N. THAJUDEENversusTAMIL NADU KHADI AND VILLAGE INDUSTRIES BOARD

                 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 952 : 2024 INSC 817

                          N. Thajudeen
                                v.
           Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6333 of 2013)
                               24 October 2024
               [Pankaj Mithal* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the registered gift deed was duly acted upon
       and accepted and is a valid document which continue to exist
       despite its revocation as the donor had not reserved the right to
       revoke the same.

                                  Headnotes†
       Gift – Gift deed – Revocation – When attracted – Execution
       of gift deed by the appellant in favour of the respondent,
       gifting the property for the purpose of manufacturing and the
       same was accepted by the respondent – However, revoked
       after five years – Four years later, the respondent filed suit
       for declaration of title over the property and recovery of
       possession on basis of the gift deed – Suit dismissed by the
       trial court holding that the gift deed was not valid as it was
       never accepted and acted upon – However, the first appellate
       court and the High Court held in favour of the respondent
       holding that the gift deed was acted upon and in absence
       of any clause authorizing revocation, it could not have been
       revoked as alleged vide the revocation deed – Correctness:
       Held: Gift deed was duly acted upon and accepted by the
       respondent, as such the said gift deed cannot be held to be
       invalid for want of acceptance – On the basis of the gift deed,
       the respondent acquired absolute right and title over the suit
       property – None of the exceptions permitting revocation of the
       gift deed as stated in s.126 of the 1882 Act attracted, thus, the
       gift deed, which was validly made, could not have been revoked
       in any manner – Revocation deed is void ab initio and of no
       consequence – Non-utilisation of the suit property for manufacturing
       for the purpose set out in the gift deed, and keeping the same

* Author
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                 953

    N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board


     as vacant may be a disobedience of the object of the gift but that
     by itself would not attract the power to revoke the gift deed – No
     stipulation in the gift deed that if the suit property is not so utilised,
     the gift would stand revoked or would be revoked at the discretion
     of the donor – As regards, the suit filed by the respondent being
     hit by limitation, once it is held that the gift deed was validly
     executed resulting in the absolute transfer of title in favour of the
     respondent, the same is not liable to be revoked, and as such
     the revocation deed is meaningless especially for the purposes
     of calculating the period of limitation for instituting the suit –
     Suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further
     relief for recovery of possession – When in a suit for declaration
     of title, a further relief is claimed, the relief of declaration would
     only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would
     be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed –
     Though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title
     is three years as per Art.58 but for recovery of possession
     based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the
     possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Art.65 –
     Thus, the suit for the relief of possession was not actually barred
     and the court of first instance could not have dismissed the entire
     suit as barred by time – No error or illegality on part of the first
     appellate court and the High Court in decreeing the suit of the
     respondent – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Limitation Act,
     1963 – Arts.58, 65. [Paras 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26]

                                Case Law Cited
     C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 67 :
     AIR 1961 SC 808 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Limitation Act, 1963.

                               List of Keywords
     Gift deed; Revocation; Revocation of gift deed; Revocation
     deed; Power to revoke gift deed; Execution of gift deed; Suit for
     declaration of title; Suit for recovery of possession; Acceptance;
     Disobedience of the object of the gift; Limitation; Transfer of title;
     Calculation of period of limitation.
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                               Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6333 of 2013
       From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2011 of the High Court of
       Madras in SA No. 1905 of 1997
                           Appearances for Parties
       Ms. T.Archana, K. K. Mani, Rajeev Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Vipin Kumar Jai, Mrs. Gurinder Jai, Ms. Sanjna Dua, Advs. for the
       Respondent.
                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                   Judgment
       Pankaj Mithal, J.
1.     Ms. T. Archana, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Vipin
       Kumar Jai, learned counsel for the respondent were heard at length.
2.     The plaintiff-respondent, Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries
       Board, instituted a suit for declaration of its title over the suit property
       measuring about 3750 square feet comprising in Survey No. 16/1
       situated in Kotlambakkam Panchayat, District Cuddalore and for
       recovery of its possession. The said suit was filed on the basis of
       a registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 allegedly executed by the
       defendant-appellant which was said to have been accepted by the
       plaintiff-respondent.
3.     The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court vide Judgment and order
       dated 23.08.1994 primarily on the ground that the alleged gift deed
       was not valid as it was never accepted and acted upon. Aggrieved
       by the aforesaid decision, the plaintiff-respondent preferred an appeal
       before the District Judge which was allowed vide Judgment and order
       dated 05.08.1997. The appellate Court reversed the judgment and
       order of the court of first instance and decreed the suit. The second
       appeal filed by the defendant-appellant was dismissed on 11.01.2011
       by the High Court. In decreeing the suit, the gift was held to be valid
       with a finding that it was acted upon and accepted and as such in
       the absence of any clause in the gift deed authorizing revocation,
       it could not have been revoked as alleged vide revocation deed
       dated 17.08.1987.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          955

     N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board


4.   The delay of 207 days in filing the Special Leave Petition was
     condoned and the leave to appeal was granted vide order dated
     05.08.2013. Thus, the civil appeal has come up for consideration
     before us.
5.   The moot question which arises for our consideration in this appeal
     is whether the registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 was duly acted
     upon and accepted and is a valid document which continue to exist
     despite its revocation on 17.08.1987 as the donor had not reserved
     the right to revoke the same.
6.   The registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 is Exhibit A-1. It has been
     executed by the defendant-appellant. A perusal of the gift deed
     reveals that the donor has gifted the suit property in favour of the
     plaintiff-respondent for the purposes of manufacturing of Khadi Lungi
     and Khadi Yarn etc., with the condition that the plaintiff-respondent
     shall not transfer the suit property for its own self-interest. The gift
     deed stipulates that neither the donor nor his legal heirs have any
     right or interest or will continue to have any right or interest in the
     suit property from the time and date of the gift deed. The gift deed
     further states that the gift is with full consent of the donor and that
     from the date of the gift itself, the plaintiff-respondent accepts the
     suit property for the use as aforesaid.
7.   A simple and complete reading of the aforesaid gift deed would
     reveal that the gift is absolute with no right reserved for its revocation
     in any contingency. The only purpose stipulated therein is that the
     property gifted shall be used for manufacturing Khadi Lungi and
     Khadi Yarn etc.
8.   It is worth noting that the gift deed itself states that from the date of
     the gift deed the suit property is accepted by the plaintiff-respondent
     for the purpose of manufacturing Khadi Lungi and Khadi Yarn etc.,
     which duly proves that the gift was accepted. It was also acted upon
     as pursuant thereof the plaintiff-respondent had applied for mutation
     to the revenue authorities. In addition to the above, the plaintiff-
     respondent issued a memo on 16.09.1983, Exhibit A-4 which also
     proves that the possession of the suit property was taken over and
     that it proceeded to raise construction thereon.
9.   Exhibits A-2 to A-4 prove that the possession of the suit property was
     taken over by the plaintiff-respondent on the date of the gift itself
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        which is sufficient evidence that the gift was acted upon and accepted
        by the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent, pursuant to
        the aforesaid gift deed and its acceptance has even applied to the
        revenue authorities for the mutation of its name which further fortifies
        the fact that the gift was duly accepted.
10. Considering the above, in view of the findings recorded by the
    first appellate Court and the High Court that the gift deed was
    duly acted upon and accepted by the plaintiff-respondent, the
    conclusion is that the said gift deed cannot be held to be invalid
    for want of acceptance. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid gift
    deed, the plaintiff-respondent acquired absolute right and title over
    the suit property.
11. Now the question arises as to whether the aforesaid gift deed has
    been validly revoked vide revocation deed dated 17.08.1987, and if
    so, what would be its impact upon the rights of the plaintiff-respondent
    in respect of the suit property.
12. No doubt, the gift validly made can be suspended or revoked under
    certain contingencies but ordinarily it cannot be revoked, more
    particularly when no such right is reserved under the gift deed.
    In this connection, a reference may be made to the provisions of
    Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 18821 which provides
    that a gift cannot be revoked except for certain contingencies
    enumerated therein.
13. It is important to reproduce Section 126 of the Act, which reads as
    follows:
                “126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.-
                The donor and donee may agree that on the happening
                of any specified event which does not depend on the will
                of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a
                gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or
                in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in
                part, as the case may be.



1      Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         957

    N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board


          A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want
          or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract,
          it might be rescinded.
          Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.
          Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect
          the rights of transferees for consideration without notice.”
14. Section 126 of the Act is drafted in a peculiar way in the sense
    that it contains the exceptions to the substantive law first and then
    the substantive law. The substantive law as is carved out from the
    simple reading of the aforesaid provision is that a gift cannot be
    revoked except in the cases mentioned earlier. The said exceptions
    are three in number; the first part provides that the donor and donee
    may agree for the suspension or revocation of the gift deed on the
    happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will
    of the donor. Secondly, a gift which is revocable wholly or in part with
    the agreement of the parties, at the mere will of the donor is void
    wholly or in part as the case may be. Thirdly, a gift may be revoked
    if it were in the nature of a contract which could be rescinded.
15. In simpler words, ordinarily a gift deed cannot be revoked except
    for the three contingencies mentioned above. The first is where
    the donor and the donee agree for its revocation on the happening
    of any specified event. In the gift deed, there is no such indication
    that the donor and donee have agreed for the revocation of the gift
    deed for any reason much less on the happening of any specified
    event. Therefore, the first exception permitting revocation of the
    gift deed is not attracted in the case at hand. Secondly, a gift deed
    would be void wholly or in part, if the parties agree that it shall
    be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor. In the
    present case, there is no agreement between the parties for the
    revocation of the gift deed wholly or in part or at the mere will of
    the donor. Therefore, the aforesaid condition permitting revocation
    or holding such a gift deed to be void does not apply. Thirdly, a
    gift is liable to be revoked in a case where it is in the nature of a
    contract which could be rescinded. The gift under consideration is
    not in the form of a contract and the contract, if any, is not liable to
    be rescinded. Thus, none of the exceptions permitting revocation
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       of the gift deed stands attracted in the present case. Thus, leading
       to the only conclusion that the gift deed, which was validly made,
       could not have been revoked in any manner. Accordingly, revocation
       deed dated 17.08.1987 is void ab initio and is of no consequence
       which has to be ignored.
16. The non-utilisation of the suit property for manufacturing Khadi
    Lungi and Khadi Yarns etc., the purpose set out in the gift deed, and
    keeping the same as vacant may be a disobedience of the object
    of the gift but that by itself would not attract the power to revoke
    the gift deed. There is no stipulation in the gift deed that if the suit
    property is not so utilised, the gift would stand revoked or would be
    revoked at the discretion of the donor.
17. In the end, we come to another limb of the argument that the suit as
    filed by the plaintiff-respondent is hit by limitation and as such the
    first appellate court and the High Court manifestly erred in decreeing
    the same.
18. In context with the point of limitation, the court of first instance has
    formulated issue no. 4 which reads as under: “Whether the suit is
    barred by limitation?”
19. Admittedly, the present suit for declaration and recovery of possession
    of the suit property was filed by the plaintiff-respondent on 25.09.1991.
    The court of first instance held that as the same was not filed within
    three years from the date of revocation of the gift deed, i.e., 17.08.1987
    (Exhibit B-2), the suit is barred by limitation.
20. Once it is held that the gift deed was validly executed resulting in
    the absolute transfer of title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the
    same is not liable to be revoked, and as such the revocation deed
    is meaningless especially for the purposes of calculating the period
    of limitation for instituting the suit.
21. The limitation for a suit for declaration is provided under Part III
    of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. It is governed by
    Articles 56-58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under all the
    aforesaid three Articles, the limitation for a suit for declaration is three
    years. The limitation provided under Articles 56 and 57 of the Schedule
    to the Limitation Act is in respect to declaration regarding forgery
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            959

    N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board


     of an instrument issued or registered and validity of the adoption
     deed. Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the
     limitation for decree of declaration of any other kind and therefore,
     the suit for declaration of title would essentially fall under Article 58 of
     the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the limitation would be three
     years from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
22. In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title
    rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be
    noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is
    claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would
    only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would
    be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The
    further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based
    upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of
    Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
23. In C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa And Ors2 it has been
    laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation
    would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further
    relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property
    would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues
    and subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for
    declaration would be a continuing right and there would be no limitation
    for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a
    right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.
24. Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of
    title is three years as per Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation
    Act but for recovery of possession based upon title, the limitation is
    12 years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes
    adverse in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
    Therefore, suit for the relief of possession was not actually barred
    and as such the court of first instance could not have dismissed the
    entire suit as barred by time.
25. No other point was raised and argued before us.



2   [1962] 1 SCR 67 : AIR 1961 SC 808
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26. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we
    do not find any error or illegality on part of the first appellate court
    and the High Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent.
27. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit.
28. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain