NARESH GOVIND VAZEversusGOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2007 INSC 1221
- Decided
- 4 December 2007
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the departmental inquiry was valid, the Rules have statutory force, the inquiry officer was properly appointed, the Evidence Act does not apply, and the compulsory retirement penalty stands.
Summary
Naresh Govind Vaze, a judicial officer of Maharashtra, was subjected to departmental disciplinary proceedings for alleged misconduct, including the use of intemperate language in representations to the High Court and other administrative lapses. A District Judge was appointed as the inquiry officer, who found the charges proved and recommended compulsory retirement under Rule 5(1)(vii) of the Maharashtra Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. Vaze challenged the order on grounds that the Rules were ultra‑vires, the inquiry officer was not a proper authority, the Evidence Act should apply, and that natural justice was violated by not summoning certain witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the Rules were framed under the proviso to Article 309 and thus have statutory force, the inquiry officer is not a court and the Evidence Act does not apply to departmental inquiries, the appointment of a District Judge was valid, and no breach of natural justice occurred. Consequently, the penalty of compulsory retirement was upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether departmental disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer constitute a judicial proceeding subject to Article 21 and the Evidence Act.
- Whether the Maharashtra Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 are ultra vires the Constitution.
- Whether a District Judge can be validly appointed as an inquiry officer in a departmental inquiry.
- Whether the failure to summon certain witnesses violated the principles of natural justice and the procedural requirements of Rule 8.
- Whether the penalty of compulsory retirement was justified under the applicable rules.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 309
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Subjects
Judgment
(
_(
i
NARESH GOVIND VAZE A
v.
GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
DECEMBER 4, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
Service Law-Judicial Officer-Disciplinary proceedings-On
charges inter alia ofusing intemperate language in representations to
High Court-Penalty ofcompulsory retirement-Held: Justified-The c
language used by the delinquent officer, does. not behove a judicial
officer-Order was not violative ofArticle 21 or the Rules or principles
ofNatural Justice-Appointment ofInquiry Officer was not faulty-
Provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable to departmental
proceedings nor is the Inquiry Officer a Court-Civil Service D
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules have been formulated under proviso to
Article 309 and thus have the force of a statute-Maharashtra Civil
Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979-rr. 5 (1) (vii) and 8-
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 21 and 309-Evidence Act,
1872-Principles ofNatural Justice. E
Departmental Proceedings-Nature of-Held: It is not a judicial
proceeding.
Evidence Act, 1872-Applicabilityof-To Departmental Inquiry
proceedings-Held: Not applicable. F
-1
Disciplinary committee of High Court, initiated departmental
proceedings against the appellant, a judicial officer. The changes
against him were that he was not discharging his duties; that in his
representation to the High Court regarding his transfer, he had used
intemperate language and other charges. District Judge was G
·1
appointed as the inquiry officer. He gave his report that the charges
were proved. Disciplinary Committee of High Court, in view of the
report, issued second show cause notice to the appellant. In
863 H
>
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A response to that, he used intemperate language. Penalty of
compulsory retirement from service as prescribed under Rule 5 (1)
(vii) of Maharashtra Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1982, was
imposed. Further2/3rd compulsory retirement pension as admissible
under Rule 100 of Maharashtra Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1982,
B was given to him. Pursuant to recommendation of High Court, State
Government passed the order dated 14.12.2005 accordingly. Writ
Petition thereagainst was dismissed by High Court. Hence the
present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1. Appellant was served with a memorandum of charges.
All the requisite documents were served upon him. He had also been
served with the list of witnesses. Before the inquiry officer, witnesses
were examined. Appellant had prayed for issuance of summons by
D the inquiry officer upon some Judges of the High Court. The same
was refused by the inquiry officer. The appellant, when questioned,
could not inform this Court as to for what purpose he intended to
examine the High Court Judges. Most of the charges levelled
against the appellant were in relation to use ofintemperate language
E in his representations. He even in his representation to the second
show cause notice had used such language which, does not behove
a judicial officer. Whereas independence and objectivity on the part
of a judicial officer is always welcome butthe same would not mean
that a judicial officer is free to use abusive or intemperate language
F against the High Court. He might have felt aggrieved while orders
of transfer were passed against him, but the same would not mean
that while making representations before the High Court he would
use such language. It is expected that a judicial officer would use
such language which behoves a judicial officer.
[Paras 15, 16 and 22) [869-C, D, E, F; 872-C]
G
2. Maharashtra Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1979, were framed under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the
Constitution of India. They have, thus, the force of a statute.
Moreover, appellant did not question the validity of the said Rules
H before the High Court. [Para 17] [869-F, G; 870-A]
NARESH GO VIND VAZE v. GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA 865
-1
3. The plea that the District Judge could not have been A
appointed as an inquiry officer by the High Court is again a contention
without any substance. By appointing a District Judge as an inquiry
officer, the High Court did not delegate its disciplinary power in his
favour as contended by the appellant. The District Judge being
superior in rank to the appellant could have been appointed as an B
-/.
inquiry officer by the High Court. [Para 18J [870-A, BJ
4. It cannot be said that the order of the State Government,
dated 14.12.2005 is ultra vires the Preamble as also Article 21 of
the Constitution oflndia. If the appellant has been found guilty of
commission of large number of misconducts, the same cannot be c
questioned on the ground of violation of Preamble as also Article
21 of the Constitution oflndia. [Para 19) (870-C, DJ
S. It is now a well-settled principle oflaw that the inquiry officer
{ appointed to enquire into the charges levelled against a delinquent D
officer is neither a court nor the provisions of the Evidence Act are
applicable. [Para 20) (870-EJ
6. The plea that the inquiry officer failed to comply with the
procedure for imposing penalties as laid down in Rule 8 of the said
Rules is equally without any merit. Only because the rule provides E
for summoning of the defence witnesses, the same would not mean
that the inquiry officer had no discretionary jurisdiction in this behalf.
An inquiry officer cannot summon witnesses far less the Judges of
the High Court who have nothing to do in the matter. The delinquent
officer must show that the witnesses to be summoned have F
"' something to do with the issues involved in the disciplinary
proceeding. It is evident that such a request was made only to
embarrass the inquiry officer. [Paras 21and22) [870-F; 871-A, BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5608 of G
2007.
'"!
From the Judgment and final Order dated 2.5.2006 of the High Court
of Bombay in Civil Writ Petition No. 1354 of2006.
Naresh Govind Vaze-Appellant-in-person. H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A S.K. Dholakia, S.S. Shinde, Sanjay Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair
and D.S. Mahra for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
B
2. Appellant herein is a judicial officer. His services were terminated
by the Government of Maharashtra on the recommendations made by the
High Court of Bombay relying on or on the basis of a report of an inquiry
officer appointed to inquire into the charges levelled against him.
C 3. Appellant joined the judicial service in the State of Maharashtra
on 16th November, 1995. His wife was also a judicial officer. She,
however, resigned in December, 2003.
4. In relation to orders of transfer passed against him, the appellant
D on various occasions had been issued several memos. It is not necessary
for us to deal therewith.
5. Several strictures were also passed against him, on the judicial
side. Several adverse remarks were also passed. A complaint was made
on 24th January, 2001 wherein the following allegations were made against
E the appellant, that he was in the habit of:
(a) "refusing to grant leave.
(b) Issuing notices intentionally
(c) Noting remarks in red ink in the service books of employees
F
(d) Insulting the employees
(e) Writing "not satisfactory work" in the report for increment and
not sending the said report within time.
(f) Rejecting the applications for grant ofG.P.F.
G
(g) Converting leave into leave without pay
(h) Insisting employees to produce medical certificates and
produce receipt of bills.
,,
(!) Threatening A~sistant Superintendent. ..
H
NARESH GO VIND VAZE v. GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA 867
[SINHA,J.]
6. The disciplinary committee of the High Court opined that a A
departmental proceeding should be initiated against him. Statement of
imputations, the charge sheet, list of witnesses and list of documents as
approved by the disciplinary committee were served upon him. The
imputation of charges served upon him are :
"(a) During his tenure at Patan, the Petitioner was not interested B
in discharging his duties and had submitted as many as six
representations for transfer, all of which were rejected.
(b) The Petitioner had used intemperate language while
communicating with the High Court under his representation dated c
02.05.2000.
(c) The Petitioner was in the habit of frequently leaving the
Headquarters, thereby causing inconvenience to Advocates and
litigants. The Petitioner used to behave whimsically and adamantly
and was harassing the litigants, Advocates and employees only with D
an intention to get transfer at a convenient place. The Petitioner
was unable to run the office administration effectively and smoothly
and had as such exhibited his incompetence in administrative
discharge of his duties."
E
7. The District Judge ofSatara was appointed as an inquiry officer.
He, having considered the materials on record, opined that inter alia all
the charges to the effect that while submitting his representation to the
High Court in regard to his transfer, he had used intemperate language
and had made allegations against the administrative authority, were F
proved. He was also found to have been harassing members of the Bar,
litigants and even members of the staff. It was opined that he was not in
a position to run the administration effectively and smoothly.
8. The disciplinary committee of the High Court, upon consideration
of the said report, in its meeting dated 16th August, 2004 decided to issue G
a second show cause notice to the appellant. In response thereto, he stated
to have been expecting such a notice from the disciplinary committee and,
thus, had no fear in his mind therewith. He further stated that 'if the High
Court wanted to dismiss him he would have nothing to say because he
was part of the judiciary and had been knowing that the disciplinary H
'
>
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A authority would take action against him'. He also contented that it was
the High Court who had persistently put him in difficulty by transferring
frequently and he was not bothered about any orders passed by the High
Court. He also threatened to initiate action against the High Court.
B 9. The representation made by the appellant was rejected by the
disciplinary committee in its meeting dated 22nd November, 2005. A
decision was taken to impose upon him a major penalty of compulsory
retirement from service as prescribed under Rule 5(1 )(vii) of the
Maharashtra Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (for short
C "the said Rules"). It was furthermore decided that 2/3rd compulsory
retirement pension as admissible under Rule 100 of Maharashtra Civil
Service (Pension) Rules, 1982 be given to him.
10. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the recommendations made
by the High Court, the State of Maharashtra issued an order dated 14th
D December, 2005 to that effect which was communicated to the appellant
on 16th December, 2005.
11. Appellant filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 8640 of2005 on
17th November, 2005 before the High Court. The same, however, was
E withdrawn on 21st December, 2005.
12. He filed another writ petition on 28th February, 2006 which was
marked as WP No. 1354 of2006 claiming a large number of reliefs. By
an order dated 2.05.2006, the Division Bench of the said Court issued a
limited notice in regard to the prayers made in clauses (h), (k), (t) and (z)
F and the first part of prayer (y) of para 17 of the writ petition.
13. The said writ petition has been dismissed by reason of the
impugned judgment.
14. Mr. Naresh Govind Vaze, Appellant, who appeared in person,
G inter alia questioned the constitutional validity of the Rules.
He also submitted that as a departmental proceeding is a judicial
proceeding and the inquiry officer is court, the provisions of the Evidence
Act would be applicable. According to him, in terms of Rule 8 of the
said Rules, it was obligatory on the part of the inquiry officer to summon
H
NARESH GO VIND VAZE v. GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA 869
[SINHA, J.]
the witnesses whom he intended to examine and the same having been A
refused, principles of natural justice were violated. It was also urged that
as he had filed an affidavit by way of defence statement and having not
been cross-examined on behalf of the High Court, the averments made
therein must be held to have been accepted by it and in that view of the
-~ matter the inquiry officer committed a serious error in holding him guilty B
of the charges levelled against him.
The High Court also committed a serious error, it was submitted,
insofar as it failed to exercise its power of judicial review.
15. Appellant is a judicial officer. Indisputably, he was served with c
a memorandum of charges. Ail the requisite documents were served upon
him. He had also been served with the list of witnesses. Before the inquiry
officer, witnesses were examined. Appellant had prayed for issuance of
summons by the inquiry officer upon some Hon'ble Judges of the High
Court of Bombay. The same was refused by the inquiry officer. On a D
querry made by us as to for what purpose he intended to examine the
High Court Judges and how the High Court Judges could have deposed
in his favour in relation to the charges framed against him, the appellant
had no answer. Most of the charges levelled as against the appellant were
in relation to use of intemperate language in his representations. He even E
in his representation to the second show cause notice had used such
language which, in our opinion, does not behove a judicial officer.
16. Whereas independence and objectivity on the part of a judicial
officer is always welcome but the same would not mean that a judicial
1
officer is free to use abusive or intemperate language against the High F
Court. He might have felt aggrieved while orders of transfer were passed
against him but the same would not mean that while making representations
before the High Court he would use such language. It is expected that a
judicial officer would use such language which behoves a judicial officer.
G
17. Appellant did not question the validity of the said Rules before
i
the High Court. There is even otherwise absolutely no ground therefor.
His contention before us that the said Rules having not been framed under
a substantive statute, the same is ultra vires is liable to be rejected as
the said Rules had been framed under the proviso appended to Article
H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 12 S.C.R.
A 309 of the Constitution oflndia. The said Rules have, thus, the force of
a statute.
18. Submission of the appellant that the District Judge Satara could
not have been appointed as an inquiry officer by the High Court is again
B a contention \Vithout any substance. By appointing a District Judge as an
inquiry officer, the High Court did not delegate its disciplinary power in
his favour as contended by the appellant. The District Judge being superior
in rank to the appellant could have been appointed as an inquiry officer
by the High Court. We, thus, do not see any reason to accept the
C contentions of the appellant in this behalf.
19. Appellant has gone to the extent of making a submission before
us that the notice dated 16th December, 2005 is ultra vires the preamble
as also Article 21 of the Constitution oflndia. We fail to understand as
to on what basis such a submission was made. Ifhe has been found guilty
D of commission of large number of misconducts, the same cannot be
questioned on the ground of violation of Preamble as also Article 21 of
the Constitution oflndia.
20. Similarly, submission of the appellant that the departmental
E proceeding being a judicial proceeding, the inquiry officer must be held
to be a court and the provisions of the Evidence Act would be attracted,
is equally meritless. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the inquiry
officer appointed to inquire into the charges levelled against a delinquent
officer is neither a court nor the provisions of the Evidence Act are
applicable.
F
21. Submission of the appellant that the disciplinary authority inquiry
officer failed to comply with the procedure for imposing penalties as laid
down in Rule 8 of the said Rules is equally without any merit.
Sub-rules (5), (6), and (7) of Rule 8 of the said Rules read, thus:
G
"(5)(a) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the r
disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the articles of
charge as are not admitted, or, if it considers it necessary as to
do, appoint, under sub-rule (2), an inquiring authority for the
H purpose, and where all the articles of charge have been admitted
NARESH GOVIND VAZE v. GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA 871
[SINHA,J.]
by the Government servant in his written statement of defence, the A
disciplinary authority shall record its findings on each charge after
taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner
laid down in Rule 9 of these rules;
(b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the
Government servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into B
the articles of charge or may, if it considers it necessary to do so,
appoint under sub-rule (2) of these rules an inquiring authority for
the purpose;
(c) Where the disciplinary authority appoints an inquiring authority c
.
~· it may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal
practitioner, to be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present the
case in support of the articles of charge before the inquiring
authority.
(6) The disciplinary authority shall where it is not the inquiring D
authority, forward to the inquiring authority-
(i) a copy of each of the articles of charge and the statement of the
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(ii) a copy of the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by E
the Government servants;
(iii) copies of statements of witnesses, if any, referred to in sub-
rule (3) of this rule;
(iv) evidence proving the delivery of the documents referred to in F
sub-rule (3) to the Government servant; and
(v) a copy of the order appointing the Presenting Officer.
(7) The Government servant shall appear in person before the
inquiring authority on such day and at such time within ten working G
days from the date of receipt by him of the articles of charge and
the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, as
the inquiring authority may, by a notice in writing, specify in this
behalf, or within such further time not exceeding ten days, as the
H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A inquiring authority may allow."
22. Appellant did not elaborate as to how the provisions of the said
Rules had not been followed. Only because the rule provides for
sununoning of the defence witnesses, the same would not mean that the
B inquiry officer had no discretionary jurisdiction in this behalf An inquiry
officer cannot summon witnesses far less the Judges of the High Court
who have nothing to do in the matter. The delinquent officer must show
that the witnesses to be summoned have something to do with the issues
involved in the disciplinary proceeding. It is evident that such a request
was made only to embarrass the inquiry officer. As indicated hereinbefore,
C the appellant, when questioned, could not inform us as to for what pmpose
he intended to examine the High Court Judges.
23. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in
this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at
D Rs. I 0,0001- (Rupees ten thousand only).
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
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