Holding

A failure to pass a reasoned order after the mandatory hearing under Section 20D(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 invalidates the subsequent declaration and acquisition steps, necessitating compensation for the affected land.

Summary

The appellants, land owners of about six kilometres of land in Surat, Gujarat, challenged the acquisition of 131 kilometres of land for the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, arguing that the Competent Authority failed to comply with Section 20D(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 by not passing a reasoned order after the personal hearing. The High Court dismissed their applications, holding that the procedural lapse did not invalidate the acquisition. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 20D(2) is a mandatory provision conferring a substantive right to a hearing and a reasoned order, and that the absence of such an order renders subsequent steps, including the declaration under Section 20E, invalid. However, to balance the public purpose of the railway project with the appellants' rights, the Court ordered compensation based on current market value for the six kilometres of land while leaving the acquisition of the remaining 125 kilometres undisturbed. The Civil Appeals were allowed, and the respondents were directed to compute and pay the compensation.

Issues considered

The Competent Authority complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 20D(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 in hearing and deciding objections.
Whether the absence of a reasoned order under Section 20D(2) invalidates the subsequent declaration and acquisition steps under Sections 20E and 20G.
What remedy, if any, is appropriate for the appellants given the procedural breach and the larger public purpose of the railway project.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 5-A, s. 6
Railways Act, 1989s. 20A, s. 20D, s. 20E, s. 20G

Subjects

land acquisitionRailways ActSection 20Dobjections hearingreasoned ordercompensationpublic purposeexpropriationnatural justice

Judgment

88 [2019]
SUPREME COURT 10 S.C.R. 88
REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI & ORS.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6270 of 2019)
B AUGUST 13, 2019
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Railways Act, 1989: ss. 20D – Hearing of objections – Non-
compliance of s. 20D(2) – Effect of – Acquisition of 131 kms of
land including 6 kms of land of the appellant for public purpose of
C
construction of a Special Railway Project-Western Dedicated Freight
Corridor in District Surat – Plea of the appellant-land owners that
no order was passed on the objections raised by them in accordance
with s. 20D(2) – Appellant sought quashing of the Notification issued
u/s. 20A and declaration issued u/s. 20E – Dismissal of the
D applications by the High Court – On appeal, held: Limited right
given to a land-owner/interested person to file objections, and be
granted a personal hearing u/s.20D cannot be reduced to an empty
formality, or a mere eye-wash by the Competent Authority –
Competent Authority was duty-bound to consider the objections
raised by the appellants, and pass a reasoned order reflecting
E
application of mind to the objections raised by the land-owners –
On facts, file noting contained in an internal office file, or in the
report submitted by the Competent Authority to the Central
Government, would not constitute a valid order in the eyes of law –
There was no order whatsoever passed rejecting the objections,
F after the personal hearing was concluded – Competent Authority
did not communicate the contents of the file noting to the appellants
at any stage of the proceedings – The said file noting recording
rejection of the objections only on the ground that the matter
pertained to an infrastructure project for public utility, came to light
when the matter was pending before the High Court, and the original
G
files were summoned – In any event, the order u/s. 20D(2) cannot
be passed prior to the personal hearing – In the absence of an
order passed u/s. 20D(2), the subsequent steps taken in the

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NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 89

acquisition would get invalidated – However, remaining stretch of A
land comprising of 125 kms on acquisition, stands vested in the
Government and pre-construction activity and earth work has been
completed on most parts of the stretch – In order to balance the
right of the appellants on the one hand, and the larger public
purpose on the other, the appellants to be compensated as per the
B
current market value of the land – Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is abundantly clear that in the absence of an
order being passed as contemplated by Section 20D of the
Railways Act, no further steps could have been taken by the C
Competent Authority in the acquisition in question. Section 20D
is a mandatory provision which confers a substantive and valuable
right on the land-owners, to object to the proposed acquisition,
before they are forcibly divested of their right, title and interest
in the land by an expropriatory legislation. The right to file
objections under Section 20D of the Railways Act, 1989 is pari D
materia to Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 even
though the scope of objections may be more limited. The
judgments rendered by this Court on the nature of the right to
object under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are equally applicable
to the Railways Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 20D mandates the E
Competent Authority to give the objectors an opportunity of
hearing, either in person or through a legal practitioner. The
Competent Authority after hearing all objections, and after making
such further enquiry, if any, is mandated to pass an order either
allowing or disallowing the objections. It has been held by this
Court that the rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the F
scheme of Section 5-A of the 1894 Act with a view to ensure that
before any person is forcibly deprived of his land by way of
compulsory acquisition, he must be provided with an opportunity
to oppose the decision of the Government; and that the hearing
given to a person must be an effective one, and not a mere G
formality. Formation of opinion with regard to the public purpose,
as also suitability thereof, must be preceded by application of
mind having due regard to the relevant factors. Section 5-A of

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90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 confers a valuable right on the
land-owners. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article
300-A of the Constitution, the right to raise and file objections
has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. [Para 10.1, 11]
[109-C-D; G-H; 110-A-F]
B 1.2 The limited right given to a land-owner/interested
person to file objections, and be granted a personal hearing under
Section 20D cannot be reduced to an empty formality, or a mere
eye–wash by the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority
was duty–bound to consider the objections raised by the
appellants, and pass a reasoned order, which should reflect
C application of mind to the objections raised by the land-owners.
In the instant case, there has been a complete dereliction of duty
by the Competent Authority in passing a reasoned order on the
objections raised by the Appellants. No order as contemplated in
the eyes of law was passed by the Competent Authority in deciding
D the objections raised by the appellants. A statutory authority
discharging a quasi-judicial function is required to pass a reasoned
order after due application of mind. [Para 11.1, 11.2] [112-D-H]
1.3 A valid order must be a reasoned order, which is duly
communicated to the parties. The file noting contained in an
E internal office file, or in the report submitted by the Competent
Authority to the Central Government, would not constitute a valid
order in the eyes of law. In the instant case, there was no order
whatsoever passed rejecting the objections, after the personal
hearing was concluded on 30.07.2011. The Competent Authority
did not communicate the contents of the file noting to the
F Appellants at any stage of the proceedings. The said file noting
came to light when the matter was pending before the High Court,
and the original files were summoned. The High Court, upon a
perusal of the files, came across the file noting recording rejection
of the objections only on the ground that the matter pertained to
G an infrastructure project for public utility. [Para 11.3] [119-A-H]
1.4 The respondents submitted that the mandate of the law
is that the order on the objections is required to be passed by
the Competent Authority “after the personal hearing” is granted.
The respondents had filed an Affidavit dated 17.07.2018 before
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NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 91

the High Court wherein it was stated that the reply given vide A
letter dated 15.07.2011 does not indicate the decision/order/pre-
determination of the Competent Authority. The Competent
Authority had informed the objectors to remain present with all
material documents at the time of personal hearing, the date of
which would be notified later. The Union of India submitted that
B
the letter dated 15.07.2011 was an order passed under Section
20D(2) of the Act. The stand taken by the respondents before
the High Court and this Court is completely contradictory, and
cannot be accepted. [Para 11.4] [120-G-H; 121-A-C]
1.5 In any event, the order under Section 20D(2) cannot be
passed prior to the personal hearing. The mandate of the law is C
that the order must be passed “after” the grant of personal
hearing, and after any further enquiry is made by the Competent
Authority. The whole process of granting a personal hearing would
be reduced to an empty formality and a farcical exercise, if the
order on the objections precedes the grant of personal hearing. D
This would be clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 20D(2)
of the Act. It is well settled that where a statute provides for a
thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in
that manner and in no other manner. The provisions of an
expropriatory legislation, which compulsorily deprives a person
of his right to property without his consent, must be E
strictly construed. The Railways Act, 1989 being an expropriatory
legislation, its provisions have to be strictly construed. [Para 11.5]
[121-D-G; 122-A]
1.6 The Competent Authority being a quasi–judicial
authority, is obligated by law to act in conformity with mandatory F
statutory provisions. This is the only opportunity made available
to a land–owner, as on submission of the Report to the Central
Government, there is no further consideration that takes place.
The Central Government acts upon the Report of the Competent
Authority, and issues the Declaration under Section 20E of the G
said Act. This is in contradistinction with the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act requires the satisfaction of Central Government before the
Declaration is issued. In the absence of an order passed u/s

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92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A 20D(2), the subsequent steps taken in the acquisition would
consequentially get invalidated. [Para 11.6, 11.7] [122-A-D]
1.7 The challenge before this Court has been made by the
appellants with respect to a stretch of land admeasuring
approximately 6 kms, out of the total stretch of 131 kms. The
B remaining stretch of land comprising of 125 kms has been
acquired, and stands vested in the Government. The respondents
have stated on affidavit that pre–construction activity and earth
work has been completed on most parts of the stretch.
Furthermore, most of the bridges are either in progress, or have
already been completed. Appellants’ counsel submitted that since
C the land was being acquired for a public utility project, his clients
would be satisfied if they were granted compensation by awarding
the current rate for acquisition of land. Admittedly, no mala fides
have been alleged by the appellants against the respondents in
the acquisition proceedings. The larger public purpose of a railway
D project would not be served if the Notification under Section 20A
is quashed. The public purpose of the acquisition is the
construction and operation of a Special Railway Project viz. the
Western Dedicated Freight Corridor in District Surat, Gujarat.
In these extraordinary circumstances, it is deemed fit to balance
the right of the appellants on the one hand, and the larger public
E purpose on the other, by compensating the appellants for the
right they have been deprived of. The interests of justice persuade
to adopt this course of action. In the instant case, the relief is
being moulded by granting compensation to the appellants, to be
assessed under Section 20G of the said Act as per the current
F market value of the land. The Competent Authority is directed
to compute the amount of compensation on the basis of the
current market value of the land, which may be determined with
reference to Section 20G(2) of the Act. [Para 12] [122-E-H]
1.8 With respect to the remaining 125 kms stretch of land,
G the land–owners were satisfied with the amount awarded, and
have not approached this Court. Under these circumstances,
despite the finding that the respondents have breached the
mandatory provisions of the Act, this is not a fit case to set aside
the entire acquisition proceedings. [Para 13] [124-B-C]

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NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 93

Union of India v. Shivraj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014] A
8 SCR 751 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 : [2005] 3 Suppl.
SCR 388 ; Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC
1 : [1998] 3 SCR 643 ; Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar
(2015) 10 SCC 241 : [2015] 11 SCR 179 ; Raghbir
B
Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792
: [2011] 14 SCR 1113 ; Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms
(P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2013) 4 SCC 210 : [2013]
5 SCR 645 ; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood
Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 : [2010] 10 SCR 1070
; Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395 C
: [1962] Suppl. SCR 713 ; Shanti Sports Club v. Union
of India (2009) 15 SCC 705 : [2009] 13 SCR 710 ;
Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA (2009) 1 SCC 180 :
[2008] 14 SCR 598 ; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State
of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322 : [1954]
D
SCR 1038 ; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964
SC 358 : [1964] SCR 485 ; J&K Housing Board v.
Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul (2011) 10 SCC 714 :
[2011] 14 SCR 976 ; Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P.
(2007) 5 SCC 85 : [2007] 4 SCR 409 ; Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1995) Supp (1) E
SCC 596 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 807 ; Khub Chand
v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074 : [1967] SCR
120 ; CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC
597 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 243 ; Indore Vikas
Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd.
F
(2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6 SCR 799 ; Savitri Devi v.
State of U.P. & Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 21 : [2015]
7 SCR 512 – referred to.
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426
– referred to.
G
Case Law Reference
[2014] 8 SCR 751 referred to Para 11
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 388 referred to Para 11

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94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A [1998] 3 SCR 643 referred to Para 11
[2015] 11 SCR 179 referred to Para 11.2
[2011] 14 SCR 1113 referred to Para 11.2
[2013] 5 SCR 645 referred to Para 11.2
B [2010] 10 SCR 1070 referred to Para 11.2
[1962] Suppl. SCR 713 referred to Para 11.3
[2009] 13 SCR 710 referred to Para 11.3
[2008] 14 SCR 598 referred to Para 11.3
C
[1954] SCR 1038 referred to Para 11.5
[1964] SCR 485 referred to Para 11.5
[2011] 14 SCR 976 referred to Para 11.5
[2007] 4 SCR 409 referred to Para 11.5
D
[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 807 referred to Para 11.5
[1967] SCR 120 referred to Para 11.5
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 243 referred to Para 11.5
[2007] 6 SCR 799 referred to Para 11.5
E
[2015] 7 SCR 512 referred to Para 12
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6270-
6273 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2018 by the High Court
F of Gujarat in Special Leave Application Nos. 19409/2015, 12711/2016,
14000/2016 and 14001/2016.
C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv., C. G. Sharma, Galav C. Sharma, Ms.
Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar Inayat, Arjun Singh, Nachiketa
Joshi, Advs. for the Appellants.
G
Sanjay Jain, ASG, Durga Dutt, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Arun Kumar
Yadav, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Ms. Indu Kaul, Ravi
Agrawal, A. P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Sanjeev Kr. Choudhary, Advs. for
the Respondents.

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NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 95

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
INDU MALHOTRA, J. Leave granted.
1. The present Civil Appeals have been filed to challenge the
Final Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2018 passed by the Gujarat High
Court, whereby the Special Civil Application Nos. 19409 of 2015, 12711
of 2016, 14000 of 2016, and 14001 of 2016 have been dismissed. B

2. Since a common issue arises in all 4 Civil Appeals, they are
being disposed of by the present common Judgment and Order.
3. The factual matrix in which the present Civil Appeals have
been filed is as under : C
3.1. On 08.02.2011, a Notification was issued under Section
20A of the Railways Act, 1989 [hereinafter referred to
as “the said Act”] by the Ministry of Railways notifying
its intention to acquire the lands specified in 18 Villages,
situated in District Surat, Gujarat for the public purpose D
of construction of the Western Dedicated Freight
Corridor. The total land under acquisition was a stretch
of 131 kms.
The land owned by the Appellants, comprising of
approximately 6 kms, was included under the Notification.
E
3.2. The Appellants along with other land-owners filed written
Objections between 06.04.2011 and 07.04.2011 under
Section 20D(1) of the Act before the Competent
Authority/ Special Land Acquisition Officer, Surat
[hereinafter referred to as “the Competent Authority”],
F
Surat to challenge the proposed acquisition.
3.3. The Competent Authority vide letter dated 15.07.2011,
informed the land-owners that the acquisition was for a
necessary public purpose i.e. the development of the
Western Dedicated Freight Corridor. It was stated that
compensation would be paid to all affected land-owners G
in accordance with Sections 20F and 20G of the Railways
Act, 1989.

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96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A The land-owners were asked to remain present with
necessary proofs at the time of personal hearing, the
date of which would be intimated to them.
3.4. The Competent Authority vide letter dated 19.07.2011,
directed the land-owners to appear for a personal hearing
B on the Objections on 30.07.2011.
3.5. The land-owners appeared before the Competent
Authority on 30.07.2011 for personal hearing, and
submitted further written Objections on 31.07.2011.
3.6. The Competent Authority submitted its Report to the
C Central Government under Section 20E(1) of the Act on
03.01.2012.
On 06.02.2012, the Ministry of Railways issued a
Notification under Section 20E(1) of the Railways Act,
1989 stating that 59 Objections had been received in
D respect of the proposed acquisition, which had been
considered and disallowed by the Competent Authority.
3.7. On 06.02.2013 and 07.02.2013, Awards were passed
by the Competent Authority under Section 20F of the
Railways Act, 1989.
E
3.8. On 13.08.2013, Shri Ghanshyamsinh Gambhirsinh Vashi,
a land-owner, filed an RTI Application before the
Competent Authority seeking a certified copy of the
Order passed on the Objections filed by the land-owners.
3.9. The Competent Authority replied to the said RTI
F
Application on 05.09.2013, and stated that the reply to
the Objections raised by the land-owners had already
been communicated vide letter dated 15.07.2011.
3.10. The Appellants herein challenged the acquisition
proceedings by filing Special Civil Application Nos. 19409
G of 2015, 12711 of 2016, 14000 of 2016, and 14001 of
2016 before the Gujarat High Court.
The principal ground of challenge raised by the
Appellants was that no Order had been passed on the
Objections in accordance with Section 20D(2) of the
H said Act.
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 97
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

The Appellants prayed for quashing and setting aside A
the Notification issued under Section 20A on 08.02.2011,
and the Declaration issued under Section 20E on
06.02.2012.
3.11. During the pendency of the proceedings, the High Court
vide Interim Order dated 12.07.2018, directed the B
Respondents to file an Affidavit giving specific details
pertaining to the disposal of the Objections after personal
hearing was granted on 30.07.2011.
3.12. The Chief Project Manager, Dedicated Freight Corridor
Corporation of India Limited filed Affidavit dated C
17.07.2018 on behalf of the Respondents before the High
Court, wherein it was stated that :
“4. I state that the clarification/reply given vide
letter dated 15/7/2011 does not indicate the
decision/order/predetermination of the Competent D
Authority. The Competent Authority has merely
clarified the purpose of acquisition and provision
of Railway Amendment Act 2008 to be considered
while awarding compensation. On the contrary,
in the said letter dated 15/7/2011, the Competent
Authority has clearly informed the objector to E
remain present with all the relevant documents on
a date which was to be intimated later.
…
8. I state that the Competent Authority, after F
hearing all the objectors of land under
acquisition, has passed two orders dated 28//11/
2011 and 3/1/2012 disallowing all the objections
raised by the objectors in public interest. Annexed
hereto and marked as Annexure VI Colly. Are the
copies of the orders dated 28/11/2011 as well as G
3/1/2012.”
3.13. The High Court vide Final Judgment and Order dated
25.07.2018 dismissed the Special Civil Applications filed
by the Appellants.
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98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A The Court took the view that in matters involving
highly technical and scientific fields, courts would be
extremely slow in overruling the decision taken by the
Government after due deliberation. Unless it was pointed
out that relevant considerations were not properly
weighed, or that the decision was blatantly mala fide,
B
courts would not attempt to substitute their understanding
of such complex subjects for that of the Government.
The Appellants failed to produce any material to support
their objection that the proposed railway line was not
advisable.
C It was, however, held that Section 20D of the Act
confers a valuable right on a person interested in the
land under acquisition, to raise objections, and be heard
on such objections. The objections raised by a person
interested have to be considered and disposed of, after
D a hearing is given by the competent authority. If the
objections received by persons interested have not been
disallowed by the competent authority, it would not be
open for the Central Government to proceed to issue
the Declaration under Section 20E(1) of the Act.
E The High Court recorded its concern about the manner
in which the entire matter was dealt with by the
Respondents. The land-owners were informed that their
objections were not valid even prior to the personal
hearing took place.

F After the personal hearing took place on 30.07.2011,
the Competent Authority disposed of the objections on
the office file, but never conveyed the decision to the
objectors. The Competent Authority had not fulfilled the
important stage of disposal of the objections prior to the
Declaration being issued under Section 20E.
G
It was further observed that the Competent Authority
gave a completely wrong reply to the RTI Application
filed by the land-owners. This was an act of utter
carelessness which had serious ramifications.

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NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 99
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

The Competent Authority vide Report dated A
03.01.2012, informed the Chief Project Manager,
Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limited
that all the Objections raised by the Appellants were
heard at length, and orally answered.
The Special Civil Applications were dismissed by the B
High Court, and the Competent Authority was directed
to pay Costs of Rs. 50,000/- in each of the Special Civil
Applications.
3.14. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the Appellant –
Land-owners filed the present Civil Appeals. C
4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and perused
the pleadings and written submissions filed by the parties.
5. Mr. C. A. Sundaram, Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellants inter alia submitted that :
D
5.1. The Objections raised by the Appellants were not decided
in accordance with the provisions of Section 20D(2) of
the Act. The non-compliance of the same would render
the entire acquisition proceedings null and void.
5.2. It was further submitted that the Reply dated 05.09.2013
E
given by the Respondents to the RTI Application filed
by the land-owners, clearly showed that there was no
application of mind on the part of the Respondents. The
said Reply simply stated that the Order disposing of the
Objections raised by the land-owners had already been
communicated to them on 15.07.2011. F
5.3. The letter dated 15.07.2011 cannot be construed to be
an Order as contemplated by Section 20D(2) of the Act,
since it was issued prior to the personal hearing which
took place on 30.07.2011, and filing of the final objections
on 31.07.2011. G
5.4. The letter dated 15.07.2011 was not an Order, but merely
a direction to the Appellants to remain present with
necessary proofs and documents at a time and date which
would be subsequently intimated.
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100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A 5.5. It was submitted that even though the land-owners were
granted a personal hearing, there was no order passed
either allowing or disallowing the objections as per the
mandate of S. 20 D(2) of the Act.
5.6. The orders dated 28.11.2011 and 03.01.2012 were not
B communicated to the land-owners. They were merely
notations made on the internal files of the Competent
Authority.
The rejection of the Objections vide an endorsement
or file noting would not constitute an order in the eyes of
C the law. An order passed by a statutory authority must
be a speaking order supported by cogent reasons, which
is required to be communicated to the objectors.
6. Mr. Sanjay Jain, Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
Union of India inter alia submitted that :
D 6.1. The land acquisition proceedings in the present case
have been undertaken in compliance with Chapter IV A
of the Railways Act, 1989.
6.2. Chapter IV A of the Railways Act, 1989 is a self-
contained code. The Court should not resort to, or seek
E the aid of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to interpret the
provisions of the Railways Act, particularly since Section
20N of the Act makes the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 inapplicable to acquisitions under
the Railways Act.
F 6.3. The process for filing objections under Section 20D(2)
of the Act is two-fold. First, the Competent Authority
permits objections to be filed within 30 days of the
publication of the Notification under Section 20A by the
Central Government notifying its intention to acquire land.
G Thereafter, the Competent Authority has the discretion
to call for a personal hearing in order to conduct a further
enquiry if deemed necessary.
6.4. In the present case, the Objections raised by the
Appellants were received in writing on 06.04.2011. The
H Competent Authority after considering the said
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 101
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

Objections, passed an Order on 15.07.2011 which was A
communicated to each of the Appellants. Thereafter,
personal hearing was granted on 30.07.2011, which was
in the nature of a further enquiry.
The Objections raised by the Appellants in the personal
hearing on 30.07.2011 were almost identical to those B
raised earlier on 06.04.2011. The Objections raised by
the Appellants had effectively been dealt with vide letter
dated 15.07.2011, which was communicated to each of
the Appellants.
6.5. It was further submitted that no order was required to C
be passed after the personal hearing dated 30.07.2011,
because no fresh material came on record.
7. The issues which arise for our consideration are :
i) Whether the provisions of Section 20D(2) have not been
complied with by the Competent Authority in the present D
case?
ii) If so, what would be the consequences of the non
compliance of Section 20D(2) with respect to the acquisition
proceedings, and the rights of the Appellants?
E
8. Relevant Statutory Provisions
To determine the issues raised by the Appellants in the present
proceedings, the statutory provisions of the Railways Act, 1989 as
amended in 2008, would require to be considered.
The statutory provisions for acquisition of land for a Special F
Railway Project are contained in Chapter IV A of the Railways Act,
1989. Chapter IV A is a complete self-contained code for the acquisition
of land.
Chapter IV A was incorporated vide Amendment Act 11 of 2008.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Railways (Amendment) G
Act, 2008 states that :
“2. There is a need to provide for land acquisition provisions
in the Railways Act, 1989 to empower the Central Government
in the Ministry of Railways for land acquisition on fast track
basis for the special railway projects on the lines of the land H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A acquisition provisions available in the National Highways Act,
1956.”
Chapter IV A comprises of Section 20A to 20P of the amended
Act. The relevant provisions under Chapter IV A are set out hereinbelow
for ready reference :
B “20A. Power to acquire land, etc.
(1) Where the Central Government is satisfied that for a public
purpose any land is required for execution of a special
railway project, it may, by notification, declare its intention
to acquire such land.
C
(2) Every notification under sub-section (1), shall give a brief
description of the land and of the special railway project for
which the land is intended to be acquired.
(3) The State Government or the Union territory, as the case
D may be, shall for the purposes of this section, provide the
details of the land records to the competent authority,
whenever required.
(4) The competent authority shall cause the substance of the
notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of
which shall be in a vernacular language.
E
20D. Hearing of objections, etc.
(1) Any person interested in the land may, within a period of
thirty days from the date of publication of the notification
under sub-section (1) of section 20A, object to the acquisition
F of land for the purpose mentioned in that sub-section.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1), shall be made to
the competent authority in writing, and shall set out the grounds
thereof and the competent authority shall give the objector
an opportunity of being heard, either in person or by a legal
G practitioner, and may, after hearing all such objections and
after making such further enquiry, if any, as the competent
authority thinks necessary, by order, either allow or disallow
the objections.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “legal
H practitioner” has the same meaning as in clause (1) of sub-
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 103
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

section (1) of section 2 of the Advocates Act, 1961(25 of A
1961).
(3) Any order made by the competent authority under sub-
section (2) shall be final.
20E. Declaration of acquisition
B
(1) Where no objection under sub-section (1) of section 20D
has been made to the competent authority within the period
specified therein or where the competent authority has
disallowed the objections under sub-section (2) of that section,
the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a
report accordingly to the Central Government and on receipt C
of such report, the Central Government shall declare, by
notification, that the land should be acquired for the purpose
mentioned in subsection (1) of section 20A.
(2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section
(1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government D
free from all encumbrances.
(3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been
published under subsection (1) of section 20A for its
acquisition, but no declaration under sub-section (1) of this
section has been published within a period of one year from E
the date of publication of that notification, the said notification
shall cease to have any effect:
Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the
period during which any action or proceedings to be taken
in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) F
of section 20A is stayed by an order of a court shall be
excluded.
(4) A declaration made by the Central Government under sub-
section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or by
any other authority. G
20G. Criterion for determination of market-value of land
(1) The competent authority shall adopt the following criteria
in assessing and determining the market-value of the land,—

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104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A (i) the minimum land value, if any, specified in the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899(2 of 1899), for the registration of sale deeds
in the area, where the land is situated; or
(ii) the average of the sale price for similar type of land situated
in the village or vicinity, ascertained from not less than fifty
B per cent, of the sale deeds registered during the preceding
three years, where higher price has been paid, whichever is
higher.
(2) Where the provisions of sub-section (1) are not applicable
for the reason that:—
C (i) the land is situated in such area where the transactions in
land are restricted by or under any other law for the time
being in force in that area; or
(ii) the registered sale deeds for similar land as mentioned in
clause (i) of sub-section (1) are not available for the preceding
D three years; or
(iii) the minimum land value has not been specified under the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899(2 of 1899) by the appropriate
authority, the concerned State Government shall specify the
floor price per unit area of the said land based on the average
E higher prices paid for similar type of land situated in the
adjoining areas or vicinity, ascertained from not less than
fifty per cent, of the sale deeds registered during the preceding
three years where higher price has been paid, and the
competent authority may calculate the value of the land
F accordingly.
(3) The competent authority shall, before assessing and
determining the market-value of the land being acquired under
this Act,—
(a) ascertain the intended land use category of such land;
G and
(b) take into account the value of the land of the intended
category in the adjoining areas or vicinity, for the purpose
of determination of the market-value of the land being
acquired.
H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 105
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

(4) In determining the market-value of the building and other A
immovable property or assets attached to the land or building
which are to be acquired, the competent authority may use
the services of a competent engineer or any other specialist
in the relevant field, as may be considered necessary by the
competent authority.
B
(5) The competent authority may, for the purpose of
determining the value of trees and plants, use the services of
experienced persons in the field of agriculture, forestry,
horticulture, sericulture, or any other field, as may be
considered necessary by him.
C
(6) For the purpose of assessing the value of the standing
crops damaged during the process of land acquisition
proceedings, the competent authority may utilise the services
of experienced persons in the field of agriculture as he
considers necessary.
D
20I. Power to take possession
(1) Where any land has vested in the Central Government
under sub-section (2) of section 20E, and the amount
determined by the competent authority under section 20F with
respect to such authority by the Central Government, the E
competent authority may, by notice in writing direct the owner
as well as any other person who may be in possession of
such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the
competent authority or any person duly authorised by it in
this behalf within a period of sixty days of the service of the
notice. F
(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any direction
made under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall
apply—
(a) In case of any land situated in any area falling within the
G
metropolitan area, to the Commissioner of Police;
(b) In case of any land situated in any area other than the
area referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of a district,

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106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A And such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may be, shall
enforce the surrender of the land, to the competent authority
or to the person duly authorised by it.
20J. Right to enter into land where land has vested in Central
Government
B Where the land has vested in the Central Government under
section 20E, it shall be lawful for any person authorised by
the Central Government in this behalf, to enter and do other
act necessary upo0n the land for carrying out the building,
maintenance, management or operation of the special railway
C project or part thereof or nay other work connected therewith.
20N. Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 not to apply
Nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to an
acquisition under this Act.”

D 9. The scheme of Chapter IV A is as follows :
i) The Central Government is empowered under Section
20A to issue a preliminary Notification, notifying its
intention to acquire land for a public purpose required
for the execution of a special railway project.
E ii) Section 20D provides for filing of objections and grant
of personal hearing. The provision is in two parts :
a) Sub-section (1) states that any person interested
in the land, may within a period of 30 days from
the date of publication of the notification under
F sub-section (1) of Section 20A, file objections to
the acquisition of land for the purpose mentioned
in that sub-section.
b) Under sub-section (2) of Section 20D, the
mandate of the statute is that :
G Every objection shall be made in writing to the
Competent Authority;
The Competent Authority is mandated to give an
opportunity of hearing to the Objector, either in
person or by a legal practitioner;
H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 107
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

That “after hearing” all objections, and after A
making such further enquiry, if any, the Competent
Authority may either allow or disallow the
objections by an order.
c) Sub-section (3) of Section 20D states that an
order passed by the Competent Authority under B
Section 20D (2) shall be final.
iii) Sub-section (1) of Section 20E provides that if no
objections are received, or if the objections are
disallowed, then the Competent Authority shall submit a
report to the Central Government. C
iv) On receipt of such report from the Competent Authority,
the Central Government shall declare by notification, that
the land should be acquired for the purpose mentioned
in sub-section (1) of Section 20A.
v) On the publication of the declaration under Section D
20E(1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central
Government free from all encumbrances.
vi) Sub-section (3) of Section 20E states that if the
declaration is not published within a period of one year
from the date of publication of the Notification under E
Section 20A(1), the Notification shall cease to have any
effect.
vii) Sub-section (4) of Section 20E states that the declaration
made by the Central Government under sub-section (1)
shall not be called in question in any court of law or by F
any authority.
9.1. A reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions shows
that the land-owner or interested person has been
granted a limited right to file objections under Section
20D of the Railways Act, 1989. The scope of the G
objections is limited to the purpose for which the
acquisition is made. It is not a general right to file
objections as under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894.
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A 9.2. The statute has mandated a strict procedure to be
followed under Section 20D with respect to the
submission and hearing of objections.
The statute mandates that the order is required to be
passed by the Competent Authority “after hearing” the
B land-owners. The order cannot precede the hearing of
objections. If an order is passed prior to the personal
hearing, and enquiry by the Competent Authority, it
would be contrary to the statute, invalid, and vitiated by
a pre-determined disposition.
C 10. In the present case, it is the admitted position that after the
personal hearing took place on 30.07.2011, no decision was passed on
the objections submitted by the land-owners, either allowing or disallowing
their objections; nor was any communication sent to them.
This is confirmed by the Affidavit of the Competent Authority
D dated 18.07.2018 filed before the High Court (pgs. 296 – 301, Volume
II), wherein it is stated as follows :-
“7. It is respectfully submitted that personal hearing was fixed
in between 30.07.2011 to 18.08.2011 and 21.10.2011 to
03.01.2012 and alongwith the objections raised by the
E petitioners, in total 88 objectors are given opportunity of
hearing in the aforementioned time period, and as the date
qua the present petitioners was fixed for providing hearing
on 30.07.2011, the personal hearing was provided wherein
the same kind of objections were raised as raised by way of
objection application dated 06.04.2011 and therefore the
F objection was recorded in the hearing memo dated 30.07.2011
and after completion of the hearing proceedings qua all the
objectors, on 28.11.2011 and 03.01.2012 respectively the
noting was prepared by endorsing that all the objections are
rejected and therefore the proposal was submitted before the
G Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation for further
procedure. I crave leave to produce the original file at the
time of hearing of the present matter.
8. It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that so far as
the averment regarding reply dated 05.09.2013 under RTI
application is concerned, I say and submit that the applicants
H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 109
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

have asked for certified copy of the decision taken for hearing A
provided to the objector, wherein vide reply dated 05.09.2013
the reply was given from the office of the answering respondent
by stating that “the reply to the objection application given
by you against Notification under the provisions of Section
20A of the Railway Amendment Act has already been given to
B
you by this office (copy is enclosed). Moreover, necessary
hearing in that behalf has also been afforded to you. No order
regarding objection application is passed after such hearing,
because reply regarding objection application has already
been given to you.”
(emphasis supplied) C

10.1. It is abundantly clear that in the absence of an order
being passed as contemplated by Section 20D of the
said Act, no further steps could have been taken by the
Competent Authority in the acquisition in question.
D
10.2. During the hearing of the Special Civil Applications, the
High Court called for the office files of the Respondent.
On a perusal of the files, the Court chanced upon a hand-
written note sent by the Competent Authority to the
Chief Project Manager, Dedicated Freight
Corridor Corporation of India Limited, which is set out E
hereinbelow :
“Finally after due consideration and taking in to
view the nationwide infrastructure, long lifetime
permanent utility and hence public utility is
greater than that of person, all the 59 objection F
were disallowed by order by the undersigned and
their applications for objection were filed at this
end.”
The file noting in the office files of the Competent
Authority cannot be considered to be an order on the G
objections.
11. Section 20D is a mandatory provision which confers a
substantive and valuable right on the land-owners, to object to the proposed
acquisition, before they are forcibly divested of their right, title and interest
in the land by an expropriatory legislation. H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A The right to file objections under Section 20D of the Railways
Act, 1989 is pari materia to Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 even though the scope of objections may be more limited.
The judgments rendered by this Court on the nature of the right to
object under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are equally applicable to the
B Railways Act.
Sub-section (2) of Section 20D mandates the Competent Authority
to give the objectors an opportunity of hearing, either in person or through
a legal practitioner.
The Competent Authority after hearing all objections, and after
C making such further enquiry, if any, is mandated to pass an order either
allowing or disallowing the objections.
There are a catena of judgments passed on Section 5-A of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which are relevant for the interpretation of
Section 20D(2) of the said Act.
D
This Court has held that the rules of natural justice have been
ingrained in the scheme of Section 5-A of the 1894 Act with a view to
ensure that before any person is forcibly deprived of his land by way of
compulsory acquisition, he must be provided with an opportunity to oppose
the decision of the Government.1
E
This Court has held that the hearing given to a person must be an
effective one, and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion with regard
to the public purpose, as also suitability thereof, must be preceded by
application of mind having due regard to the relevant factors.
Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 confers a valuable
F
right on the land-owners. Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300-A of the Constitution, the right to raise and file objections
has been held to be akin to a fundamental right.2
In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai,3
this Court held that:
G
“6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a
valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought
1
Union of India v. Shivraj, (2014) 6 SCC 564.
2
Ibid.
3
H (2005) 7 SCC 627.
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 111
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in A
Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its
power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of
property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must
be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor
must be paid.
B
…
9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective
one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regards
the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded
by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant C
factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its
decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in
law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers
a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has been
held to be akin to a fundamental right. D

(emphasis supplied)
In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held
that :
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a E
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in
accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects
such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such
right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” F
(emphasis supplied)
In Om Prakash v. State of U.P.,4 this Court held that :
“21. Our attention was also invited by Shri Shanti Bhushan,
learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to a decision of a
two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of State of Punjab G
v. Gurdial Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 471] wherein Krishna Iyer,
J. dealing with the question of exercise of emergency powers

4
(1998) 6 SCC 1.
H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A under Section 17 of the Act observed in para 16 of the Report
that save in real urgency where public interest did not brook
even the minimum time needed to give a hearing, land
acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles
14 and 19, burke an inquiry under Section 17 of the Act.
Thus, according to the aforesaid decision of this Court,
B
inquiry under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has
a flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of
the Constitution though right to property has now no longer
remained a fundamental right, at least observation regarding
Article 14, vis-à-vis, Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
C would remain apposite.
The said decision has been cited with approval in Union of
India v. Krishan Lal Arneja[(2004) 8 SCC 453].”
(emphasis supplied)
D 11.1. The limited right given to a land-owner/interested person
to file objections, and be granted a personal hearing under
Section 20D cannot be reduced to an empty formality,
or a mere eye-wash by the Competent Authority.
The Competent Authority was duty-bound to consider
E the objections raised by the Appellants, and pass a
reasoned order, which should reflect application of mind
to the objections raised by the land-owners.
In the present case, there has been a complete
dereliction of duty by the Competent Authority in passing
F a reasoned order on the objections raised by the
Appellants.
11.2. In the present case, it is the undisputed position that no
order as contemplated in the eyes of law was passed by
the Competent Authority in deciding the objections raised
by the Appellants.
G
A statutory authority discharging a quasi-judicial
function is required to pass a reasoned order after due
application of mind.

H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 113
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

In Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar,5 this Court held A
that :
“9. The importance of Section 5-A cannot be
overemphasised. It is conceived from natural
justice and has matured into manhood in the
maxim of audi alteram partem i.e. every person B
likely to be adversely affected by a decision must
be granted a meaningful opportunity of being
heard. This right cannot be taken away by a side
wind, as so powerfully and pellucidly stated in
Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964
SC 1217] . So stringent is this right that it C
mandates that the person who heard and
considered the objections can alone decide them;
and not even his successor is competent to do so
even on the basis of the materials collected by
his predecessor. Furthermore, the decision on the D
objections should be available in a self-
contained, speaking and reasoned order; reasons
cannot be added to it later as that would be akin
to putting old wine in new bottles. We can do no
better than commend a careful perusal of Union
of India v. Shiv Raj [(2014) 6 SCC 564 : (2014) E
3 SCC (Civ) 607] , on these as well as cognate
considerations.”
(emphasis supplied)
In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana,6 F
this Court held that :
“40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable
to make a list of the grounds on which the
landowner can persuade the Collector to make
recommendations against the proposed G
acquisition of land, but what is important is that
the Collector should give a fair opportunity of
hearing to the objector and objectively consider
5
(2015) 10 SCC 241.
6
(2012) 1 SCC 792. H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A his plea against the acquisition of land. Only
thereafter, he should make recommendations
supported by brief reasons as to why the
particular piece of land should or should not be
acquired and whether or not the plea put forward
by the objector merits acceptance. In other words,
B
the recommendations made by the Collector must
reflect objective application of mind to the
objections filed by the landowners and other
interested persons.”
(emphasis supplied)
C
In Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State
of Haryana,7 this Court held that,
“The ratio of the aforesaid judgments is that
Section 5-A(2), which represents statutory
D embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem,
gives an opportunity to the objector to make an
endeavour to convince the Collector that his land
is not required for the public purpose specified
in the Notification issued under Section 4(1) or
that there are other valid reasons for not
E acquiring the same. That section also makes it
obligatory for the Collector to submit report(s) to
the appropriate Government containing his
recommendations on the objections, together with
the record of the proceedings held by him so that
F the Government may take appropriate decision
on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that if
the appropriate Government is satisfied, after
considering the report, if any, made by the
Collector under Section 5-A(2) that particular
land is needed for the specified public purpose
G then a declaration should be made. This
necessarily implies that the State Government is
required to apply mind to the report of the
Collector and take final decision on the objections

7
H (2013) 4 SCC 210.
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 115
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

filed by the landowners and other interested A
persons. Then and then only, a declaration can
be made under Section 6(1).”
(emphasis supplied)
In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (supra), this
Court held that: B

“16. However, considerations of the objections
by the owner of the land and the acceptance of
the recommendations by the Government, it is trite,
must precede a proper application of mind on the
part of the Government. As and when a person C
aggrieved questions the decision-making process,
the court in order to satisfy itself as to whether
one or more grounds for judicial review exist, may
call for the records whereupon such records must
be produced. The writ petition was filed in the D
year 1989. As noticed hereinbefore, the said writ
petition was allowed. This Court, however,
interfered with the said order of the High Court
and remitted the matter back to it upon giving an
opportunity to the parties to raise additional
pleadings. E

…
19. Furthermore, the State is required to apply its
mind not only on the objections filed by the owner
of the land but also on the report which is F
submitted by the Collector upon making other and
further enquiries therefor as also the
recommendations made by him in that behalf. The
State Government may further inquire into the
matter, if any case is made out therefor, for
arriving at its own satisfaction that it is necessary G
to deprive a citizen of his right to property. It is in
that situation that production of records by the
State is necessary.
…
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A 28. Although assignment of reasons is the part of
principles of natural justice, necessity thereof may
be taken away by a statute either expressly or by
necessary implication. A declaration contained
in a notification issued under Section 6 of the
Act need not contain any reason but such a
B
notification must precede the decision of the
appropriate Government. When a decision is
required to be taken after giving an opportunity
of hearing to a person who may suffer civil or
evil consequences by reason thereof, the same
C would mean an effective hearing.”
(emphasis supplied)
In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed
Khan,8 this Court held that:
D “12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or
authority in support of its decision came up for
consideration before this Court in several cases.
Initially this Court recognised a sort of
demarcation between administrative orders and
quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time
E the distinction between the two got blurred and
thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing
point in the judgment of this Court in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 :
AIR 1970 SC 150]
F …
47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court
holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to
record reasons, even in administrative decisions,
G
if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons
in support of its conclusions.

8
H (2010) 9 SCC 496.
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 117
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to A
serve the wider principle of justice that justice
must not only be done it must also appear to be
done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid
restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of B
judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been
exercised by the decision-maker on relevant
grounds and by disregarding extraneous C
considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-making
process as observing principles of natural justice
by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by D
administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial
review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries
committed to rule of law and constitutional E
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions
based on relevant facts. This is virtually the
lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these F
days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions
serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors
have been objectively considered. This is
G
important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the
justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both
judicial accountability and transparency.
H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not
candid enough about his/her decision-making
process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
B (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,
clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or
“rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with
a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the
C sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial
powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone
to errors but also makes them subject to broader
scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of
Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law
D Review 731-37] .)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons
emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in
decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was
E considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See
Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR,
at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford
[2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European Convention
F of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and
intelligent reasons must be given for judicial
decisions”.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play
a vital role in setting up precedents for the future.
G Therefore, for development of law, requirement
of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence
and is virtually a part of “due process”.”
(emphasis supplied)

H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 119
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

11.3. File Notings and lack of Communication A
It is settled law that a valid order must be a reasoned
order, which is duly communicated to the parties. The
file noting contained in an internal office file, or in the
report submitted by the Competent Authority to the
Central Government, would not constitute a valid order B
in the eyes of law.
In the present case, there was no order whatsoever
passed rejecting the objections, after the personal hearing
was concluded on 30.07.2011.
It is important to note that the Competent Authority C
did not communicate the contents of the file noting to
the Appellants at any stage of the proceedings. The said
file noting came to light when the matter was pending
before the High Court, and the original files were
summoned. D
The High Court, upon a perusal of the files, came
across the file noting recording rejection of the objections
only on the ground that the matter pertained to an
infrastructure project for public utility.
In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 9 a E
Constitution Bench held that merely writing something
on the file does not amount to an order. For a file-noting
to amount to a decision of the Government, it must be
communicated to the person so affected, before that
person can be bound by that order. Until the order is F
communicated to the person affected by it, it cannot be
regarded as anything more than being provisional in
character.
Similarly, in Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India,10
this Court held that notings recorded in the official files,
G
by the officers of the Government at different levels,
and even the Ministers, do not become a decision of the
Government, unless the same are sanctified and acted
upon, by issuing an order in the name of the President or
9
AIR 1963 SC 395.
10
(2009) 15 SCC 705. H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A Governor, as the case may be, and are communicated to
the affected persons.
In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA,11 this Court
held that:
“14. It is trite to state that notings in a
B departmental file do not have the sanction of law
to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is
an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It
is no more than an opinion by an officer for
internal use and consideration of the other
C officials of the department and for the benefit of
the final decision-making authority. Needless to
add that internal notings are not meant for outside
exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an
executable order, affecting the rights of the
parties, only when it reaches the final decision-
D making authority in the department, gets his
approval and the final order is communicated to
the person concerned.
…

E 16. To the like effect are the observations of this
Court in Laxminarayan R. Bhattadv. State of
Maharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413] , wherein it was
said that a right created under an order of a
statutory authority must be communicated to the
person concerned so as to confer an enforceable
F right.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.4. Contradictory Stand taken by the Respondents
The mandate of the law is that the order on the
G objections is required to be passed by the Competent
Authority “after the personal hearing” is granted.
The Respondents had filed an Affidavit dated
17.07.2018 before the High Court wherein it was stated
11
(2009) 1 SCC 180.
H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 121
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

that the reply given vide letter dated 15.07.2011 does A
not indicate the decision/order/pre-determination of the
Competent Authority. The Competent Authority had
informed the objectors to remain present with all material
documents at the time of personal hearing, the date of
which would be notified later.
B
At the time of arguments before this Court, it was
sought to be contended by the Additional Solicitor
General for the Union of India that the letter dated
15.07.2011 was an order passed under Section 20D(2)
of the Act.
C
We find that the stand taken by the Respondents before
the High Court and this Court is completely contradictory,
and does not commend acceptance.
11.5. In any event, the order under Section 20D(2) cannot be
passed prior to the personal hearing. The mandate of D
the law is that the order must be passed “after” the grant
of personal hearing, and after any further enquiry is made
by the Competent Authority.
The whole process of granting a personal hearing
would be reduced to an empty formality and a farcical E
exercise, if the order on the objections precedes the grant
of personal hearing. This would be clearly contrary to
the provisions of Section 20D(2) of the Act.
It is well settled that where a statute provides for a
thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be F
done in that manner and in no other manner.12 The
provisions of an expropriatory legislation, which
compulsorily deprives a person of his right to property
without his consent, must be strictly construed.13 The

12
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 followed in Rao Shiv Bahadur G
Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh,
AIR 1964 SC 358 ; J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul, (2011) 10
SCC 714; Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2007) 5 SCC 85.
13
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 96; See also Khub
Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074;
CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 597.
H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A Railways Act, 1989 being an expropriatory legislation,
its provisions have to be strictly construed.14
11.6. The Competent Authority being a quasi-judicial authority,
is obligated by law to act in conformity with mandatory
statutory provisions. It is important to note that this is
B the only opportunity made available to a land-owner, as
on submission of the Report to the Central Government,
there is no further consideration that takes place. The
Central Government acts upon the Report of the
Competent Authority, and issues the Declaration under
Section 20E of the said Act.
C
This is in contradistinction with the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act requires the satisfaction of Central
Government before the Declaration is issued.
D 11.7. In the absence of an order passed under Section 20D(2),
the subsequent steps taken in the acquisition would
consequentially get invalidated.
12. The issue which remains to be decided is that in the absence
of an order passed on the objections under Section 20D, should the
E consequential steps be invalidated.
We find that the challenge before this Court has been made by
the Appellants with respect to a stretch of land admeasuring approximately
6 kms, out of the total stretch of 131 kms. The remaining stretch of land
comprising of 125 kms has been acquired, and stands vested in the
F Government. The Respondents have stated on Affidavit that pre-
construction activity and earth work has been completed on most parts
of the stretch. Furthermore, most of the bridges are either in progress,
or have already been completed.
The Senior Counsel representing the Appellants in all the present
Civil Appeals, after taking instructions from his clients, submitted that
G
since the land was being acquired for a public utility project, his clients
would be satisfied if they were granted compensation by awarding the
current rate for acquisition of land.
14
Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC
705.
H
NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. UNION OF INDIA 123
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

Admittedly, no mala fides have been alleged by the Appellants A
against the Respondents in the acquisition proceedings. The larger public
purpose of a railway project would not be served if the Notification
under Section 20A is quashed. The public purpose of the acquisition is
the construction and operation of a Special Railway Project viz. the
Western Dedicated Freight Corridor in District Surat, Gujarat.
B
In these extraordinary circumstances, we deem it fit to balance
the right of the Appellants on the one hand, and the larger public purpose
on the other, by compensating the Appellants for the right they have
been deprived of. The interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course
of action.
C
In Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors.,15 this Court held that:
“Thus, we have a scenario where, on the one
hand, invocation of urgency provisions under
Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right
to file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is D
found to be illegal. On the other hand, we have a
situation where because of delay in challenging
these acquisitions by the land owners,
developments have taken in these villages and in
most of the cases, third party rights have been
created. Faced with this situation, the High Court E
going by the spirit behind the judgment of this
Court in Bondu Ramaswamy and Others (supra)
came out with the solution which is equitable to
both sides. We are, thus, of the view that the High
Court considered the ground realities of the F
matter and arrived at a more practical and
workable solution by adequately compensating
the land owners in the form of compensation as
well as allotment of developed Abadi land at a
higher rate i.e. 10% of the land acquired of each
of the land owners against the eligibility and to G
the policy to the extent of 5% and 6% of Noida
and Greater Noida land respectively.”
(emphasis supplied)
15
(2015) 7 SCC 21. H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R.

A In the present case, the relief is being moulded by granting
compensation to the Appellants, to be assessed under Section 20G of
the said Act as per the current market value of the land. The Competent
Authority is directed to compute the amount of compensation on the
basis of the current market value of the land, which may be determined
with reference to Section 20G(2) of the Act.
B
13. With respect to the remaining 125 kms stretch of land, the
land-owners were satisfied with the amount awarded, and have not
approached this Court.
Under these circumstances, despite our finding that the
C Respondents have breached the mandatory provisions of the Act, we do
not think this is a fit case to set aside the entire acquisition proceedings.
The relief granted in the present case is confined to the Appellants
herein, and would not become a precedent for other land-owners who
have not challenged the acquisition proceedings before this Court.
D The Civil Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending
Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.
Ordered accordingly.

E Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.

F

G

H