NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLANversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                        (2011) 12 S.C.R. 84


A                NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN
                                  v.
                  STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                   (Civil Appeal No.3726 of 2011)
                           JULY 26, 2011
B
        [J.M. PANCHAL, DEEPAK VERMA AND DR. B.S.
                       CHAUHAN, JJ.]

          Land Acquisition - Construction of dam in the State of
C   M.P. - Re-settlement and Rehabilitation policy for oustees -
    Entitlement of oustee to claim land or compensation in lieu
    of the land acquired - Order dated 7-6-1991 passed by
    Narmada Valley Development Department (NVDD)
    amending Clause 5. 1 of the Re-settlement and Rehabilitation
D   Policy, 1991 (R & R Policy) - Challenge to - Held: The
    chronological development of amendment of R & R Policy
    reveals that Clause 3 of the R & R Policy provided for
    entitlement of oustees to get land in lieu of the land acquired
    - Clause 5 prescribed only the procel'ure for allotment of land
E   under Clause 3 of the R & R Policy - Amendment of R & R
    Policy on 7-6-1991 only facilitated those oustees who were not
    willing to take the land in lieu of the land acquired - Such
    amendment was brought on demand of the oustees as an
    alternative - However, it did not take away the right of the
F   oustees to claim land in lieu of the land acquired, for the
    simple reason that there was no amendment in year 1991 to
    Clause 3.2 of the R & R Policy and amendment to the said
    Clause 3.2 incorporated on 27.4.2002 is not under challenge
    - The amendment under challenge simply facilitated an
    oustee to claim compensation instead of land - This may be
G   for the reason that oustee may be willing to settle in another
    State or in urban area or want to adopt any other vocation!
    profession or want to start any other business - However, it
    did not take away the right of any oustee to claim land in lieu
    of the land acquired.
H                                  84
     NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                     85
              MADHYA PRADESH.
      Land acquisition - Construction of dam in the State of A
 M.P. - Re-settte_ment and Rehabilitation policy for oustees -
Entitlement of landless labourers to agricultural land - Held:
 The Re-settlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 1991 (R & R
Policy) made it clear that there was no provision for allotment
of agricultural land to the landless labourers - The appellant 8
mistakenly relied on the clearance letter by the Ministry of
Welfare to say that granting land to landless labourers was a
precondition for granting clearance to the project - Even if
allotment of land to landless labourers is regarded as a
condition, the Government of M.P. did not accept such a C
condition - The Ministry of Welfare's clearance was not
statutory, like any other statutory clearance e.g. clearance
granted by Environment and Forest Ministry - The Authorities
also treated the same as non-statutory - Thus, the
submission made by the appellant that landless labourers
were entitled for allotment of agricultural land to the extent of D
two hectares is devoid of any merit - Even otherwise, it does
not appeal to this Court that a landless labourer could be
entitled for allotment of agricultural land admeasuring two
hectares - Neither it had ever been contemplated nor it is
compatible with R & R Policy - Nor such land had ever been E
allotted to this class of persons.

    .· Administrative Law - Policy and Procedure - Procedure
for amendment of policy - Rules of business framed under
Article 166 of the Constitution - Rule 7 of the Business Rules,   F
Part II - Cases to be brought before the State Council of
Ministers - Issue as to whether the Council of Ministers was
permitted to delegate the power to amend its decision to a
Committee of Ministers consisting of the Ministers-in-charge
of the Departments concerned and the Chief Minister, and          G
whether such amendment needed to be consistent with the
Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the
Constitution - Held: Rules of Business were directory in nature
- Delegation of power was permissible - Constitution of India.
1950 - Article 166.
                                                                  H
    86      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 12 S.C.R.

A     In the year 1972, the State of Madhya Pradesh
  conceived a dam to provide irrigation facilities to farmers.
  In 1992, a detailed Project Report was prepared and
  submitted to the State Government and the Final Project
  Report was approved by Technical Committee of Central
  Water Commission in 1997. Clearance to the project was
8
  given by the Government of India. In 2002 the project was
  accorded Environmental and Forest clearance. The
  Cabinet of Ministers in its meeting approved payment of
  Special Rehabilitation Grant (SRG) to be paid to oustees,
C who would not ask for land in lieu of the land acquired.
  As a consequence thereof, order was issued to the same
  effect in the name of the Governor of the State of Madhya
  Pradesh. Construction of dam site commenced and was
  completed upto crest level in the year 2008; only gates
  were required to be installed so as to achieve full
D reservoir level of 317 metres, when Notification was
  issued regarding submergence of four villages.

       Appellant filed writ petition before High Court
  claiming various reliefs, inu:!r-alia, to stop further
E construction which may cause submergence so that
  displaced families are resettled and rehabilitated in 6
  months before the submergence; to direct Jtate
  Government to provide irrigated agricultural land to
  eligible oustees including encroachers and landless
F labourers; and to declare the order dated 7 .6.1991
  passed by Narmada Valley Development Department
  (NVDD) amending para 5.1 of the Re-settlement and
  Rehabilitation Policy, 1991 (R & R Policy) to be ultra vires
  and unconstitutional, being arbitrary and malafides.
G       The State Authorities opposed the writ petition
    contending that the validity of the R & R Policy had
    already been upheld by the courts; that landless
    labourers were not entitled for allotment of agricultural
    land; that the writ petition was filed at much belated stage,
H
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                    87
             MADHYA PRADESH
i.e. after completion of the dam; that appellant had an A
alternative efficacious remedy before the Grievance
Redressal Authority (GRA); that amendment in para 5.1
of the R & R Policy was only procedural, and carried out
legally and was thus valid; and that even otherwise the
amendment to para 5.1 was inconsequential because the s
allotment of land for the oustees is provided under
Clause 3 of the R & R Policy and amendment carried out
in Clause 3 of the Policy at subsequent stage had not
been challenged by the appellant.

     The High Court held that challenge to the validity of C
the amendment dated 7.6.1991 was belated and could not
be entertained; that the alternative remedy before the
GRA was efficacious and no extraordinary situation
prevailed warranting the High Court to interfere at such
a stage; that the landless labourers were not entitled for D
allotment of agricultural land; that the oustees had been
offered grant; that the value of their land had also been
assessed un_der the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and that
person aggrieved, if any, can approach the GRA if he is
not satisfied with the reliefs granted to him in terms of E
the R & R Policy.

     In the ·instant appeal, the appellant raised all the
issues which had been agitated before the High Court,
including the right of oustees for allotment of land in lieu    F
of land acquired and non-compliance of R&R Policy was
violative of fundamental rights of the oustees enshrined
in Article 21 of the Constitution. The appellant further
submitted that the amendment in Clause 5.1 of the R &
R Policy was null and void as it was not carried out in         G
accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section
21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as the
provisions of Article 166(2) and (3) of the Constitution;
that Clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy could not be amended
in violation of Rule 7(viii) of Part II of the Business Rules   H
    88      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A and that since the Ministry of Welfare, Government of
  India, had accorded clearance to the project with a clear
  understanding that landless labourers would also be
  allotted agricultural land and as the same had not been
  complied with, the High Court's judgment required
B interference.

      The appellant submitted that as the High Court did
  not consider the issue of amendment of Clause 5.1 of the
  R & R Policy and the effect of non-compliance of the
  condition imposed by the Ministry of Welfare while
C granting the clearance for the project, this court must
  examine the said issues. According to the appellant,
  while making the amendment the procedure prescribed
  under Article 166 of the Constitution was not followed
  and while granting the clearance, the Ministry of Welfare ,
D added the clause that families of the landless labourers
  would be given agricultural land to the extent of 2
  hectares which was not given.

         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E
         HELD:

    Amendment to Clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy:
       1.1. The chronological development of amendment
F of R & R Policy reveals that Clause 3 of the R & R Policy
  provided for entitlement of oustees to get land in lieu of
  the land acquired. Clause 5 prescribed only the procedure
  for allotment of land under Clause 3 of the R & R Policy.
  The amendment of R & R Policy on 7.6.1991 which is
G under challenge by the appellant only facilitates those
  oustees who were not willing to take the land in lieu of
  the land acquired. Such an amendment was brought on
  demand of thE~ oustees as an alternative. However, it
  does not take away the right of the oustees to claim land
H in lieu of the land acquired, for the simple reason that
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                  89
             MADHYA PRADESH
there was no amendment in year 1991 to Clause 3.2 of          A
the R & R Policy and the amendment to the said Clause
3.2 incorporated on 27.4.2002 is not under challenge. The
amendment under challenge simply facilitated an oustee
to claim compensation instead of land. This may be for
the reason that oustee may be willing to settle in another    B
State or in urban area or wants to adopt any other
vocation/profession or wants to start any other business.
However, it does not take away the right of any oustee
to claim the land in lieu of the land acquired. Therefore,
amendment to Clause 5.1 remains inconsequential so far        c
as the right of an oustee to claim land in lieu of the land
acquired is concerned. The appellant could not explain
that in case the amendment to Clause 5.1 dated 7.6.1991
stood struck down, what benefit could an oustee derive
from the same. [Para 12] [100-F-H; 101-A-C]                   D
     1.2. Since amendment to clause 5.1 of the R & R
Policy was inconsequential so far as entitlement of
allotment of agricultural land_jn lieu of land acquired was
concerned, grievance of the appellant that procedure
adopted for its amendment was not in conformity with          E
the Statutory/Constitutional requirement becomes purely
an academic issue, not required to be determined as the
appellant could not point out as what prejudice the said
amendment could cause to an oustee. However, as the
issue has been heard at length, it is desirable to decide     F
the same also. [Para 13] [101-D-F]
Procedure adopted for amendment:
    2.1. Rule 7 of the Business Rules, Part II provided for
the cases to be brought before the Council of Ministers.      G
Even function or duties which are vested in a State
Government by a statute may be allocated to ministers
by the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of
the Constitution. The decision of any minister or officer
under the Rules of Business made under Articles 77(3)
                                                              H
    90      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A   and 166(3) of the Constitution is the decision of the
    President or the Governor respectively and these Articles
    do not provide for 'delegation'. That is to say, that
    decisions made and actions taken by the minister or
    officer under the Rules of Business cannot be treated as
8   exercise of delegated power in real sense, but are
    deemed to be the actions of the President or Governor,
    as the case may be, that are taken or done by them on
    the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Whether
    there can be further delegation by the minister to the
C   officer subordinate to him depends on the provisions of
    the Rules of Business. [Paras 14, 18, 20, 21] [101-G-H;
    103-B-C; 104-E-F; 106-A]
      2.2. The issue here is whether tbe Council of
  Ministers is permitted to delegate the power to amend its
D decision to a Committee of Ministers consisting of the
  Ministers-in-charge of the Departments concerned and
  the Chief Minister, and whether such amendment needs
  to be consistent with the Rules of Business framed
  under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. The case
E law provides that delegation is permissible and that
  Rules of Business are directory in nature. In view of the
  above, delegation of power is permissible. [Para 30) [109-
  B-D]
         MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar & Ors. (2010) 11 SCC 37 4
F   - distinguished.
        R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore & Ors. AIR 1964 SC
    1823: 1964 SCR 368 - followed.
       Sampat Prakash v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir &
G Anr. AIR 1970 SC 1118: 1970 SCR 365; The State of Bihar
  v. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961 SC 221: 1961 SCR 728;
  State of U.P. & Ors. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti &
  Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1512: 1995 (2) SCR 1015; Samsher
  Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. AIR 1974 SC 2192: 1975
H (1) SCR 814; King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                    91
             MADHYA PRADESH
 1945 PC 156; Smt. Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The            A
 State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1128: 1964 SCR
 446; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta, AIR 1970
 SC 679: 1969 (3) SCC 775; Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v.
 Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 625: 2004 (6)
 Suppl. SCR 264; Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of           B
 Bombay & Ors. AIR 1952 SC 181: 1952 SCR 612; Mis.
 Crawford Bayley & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR
 2006 SC 2544: 2006 (3 ) Suppl. SCR 240 - referred to.
     Land to landless labourers:
       3.1. The issue of non-compliance of the clearance of     C
  the terms incorporated by the Ministry of Welfare has
  been elaborately dealt in the earlier judgment in
  Narmada Bachao Andolan Ill. So far as the present
  appeal in respect of Upper Beda Project is concerned,
  the rehabilitation policy for the oustees provided that the   D
  displaced families would be rehabilitated maintaining
  existing structure of social groups as far as possible, in
. the command area or near the periphery of.-the affected
  areas in accordance with their preferences. [Paras 31, 32]
  [109-E-G]                                                     E
     3.2. The R & R Policy policy makes it clear that there
was no provision for allotment of agricultural land to the
landless labourers. The appellant mistakenly relied on the
clearance letter by the Ministry of Welfare to say that         F
granting land to landless labourers was in and by itself
a precondition for granting clearance to the project. It is
impermissible in law to read a part of the document In
isolation. The document is to be read as a whole. The
letter of approval mentions "allotting a minimum of 2
hectares of land for all landless labourers" and says that      G
unmarried major daughters would be treated as separate
entities for that particular purpose, i.e. of allotting 2
hectares of land. The appellant never pleaded the cause
of unmarried major daughters to be treated as separate
entities for allotment of land. The issue of entitlement of     H
    92      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A   major sons and daughters of oustees for allotment of
    land has been already dealt with and answered in
    negative in Narmada Bachao Andolan Ill. [Paras 33, 36)
    [111-D-E; 113-A-C]
       3.3. Moreover, even if the allotment of land to
B landless labourers is regarded as a condition, the
   Government of M.P. did not accept such a condition. The
   Ministry of Welfare's clearance was not statutory, like any
   other statutory clearance e.g. clearance granted by
   Environment and Forest Ministry. There is nothing in
C that clearance as to what would be the consequence for
   non-compliance with those conditions. More so,
 · subsequent thereto, it is evident from the record that
   representations had been filed on behalf of the oustees
   before the Ministry of Welfare. However, no action had
D ever been taken by the Ministry of Welfare that the terms
   incorporated by it while gran.ing clearance were not
   being adhered to and in spite of writing several letters,
   the Ministry of Welfare did not consider it proper to take
   any action or even to refer those letters to the State
E Government or to the NVDD. Thus, the said Autt:iorities
   also treated the same as non-statutory. [Para 37) [113-D-
    G]
       3.4. In view of the above, the submission made by the
  appellant that landless labourers are entitled for allotment
F of agricultural land to the extent of 2 hectares is devoid
  of any merit. Even otherwise, it does not appeal to this
  Court that a landless labourer could be entitled for
  allotment of agricultural land admeasuring two hectares.
  Neither it had ever been contemplated nor it is
G compatible with R & R Policy. Nor such land had ever
  been allotted to this class of persons. [Para 37] [113-G-
  H; 114-A-8]
      Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. State of M.P. AIR 2011 SC
H 1989: 2011 (7) SCC 639 - referred to.
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                      93
             MADHYA PRADESH

                     Case Law Reference:                         A
 2011 (7) sec 639            referred to     Paras 4,6,6,
                                             31, 36
 1970 SCR 365                referred to     Para 15
                                                                 B
 1961 SCR 728                referred to     Para 18
 1964 SCR 368                followed        Paras 19,25,
                                             26, 30
 1995 (2) SCR 1015           referred to     Para 20             c
 1975 (1) SCR 814            referred to     Para 20
 1964 SCR 446                referred to     Para 23
 1969 (3) sec 775            referred to     Para 24
                                                                 D
 2004 (6 ) Suppl. SCR 264 referred to        Para 26
 1952 SCR 612                referred to     Para 27
 2010 (11) sec 374           distinguished Paras 28, 30
 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 240 referred to         Para 29             E

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3726 of 2011.

     From the Judgment & Order dated 16.12.2010 of the High      F
Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Jabalpur in W.P. No. 1360
of 2009.

    Gourab Banerji, ASG, P.S. Patwalia, Chittroopa
(Appallant-ln-Person), Sahil Tagotra, Arjun Krishnan, C.D.
Singh, Sunny Choudhary, Ajay Singh for the appearing parties.    G

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been
preferred against the judgment and order dated 16.12.2010        H
    94       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 12 S.C.R.

A passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur in Writ
  Petition No. 1360 of 2009.

        2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
    as under:
B     A. In the year 1972, the State of Madhya Pradesh
  conceived a dam to provide irrigation facilities to farmers of
  Khargone district. The dam, on filling upto full, would cause
  submergence of 1258.59 hectares of land, out of which
  1037.715 is private and 206.635 is government and 14.24
C hectares is forest land.

       8. On 10.1.1992, a detailed Project Report was prepared
  and submitted to the State Government and the Final Project
  Report was approved by Technical Committee of Central Water
0 Commission vide order dated 6.5.1997. Clearance to the
  project was given by the Government of India. It was on
  10.10.2002 that the project was accorded Environmental and
  Forest clearance.

       C. The Cabinet of Ministers in its meeting dated
E 4.10.2002 approved payment of Special Rehabilitation Grant
  (hereinafter called SRG) to be paid to oustees, who would not
  ask for land in lieu of land acquired. As a consequence thereof,
  order dated 28.12.2002 was issued to the same effect in the
  name of the Governor of the State of Madhya Pradesh.
F
       D. On 23.5.2004, construction of dam site commenced
  and was completed upto crest level in the year 2008; only gates
  were required to be installed so as to achieve full reservoir level
  of 317 metres. Subsequent thereto, Notification dated 5.3.2008
G was issued regarding submergence of four villages, namely,
  Sonud, Nimit, Bedhaniya and Khamid.

          E. Appellant approached the High Court by filing writ
    petition No. 1360 of 2009 claiming various reliefs, inter-alia, to
    stop further construction which may cause submergence so that
H
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                          95
    MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
displaced families are resettled and rehabilitated in 6 months        A
before the submergence; to direct State Government to
provide irrigated agricultural land to eligible oustees including
encroachers and landless labourers; to declare the order dated
7.6.1991 passed by Narmada Valley Development Department
(hereinafter called NVDD) amending para 5.1 of the Re-                B
settlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 1991 (hereinafter called
R & R Policy) to be ultra vires and unconstitutional, being
arbitrary and mala fides.

      F. The State Authorities opposed the writ petition
contending that the validity of the R & R Policy had already been     C
upheld by the courts; landless labourers were not entitled for
allotment of agricultural land; the writ petition was filed at much
belated stage, i.e. after completion of the dam; appellant had
an alternative efficacious remedy before the Grievance
Redressal Authority (hereinafter called GRA); amendment in            D
para 5.1 of the R & R Policy was only procedural, and carried
out legally and was thus valid; even otherwise the amendment
to para 5.1 was inconsequential because the allotment of land
for the oustees is provided under Clause 3 of the R & R Policy
and amendment carried out in Clause 3 of the Poljcy at                E
subsequent stage had not been challenged by the appellant.

     G. The High Court considered the rival submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties and held that challenge to
the validity of the amendment dated 7.6.1991 was belated and F
could not be entertained. The alternative remedy before the
GRA was efficacious and no extraordinary situation prevailed
warranting the High Court to interfere at such a stage. The
landless labourers were not entitled for allotment of agricultural
land. The oustees had been offered grant; the value of their land G
had also been assessed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter called 'the Act 1894'). Person aggrieved, if any,
can approach the GRA if he is not satisfied with the reliefs .
granted to him in terms of the R & R Policy. After taking the
aforesaid view, the High Court ·issued various directions
                                                                   H
    96       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011} 12 S.C.R.


A   including: to install radial gates, block sluice gates and to fill
    up dam upto 310 metres; when canal network is ready, the
    Government could approach the Court to fill up the dam to 317
    metres; the Government would ensure that land oustees were
    given benefits to which they are entitled under the R & R Policy
s   within four weeks; and that persons aggrieved, if any, were at
    liberty to agitate the grievances in respect of reliefs before the
    GRA.

         Hence, this appeal.

C       3. Ms. Chittaroopa Palit, representative of the appellant,
  has raised before us all the issues which had been agitated
  before the High Court, including the right of oustees for
  allotment of land in lieu of land acquired and non-compliance
  of R&R Policy is violative of fundamental rights of the oustees
D enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been
  submitted by her that the amendment in Clause 5.1 of the R &
  R Policy was null and void as it has not been carried out in
  accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 21
  of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as the provisions of
E Article 166(2) and (3) of the Constitution of India. Clause 5.1
  of the R & R Policy could not be amended in violation of Rule
  ?(viii) of Part II of the Business Rules. And that since the
  Ministry of Welfare, Government of India, has accorded
  clearance to the project with a clear understanding that landless
F labourers would also be allotted agricµltural land and as the
  same has not been complied with, the High Court's judgment
  requires interference.

       4. On the contrary, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior
  counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently
G opposed the appeal contending that Clause 5.1 of the R & R
  Policy deals with procedure only. Entitlement for allotment of
  land is provided under Clause 3.2 of the R & R Policy and as
  the amendment to the said clause was not challenged,
  amendment to Clause 5.1 remains inconsequential. Dam
H
      NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                         97
      MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

  construction started in year 2004 and compensation for land          A
  acquired had been determined much ago. By December .2002,
  the benefit of SRG had also been given to the oustees. The
  writ petition was filed in year 2008 after the dam stood fully
  constructed. At the time of filing the writ petition there was no
  challenge to Clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy, rather it was           B
1
  challenged seeking amendment by filing an application dated
  11.5.2010. Amendment to Clause 5.1 of R & R Policy has
  been in conformity with the Business Rules of the Government
  and all the orders in this respect had been passed in the name
  of the Governor. The Council of Ministers had delegated the          c
  power to the NVDD and to the Hon'ble Ministef for
  Rehabilitation and in case there was any difference between
  the said two Hon'ble Ministers, the matter would be referred to
  the Hon'ble Chief Minister. The law permits delegation of power
  to make routine changes in subordinate legislation. Therefore,
                                                                       0
  no fault can be found with the procedure adopted for
  amendment of Clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy. ·

      Mr. Patw<1lia further asserts that so far as the entitlement
 of relief in favour of landless labourers etc. is concerned, this
 Court has dealt with the issue in Narmada Bachao Ando/an              E
 v. State of M.P., AIR 2011 SC 1989 (hereinafter called
 "Narmada Bachao Andolan Ill") and all the issues agitated in
 this appeal have been answered in the said judgment. The
 appeal lacks merit. and is liable to be dismissed.
                                                                       F
       5. We have considered the rival submissions made by
  learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

      6. This Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an Ill (supra) has
  de~lt elaborately with most of the issues agitated in this appeal,
  particularly, the issues of delay and laches, availability of        G
  alternative remedy, entitlement of major sons and daughters of
  oustees/as well as the landless labourers for allotment of
  agricultural land. The issues of land acquisition, rehabilitation
  and resettlement of oustees considering their fundamental and
  constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 300-A of the             H
    98       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A Constitution of India have been dealt with elaborately therein.
  This Court held:-
         ''These cases are to be decided giving strict adherence
         to the R & R Policy, as amended on 3.7.2002, further
         considering that special care is to be taken where persons
B
         are oppressed and uprooted so that they are better off.
         Our Constitution requires removal of economic inequalities
         and provides for provision of facilities and opportunities
         for a decent standard of living and protection of economic
         interests of the weaker segments of the society and in
         particular Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Every
         human being has a right to improve his standard of living.
         Ensuring people are better off is the principle of socio-
         economic justice which every State is under obligation to
         fulfil, in view of the provisions contained in Articles 37, 38,
D        39(a), (b), (e), (f), 41, 43, 46 and 47 of the Constitution of
          India."

         Thus, the case in fact requires to be disposed of .i11 terms
    of the said judgment.                                  -
E
        7. Ms. Palit has submitted that as the High Court did not
  consider the issue of amendment of Clause 5.1 of the R & R
  Policy and the effect of non-compliance of the condition
  imposed by the Ministry of Welfare while granting the clearance
F for the project, this court must examine the said issues.

       According to Ms. Palit, while making the amendment the
  procedure prescribed under Article 166 of the Constitution has
  not been followed and while granting the clearance, the Ministry
  of Welfare has added the clause that families of the landless
G labourers would be given agricultural land to the extent of 2
  hectares which has not been given.

        Thus, this appeal is being considered to be restricted to
    these two issues.
H
     NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                        99
     MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Amendment to Clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy:                         A

     8. The NVDD vide Resolution dated 18.11.1987 proposed
liberal amended policy for the oustees of the Narmada Projects
and submitted the same for approval to the Cabinet of
Ministers, Government of Madhya Pradesh. The said proposal
                                                               8
was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, Government ofM.P.
on 25.11.1987. Subsequently, the NVDD vide Resolution dated
28.8.1989 proposed certain modifications in the rehabilitation
policy and the summary of the same was submitted for the
approval to the Cabinet of Ministers, Government of M.P. The
said proposal specifically provided for delegation of power to C
the NVDD and Rehabilitation Department to make routine/
general amendment in R & R Policy with the permission of the
Ministers-in-charge of the said two departments. The Council
of Ministers vide resolution dated 1.9.1989 approved the said
proposal.                                                      D

     9. Certain amendments were sought in R & R Policy vide
resolution dated 5.9.1989. The NVDD, in consultation with the
Rehabilitation ·Department and afte·r seeking approval of the
Ministers-in-charge of both the said Departments, amended            E
Clauses 4.1, 5.1 and 8.3 of the R & R Policy and issued the
amended policy on 7.6.1991 in the name of the Governor of
the State. The copy of the said amendment order was issued
to 44 officers concerned as is evident from the record. Clause
4.1 of the R & R Policy was amended to facilitate the tenure         F
holders, who were voluntarily willing to sell their lands, "as far
as possible" to alienate the same and further providing for
procedure for determination of reasonable price of such lands.
Clause 5.1 was amended to the effect that if an oustee family
does not wish to obtain land in lieu of the submerged land and       G
wishes full payment of the amount of compensation, it can do
so by submitting an application to this effect in writing to the
concerned Land Acquisition Officer. In such cases, the oustee
families would have no entitlement over allotment of land and
would be paid full amount of compensation. An option once            H
    100      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A exercised under this provision would be final, and no claim for
  allotment of land, in lieu of the land, acquired could be made
  afterwards. If any oustee family belonging to the Scheduled
  Tribes submits such an application, it will be essential to obtain
  orders from the Collector, who would after necessary enquiry
B certify that it would not adversely affect the interests of the
  oustee family. Such applications of the Scheduled Tribes
  oustee families could be accepted only after the said
  certification by the Collector. Clause 8.3 was also amended
  changing the size of plots to be allotted to the oustees etc.
c      10. Subsequently on 24.10.2002, NVDD submitted the
  summary to Council of Ministers for approval of SRG for
  oustees of Narmada Projects, particularly in respect of those
  oustees who were not claiming land in lieu of the land acquired,
  and the said proposal was approved by the Cabinet of
D Ministers. As a consequence, the order dated 28.12.2002 was
  issued giving effect to the said amendment in the name of the
  Governor of the State of Madhya Pradesh.

       11. On 27.4.2002, the amendment was made in Clause
E 3.2 of the R & R Policy putting the words "as far as possible"
  for allotment of agrlcultural land to the oustees in lieu of the
  land acquired.

       12. The aforesaid chronological development of
  amendment of R &. R Policy reveals that Clause 3 of the R & R
F Policy provided for entitlement of oustees to get land in lieu of
  the land acquired. Clause 5 prescribed only the procedure for
  allotment of land under Clause 3 of the R & R Policy. The
  amendment of R & R Policy on 7.6.1991 which is under
  challenge by the appellant only facilitates those oustees who
G were not willing to take the land in lieu of the land acquired. Such
  an amendment was brought on demand of the oustees as an
  alternative. However, it does not take away the right of the
  oustees to claim land in lieu of the land acquired, for the simple
  reason that there was no amendment in year 1991 to Clause
H 3.2 of the R & R Policy and the amendment to the said Clause
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                      101
    MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 3.2 incorporated on 27.4:2002 is not under challenge. The A
amendment under challenge simply facilitated an oustee to
claim compensation instead of land. This may be for the
reason that oustee may be willing to settle in another State or
in urban area or wants to adopt any other vocation/profession
or wants to start any other business. However, it does not take B
away the right of any oustee to claim the land in lieu of the land
acquired. Therefore, in our opinion, ·amendment to Clause 5.1
remains inconsequential so far as the right of an oustee to claim
land in lieu of the land acquired is concerned. Ms. Palit could
not explain that in case her averment was accepted and the C
amendment to Clause 5.1 dated 7.6.1991 stood struck down,
what benefit could an oustee derive from the same. In view of
the above, we do not find any force in the submissions made
on behalf of the .appellant on this count. ·

     13. In view of our conclusion reached herein that D
amendment to clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy was
inconsequential so far as entitlement of allotment of agricultural
land in liel!.Of land acquired was concerned, grievance of the
appellant that procedure adopted for its amendment was not
in conformity with the Statutory/Constitutional requirement E
becomes purely an academic issue, not required to be
determined as Ms. Palit could not point out as what prejudice
the said amendment could cause to an oustee. However, as
we have heard the issue at length, it is desirable to decide the
same also.                                                         F

Procedure adopted for amendment:

     14. Ms. Palit has submitted that the procedure adopted
for amendment of Clause 5.1 of the R & R Policy is not in
consonance with the provisions of Section 21 of the General G
Clauses Act, 1897 and Article 166 (2) and (3) of the
Constitution. Rule 7 of the Business Rules, Part II provided for
the cases to be brought before the Council of Ministers.
Clause (viii) thereof reads:-                              ·
                                                                  H
    102       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 12 S.C.R.


A         "Proposals to vary or reverse a decision previously taken
          at meeting of the Council".

        15. In Sampat Prakash v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir
    & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 1118, this Court held:-
B         "This provision (S.21) is clearly a rule of interpretation which
          has been made applicable to the Constitution in the same
          manner as it applies to any Central Act or Regulation ..... .
          As an example, under Article 77(3), the President, and,
          under Article 166(3) the Governor of a State are
C         empowered to make rules for the more convenient
          transaction of the business of the Government of India or
          the Government of the State, as the case may be, and for
          the allocation among Ministers of the said business. If, for
          the interpretation of these provisions, Section 21 of the
D         General Clauses Act is not applied, the result would be
          that the rules once made by the President or a Governor
          would become inflexible and the allocation of the business
          among the Ministers would forever remain as laid down
          in the first rules .. Clearly, the power of amending these
E          rules from time to time to suit changing situations must be
           held to exii>t a'ld that power can only be found in these
           articles by applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act".
         16. As the issue raised is of great public importance and
    Ms. Palit was not able to render proper legal assistance, we
F   requested Mr. Gourab Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor
    General who was present in the court to assist the court on two
    issues, namely:
          (1) Whether the State Council of Ministers is, as a matter
G         of law, permitted to delegate its power to a subordinate
          authority to amend its own decision.
          (2) Whether such amendment is to be consistent with the
          Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the
          Constitution of India.
H
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                       103
    MADHYA PRADESH .[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
     17. Mr. Banerjee has made the submissions citing large         A
number of judgments of this Court and contended that law
permits the delegation of power for amending the subordinate
legislation in view of the provisions of Articles 77 and 166 of
the Constitution.                  '
                                                                    B
     18. Even function or duties which are vested in a State
Government by a statute may be allocated to ministers by the
Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3). In the case of
The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 Sc
221, it was held as under:
                                                                    c
    "Section 3(1) of the Act confers the power of issuing
    notifications under it, not on any officer but on the State
    Government as such though the exercise of that power
    would be governed by the rules of business framed by the
    Governor under Art. 166(3) of the Constitution. But this        D
    does not afford any assistance to the appellant. The order
    of Government in the present case in expressed to be
    made "in the name of the Governor" and is authenticated
    as prescribed by Art. 166(2), and consequently "the validity
    of the order or instrument cannot be called in question on      E
    the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or
    executed by the Governor."

      19. In the said judgment, it was also observed that the
Governor remains responsible for actions of subordinates taken
in his name:                                                        F

    "The only point canvassed is whether it was an order made
    by the G.overnor or by some one duly authorised by him in
    that behalf within Art.154(1 ). Even assuming that the order
    did not originate from the Governor personally, it avails the   G
    State nothing because the Governor remains responsible
    for the action of his subordinates taken in his name. In King
    Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1945 PC 156
    already referred to, Lord Thankerton pointing out the
    distinction between delegation by virtue of statutory power     H
    104       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A         there and the case of the exercise of the Governor's power
          by authorised subordinates under the terms of S. 49(1) of
          the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding to Art.
          154(1), said:

          "Sub-section 5 of S. 2 (of the Defence of India Act, 1939)
B
          provides a means of delegation in the strict sense of the
          word, namely, a transfer of the power or duty to the officer
          or authority defined in the sub-section, with a
          corresponding divestiture of the Governor of any
          responsibility in the matter, whereas under S. 49(1) of the
c         Act of 1935, the Governor remains responsible for the
          action of his subordinates taken in his name.

          This last point is therefore without force and has to be
          rejected."
D
          (See also the decision of the Constitution Bench in R.
          Chitralekha v. State of Mysore & Ors., AIR 1964 SC
          1823).

       20. The decision of any minister or officer under the Rules
E of Business made under Articles 77(3) and 166(3) of the
  Constitution is the decision of the President or the Governor
  respectively and these Articles do not provide for 'delegation'.
  That is to say, that decisions made and actions taken by the
  minister or officer under the Rules of Business cannot be
F treated as exercise of delegated power in real sense, but are
  deemed to be the actions of the President or Governor. as the
  case may be, that are taken or done by them on the aid and
  advice of the Council of Ministers. In State of UP. & Ors. v.
  Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1512,
G this Court relied on the decision of the Seven-Judge Bench in
  Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 2192
  and held as under:

          "....Any action taken in the exercise of the executive power
          of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1)
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                      105
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
is taken by the Government of the State in the name of the     A
Governor as will appear in Article 166(1). There are two
significant features in regard to the executive action taken
in the name of the Governor. First, Article 300 states,
among other things, that the Governor may sue or be sued
in the name of the State. Second, Article 361 states that      B
proceedings may be brought against the Government of
the State but not against the Governor. The reason is that
the Governor does not exercise the executive functions
individually or personally. Executive action taken in the
name of the Governor is the executive action of the State.     c
Para 48 of the said judgment explains the position of law
in that behalf succinctly as follows:

"The President as well as the Governor is the constitutional
or formal head. The President as well as the Governor
exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by         D
or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his
Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor
is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his
functions in his discretion. Wherever the Constitution
requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor     E
for the exercise by the President or the Governor of any
power or function, the satisfaction required by the
Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the
President or Governor but the satisfaction of the President
or Governor in the constitutional sense in the Cabinet         F
system of Government, that is, satisfaction of his Council
of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the
Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions.
The decision of any Minister or officer under Rules of
Business made under any of these two Articles 77(3) and        G
166(3) is the decision of the President or the Governor
respectively. These articles did not provide for any
delegation. Therefore, the decision of a Minister or officer
under the Rules of Business is the decision of the
President or the Governor.';                                   H
    106       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A        21. Whether there can be further delegation by the minister
    to the officer subordinate to him depends on the provisions of
    the Rules of Business.

       22. Rules of Business operate even when a statute does
B not authorise sub-delegation. In King Emperor v. Sibnath
  Banerjee & Ors. (supra), the law was crystallised by the Privy
  Council holding that a provision permitting sub-delegation is
  merely supplementary and can be no ground for excluding the
  ordinary method by which the Government's executive business
  was carried on.
c
       23. The requirement of the Rules of Business must be
  complied with in order to give validity to the action or decision
  taken. In Smt. Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The State of
  Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1128, a Constitution Bench
D of this Court considered whether an order of preventive
  detention under the Defence of India Ordinance could have
  been passed in terms of the Rules of Business. While upholding
  the order of detention, the court held that the preventive
  detention could only be ordered by the minister who had been
E allocated the relevant subject which was the basis of the
  detention order.

         24. Earlier cases of this Court suggest that the Rules of
    Business are to be~ construed as directory so that substantial
F   compliance with them would suffice to uphold the validity· of the
    relevant order of the Government. (See: State of Uttar Pradesh
    v. Om Prakash Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 679)
      25. Similarly, in R. Chitralekha (Supra), a Constitution
  Bench of this Court had observed that it is settled law that the
G provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution are only directory
  and not mandatory in character. In paragraph 4 it was held as
  under:

          " ..... This view has been reaffirmed by this Court in
          subsequent decisions: see Ghaio Mal & Sons v. The State
H
   · NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                       107
     MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     of Delhi & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 65 and it is, therefore,           A
     settled law that provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution
     are only directory and not mandatory in character and, if
     they are not complied with, it can be established as a
     question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact
     by the State Government or the Governor."                       8
                                             (Emphasis added)

     26. The judgment in R. Chitralekha (supra) has been
subsequently cited for this proposition in Bannari Amman
Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC           C
625.

     27. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay &
Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181, a Constitution Bench of this Court held
that an omission to make and authenticate an executive
decision in the form mentioned in Article 166 does not make          D
the decision itself illegal, on the basis that its provisions were
directory and not mandatory.

     28. However, in the recent decision of MRF Ltd. v.
Manohar Parrikar & Ors., (2010) 11 SCC 374, a two-Judge              E
Bench of this Court has sought to distinguish the above
mentioned judgments and taken the view that in case there is
non-compliance of Business Rules framed under Article 166(3)
of the Constitution, the notification issued in violation of
Business Rules is void ab initio and all actions consequent          F
thereto are null and void. The court held:              ·

    "Thus, from the foregoing, it is clear that a decision to be
    the decision of the Government must satisfy the
    requirements of the Business Rules framed by the State           G
    Government under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the
    Constitution of India. In the case on hand, as has been
    noticed by us and the High Court, the decisions leading
    to the notifications do not comply with the requirements of
    the Business Rules framed by the Government of Goa
                                                                     H
    108       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A         under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution
          and the notifications are the result of the decision taken
          by the Power Minister at his level. The decision of the
          individual Minister cannot be treated as the decision of the
          State Government and the notifications issued as a result
          of the decision of the individual Minister which are in
B
          violation of the Business Rules are void ab initio and all
          actions consequent thereto are null and void."

        29. On the other hand, in Mis. Crawford Bayley & Co. &
  Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2544, a two-Judge
C Bench has accepted that the Rules of Business framed under
  Article 77 of the Constitution, which is analogous to Article 166,
  are directory and not mandatory, with the following
  observations:

D                "It was next contended with reference to the
          Allocation of Business Rules thRt the Central Government
          in the Urban Department can appoint an Estate Officer but
          in the present case, the Finance Department has
          appointed an Estate Officer which is in violation of the
          Allocation of Business Rules, 1961. Though the Division
E
          Bench dealt with this aspect exhaustively in its judgment
          and held that the provisions of the Business Rules are not
          mandatory and will not vitiate the appointment, we fully
          agree that the Rules of Business are administrative in
          nature for governance of its business of the Government
F
          of India framed under Article 77 of the Const~ution of India.
          In this connection, the Division Bench referred to the
          decision of this Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar
          v. The State of Bombay, (1952) SCR 612. There
          analogous Rules of Business framed by the State under
G         Article 166 of the Constitution of India came up for
          consideration and it was observed that they are directive
          and no order will be invalidated, if there is a breach
          thereof.... ".

H         30. We have considered the larger Bench judgment of this
    NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                        109
    MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Court in R. Chitralekha (supra) and taken note of the fact that       A
MRF Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable from the case at hand since
that case dealt with rules pertaining to financial implications for
which there were no provisions in the Appropriation Act, and
so the rules required mandatory compliance. Here, there is no
issue of financial repercussions. The issue here is whether the       B
Council of Ministers is permitted to delegate the power to
amend its decision to a Committee of Ministers consisting of
the Ministers-in-charge of the Departments concerned and the
Chief Minister, and whether such amendment needs to be
consistent with the Rules of Business framed under Article 166        c
of the Constitution of India. The case law provides that
delegation is permissible and that Rules of Business are
directory in nature. In view of the above, we find that delegation
of power is permissible. Submissions so made on behalf of the
appellant in this regard are preposterous.                            D

Land to landless labourers:
     31. So far as the issue of non-compliance of the clearance
of the terms incorporated by the Ministry of Welfare is
concerned, the issue has been elaborately dealt with by us in         E
earlier judgment in Narmada Bachao Ando/an Ill (Supra).
However, Ms. Palit has submitted that certain issues could not
be agitated in that case as the terms and conditions were
incorporated by the Ministry of Welfare (Government of India),
while granting the clearance dated 6.5.1997.                          F

     32. So far as the present appeal in respect of Upper Seda
Project is concerned, the rehabilitation policy for the oustees
provided that the displaced families would be rehabilitated
maintaining existing structure of social groups as far as
possible, in the command area or near the periphery of the            G
affected areas in accordance with their preferences.

     Relevant provisions of the R & R Policy read as under:

     "3.1   xxxxxx                                                    H
    110       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A         3.2 (a) Every displaced family from whom more than 25
          per cent of its land is acquired in revenue villages or forest
          villages shall be entitled to and be allotted land to the extent
          of land acquired from it, subject to provision in 3.2(b)
          below.
8
          (b) A minimum area of 2 hectares of land would be allotted
          to all the families whose lands would be acquired
          irrespective of whether government land is offered or
          private land is purchased for allotment.

c               Where more than 2 hectares of land is acquired from
          a family, it will be allotted equal land, subject to a ceiling
          of 8 hectares.

                xx xx xx
D               xx xx xx
          9.1 Special efforts will be made for the effective
          rehabilitation of landless di~placed families. Adequate
          arrangements will be made by the Narmada Valley
E         Development Authority for the up-gradation of existing
          skills or impartment of new skills so as to promote full
          occupational rehabilitation. In this regard, new opportunities
          emerging as a result of the project will be fully used for the
          benefit of the displaced families. Suitable provisions will
F         be incorporated in the tender document of Local
          Competitive Bidding (LCB) and other forms to ensure the
          employment of displaced persons. The Narmada Valley
          Development Authority will ensure appropriate
          arrangement for discharge of these responsibilities within
G         a stipulated time frame. In the interim time, special
          financial assistance will be given to supplement the
          income of the landless agricultural labourers and the
          landless scheduled castes and scheduled tribes oustee
          families for 3 years in descending order, which shall be
          in addition to the grant-in-aid mentioned in para 6. 1. This
H
   NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                      111
   MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    period of 3 years will be calculated from the payment         A
    year of the grant-in-aid under para 6.1. Thus, a landless
    oustee family will get a special income support amount
    of Rs. 2,250/-, Rs.5,500/- and Rs.2, 750/- in the second,
    third and fourth year of displacement, respectively. In
    addition, a further sum of Rs.12,500/- shall be kept in       B
    reserve for every landless oustee family and for earning
    livelihood or for purchase of productive assets. The above
    poverty line and the amount to be kept in reserve is also
    linked with special support amount and the reserve shall
    also be proportionately increased accordingly. For other      C
    landless families special financial assistance of
    Rs.19,500/- will be given for the purchase of productive
    assets."

    (Emphasis added)
                                                                  D
     33. The policy makes it clear that there was no provision
for allotment of agricultural land to the landless labourers.
However, ~en the project was placed before the Ministry of
Welfare, Government of India, it granted clearance on 6.5.1997
providing for allotment of minimum 2 hectares of land for all     E
landless labourers.

     34. Before the High Court the issue was raised and the
State Authorities while filing the counter affidavit replied as
under:
                                                                  F
          "Reply to para 5.4: While the approval and
    sanction as mentioned in the para under reply are not
    disputed, it is submitted that in so far as the said
    clearance (Annexure P-3) proceeds on the basis that 2
    hectares of land would be given to even a landless labour, G
    the same was represented against by the State
    Government by its letter dated 5.4.1997 ........ A bare
    perusa.1 of the said letter would show that the issue
    regarding the grant of minimum 2 hectares of land to all
    landless labourers was denied and it was pointed out that . H
    112       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011) 12 S.C.R.


A         the State has no such policy. It was also pointed out that
          such a policy was the prerogative of the State Government
          as "land" and "water" are State subjects appearing in
          entries 17 and 18 respectively of the State list of the Vllth
          Schedule of the Constitution of India. Thus, the State has
B         the exclusive power to frame R&R policies. It is also
          pertinent to mention here that the said provision of
          allotment of 2 hectares of land to all the landless labourers
          neither finds mention in the R&R policy of the State nor in
          the NWDT Award nor even in the National Resettlement
c         and Rehabilitation Policy, 2007. Thus, the petitioner's
          reliance on the letter dated 6.5.1997 is baseless and
          misconceived."

                                                  (Emphasis added)

D         35. Further vide letter dated 5.4.1997, the NVDD wrote
     to the Ministry of Welfare informing it that landless labourers
     had been proposed for giving them minimum 2 hectares of land
    -as per its clearance but action in this respect would be taken
    as per decision of the Government.
E
         36. We have also gone through the clearance letter dated
    6.5.1997 issued by the Ministry of Welfare. The relevant part
    of the said letter on which Ms. Pal it has placed strong reliance
    reads:
F               "In view of the fact that R&R Action Plan prepared
          is based on the R&R guidelines of N.V.D.A projects and
          since the R&R Action Plan has been modified to treat
          unmarried major daughters as separate entities for all
          R&R packages and for allotting a minimum of 2 hectares
G         of land for all landless labourers, I am directed to initiate
          the clearance for the R&R Action Plan of this project by
          this ministry"

                                                   (Emphasis added)
H
     NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF                        113
     MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

      It is impermissible in law to read a part of the document       A
in isolation. The document is to be read as a whole. The letter
of approval mentions "allotting a minimum of 2 hectares of
land for all landless labourers" and says that unmarried major
daughters would be treated as separate entities for that
particular purpose, i.e. of allotting 2 hectares of land. Ms. Palit   B
never pleaded the cause of unmarried major daughters to be
treated as separate entities for allotment of land. As noted
earlier, we have already dealt with and answered the issue of
entitlement of major sons and daughters of oustees for
allotment of land in negative in Narmada Bachao Ando/an Ill           c
(supra). Thereby, Ms. Palit mistakenly relied on the clearance
letter by the Ministry of Welfare to say that granting land to
landless labourers was in and by itself a precondition for
granting clearance to the project.

      37. Moreover, even if we regard the allotment of land to        D
landless labourers as a condition, the Government of M.P. did
not accept such a condition. The Ministry of Welfare's
clearance was not statutory, like any other statutory clearance
e.g. clearance granted by Environment and Forest Ministry.
There is nothing in that clearance as to what would be the            E
consequence for non-compliance with those conditions. More
so, subsequent thereto, it is evident from the record that
representations had been filed on behalf of the oustees before
the Ministry of Welfare. However, no action had ever been
taken by the Ministry of Welfare that the terms incorporated by       F
it while granting clearance were not being adhered to and in
spite of writing several letters, the Ministry of Welfare did not
consider it proper to take any action or even to refer those
letters to the State Government or to the NVDD. Thus, the said
Authorities also treated the same as non-statutory.                   G

    In view of the above, we do not find any cogent reason to
accept the submission made by Ms. Palit that landless
labourers are entitled for allotment of agricultural land to the
extent of 2 hectar~~· The said contention is devoid of any merit.     H
    114      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A Even otherwise, it does not appeal to us that landless labourer
  could be entitled for allotment of agricultural land admeasuring
  two hectares. Neither it had ever been contemplated nor it is
  compatible with R & R Policy. Nor such land had ever been
  allotted to this class of persons. The contention is hereby
B rejected.

        38. In view of the above, appeal lacks merit and is
    accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

       Before parting with the case, we record our deep sense
C of appreciation and thanks to Mr. Gourab Banerjee, learned
  Additional Solicitor General for India, for rendering assistance
  to the Court on our request.

    B.B.B.                                    Appeal dismissed.