Holding

The 1985 instrument is a gift by settlement, validly accepted and vested in the plaintiff, rendering the later cancellation and sale deeds void.

Summary

The appellant (son) challenged a decree of the Kerala High Court that declared a 1985 deed executed by his father in favour of his sister (plaintiff) to be a settlement and a valid gift, thereby invalidating a later cancellation deed and sale deed dated 19.10.1993. The core issue was whether the 1985 instrument was a gift, a settlement, or a will, and whether the statutory requirements for vesting a legal right were satisfied. The Supreme Court examined the deed's language, the presence of consideration, reservation of life interest, and the conduct of the parties, concluding that the deed constituted a gift by settlement with immediate vesting in the plaintiff. Acceptance was inferred from the plaintiff's registration of the deed and possession of the original title. Consequently, the unilateral cancellation and subsequent sale deed were held void. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decree.

Issues considered

Whether the document dated 26.06.1985 is a gift, a settlement, or a will.
Whether the statutory requirements under the Transfer of Property Act and related statutes for a valid gift/settlement were fulfilled, including acceptance and vesting of interest.

Legislation cited

Indian Stamp Act, 1899s. Art.33
Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 2(h), s. 59, s. 61, s. 62, s. 63, s. 70, s. 89
Kerala Stamp Act, 1959s. Art.31
Registration Act, 1909s. 17
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 2(b)
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 11, s. 122, s. 123, s. 126, s. 127, s. 128, s. 41

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The question to be decided herein is twin fold, whether the document of the year 1985 is a gift or Settlement or Will and whether the requirements under law or conditions in the deed have been satisfied to vest a legal right. Headnotes† Transfer of Property Act, Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Art. 33 – Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 – Art.31 – Registration Act, 1909 – s.17 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.2(b) – Indian Succession Act, 1925 – Part VI – ss.2(h), 59, 61, 62, 63, 70, 89 – Respondent No.1 was

Subjects

GiftWillSettlementInterplay between Gift, Will and SettlementInterplay between Gift and WillInterplay between Gift and SettlementSettlement deedCancellation of deedAbsolute ownerTestamentary documentCreation of life interestRegistration of giftPossession of documentElement of voluntary dispositionDelivery of possessionTransfer of interest in praesentiGift by settlement

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 957 : 2025 INSC 388

N.P. Saseendran
v.
N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4312 of 2025)
24 March 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The question to be decided herein is twin fold, whether the document
of the year 1985 is a gift or Settlement or Will and whether the
requirements under law or conditions in the deed have been
satisfied to vest a legal right.

Headnotes†
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ss.122 - 123, 126, 127,
128 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Art. 33 – Kerala Stamp Act,
1959 – Art.31 – Registration Act, 1909 – s.17 – Specific Relief
Act, 1963 – s.2(b) – Indian Succession Act, 1925 – Part VI –
ss.2(h), 59, 61, 62, 63, 70, 89 – Respondent No.1 was the
plaintiff (daughter) in O.S.No.27 of 1994 and the appellant was
defendant No.2 (son) in the said suit – Respondent no.1 alleged
that the suit schedule property was gifted by her father, who
was defendant No.1 in the suit, vide registered deed dated
26.06.1985 – Respondent No.1/plaintiff filed the said suit for
declaration of right, title and interest over the suit schedule
property and also for a declaration that the cancellation deed
and sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by the defendant
No.1/father in favour of the appellant/defendant No.2 as null
and void and for consequential injunction – The High Court
upsetting the concurrent findings of the Courts below, granted
a decree in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 declaring
her right, title and interest over the suit schedule property by
virtue of Ext.A1 settlement deed dated 26.06.1985 and declared
that cancellation deed (Ext.A2) dated 19.10.1993 and sale deed
(Ext.A3) dated 19.10.1993 both executed by defendant No.1
would not bind the plaintiff as far as her right, title and interest
over the suit schedule property is concerned – Correctness:

* Author
958 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Held: Ext.A1 document dated 26.06.1985 was executed by
defendant No.1/father in favour of respondent No.1/plaintiff
(daughter) – It was categorically stated therein that the suit
schedule property belonged to defendant No.1/father and he
was in possession and enjoyment of the same with full rights –
The contents of the document would clearly reveal that there is
consideration, conveyance, imposition of conditions and reservation
of life interest by the executant, defendant No.1/father satisfying
the requirements to classify the document as a “settlement” – The
conditions to construct a house, to reside in the house, retention
of life interest, the right of mortgage up to a sum of Rs.2,000/- and
avail loan on that basis, cannot alter the gift, by which in unequivocal
terms, the property stood vested in the plaintiff by earlier part – The
condition, creating a life interest in favour of father and mother
and the restriction regarding mortgage, would further imply that
defendant No.1 had ceased to be the absolute owner – Defendant
No.1 has also enabled the plaintiff to construct the house from then
on and no outer time has been fixed for the construction of the
house – Since the life interest was reserved in favour of defendant
No.1 and his wife, defendant No.1 was only holding an ostensible
possession and ownership as contemplated u/s.41, while the true
owner being the plaintiff, after the clear conveyance by earlier
clause – In the instant case, the clear and unambiguous language
employed in the first part of Ext.A1 document dated 26.06.1985,
reveals a clear disposition by defendant No.1/father to the plaintiff,
by only retaining a life interest in the second part – Therefore,
the instrument of 1985 is a gift by settlement – Now, as far as
question that whether the gift was accepted and acted upon is
concerned, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff has registered the
instrument – Such registration by the plaintiff is possible only if the
document was handed over by defendant No.1 – The factum of
acceptance can be derived from the conduct of the parties – The
plaintiff, when the suit was filed, was in possession of the original
title deed – Even assuming that the original deed was returned
after registration, the fact that it was already acted upon, cannot
be altered – Once a gift has been acted upon, the same cannot be
unilaterally cancelled – The receipt of the original document by the
plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance
of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section
122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Once the document is
categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation
to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same – The
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 959

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a
court of law – Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document
is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993
executed by defendant No.1/father also, is invalid – Furthermore,
the recitals in the document apparently demonstrate and satisfy
the requirement to classify the document as a “settlement” – The
Judgment of the High Court is confirmed. [Paras 15.1, 16, 18, 21]

Gift – Settlement – Interplay between Gift and Settlement:
Held: The primary difference between the Gift and the Settlement
is the existence of consideration in the settlement – Consideration
is nothing but the quid pro quo, that each party to a contract is to
perform or render a part of their obligation under the contract – In
view of the fact that a gift is a voluntary disposition, it is essentially
not an agreement and hence, the element of consideration is taken
away from it – Settlement on the other hand is always coupled with
consideration as it is mostly executed in favour of a family member –
The gift or settlement of an immovable property has to be registered
as per Section 17 of the Registration Act – The conditions regarding
acceptance, reservation of life interest and restriction on revocation
are applicable to both “gift and settlement” – The vesting of the
right also takes place in praesenti in both the cases – Therefore,
there is an element of gift in every settlement. [Para 11.3]

Gift – Will – Interplay between Gift and Will:
Held: A Will is the declaration of the intention of the testator to give
away his property – Such will comes into force after the death of
the testator – The most important requirement for a valid will is that
it must again be a voluntary disposition in sound mind, which must
be explicit from the instrument itself – Therefore, it can be concluded
that every will also has an element of gift, with the difference being
the disposition deferred until the death of the testator – Insofar as
the revocation is concerned, the testator is at liberty to revoke or
alter the will any number of times until his demise, but it is essential
that he remains of sound mind while doing so. [Para 11.4]

Gift – Will – Settlement – Interplay between Gift, Will and
Settlement:
Held: The element of voluntary disposition is common to all the
three deeds – The element of gift is traceable to both “settlement”
and “will” – As settled in law, the nomenclature of an instrument
960 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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is immaterial and the nature of the document is to be derived
from its contents – While so, a voluntary disposition can transfer
the interest in praesenti and in future, in the same document – In
such a case, the document would have the elements of both the
settlement and will – Such document, then has to be registered and
by operation of the doctrine of severability, becomes a composite
document and has to be treated as both, a settlement and will
and the respective rights will flow with regard to each disposition
from the same document – It is pertinent to mention here that the
reservation of life interest or any condition in the instrument, even
if it postpones the physical delivery of possession to the donee/
settlee, cannot be treated as a will, as the property had already
been vested with the donee/settlee. [Para 11.5]

Case Law Cited
Ramachandra Reddy (dead) through LRs and Others v. Ramulu
Ammal through LRs [2024] 11 SCR 2329 : 2024 SCC Online SC
3304; K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam [2003] Supp. 6 SCR 1097 :
(2004) 1 SCC 581 : 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1428; Renikuntla
Rajamma v. K. Sarwanamma [2014] 8 SCR 890 : (2014) 9 SCC
445 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 1 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 565; Daulat
Singh v. State of Rajasthan [2020] 11 SCR 845 : (2021) 3 SCC
459 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 197 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1004; Satya
Pal Anand v. State of M.P. [2016] 12 SCR 26 : (2016) 10 SCC 767 :
(2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 1 : 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1202; Navneet Lal
@ Rangi v. Gokul and Others [1976] 2 SCR 924 : (1976) 1 SCC
630; P.K.Mohan Ram v. B.N. Ananthachary and Others [2010] 3
SCR 401 : (2010) 4 SCC 161; Mathai Samuel v. Eapen Eapen
[2012] 10 SCR 1098 : (2012) 13 SCC 80; Mauleshwar Mani v.
Jagdish Prasad [2002] 1 SCR 423 : (2002) 2 SCC 468 : 2002
SCC OnLine SC 113; Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya
Kantham [2010] 12 SCR 808 : (2010) 13 SCC 147 : (2010) 4
SCC (Civ) 812 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1198; Madhuri Ghosh v.
Debobroto Dutta (2016) 10 SCC 805 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 208 :
2016 SCC OnLine SC 1271 at page 809; Bharat Sher Singh
Kalsia v. State of Bihar [2024] 1 SCR 1165 : (2024) 4 SCC 318 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 87 at page 327; Naramadaben Maganlal
Thakker v. Pranjivandas Maganlal Thakker & Ors [1996] Supp.
4 SCR 780 : (1997) 2 SCC 255; Khursida Begum (D) by Lrs v.
Mohammad Farooq (D) by Lrs [2016] 1 SCR 484 : C.A. No. 2845-
2845/2006; Sarojini Amma v. Velayudha Pillai Sreekumar [2018]
13 SCR 554 : C.A. No 10785/2018 – relied on.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 961

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

Baby Ammal v. Rajan Asari [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 418 : (1997)
2 SCC 636; Reninkuntala Rajamma (Dead) v. K.Sarwanamma
[2014] 8 SCR 890 : (2014) 9 SCC 445; K. Balakrishnan v. K.
Kamalam and Others [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 1097 : (2004) 1 SCC
581; Sawarni v. Inder Kaur [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 165 : (1996) 6
SCC 223; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar [2023] 14 SCR
796 : Civil Appeal No. 7210 of 2011; Arunkumar & Another v.
Shriniwas & Another [2003] 3 SCR 453 : AIR 2003 SC 2528;
Bajrang Factory Ltd. & Another v. University of Calcutta & Others
[2007] 7 SCR 363 : Civil Appeal No. 3374/2006 – referred to.
Ramaswami Naidu and Another v. Gopalakrishna Naidu and Others,
AIR 1978 Madras 54 – referred to.

List of Acts
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Kerala
Stamp Act, 1959; Registration Act, 1909; Specific Relief Act, 1963;
Indian Succession Act, 1925.

List of Keywords
Gift; Will; Settlement; Interplay between Gift, Will and Settlement;
Interplay between Gift and Will; Interplay between Gift and
Settlement; Settlement deed; Cancellation of deed; Absolute owner;
Testamentary document; Creation of life interest; Registration of
gift; Possession of document; Element of voluntary disposition;
Delivery of possession; Transfer of interest in praesenti; Gift by
settlement.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4312
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2019 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in RSA No. 1338 of 2004

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
V. Chitambaresh, Sr. Adv., Karthik S.D., C. Govind Venugopal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
P.V. Dinesh, Sr. Adv., Zulfiker Ali P. S, Ms. Anna Oommen.
962 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed against the final judgment and decree
dated 10.06.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam1
in R.S.A. No.1338 of 2004, whereby the High Court allowed the said
Regular Second Appeal and set aside the concurrent findings of the
Courts below, besides granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff
/ Respondent No.1 declaring her right, title and interest over the
suit schedule property by virtue of Ext.A1 settlement deed dated
26.06.1985. The High Court also declared that cancellation deed (Ext.
A2) dated 19.10.1993 and sale deed (Ext.A3) dated 19.10.1993 both
executed by Defendant No.1 would not bind the plaintiff as far as her
right, title and interest over the suit schedule property is concerned.
3. The Respondent No.1 was the plaintiff (daughter) in O.S.No.27 of
1994 filed before the Sub Court, Cherthala2 and the appellant was
Defendant No.2 (son) in the said suit. Alleging that the suit schedule
property was gifted by her father, who was Defendant No.1 in the
suit, vide registered deed dated 26.06.1985, the Respondent No.1/
plaintiff filed the said suit for declaration of right, title and interest
over the suit schedule property and also for a declaration that the
cancellation deed and sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by
the Defendant No.1 / father in favour of the appellant / Defendant
No.2 are null and void and for consequential injunction. During the
pendency of the suit, the Defendant No.1 / father died on 06.01.1995
and his legal heirs viz., Respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein were
impleaded as Defendant Nos.3 and 4 therein. The trial Court, after
due contest by the parties, accepted the defence put forth by the
appellant / Defendant No.2 that the deed executed in 1985 was
only a Will and not a gift, and dismissed the suit by judgment dated
28.05.2001. Challenging the same, the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 963

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

preferred an appeal being A.S.No.109 of 2001 before the Additional
District Court, Fast Track Court No.II, Alappuzha3. The First Appellate
Court vide judgment dated 20.12.2003, affirmed the findings of the
trial Court and dismissed the appeal suit. Aggrieved by the same,
the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff preferred a Regular Second Appeal
being R.S.A. No. 1338 of 2004 before the High Court. By judgment
dated 10.06.2019, the High Court upset the concurrent findings of
the Courts below and granted a declaratory decree in favour of the
Respondent No.1 / plaintiff, by construing the document of 1985 as
a gift deed. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by the High Court,
the appellant / Defendant No.2 is before us with the present appeal.
4. During the pendency of this appeal, the Respondent No.2 died and
her legal heirs were brought on record. Taking note of the same, the
name of Respondent No.2 was deleted from the array of parties, vide
order dated 24.11.2023 and cause title was accordingly, amended.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the document
executed by the Defendant No.1 / father in 1985 was only a Will
and not a gift deed, since there was no immediate transfer of
ownership; possession of the suit schedule property was retained
by the Defendant No.1 / father and was never handed over to the
Respondent No.1 / plaintiff (daughter).
5.1. Adding further, it is submitted that the main test to find out
whether the document constitutes a Will or a gift is to see
whether the disposition of interest in the property is in praesenti
in favour of the settlee or whether the disposition is to take
effect on the death of the executant. If the disposition is to
take effect on the death of the executant, it would be a Will.
But, if the executant divests his interest in the property and
vests his interest in praesenti on the settlee, the document
will be a settlement [Refer: Ramaswami Naidu and another v.
Gopalakrishna Naidu and others4 as confirmed by this Court in
P.K.Mohan Ram v. B.N. Ananthachary and Others5]. In the instant
case, the Defendant No.1 / father never intended to transfer
the ownership of the suit schedule property while executing the

3 Hereinafter referred to as “the First Appellate Court”
4 AIR 1978 Madras 54
5 (2010) 4 SCC 161
964 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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document of 1985 and hence, the same can only be construed
as a Will and not a gift deed as claimed by the Respondent
No.1 / plaintiff and thus, he had the right to revoke his will and
consequently, convey the suit schedule property in favour of
the appellant / Defendant No.2 by way of a sale deed without
any impediment.
5.2. According to the learned counsel, it is borne out by the evidence
that the Defendant No.1 / father had sent a legal notice to the
Respondent No.1 / plaintiff (daughter) demanding / calling her
to return the Will executed on 26.06.1985, which clearly shows
that the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff (daughter) was holding the
Will against the wishes of the testator i.e., Defendant No.1/
father. Even assuming that the document in question was a
gift deed, the same was never accepted by the Respondent
No.1/ plaintiff during the lifetime of the Defendant No.1/ father
and therefore, the gift was not acted upon.
5.3. Referring to the decision of this Court in Baby Ammal v. Rajan
Asari6, it is submitted that going by the recitals in the document
of 1985, the Defendant No.1 / father had retained the title to
the enjoyment of the property during his lifetime as full owner
with all rights. That apart, the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff failed
to prove that she had accepted the alleged gift. On the other
hand, the appellant / Defendant No.2 took possession of the
suit schedule property, effected mutation and paid necessary
taxes, pursuant to the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed in
his favour and that he has been in possession and enjoyment
of the same since then. Taking note of all these factors, the trial
Court and the First Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the
suit filed by the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff. However, the High
Court set aside the concurrent judgments of the Courts below
and granted the declaratory decree in favour of the plaintiff,
by the judgment impugned herein, which has to be set aside,
as the same is contrary to law, facts of the case and evidence
on record.
6. To begin with, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff
submitted that there is no substantial question of law involved

6 (1997) 2 SCC 636
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 965

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

in this case. According to the learned counsel, the suit schedule
property belongs to the Respondent No.1 as per the gift deed dated
26.06.1985 bearing Document No.3148 of 1985 executed by
Defendant No.1 / father. It was stated in the said gift deed that the
right to take income was reserved in favour of the settlor (father)
and also during the lifetime of mother of Respondent No.1; and
that the settlor was having the right to mortgage the property upto
a sum of Rs.2,000/-, but possession of the property was transferred
to Respondent No.1. However, claiming that he continued to be
the owner of the property, Defendant No.1 / father on 19.10.1993,
executed a cancellation deed of the gift deed vide Document
No.4233 of 1993 as well as a sale deed bearing Document No.4234
of 1993 in favour of the appellant / Defendant No.2. The suit filed
by the Respondent No.1/ plaintiff came to be dismissed by the trial
Court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court. Yet, the High Court
correctly set aside the judgments of the Courts below and granted
the declaratory reliefs in favour of the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff.
6.1. Elaborating further, the learned counsel submitted that the
ownership of the existing property has been transferred
voluntarily to Respondent No.1 (donee) without any
consideration and the same was also accepted by Respondent
No.1 during the lifetime of Defendant No.1 by presenting the
deed for registration, vide Document No.3148 of 1985, on
the file of SRO, Cherthala and hence, all the requirements in
accordance with section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act
have been satisfied.
6.2. The learned counsel also submitted that the tone and tenor of
the document will clearly show that it was a gift deed, as the
recitals of the deed indicate that only limited rights were reserved
to the settlor i.e., right to take income during the lifetime of the
father and mother of Respondent No.1 and a provision, which
enabled the settlor to mortgage the property upto a sum of
Rs.2,000/-. Apart from the said two conditions, there was no
restriction placed on the absolute ownership and enjoyment
of the property by Respondent No.1. Therefore, upon valid
execution of the gift deed, the same was also duly presented
by the Respondent No.1 for registration, which itself amounts
to acceptance of gift.
966 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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6.3. Referring to the decision of this Court in Reninkuntala Rajamma
(Dead) v. K.Sarwanamma7, the learned counsel submitted that
transfer of possession of property is not necessary for the
acceptance of a valid gift deed.
6.4. The learned counsel further submitted that Ext.A1 deed
was accepted in 1985 and the same was acted upon by the
Respondent No.1. After the period of 7 years, the Defendant
No.1 / father executed a cancellation deed of the said gift deed
and a sale deed in respect of the subject property, without
any notice to the Respondent No.1. According to the learned
counsel, Ext.A1 is a gift deed and it cannot be unilaterally
revoked as per section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. In
this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this court
in K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam and others8.
6.5. It is also submitted that the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 (Defendant
Nos.3 and 4 in the suit) supported the case of the Respondent
No.1 and they stated in their written statement that the
Defendant No.1 never had any right to cancel the document
and the appellant / Defendant No.2 had no right over the suit
schedule property.
6.6. Regarding the appellant’s contention that after execution of the
sale deed, revenue record was mutated and he has been in
possession of the suit property since then, the learned counsel
submitted that mutation of the property in the revenue record
does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive
value on title, and it only enables the person in whose favour
mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. In this
regard, reference was made to the decision of this Court in
Sawarni v. Inder Kaur9 and P.Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar10.
Therefore, such contention of the appellant is incorrect and
deserves to the rejected by this court.
6.7. Pointing out the above submissions, the learned counsel prayed
for dismissal of this appeal filed by the appellant / Defendant No.2.

7 (2014) 9 SCC 445
8 (2004) 1 SCC 581
9 (1996) 6 SCC 223
10 Civil Appeal No. 7210 of 2011
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 967

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel and perused the materials available on record, more
particularly, Ext.A1 dated 26.06.1985.
8. Primarily, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1 has contended
that there is no substantial question of law to entertain this appeal.
We do not agree with the same because the right to appeal under
Section 100 or 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 133
of the Constitution of India can basically be on the same premise of
existence of a substantial question of law and if the question raised
before us is not substantial, the High Court could not have interfered
with the concurrent findings without substantial question of law.
A substantial question of law is always of general importance. That
apart, we are invigorated with the authority under Article 142 of the
Constitution to do complete justice, though bridled with a responsibility
to be exercised in appropriate cases. Hence, we proceed to decide
the question of law raised in the facts of the present case.
9. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. Seemingly,
the father of the appellant originally executed a document in 1985
titled as “Dhananischayaadharam” in respect of the suit schedule
property, in favour of Respondent No.1 (daughter). Subsequently,
he cancelled the said document and executed a sale deed for
valid consideration on 19.10.1993 in favour of the appellant (son).
Claiming that the document of 1985 was a gift deed, Respondent
No.1 instituted a suit for declaration and consequential injunction.
Pending the suit, Defendant No.1/ father died on 06.01.1995; and
the suit was dismissed by the trial Court as affirmed by the First
Appellate Court by construing the document of 1985 as Will. But the
High Court set aside the concurrent judgments of the Courts below
and granted the declaratory reliefs to Respondent No.1, interpreting
the said document as settlement. Therefore, this appeal came to be
filed by the appellant before us.
10. The question to be decided herein is twin fold, whether the document
of the year 1985 is a gift or Settlement or Will? and whether the
requirements under law or conditions in the deed have been satisfied
to vest a legal right?
11. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to analyze the nature, scope
and provisions dealing with the above document in brief. Section
122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines “Gift”. Article 33
968 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Article 31 of the Kerala Stamp
Act, 1959, defines “Gift” as an instrument of, not being settlement,
will or transfer. Therefore, a valid Gift, as defined would refer to an
instrument by which there is voluntary disposition of one’s existing
property either movable or immovable, without consideration to
another, the acceptance of which should be made during the lifetime
of the donor, implying imminent vesting of the right upon acceptance.
Section 123 states, how a gift is to be made. It has two parts.
The earlier part deals with immovable property and the later, with
movable property. Insofar as an immovable property is concerned,
registration is mandatory, which is in tune with Section 17 of the
Registration Act. Whereas, it is not only mandatory to register a gift
of a movable property, it also can be effected by delivery. Section
126 states, as to when a gift can be suspended or revoked. This
section bars unilateral revocation. Section 127 enables the donor
to impose any condition in the deed, which has to be accepted for
the gift to take effect or in other words, the donee without accepting
the obligation, cannot be said to have accepted the gift. Section 128
deals with the liability of the donee for the debts of the donor to the
extent of the property comprised therein. A conspicuous reading of
the provisions would disclose that for a gift of an immovable property
to be valid, it has to be registered, universal cancellation of the gift
is impermissible and delivery of possession is not a condition sine
qua non to validate the gift.
11.1. Insofar as a settlement deed is concerned, Section 2(b) of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963, defines the same to be a non-
testamentary instrument whereby, there is a disposition or an
agreement to dispose of any movable or immovable property to
a destination or devolution of successive interest. “Settlement”
under the Indian Stamp Act and the Kerala Stamp Act under
Section 2(q) refers to a non-testamentary disposition of any
movable or immovable property in writing, in consideration
of marriage or for the purpose of distributing the property of
the settlor among his family or to those to whom he desires
to provide or for the purpose of providing for some person
dependent on him or for any religious or charitable purpose and
includes an agreement in writing to make such a disposition.
However, insofar as immovable properties, the registration is
mandatory under Section 17 of the Registration Act. From the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 969

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

above definitions, it can be discerned that a settlement would
mean a disposition of one’s property to another directly or to
vest in any such person after successive devolution of rights
on other(s). Further, the circumstances and reasons that led to
the execution of such a settlement deed are described as its
consideration, which need not necessarily be of any monetary
value. More often than not, it consists of love, care, affection,
duty, moral obligation, or satisfaction, as such deed are typically
executed in favour of a family member. Also, a settlor is entitled
to reserve a life interest either upon himself or upon others
and impose any condition. The person in whose favour, a life
interest is created, is permitted to use and enjoy the income
arising out of such property during his life time, but has no
right of alienation as the property had already vested in the
settlee. The breach of any condition in the settlement, would
then render the settlement void. However, there are restrictions
under the Transfer of Property Act,1882 on the conditions
that can be imposed. Section 11 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 states that when by virtue of a transfer, absolute
right and interest has been vested in a party, any condition
restricting or directing that the property must be enjoyed in
a particular manner would be void as it is repugnant to the
original grant. Similarly, any condition restraining or limiting
the transferee from enjoying the property is also void to that
extent. Though under both the situations, the conditions are
void, the interest vested already can be enjoyed absolutely
as per the will of the transferee.
11.2. Will is a testamentary document dealt under the Indian
Succession Act, 1925. Part VI of the Act deals with the
Testamentary Succession. We will consider only the relevant
provisions applicable to this case. Will is defined under
Section 2(h) as a legal declaration of the intention of the
testator to be given effect after his death. Such declaration
is with respect to his property and must be certain. As per
Section 59, every person of sound mind, not being a minor,
may dispose of his property by executing a Will. Section 61
states the circumstances under which a Will is void. Section
62 enables a person to revoke or alter a Will at any time
while he is competent to dispose of his property by will.
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Needless to say, since the Will comes into effect only after
his life time, he is at full liberty to revoke or alter his earlier
Will any number of times as long as he is in sound state of
mind and not hit by the circumstances enumerated under
Section 62. Section 63 deals with execution of the Will. As
per this section, a Will must be signed by the testator or
have his mark affixed by him, or by any other person in his
presence and under his direction. It must also be attested
by at least two witnesses in the presence of the testator,
either by actually witnessing the execution of the Will by the
testator or by receiving an acknowledgment from the testator
that he or a person authorized by him has signed or affixed
his mark. It is not necessary for the witnesses to attest at
the same time. Section 70 speaks about the revocation of
unprivileged will which can be revoked by marriage or by
execution of another will or codicil or by writing in some other
instrument clearly expressing his intention to revoke the will
or by destroying the will by burning or tearing or in some
other form by the testator or by his authorised person in his
presence with the intention to revoke the same. Chapter VI
of Part VI deals with construction of wills. The provisions
consider the various rules regarding the construction of wills
to determine the true intention of the testator and to ensure
that object of such testament is achieved. The rules prescribe
the remedy to deal with certain errors and circumstances like
misdescription, misnomer and the need for causes omisus.
They also lay down that the meaning is to be discerned from
the contents of the entire will and every attempt must be made
to give effect to every clause. Section 89 states that the later
clause will prevail in case of the two conflicting clauses of
gifts in the will, if they are irreconcilable.

Interplay between Gift and Settlement
11.3. As we have already seen, the primary difference between
the Gift and the Settlement is the existence of consideration
in the settlement. Consideration is nothing but the quid pro
quo, that each party to a contract is to perform or render a
part of their obligation under the contract. In view of the fact
that a gift is a voluntary disposition, it is essentially not an
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 971

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

agreement and hence, the element of consideration is taken
away from it. Settlement on the other hand is always coupled
with consideration as it is mostly executed in favour of a family
member. The gift or settlement of an immovable property
has to be registered as per Section 17 of the Registration
Act. The conditions regarding acceptance, reservation of life
interest and restriction on revocation are applicable to both
“gift and settlement”. The vesting of the right also takes place
in praesenti in both the cases. Therefore, there is an element
of gift in every settlement. At this juncture, it will be useful to
refer to the recent judgment of this court in Ramachandra
Reddy (dead) through LRs and others v. Ramulu Ammal
through LRs11, in determining, what a “consideration” is or
can be, qua a “settlement deed” in the following paragraphs:
“15. Since the point which the High Court in its wisdom
found to be the determining factor qua the nature
of the deed is the element of consideration and its
adequateness, let us consider the same.
15.1 It shall be useful to refer to certain provisions
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The relevant part
of the interpretation clause thereof says -
“2…
(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the
promisee or any other person has done or
abstained from doing, or does or abstains from
doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing,
something, such act or abstinence or promise
is called a consideration for the promise;
(e) Every promise and every set of promises,
forming the consideration for each other, is an
agreement;
(f) Promises which form the consideration or part
of the consideration for each other are called
reciprocal promises;…”

11 2024 SCC Online SC 3304
972 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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15.2 The discussion regarding the meaning of the
word ‘consideration’ made in CITv. Ahmedabad
Urban Development Authority,5 is relevant for our
purposes here:
“165. The term “consideration” however is broader.
The plain meaning is a monetary payment, for
something obtained, in the form of goods, or services.
In CCE v. Fiat India (P) Ltd. [CCE v. Fiat India (P)
Ltd., (2012) 9 SCC 332 : (2012) 12 SCR 975] this
Court explained the meaning of that term : (SCC pp.
360-61, paras 68-73)
“68. … Consideration means something which
is of value in the eye of the law, moving from
the plaintiff, either of benefit to the plaintiff or
of detriment to the defendant. In other words, it
may consist either in some right, interest, profit
or benefit accruing to the one party, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility,
given, suffered or undertaken by the other, as
observed in Currie v. Misa [Currie v. Misa, [L.R.]
10 Exch. 153].
69. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(unabridged) defines, “consideration” thus:
‘Something that is legally regarded as the
equivalent or return given or suffered by
one for the act or promise of another.’
70. In Vol. 17 of Corpus Juris Secundum (pp.
420-21 and 425) the import of “consideration”
has been described thus:
‘Various definitions of the meaning of
“consideration” are to be found in the
textbooks and judicial opinions. A sufficient
one, as stated in Corpus Juris and which
has been quoted and cited with approval
is “a benefit to the party promising or a
loss or detriment to the party to whom the
promise is made….”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 973

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

At common law every contract not under
seal requires a consideration to support it,
that is, as shown in the definition above,
some benefit to the promisor, or some
detriment to the promisee.’
71. In Salmond on Jurisprudence, the word
“consideration” has been explained in the
following words:
‘A consideration in its widest sense is
the reason, motive or inducement, by
which a man is moved to bind himself
by an agreement. It is for nothing that he
consents to impose an obligation upon
himself, or to abandon or transfer a right.
It is in consideration of such and such a
fact that he agrees to bear new burdens
or to forego the benefits which the law
already allows him.’
xxxxxxxxx
73. From a conspectus of decisions and
dictionary meaning, the inescapable conclusion
that follows is that “consideration” means a
reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit
passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by
the transferor to the transferee. Similarly, when
the word “consideration” is qualified by the word
“sole”, it makes consideration stronger so as to
make it sufficient and valuable having regard
to the facts, circumstances and necessities of
the case.”
(Emphasis supplied)

15.3 Chidambara Iyer v. P.S. Renga Iyer which
cites similar authorities is also important for our
consideration.
15.4 What flows from the above-cited judgments as
also provisions of law, is that ‘consideration’ need
974 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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not always be in monetary terms. It can be in other
forms as well. In the present case, it is seen that the
transfer of property in favour of Govindammal was
in recognition of the fact that she had been taking
care of the transferors and would continue to do so
while also using the same to carry out charitable
work. Although the deed stands reproduced supra,
for immediate recollection the relevant extract is once
again reproduced hereinbelow:
“…execute this Settlement deed that you are
the only daughter of Bagi Reddi and that we do
not have any wife or children or legal heirs and
you happened to be the daughter of our elder
brother Chenga Reddi and that since we do not
have any wife or children and you happened
to have looked after us very well till now and
that herein after you will look after our food and
shelter needs and in the belief that you would
do all the charitable work.”
15.5 In that view of the matter, the High Court has erred
in taking such a constricted view of ‘consideration’,
especially taking note of the fact that this settlement
was between the members of a family.”
Further, in both the cases, unilateral revocation is not permitted as
evident from Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. There
can be a clause permitting such revocation in the deed. Similarly,
the creation of a life interest would not affect the grant and change
the character of the document. Similarly, the delivery of possession
is not mandatory as in both cases. In case of a gift or settlement, it
is sufficient if the donee/settlee had accepted the same during the
life time of the executor of the document and such acceptance can
be either express or implied, but must be visible from the conduct
of the parties. Putting the donee/settlee into possession or handing
over the document to the recipient can also be recognised as
valid acceptance. The registration of the gift by the donee and the
possession of such document will also amount to valid acceptance.
At this point it will be useful to refer to the following judgements of
this court:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 975

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

(i) K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam12
“10. We have critically examined the contents of the
gift deed. To us, it appears that the donor had very
clearly transferred to the donees ownership and title in
respect of her 1/8th share in properties. It was open to
the donor to transfer by gift title and ownership in the
property and at the same time reserve its possession
and enjoyment to herself during her lifetime. There
is no prohibition in law that ownership in a property
cannot be gifted without its possession and right of
enjoyment. Under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property
Act “property of any kind may be transferred” except
those mentioned in clauses (a) to (i). Section 6 in
relevant part reads thus:
“6. What may be transferred.—Property of any kind
may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by
this Act or by any other law for the time being in force.
(a) ***
(b) A mere right to re-entry for breach of a
condition subsequent cannot be transferred
to anyone except the owner of the property
affected thereby.
(c) ***
(d) An interest in property restricted in its
enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be
transferred by him.
(e) A mere right to sue cannot be transferred.”
11. Clause (d) of Section 6 is not attracted on the
terms of the gift deed herein because it was not
a property, the enjoyment of which was restricted
to the owner personally. She was absolute owner
of the property gifted and it was not restricted in
its enjoyment to herself. She had inherited it from
her maternal father as a full owner. The High Court

12 (2004) 1 SCC 581 : 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1428
976 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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was, therefore, apparently wrong in coming to the
conclusion that the gift deed was ineffectual merely
because the donor had reserved to herself the
possession and enjoyment of the property gifted.
……
31. In our considered opinion, therefore, the trial
court and the High Court were wrong in coming to
the conclusion that there was no valid acceptance of
the gift by the minor donee. Consequently, conclusion
has to follow that the gift having been duly accepted
in law and thus being complete, it was irrevocable
under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Section 126 prohibits revocation of a validly executed
gift except in circumstances mentioned therein. The
gift was executed in 1945. It remained in force for
about 25 years during which time the donee had
attained majority and had not repudiated the same.
It was, therefore, not competent for the donor to have
cancelled the gift and executed a Will in relation to
the property.”

(ii) Renikuntla Rajamma v. K. Sarwanamma13
“9. Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
deals with gifts generally and, inter alia, provides
for the mode of making gifts. Section 122 of the Act
defines “gift” as a transfer of certain existing movable
or immovable property made voluntarily and without
consideration by one person called the donor to
another called the donee and accepted by or on
behalf of the donee. In order to constitute a valid
gift, acceptance must, according to this provision,
be made during the lifetime of the donor and while
he is still capable of giving. It stipulates that a gift is
void if the donee dies before acceptance.
10. Section 123 regulates the mode of making a
gift and, inter alia, provides that a gift of immovable

13 (2014) 9 SCC 445 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 1 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 565
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 977

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

property must be effected by a registered instrument
signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at
least two witnesses. In the case of movable property,
transfer either by a registered instrument signed as
aforesaid or by delivery is valid under Section 123.
Section 123 may at this stage be gainfully extracted:
“123. Transfer how effected.—For the purpose of
making a gift of immovable property, the transfer
must be effected by a registered instrument signed
by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least
two witnesses.
For the purpose of making a gift of movable property,
the transfer may be effected either by a registered
instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery.
Such delivery may be made in the same way as
goods sold may be delivered.”
11. Sections 124 to 129 which are the remaining
provisions that comprise Chapter VII deal with matters
like gift of existing and future property, gift made
to several persons of whom one does not accept,
suspension and revocation of a gift, and onerous gifts
including effect of non-acceptance by the donee of any
obligation arising thereunder. These provisions do not
concern us for the present. All that is important for the
disposal of the case at hand is a careful reading of
Section 123 (supra) which leaves no manner of doubt
that a gift of immovable property can be made by a
registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the
donor and attested by at least two witnesses. When
read with Section 122 of the Act, a gift made by a
registered instrument duly signed by or on behalf of
the donor and attested by at least two witnesses is
valid, if the same is accepted by or on behalf of the
donee. That such acceptance must be given during
the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable
of giving is evident from a plain reading of Section
122 of the Act. A conjoint reading of Sections 122
and 123 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that
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“transfer of possession” of the property covered by
the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by
the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua
non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
12. Judicial pronouncements as to the true and correct
interpretation of Section 123 of the TP Act have for
a fairly long period held that Section 123 of the Act
supersedes the rule of Hindu law if there was any
making delivery of possession an essential condition
for the completion of a valid gift.
………
16. The matter can be viewed from yet another
angle. Section 123 of the TP Act is in two parts.
The first part deals with gifts of immovable property
while the second part deals with gifts of movable
property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property
are concerned, Section 123 makes transfer by a
registered instrument mandatory. This is evident
from the use of word “transfer must be effected”
used by Parliament insofar as immovable property
is concerned. In contradiction to that requirement
the second part of Section 123 dealing with gifts of
movable property, simply requires that gift of movable
property may be effected either by a registered
instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The
difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that
insofar as the transfer of movable property by way
of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a
registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in
the case of immovable property no doubt requires a
registered instrument but the provision does not make
delivery of possession of the immovable property
gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be
valid and effective. If the intention of the legislature
was to make delivery of possession of the property
gifted also as a condition precedent for a valid gift,
the provision could and indeed would have specifically
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 979

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

said so. Absence of any such requirement can only
lead us to the conclusion that delivery of possession
is not an essential prerequisite for the making of a
valid gift in the case of immovable property.
……
18. We are in respectful agreement with the statement
of law contained in the above passage in K.
Balakrishnan case [(2004) 1 SCC 581] . There is
indeed no provision in law that ownership in property
cannot be gifted without transfer of possession of
such property. As noticed earlier, Section 123 does
not make the delivery of possession of the gifted
property essential for validity of a gift. It is true that
the attention of this Court does not appear to have
been drawn to the earlier decision rendered in
Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker [(1997) 2 SCC 255]
where this Court had on a reading of the recital of the
gift deed and the cancellation deed held that the gift
was not complete. This Court had in that case found
that the donee had not accepted the gift thereby
making the gift incomplete. This Court further held
that the donor cancelled the gift within a month of the
gift and subsequently executed a will in favour of the
appellant: on a proper construction of the deed and
the deed cancelling the same this Court held that the
gift in favour of the donee was conditional and that
there was no acceptance of the same by the donee.
The gift deed conferred a limited right upon the donee
and was to become operative after the death of the
donee. This is evident from the following passage from
the said judgment: (Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker
case[(1997) 2 SCC 255] , SCC p. 258, para 7)
“7. It would thus be clear that the execution of a
registered gift deed, acceptance of the gift and
delivery of the property, together make the gift
complete. Thereafter, the donor is divested of his
title and the donee becomes the absolute owner
of the property. The question is whether the gift in
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question had become complete under Section 123
of the TP Act? It is seen from the recitals of the gift
deed that Motilal Gopalji gifted the property to the
respondent. In other words, it was a conditional gift.
There is no recital of acceptance nor is there any
evidence in proof of acceptance. Similarly, he had
specifically stated that the property would remain
in his possession till he was alive. Thereafter, the
gifted property would become his property and he
was entitled to collect mesne profits in respect of
the existing rooms throughout his life. The gift deed
conferred only limited right upon the respondent
donee. The gift was to become operative after the
death of the donor and he was to be entitled to have
the right to transfer the property absolutely by way of
gift or he would be entitled to collect the mesne profits.
It would thus be seen that the donor had executed
a conditional gift deed and retained the possession
and enjoyment of the property during his lifetime.”
……
20. In the case at hand as already noticed by us, the
execution of registered gift deed and its attestation
by two witnesses is not in dispute. It has also been
concurrently held by all the three courts below that the
donee had accepted the gift. The recitals in the gift deed
also prove transfer of absolute title in the gifted property
from the donor to the donee. What is retained is only
the right to use the property during the lifetime of the
donor which does not in any way affect the transfer of
ownership in favour of the donee by the donor.”

(iii) Daulat Singh v. State of Rajasthan14
“24. At the outset, it ought to be noted that Section 122
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 neither defines
acceptance, nor does it prescribe any particular mode
for accepting the gift. The word “acceptance” is defined

14 (2021) 3 SCC 459 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 197 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1004
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 981

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

as “is the receipt of a thing offered by another with
an intention to retain it, as acceptance of a gift”. (See
Ramanatha P. Aiyar: The Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn., p. 19.)
25. The aforesaid fact can be ascertained from
the surrounding circumstances such as taking into
possession the property by the donee or by being in the
possession of the gift deed itself. The only requirement
stipulated here is that, the acceptance of the gift must
be effectuated within the lifetime of the donor itself.
26. Hence, being an act of receiving willingly,
acceptance can be inferred by the implied conduct of
the donee. The aforesaid position has been reiterated
by this Court in Asokan v. Lakshmikutty [Asokan v.
Lakshmikutty, (2007) 13 SCC 210] : (SCC pp. 215-
16, para 14)
“14. Gifts do not contemplate payment of any
consideration or compensation. It is, however, beyond
any doubt or dispute that in order to constitute a valid
gift acceptance thereof is essential. We must, however,
notice that the Transfer of Property Act does not
prescribe any particular mode of acceptance. It is the
circumstances attending to the transaction which may
be relevant for determining the question. There may
be various means to prove acceptance of a gift. The
document may be handed over to a donee, which in a
given situation may also amount to a valid acceptance.
The fact that possession had been given to the donee
also raises a presumption of acceptance.”
(emphasis supplied)”

(iv) In Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P.15, this court after considering
the scope of the Registration Act, held that even if fraud is
pleaded or claimed, the authorities under the Registration Act
cannot unilaterally cancel the document and the parties should
only approach the jurisdictional Civil Court, in the following words:

15 (2016) 10 SCC 767 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 1 : 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1202
982 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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“36. If the document is required to be compulsorily
registered, but while doing so some irregularity
creeps in, that, by itself, cannot result in a fraudulent
action of the State Authority. Non-presence of the
other party to the extinguishment deed presented
by the Society before the Registering Officer by no
standard can be said to be a fraudulent action per se.
The fact whether that was done deceitfully to cause
loss and harm to the other party to the deed, is a
question of fact which must be pleaded and proved
by the party making such allegation. That fact cannot
be presumed. Suffice it to observe that since the
provisions in the 1908 Act enables the Registering
Officer to register the documents presented for
registration by one party and execution thereof to
be admitted or denied by the other party thereafter,
it is unfathomable as to how the registration of
the document by following procedure specified
in the 1908 Act can be said to be fraudulent. As
aforementioned, some irregularity in the procedure
committed during the registration process would
not lead to a fraudulent execution and registration
of the document, but a case of mere irregularity. In
either case, the party aggrieved by such registration
of document is free to challenge its validity before
the civil court.”

Interplay between Gift and Will
11.4. As we have seen, a will is the declaration of the intention
of the testator to give away his property. Such will comes
into force after the death of the testator. The most important
requirement for a valid will is that it must again be a voluntary
disposition in sound mind, which must be explicit from the
instrument itself. Therefore, it can be concluded that every
will also has an element of gift, with the difference being the
disposition deferred until the death of the testator. Insofar as
the revocation is concerned, the testator is at liberty to revoke
or alter the will any number of times until his demise, but it
is essential that he remains of sound mind while doing so.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 983

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

Interplay between Gift, Settlement and Will
11.5. The element of voluntary disposition is common to all the three
deeds. The element of gift is traceable to both “settlement” and
“will”. As settled in law, the nomenclature of an instrument is
immaterial and the nature of the document is to be derived from
its contents. While so, a voluntary disposition can transfer the
interest in praesenti and in future, in the same document. In
such a case, the document would have the elements of both the
settlement and will. Such document, then has to be registered
and by operation of the doctrine of severability, becomes a
composite document and has to be treated as both, a settlement
and will and the respective rights will flow with regard to each
disposition from the same document. It is pertinent to mention
here that the reservation of life interest or any condition in
the instrument, even if it postpones the physical delivery of
possession to the donee/settlee, cannot be treated as a will, as
the property had already been vested with the donee/settlee.
12. At this juncture, it will be useful to refer to a few judgements on the
subject:
(i) In Navneet Lal @ Rangi v. Gokul and others16, after analysing
the entire case laws on the subject, this Court highlighted the
essential principles that should guide the courts in interpreting
Wills, distinguishing from other types of documents, as follows:
(i) The fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention
of the testator from the words used, the surrounding
circumstances for the purpose of finding out the
intended meaning of the words which have been
employed;
(ii) The court, in doing so is entitled to put itself into
the armchair of the testator and is bound to bear in
mind also other matters than merely the words used
and the probability that the testator had/would have
used the words in a particular sense, in order to arrive
at a right construction of the Will and ascertain the
meaning of the language used;

16 (1976) 1 SCC 630
984 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(iii) The true intention of the testator has to be
gathered not by attaching importance to isolated
expression but by reading the Will as a whole, with
all its provisions and ignoring none of them, as
redundant or contradictory, giving such construction
as would give to every expression some effect rather
than that which would render any of the expressions
inoperative;
(iv) Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be
reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in
a document, such a construction should be accepted
instead of a construction which would have the effect
of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used
by the testator;
(v) It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of
Wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect
should be given to every disposition contained in the
Will, unless the law prevents effect being given to it.
If even there appear to be two repugnant provisions
conferring successive interests and the first interest
created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take
effect, the court will proceed to the farthest extent
to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given
as far as possible, to every testamentary intention
contained in the Will.”
12.1. The aforesaid principles were reiterated in the decisions
subsequently rendered by this Court [Refer: Arunkumar &
another v. Shriniwas & another17, and Bajrang Factory Ltd. &
another v. University of Calcutta & others18.
13. This Court in P.K. Mohan Ram v. B.N. Ananthachary19, referred to
the broad tests or characteristics as to what constitutes a will and
what constitutes a settlement. The relevant paragraphs of the said
decisions are reproduced below for ready reference:

17 AIR 2003 SC 2528
18 Civil Appeal No. 3374/2006
19 (2010) 4 SCC 161 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 78 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 361 at page 172
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 985

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

“13. Having noticed the distinction between vested interest
and contingent interest, we shall now consider whether
Ext. A-2 was a settlement deed or a will. Although, no
straitjacket formula has been evolved for construction of
such instruments, the consistent view of this Court and
various High Courts is that while interpreting an instrument
to find out whether it is of a testamentary character, which
will take effect after the lifetime of the executant or it is an
instrument creating a vested interest in præsenti in favour
of a person, the Court has to very carefully examine the
document as a whole, look into the substance thereof,
the treatment of the subject by the settlor/executant,
the intention appearing both by the expressed language
employed in the instrument and by necessary implication
and the prohibition, if any, contained against revocation
thereof. It has also been held that form or nomenclature of
the instrument is not conclusive and the court is required
to look into the substance thereof.
14. Before proceeding further, we may notice the judgments
on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the
parties. In Gangaraju v. Pendyala Somanna (supra), the
learned Single Judge was called upon to construe deed
dated 27.2.1917 executed by one Kristnamma. The learned
Single Judge referred to the contents of the document
and observed:
“The document on the face of it is of a non-testamentary
character. It was so stamped and so registered. It is called
a dakal dastaveju, which means a conveyance or settlement
deed. It is true that a document which is not a Will in form,
may yet be a Will in substance and effect; but as was held in
Mahadeva Iyer v. Sankarasubramania Iyer, if an instrument
is a deed in form, in order to hold that it is testamentary
or in the nature of a Will, there must be something very
special in the case; and unless there are circumstances
which compel the Court to treat an instrument in the form
of a deed as a Will, the Court will not do so. The leading
argument of the appellant is that the document created no
estate in praesenti. A more literal translation of the fourth
sentence in para 2 of the document is:
986 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Therefore, on account of my affection for you, I have
arranged that after my death the property shall belong to you.
It is certainly very difficult to derive from these words
any immediate interest created in favour of the plaintiff.
But the line between a Will and a conveyance reserving
a life estate is a fine one, and it would be hard to define
in some cases where the document has been held to be
non-testamentary, wherein the personal interest which
was transferred consists. A more easily applied test is
that of revocability. There is nothing in the suit document
to show that Kristnamma reserved the right to revoke it.
On the contrary there is an undertaking not to alienate
any part of the property during his lifetime. I consider
that this is equivalent to a promise not to revoke the
instrument, because if the executant intended to reserve
that right he could not consistently have parted with the
right to alienate. The same intention to give finality to the
deposition is suggested by Ex.3, which is a conveyance of
a portion of the property executed jointly by Kristnamma
and the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff was required
to join is significant, and in the schedule the property is
described as that which was conveyed by Kristnamma to
him. This document seems also to lend some colour to
the view that an immediate conveyance of interest was
intended in Ex.F. I think that Kristnamma had the intention
not to revoke the conveyance and this has always been
regarded as one of the most important tests.”
(emphasis supplied)

16. In Ramaswami Naidu v. Gopalakrishna Naidu (supra),
the High Court laid down the following broad test for
construction of document:
“The broad tests or characteristics as to what constitutes a
will and what constitutes a settlement have been noticed in
a number of decisions. But the main test to find out whether
the document constitutes a will or a gift is to see whether
the disposition of the interest in the property is in praesenti
in favour of the settlees or whether the disposition is to
take effect on the death of the executant. If the disposition
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 987

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

is to take effect on the death of the executant, it would
be a will. But if the executant divests his interest in the
property and vests his interest in praesenti in the settlee,
the document will be a settlement. The general principle
also is that the document should be read as a whole and
it is the substance of the document that matters and not
the form or the nomenclature the parties have adopted.
The various clauses in the document are only a guide to
find out whether there was an immediate divestiture of the
interest of the executant or whether the disposition was
to take effect on the death of the executant.”
“If the clause relating to the disposition is clear and
unambiguous, most of the other clauses will be ineffective
and explainable and could not change the character of
the disposition itself. For instance, the clause prohibiting
a revocation of the deed on any ground would not change
the nature of the document itself, if under the document
there was no disposition in praesenti.”
20. In Vynior’s case (supra) Lord Coke said “if I make my
testament and last will irrevocable, yet I may revoke it,
for my act or my words cannot alter the judgment of the
law to make that irrevocable which is of its own nature
revocable.” This statement of law was relied upon by the
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Sagar Chandra
Mandal v. Digamber Mandal and others (supra). In that
case, the court was called upon to consider the true
character of the instrument which was described as a Will.
After noticing the contents of the documents, the Division
Bench referred to Vynior’s case and observed:
“As to the true character of the instrument propounded by
the appellant, we think there can be no reasonable doubt
that it is a will. A will is defined in section 3 of the Indian
Succession Act as the legal declaration of the intention of the
testator with respect to his property which he desires to be
carried into effect after his death. Section 49 then provides
that a will is liable to be revoked or altered by the maker
of it, at any time when he is competent to dispose of his
property by will. If therefore an instrument is on the face of
it of a testamentary character, the mere circumstance that
988 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the testator calls it irrevocable, does not alter its quality, for
as Lord Coke said in Vynior’s Case. “If I make my testament
and last will irrevocable, yet I may revoke it, for my act or
my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make that
irrevocable which is of its own nature revocable.”
The principal test to be applied is, whether the disposition
made takes effect during the lifetime of the executant of
the deed or whether it takes effect after his decease. If it
is really of this latter nature, it is ambulatory and revocable
during his life. [Musterman v. Maberley, and in Bonis v.
Morgan]. Indeed, the Court has sometimes admitted
evidence, when the language of the paper is insufficient,
with a view to ascertain whether it was the intention of the
testator that the disposition should be dependent on his
death. [Robertson v. Smith]. Tested in the light of these
principles, there can be no doubt that the instrument now
before us is of a testamentary character. It is described
as a will and states explicitly that as after the death of
the testator, disputes might arise among his relations with
regard to the properties left by him, he made the disposition
to be carried into effect after his demise. The terms and
conditions are then set out, paragraph by paragraph, and
in each paragraph the disposition is expressly stated to
take effect after his demise. Against all this, reliance is
placed on the sixth paragraph, in which the testator says
that he would be at liberty to mortgage the properties and
not to sell them absolutely. Such a restraint as this upon
his own power of alienation during his lifetime would be
obviously void. It does not indicate any intention to make
the deed irrevocable. The principal test to be applied
is, whether the disposition made takes effect during the
lifetime of the executant of the deed or whether it takes
effect after his decease. If it is really of this latter nature, it
is ambulatory and revocable during his life. [Musterman v.
Maberley, and in Bonis v. Morgan]. Indeed, the Court has
sometimes admitted evidence, when the language of the
paper is insufficient, with a view to ascertain whether it was
the intention of the testator that the disposition should be
dependent on his death. [Robertson v. Smith]. Tested in
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 989

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

the light of these principles, there can be no doubt that the
instrument now before us is of a testamentary character.
It is described as a will and states explicitly that as after
the death of the testator, disputes might arise among his
relations with regard to the properties left by him, he made
the disposition to be carried into effect after his demise.
The terms and conditions are then set out, paragraph
by paragraph, and in each paragraph the disposition is
expressly stated to take effect after his demise. Against
all this, reliance is placed on the sixth paragraph, in which
the testator says that he would be at liberty to mortgage
the properties and not to sell them absolutely. Such a
restraint as this upon his own power of alienation during
his lifetime would be obviously void. It does not indicate
any intention to make the deed irrevocable.”
14. In Mathai Samuel v. Eapen Eapen20, while examining a composite
document, this Court outlined the requirements for both a Will and
a gift, which read as under:
“16. We may point out that in the case of a will, the crucial
circumstance is the existence of a provision disposing of or
distributing the property of the testator to take effect on his
death. On the other hand, in case of a gift, the provision
becomes operative immediately and a transfer in praesenti
is intended and comes into effect. A will is, therefore,
revocable because no interest is intended to pass during
the lifetime of the owner of the property. In the case of
gift, it comes into operation immediately. The nomenclature
given by the parties to the transaction in question, as we
have already indicated, is not decisive. A will need not be
necessarily registered. The mere registration of “will” will
not render the document a settlement. In other words, the
real and the only reliable test for the purpose of finding
out whether the document constitutes a will or a gift is
to find out as to what exactly is the disposition which
the document has made, whether it has transferred any
interest in praesenti in favour of the settlees or it intended

20 (2012) 13 SCC 80
990 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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to transfer interest in favour of the settlees only on the
death of the settlors.
17. A composite document is severable and in part clearly
testamentary, such part may take effect as a will and other
part if it has the characteristics of a settlement and that part
will take effect in that way. A document which operates to
dispose of property in praesenti in respect of few items of
the properties is a settlement and in future in respect of
few other items after the deaths of the executants, it is a
testamentary disposition. That one part of the document
has effect during the lifetime of the executant i.e. the gift
and the other part disposing the property after the death
of the executant is a will. Reference may be made in this
connection to the judgment of this Court in M.S. Poulose v.
Varghese [1995 Supp (2) SCC 294].
18. In a composite document, which has the characteristics
of a will as well as a gift, it may be necessary to have that
document registered otherwise that part of the document
which has the effect of a gift cannot be given effect
to. Therefore, it is not unusual to register a composite
document which has the characteristics of a gift as
well as a will. Consequently, the mere registration of
document cannot have any determining effect in arriving
at a conclusion that it is not a will. The document which
may serve as evidence of the gift, falls within the sweep
of Section 17 of the Registration Act. Where an instrument
evidences creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or
extinction of any present or future right, title or interest in
immovable property or where any instrument acknowledges
the receipt of payment of consideration on account of
creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction
of such right, title or interest, in those cases alone the
instrument or receipt would be compulsorily registerable
under Section 17(1)(b) or (c) of the Registration Act, 1908.
A “will” need not necessarily be registered. But the fact
of registration of a “will” will not render the document a
settlement. Exhibit A-1 was registered because of the
composite character of the document.”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 991

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

14.1. Thus, the legal position is well settled. There must be a
transfer of interest in praesenti for a gift or a settlement and
in case of postponement of such transfer until the death of the
testator, the document is to be treated as a will. The fact that a
document is registered, cannot be the sole ground to discard
the contents and to treat the document as a gift, just because
the law does not require a will to be registered. The act and
effect of registration depends upon the nature of the document,
which is to be ascertained from a wholesome reading of the
recitals. The nomenclature given to the document is irrelevant.
The contents of the document have to be read as a whole
and understood, while keeping in mind the object and intent
of the testator. What is not to be forgotten is that in case of
a gift, it is a gratuitous grant by the owner to another person;
in case of a settlement, the consideration is the mutual love,
care, affection and satisfaction, independent and resulting
out of the preceding factors; in case of a will, it is declaration
of the intention of the testator in disposition of his property
in a particular manner. Therefore, even when there is any
ambiguity in understanding the nature of the documents from
its contents, we are of the view that the subsequent conduct
of the executant must also be considered to take a decision. It
is possible that in a single document, there could be multiple
directions in different clauses though seemingly repugnant
but in reality, it could only be ancillary or a qualification of the
earlier clause. Therefore, the document must be harmoniously
read to not only understand the true intent and purport, but
also to give effect to each and every word and direction.
15. In light of the aforesaid legal principles, let us examine Ext.A1
document dated 26.06.1985 executed by Defendant No.1 / father in
favour of Respondent No.1 / plaintiff (daughter). It was categorically
stated therein that the suit schedule property belonged to Defendant
No.1/ father and he had been in possession and enjoyment of the
same with full rights. The following statements in the document are
important in determining the nature of the document:
“In consideration of my love and affection towards you, the
schedule below properties are herein conveyed to you,
for your subsistence and for residence after constructing
992 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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a house, subject to the conditions herein below. Till my
lifetime, I shall be in possession of the schedule properties
and shall take the yields from it and if necessary I shall
have the right to pledge the schedule properties for a
sum not exceeding Rs.2000/- and to avail loan on that
basis. After my lifetime, Janaki Amma, who is my wife
and your mother, shall have the right to possess the
property and take income from the property and utilize
the same according to the will and wishes of the said
Janaki Amma till the end of her lifetime and you have no
right to restrain the said rights of Janaki Amma for any
reasons. Now onwards, you have every right to make the
necessary constructions in the scheduled property, pay
taxes to the Government and obtain Purchase Certificate
for the same. In case of creation of any encumbrances
by me as aforesaid, the same should be cleared by you
and I hereby accord my consent for you to possess and
enjoy the scheduled property along with the usufructuaries
situated in it and reside therein by constructing a house
after the lifetime of me and Janaki Amma with all freedom
including the rights to transfer the same. The scheduled
property is included in Purchase Certificate No. 199 and
having a value of Rs. 8000/- Rupees Eight Thousand
Only including the above said amount and there is no
other encumbrances over the property and accordingly
I hereby assign all the rights and liabilities over the
scheduled property to you after excluding the rights of
taking and enjoying the income from the properties and
my right to create encumbrances as aforesaid.”
15.1. The above contents of the document would clearly reveal that
there is consideration, conveyance, imposition of conditions and
reservation of life interest by the executant, Defendant No.1/
father satisfying the requirements to classify the document as
a “settlement”. The conditions to construct a house, to reside
in the house, retention of life interest, the right of mortgage
up to a sum of Rs.2,000/- and avail loan on that basis, cannot
alter the gift, by which in unequivocal terms, the property stood
vested in the plaintiff by earlier part. The condition, creating a
life interest in favour of father and mother and the restriction
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 993

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

regarding mortgage, would further imply that Defendant No.1
had ceased to be the absolute owner. The postponement
of delivery by creation of life interest is not an anathema to
absolute conveyance in praesenti. It is pertinent to mention
here that Defendant No.1 has not only expressed that the
property is being conveyed on account of love and affection,
by vesting the rights in the property in praesenti in favour
of the plaintiff, but also enabled the plaintiff to construct the
house from then on and no outer time has been fixed for the
construction of the house. Since the life interest was reserved
in favour of Defendant No.1 and his wife, Defendant No.1
was only holding an ostensible possession and ownership as
contemplated under Section 41, while the true owner being
the plaintiff, after the clear conveyance by earlier clause.
15.2. In the present case, the doubt has arisen in view of three
conflicting sentences, namely “In consideration of my love
and affection towards you, the schedule below properties
are herein conveyed to you, for your subsistence and for
residence after constructing a house”, “Now onwards, you
have every right to make the necessary constructions in the
scheduled property, pay taxes to the Government and obtain
Purchase Certificate for the same” and “ I hereby accord my
consent for you to possess and enjoy the scheduled property
along with the usufructuaries situated in it and reside therein
by constructing a house after the lifetime of me and Janaki
Amma with all freedom including the rights to transfer the
same”. Seemingly, the first part affirms the conveyance in
consideration of love and affection. The second part enables
the plaintiff to commence the construction at any time after
the execution of the instrument, confirming that there is an
absolute conveyance. We have already held that reservation
of life interest is permissible in a disposition by settlement
and such retention cannot affect the rights already vested.
That apart, the executant has limited his right to mortgage the
property only up to a particular sum and has also permitted
the plaintiff to mutate the records. Though the later part on the
first blush would look to be a contradiction, in reality, it is not.
The third part, according to us, is not repugnant to the earlier
part and is only an ancillary clause that qualifies the plaintiff to
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reside in the property after the cessation of the life interest of
both the executant and his wife with all freedom including the
right of alienation, which even without any specific mention is
likely to happen, in view of the clear disposition and vesting
in the earlier part. The direction in the third part enabling the
plaintiff to reside in the property is again a qualifying clause.
Even assuming for a moment that the third part is repugnant
to earlier part, by postponing the rights granted earlier until
the death of Defendant No.1 and his wife, the same only has
to be discarded or treated as void as per Section 11 of the
Transfer of Property Act and the earlier clause will prevail
over the later clause. At this juncture, it will be useful to refer
to the following judgments:

(i) Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad21
“10. In Ramkishorelal v. Kamalnarayan [AIR
1963 SC 890 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 417] it was
held that in a disposition of properties, if there
is a clear conflict between what is said in one
part of the document and in another where in
an earlier part of the document some property
is given absolutely to one person but later on,
other directions about the same property are
given which conflict with and take away from
the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in
such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute
title should prevail and the later directions of
disposition should be disregarded. In Radha
Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim [AIR
1959 SC 24 : 1959 SCR 1309] it was held where
there is conflict between the earlier clause and
the later clauses and it is not possible to give
effect to all of them, then the rule of construction
is well established that it is the earlier clause
that must override the later clauses and not vice
versa. In Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj
Kuar [AIR 1935 PC 187 : 1935 All LJ 1133] it

21 (2002) 2 SCC 468 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 113
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 995

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

was laid down that where an absolute estate
is created by a will in favour of devisee, the
clauses in the will which are repugnant to such
absolute estate cannot cut down the estate; but
they must be held to be invalid.
11. From the decisions referred to above, the
legal principle that emerges, inter alia, are:
(1) where under a will, a testator has bequeathed
his absolute interest in the property in favour
of his wife, any subsequent bequest which
is repugnant to the first bequeath would be
invalid; and
(2) where a testator has given a restricted or
limited right in his property to his widow, it is
open to the testator to bequeath the property
after the death of his wife in the same will.
12. In view of the aforesaid principles that once
the testator has given an absolute right and
interest in his entire property to a devisee it
is not open to the testator to further bequeath
the same property in favour of the second set
of persons in the same will, a testator cannot
create successive legatees in his will. The object
behind is that once an absolute right is vested in
the first devisee the testator cannot change the
line of succession of the first devisee. Where a
testator having conferred an absolute right on
anyone, the subsequent bequest for the same
property in favour of other persons would be
repugnant to the first bequest in the will and has
to be held invalid. In the present case the testator
Jamuna Prasad under the will had bequest his
entire estate, movable and immovable property
including the land under self-cultivation, house
and groves etc. to his wife Smt Sona Devi and
thereafter by subsequent bequest the testator
gave the very same properties to nine sons of
his daughters, which was not permissible. We
996 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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have already recorded a finding that under the
will Smt Sona Devi had got an absolute estate
and, therefore, subsequent bequest in the will by
Jamuna Prasad in favour of the nine daughters’
sons was repugnant to the first bequest and,
therefore, invalid. We are, therefore, of the view
that once the testator has given an absolute
estate in favour of the first devisee it is not
open to him to further bequeath the very same
property in favour of the second set of persons.”

(ii) Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham22
“20. Time now to refer to the provisions of the
Succession Act, 1925, Chapter VI whereof deals
with construction of wills. Some of the principles
of interpretation of wills that are statutorily
recognised in Chapter VI need special notice.
For instance, Section 84 provides that if a clause
is susceptible of two meanings, according to
one of which it has some effect and according
to the other it can have none, the former shall
be preferred. So also, Section 85 provides that
no part of a will shall be rejected as destitute
of meaning if it is possible to put a reasonable
construction on the same.
21. Section 86 provides that:
“86. Interpretation of words repeated in different
parts of will.—If the same words occur in different
parts of the same will, they shall be taken to
have been used everywhere in the same sense,
unless a contrary intention appears.”
Section 87 makes it clear that the intention of the
testator shall not be set aside merely because
it cannot take effect to the full extent, and that
effect is to be given to it as far as possible.

22 (2010) 13 SCC 147 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 812 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1198
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 997

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

Section 88 provides that if there are two clauses
of gift in a will, which are irreconcilable, so that
they cannot possibly stand together, the last
shall prevail.
22. It is evident from a careful reading of
the provisions referred to above that while
interpreting a will, the courts would as far as
possible place an interpretation that would avoid
any part of a testament becoming redundant.
So also the courts will interpret a will to give
effect to the intention of the testator as far as
the same is possible. Having said so, we must
hasten to add that the decisions rendered by
the courts touching upon interpretation of the
wills are seldom helpful except to the extent the
same recognise or lay down a proposition of law
of general application. That is so because each
document has to be interpreted in the peculiar
circumstances in which the same has been
executed and keeping in view the language
employed by the testator. That indeed is the
requirement of Section 82 of the Succession Act
also inasmuch as it provides that meaning of
any clause in a will must be collected from the
entire instrument and all parts shall be construed
with reference to each other.
23. Coming then to the facts of the case at hand
it is evident from a careful reading of Clause
6 of the will extracted above that the same
makes an unequivocal and absolute bequest
in favour of the daughters of the testatrix. The
use of words like “absolute rights of sale, gift,
mortgage, etc.” employed by the testatrix make
the intention of the testatrix abundantly clear.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents
herein also did not have any quarrel with the
proposition that the testatrix had in no uncertain
terms made an absolute bequest in favour of her
daughters. What was argued by him was that
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the bequest so made could be treated as a life
estate not because the testament stated so but
because unless it is so construed the second
part of Clause 6 by which the female offspring
of the legatees would get the property cannot
take effect. It was on that premise contended
that the absolute estate of Smt Sadaram
Appalanarasamma ought to be treated only as
a life estate. The contention though attractive
on first blush, does not stand closer scrutiny.
We say so because the ultimate purpose of
interpretation of any document is to discover and
give effect to the true intention of the executor,
in the present case the testatrix.
24. We are not here dealing with a case where
the testatrix has in one part of the will bequeathed
the property to A while the same property has
been bequeathed to B in another part. Had
there been such a conflict, it may have been
possible for the respondent-plaintiffs to argue
that the latter bequest ought to take effect in
preference to the former. We are on the contrary
dealing with a case where the intention of the
testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour
of her daughters is unequivocal. Secondly, the
expression “after demise of my daughters the
retained and remaining properties shall devolve
on their female children only” does not stricto
sensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one
made earlier in favour of the daughters of the
testatrix.
25. The expression extracted above does not
detract from the absolute nature of the bequest
in favour of the daughters. All that the testatrix
intended to achieve by the latter part of Clause
6 was the devolution upon their female offspring
all such property as remained available in the
hands of the legatees at the time of their demise.
There would obviously be no devolution of any
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 999

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

such property upon the female offspring in
terms of the said clause if the legatees decided
to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them
as indeed they had every right to do under the
terms of the bequest. Seen thus, there is no real
conflict between the absolute bequest which
the first part of Clause 6 of the will makes and
the second part of the said clause which deals
with devolution of what and if at all anything that
remains in the hands of the legatees.
26. The two parts of Clause 6 operate in different
spheres, namely, one vesting absolute title upon
the legatees with rights to sell, gift, mortgage,
etc. and the other regulating devolution of what
may escape such sale, gift or transfer by them.
The latter part is redundant by reason of the
fact that the same was repugnant to the clear
intention of the testatrix in making an absolute
bequest in favour of her daughters. It could be
redundant also because the legatees exercised
their rights of absolute ownership and sale
thereby leaving nothing that could fall to the lot
of the next generation, females or otherwise. All
told, the stipulation made in the second part of
Clause 6 did not in the least affect the legatees
being the absolute owners of the property
bequeathed to them. The corollary would be
that upon their demise the estate owned by
them would devolve by the ordinary law of
succession on their heirs and not in terms of
the will executed by the testatrix”.

(iii) Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta23
“7. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants, contended
before us that first and foremost there was no

23 (2016) 10 SCC 805 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 208 : 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1271 at page 809
1000 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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pleading of life interest by the defendants and
that therefore, this question ought not to have
been raised in the second appeal. He went on
to state that it was clear that a will must first
be read as a whole, and if various parts of it
appear to conflict with each other, they ought
to be harmoniously construed. In the event
that this cannot be done, then if there is an
absolute bequest in an earlier part of the will,
which cannot be reconciled with a subsequent
bequest of the same property in a latter part
of the will, the subsequent portion of the will,
will have to be declared as invalid. For this
proposition, he cited three judgments of this
Court before us. He also argued that it is well
settled that if a will contains one portion which
is illegal and another which is legal, and the
illegal portion can be severed, then the entire
will need not be rejected, and the legal portion
can be enforced. He also argued that in any
case Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 would come to the rescue even if a life
interest was created in favour of the widow,
inasmuch as the deceased had really provided
for her share in the said immovable property in
lieu of maintenance.
……….
11. However, it remains to consider the argument
on behalf of the respondent that the will should
be read as a whole and that the testator’s
intention should be given effect so that the
grandchildren are “not on the road” as is argued
by the counsel for the respondents. In law, the
position is that where an absolute bequest has
been made in respect of certain property to
certain persons, then a subsequent bequest
made qua the same property later in the same
will to other persons will be of no effect. This
is clearly laid down in Ramkishorelal v. Kamal
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1001

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

Narayan [Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan,
1963 Supp (2) SCR 417 : AIR 1963 SC 890]
as follows: (AIR pp. 893-94, para 12)
“12. The golden rule of construction, it has been
said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties
to the instrument after considering all the words,
in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this
intention the court had to consider the relevant
portion of the document as a whole and also
to take into account the circumstances under
which the particular words were used. Very often
the status and the training of the parties using
the words have to be taken into consideration.
It has to be borne in mind that very many
words are used in more than one sense and
that sense differs in different circumstances.
Again, even where a particular word has, to
a trained conveyancer, a clear and definite
significance and one can be sure about the
sense in which such conveyancer would use
it, it may not be reasonable and proper to give
the same strict interpretation of the word when
used by one who is not so equally skilled in the
art of conveyancing. Sometimes it happens in
the case of documents as regards disposition
of properties, whether they are testamentary
or non-testamentary instruments, that there
is a clear conflict between what is said in one
part of the document and in another. A familiar
instance of this is where in an earlier part of the
document some property is given absolutely to
one person but later on, other directions about
the same property are given which conflict
with and take away from the absolute title
given in the earlier portion. What is to be done
where this happens? It is well settled that in
case of such a conflict the earlier disposition
of absolute title should prevail and the later
directions of disposition should be disregarded
1002 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title
already given. (See Sahebzada Mohammad
Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal
Deb [Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah v.
Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, AIR 1960
SC 953] , AIR p. 957.) It is clear, however, that
an attempt should always be made to read
the two parts of the document harmoniously,
if possible. It is only when this is not possible
e.g. where an absolute title is given is in clear
and unambiguous terms and the later provisions
trench on the same, that the later provisions
have to be held to be void.”
12. This judgment was referred to with approval
and followed in Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish
Prasad [Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad,
(2002) 2 SCC 468] as follows: (SCC p. 473,
paras 9-11)
“9. The next question that arises for consideration
is, the validity of the second part of the will
whereby and whereunder the testator gave the
very same property to nine sons of his daughters.
10. In Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan
[Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan, 1963 Supp
(2) SCR 417 : AIR 1963 SC 890] it was held
that in a disposition of properties, if there is a
clear conflict between what is said in one part
of the document and in another where in an
earlier part of the document some property is
given absolutely to one person but later on,
other directions about the same property are
given which conflict with and take away from
the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in
such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute
title should prevail and the later directions of
disposition should be disregarded. In Radha
Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim [Radha
Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1003

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

1959 SC 24] it was held where there is conflict
between the earlier clause and the later clauses
and it is not possible to give effect to all of them,
then the rule of construction is well established
that it is the earlier clause that must override the
later clauses and not vice versa. In Rameshwar
Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar [Rameshwar
Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar, 1935 SCC OnLine
PC 41 : AIR 1935 PC 187] it was laid down that
where an absolute estate is created by a will in
favour of devisee, the clauses in the will which
are repugnant to such absolute estate cannot
cut down the estate; but they must be held to
be invalid.
11. From the decisions referred to above, the
legal principle that emerges, inter alia, are:
(1) where under a will, a testator has bequeathed
his absolute interest in the property in favour of his
wife, any subsequent bequest which is repugnant
to the first bequeath would be invalid; and
(2) where a testator has given a restricted or
limited right in his property to his widow, it is
open to the testator to bequeath the property
after the death of his wife in the same will.”
13. Needless to add, it is settled law that the
fact that Clause 4 has been declared by us to
be of no effect would not impact the bequest
made under Clause 2, and the rest of the will,
therefore, would have to be given effect to.
In view of the aforesaid, we do not deem it
necessary to go into the other questions raised
by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel,
namely, the absence of pleading and the effect
of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The appeal is, accordingly allowed and the
judgment [Debobroto Dutta v. Madhuri Ghosh,
2013 SCC OnLine All 13769 : (2013) 6 All LJ 6]
of the High Court is set aside.”
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(iv) Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar24
“26. Thus, the Court is required to interpret
harmoniously as also logically the effect of
a combined reading of the afore-extracted
clauses. As such, our endeavour would, in the
first instance, necessarily require us to render
all three effective and none otiose. In order to
do so, this Court would test as to whether all
the three clauses can independently be given
effect to and still not be in conflict with the other
clauses.
32. We are of the considered opinion that all
three clauses are capable of being construed
in such a manner that they operate in their
own fields and are not rendered nugatory.
That apart, we are mindful that even if we had
perceived a conflict between Clauses 3 and 11,
on the one hand, and Clause 15 on the other,
we would have to conclude that Clauses 3 and
11 would prevail over Clause 15 as when the
same cannot be reconciled, the earlier clause(s)
would prevail over the latter clause(s), when
construing a deed or a contract. Reference
for such proposition is traceable to Forbes v.
Git [Forbes v. Git, (1922) 1 AC 256 (PC)] ,
[ “The principle of law to be applied may be
stated in few words. If in a deed an earlier clause
is followed by a later clause which destroys
altogether the obligation created by the earlier
clause, the later clause is to be rejected as
repugnant and the earlier clause prevails. In
this case the two clauses cannot be reconciled
and the earlier provision in the deed prevails
over the later. Thus, if A covenants to pay 100
l. and the deed subsequently provides that he

24 (2024) 4 SCC 318 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 87 at page 327
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1005

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

shall not be liable under his covenant, that later
provision is to be rejected as repugnant and
void, for it altogether destroys the covenant.
But if the later clause does not destroy but
only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be
read together and effect is to be given to the
intention of the parties as disclosed by the deed
as a whole.” (AC p. 259)(emphasis in original)],
as approvingly taken note of by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Radha Sundar Dutta v.
Mohd. Jahadur Rahim [Radha Sundar Dutta v.
Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, 1958 SCC OnLine SC
38: AIR 1959 SC 24] . However, we have been
able, as noted above, to reconcile the three
clauses in the current scenario.”
16. In the instant case, the clear and unambiguous language employed
in the first part, reveals a clear disposition by Defendant No.1/
father to the plaintiff, by only retaining a life interest in the second
part. Therefore, the instrument of 1985, according to us, is a gift by
settlement. Ascertainment of the nature of the document is different
from validity. We have already held that Defendant No.1 was only
holding an ostensible possession by way of life interest. Though, in
cases of settlement, possession is deemed to be transferred along
with the title, since we have held that there is an element of gift in
every settlement, we deem it necessary in the facts of the present
case to ponder further and examine, whether the gift was accepted
and acted upon.
17. In this connection, we may refer to the following decisions, in which
the effect of non-acceptance during the life time of the donor has
been discussed:
(i) Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker v. Pranjivandas Maganlal
Thakker & Ors25
“5. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(for short, “the TP Act”) defines ‘gift’ to mean the

25 (1997) 2 SCC 255
1006 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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transfer of certain existing moveable or immovable
property made voluntarily and without consideration,
by one person, called the donor, to another, called the
donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.
6. Acceptance by or on behalf of the donee must be
made during the lifetime of the donor and while he
is still capable of giving.
7. It would thus be clear that the execution of a
registered gift deed, acceptance of the gift and
delivery of the property, together make the gift
complete. Thereafter, the donor is divested of his
title and the donee becomes the absolute owner
of the property. The question is whether the gift in
question had become complete under Section 123
of the TP Act? It is seen from the recitals of the gift
deed that Motilal Gopalji gifted the property to the
respondent. In other words, it was a conditional gift.
There is no recital of acceptance nor is there any
evidence in proof of acceptance. Similarly, he had
specifically stated that the property would remain
in his possession till he was alive. Thereafter, the
gifted property would become his property and he
was entitled to collect mesne profits in respect of
the existing rooms throughout his life. The gift deed
conferred only limited right upon the respondent-
donee. The gift was to become operative after the
death of the donor and he was to be entitled to have
the right to transfer the property absolutely by way of
gift or he would be entitled to collect the mesne profits.
It would thus be seen that the donor had executed
a conditional gift deed and retained the possession
and enjoyment of the property during his lifetime. The
recitals in the cancellation deed is consistent with
the recitals in the gift deed. He had expressly stated
that the respondent had cheated him and he had not
fulfilled the conditions subject to which there was an
oral understanding between them. Consequently, he
mentioned that the conditional gift given to him was
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1007

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

cancelled. He also mentioned that the possession
and enjoyment remained with him during his lifetime.
He stated, “I have to execute immediately this deed
of cancelling the conditional gift deed between us.
Therefore I hereby cancel the conditional gift deed
dated 15-5-1965 of Rs 9000 in words rupees nine
thousand presented at Serial No. 2153 on 15-5-
1965 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Baroda for
registration. Therefore, the said conditional gift deed
dated 15-5-1965 is hereby cancelled and becomes
meaningless. The property under the conditional gift
has not been and is not to be transferred in your
name”. Thus he expressly made it clear that he did
not hand over the possession to the respondent nor
did the gift become complete during the lifetime of
the donor. Thus the gift had become ineffective and
inoperative. It was duly cancelled. The question then
is whether the appellant would get the right to the
property? It is not in dispute that after the cancellation
deed dated 9-6-1965 came to be executed, duly
putting an end to the conditional gift deed dated 15-
5-1965, he executed his last Will on 17-5-1965 and
died two days thereafter.”
(ii) Khursida Begum (D) by Lrs vs. Mohammad Farooq (D) by Lrs26
“17. …gift of immovable property is not complete
unless the donor parts with the possession and
donee enters into possession but if the property is
in occupation of tenants, gift can be completed by
delivery of title deed or by request to tenants to attorn
to the done or by mutation.”
(iii) Sarojini Amma v. Velayudha Pillai Sreekumar27
“14. Gift means to transfer certain existing moveable
or immoveable property voluntarily and without

26 C.A. No. 2845-2845/2006
27 C.A. No 10785/2018
1008 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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consideration by one person called the donor to
another called the donee and accepted by or on
behalf of the donee as held by the Supreme Court
in Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker Vs. Pranivandas
Maganlal Thakker & Ors. As further held by this Court
in Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker (supra) “It would
be clear that the execution of a registered gift deed,
acceptance of the gift and delivery of the property
together make the gift complete. Thereafter, the
donor is divested of his title and the done becomes
absolute owner of the property.
15. A conditional gift with no recital of acceptance and
no evidence in proof of acceptance, where possession
remains with the donor as long as he is alive, does
not become complete during lifetime of the donor.
When a gift is incomplete and title remains with the
donor the deed of gift might be cancelled.
..
18. … there is no provision in law that ownership
in property cannot be gifted without transfer of
possession of such property. However, the conditions
precedent of a gift as defined in Section 122 of the
Transfer of Property Act must be satisfied. A gift is
transfer of property without consideration.
19. In the instant case, admittedly, the deed of
transfer was executed for consideration and was
in any case conditional subject to the condition
that the donee would look after the petitioner and
her husband and subject to the condition that the
gift would take effect after the death of the donor.
We are thus constrained to hold that there was no
completed gift of the property in question by the
appellant to the respondent and the appellant was
within her right in cancelling the deed.”
18. The ratio in the above judgments would have to be applied considering
the facts of the case. It is settled law that delivery of possession is
not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Therefore, for the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1009

N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

document to be valid, it is sufficient if it is proved that the same was
acted upon during the life time of the executant. In the present case,
it is not in dispute that the plaintiff has registered the instrument.
Such registration by the plaintiff is possible only if the document was
handed over by Defendant No.1. The factum of acceptance can be
derived from the conduct of the parties. This Court in the judgment
in Daulat Singh (Supra) has held that the possession of the gift itself
would amount to acceptance. The plaintiff, when the suit was filed, was
in possession of the original title deed. The stand of the defendants
that the plaintiff took away the document later is unbelievable. Even
assuming that the original deed was returned after registration, the
fact that it was already acted upon, cannot be altered. Once a gift
has been acted upon, the same cannot be unilaterally cancelled. As
already held by us, delivery of possession is only one of the methods
to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the
original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would
amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the
requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The creation of life interest with rights to enjoy the income from the
property is a plausible and justifiable reason for the plaintiff not to
reside in the premises. Once the document is declared as “gift”,
Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the
Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once
the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause
or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the
same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be
proved in a court of law. Therefore, according to us, the unilateral
cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the
sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father
also, is invalid.
19. The facts on record also reveal that the other family members, namely,
Defendant Nos.3 and 4 supported the case of Respondent No.1/
plaintiff cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the recitals in the document
apparently demonstrate and satisfy the requirement to classify the
document as a “settlement”.
20. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find that the trial Court as well
as the First Appellate Court had erroneously come to the conclusion
that Ext.A1 document was a Will, without appreciating the law.
However, the High Court rightly set aside the concurrent judgments
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of the Courts below by treating the document as settlement in the
judgment impugned herein.
21. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment passed
by the High Court. The parties shall bear their own costs. Connected
Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan