation Act’s provisions can be inferred if
the nature and language of the provisions, and the scheme of the
special law necessarily exclude the applicability of one or more of
the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.21
Thus, as per settled case-law, an express reference to an exclusion is
not essential and the court can examine the language of the special

18 State of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239, para 10; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises
(supra), para 19.
19 See State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518, para 29.
20 Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392, para 7.
21 Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, para 17; Popular Construction
(supra), paras 8-11; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt Ltd, (2009) 5 SCC
791, para 35.
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law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that certain provisions
of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded.
17. The applicability of Sections 4 to 24, and the extent of their applicability
and exclusion under Section 34(3), has been considered by this
Court in several cases. It is useful to categorise these cases based
on the provision of the Limitation Act under consideration therein.
18. Section 5 of the Limitation Act22: In the leading judgment of Popular
Construction (supra), this Court considered whether a court can
condone delay beyond 30 days, as specified in the proviso to Section
34(3), by relying on Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It considered the
expression ‘’but not thereafter’’ in the proviso to Section 34(3), which
it held would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Hence, Section 5 would not apply
as it would render this phrase redundant if a further period was allowed
to be condoned through reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.23
18.1 The Court further considered the scheme and object of the ACA
and held that Section 34(1) provides for recourse against the
arbitral award “in accordance with” sub-sections (2) and (3),
which set out the grounds and the time period for challenging
the arbitral award. Reading the provision as a whole, the
Court held that an application beyond 3 months and 30 days
would not be “in accordance with” Section 34(3), and hence
the recourse under Section 34(1) cannot be availed.24
18.2 Further, the Court also considered the enforceability of the
award under Section 36 of the ACA once the time to make an
application under Section 34 expires.25 Thus, it held that the
scheme of the ACA would result in an exclusion of Section 5

22 Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application,
other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or
the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period.
Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice
or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be
sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”
23 Popular Construction (supra), para 12.
24 ibid, para 16.
25 ibid.
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of the Limitation Act, and therefore, a delay beyond 30 days
cannot be condoned by recourse to Section 5.
19. Section 12 of the Limitation Act26: This Court in State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers27 held that Section 12 of the
Limitation Act applies for the purpose of calculating limitation under
Section 34(3), and the same is not excluded by the provisions of the
ACA. It held that the day from which the 3-month limitation period is
to be reckoned must be excluded as per Section 12(1).28
20. Section 14 of the Limitation Act29: In State of Goa v. Western Builders
(supra), a division bench of this Court held that nothing in the ACA or
in the language of Section 34 excludes the applicability of Section 14
of the Limitation Act. Hence, the time spent by a party who was
bona fide prosecuting his remedy before a court that did not have
jurisdiction must be excluded while calculating the prescribed period
under Section 34(3). It held that when the special law is silent and
there is no specific prohibition, it must be interpreted in a manner
that advances justice. While the object of the ACA is to ensure
expeditious decisions in commercial matters through arbitration,
Section 43 makes the entirety of the Limitation Act applicable. The
Limitation Act is excluded only to that extent of the area which is
covered under the ACA, and hence Section 5 is excluded by virtue
of the stipulation of the mandatory 30-day condonable period under
Section 34(3).30

26 The relevant portion of Section 12 of the Limitation Act reads:
“12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for
any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be
excluded…”
27 (2010) 12 SCC 210
28 ibid, paras 12, 19.
29 The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads:
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In
computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or
of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates
to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the
applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a
court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall
be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect
of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it…”
30 Western Builders (supra), paras 16-25. Followed in Gulbarga University v. Mallikarjun S. Kodagali,
(2008) 13 SCC 539
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21. A three-judge bench of this Court in Consolidated Engineering
Enterprises (supra) also held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act
applies to Section 34(3). Merely because Section 5 of the Limitation
Act stands excluded, does not lead to a conclusion that other
provisions are also excluded.31 Adopting a similar reasoning as
Western Builders (supra), the Court held that there is no provision
in the ACA that excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act to Section 34 proceedings.32 Further, the Court held
that there is a fundamental distinction between Sections 5 and 14 of
the Limitation Act. Section 5 allows the court to exercise discretion
to condone delay, and thereby extends the period of limitation.33
However, under Section 14, the exclusion of time is mandatory if
certain conditions are satisfied. Exercise of power under Section 5
is therefore broader than Section 14, as a wide range of reasons
can be put forth to show sufficient cause for delay.34 Hence, it held
that the decision in Popular Construction (supra) does not mean that
Section 14 of the Limitation Act is also inapplicable to Section 34(3)
of the ACA. This decision has been subsequently followed by this
Court in other cases.35
22. Section 17 of the Limitation Act 36: In P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok
Kumar 37, this Court held that Section 17 of the Limitation Act does
not enable condonation of delay in a Section 34 application beyond

31 Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), para 20.
32 ibid, paras 23, 27.
33 ibid, paras 28, 54.
34 ibid, para 28.
35 Coal India Limited v. Ujjal Transport Agency, (2011) 1 SCC 117; Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh
Housing Board v. Mohanlal and Company, (2016) 14 SCC 199.
36 The relevant portion of Section 17 of the Limitation Act reads:
“17. Effect of fraud or mistake.—(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which
a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act,—
(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his
agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by
the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been
fraudulently concealed from him,
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until plaintiff or applicant has discovered the
fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of
a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the
concealed document or compelling its production…”
37 (2019) 13 SCC 445
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the 30-day period when such delay is caused due to fraud played
on the applicant party. The Court took note of the applicability of
Sections 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act (discussed above). It held
that Section 17 only defers the commencement of the limitation period,
but does not extend or break the limitation period.38 However, it held
Section 17 to be inapplicable for the following reasons.
22.1 Under Section 34(3) of the ACA, the limitation period
commences on the date of receipt of award or the date of
disposal of request under Section 33 for correction or an
additional award. However, if Section 17 of the Limitation Act
were to apply, the limitation would commence on the date of
discovery of the alleged fraud or mistake, and the outer limit
to challenge the award would go beyond the mandatory 3
months plus 30 days period.39 Based on these inconsistencies
between Section 17 of the Limitation Act and the language
of Section 34(3), the Court held that there is an “express
exclusion”.
22.2 It also considered the object of the ACA to ensure speedy
dispute resolution and finality to the award; enforceability
of the award under Section 36 of the ACA, once the time
to challenge the award expires; and “unbreakability” of the
time limit under Section 34(3), to hold that Section 17 of the
Limitation Act is inapplicable.40
23. Section 4 of the Limitation Act: We found it necessary to deal with
the case-law, categorised as per the provisions of the Limitation Act,
due to a certain view at the bar that the provisions of the Limitation
Act are entirely inapplicable to Section 34(3). Such a view was put
forth before the High Court as well as before us. Through the above
discussion, it is amply clear that there is no wholesale exclusion of the
provisions of the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation
under Section 34(3). Rather, each provision’s applicability/exclusion
has been individually tested by this Court, on a case-to-case basis,
based on the language and purpose of the specific provision in the
Limitation Act, the language of Section 34(3) of the ACA, and the

38 ibid, para 30.
39 ibid, paras 31.1-31.2.
40 ibid, paras 36-37.
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scheme and object of the ACA. It is in this light that we must consider
whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3), and
in what manner. The above context is also necessary to appreciate
the precedents on this issue.
24. Before analysing the case-law, it is relevant to extract Section 4 of
the Limitation Act:

“Section 4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is
closed.—Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal
or application expires on a day when the court is closed,
the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred
or made on the day when the court re-opens.
Explanation.—A court shall be deemed to be closed on any
day within the meaning of this section if during any part of
its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.”
We will also extract Section 10 of the GCA to juxtapose these
provisions:
“Section 10. Computation of time.—(1) Where, by any
Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement
of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to
be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day
or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office
is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed
period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done
or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day
afterwards on which the Court or office is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act
or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15
of 1877), applies.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and
Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of
January, 1887.”
(emphasis supplied)

25. As per Section 4, if the ‘‘prescribed period’’, which is defined in
Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act as the period of limitation computed
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in accordance with its provisions41, expires on a day when the court
is closed, the application may be made on the day when the court
reopens.
26. This Court in Assam Urban (supra) considered the applicability of
Section 4 of the Limitation Act in a situation when the condonable
period of 30 days expired on a court holiday. The brief facts are that
the appellants received the arbitral awards on 26.08.2003, the 3-month
limitation period expired on 26.11.2003, on which date the court was
open. The further condonable period of 30 days expired during court
vacation between 25.12.2003 to 01.01.2004. The application under
Section 34 was filed on 02.01.2004, on the date of court reopening.
This Court upheld the dismissal of the Section 34 application on the
ground of delay, as the same could not be condoned.
26.1 First, the Court held that by virtue of Section 43(1), the
Limitation Act applies to matters of arbitration, “save and
except to the extent its applicability has been excluded by
virtue of the express provision contained in Section 34(3) of
the 1996 Act”.42
26.2 It then considered the meaning of the expression ‘‘prescribed
period’’ in Section 4, to determine whether the appellants in
this case would be entitled to an extension of time. Reading
Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act in the context of Section 34(3)
of the ACA, it held that the “prescribed period’’ for an application
to set aside the arbitral award is 3 months. The 30-day period
is not the period of limitation, but the condonable period, and
is therefore not the “prescribed period’’. Hence, it held that
Section 4 was not attracted to the facts of the case.43
27. Contrary to the interpretation of the judgment put forth by Mr. Kaul
during the hearings, a reading of the entire judgment does not
indicate that the Court in Assam Urban (supra) held Section 4 of
the Limitation Act to be inapplicable. The wording of para 9 of the
judgment makes it clear that the Limitation Act does not apply only

41 Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act reads:
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(j) “period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed
in accordance with the provisions of this Act;” (emphasis supplied)
42 Assam Urban (supra), para 9.
43 ibid, paras 11-14.
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to the extent that its applicability is excluded by an express provision
in Section 34(3). While the Court did not explicitly deal with whether
Section 4 of the Limitation Act was excluded, a reading of the entire
judgment makes it clear that the Court proceeded on the basis
that Section 4 applies. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept Mr.
Kaul’s submission that Section 4 was held to be excluded in Assam
Urban (supra). His further submission that once the Limitation Act is
inapplicable, there was no occasion for the Court to decide on the
applicability of Section 4 only to the prescribed period of 3 months,
must also be rejected for the same reason.
28. The position of law after Assam Urban (supra) is that while Section 4
of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA, it only
applies in relation to the prescribed period of 3 months. It does not
apply when the condonable period of 30 days expires on a day when
the court is not working.
29. This position of law was subsequently considered and reiterated in
Bhimashankar (supra) as well. Here, the arbitral award was made on
24.08.2016, the 3-month period of limitation expired on 24.11.2016,
and further 30 days came upto 24.12.2016, which fell during the
court’s winter/Christmas vacation. The Court here considered the
applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and Section 10 of the
GCA.
29.1 On the issue of Section 4 of the Limitation, it held that the
issue is covered by Assam Urban (supra), where it was held
that the benefit of exclusion of the period when the court is
closed is only available with respect to the “prescribed period
of limitation” and not the period extendable by the court in
exercise of its discretion.44
29.2 To determine the applicability of Section 10 of the GCA, it
considered whether the Limitation Act applies to the ACA.
It specifically rejected the submission that the Limitation Act
does not apply. It further referred to Assam Urban (supra) on
the extent of exclusion and held as follows in para 54:
“54. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the
appellant that the Limitation Act shall not be applicable
to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act is

44 Bhimashankar (supra), paras 50-53.
754 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. Section
43(1) of the Arbitration Act specifically provides that
the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations
as it applies to proceeding in Court. However, as
observed and held by this Court in Assam Urban,
the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to the
matters of arbitration covered by the 1996 Act save
and except to the extent its applicability has been
excluded by virtue of express provision contained
in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.”
(emphasis supplied)

In paras 55 and 56, it discussed Popular Construction (supra)
and Hindustan Construction (supra) on the inapplicability of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the mandatory nature of
the 30-day time limit for condonation of delay, respectively.
29.3 Finally, in paras 57 and 58, in light of the proviso to Section
10 of the GCA which specifically excludes its applicability to
any act or proceeding to which the Limitation Act applies, the
Court rejected the applicability of Section 10 of the GCA to
Section 34(3).
30. The logic of the above reasoning in Bhimashankar (supra), like in
Assam Urban (supra), proceeds on the basis that Section 4 of the
Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3), as the same is not expressly
or impliedly excluded. Reading paragraphs 54 to 58 together, it is
clear that any apparent contradiction within them, which was raised
by Mr. Kaul, does not in fact exist. The judgment is consistent
throughout, in that it necessarily affirms the applicability of Section 4
of the Limitation Act while calculating limitation under Section 34(3),
and consequently, relies on the proviso of Section 10 of the GCA to
hold that Section 10 of the GCA does not apply.
31. The applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act is also implicit in
the recent decision in State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors
(supra). Here, the award was served on the appellant on 30.06.2022.
The 3-month limitation was reckoned from 01.07.2022, which came
upto 30.09.2022. The court vacation started from 01.10.2022. The
further 30-day period ended on 30.10.2022, which was during the
court vacation. The application was filed on 31.10.2022. The Court
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 755

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

held that the prescribed limitation period ended on 30.09.2022, when
the court was working. Hence, by referring to Assam Urban (supra),
it held that the appellant could not benefit from Section 4 of the
Limitation Act as only the 30-day period expired on a court holiday.
Hence, it held that the application was filed beyond the time under
Section 34(3) and the delay could not be condoned.45
32. Applicability of Section 10 of the GCA: In view of this legal position,
the final issue for our consideration is whether the appellant can claim
the benefit of Section 10 of the GCA. This issue is also answered
against the appellant by virtue of the clear and express language
of the proviso to Section 10 of the GCA.
33. This Court in Bhimashankar (supra) has already considered this issue
and has clearly held that since the Limitation Act applies to Section
34(3), Section 10 of the GCA is not applicable.46 The argument put
forth by the appellant in its written submissions that Section 10 of
the GCA must apply to the 30-day period stipulated in the proviso to
Section 34(3) also warrants rejection due to the statutory language
of the proviso to Section 10 of the GCA, which states that it does not
apply to “any act or proceeding” to which the Limitation Act applies.
Considering that Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to a Section
34 proceeding, the appellant cannot simultaneously claim benefit of
Section 10 of the GCA.
34. Since the applicability of Section 10 of the GCA is rejected at the
very threshold, it is no longer necessary to consider the interpretation
of “prescribed period’’ under Section 10 of the GCA as including
the condonable period, as put forth by this Court in Sridevi Datla
(supra) in the context of Section 16 of the NGT Act. The position
of law in the context of Section 34(3) of the ACA has been clearly
enunciated in Assam Urban (supra), Bhimashankar (supra), and
Rajpath Contractors (supra). Hence, Sridevi Datla (supra) can be
differentiated on this ground as well.
35. Summarising the Current Position of Law: From the reasoning and
decisions in the above cases, the following conclusions evidently
follow:

45 Rajpath Contractors (supra), paras 10-12.
46 Bhimashankar (supra), paras 57 and 58.
756 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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35.1 First, Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3)
of the ACA.
35.2 Second, Section 4 of the Limitation Act benefits a party only
when the “prescribed period’’, i.e. the 3-month limitation period
under Section 34(3) expires on a court holiday. In such a
situation, the application under Section 34 will be considered
as having been filed within the limitation period if it is filed on
the next working day of the court.
35.3 Third, Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not come to the
aid of the party when the 3-month limitation period expires on
a day when the court was working. The 30-day condonable
period expiring during the court holidays will not survive and
neither Section 4, nor any other provision of the Limitation
Act, will inure to the benefit of the party to enable filing of the
Section 34 application immediately after reopening.
35.4 Fourth, since Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to
proceedings under Section 34 of the ACA, the applicability of
Section 10 of the GCA stands excluded in view of the express
wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability of the
provision when the Limitation Act applies.
36. Highlighting Certain Concerns with the Current Legal Position: Before
parting with this judgment, we find it necessary to express certain
difficulties with the current position of law. In our view, the above
construction of limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails
a remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of
an arbitral award. This must be addressed by the Parliament.
36.1 The purpose of reading the Limitation Act alongside the ACA is
not to restrict the special remedy under the ACA, but to enable
exercise of such remedy in circumstances as contemplated
under the Limitation Act. In this context, Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act becomes relevant as it incorporates Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act in special statutes, including the ACA,
to the extent that its provisions are not expressly excluded.
36.2 The language of Section 34(3) read with its proviso does not
expressly or impliedly exclude Section 4 of the Limitation Act
and this interpretation is in consonance with the important
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 757

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

principle contemplated under Section 29(2) to protect rights and
remedies. This Court has already recognised the applicability
of Section 4 of the Limitation Act.
36.3 The substantive remedies available under Sections 34
and 37 of the ACA are, by their very nature, limited in their
scope due to statutory prescription. It is therefore necessary
to interpret the limitation provisions liberally, or else even the
limited window available to parties to challenge an arbitral
award will be lost. The remedy under Section 34 is precious,
and courts will keep in mind the need to secure and protect
such remedy while applying limitation provisions.47 If this
limited remedy is denied on stringent principles of limitation,
it will cause great prejudice and has the effect of (a) denying
the remedy, and (b) in the long run, it will have the effect
of dissuading contracting parties from seeking resolution of
disputes through arbitration. This is against public policy.
36.4 However, the difficulty arises as the judgments affirming the
applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act equate the
expression ‘’prescribed’’ in that section and Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act only with the main period of limitation (3
months). The problem with this construction is that the special
law, i.e., Section 34(3) of the ACA, along with its proviso does
not prescribe the period of limitation in the manner that a
period is specified in the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The
statutorily prescribed period under Section 34(3) of the ACA
is 3 months, and an additional 30 days. In our opinion, it will
be wrong to confine the period of limitation to just 3 months
by interpreting it as the “prescribed period” and excluding the
balance 30 days under the proviso to Section 34(3) as not
being the prescribed period through a process of interpretation.
36.5 The purpose of applying the Limitation Act to special laws is
to vest in the court the power to exercise discretion or to grant
the benefit of exclusion. In such cases, when the Limitation
Act applies, the discretion of the court as contemplated under
its provisions, commencing from Sections 4 to 24, must be

47 Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3814, para 10.
758 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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given full effect. In this light, the additional period of 30 days
specifically provided under the ACA loses its efficacy and
purpose, and becomes untenable due to the current position of
law. This takes us to a fundamental question as to the meaning
of “express exclusion” of certain provisions of the Limitation Act
by the ACA. In Popular Construction (supra), the Court came
to the conclusion that Section 34(3) proviso “impliedly” – as
against the specific expression “expressly” in Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act – excludes Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
36.6 Once the Court commenced disapplying provisions of the
Limitation Act to the ACA on the ground of implied exclusions, it
is only a matter of interpretation to include or exclude provisions
from Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act on a case-to-case
basis. Thus, for example, while the Court held that Sections 5 and
17 of the Limitation Act are excluded from Section 34(3), it came
to the conclusion that Sections 4, 12, and 14 of the Limitation
Act are applicable. In a way, the applicability of provisions from
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and the manner in which
they apply are at the doorstep of the court, rather than being
determined by a clear and categorical statutory prescription.
This is perhaps the reason why the Parliament has used the
expression “express exclusion” in Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act. We are conscious of the fact that it is too late in the day to
hold that “express exclusion” will not include implied exclusion.
It is for the legislature to take note of this position and bring
about clarity and certainty. We say no more, for the overbearing
intellectualisation of the Act by courts has become the bane
of Indian arbitration.
37. Conclusion: For the reasons set forth above, the application preferred
by the appellant under Section 34 of the ACA stands dismissed as it
was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days, which conclusively
and absolutely expired on 28.06.2022.
38. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment and order
passed by the High Court in FAO (OS) (COMM) No. 67/2023 dated
03.04.2024 and dismiss the appeal.
39. There shall be no order as to costs.
40. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 759

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

Judgment

Pankaj Mithal, J.

1. The sole issue arising in this appeal for our consideration is whether
the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition filed by the
appellants herein under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 19961 as barred by time.
2. My esteemed brother, in his opinion expressed on the above issue,
has clearly concluded that the petition filed by the appellants under
Section 34 of the A & C Act was beyond limitation and was rightly
dismissed as barred by time. I fully agree with the said opinion
expressed by my brother on the basis of the legal interpretation of
the various relevant provisions and the conclusions drawn on its
basis. However, I would like to write a supporting opinion in my own
way based upon the facts of the case at hand.
3. On account of lease agreements entered into between the appellants
and the respondent, certain disputes arose between them. Therefore,
respondent invoked the arbitration clause whereupon the disputes
were referred to arbitration. An arbitral award was passed on
04.02.2022, a soft copy of which was supplied to the appellants on
the very same day by e-mail. A signed hard copy of the award dated
04.02.2022 was made available to the appellants on 14.02.2022.
4. The prescribed period of time for filing a petition under Section 34
of the A & C Act is 3 months from the date on which the party, filing
the petition, had received the arbitral award or if a request had been
made under Section 33 of the A & C Act, from the date on which the
request has been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. Here, we are
not concerned with the second part of Sub-Section (3) of Section
34 of the A & C Act but only with the first part of it which provides
for a limitation of 3 months from the date on which the party, filing
the petition, had received the arbitral award. Since the appellants in
the present case received the arbitral award on 14.02.2022, the 3
months period prescribed for filing a petition as per sub-Section (3)
of Section 34 expired on 14.05.2022. By operation of this Court’s

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the A & C Act’
760 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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order dated 10.01.2022 on account of COVID-19 pandemic, the said
period of limitation stood extended upto 29.05.2022.
5. The day on which the limitation expired for filing a petition under
Section 34 of the A & C Act after giving the benefit of the COVID-19
pandemic i.e., 29.05.2022, as mentioned above, happened to be a
working day. However, the appellants filed the petition under Section
34 of the A & C Act, not on the last day of limitation i.e. 29.05.2022
but on 04.07.2022 when the Courts re-opened after the summer
vacation which were notified between 04.06.2022 and 03.07.2022.
The petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the A & C
Act was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay.
6. The High Court rejected the delay condonation application and
accordingly dismissed the petition filed by the appellants under
Section 34 of the A & C Act vide order dated 07.02.2023 as barred
by limitation. The appeal preferred by the appellants under Section 37
of the A & C Act before the Division Bench also met the same fate.
7. The submission is that, though, the period of limitation for filing a
petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act is 3 months but the court,
on being satisfied that the appellants were prevented by sufficient
cause from filing the petition within the aforesaid 3 months, could
have entertained it within a further period of 30 days. Therefore,
the maximum period in which the petition under Section 34 of the A
& C Act, after condoning the delay, could be entertained is 90+30
days i.e., 120 days. The said period expired on 28.06.2022 which
fell during the summer vacation of the Court. Therefore, the petition
filed by the appellants on the first day of re-opening of the Court
after summer vacation was within time.
8. In order to appreciate the above submission, it may be pertinent to
refer to Section 43 of the A & C Act which provides for the applicability
of the Limitation Act, 1963 which in unequivocal terms states that the
Limitation Act shall apply to Arbitrations as it applies to proceedings
in court. In view of the above provision and the case law on the
subject as discussed by my brother, there remains no doubt that the
Limitation Act is applicable to the arbitration proceedings as also to
court proceedings under the A & C Act.
9. The Limitation Act is based on public policy to bring to an end the
life of a dispute for which appropriate remedy has not been availed
within a time bound period.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 761

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

10. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 clearly lays down that every
suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made to the court
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed even though limitation
has not been setup as a defence.
11. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act defines “period of limitation” to mean
the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
under the Schedule. The Schedule to the Limitation Act lays down
the limitation prescribed inter alia for any suit, appeal or application.
However, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the period
of limitation for any suit, appeal or application as contained in the
Schedule of the Limitation Act stands substituted by the period
prescribed in Section 34(3) of the A & C Act for the purposes of filing
a petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act.
12. Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that if the prescribed period
of limitation of any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when
the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application can be submitted/
presented or made to the court on the day when the court reopens
which on such presentation would be treated as within time.
13. The period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition under Section
34 of the A & C Act is 3 months i.e., 90 days. In the present case,
the said period of limitation prescribed by extending the benefit of
COVID-19, expired on 29.05.2022 when the courts were working.
Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of Section
4 of the Limitation Act to permit them to prefer the petition on the
re-opening of the court as the period of limitation prescribed had not
expired on the day when the court was closed.
14. The appellants are not entitled even to any benefit as per Section
10 of the General Clauses Act2, 1897 which also permits the filing
of a petition on the re-opening of the court where the last day of
prescribed period for filing it falls or expires on the day on which
the court is closed. The proviso to Section 10 in no uncertain terms
states that the provisions of Section 10 of the GC Act shall not apply
to any Act or proceedings to which the Limitation Act applies. In the
case at hand, admittedly in proceedings of arbitration as also to
court proceedings under the A & C Act, the Limitation Act squarely
applies. Therefore, by proviso to Section 10 of GC Act, Section 10

2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the GC Act’
762 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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of the GC Act stands excluded and would not be attracted to accord
any benefit to the appellants.
15. The period of limitation prescribed for instituting a suit or filing an
appeal or making an application has to be distinguished from a
condonable period which cannot be made part of the period of
limitation prescribed.
16. In view of the above discussion, as the period of limitation prescribed
for filing a petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act expired on a
working day and not on a day on which the court was closed, the
appellants were not entitled to file it on the re-opening of the court
after the summer vacation and as such the petition so filed was
patently barred by limitation.
17. Admittedly, as the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition
under Section 34 of the A & C Act expired on 29.05.2022 whereas
the petition was preferred on 04.07.2022 much beyond the period of
limitation prescribed and the condonable period of 30 days stipulated
under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A & C Act, the petition under
Section 34 of the A & C Act was beyond time and the delay could
not have been condoned. Accordingly, there is no error or illegality
on part of the High Court in dismissing the petition under Section
34 of the A & C Act as barred by limitation.
18. It would not be out of context for me to mention on the basis of my
experience that practically all new/recent enactments are deviating
from the prescribed period of limitation as per the Schedule of the
Limitation Act and are generally prescribing its own period of limitation
as under the A & C Act itself. At the same time, statutes further
provide that the delay beyond a certain period cannot be condoned
by the court. This is obviously in deviation to what is prescribed by
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. In my personal opinion, the statutes ought not to provide different
period of limitation for instituting suit, preferring appeal and making
an application, rather all statutes should stick to a uniform period of
limitation say 90 days for preferring Special Leave Petition/Appeal to
the Supreme Court of India. The courts should also be empowered to
condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown for not filing it within
the time prescribed rather than restricting the condonable period to a
fix period of 15 days or 30 days as provided in some of the statutes.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 763

My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

20. This deviation and restriction create confusion and ordinarily even a
lawyer at times fails to notice that a different period of limitation has
been prescribed for preferring an appeal under a particular statute.
Moreover, there may be genuine cases where the litigant may not
be able to approach the court in time for cogent reasons beyond his
control. For example, in arbitration matters where an award is passed
on a particular date and a copy of it is also served upon the litigating
party but that party happens to be seriously ill and hospitalised for
months together and as such is unable to prefer a petition under
Section 34 within the period of limitation prescribed. If the delay
in challenging the award is not condoned beyond the period of 30
days, he would suffer great prejudice and may lose the remedy on
a technical ground even though he may be having a good case
on merit. There may also be a situation where a litigant is facing
proceedings by the law enforcement agencies like the Enforcement
Directorate, Central Bureau of Investigation, etc., and is taken into
custody and as such is unable to take the legal remedy within the
period of limitation prescribed. He avails the remedy only after he
is out of custody; months after the service of the order. In such
circumstances, in my opinion, the legislature ought not to confine
condoning the delay only for a prescribed period and not beyond
it. Rather it should follow the principle of condoning the delay as
enshrined under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This would not only
avoid a good case to be thrown out on the ground of limitation but
at the same time would bring about uniformity in law.
21. I, therefore, suggest to the law makers to keep this in mind while
enacting new Acts and ensure that uniform system is applied in all
enactments, be it present or future.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain