N. RAMKUMARversusTHE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

                  [2023] 11 S.C.R. 845 : 2023 INSC 812



                             CASE DETAILS

                             N. RAMKUMAR
                                       v.
           THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 2006 of 2023)
                          SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
       [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]

                               HEADNOTES

      Issue for consideration: Appellant in fit of rage, dashed head of the
victim against the wall, resulting in death of victim. Appellant convicted u/s.
302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. Whether judgment,
order and sentence passed by the Sessions Court and affirmed by the
High Court requires to be affirmed or the sentence is to be converted and
punishment to be awarded u/s. 304 of IPC and if so, which part of s.304 IPC?
     Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 and 304 Part II – Limited question before
the Supreme Court regarding the affirmation of sentence u/s. 302 IPC
or conversion of sentence to s.304 IPC:
      Held: In the instant case it can be noticed that appellant-convict and
the deceased were in love with each other – The fact that deceased had
stopped talking to the appellant and she was talking to her neighbour, had
made the appellant furious and he was upset about this change of attitude
of the deceased – Even according to the testimony of PW-1 (mother of the
deceased), there was altercation between the appellant and the deceased
regarding their love affair – Appellant got infuriated and in that spur of the
moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to the wall which
resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away from the scene
of the incident – Thus, the single assault by the appellant coupled with the
duration of the entire period having occurred for about 2-3 minutes would
not be sufficient to infer that he had the intention to kill the deceased – In the
facts of the case, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause
death or the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and
                                     845
846          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 11 S.C.R.


duration of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention – Therefore,
conviction of the appellant u/s. 302 is altered/converted to one u/s. 304 part
II of the IPC and the appellant is sentenced to the imprisonment to the period
already undergone and directed to be released forthwith. [Paras 20 and 21]
     Penal Code, 1860 – When accused can be held guilty u/s. 302 and
304 Part-II of IPC:
      Held: Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused
had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can
be held guilty under second part of s.304 IPC – It is in this background
that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and
“knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between
these two expressions – The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and
circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not
satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the
said Section – In order to bring a case within Part 3 of s.300 IPC, it must
be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury
which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. [Para 16]

       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956] SCR 363;
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
2006 SC 3010 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633; Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of
Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424; Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 8
SCC 228; Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police
in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 – relied on.
    Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289 : [2012] 7
SCR 160 – referred to.

       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2006 of 2023.
       N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                         847
                       OF POLICE

     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2015 of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLA No. 334 of 2013.
     Appearances:
     M. A. Chinnasamy, Adv. for the Appellant.
     V. Krishnamurthy, AAG, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Vaidehi Rastogi,
Ms. Richa Vishwakarma, Advs. for the Respondent.
       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
                               JUDGMENT
     ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
     1. Heard.
     2. This appeal is at the instance of a Convict-Accused and is directed
against the judgement and order passed by the Madurai bench of Madras
High Court dated 28.10.2015 in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.334 of 2013
whereunder the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant
herein thereby affirming the judgement and order of conviction and sentence
passed by the First Additional District Judge (NCR) Tiruchirappalli in Case
No.226 of 2010.
      3. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details leading to the filing
of this appeal are as under:
       4. The case of the prosecution was that the deceased Sangeetha was
in love with the appellant and she was unhappy with the conduct of the
appellant and her mother had also warned them in this regard. It is further
case of prosecution that deceased stopped seeing the appellant and broke her
relationship with the appellant and deceased was talking to her neighbour
one Mr. Sudhakar and being agitated with the said turn of events, appellant
is said to have trespassed into the house of the deceased on 19.06.2010 at
about 10.30 p.m. and questioned her conduct of talking to another person. It
is stated by the prosecution that appellant in a fit of rage, held the deceased
by her ears and dashed her head against the wall and fled away from the spot.
PW-1 and PW-2 had admitted the deceased to the hospital and after three
days the complaint was lodged resulting in registration of FIR No.1659 of
2010 for the offence punishable under Sections 294(b), 448, 323 and 506(1)
848          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 11 S.C.R.


of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and Section 4
of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act against the
appellant.
      5. It is stated by the prosecution that on 28.06.2010 deceased who
was under treatment started vomiting blood and struggled to breathe and
expired on 29.06.2010 at 3.30 a.m. On her demise the Investigating Officer
(PW-12) altered the charge to one under Sections 294(b), 448, 323, 506(1)
IPC, and 302 IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment
of Woman Act.
      6. The appellant – accused came to be tried for the said offence and
on the basis of the testimony of the mother of the deceased (PW-1) and also
taking into consideration the deposition of neighbour (PW-2) who claimed to
have seen the accused fleeing away from the scene of offence by taking into
consideration the attendant circumstance, learned First Additional District
Judge convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 450
& 302 IPC. The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- and in default to undergo
simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 450 and
sentenced him and to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs.60,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months
for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The sentences were ordered to run
concurrently.
      7. The legality of the said judgment was questioned before the High
Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.334 of 2013 and on re-
appreciation of the entire evidence, the High Court affirmed the judgment
of the Sessions Court by arriving at a conclusion that it was the appellant
who had caused the injury to the deceased resulting in her death and the act
of accused in trespassing to the house of the deceased was for committing
the murder, had been clearly established. It was also opined by the High
Court that deceased had given up her love for the accused and she had
developed relationship with one Mr. Sudhakar which enraged the accused
to wreak vengeance and for this reason he had gone all the way to the house
of the deceased with a determination to eliminate her and as such it would
fall within the first limb of Section 300 IPC and thus, he was liable to be
punished under Section 302 IPC. Hence, this appeal.
       N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                          849
             OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

      8. We have heard the arguments of learned Advocates. It is the
contention of Shri M. A. Chinnasamy, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, that there has been delay in filing the complaint and on this ground
alone the theory of the prosecution cannot be considered as trustworthy.
He would also contend that conviction of the accused is based on the sole
testimony of PW-1 and the contradictions in her testimony is manifestly
clear and is not trustworthy and cannot be relied on to convict the appellant.
The very fact that PW-1 was against the love affair of her daughter with the
accused having been admitted by her would disclose the inimical attitude
against the accused. With regard to there being blood in the floor of the
kitchen is belied by the statement of PW-12 (investigating officer) and so
also the statement of PW-5 who have not whispered a word in that regard.
He would also draw the attention of the Court that theory of the prosecution
as put forth in the complaint lodged by PW-1 is that the accused had punched
her daughter on the face and she fell on the kitchen slab. However, in her
evidence she has deposed that accused held the ears of the victim and dashed
her against the wall. Though, PW-1 claimed that deceased was taken in an
auto rickshaw, non-examination of the driver of auto rickshaw would create
a doubt in the prosecution theory. Neither the clothes of the accused nor of
the victim was sent for chemical analysis. He would also contend that in the
event this Court were to affirm the findings of the courts below, he would
pray for sentence being converted to the one under second part of Section
304 of the IPC in as much as the accused had no knowledge that his act is
likely to cause death, as such it would be culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.
       9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would support
the impugned order and has prayed for affirming the same. He would also
contend that the evidence tendered by the prosecution has not been impeached
and the prosecution witnesses have stood the test of cross-examination and as
such the impugned order deserves to be affirmed. He would further contend
that the accused having been in love with the deceased was unable to digest the
fact that she had developed intimacy with her neighbour Sudhakar and being
dejected the accused had taken the extreme step of eliminating the deceased
and the reasons assigned by the High Court while affirming the judgment and
sentence awarded by the Sessions Court would not be required to be interfered
with. Hence, he has prayed for rejection of the appeal.
850           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


       10. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that while issuing notice of
this appeal on 21.11.2016, it was restricted for the purpose of conversion of
the offence. Hence, within this limited sphere this appeal has to be examined,
namely, as to whether judgement, order and sentence passed by the Sessions
Court and affirmed by the High Court requires to be affirmed or the sentence
is to be converted and punishment to be awarded under Section 304 of IPC
and if so, which part of Section 304 IPC?
     11. In the aforesaid background, it would be necessary to discern the
evidence available on record. The final opinion given by the doctor for the
cause of death as evident from exhibit P-9 reads as under:
      “The deceased would appear to have died of “head injury”. (viscera
      report enclosed-alcohol in other format was not detected”).
      12. The doctor (PW-11) who conducted the post-mortem of the
deceased has deposed that he is the author of the report Ex. P-9. He has
also deposed that injuries found therein can be inflicted when a person slips
and falls on the kitchen slab. He has admitted that two injuries which he
had identified had been inflicted a week before, and were in the process
of healing. PW-10 who is the doctor at Cauvery Hospital, Trichy and had
examined the deceased, has deposed that deceased was conscious when
he examined her on 26.06.2010. He has also deposed that deceased was
in a good speaking condition. In the teeth of aforesaid medical evidence
available on record, the testimony of eye-witness, namely, mother of the
deceased-PW-1 requires to be examined. A perusal of the same would
indicate she has deposed that on 19.06.2010 at 10:30 pm when she and
her deceased daughter were at home, accused had visited their house
and questioned her daughter as to why she was talking to the neighbour
Sudhakar and not talking to him. She further deposes that after saying
so, he punched on her daughter’s face and held both her ears and dashed
her hard against the kitchen wall and immediately her daughter fell down
and her head was broken and right ear was cut. It is thereafter she is said
to have shifted her daughter to Geetanjali hospital and next day to KMC
Hospital. The testimony of the uncle of the deceased – PW-2 which is
on record would disclose that he was returning from work at 10:45 pm
on 19.06.2010 and he saw the accused coming out of his mother in law’s
house and heard her cry and as such he rushed to her house and saw the
       N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                           851
             OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

deceased lying in a fainted condition. On enquiry, PW-1 is said to have
informed him (PW2) about the attack made by the accused.
      13. Having given our anxious consideration as regards the genesis of
the incident and the role attributed to the appellant herein and testimony
of the doctors who treated her and also who performed the post-mortem of
the deceased, discloses that doctor has noted two injuries on the deceased:
(i) cut injury in the left ear measuring 3 centimetres and; (ii) Two wounds
in left head roughly measuring 7 centimetres and near to that another small
injury. The injuries, as noted in Post-Mortem Report Ex.P-9 are as under:
     “(i) Sutured wounds: - On the lobule of right ear 2 cm in length. On
     removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 0.5 cm in breadth and
     muscle deep, on the left temporal region of the scalp, 7 cm in length.
     On removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 2 cm in breadth and
     bone deep, on the left parietal region of the scalp, 2 cm in length. On
     removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 1 cm in breadth and bone
     deep.
     (ii) Resolving bruising of left temporal, left parietal and left side of
     occipital regions of scalp. Sub-dural haemorrhage and Sub arachnoid
     haemorrhage on both cerebral and cerebellar hemi-spheres. Fracture
     base of skull-left middle cranial fossa present.”
      14. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report as already
noticed is “died of head injury”. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a
genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides,
but all “culpable homicides” are not “murders” as held by this court in
Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289. The intention
of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but
in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.
     15. In the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 at page
490 the following observations have been made:
     “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and
     knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an
     intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the
     act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and
     mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from
852          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention
      is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
      different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are
      used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”
       16. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different
terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which
is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his
act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in
equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the
circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring
the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had
knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held
guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the
expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge”
has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two
expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances,
would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such
act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In
order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved
that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in
the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words,
that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be
inflicted. This Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy
vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 3010 has observed:
       “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of
      intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case
      falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or
      insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel
      of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance,
      may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths.
      Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be
      totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may
       N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                          853
             OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At
     the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where
     the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting
     to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for
     the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section
     302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304
     Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
     are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to
     cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few
     or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of
     the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused
     or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a
     vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing
     injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or
     sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by
     chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there
     was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii)
     whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the
     cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
     (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage
     or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused
     dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances
     is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special
     circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw
     light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.
      17. This Court in the case of Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of Uttarakhand
(2019) 7 SCC 424 had noticed that the deceased-victim had suffered total 11
injuries and had been convicted for offences under Section 304 Part-II/Section
34 IPC apart from other offences. It was noticed that some altercation took place
and the groups entered into scuffle without any premeditation and convicted
accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II/Section 34 IPC.
Taking into consideration that the appellants therein were young boys and had
served sentence of more than three years and five months and there was no
previous enmity, persuaded this Court that the quantum of sentence is excessive
and accordingly sentenced them to the period already undergone for the offence
under Section 304 Part-II/ Section 34 IPC by observing thus:
854           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      “27. We do find substance in what being submitted by the learned
      counsel for the appellant and in the first place, it is to be noted that the
      trial Court, while awarding sentence to the appellant has not made any
      analysis of the relevant facts as can be discerned from the judgment
      (page 96−97 of the paper book) dated 12th January, 1998. Even the
      High Court has not considered the issue of quantum of sentence.
      From the factual position which emerge from the record, it is to be
      noticed that they were young boys having no previous enmity and
      were collectively sitting and watching Jagjit Singh night. On some
      comments made to the girls sitting in front of the deceased, some
      altercation took place and they entered into a scuffle and without any
      pre−meditation, the alleged unfortunate incident took place between
      two group of young boys and it is informed to this Court that the
      appellant has served the sentence of more than three years and five
      months. Taking into consideration in totality that the incident is of
      June 1995 and no other criminal antecedents has been brought to
      our notice, and taking overall view of the matter, we find force in the
      submission of the appellant that the quantum of sentence is excessive
      and deserves to be interfered by this Court.”
      18. In the case of Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018)
8 SCC 228 it came to be noticed by this Court that incident had taken place
in the heat of the moment and the assault was by a single sword blow in the
rib cage was without any premeditation and incident had occurred at the
spur of the moment, and thus inferred there was no intention to kill and as
such the offence was converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part
II IPC and the appellant was ordered to be released forthwith by sentencing
them to the period of conviction already undergone. It was held:
      “7. On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can safely be
      concluded that the occurrence took place in the heat of the moment
      and the assault was made without premeditation on the spur of time.
      The fact that the appellant may have rushed to his house across the
      road and returned with a sword, is not sufficient to infer an intention
      to kill, both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the single
      assault by the appellant, coupled with the duration of the entire episode
      for 1½ to 2 minutes. Had there been any intention to do away with the
       N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                         855
             OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     life of the deceased, nothing prevented the appellant from making a
     second assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away. The
     intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson by the venting
     of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud playing of the tape recorder.
     But in the nature of weapon used, the assault made in the rib-cage area,
     knowledge that death was likely to ensue will have to be attributed
     to the appellant.
     8. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts and circumstances of the
     case, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellant under
     Section 302 IPC and are satisfied that it deserves to be altered to Section
     304 Part II IPC. It is ordered accordingly. Considering the period of
     custody undergone after his conviction, we alter the sentence to the
     period of custody already undergone. The appellant may be released
     forthwith if not required in any other case.
     9. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with the aforesaid
     modification of the conviction and sentence.”
      19. This Court in a recent judgement in the case of Anbazhagan
vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal
No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the
true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused
in doing the act as under:
     “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid
     discussion may be summed up thus:
     (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence
     the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find
     out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the
     intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4)
     of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a
     single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’
     comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in
     his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty
     in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him,
     though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be
     of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking
856           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while
      the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’
      forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’
      dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in
      ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty
      in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found
      to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the
      ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of
      ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty
      of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.
      (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall
      within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the
      accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the
      purview of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any one of the five
      exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling
      within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide
      not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the
      IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1)
      to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of
      Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section
      300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may
      be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be
      attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that
      situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting
      to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under
      Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299,
      while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case
      fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
      (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within
      the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in
      Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section
      304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under
      the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of
      this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the
      second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is
      ‘guilty knowledge’.
 N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                          857
       OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was
intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to
Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases
: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section
300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when
the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally
spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall
under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done
with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention
to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of
Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder
is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one
of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second
part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the
purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under
the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring
his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more
‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its
not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In
reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation
of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge
that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC)
and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne
in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC.
Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable
homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder
would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought
within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though
858           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established
      on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under
      the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300
      of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails
      to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of
      Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder
      would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide
      not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
      (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause
      thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the
      particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely
      be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to
      be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must
      necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the
      body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the
      injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant
      on the attack.
      (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable
      homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient
      in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable
      homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention
      to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts
      resulting in the injury or injuries.
      (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of
      the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the
      accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular
      injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused
      had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has
      to be determined on the facts of each case.
      (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention
      to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the
      intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
      death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death
      of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section
      300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
       N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR                          859
             OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
     intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is
     inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of
     nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation
     in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the
     injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple
     injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence
     would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”
      20. Thus, it emerges from the case law analysed herein-above for
converting the sentence imposed under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II
the facts unravelled during trial will have to be seen. In the facts of the case
on hand, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause death or
the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and duration
of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention. The offence can be
brought clearly within the ambit of Section 304 Part-II IPC. In the instant
case it can be noticed that appellant and the deceased were in love with each
other. The fact that deceased had stopped talking to the appellant and she was
talking to her neighbour Mr. Sudhakar had ignited the mind of the appellant
to be furious about the conduct of the deceased and he was upset about
this change of attitude of the deceased. Even according to the testimony of
PW-1, who is none other than mother of the deceased there was altercation
between the appellant and the deceased and exchange of words between
appellant and deceased with regard to their love affair. On being confronted
by the appellant as to why the accused had stopped talking to him and as
to why she was trying to develop friendship with Sudhakar and the answer
given by the deceased had resulted in appellant’s getting infuriated and in
that spur of the moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to
the wall which resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away
from the scene of the incident. Thus, the single assault by the appellant
coupled with the duration of the entire period having occurred for about
2-3 minutes would not be sufficient to infer that he had the intention to kill
the deceased. Had there been any intention to do away with the life of the
deceased, obviously the appellant would have come prepared and would
have assaulted the deceased with pre-meditation. Yet another factor which
cannot go unnoticed, the appellant had obviously approached the deceased
and intended to confront her as to why she was not talking to him though
860            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 11 S.C.R.


they were in love and also to clear the doubts about she being friendly with
Mr. Sudhakar (neighbour) and in this factual scenario, heated exchange of
words have taken place and enraged by her reply the appellant has banged
her head on the wall in a fit of fury, which cannot be inferred that he had any
intention to take away her life, particularly when he was in love with her.
      21. In the aforesaid analysis of law and facts, we are of the considered
view that the present appeal deserves to be allowed in part. The conviction
of the appellant under 302 is altered/converted to one under Section 304
part II of the Indian Penal Code for the altered conviction, the appellant is
sentenced to the imprisonment to the period already undergone and shall
be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
      22. The appeal is partly allowed, in the above terms.


Headnotes prepared by:                                     Appeal partly allowed.
Ankit Gyan