Holding

The High Court's directions granting land to major sons and landless labourers are set aside; only displaced families who have not withdrawn SRG benefits and apply for land are entitled to agricultural land "as far as possible" under the R & R Policy.

Summary

The Supreme Court heard appeals by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Narmada Hydro Development Corporation challenging the High Court's interim orders in a public‑interest litigation filed by Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) concerning the Omkareshwar Dam. NBA sought land‑for‑land rehabilitation, inclusion of major sons as separate families for land allotment, and entitlement for landless labourers, but the Court found the writ petition lacked proper pleadings and material. The Court held that procedural rules apply to PILs, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction, and the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal award does not apply to the Omkareshwar project. It set aside the High Court's directions granting land to major sons and landless labourers, holding that major sons are not entitled to separate land allotments and landless persons have no claim to agricultural land under the R & R Policy. However, displaced families who have not withdrawn SRG benefits and who apply for land before the authority are entitled to agricultural land "as far as possible" under the R & R Policy, with the Grievance Redressal Authority as the appropriate forum. The appeals were allowed in part and the High Court's orders were modified and partly set aside.

Issues considered

The writ petition lacked sufficient pleadings and material to support its claims.
Whether the High Court could direct land‑for‑land rehabilitation, including landless labourers, under the R & R Policy.
Whether major sons of oustees are entitled to be treated as separate families for land allotment.
Whether the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal award applies to the Omkareshwar Dam project.
Whether the State may abandon acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the scope of acquisition for dwelling units.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21, s. Article 226, s. Article 300-A
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. Section 16, s. Section 17, s. Section 18, s. Section 4, s. Section 48, s. Section 50, s. Section 54
Madhya Pradesh Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R & R) Policy
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Act, 1956

Subjects

public interest litigationrehabilitationland acquisitionNarmada dammajor son entitlementlandless labourerprocedural lawlachesper incuriamas far as possibleGrievance Redressal Authority

Judgment

(20111 s s.-c.R. 443

NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2082 of 2011)
B
MAY 11, 2011
[J.M. PANCHAL, DEEPAK VERMA AND DR. B.S.
CHAUHAN, JJ.]

PLEADINGS: c
Pleadings...,. Writ petition by Narmada Bachao Ando/an,
as public interest litigation - Held: A party has to plead its
case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate
the averrnents made in the petition and in case the pleadings D
are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain
the pleas - It cannot be said that the rules of procedural law
do not apply in PIL - In the instant case, there were no
pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ
petition could be entertained/decided - Thus, it was liable to E
be rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition
suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to
substantiate the avermentslallegations contained therein -
Besides, there was no explanation as to under what
circumstances the High Court had been approached at such F
belated stage - In fact for redressal of any grievance
regarding implementation of the Rehabilitation &
Resettlement Policy, the oustees ought to have approached
the Grievance Redressal Authority - High Court ought not to
have examined any issue other than relating to rehabilitation
i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy - Constitution of India, G
1950- Article 226 - Writ petition - Delay I Laches - Remedy
- Alternate remedy - Public Interest Litigation.

443 H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:
Articles 21 and 14 - Hydro Electric Projects -
Omkareshwar Dam in the basin of river Narmada - Land
acquisition and rehabilitation of oustees - Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Policy framed by state of Madhya Pradesh -
B Providing for allotment of land and other benefits to oustees-
Policy amended on 30. 7. 2003 providing that agricultural land
would be offered to oustees 'as far as possible' - Expressions
'as far as possible' and 'rehabilitation' - Connotation of- Held:
The R & R Policy or amendment thereto in 2003, has not
C been under challenge. Relief not sought by the patty cannot
be granted by the Court - However, in terms of the
amendment dated 3. 7.2003, it is desirable for the authority
concerned to ensure that as far as practicable persons who
had been living and carrying on business or other activity on
D the land acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to •·
purchase and comply with the rf-quirements be given a piece
of land on the terms settled with due regard to the price at
which land has been acquired from them - However, the State
Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate
E accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority
concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of
providing alternative land considering the facts and
circumstances of each case - In cerlain cases, the oustees
are entitled to rehabilitation - Rehabilitation is meant only
F for those persons who have been rendered destitute because
of a loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land
acquisition - The definition of "displaced family" cannot be
read in isolation, rather it requires to be considered taking into
account the eligibility criteria for allotment of land in Clause
(5) of the R & R Policy - To that extent, the judgment of the
G High Courl is liable to be set aside - The direction given by
the High Courl in paragraph 64 (i) of the judgment, is modified
to the extent that the displaced families who have not
withdrawn SRG benefits/ compensation voluntarily and submit
applications for allotment of land before the Authority
H concerned, shall be entitled to the allotment of agricultural
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 445
MADHYA PRADESH
land "as far as possible" in terms of the R & R Policy, and for A
that purpose, the authorities must make some government or
private land available for allotment to such oustees if they opt
for such land and agree to ensure compliance with other terms
and conditions stipulated therein - Maxims - "lex non cogit
ad impossibilia" , "impossibilium nu/la obligatio est", 8
"impotentia excusat legem" and "nemo tenetur ad
impossibilia".

Articles 300-A and 21 - Compensation for property
acquired and rehabilitation -
c
Concepts of - Explained.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE:

Rehabilitation and resettlement - Oustees of Omkarshwar
Dam - HELD: As regards the issue of land for land, it has to D
be decided taking into consideration the totality of the
circumstances - These cases are to be decided giving strict
adherence to the R & R Policy, as amended on 3. 7. 2003,
further considering that special care is to be taken where
persons are oppressed and uprooted so that they are better E
off - Mere payment of compensation to the oustees may not
be enough - In case the oustee is not able to purchase the
land just after getting the compensation, he may not be able
to have the land at all - In the process of development, the
State cannot be permitted to displace tribal people, a F
vulnerable section of our society, suffering from poverty and
ignorance, without taking appropriate remedial measures of
rehabilitation - In regard to the amended provisions of the R
& R Policy, the phrase "as far as possible" would come into
play, in case an attempt is made to acquire/purchase lands G
and then to make allotment of land to oustees.

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:

Rights and obligations, and locus of public interest litigant
H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A - Hydro-electric projects - Omkareshwar Dam in the basin
of river Narmada - Writ petition under public interest litigation
filed by Narmada Bachao Ando/an stating that the tenure
holders had already been dispossessed and land vested in
the State - Held: The 'rights' of the public interest litigant in a
PIL are always subordinate to the 'interests' of those for whose
8
benefit the action is brought - The status of dominus litis
could not be conferred unreflectively or for the asking, on a
PIL petitioner as that would render the proceedings
·vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which
might, in conceivable cases be used by persons for personal
C ends resulting in prejudice to the public weal - The courts
expect a public interest litigant to discharge high standards
of responsibility - Negligent use or use for oblique motives
is extraneous to the PIL process - A person seeking relief in
public interest should approach the court of Equity, not only
D with clean hands but also with a clean mind, clean heart and
clean objective - A petition containing misleading and
inaccurate statement(s), if filed, to achieve an ulterior
purpose, amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court -
Further, a false statement made in the court or in the
E pleadings, intentionally to mislead the Court and obtain a
favourable order, amounts to criminal contempt, as it tends
to impede the administration of justice - In the instant case,
the NBA has not acted with a sense of responsibility and so
far succeeded in securing favourable orders by misleading
F the court - Such conduct cannot be approved - However, in
a P/L, the Court has to strike a balance between the interests
of the parties - The court has to take into consideration the
pitiable condition of oustees, their poverty, inarticulateness,
illiteracy, extent of backwardness, unawareness also - It is
G desirable that in future the court must view any presentation
by the NBA with caution and care, insisting on proper
pleadings, disclosure of full facts truly and fa:rly and in case
it has any doubt, refuse to entertain the NBA - However,
considering the interests of the oustees, it may be desirable
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 447
MADHYA PRADESH
that the court may appoint Amicus Curiae to present their A
cause, if such a contingency arises - 'Jure naturae aequum
est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri
locupletiorem', Juri ex injuria non oritur' and 'suppressio veri
and suggestio falsi'.
8
PRECEDENT:

Reliance upon a judgment- Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Policy for oustees of Omkareshwar Dam - Term
'family'- Connotation of - Held: Court should not place
reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual C
situation fits in with a fact-situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analysing
all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and
argued on both sides - A judgment may not be followed in a
given case if it has some distinguishing features - A little D
difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of
difference to the precedential value of a decision - The
NWDT Award did not provide for allotment of agricultural land
to the major sons of such oustees - The Narmada Bachao
Ando/an-/ has been decided with presumption that such a E 1

right had been conferred upon major sons by the NWDT
Award and Narmada Bachao Ando/an-II has been decided
following the said judgment and interpreting the definition of
"family" contained in the R & R Policy - When the two earlier
cases were being considered by the Court, it had not been F
brought to its notice that the NWDT Award did not provide for
such an entitlement - The courts are not to perpetuate an
illegality, rather it is the duty of the courts to rectify mistakes
- In view of the principles of 'per incuriam', the "quotable in
law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in ignorance of a G
Statute or other binding authority - Direction given by the
High Court to allot agricultural land to major sons of the
oustees in Paragraph 64 (iii) of the impugned judgment is set
aside - Principle of 'per inquiriam'- Constitution of India, 1950
- Article 14.
H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894:

Hydroelectric Project - Omkareshwar Dam -
Rehabilitation of oustees - Landless labourers - Held: As the
landless labourers never had any land, they are not entitled
to any compensation under the Act, thus, the question of
8
allotment of land to them would not arise - The R & R Policy
itself provides that such persons are entitled to get the
specified amount of Rs.49,3001- to buy productive
employment creating assets etc., and such money can also
C be used for acquiring land.
s. 48 - Denotification of acquisition - Land in respect of
which acquisition proceedings initiated not likely to submerge
- Government abandoning the acquisition proceedings - The
stand of the NBA was that tenure-holders were not in
D possession - On the direction of Supreme Court, the District
Judge reported that tenure holders were in actual possession
of the land - Expression 'taking possession of the land' -
Explained - Law on the issue summarised - HELD: The State
is entitled to abandon the land acquisition proceedings in
E exercise of its power uls 48 of the Act - However, it shall not
apply to 167 dwelling units on the said land - Such persons
whose dwelling units are acquired shall be entitled for the
benefit of R & R Policy to the extent provided therein.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
F
Government policy - Judicial review of, through public
interest litigation- Held: A public policy cannot be challenged
through PIL where the State Government is competent to
frame the policy - The wisdom and advisability of the policies
G are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the
policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions
or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power - In the instant
case, it was not desirable for the High Court to make any
comment on the competence of the State of amend the
H policy.
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 449
MADHYA PRADESH

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: A

Interpretation of Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy
framed by Government- Held: The Court while interpreting
the provisions of a Statute, can neither add nor subtract a word
- The Court has to interpret a provision giving it a construction 8
agreeable to reason and justice to all parties concerned,
avoiding injustice, irrationality and mischievous
consequences - In the instant case, the directions of the High
Court regarding land-for-land would lead to grave inequity, and
thereby likely to cause undue enrichment of some categories C
of oustees - The High Court, therefore, fell into an error by
proceeding to assume that a major son would be treated to
be a separate family for the purpose of allotment of land also
- Thus, the policy must be interpreted to the effect that the
major sons of oustees will be entitled to all the benefits under
the R & R Policy, except a/location of agricultural land - D
Maxim: "a verbis legis non est recedendum".
On construction of Omkareshwar Dam in the basin
of river Narmada, 30 villages in State of Madhya Pradesh
1
were expected to submerge at the full reservoir level of E
196.6 meter. The State Government framed a
rehabilitation and resettlement policy (R & R Policy) for
the oustees of all the Narmada Projects. The policy
provided for allotment of a minimum of two hectares of
agricultural land; irrigational facilities at government cost; F
grant-in-aid for small and marginal farmers and SC/ST
families, and to meet the entire cost of the allotted land.
The policy was amended from time to time and by
amendment dated 3.7.2003 it was provided that
agricultural land would be offered to the oustees "as far G
as possible" and not to those who would make
application in writing to receive compensation for their
acquired land. The displaced persons were allegedly not
offered the land under the R & R Policy, as amended on
3. 7.2003, rather compensation for their land was H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A deposited in their accounts. When the decision was taken
to raise the height of the dam, Narmada Bachao Andolan
(NBA), flied a writ petition before the High Court seeking
a number of reliefs. The High Court issued a large
number of directions as interim measures including the
B direction for allotment of land in lieu of the land acquired
and to treat the major sons of the family as independent
families for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land.

State of Madhya Pradesh and the Narmada Hydro
C Electric Development Corporation filed CA Nos. 2115 and
2116 of 2011 contending that the High Court ought not
to have entertained the writ petition as it did not have
material facts/particulars disclosing any cause of action
to the writ petitioners even in the PIL; that not a single
order passed by any statutory authority had been
D challenged and the writ petition was filed after inordinate
delay without furnishing any explanation for the same;
that Grievance Redressal Authority (GRA) had been
constituted to consider grievances of the oustees and not
a single oustee approached the GRA before filing of the
E writ petition; that the High Court erred in treating the
major son of such an oustee as a separate family for the
purpose of allotment of agricultural land, though he did
not have any independent right to claim compensation
for the land acquired; that land for allotment to such
F oustees was not available and the State authorities could
not be asked to do an impossible task.

The State of Madhya Pradesh and the Narmada
Hydro Development Corporation also filed C.A. Nos.
G 2083-2012 of 2011 challenging the order of the High
Court whereby it allowed the applications of the NBA and
directed the State to rehabilitate the oustees so far as the
land measuring 284.03 hectares in the five villages,
namely, Dharadi, Nayapura, Guwadi, Kothmir,
H Narsinghpura was concerned and not to withdraw the
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 451
MADHYA PRADESH
acquisition proceedings in respect of the. said area. A
C.A. No. 2082 of 2011 was filed by the writ petitioner
NBA claiming allotment of agricultural land to landless
oustees and that the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal
- award dated 12.12. 1979 (NWDT award) be made 8
applicable to the project of the Omkareshwar Dam and
that the oustees of five villages, which were submerged,
were entitled to allotment of land in lieu of land acquired
inspite of the fact that the SRG had already been granted
to them. ci
Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD:

C.A. Nos. 2015-2016 of 2011
D
1.1. It is a settl~d proposition of law that a party has
to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence
to substantiate the averments made in the petition and
in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is
under no obligation to entertain the pleas. It cannot be E
said that the rules of procedural law do not apply in PIL.
[Para 7 and 1OJ [481-D; 482-G-H]
I

Bharat Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., 1988(2)
Suppl. SCR 1050=AIR 1988 SC 2181; Larsen & Toubro Ltd. F
& Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 1988 (2) SCR 339=AIR 1998
SC 1608; Mis Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh,
2001 (3) SCR 124 =AIR 2001 SC 1684; Rajasthan Pradesh
V.S. Sardarshahar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 2010 (1)
SCR 252 =AIR 2010 SC 2221; Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by
L.Rs. v. Bishun Narain Inter-College & Ors., 1987 (2) SCR G
805 =AIR 1987 SC 1242; Kalyan Singh Chauhan v. C.P.
Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127; Rural Litigation and Entitlement
Kendera v. State of U.P., 1988 Suppl.; SCR 690 =AIR 1988
SC 2187; A. Hamsaveni & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu &
Anr., 1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 404 =(1994) 6 SCC 51; Ashok H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A Kumar Pandey it. State of West Bengal, AIR 2004 SC 280;
Prabir Kumar Das v. State of Orissa & Ors., 2003 (5) Suppl.
SCR 716 =(2005) 13 SCC 452; and A. Abdul Farook v.
Municipal Council. Perambalur, 2009 (11) SCR 727 =(2009)
15 sec 351 - relied on.
B
1.2. In the instant case, in the writ petition, an
impression had been given that some drastic steps would
be taken by the authorities which would cause great
hardship to a large number of persons and urgent
measures were required to be taken by the Court in order
C to mitigate the sufferings of the people. However, the writ
petition did not disclose the factum of how many persons
had already vacated their houses and handed over the
possession of their land. There was no material before
the High Court to adjudicate upon the issues involved.
D There were no pleadings before the High Court on the
basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/
decided. Thus, it was liable to be rejected at the threshold
for the reason that the writ petition suffered for want of
proper pleadings and material !o substantiate the
E averments/allegations contained therein. Even in the case
of a PIL, such a course could not be available to the writ
petitioners. [Para 12- 13) (483-E-G; 484-F]

1.3. The construction of the dam started in October
F 2002 and was completed in October 2006. No objection
had ever been raised by NBA at any stage. The Narmada
Development Authority by order dated 28.3.2007 gave
permission to National Hydraulic Development
Corporation to raise the water level of the dam to 189
G meters upon showing that rehabilitation of oustees of 5
villages adversely affected at 189 meters, had already
been completed. The writ petition was filed praying for
restraining the appellants from closing the sluice gates
of the dam contending that resettlement and rehabilitation
H was not complete. There was no explanation as to under
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 453
MADHYA PRADESH
what circumstances the High Court had been A
approached at such belated stage. In fact, for redressal
of any grievance regarding implementation of the R & R
Policy, the oustees ought to have approached the GRA.
There is nothing on record to show how many oustees
remained unsatisfied/aggrieved of the orders passed by B
GRA till the fmng of the writ petition. Thus, the High Court
ought not to have examined any issue other than relating
to rehabilitation i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy.
[para 14, 16 and 17] [484-G-H; 485-A-B; 486-0-E]

Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., C
2000(4) Suppl. SCR 94 = (2000) 10 SCC 664; State of
Maharashtra v. Digambar, 1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 492 =(1995)
4 SCC 683; and Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India
& Ors., 2005 (2) SCR 840 =(2005) 4 SCC 32 -referred to.
D
1.4. The R & R Policy or amendment thereto in 2003,
has not been under challenge. Relief not sought by the
party cannot be granted by the Court. It was not desirable
for the High Court to make any comment on the
competence of the State to amend the policy and the E
finding so recorded in Para 38 of the judgment cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law, and thus is set aside. [Para
86] [524-8-C]

1.5. In view of the fact that neither the writ petitioner F
asked the High ·court to quash the amendment dated
3.7.2003, nor has the High Court suo motu quashed it, nor
has the writ petitioner filed Special Leave Petition raising
the said point, it is not permissible for this Court to deal
with the issue. [Para 23] [488-C]
G
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr.,
1983(1) SCR 8=AIR 1982 SC 1249; Transmission
Corporation of A.P. Ltd & Ors. v. P. Surya Bhagavan, AIR
2003 SC 2182; and Mount Carmel School Society v. ODA,
2007 (13) SCR 876 = (2008) 2 SCC 141 - referred to. H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A 2.1. In terms of the amendment dated 3. 7.2003, it is
desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that as
far as practicable persons who had been living and
carrying on business or other activity on the land
acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to purchase
B and comply with any requirement of the authority or the
local body, be given a piece of land on the terms settled
with due regard to the price at which land has been
acquired from them. However, the State Government
cannot be compelled to provide alternate
C accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority
concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of
providing alternative land considering the facts and
circumstances of each case. In certain cases, the oustees
are entitled to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is meant only
for those persons who have been rendered destitute
0
because of a loss of residence or livelihood as a
consequence of land acquisition. The authorities must
explore the avenues of rehabilitation by way of
employment, housing, investment opportunities, and
identification of alternative lands. For people whose lives
E and livelihoods are intrinsically connected to the land, the
economic and cultural shift to a market economy can be
traumatic. [Para 23 & 24] [488-C-H; 489-A-B]

State of UP. v. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors., AIR 1986 SC
F 2025; Narpat Singh etc. etc. v. Jaipur Development Authority
& Anr., 2002 (3) SCR 365=AIR 2002 SC 2036; Special Land
Acquisition Officer, UK. Project v. Mahaboob & Anr., 2009
(2) SCR 881 =(2009) 14 SCC 54; Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd.
& Anr. v. Mathias Oram & Ors., 2010 (8) SCR 750 =JT (2010)
G 7 SC 352; and Brij Mohan & Ors. v. Haryana Urban
Development Authority & Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 29; Chameli
Singh & Ors. v. State of UP. & Anr., 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR
827 =AIR 1996 SC 1051; and Samatha v. State of A.P. &
.Ors., 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 = AIR 1997 SC 3297;
H Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors., 2007 (2) SCR 980
-----·

NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 455
MADHYA PRADESH
=(2007) 10 SCC 448; and Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of A
Punjab & Ors. 2010 (12) SCR 163 = (2010) 10 SC 43 - relied
on.
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &
Anr., 1994(1) Suppl. SCR 807 =AIR 1995 SC 142 - referred B
to

2.2. From the judgments of this Court, it is evident
that acquisition of land does not violate. any
constitutional/fundamental right of the displaced
persons. However, they are entitled to resettlement and C
rehabilitation as per the policy framed for the oustees of
the concerned project. [Para 29] [4~1-G-H]

State of Kera/a & Anr. v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties,
Kera/a State Unit & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 46 - relied on. D
2.3. It is a settled legal proposition that Government
has the power and competence to change the policy on
the basis of ground realities. A public policy cannot be
challenged through PIL where the State Government is
competent to frame the policy and there is no need for E
anyone to raise any grievance even i.f the policy is
changed. The public policy can only be challenged where
it offends some constitutional or stat1,1tory provisions. The
court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the
Government merely because it feels that another decision F
would have been fairer or more scientific or logical or
wiser . .The wisdom and advisability of the policies are
ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the·
policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional
provisions or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. G
[Para 34-35] [496-D-G]
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga etc. etc.
AIR 1998 SC 1703; Ram Singh Vijay Pal Singh & Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Ors., 2007(5) SCR 1960 =(2007) 6 SCC 44; H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A Villianur lyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors.,
2009 (9) SCR 225 =(2009) 7 sec 561 - relied on.
2.4. In the instant case, the phrase 'as far as possible'
inserted by the amendment dated 3.7.2003 provides for
flexibility, clothing the authority concerned with powers
8
to meet special situations where the normal process of
resolution cannot flow smoothly. The phrase can be
interpreted as not being prohibitory in nature. The phrase
simply means that the principles are to be observed
unless it is not possible to follow the same in the
C particular circumstances of a case. The words rather,
connote a discretion vested in the prescribed authority.
It is thus discretion and not compulsion. Once the
authority exercises its discretion, the court should not
interfere with the discretion/decision unless it is found to
D be palpably arbitrary. The court has to consider and
understand the scope of application of the doctrines of
"lex non cogit ad impossibi/ia" (the law does not compel
a man to do what he cannot possibly perform);
"impossibilium nu/la obligatio esf' (the law does not
E expect a party to do the impossible); and impotentia
excusat /egem in the qualified sense that there is a
necessary or invincible disability to perform the
mandatory part of the law or to forbear the prohibitory.
These maxims are akin to the maxim of Roman Law nemo
F tenetur ad impossibilia (no one is bound to do an
impossibility) which is derived from common sense and
natural equity. [Para 36-38) (497-A-G]
Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., 2005 (1) SCR
=
G 73 AIR 2005 SC 514; and High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan v. Veena Verma & Anr., 2009 (1) SCR 795 = AIR
2009 SC 2938; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad &
Ors., 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 754 =AIR 1999 SC 3558; Hira
Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., 2004(1) Suppl.
H SCR 65 =AIR 2004 SC 3648; and Haryana Urban
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 457
MADHYA PRADESH
Development Authority & Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr., A
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 282 =AIR 2005 SC 1491; Gramin Sewa
Sanstha v. State of M.P. & Ors., 1986 Supp SCC 578-
referred to. ·

2.5. As regards the land for land, the issue has to be
8
decided taking into consideration the totality of the
circumstances. These cases are to be decided giving
strict adherence to the R & R Policy, as amended on
3.7.2003, further considering that special care is to be
taken where persons are oppressed and uprooted so that
they are better off. Mere payment of compensation to the C
oustees may not be enough. In case the· oustee is not
able to purchase the land just after getting the
compensation, he may not be able to have the land at all.
[Para 43-44] [499-F-H; 500-A, DJ
D
K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. Sp/. Dy. Collector, Land
Acqn. Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR
853=AIR 1988 SC 2123; Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v.
Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr. 1995(2) SCR 260 = (1995)
Suppl. 2 SCC 549; and N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union of India E
& Ors., 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 152 =AIR 2004 SC 867; Ezra
v. Secretary of State for India, (1905) 32 Ind App 93; and
Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation & Anr.,
1986 (1) SCR 603 =AIR 1986 SC 1164 - referred to.

2.6. In the process of development, the State cannot F
be permitted to displace tribal people, a vulnerable
section of our society, suffering from poverty and
ignorance, without taking appropriate remedial measures
of rehabilitation. The record of the case reveals that about
5~ 0/o of the oustees involved in these cases are members G
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Land had
never been offered to any of these oustees. The amount
of compensation as determined under the Land
Acquisition Act 1894 had been deposited in their bank
accounts. No attempt had ever been made by the State H
'
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A to either acquire or purchase land by agreement/
negotiation for resettlement of the oustees. Only 11 % of
the oustees could purchase the land of their own without
any assistance from the State authorities. [Para 47-48]
[501-G-H; 502-A-B; 503-B-C]
B
2.7. In regard to the amended provisions of the R &
R Policy, the phrase "as far as possible" would come into
play, in case an attempt is made to acquire/purchase
lands and then to make allotment of land to oustees. The
other added term i.e. giving the option to oustees to make
C application for acceptance of compensation and not
c.laiming land for land acquired, remained inapplicable, as
it is alleged that not a single oustee made such an
application. None of the obligations on the part of the
authorities as clearly stipulated by the R & R Policy had
D been fulfilled . .The Adhiniyam 1985 had not been made
applicable in respect of the Omkareshwar Dam Project
taking into account the past experience in other projects.
The State authorities, ought to have assisted the oustees
in purchasing the land of their choice from other
E agriculturists and met the difference of cost, if any, over
and above the amount of compensation and the cost of
land so purchased. While determining such issues, the
State authorities could take into consideration the fact
that the land should be not less than of the same quality
F and nature which the oustees were originally having with
them. This exercise could have been done "pari pasu"
which means "equably" or "ratably" to the construction I
of the Dam and could have been completed much In
advance of completion of the Dam to the Full Water Level.
G [Para 48] [502-C-H; 503-A]
2.8. It has been stated that the State Government
devised a scheme whereby the PAF is given substantial
additional amount over and above the compensation for
his land in order to enable him to purchase arable and
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 459
MADHYA PRADESH
irrigable land at the location of his choice. This scheme A
has come to be known as SRG or Special Rehabilitation
Package (SRP). The offer of SRG is over and above the
Rehabilitation Policy. The relief granted by the appellants
to the oustees as SRG is much more than the amount of
compensation or amount entitled in R & R Policy as B
amended on 3.7.2003. In fact, to certain extent, it is in
consonance with the provisions contained in Clause (5.4)
of R & R Policy, wherein the State is un/ier an obligation
to meet the gap of amount between the amount of
compensation and the value of the land purchased by the c
oustees. It has also been stated that all the oustees have
voluntarily accepted SRG and withdrawn the amount and
they stand fully satisfied. However, if an oustee feels
aggrieved of what he has received, he may approach the
GRA, and against the decision of GRA any aggrieved D
party may approach the High Court. [para 50-53] [504-C-
D, G; 506-A-E]
3.1. The Court should not place reliance upon a
judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits·
in with a fact-situation of the decision on which reliance E
is placed, as it ha.s to be ascertained by analysing all the
material facts and the issues involved in the case and
argued on both sides. A judgment may not be followed
in a given case if it has some distinguishing features. A
little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot F
of difference to the precedential value of a decision. [Para
59] [508-H; 509-A-B]

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur, State of
·Kamataka & Ors. v. Gowramma & Ors., 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR G
929 =AIR 2008 SC 863; and State of Haryana & Anr. v.
Dharam Singh & Ors. 2009 (1) SCR 979 - relied on.
3.2. Admittedly, the NWDT Award did not provide for
allotment of agricultural land to the major sons of such
oustees. Th~ States of Gujarat and Maharashtra had H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A given concessions/relief over and above the said Award.
Thus, the Narmada Bachao Andolan-1 has been decided
with presumption that such a right had been conferred
upon major sons by the NWDT Award and Narmada
Bachao Andolan-11 has been decided following the said
B judgment and interpreting the definition of "family"
contained in the R & R Policy. When the two earlier cases
were being considered by the Court, it had not been
brought to its notice that the NWDT Award did not
provide for such an entitlement. The courts are not to
c perpetuate an illegality, rather it is the duty of the courts
to rectify mistakes. In view of the principles of 'per
incuriam', the "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored
if it is rendered in ignorance of a Statute or other binding
authority. [para 60,62 and 63] (510-E-F; 511-A; 509-E-F]

D India Cement Ltd. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu etc.
etc., 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692 =AIR 1990 SC 85, State of
West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors., 2004(1) SOR
564 = (2004) 10 SCC 201 Mam/eshwar Prasad & Anr. v.
Kanhaiya Lal (D) by Lrs., 1975 (3) S~R 834 =AIR 1975 SC
E 907; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 =
AIR 1988 SC 1531; State of UP. & Anr. v. Synthetics and
Chemicals Ltd. & Anr., 1991 (3) SCR 64 = (1991) 4 SCC 139;
and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra
& Ors., 2010 (15) SCR 201 = (2011) 1 SCC 694; Hotel Balaji
F & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of A.P. & Ors. etc. etc., 1992(2) Suppl.
SCR 182 =AIR 1993 SC 1048; Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of
M.P. & Anr., 2004(3) Suppl. SCR 1006 = (2004) 7 SCC 558;
and Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. CBI, 2006(3)
Suppl. SCR 48 =AIR 2006 SC 2449, Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy.,
G Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1995 (3) SCR 450 =
(1995) 3 sec 619 - referred to.

3.3. Discrimination means an unjust, an unfair action
in favour of one and against another. It involves an
element of intentional and purposeful differentiation and
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 461
MADHYA PRADESH
further an element of unfavourable bias; an unfair A
·classification. Discrimination under Article 14 of the
Constitution must be conscious and not accidental
discrimination that arises from oversight which the State
is ready to rectify. [para 67] [512-C-D]
B
Madhu Kishwar & Ors.v. State ofBihar & Ors., 1996 (1)
Suppl. SCR 442 =AIR 1996 SC 1864; Kathi Raning Rawat
v. State of Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435 =AIR 1952 SC 123;
and Mis. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Punjab
& Anr., 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 =AIR 1990 SC 820,
Vishundas Hundumal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & C
Ors., 1981 (3) SCR 234 =AIR 1981 SC 1636; and Eskayef
Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1990(1) Suppl. SCR 442
=(1990) 4 sec 680 - referred to

3.4. The High Court while passing the order had given D
a much wider interpretation to the R & R Policy making
reference to the terms as "bigger family" and the "large
land owning family". The Court while interpreting the
provisions of a Statute, can neither add nor subtract a
word. The legal maxim "a verbis legis non est E
recedendum" means from the words of law, there must
be no departure. [para 69] [512-G; 513-A-B]

S.P. Gupta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1982 SC
149; P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries & Ors., AIR 1990 SC F
933; and Commissioner of Income Tax, Kera/a v. Tara
Agencies, (2007) 6 SCC 429 - relied on

3.5. The Court has to interpret a provision giving it a
construction agreeable to reason and justice to all
parties concerned, avoiding injustice, irrationality and G
mischievous consequences. The interpretation so made
must not produce unworkable and impracticable results
or cause unnecessary hardship, serious inconvenience
or anomaly. The court also has to keep in mind the object
of the legislation. [para 79] [516-F-G] H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, AIR
1994 SC 1775; Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala
& Anr. 2008 916) SCR 340 =(2009) 1 SCC 540; and Sonic
Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009(15) SCR 265
= (2010) 1 SCC 135; Bihar State Council of Ayurvedic and
s Unani Medicine v. State of Bihar, 2007 (11) SCR 824 = AIR
2008 SC 595; and Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota
Shaikh v. Union of India, 2008 (14) SCR 889 = (2009) 2 SCC
1; Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., 2008 (8) SCR
315 = AIR 2008 SC 2286; Narashimaha Murthy v.
C Susheelabai, 1996(1) Suppl. SCR 414 =AIR 1996 SC 1826;
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of
Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCR 1156 =AIR 1958 SC 353,
Sheikh Gu/fan v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli, 1965 SCR 364 =AIR
1965 SC 1839 - referred to.
D 3.6. In the instant case, the directions of the High
Court regarding land-for-land would lead to grave
inequity, and thereby likely to cause undue enrichment
of some categories of oustees: a.) Sons of land owning
class get better rights than their fathers; b) Sons of land
E owning class get better rights than those of land less
class; c) even though everybody loses same measure of
land, some are not entitled to any land while for some it
becomes an unimaginable bounty or proves to be
bonanza. [para 81] [519-A-C]
F
3.7. Compensation in the present context has to be
understood in relation to right to property. The right of
the oustee is protected only to a limited extent as
enunciated in Article 300-A of the Constitution. The tenure
G holder is deprived of the property only to the extent of
land actually owned and possessed by him. This Is,
therefore, limited to the physical area of the property and
this area cannot get expanded or reduced by any fictional
definition of the word "family" when it comes to awarding
H compensation. Compensation is Awarded by authority of
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 463
MADHYA PRADESH

law under Article 300-A read with the relevant statutory law A
of'eompensatioh under any law made by the legislature
and for the time being in force, only for the area acquired.
RehabilitatiOn on the other hand, is restoration of the
status of something lost, displaced or even otherwise a
grant to secure a dignified mode of life to a person who B
has nothing to sustain himself. This concept, as against
compensation and property under Article 300-A, brings
within its fold the presence of the elements of Article 21
of the Constitution. Those who have been rendered
destitute, have to be assured a permanent source of basic C
livelihood to sustain themselves. This becomes necessary
for the State when it relates to the rehabilitation of the
already depressed classes like Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and marginal farmers in order to meet
the.requirements of social justice. [Para 83) [520-F-H; 521- D
A.-0.l
3.8. The benefit given to a major son was not within
thtr;ferms of the Award. It was rather a concession given
by the States who were parties to the NWDT Award after
the Award was delivered during the course of subsequent E
negotiations, and, therefore, could not be a part of the
Award. The previous decisions,* therefore, would not be
a binding precedent for the purpose of the instant case
as it was under some mistaken belief that the Award was
understood to have extended the said benefit to major F
sons also. The High Court therefore, fell into an error by
proceeding to assume that a major son would be treated
to be a separate family for the purpose of allotment of
land also. Thus, the policy must be interpreted to the
effect that the major sons of oustees will be entitled to all G
the benefits under the R & R Policy, except allocation of
agricultural land. The major son would, however, be
entitled to his share in the area which is to be allotted to
the tenure holder on rehabilitation in case he is entitled
to such a share in the law applicable to the particular H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A State. [Para 83-84 & 85) [521-E-G; 522-D-E & F-G]

Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors.,
2000(4) Suppl. SCR 94 = (2000-) 10 SCC 664 and Narmada
Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., 2005 (2) SCR 840
B =(2005) 4 SCC 32 held per incuriam as regards benefit
given in those cases to major son.

3.9. Each State has a right to frame the rehabilitation
policy considering the extent of its resources and other
priorities. One State is not bound if, in a similar situation,
C the other State has accorded additional facilities even
over and above the policy. The definition of "displaced
family" cannot be read in isolation, rather it requires to
be considered taking into account the eligibility criteria
for allotment of land in Clause (5) of the R & R Policy. To
D · that extent, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be
set aside. The direction given by the High Court in
paragraph 64 (i) of the judgment, is modified to the extent
that the displaced families who have not withdrawn SRG
benefits/ compensation voluntarily and submit
E applications for allotment of land before the Authority
concerned, shall be ehtitled to the allotment of agricultural
land "as far as possible" in terms of the R & R Policy, and
for that purpose, the appellants must make some
government or private land available for allotment to such
F oustees if they opt for such land and agree to ensure
compliance with other terms and conditions stipulated
therein. [Para 85-86) [523-G-H; 524-A-D]

3.10. Directions given by the High Court to allot
agricultural land to major sons of the oustees in
G Paragraph 64 (iii) of the impugned judgment is set aside.
[Para 86) [523-H; 524-A]

C.A. No.2082 of 2011

4.1. The Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 465
MADHYA PRADESH
of Forest and Environment dated 13.10.1993 granting A
clearance for the·. Omkareshwar Dam Project with the
· condition that the Rehabilitation Programme should be
extended to landless labourers and the people affected
due to canal by identifying and allocating suitable land
as permissible. As the said condition imposed by the B
Ministry of Forest and Environment while granting
clearance is as stood qualified, and has been subject to
any other law for the time being in force or the
government policy etc., the landless labourers are not
entitled to allotment of land. More. so, the R & R Policy c
itself provides a particular mode of retaining 50% of the
compensation amount and 50% to be recovered in 20
years. As the landless labourers never had any land, they
are not entitled to any compensation under the Act 1894,
thus, the question of allotment of land to them would not
0
arise. The R & R Policy itself provides that such persons
are entitled to get the speqified amount of Rs.49,3001- to
buy productive employment creating assets etc., and
such money can also be used for acquiring land. [para
90 and 91] [525-H; 526-A-B & D-G]
E
Gurbax Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1967 SC
502, Municipal Committee, Patiala v. Model Town Residents
Association & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2844 and Jagjit Cotton
Textile Mills v. Chief Commercial Superintendent, N.R. &
Ors., (1998) - relied on F

4.2. In the instant case, the Court is concerned with
the rights and entitlements of the oustees of the 5 villages
which have already been submerged. There are claims
and counter claims in regard to voluntary acceptance of G
compensation amount/SRG by the oustees of those 5
villages. The record does not contain sufficient material
to adjudicate upon the factual aspects involved herein.
The GRA is the best forum to decide the claims of such
persons. However, in view of the settled legal proposition
H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A that no person should suffer from an act of the court and
to ensure that the oustees of the 5 villages which have
already been submerged, do not face hostile
discrimination at the hands of the authorities, they shall
be entitled to the relief to which the other oustees are
e entitled in Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011. [para 98,
100 and 101] [531-D; 532-B-C-D-F]

CA Nos. 2083-2012 of 2011:

In these appeals the question for consideration
C before the Court was whether submergence temporarily
for a very short period in the exceptional flood situation
warrants acquisition of the land in dispute.

5.1. There are claims and counter claims regarding
0 "taking possession of the land". The High Court did not
deal with the issue. Law on the issue can be summarized
to the effect that no strait-jacket formula can be laid down
for taking the possession of the land for the purpose of
ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. It would
depend upon the facts of an individual case. In case the
E land is fallow and barren and does not have any structure
or crop on it, symbolic possession may meet the
requirement of law. However, this would not be the
position in case crop is standing on the land or a kachha
or pacca structure has been raised on such land. In that
F case, actual physical possession is required to be taken.
There may be a case where the acquiring authority is in
possession of the land, as the same has already been
requisitioned under any law or the property is in
possession of a tenant, in such a case symbolic
G possession qua the tenure holder would be sufficient.
[para 114, 116 and 124] [539-F-G; 543-C-F]
Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors., AIR
1975 SC 1767 In State of T.N. & Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal
H & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 269, Ba/mokand Khatri Educational &
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 467
MADHYA PRADESH
Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1996) 4 A
SCC 212, P.KKa/burqutv. State ofKamataka, (2005) 12 SCC
489, National Thermal Power Corporation v. Mahesh Datta
& Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 339, Thakur Nirman Singh & Ors. v.
Thakur Lal Rudra Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1926 PC 100;
Smt. Sawarni v. lnder Kaur & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2823; R. V.E. B
Venkata Cha/a Gounder v. Aru/mign Ciswesaraswamy & V
Temple & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4548; and Suman Verma v.
Union of India & Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 57) - referred to.

5.2. In the instant case, in view of the fact that land
in dispute is an agricultural land and has 167 dwelling C
houses, law in fact requires taking over the actual
physical possession. Respondent no. 1 has asserted that
the tenure holders are not in possession of the said land.
However, on the directions of this Court, the District and
Sessions Judge, Indore has submitted a detailed report D ·
stating that the tenure holders are in actual physical
possession of the acquired lands. This fact is further
evident from the D.V.Ds. and C.Ds. of the videos,
prepared during the time of inspection by District Judge,
Indore. Thus none of the tenure holders, so far the land E
in dispute is concerned, has been evicted/dispossessed.
All the tenure holders are enjoying the land without any
interference. [para 125-127 and 129) [543-G; 545-C; 546·
G]
F
5.3. In view of the serious controversy raised in these
appeals, on the directions of this Court the CWC
submitted its report dated 22.3.2011 to the effect that out
of 284.03 hectare of the land in the five villages, 281.75
hectare falls between FRL and BWL, which will come G
under temporary submergence due to back water effect.
The remaining 2.28 hectare area will not come under
submergence due to back water levels when water levels
are up to BWL. Therefore, the agricultural land of these
five villages is not to be acquired as it may only be under H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A temporary submergence for a very short period, which
occurs throughouf the country during floods in
monsoon. [para 147, 148 and 159) [553-E-F; 561-B-C]

5.4. The State is, therefore, competent to exercise its
8 power u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and, as
such, is entitled to abandon the land acquisition
proceedings. However, it shall not apply to 167 dwelling
units on the said land. Such persons whose dwelling
units are acquired shall be entitled for the benefit of R &
R Policy to the extent provided therein. The State shall
C establish roads etc. after raising the height of the Bandh
as proposed by the Authorities. [para 130 and 160) [547 -
B; 563-A-B]

6.1. It has been the case of the applicant/respondent
D NBA that the tenure holders had already been physically
dispossessed and land stood vested in the State. The I

Court has been entertaining this matter under the bona·
fide belief that NBA was espousing the grievance of
inarticulate and illiterate poor farrr, ""S, with all sincerity
E and thus, would not make any misleading statement.
However, belief stands fully belied. In such a fact-
situation, the NBA not having personal interest in the
case, cannot claim to be dominus litis. Thus, it ought to
have acted at every stage with full sense of responsibility
F and sincerity. [Para 131-132) [547-D, G-H; 548-B-C]

Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors.,
(1998) 5 SCC 586; R. and M. Trust v. Koramangla Residents
Vigilance Group & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 894). Mis Ho/icow
Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors., AIR 2008
G SC 913; and Sheela Barse v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988
SC 2211 - referred to.
6.2. The 'rights' of the public interest litigant in a PIL
are always subordinate to the 'interests' of those for
H whose benefit the action is brought. The status of
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 469
MADHYA PRADESH
dominus litis could not be conferred unreflectively or for A
the asking, .on a PIL petitioner as that would render the
proceedings "vulnerable to and susceptible of a new
dimension which might, in conceivable cases be used by
persons for personal ends resulting in prejudice to the
public weal". [para 135) [549-B-C] B

6.3. The standard of expectation of civic
responsibility required of a petitioner in a PIL is higher
than that of ·an applicant who strives to realise personal
ends. The courts expect a public interest litigant to
discharge high standards of responsibility. Negligent use C
or use for oblique motives is extraneous to the PIL
process for were the litigant to act for other oblique
considerations, the application will be rejected at the
threshold. Measuring the 'seriousness' of the PIL
petitioner and to see whether she/he is actually a D
'champion' of the cause of the individual or the group
being represented, is the responsibility of the Court, to
ensure that the party's procedural behaviour remains that
of an adequate 'champion' of the public cause. [para 136]
[549-D-F] E

The Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 1993 SC
.892; Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1; and
Kusum Lata v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 180);
State of Uttaranchal v. Ba/want Singh Chaufal and Ors., (2010) F
3 sec 402. - relied on
6.4. Therefore, while dealing with the PIL, the Court
has to be vigilant and it must ensure that the forum of the
Court be neither abused nor used to achieve an ~blique
purpose. A person seeking relief in public interest should G
approach the Court of Equity, not only with clean hands
but also with a clean mind, clean heart and clean
objective. Thus, he who seeks equity must do equity. The
legal maxim "Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum
a/terius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem", means H,
I
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011} 6 S.C.R.

A that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched
by the loss or injury to another. The judicial process
should never become an instrument of oppression or
abuse or means to subvert justice. A petition containing
misleading and inaccurate statement(s), if filed, to
B achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts. to an abuse of the
process of the Court and such a litigant is not required
to be dealt with lightly. Further, a false statement made
in the Court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead
the Court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to
c criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the
administration of justice. Thus, a litigant is bound to make
"full and true disclosure of facts". The Court is not a
forum to achieve an oblique purpose. [para 137-139 and
141] [550-B-G; 551-D]

D 6.5. Whenever the Court comes to the conclusion
that the process of the Court is being abused, the Court
would be justified in refusing to proceed further with the
matter. This rule has been evolved out of need of the
courts to deter a litigant from abusl ig the process of the
E Court by deceiving it. However, the concealed fact must
be material one in the sense that had it not been
suppressed, it would have an effect on the merit of the
case/order. The legal maxim ''iuri ex injuria non oritur"
means that a right cannot arise out of wrong doing, and
F it becomes applicable in a case like this. In such a case
the person who suppresses the material facts from the
court is guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio fa/si i.e.
suppression or failure to disclose what a party is bound
to disclose, which may amount to fraud. [para 140 &144]
G [550-G-H; 551-A-B; 552-F-G]

The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
AIR 1993 SC 852; Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1
SCC 242; Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
& Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236; Sabia Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P.
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 471
MADHYA PRADESH
& Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 271; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) A
Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 166; and Union
of India & Ors. v. Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90 -
relied on

Naraindas v. Government of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., B
AIR 1974 SC 1252; The Advocate General, State of Bihar v.
Mis. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries & Anr., AIR 1980 SC
946; and Afzal & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 7
SCC 397). K. 0. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited &
Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 481 - referred to.
c
6.6. In the instant case , the NBA has not acted with
a sense of responsibility and so far succeeded in
securing favourable orders by misleading the Court.
Such conduct cannot be approved. However, in a PIL,
the Court has to strike a balance between the interests D
of the parties. The Court has to take into consideration
the pitiable condition of oustees, their poverty,
inarticulateness, illiteracy; extent of backwardness,
unawareness also. It is desirable that in future the Court
must view any presentation by the NBA with caution and E
care, insisting on proper pleadings, disclosure of full
facts truly and fairly and in case it has any doubt, refuse
to entertain the NBA. However, considering the interests
of the oustees, it may be desirable that the Court may
appoint an Amicus Curiae to present their cause, if such F
a contingency arises. [para 145) (552-G-H; 553-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
1988(2) Suppl. SCR 1050Para 7 Relied on
1988 (2) SCR 339 . Para 7 Relied on G

2001 (3) SCR 124 Para 7 Relied on
2010 (7) SCR 252 Para 7 Relied on
H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A 1987 (2) SCR 805 Para 9 Relied on

1988 Suppl.; SCR 690 para 10 Relied on

1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 404 Para 11 Relied on

2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 716 Para 11 Relied on
B
2009 (11) SCR 727 Para 11 Relied on

2000(4) Suppl. SCR 94 Para 14 Referred to

1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 492 Para 16-17 referred to
c
2005 (2) SCR 840 Para 16-17 referred to

1983(1) SCR 8 Para 22 referred to

2007 (13) SCR 876 Para 22 referred to
D . 2002 (3) SCR 365 Para 24 relied on
2009 (2) SCR 881 Para 24 relied on
2010 (8) SCR 750 Para 24 relied on

E 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 827 Para 24 relied on

1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 Para 25 relied on
2007 (2) SCR 980 Para 26 relied on

2010 (12) SCR 163 Para 26 relied on
F
1994(1) Suppl. SCR 807 Para 26 relied to
2007(5) SCR 1060 Para 34 relied on
2009 (9) SCR 225 Para 34 relied on
G
2005 (1) SCR 73 Para 36 relied on
2009 (1) SCR 795 Para 34 referred to
1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 754 Paras 38-39 Referred to
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 473
MADHYA PRADESH
2004(1) Suppl. SCR 65 Paras 38-39 Referred to A
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 282 Paras 38-39 Referred to

1995(2) SCR 260 Para 43 referred to

2003(3) Suppl. SCR 152 Para 43 referred to B
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 853 Para 44 referred to

1986 (1) SCR 603 Para 45 referred to

1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929 Para 59 relied on
c
2009 (1) SCR 979 Para 59 relied on

1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692 Para 60 relied on

2004(1) SCR 564 Para 60 relied on

Para 60 relied on D
1975 (3) SCR 834
1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 Para 60 relied on

1991 (3) SCR 64 Para 60 relied on

2010 (15) SCR 201 Para 60 relied on E
1992(2) Suppl. SCR 182 Para 63 referred to

2006(3) Suppl. SCR 48 Para 63 relied on

1995(3) SCR 450 Para 63 relied on
F
1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 442 Para 63 relied on

1952 SCR 435 Para 67 relied on

1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 Para 67 relied on
G
1981 (3) SCR 234 Para 67 relied on
1990(1) Suppl. SCR 442 Para 67 relied on
1952 SCR 435 Para 67 relied on
H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 Para 67 relied on
1981 (3) SCR 234 Para 67 relied on
1990(1) Suppl. SCR 442 Para 67 relied on
1982 SCR 365 Para 72 relied on
B
1990 (1) SCR 483 Para 72 relied on
2007(8) SCR 136 Para 72 relied on
2008 916) SCR 340 Para 72 relied on
c
2009(15) SCR 265 Para 72 relied on
2007 (11) SCR 824 Para 73 relied on
2008 (14) SCR 889 Para 73 relied on
D 2008 (8) SCR 315 Para 74 relied on
1996(1) Suppl. SCR 414 Para 74 relied on
1958 SCR 1156 Para 74 relied on

E 1965 SCR 364 Para 74 relied on
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2082 of 2011.

From the Judgment & Order dated 21.2.2008 of the High
F Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.P. (C)
No. 4457 of 2007.

WITH
C.A. Nos. 2083-2097, 2098-2112, 2115 and 2116 of2011.
G
Sanjay Parikh, TVS Raghavendra Sreyas, Swapnil Verma,
Nikhil Nayyar for the Appellant.
P.S. Patwalia, Ravi Shankar Prasad, Sunny Choudhary,
H Ajay Chauhan, C.D. Singh, Suparna Srivastava, Ran Swarup
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 475
MADHYA PRADESH

Sharma, Ashok Bhan, D.S. Mehra for the Respondents. A

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. All these appeals relate to the
establishment of the Omkareshwar Dam on the Narmada river
in Madhya Pradesh. As these appeals are inter-connected and B
have been filed against interim orders passed by the High Court
in the same writ petition, they have been heard together and
disposed of by a common judgment. However, for convenience
Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011 are dealt with first.
c
Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011

2. These appeals have been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 21.2.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 4457 of
0
2007, 'Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh
& Anr.', wherein the High Court as an interim measure, has
issued directions, inter-a/ia, for allotment of agricultural land to
the displaced persons in lieu of the land acquired for
construction of the dam in terms of the Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Policy (hereinafter called as 'R & R Policy') as E
amended on 3. 7.2003. The High Court direction applied even
to those oustees who had already withdrawn the compensation,
if such oustees opt for such land and refund 50% of the
compensation amount received by them. The balance cost of
the ~Hotted land would be deposited by the allottees in 20 equal F
yearly installments as stipulated in clause (5.3) of the R & R
Policy, and to treat a major son of the family whose land has
been acquired as a separate family for the purpose of allotment
of agricultural land.
G
3. FACTUAL MATRIX :

Facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are
as follows:

H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R.

A (A) The Narmada river starts at Amarkantak. It flows
through Madhya Pradesh for 1077 km, then forms a common
boundary in Maharashtra for 74 km (35 km with MP and 39 km
with Maharashtra) and then passes through Gujarat for 161 km
before meeting the Arabian Sea after a total length of 1312 km.
B The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal apportioned the water
in the Narmada between Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Rajasthan, subject to review after 45 years.

(B) The State of Madhya Pradesh, conducted a survey in
C 1955 for the establishment of hydro-power projects in the
Narmada basin at different sites including Barwaha
(Omkareshwar Project). In 1983, Narmada Valley Development
(Irrigation) Department (hereinafter called NVD) was set up and
further studies were conducted for the establishment of hydro-
power projects.
D
(C) The Omkareshwar Dam - an intra-state project for
generating 520 mega watts of power, which also involved the
irrigation of 1.47 lakh hectares of agricultural land, was approved
by the State Government, with an assessment that on the
E completion of the project, 30 villages would be submerged at
the full reservoir level i.e. 196.60 mtrs.

(D) The Government of Madhya Pradesh framed a
rehabilitation and resettlement policy in 1985 (hereinafter called
F 'R & R Policy') for the oustees of all the Narmada projects in
the State. The said policy was amended from time to time as
is evident from the R & R Policies dated: 9th June, 1987; 5th
September, 1989; 7th June, 1991; and 27th August 1993.

The said policy provided for the allotment of a minimum
G of 2 hectares of agricultural land; irrigation facilities at
government cost; grant-in-aid for small and marginal farmers
and SC/ST families; and to meet the entire cost of the allotted
land. The policy further provided that the allotment of agricultural
land would be carried out much in advance, before dam
H construction reached crest level. The land required for allotment
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 477
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
would be procured in the common area from the farmers having A
holdings of more than 4 hectares of land.
The State authorities obtained environmental clearance for
the Omkareshwar project from the Ministry of Environment and
Forest on 13.10.1993. The Mtnistry of Welfare granted
8
clearance on 8.10.1993. The Planning Commission also
granted clearance on condition of compliance with welfare and
environmental clearances vide order dated 25.5.2001.

The Central Electricity Authority accorded techno-economic
clearance under the provisions of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 C
on 24.7.2001. The Government of India approved and granted
financial concurrence from Public Investment Board of the
Planning Commission for this project on 17.5.2002. Forest
clearance was granted on 20.8.2004 under the provisions of
Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for the D:
diversio.n of 5829 hectares of forest lands. Therefore, there had
been various statutory and lion-statutory clearances from the
authorities.
(E) The R & R Policy further stood amended on 3.7.2003, E
to the effect that agricultural land would be offered to the oustees
"as far as possible"; and not to those who would make
application in writing to receive compensation for their acquired
land.

(F) Construction of the Omkareshwar dam began in 2002 F
and stood completed in October, 2006. A large number of
families had been uprooted on construction of the dam upto its
190 mtrs. height. For the dam site, a huge area of land had
been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter called as 'Act 1894'). The displaced persons G
were allegedly not offered the land under the R & R Policy, as
amended on 3.7.2003, rather compensation for their land was
deposited in their accounts.
(G) Narmada Bachao Andolan, respondent No.1
H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A (hereinafter referred to as 'NBA'), an action group, had been
espousing the grievances of displaced persons by filing Public
Interest litigations (hereinafter called 'PIL') before the High
Court/further to this Court from time to time and a large number
of orders had been passed by the courts to redress the
B grievances of the oustees. When the decision was taken to
raise the height of the dam, NBA filed writ petition No.4457 of
2007 before the High Court seeking a number of reliefs, inter-
alia, to stop all eviction; directions for serving of life supplies
such as drinking water and electricity; not to take any other
c coercive measures, to stop closure of the radial gates of the
Omkareshwar dam above crest level of EL 179.60 M; and to
stop the blocking of the sluice gates below crest level, until all
Project Affected Families (hereinafter called 'PAFs') were
rehabilitated as per the R & R Policy. Further reliefs sought
included the issuance of appropriate directions for an
0
assessment by the Grievance Reuressal Authority (hereinafter
called 'GRA') for the Omkareshwar Project of the status of relief
and rehabilitation of the oustees affected at Full Reservoir Level
(hereinafter called 'FRL') and Back Water Level (hereinafter
called 'BWL') within a stipulated period.
E
(H) During the pendency of the writ petition in pursuance
of the orders passed by the High Court from time to time, a
large number of reports/interim reports were furnished by the
authorities concerned. The High Court after considering the
F said reports and submissions advanced on behalf of the
parties passed the impugned judgment and order dated
21.2.2008. The High Court issued a large number of directions
as interim measures, including the direction for allotment of land
in lieu of land acquired and to treat the major sons of the family,
G as independent families for the purpose of allotment of
agricultural land. Hence, these appeals.

4. S/Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad and P.S. Patwalia, learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants have submitted that
the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 479
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
as it did not have material facts/particulars disclosing any cause A
of action to the writ petitioners even in the PIL. Not a single
order passed by any statutory authority had been challenged
and the writ petition was filed after inordinate delay without
furnishing any explanation for the same. The GRA had been
constituted to consider individuals' grievances and not a single B
oustee approached the GRA before filing of the writ petition.
The Court ought to have relegated the parties for redressal of
their grievances to the GRA. An efficacious alternative remedy
was available to the oustees. The High Court further committed
c
an error in issuing directions for allotment of land in lieu of land
even in those cases where the oustees have voluntarily
accepted the compensation amount; that such oustees would
deposit 50% of the said amount and would be entitled to
rulqtment of land. It is further submitted that the High Court erred
in treatiqg the major son of such an oustee as a separate family
0
· for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land, though he did
not have. any independent right to claim compensation for the
land acquired. Land for allotment to such oustees is not
available. The State authorities cannot be asked to do an
impossible task. The State authorities have provided a
package for their re-settlement and rehabilitation, giving all E
facilities and financial aid. Making the allotment of land
mandatory in lieu of land acquired would force the State to
displace other persons to settle such oustees, which is
impermissible in law. In case each major son of such oustees
is treated as a separate family, acquisition of his family land F
would prove to be a bonanza for such persons as the tenure
holding of such a family would multiply several times and State
would suffer irreparable losses. The State Government vide
amendments of the Revenue Code, reduced the area of the
grazing land, but the land so made available is not enough to G
meet the needs of such a large number of oustees. Cases
decided by this Court, earlier on two occasions, have no - -
bearing on the issue in these cases, as the true and correct
facts could not be brought to the notice of this Court. Most of
H
--_,__.
f _,

480 SUPREME COURT. REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R .

.
A the .oustees had taken benefit of the Special .Rehabilitation
Grant (hereinafter called as 'SRG') and withdrawn .the amount
and surrendered the possession of their land. The SR.G amount ·
has been more than the compensation amount for acquisition
of land. The High Court did not issue any direction in regard to
B the amount taken by the oustees as SRG, either to refund the
same or for adjustment of the same. Therefore, directions
issued by the High Court are liable to be set aside. The appeals
deserve to be allowed.

5. On the contrary, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior
C counsel and Shri Sanjay Parekh, Advocate representing the
oustees, have vehemently opposed the appeals contending that
displacement of oustees without proper imple.mentation of the
rehabilitation scheme is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. In a matter of this nature where a very large number of··
D illiterate, inarticulate and poor people have suffered at the hands
of the statutory authorities, no technical objections e.g. want of.
proper pleadings or delay etc., .can be allowed to be 'raised.
Statutory and non-statutory authorities have granted clearances
for the Omkareshwar Dam Project on the Clear understanding
E that the State authorities would carry out and implement, in letter
and spirit, all the terms and conditions of the R & R Policy:
Therefore, it is not permissible for the State authorities to say
that it would not strictly adhere to the terms incorporated therein.
The appellant-State and its instrumentalities never made any
F serious attempt to acquire land for such oustees and the
compensation amount has been deposited in rEi°spective
accounts of the oustees. Not a single oustee had ever opted
for compensation for land in lieu of land acquired: Amendment
made in the R & R Polley vide order dated 3.7.2003 is ultra
G vires and illegal and is liable to be ignored for the reason that
the R & R Policy had beeri approved by the State Government,
though the amendment had not undergone the same process.
If a major son of the family, whose land has been· acquired, is
not treated as a 'separate family' for the purpose of allotment
H of land for land acquired, the definition of 'displaced family'
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 481
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
under clause 2(b) of the R & R Policy would be rendered . A
nugatory. Therefore, such an interpretation is not permissible.
This Court, while interpreting the other schemes in respect of ·
Narm.ada Projects itself has given effect to the said policy and
directed for allotment of land for land acquired and upheld the
entitlement of the major son of an oustee to an independent B
allotment of agricultural land. Denial of such a right would be
discriminatory and thus violative of the equality clause enshrined
in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the appeals lack
merit and are liable to be dismissed.

6. We have considered the rival submissions made by C
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

PLEADINGS:
7. It is a settled proposition of law that a party has to plead D
its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate
the averments made in the petition and in case the pleadings
are not complete the Court is under no obligation to entertain
the pleas.
In Bharat Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR E
1988 SC 2181, this Court has observed as under:-

"lh ot1r opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point
of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party
raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and F
prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the
writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter
affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in
support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or
the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not G
entertain the point. There is a distinction between a hearing
under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a
counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e. a plaint orwritten
statement, the facts and no; the evidence are required to
be pleaded. In a writ petition or in the counter affidavit, not H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011J 6 S.C.R.

A only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts
have to be pleaded and annexed to it." (Emphasis added)

8. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR
1998 SC 1608; Mis Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan
8
Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684; and Rajasthan Pradesh V.S.
Sardarshahar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC
2221.

9. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the
C court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the
pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the
controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the
question(s) in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate
evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that
D "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be
granted." Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on
grounds outside the pleadings of the parties.

The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to
E ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly
defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being
shifted during trial. If any factual or legal issue, despite having
merit, has not been raised by the parties, the court should not
decide the same as the opposite counsel does not have a fair
opportunity to answer the line of reasoning adopted in that
F regard. Such a judgment may be violative of the principles of
natural justice. (Vide: Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. v.
Bishun Narain Inter-College & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1242; and
Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127).

G
10. It cannot be said that the rules of procedural law do
not apply in PIL. The caution is always added that every
technicality in the procedural law is not available as a defence
in such proceedings when a matter of grave public importance
H is for consideration before the Court. (Vide: Rural Litigation
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 483
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
and Entitlement Kendera v. State of U.P., AIR 1988 SC 2187). A

11. Strict rules of pleading may not apply in PIL, however,
there must be sufficient material in the petition on(the basis of
which Court may proceed. The PIL litigant has to l~y a factual
foundation for his averments on the basis of which such a 8
person claims the reliefs. Information furnished by him should
not be vague and indefinite. Proper pleadings are necessary
to meet the requirements of the principles of natural justice;
Even in PIL, the litigant cannot approach the Court to havek
fishing or roving enquiry. He cannot claim to have a chance 'to
establish his claim. However, the technicalities of the rules of C
pleading cannot be made applicable vigorously. Pleadings
prepared by a layman must be construed generously as he
lacks standard of accuracy and precision particularly when a
legal wrong is caused to a determinate class. (Vide: A.
Hamsaveni & Ors: v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (1994) 6 D
SCC 51; Ashok K4mar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR
2004 SC 280; Prt{pir Kumar Das v. State of Orissa & Ors.,
(2005) 13 SCC 152; and A. Abdul Farook v. Municipal
Council, Perambalur, (2009) 15 SCC 351).
E
12. In the instant case, in the writ petition, an impression
had been given, that some drastic steps would be taken by the
authorities which would cause great hardship to a large number
of persons. However, the writ petition did not disclose the
factum of how many persons had already vacated their houses F
and handed over the possession of their land. It was contended
that urgent measures were required to be taken by the Court
in order to mitigate the sufferings of the people. In view of the
fact that there was no material before the Court to adjudicate
upon the issues involved therein, the High Court passed the G
order dated 30.3.2007 directing the GRA to submit the report
on the rehabilitation work already done and still to be done; and
to disclose the consequences of the closure of radial gates of
the dam and blocking of the sluice gate of the dam on the
people residing in the area which would be submerged. In H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 6 S.C.R.

A pursuance of the said order, the GRA submitted the report
dated 7.4.2007, explaining that a huge amount of several
thousand crores of rupees had already been invested. The
SRG had already been disbursed. Out of a total number of 4513
families to be adversely affected by the project, 2787 families
B had already shifted and 1726 families remained there. An
amount of Rs.9924 lacs had already been disbursed among
the claimants and only a sum of Rs.589 lacs remained to be
disbursed. The report further explained that land in lieu of land
acquired would be allotted to oustees "as far as possible" and
c as most of the oustees had accepted the compensation, it was
not required on the part of the State to allot the land for land
acquired. The other benefits of the R & R Policy had already
been given. In fact, it is in view of this report, the High Court
started examining the grievances of the oustees. Several
reports were submitted by the GRA before the High Court from
0
time to time and whatever has been disclosed in those reports
provided the basis for raising further queries and that, in fact,
became part of pleadings of the case. In fact, the present
appellants had been asked to lay factual foundation to
E adjudicate the issues raised by the wnt petitioners.

13. In view of the above, it is evident that there were no
pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ
petition could be entertained/decided. Thus, it was liable to be
rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition
F suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to
substantiate the averments/allegations contained therein. Even
in the case of a PIL, such a course could not be available to
the writ petitioners.

G DELAY/LACHES:

14. In the instant cases, the construction of the dam started
in October 2002 and was completed in October 2006. No
objection had ever been raised by NBA at any stage. The
Narmada Development Authority vide order dated 28.3.2007
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 485
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
gave permission to National Hydraulic Development A
Corporation to raise the water level of the dam to 189 meters
upon showing that· rehabilitation of oustees of 5 villages
adversely affected at 189 meters, had already been completed.
The writ petition was filed praying for restraining the appellants
from closing the sluice gates of the dam contending that B
resettlement and rehabilitation was not complete. There was
no explanation as to under what circumstances the Court had
been approached at such belated stage.

15. In Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2000) 10 SCC 664, (hereinafter called as 'Narmada Bachao C
Andolan-1'), this Court dealt with a similar issue of laches and
observed that in spite of the fact that the clearance for
construction of the dam was given in 1987, the same was
challenged in 1994 on the ground that there was a lack of
studies available regarding the environmental aspects and also D
because of seismicity. Thus, the clearance should not have
been granted. The rehabilitation package was dissimilar and
there had been no independent study or survey done before
the decision to undertake the project was taken and
construction started. This Court held that clearance and E
undertaking to construct the dam had been given and hundreds
of crores of rupees had already been invested, before the writ
petitioner had chosen to file the writ petition in 1994. Thus, the
petitioner was guilty of laches in not approaching the court at
an earlier point of time. The Court, however, observed as uncler: F

"When such projects are undertaken and hundreds
of crores of public money is spent, any individual or
organisations in the garb of PIL cannot be permitted to
challenge the policy decision taken after a lapse of time. G
It is against the national interest and contrary to the
established principles of law that decisions to undertake
developmental projects are permitted to be challenged
after a number of years during which period public money
has been spent in the execution of the project.. ......... .
H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A This Court has entertained this petition with a view
to satisfy itself that there is proper implementation of the
relief and rehabilitation measures ............. In short, it was
only the concern of this Court for the protection of the
fundamental rights of the oustees under Article 21 of the
B Constitution of India which led to the entertaining of this
petition. It is the relief and rehabilitation measures that this
Court is really concerned with and the petition in regard
to the other issues raised is highly belated." (Emphasis
added)
c In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683,
this Court had taken a similar view.

16. In fact for redressal of any grievance regarding
· implementation of the R & R Policy, the oustees ought to have
D approached the GRA. There is nothing on record to show how
many oustees remained unsatisfied/aggrieved of the orders
passed by GRA till the filing of the writ petition.

17. Thus, in view of the above, the High Court ought not to
E have examined any issue other than reiating to rehabilitation
i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDY:

18. While dealing with a similar issue in Narmada Bachao
F Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 32,
(hereinafter called as 'Narmada Bachao Andolan-11'), this Court
observed as under:

"Several contentions involving factual dispute had, we may
notice, not been raised before GRA. GRA had been
G constituted with a purpose, namely, that the matters relating
to rehabilitation scheme must be addressed by it at the
first instance. This Court cannot entertain applications
raising grievances involving factual issues raised by the
parties. GRA being headed by a former Chief Justice of
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 487
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the High Court would indisputably be entitled to adjudicate A
upon such disputes. It is also expected that the parties
should ordinarily abide by such decision. This Court may
entertain an application only when extraordinary situation
emerges."
B
19. Thus, in view of the above, the High Court ought to
have directed the oustees to approach the GRA for redressal
of their grievances and if any person was further aggrieved of
the directions issued by the GRA, he could have approached
the High Court after full fledged adjudication of the factual issues C
by the GRA.

AMENDMENT OF R & R POLICY:
20. There are claims and counter-claims on the issue as
to whether the validity of the amendment of the R & R Policy o·
was under challenge before the High Court. However, it is
evident from the pleadings that the validity of the amendment
dated 3. 7.2003 had been raised while filing the rejoinder
affidavit. The rejoinder affidavit reveals that as the R & R Policy
had been approved by the State Government and statutory and E
non-statutory clearances had been obtained on the basis of the
R & R Policy, the amendment dated 3.7.2003 ought to have
been brought for the approval of the authorities who had
granted approval at initial stage. The amendment cannot be
given effect to. The impugned judgment makes it explicit that F
the issue had been raised and only taken note of by the Court
but not decided.

21. The appellants have placed documents on record to
show that amendment in issue had been duly approved by the
Cabinet of the Ma~hya Pradesh government and suggestion G
has been made that amendment did not require approval of the
authorities who had granted clearances. It has been opposed
by the respondents.

22. In case a plea is raised and not considered properly H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

/A by the court the remedy available to the party is to file a review
petition. (Vide: State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas
Nayak & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1249; Transmission Corporation
of A.P. Ltd & Ors. v. P. Surya Bhagavan, AIR 2003 SC 2182;
and Mount Carmel School Society v. DOA. (2008) 2 SCC
8 141).
23. Be that as it may, in view of the fact that neither the
writ petitioner asked the High Court to quash the said
amendment dated 3. 7.2003, nor the court has suo motu
quashed it, nor the writ petitioner has filed Special Leave
C Petition raising the said point, it is not permissible for us to deal
with the issue.

LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION: Article 21:

0 24. It is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that
as far as practicable persons who had been living and
carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired, if
they so desire, and are willing to purchase and comply with
any requirement of the authority or the local body, be given a
E piece of land on terms settled with due regard to the price at
which land has been acquired from them. However, the State
Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate
accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority
concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of
providing alternative land considering the facts and
F circumstances of each case. In certain cases, the oustees are
entitled to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is meant only for those
persons who have been rendered destitute because of a loss
of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition.
The authorities must explore the avenues of rehabilitation by
G way of employment, housing, investment opportunities, and
Identification of alternative lands. "A blinkered vision of
development, complete apathy towards those who are highly
adversely affected by the development process and a cynical
unconcern for the enforcement of the laws lead to a situation
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 489
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

where the rights and benefits promised and guaranteed under A
the Constitution hardly ever reach the most marginalised
citizens." For people whose lives and livelihoods are intrinsically
connected to the land, the economic and cultural shift to a
market economy can be traumatic.
B
(Vide: State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors., AIR 1986 SC
2025; Narpat Singh etc. etc. v. Jaipur Development Authority
& Anr., AIR 2002 SC 2036; Special Land Acquisition Officer,
U.K. Project v. Mahaboob & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 54;
Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. & Anr. v. Mathias Oram & Ors., C
JT (2010) 7 SC 352; and Brij Mohan & Ors. v. Haryana Urban
Development Authority & Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 29).

25. The Fundamental Right of the farmer to cultivation is
a part of right to livelihood. "Agricultural land is the foundation
for a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured D
possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity." India
being a predominantly agricultural society, there is a "strong
linkage between the land and the person's status in the social
system." However, in case of land acquisition, "the plea of
deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 is E
unsustainable." (Vide: Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1051; and Samatha v. State of A.P. &
Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3297).

26. This Court has consistently held that Article 300-A is
not only a constitutional right but also a human right. (Vide:
F
Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors., (2007) 10 SCC 448;
and Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2010) 10
SC 43).

27. However, in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. v. State G
of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 142, this Court held:

"Thus, it is clear that right to property under Article 300-A
is not a basic feature or structure of the Constitution. It is
only a constitutional right. ..... The principle of unfairness of H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A the procedure attracting Article 21 does not apply to the
acquisition or deprivation of property under Article 300-A
giving effect to the directive principles ... ."

28. This Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an - I held as
under:
8
"62. The displacement of the tribals and other persons
would not per se result in the violation of their fundamental
or other rights. The effect is to see that on their
rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than what
C they were. At the rehabilitation sites they will have more
and better amenities than those they enjoyed in their tribal
hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream of the
society will lead to betterment and progress."

0 29. In State of Kera/a & Anr. v. Peoples Union for Civil
Liberties, Kera/a State Unit & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 46, this
Court held as under:
"102. Article 21 deals with right to life and liberty. Would it
bring within its umbrage a right of tribals to be rehabilitated
E in their own habitat is the question?

103. If the answer is to be rendered in the affirmative,
then, for no reason whatsoever even an inch of land
belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe can ever be
F acquired. Furthermore, a distinction must be borne
between a right of rehabilitation required to be provided
when the land of the members of the Scheduled Tribes are
acquired vis-a-vis a prohibition imposed upon the State
from doing so at all."
G Thus, from the above referred to judgments, it is evident
that acquisition of land does not violate any constitutional/
fundamental right of the displaced persons. However, they are
entitled to resettlement and rehabilitation as per the policy
framed for the oustees of the concerned project.
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 491
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: A
30. The High Court after considering the submissions and
examining the documents on record, so far as the issue of land
in lieu of land acquired is concerned, came to the following
conclusions: B
(i) An area of 2508.14 hectares of agricultural land was
required for allotment to the displaced families as per the R &
R Policy for the Omkareshwar Project. Such land was
proposed to be acquired from big cultivators having more than
4 hectares of land in the command area of the project under C
Section 11 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Pariyojana Ke Karan
Visthapit Vyakti (Punahsthapan) Adhiniyam, 1985, (herein after
called 'Adhiniyam 1985').

(ii) Vide order dated 4th March, 1998, the area of the D
grazing land (required under the M.P. Land Revenue Code)
was reduced from 10 per cent to 5 per cent in every village.
Subsequently, vide order dated 19th September, 2002, area
of grazing land was further reduced to 2 per cent so that some
part of such land could be allotted to the oustees of the project. E
(iii) No efforts had been made by the Government for
allotment of land in lieu of land acquired to the displaced
families under the R & R Policy as amended on 3.7.2003.

(iv) The State instrumentalities had not made any effort to F
purchase private lands, for allotment to oustees under the R &
R Policy. On the contrary, the Government made available a
huge area of land required for a Special Economic Zone by
acquiring private land under the Act 1894 for settif'lg up of
industries in the State of Madhya Pradesh. G
(v) The submission of the State authorities that on account
of scarcity of cultivable land in the State, it was impossible for
the State Government to purchase private land for allotment,
was not acceptable.
H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011} 6 S.C.R.

A (vi) Only 11 per cent of the displaced families were able
to purchase private agricultural land themselves without any aid
or assistance of the State authorities.

(vii) None of the oustees has given option in writing to
receive compensation in lieu of land acquired.
8
(viii) The State deposited the amount of compensation in
the accounts of the oustees irrespective of whether they wanted
land in lieu of land acquired.

c (ix) None of the protections/facilities provided for persons
belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under
the R & R Policy had been accorded. The District Collector did
not make any verification in regard to their claim for land in lieu
of land acquired as required under the R & R Policy.
D (x) The Government had not made any attempt to provide
any grant-in-aid to cover up the gap between the amount of
compensation and the actual cost of land available for the
purpose, particularly to all displaced Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes families.
E
(xi) The State authorities had hastily proceeded to
complete the rehabilitation process and started the power
project of the Omkareshwar Dam contrary to the assurances
given under the said policy for Scheduled Castes and
F Scheduled Tribes families, as none of such oustees was
interested in receiving compensation for agricultural land.
(xii) Grant-in-aid to cover up the difference of costs of the
land purchased and amount of compensation was not paid to
G marginal farmers having upto 2 hectares of land, as provided
in the R & R Policy.
31. We have to examine whether any of the findings
recorded by the High Court on the issue of entitlement for land
in lieu of land acquired suffers from perversity and thus,
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 493
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
warrants interference by this Court. A
32. The relev~nt part of the R & R Policy, for the purpose
of determination of first issue, reads as under:

(I) Principles for rehabilitation of displaced
families: B

1. The aim of the State Government is that all displaced
families as defined hereinafter would after their relocation
and resettlement improve, or at least regain, their previous
standard of living within a reasonable time. c
xx xx xx
4. Special care would be taken of the families of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, marginal
farmers and small farmers. D

xx xx xx
1. The displaced families would be encouraged and ·
assisted in purchase of lands from voluntary sellers of the E
host villages.

II. - State Government Policy regarding rehabilitation
and resettlement of families affected due to
submerging in Narmada Projects:
F
1. Definitions:

(1.1) Displaced person:

a. Any person who has been ordinarily residing or carrying
on any trade or vocation for his livelihood or has been G
cultivating land for at least one year before the date of
publication of notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act in the area which is likely to be submerged
permanently or temporarily due to project.
H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A xx xx xx
3. Allotment of Agricultural land:

xx xx xx
B 3.2 (a) Every displaced family from whom more than 25
percent of its land holding is acquired in revenue villages
or forest villages shall be entitled to and as far as
possible will be allotted land to the extent of land acquired
from it, subject to the provision of para 3.2(b) below.
c (b) As far as possible, a minimum area of 2 hectares of
land would be allotted to all the families whose lands would
be acquired irrespective of whether Government land is
offered or private land is purchased for allotment. Where
more than 2 hec. of land is acquired from a family, it will
D be allotted equal land as far as possible, subject to a
ceiling of 8 hec. (Portion in italics was added vide
amendment dated 3.7.2003)

xx xx xx
E
5. Recovery of cost of allotted land:

(5.1) At least fifty per cent amount of compensation for the
acquired land shall be retained as initial installment
towards the payment of the cost of land to be allotted to
F the displaced family. However, if a displaced family does
not wish to obtain land in lieu of the submerged land and
wishes full payment of the amount of compensation, it
can do so by submitting an application to this effect in
writing to the concerned Land Acquisition Officer. In such
G cases displaced families will have no entitlement over
allotment of land and shall be paid full amount of
compensation in one installment. As option once
exercised under this provision shall be final, no claim for
allotment of land in lieu of the acquired land can be made
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 495
·MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
.· afterwards. (Portion in italics was added vide amendment A
· dated 3.7.2003).

· If any displaced family belonging to the Scheduled Tribes,
submits such an application, it will be essential to obtain
orders of the Collector who will, after necessary enquiry, 8
certify that this will not adversely affect the interests of the
displaced family. Such appJication of the Scheduled Tribes
displaced families will be accepted only after the above
said certification by the Collector.

(5.2) ............... .. c
(5.3) There will be no recovery of this loan for the first 2
years. Thereafter, the loan would be recovered in 20 equal
yearly installments.

(5.4) Grant-in-aid would be paid to cover up the gap D
between the amount of compensation and the cost of
allotted land in the cases where the cost of allotted land
is more than the amount of compensation. This grant
would be payable to all displaced land owning Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe families and other families E
losing upto 2 hec. of land. For other families from whom
more than 2 hec. and upto 8 hectares of land is acquired,
grant-in-aid in addition to amount of compensation will be
given by the Narmada Valley Development Authority on the
rates prescribed therein. F

POLICY DECISIONS:

33. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga etc.
etc., AIR 1998 SC 1703, this Court while examining the State
policy fixing the rates for reimbursement of medical expenses G
to the government servants held :

" •........ When Government forms its policy, it is based on
a number of circumstances on facts, law including
H.
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A constraints based on its resources. It is also based on
expert opinion. It would be dangerous if court is asked to
test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal
based on facts set out on affidavits. The court would
dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs
B to the executive. It is within this matrix that it is to be seen
whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts
reimbursement on account of its financial
constraints.......... For every return there has to be
investment. Investment needs resources and finances. So
c even to protect this sacrosanct right finances are an
inherent requirement. Harnessing such resources needs
top priority ........ No State of any country can have unlimited
resources to spend on any of its projects. That is why it
only approves its projects to the extent it is feasible."
D 34. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken
by the Government merely because it feels that another
decision would have been fairer or more scientific or logical
or wiser. The wisdom and advisability of the policies are
ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the policies are
E contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or
irrational or an abuse of power. (See: Ram Singh Vijay Pal
Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 44;
Villianur /yarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2009) 7 SCC 561; and State of Kera/a & Anr. v. Peoples'
F Union for Civil Liberties, Kera/a State Unit & Ors., (Supra).

35. Thus, it emerges to be a settled legal proposition that
Government has the power and competence to change the
policy on the basis of ground realities. A public policy cannot
G be challenged through PIL where the State Government is
competent to frame the policy and there is no need for anyone
to raise any grievance even if the policy is changed. The public
policy can only be challenged where it offends some
constitutional or statutory provisions.

H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 497
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE : A
36. The aforesaid phras~ provides for flexibility, clothing
the authority concerned with powers to meet special situations
. where the normal process of resolution cannot flow smoothly.
The aforesaid phrase can be interpreted as not being
prohibitory in nature. The said wo.rds rather, connote a
8
discretion vested in the prescribed authority. It is thus discretion
and not compulsion. There is no hard and fast rule in this regard ·
as these words give a discretion to the authority concerned.
Once the authority exercises its discretion, the Court should not
interfere with the said discretion/decision unless it is found to C
be palpably arbitrary. (Vide: Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v.
Motorola Inc., AIR 2005 SC 514; and High Court of Judicature
for Rajasthan v. Veena Verma & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2938).

37. Thus, it is evident that this phrase simply means that o
the principles are to be observed unless it is not possible to
follow the same in the particular circumstances of a case.

DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY:

38. The Court has to consider and understand the scope E
of application of the doctrines of "lex non cogit ad impossibilia"
(the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly
perform); "impossibi/ium nu/la obligatio est" (the law does not
expect a party to do the impossible); and impotentia excusflt
legem in the qualified sense that there is a necessary 1-0r F
invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the la~ or
to forbear the prohibitory.These maxims are akin to the maxim
of Roman Law Nemo Tenetur ad lmpossibilia (no one is bound
to do an impossibility) which is derived from common sense
and natural equity and has been adopted and applied in law G
. from time immemorial. Therefore, when it appears that the
performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been
rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons
interested had no control, like an act of God, the circumstances
will be taken as a valid excuse. (Vide: Chandra Kishore Jha H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A v. Mahavir Prasad & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3558; Hira Tikkoo v.
Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 3648; and
Haryqna Urban Development Authority & Anr. v. Dr.
Babeswar Kanhar & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 1491).

39. Thus, where the law creates a duty or charge, and the
B party is disabled to perform it, without any fault on his part, and
has no control over it, the law will in general excuse him. Even
in such a circumstance, the statutory provision is not denuded
of its mandatory character because of the supervening
impossibility caused therein.
c
LAND FOR LAND:
40. In Gramin Sewa Sanstha v. State of M.P. & Ors., 1986
Supp SCC 578, this Court held :
"2. We are also informed that though land has been
D
earmarked by the State Government for re-settlement of
the displaced tribals, such land is not available because
it is already occupied by other persons who themselves
will be uprooted if such land is acquired and made
available for the tribals displaced on account of the Hasdeo
E Bango Dam Project. If this is true, the remedy might be
worse than the disease because in order to re-settle one
set of displaced persons the State Government would be
displacing another set of persons. We would, therefore
direct the State Government to consider in the meanwhile
F as to whether the cultivable land at any other place or
places can be made available for the tribals who are
displaced on account of the present project." (Emphasis
added)
41. This Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an-I, held as
G under:
58 .......... when the removal of the tribal population is
necessary as an exceptional measure, they shall be
provided with land of quality at least equal to that of the
H land previously occupied by them and they shall be fully
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 499
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
compensated for any resulting loss or injury. The · A
rehabilitation package contained in the Award of ·the
Tribunal as improved further by the State of Gujarat and
the other States prima facie shows that the land required
to be allotted to the tribals is likely to be equal, if not better
than what they had owned." (Emphasis added) B

42. In State of Kera/a v. Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties
{Supra), this Court held as under:

"121. We must also make it clear that while allotting land
to the members of the Scheduled Tribes, the State cannot C
and must not allot them hilly or other types of lands which
are not at all fit for agricultural purpose. The lands, which
are to be allotted, must be similar in nature to the land
possessed by the members of the Scheduled Tribes. If in
the past, such allotments have been made, as has been D
contended before us by the learned counsel for the
respondent, the State must allot them other lands which are
fit for agricultural purposes. Such a process should be
undertaken and completed as expeditiously as possible
and preferably within a period of six months from date." E
(Emphasis added)

43. The issue has to be decided taking into consideration
the totality of the circumstances. For deciding this issue, the
terms and conditions incorporated in the Narmada Water
Disputes Tribunal Award (hereinafter called as 'NWDT Award') F
cannot be taken into consideration for the simple reason that
the Tribunal had been constituted under the provisions of Inter
State Water Disputes Act, 1956 (hereinafter called Act 1956),
and Award had been given in a case where several States, i.ef G
the States of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra were
involved. The said Award has no application in the instant cases
nor can it be a Bench Mark. More so, in the Sardar Sarovar
Project, land for land was mandatory. These cases are to be
decided giving strict adherence to the R & R Policy, as
amended on 3.7.2003, further considering that special care is H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A to be taken where persons are oppressed and uprooted so that
they are better off. Our Constitution requires removal of
economic inequalities and provides for provision of facilities
and opportunities for a decent standard of living and protection
of economic interests of the weaker segments of the society
B and in particular Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Every human being has a right to improve his standard of living.
Ensuing people are better off is the principle of socio-economic
justice which every State is under an obligation to fulfill, in view
of the provisions contained in Articles 37, 38, 39(a), (b), (e),
c (f), 41, 43, 46 and 47 of the Constitution of India. (Vide:
Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde &
Anr. (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 549; and N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union
of India & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 867).

44. Mere payment of compensation to the oustees in such
D a case may not be enough. In case the oustee is not able to
purchase the land just after getting the compensation, he may
not be able to have the land at all.

In K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. St:- 1 Dy. Collector, Land
E Acqn. Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, AIR 1988 SC 2123, this Court
expressed grave concern on the issue observing as un9er:

"....After all money is what money buys. What the claimants
could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot
do in 1988. Perhaps, not even half of it. It is a common
F experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling -
with rising inflation ..... The Indian agriculturists generally
have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If
uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left
high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have
G nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They
may even face starvation unless rehabilitated."(Emphasis
added)

45. It is a matter of common experience that the "person
H interested" gets the actual amount of compensation in reference
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF- 501
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
under Section 18 and appeal under Section 54 of the Act 1894. A
Award made by the Land Acquisition Collector is merely an
offer by the State through its agent. The Collector acts in dual
capacity. It is in fact, for this reason that local authority/company
for whom the land is acquired cannot question the Award of the
Collector except on the ground of fraud, corruption or collusion, B
as provided under Section 50 of the Act 1894. The Award in
the enquiry by the Collector is merely a decision (binding only
on the Collector) as to what sum shall be tendered to the owners
of the lands, and that, if a judicial ascertainment of value is
desired by the owner, he can obtain it by requiring the matter c
to be referred by the Collector to the Court. (See Ezra v.
Secretary of State for India, (1905) 32 Ind App 93; and
Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation & Anr.,
AIR 1986 SC 1164).

46. In the instant cases, admittedly, in spite of the fact that
D ,
there has been a consent Award under Section 11 (2) of the Act
1894, the appellants had agreed before the High Court that the
oustees would be entitled to have reference under Section 18
of the Act 1894, a large number of references are pending
before the courts for consideration. Thus, there is still a E
possibility of enhancement of compensation, but such a course
would take time. By that time there will be such a hike in the
price of land that the oustees will not be able to purchase Ahe
land. For lack of any experience or skill, such oustees would
not be able to engage themselves in any other alternative F
occupation/vocation. Thus, it would be difficult for them to
survive.

4 7. The record of the case reveals that about 56% of the
oustees involved in these cases are members of Scheduled G
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Land had never been offered
to any of these oustees. The amount of compensation as
determined under the Act 1894 had been deposited in their
bank accounts. No attempt had ever been made by the
appellant-State to either acquire land from other persons having H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A a larger area of land resorting to the provisions of Act 1894 or
purchase the same by agreement/negotiation for resettlement
of the oustees. Only 11 % of the oustees could purchase the
land of their own from other persons without any assistance
from the State Authorities. The submission raised on behalf of
B the State that it had been impossible for authorities to acquire/
purchase the land cannot be accepted as this is a pure
question of fact and in absence of any material to show that
any attempt had ever been made to acquire the land to
rehabilitate the oustees, such a submission remains
c unsubstantiated.

48. Same appears to be the position in regard to the
amended provisions of the R & R Policy. The phrase "as far
as possible" would come into play, in case an attempt is made
to acquire/purchase lands and then to make allotment of land
D to oustees. The other added term i.e. giving the option to
oustees to make application for acceptance of compensation
and not claiming land for land acquired, remained inapplicable,
as it is alleged that not a sing e oustee made such an
application. If it is so, the question remains merely academic.
E None of the obligations on the part of the authorities as clearly
stipulated by the R & R Policy had been fulfilled. The Adhiniyam
1985 had not been made applicable in respect of the
Omkareshwar Dam Project taking into account the past
experience in other projects. Undoubtedly, the acquisition of
F land and displacing other persons for resettling these oustees
could have a chain reaction and the remedy/cure might have
been worse than the disease itself and could further give rise
to the question as to whether such an action was permissible
in law. The State authorities ought to have assisted the oustees
G in purchasing the land of their choice from other agriculturists
and met the difference of cost, if any, over and above the
amount of compensation and the cost of land so purchased.
While determining such issues, the State authorities could take
into consideration the fact that the land should be not less than
H of the same quality and nature which the oustees were originally
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 503
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

having with them. Thi.s exercise could have been done "pari A
pasu" which means "equably" or "ratably" to the construction of
the Dam and could have been completed much in advance of
completion of the Dam to the Full Water Level.

In the process of development, the State cannot be B
permitted to displace tribal people, a vulnerable section of our
society, suffering from poverty and ignorance, without taking
appropriate remedial measures of rehabilitation. The Court is
not oblivious of the fact that social and economic reasons had
caused disaffection, and thus, the tribal areas are today in the C
grip of extremism, as the tribal youths have become easy prey
to the extremists' propaganda.

49. While dealing with I.A. No. 42086/2008 in Writ Petition
No. 4457 of 2007 (PIL), the High Court on 16.3.2009
considered the grievance of the oustees that the land available D
with the State for allotment was not cultivable and had been
encroached upon, thus, the oustees were not willing to accept
the land offered to them. The Court directed the Indian Council
of Agricultural Research (Bhopal) to depute a sufficient number
of experts to inspect the land offered to the displaced families E
and to find out as to whether it was suitable for agricultural
purposes and submit its report and further directed the
authorities to file an affidavit as to whether the encroachment
could be removed expeditiously within a period of two months.
The expert committee of Indian Council of Agricultural Research F
(Bhopal) had submitted the report that the land was cultivable.
The matter was directed to be listed on 13.9.2009 and in the
meanwhile, the GRA was directed to dispose of all
applications/objections of the oustees for allotment of land in
lieu of land acquired except those where the dispute related to G
entitlement of major sons for allotment of land and where the
oustees had withdrawn the entire amount of compensation/
SRG amount. Report dated 13.1.2010 submitted by the GRA
before the High Court makes it clear that all objections filed
before it by the oustees had been decided and directions H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A issued by the GRA had been complied with by the State
authorities.

50. Before the High Court, the State put forward the
explanation that the Authorities had Awarded the benefit of SRG
to the oustees. In fact, the PAFs had complained that with the
8
amount of compensation for their lands they were not able to
buy land elsewhere and that instead of purchasing the land by
Government, the additional cost involved may be made
available to the PAFs to enable them to purchase land of their
choice. The State Government after consultation with all
C concerned and approval by Hon'ble Chief Minister devised a
scheme whereby the PAF is given substantial additional
amount over and above the compensation for his land in order
to enable him to purchase arable and irrigable land at the
location of his choice. This scheme has come to be known as
D SRG or Special Rehabilitation Package (SRP). The rate of the
irrigated land in the nearest command area is worked out on
the basis of sale deeds and the cost of land going under
submergence is calculated. 30% of this amount is again added
to this cost and a sum is worked out which is known as the
E determined value. Difference between the determined value
and compensation already paid is called SRG and is paid to
the PAF. The problems inherent in Government purchase are
totally eliminated and the PAF is fully empowered and
competent to decide things for himself. The additional amount
F made available to the PAF as SRG is not recoverable from
him. The purchase of land made by the PAF is exempt from
the stamp duty and registration fee.

51. The offer of SRG is over and above the Rehabilitation
G Policy. SRG enables the PAF to purchase land suitable to him
at a place of his choice as he is neither willing to accept the
land offered by the government nor to start the life at the new
place by mortgaging the land for the loan. Under the SRG, the
extra amount paid over and above the compensation is not
H recoverable. Due to the advantage of free hand, the SRG is
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 505
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
well accepted by the PAFs. Registration fees and stamp duty A
are also paid. As the SRG comes into operation after the PAFs
showed unwillingness to accept the land from the land bank and
the PAFs want complete freedom for getting land of their
choice, so land for land option has not been exercised by the
PAFs and instead they have preferred and accepted cash s
compensation. So land for land has not been allotted to PAFs
as the policy. It is, however, erroneous to say that not a single
PAF of Omkareshwar Project was allotted agricultural land
because the PAFs were empowered to purchase land of their
choice by paying SRG. c
52. SRG is an additional amount paid to an oustee to
enable him to purchase land in the command area to the extent
of his land acquired. Normally, an oustee who looses land in
submergence area gets an amount determined under the Act
1894. When a project is envisaged in an area, the sale and D
purchase in that area decrease and the prices also get
depressed. By the time, the notification under Section 4(1) of
the Act 1894, is issued, the sale deeds, if any, executed in that
area, do not represent the correct price. Similarly, the prices
in the command area also increase as a result qf declaration E
of the project. Hence, it is difficult for an oustee to purchase
land in command area from the amount given to him under the
Act 1894. SRG is designed to nullify both the above effects and
to enable the oustee to get an amount by which he can
purchase land to the extent of his land acquired, in command F
area.
SRG= Award Amount Award Amount calculated
calculated for equal (minus) for the land acquired from
land in command oustee in submergence
area as per Act 1894 area as per Act 1894 G
solatium including
or
SRG= Award with assumption - Actual Award for the basis
that land is in (minus) land in submergence
command area. area H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A The aforesaid relief granted by the appellants to the
oustees as SRG is much more than the amount of
compensation or amount entitled in R & R Policy as amended
on 3.7.2003. In fact, to certain extent, it is in consonance with
the provisions contained in Clause (5.4) of R & R Policy,
B wherein the State is under an obligation to meet the gap of
amount between the amount of compensation and the value of
the land purchased by the oustees.

53. The appellants have submitted that all the oustees have
voluntarily accepted SRG and withdrawn the amount and they
C stand fully satisfied. In absence of appropriate pleadings and
evidence on record, it is not possible for this Court to adjudicate
upon the individual claims or issue a direction of sweeping
nature. Thus, if an oustee feels aggrieved of what he has
received, he may approach the GRA. In case the GRA after
D adjudication of facts, comes to the conclusion that a particular
oustee has not been granted the relief, he is entitled for; the
GRA itself would grant the appropriate relief taking into account
the provisions of R & R Policy. In case, either of the parties is
aggrieved, it may approach the High Court for appropriate
E directions.

ENTITLEMENT OF MAJOR SONS FOR AGRICULTURAL
LAND IN THE R & R POLICY 1993:

F 54. So far as the 2nd issue is concerned, the R & R Policy
provides for definition clause:

Displaced Family:

"(i) A family composed of displaced persons as defined
G above shall mean and include husband, wife and minor
children and other persons dependent on the head of the
family e.g. widowed mother, widowed sister, unmarried
sister, unmarried daughter or old aged father.
(ii) Every son/unmarried daughter who has become major
H on or before the date of notification under Section 4 of the
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 507
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Land· Acquisition Act, will be treated as a separate A
family." (Emphasis added)

55. This Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an-I, dealt with
the issue of entitlement of major sons of oustees of the Sardar
Sarovar Project and held that as it had been provided in the 8
NWDT Award, the sons who had become major one year prior
to the date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of
the Act 1894, for land acquisition, had become entitled to
allotment of land.

56. In Narmada Bachao Ando/an - JI, this Court had taken C
note of the said observation/finding in the aforesaid case and
held:

"62. Once major son comes within the purview of the
expansive definition of family, it would be idle to contend D
that the scheme of giving "land for land" would be
applicable to only those major sons who were landholders
in their own rights. If a person was a landholder, he in his
own right would be entitled to the benefit of rehabilitation
scheme and, thus, for the said purpose, an expansive E
definition of family was not necessarily to be rendered.
Furthermore, if such a meaning is attributed as has been
suggested by Mr Vaidyanathan, the definition of "family"
would to an extent become obscure. As a major son
constitutes "separate family" within the interpretation clause F
of "family", no meaning thereto can be given." (Emphasis
added)

57. In the instant case, the High Court on this issue held
as under:-
G
There is no separate definition of displaced family given
in para 3 of the R&R Policy of 1993. Hence, the same
definition as has been given in sub-para 1.1 (b) of the R&R
policy of 1993 would be applicable to para 3 of the R&R
policy and the displaced family in para 3.2 will include H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A husband, wife, minor children and other persons dependent
on the head of the family and every son who has become
major on or before the date of notification under Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act but who was part of the larger
land owning family from whom land was acquired will have
B to be treated as separate displaced family from whom
land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. While
calculating however the extent of landholding of a displaced
family for the purposes of determining the area of land to
be allotted to the displaced family, the share of the
c displaced family without the major son may only be taken.
Similarly, while calculating the extent of land to be allotted
to the separated family of such major son, the share of the
major son in the land may be taken into
consideration ............. we hold that every adult son and
his family who was part of the bigger family from whom land
D
was acquired would be enti'led to allotment of agricultural
land in accordance with paras 3 and 5 of the R&R Policy
of 1993 for the Omkareshwar Dam project." (Emphasis
added)

E 58. In view of the above, this Court has to consider as to
whether the NWDT Award provided for any entitlement of major
sons to allotment of agricultural land, and if not, whether the
judgment in Narmada Bachao Ando/an -I could have been
considered as a precedent in Narmada Bachao Ando/an -II,
F and whether the High Court has rightly interpreted the terms and
conditions of the R & R Policy, as the High Court has proceeded
with the assumption that the R & R Policy provides that major
sons of oustees i.e. the "large land owning families" and those
who had been "part of the bigger family" would be entitled for
G allotment of agricultural land.
PRECEDENCE -Doctrine:

59. The Court should not place reliance upon a judgment
without discussing how the factual situation fits in with a fact-
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 509
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has A
to be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the
issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. A
judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some
distinguishing features. A little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of B
a decision. A judgment of the Court is not to be read as a
statute, as it is to be remembered that judicial utterances have
been made In setting of the facts of a particular case. One
additional or different fact may make a world of difference
between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by c
blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper. (Vide:
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC
38; Govt. of Karnataka & Ors. v. Gowramma & Ors., AIR 2008
SC 863; and State of Haryana & Anr. v. Dharam Singh & Ors.
(2009) 4 sec 340).
D
PER INCURIAM - Doctrine:
60. lncuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per
incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The Courts have
developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. E
Thus, the "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is
rendered, in ignorance of a Statute or other binding authority.
While dealing with observations made by a seven Judges'
Bench in India Cement Ltd. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu
etc. etc., AIR 1990 SC 85, the five Judges' Bench in State of F
West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 10
sec 201, observed as under:-
A doubtful expression occurring in a judgment, apparently
by mistake or inadvertence, ought to be read by assuming
that the Court had intended to say only that which is correct G
· ,.,according to the settled position of law, and the apparent ·
error should be ignored, far from making any capital out
of it, giving way to the correct expression which ought to
be implied or necessarily read in the context, .......... A
H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A statement caused by an apparent typographical or 1

inadvertent error in a judgment of the Court should not be
misunderstood as declaration of such law by the Court."
(Emphasis added)

(See also Mamleshwar Prasad & Anr. v. Kanhaiya Lal
8
(Dead) by Lrs., AIR 1975 SC 907; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
AIR 1988 SC 1531; State of U.P. & Anr. v. Synthetics and
Chemicals Ltd. & Anr., (1991) 4 SCC 139; and Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2011) 1
c sec 694).
61. Thus, "per incuriam" are those decisions given in
ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or
authority binding on the Court concerned, or a statement of law
caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at
D without application of mind or proceeded without any reason
so that in such a case some part of Hie decision or some step
in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account
to be demonstrably wrong.

E 62. Admittedly, the NWDT Award did not provide for
allotment of agricultural land to the major sons oi such oustees.
The States of Gujarat and Maharashtra had given concessions/
relief over and above the said Award. Thus, the Narmada
Bachao Ando/an-I has been decided with presumption that
such a right had been conferred upon major sons by the NWDT
F Award and Narmada Bachao Ando/an-II has been decided
following the said judgment and interpreting the definition of
"family" contained in the R & R Policy. When the two earlier
cases were being considered by the Court, it had not been
brought to its notice that the NWDT Award did not provide for
G such an entitlement. In such cases, the issue is further required
to be considered as to whether, as we will consider the
definition of the word "family" at a later stage, the mistake
inadvertently committed by this Court earlier, should be
perpetuated.
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 511
MADHYA PRADE.SH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
63. The Courts are not to perpetuate an illegality, rather it A
is the duty of the courts to rectify mistakes. While dealing with
a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji & Ors. etc. etc. v.
State of A.P. & Ors. etc. etc., AIR 1993 SC 1048 observed as
under.
B
"... To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the
compulsion of judicial conscience. In this, we derive
comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of
Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter (A.M.Y. at page
18: 'a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is C
fallible and, therefore, ever ready to learn: great and honest
enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth
wherever it may lead: and courageous enough to
acknowledge his errors".

(See also Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. & Anr., (2004) 7 D
SCC 558; and Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. CBI, AIR
2006 SC 2449).

64. In re: Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry of Information
& Broadcasting, (1995) 3 SCC 619, this Court observed : E

"... None is free from errors, and the judiciary does nott
claim infallibility. It is truly said that a judge who has not
committed a mistake is yet to be born. Our legal system
in fact acknowledges the fallibility of the courts and F
provides for both internal and external checks to correct
the errors. The law, the jurisprudence and the precedents,
. the open public hearings, reasoned judgments, appeals,
revisions, references and reviews constitute the internal
checks while objective critiques, debates and discussions G
of judgments outside the courts, and legislative correctives
provide the external checks. Together, they go a long way
to ensure judicial accountability. The law thus provides
procedure to correct judicial errors."
H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A DISCRIMINATION:

65. We also have to consider the submissions made on
behalf of the respondent No.1 that the denial of allotment to
major sons of agricultural land would amount to hostile
B discrimination as in earlier cases, it had been granted.

66. Unequals cannot claim equality. In Madhu Kishwar &
Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1864, it has been
held by this Court that every instance of discrimination does not
C necessarily fall within the ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution.

67. Discrimination means an unjust, an unfair action in
favour of one and against another. It involves an element of 1

intentional and purposeful differentiation and further an element
of unfavourable bias; an unfair classification. Discrimination
D under Article 14 of the Constitution must be conscious and not
accidental discrimination that arises from oversight which the
State is ready to rectify. (Vide: Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of
Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123; and Mis Video Electronics Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 820).
E
68. However, in Vishundas Hundumal & Ors. v. State of
'Madhya Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1636; and Eskayef Ltd.
v. Collector of Central Excise, (1990) 4 SCC 680, this Court
held that when discrimination is glaring, the State cannot take
F recourse to inadvertence in its action resulting in discrimination. •
In a case where denial of equal protection is complained of and
the denial flows from such action and has a direct impact on
the fundamental rights of the complainant, a constructive
approach to remove the discrimination by putting the
G complainant in the same position as others enjoying favourable
treatment by inadvertence of the State authorities, is required.

69. The High Court while passing the order had given a
much wider interpretation to the R & R Policy making reference
H to the terms as abigger family" and the «large land owning
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 513
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
family". A

The Court while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, can
neither add nor subtract a word. The legal maxim "a verbis /egis
non est recedendum" means from the words of law, there must
be no departure. (See: S.P. Gupta & Ors. v. Union of India & B
Ors., AIR 1982 SC 149; P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries & Ors.,
AIR 1990 SC 933; and Commissioner of Income Tax, Kera/a
v. Tara Agencies, (2007) 6 SCC 429).

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE: c
70. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.
Singh (12 Edn. 2010), the learned Author has stated as under:

"In selecting out of different interpretations 'the court will o
adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather
than that which is none of those things'. .... .. A construction
that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice,
absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or
uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute E
purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference
should be given to that construction which avoids such
results." (pp. 131-132)

71. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, F
AIR 1994 SC 1775, this Court held as under:

"Though the function of the courts is only to expound the
law and not to legislate, nonetheless the legislature cannot
be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties in the G
implementation of its intention and the spirit of the law. In
such circumstances, it is the duty of the court to mould or
creatively interpret the legislation by liberally interpreting
the statute.
H
\ 514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edn.
at page 229, the following passage is found:

'Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary
meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest
8 contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or
to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon
it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
structure of the sentence.'
c
But to winch up the legislative intent, it is permissible
for courts to take iRto account of the ostensible purpose
and object and the real legislative intent. Otherwise, a bare
mechanical interpretation of the words and application of
D the legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose and
object will render the legislative inane."

72. Therefore, an interpretation having a social justice
mandate is required. The statutory provision is to be read in a
E manner so as to do justice to all the parties. Any construction
leading to confusion and absurdity must be avoided. The Court
has to find out the legislative intent and eschew the construction
which will lead to absurdity and give rise to practical
inconvenience or make the provision of the existing law
F nugatory. The construction that results in hardship, serious
inconvenience or anomaly or gives unworkable and
impracticable results, should be avoided. (Vide: Corporation
Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala & Anr. (2009) 1 SCC 540;
G and Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1
sec 135).
73. A reasonable construction agreeable to justice and
reason is to be preferred to an irrational construction. The Court
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 515
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
has to prefer a more reasonable and just interpretation for the A
reason that there is always a presumption against the law
maker intending injustice and unreasonability/irrationality, as
opposed to a literal one and which does not fit in with the
scheme of the Act. In case the natural meaning leads to
mischievous consequences, it must be avoided by accepting B
the alternative construction. (Vide: Bihar State Council of
Ayurvedic and Unani Medicine v. State of Bihar, AIR 2008 SC
595; and Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh I(. Union
oflndia (2009) 2 sec 1).
C·
.· . . .

74. The Court has not only to take a pragmatic view while
interpreting a statutory provision, but must also consider the
practical aspect of it. (Vide: Union of India v. Ranbaxy
Laboratories Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 2286). D

75. In Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai, AIR 1996 SC
1826, this Court held :

"The purpose of the law is to prevent brooding sense of E
injustice. It is not the words of the law but the spirit and
eternal sense of it that makes the law meaningful."

76. In Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management F
of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353, it has been held
thus:

".. the definition clause must be read in the context of the
G
subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with
the objects and other provisions of the Act."

77. In Sheikh Gu/fan v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli, AIR 1965
H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R.

A SC 1839, it has been held as follows:

"19 ... 0ften enough, in interpreting a statutory provision, it
becomes necessary to have regard to the subject matter
of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.
B
That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the
relevant words in any statutory provision, the context in
which the words occur, the object of the statute in which
the provision is included, and the polrcy underlying the
c statute assume relevance and become material..."

78. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the
recipient of justice is not to be followed. Justice means justice
D between both the parties. Justice is the virtue, by which the
Court gives to a man what is his due. Justice is an act of
rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has
suffered a wrong. The underlying idea is of balance. It means
E to give to each his right. Therefore, while tempering the justice
with mercy, the Court has to be very conscious that it has to
do justice in exact conformity with the statutory requirements.

79. Thus, it is evident from the above referred law, that the
F Court has to interpret a provision giving it a construction
agreeable to reason and justice to all parties concerned,
avoiding injustice, irrationality and mischievous consequences.
The interpretation so made must not produce unworkable and
G impracticable results or cause unnecessary hardship, serious
inconvenience or anomaly. The court also has to keep in mind
the object of the legislation.

H
INSTANT CASE: z
)>
80. REHABILITATION PROVISIONS AS PER NWDT AWARD AND STATE-WISE ~ ::0
)> ~
COMPARATIVE PROVISIONS 0 )>
:z:O
:< )>
s. Item NWDT Award Madhya Gujarat Maharashtra )> OJ
-0 )>
No. Pradesh
1.(a) Tenure xx xx xx xx $?~
0 )>
Holder mO
(/) )>
(b) Xx xx xx xx xx Iz
~o
(c) Xx. xx xx xx xx Oo
;;o r
Major son will 2 hec. of land 1 hec. of land to . )>
(d) Major sons No· provision
of above all for land be treated as to each major each unmarried
OJz
categories allotment. separate family. son of all daughter and
0 :<:
() (/)
· of oustees They will be categories. major son of I~
entitled to cash all categories of )> ;;....i

compensation oustees with - as ~m
)>Q
according to cut- off date for ~,,
i.i" r> ca~egory major sons and c_
.:.....
to whici1 they unmarried
belong. daughters.
81. IMPLICATIONS IF IMPUGNED JUDGMENT IS UPHELD

Category of In case each of the following Categories of oustees lose only one hectare of land
oustees CJ)
Mr. A Mr. B Mr. C Mr. D Mr. E Mr. F c
'"O
(land (Losing (Single Single (E1+ (F1+F2+F3) ;:o
less) less than Khatedar) {Khatedar) E2+E3) Joint m
:s:
25% of Joint Khatedars m
Khatedars ()
holding)
0
No. of major 3 3 0 3 0 F1: 3 sons c
sons/ F2: 3 sons ~
daughters F3: 4 sons :::0
m
Entitlement if contention of Respondent is accepted '"O
0
:::0
For Self 0 0 2 hect. 2 hect. 3@2 hect. 3@2 hect. =
= 6 hect. 6 hect. ~
For Major 0 0 0 3@2 hect. 0 10@ 2 hect.=
sons/ = 6 hect. 20 hect.
daughters
O>
Total 0 0 2 hect. 8 hect. 6 hect. 26 hect. CJ)

Entitlement ()
.
:::0
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 519
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
It is apparent that the directions of the Hon'ble High Court A
regarding land-for-land would lead to grave inequity, and
thereby likely to cause undue enrichment of some categories
of oustees:

a. Sons of land owning class get better rights than their
8
fathers.· ·

b. Sons of land owning class get better rights than those
of land less class ..

c. Even though everybody loses same measure of land, c
some are not entitled to any land while for some it becomes
an unimaginable bounty or proves to be bonanza.

82. In case, the view taken by the High Court is upheld, it
would have very serious repercussions for the reason that no
0
land had been acquired wherein a major son can independently
claim compensation as a matter of right. In such an eventuality,
the question of re~aining 50 per cent of the compensation could
not arise. If it were allowed, jt would ~reate hostile discrimination
against others like landless persons who have been found to
be non-suited by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The E
High Court has added words like "larger land owning family"
and "bigger family" to justify the relief given to major sons even
though such terms do not appear in the R & R Policy or either
of the judgments given by this Court earlier. The charts
hereinabove make it crystal clear that there was no provision F
for allotment of land to major sons in the NWDT Award.
Obviously, it has wrongly been mentioned in the earlier
judgments of this Court by inadvertence. This requires
correction as such an error cannot be perpetuated .. The claims
of the respondents, if accepted, and the High Court judgment G
if upheld, would lead to unwarranted results. For some of the
families having a large number of major sons, it would lead to
a level of unjust enrichment that could never have been
envisaged by the Government of Madhya Pradesh. The view
taken by the High Court gives rise to pre-supposition (a fiction) H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A of partition of agricultural land amongst the tenure-holder and
his major sons. Such a concept would defeat the right of minor
sons for partition or claiming the share in the agricultural land
and also lead to uncertainty as to whether 75% of the total land
of the major son, after partition stood acquired. The plea of
B discrimination is not available to such major sons of the
families, whose land has been acquired for this project, as they
cannot be put at par with the major sons of the oustees of the
Sardar Sarovar Project. Even if the plea is tenable, such
discrimination cannot be held to be conscious or intentional as
c the State is willing to rectify the mistake. The State has filed
an application to rectify the mistake in the judgment of 2005,
as I.A. No. 37 of 2009 for clarification/modifications of the said
judgment which is pending consideration.

The view expressed earlier, inadvertently, on a wrong
D assumption may result in great public loss and would be
against larger public interest. There is no prohibition under the
law on this Court to locate the error and adopt a correct
approach if the Court is convinced that the error exists and its
avoidance is necessary to prevent any baneful effect on the
E general interest of the public or the State. The mistake is
manifestly wrong and has a direct impact on the procedure to
be adopted for rehabilitation. The impact of allotment cannot
be against public good and has to be balanced with an
appropriate grant to the oustees. It is, therefore, essential to
F rectify the mistake.

83. Compensation in the present context has to be
understood in relation to right to property. The right of the oustee
is protected only to a limited extent as enunciated in Article
G 300-A of the Constitution of India. The tenure holder is deprived
of the property only to the extent of land actually owned and
possessed by him. This is, therefore, limited to the physical
area of the property and this area cannot get expanded or
reduced by any fictional definition of the word "family" when it
H comes to awarding compensation. Compensation is Awarded
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 521
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

by authority of law under Article 300-A of the Constitution read A
with the relevant statutory law of compensation under any law
made by the legislature and for the time being in force, only for
the area acquired.

Rehabilitation on the other hand, is restoration of the status
8
of something lost, displaced or even otherwise a grant to secure
a dignified mode of life to a person who has nothing to sustain
himself. This concept, as against compensation and property
under Article 300-A, brings within its fold the presence of the
elements of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Those who C
have been rendered destitute, have to be assured a permanent
source of basic livelihood to sustain themselves. This becomes
necessary for the State when it relates to the rehabilitation of
the already depressed classes like Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and marginal farmers in order to meet the
requirements of social justice. D

As noted above, benefit given to a major son was not
within the terms of the Award. It was rather a concession given
by the States who were parties to the NWDT Award. The said
Award, therefore, as understood in the previous decisions was E
not at all applicable for the purpose of extending any such grant
of benefit to a major son. The concession given by the
respective States after the Award was delivered during the
course of subsequent negotiations therefore, could not be a part
of the Award. The aforesaid decisions, therefore, would not be F
a binding precedent for the purpose of the present case as it
was under some mistaken belief that the Award w~s understood
to have extended the said benefit to major sons also. The High
Court therefore, fell into an error by proceeding to assume that
a major son would be treated to be a separate family for the G
purpose of allotment of land also.

84. The rehabilitation has to be done to the extent of the
displacement. The rehabilitation is compensatory in nature with
a view to ensure that the oustee and his family are at least
H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A restored to the status that was existing on the date of the
commencement of the proceedings under the Act 1894. There
was no intention on behalf of the State to have awarded more
land treating a major son to be separate unit. This would
otherwise bring about an anomaly, as is evident-from the chart
B that has been gainfully reproduced hereinabove. The idea of
rehabilitation was, therefore, not to distribute largesse of the
State that may reflect distribution totally disproportionate to the
extent of the land acquired. The State has, therefore, rightly
resisted this demand of the writ petitioners and, in Q_ur opinion,
c for the High Court to presuppose or assume a seRarate unit
for each major son far above the land acquired, was neither
justified nor legally sustainable.

In effect, the major son would not be entitled to anything
additional as his separate share in the original holding and it
D will not get enhanced by the fictional definition as stated in the
impugned judgment. The major son would, however, be entitled
to his share in the area which is to be allotted to the tenure
holder on rehabilitation in case he is entitled to such a share
in the law applicable to the particular State.
E
85. More so, the view taken by the High Court that the land
to be allotted to major sons shall be determined on the basis
of his share in the land prior to its acquisition, does not appear
to be compatible or in consonance with the terms of R & R
F Policy which provides for a minimum allocation of 2 hectares.
Thus, the policy must be interpreted to the effect that the major
sons of oustees will be entitled to all the benefits under the R
& R Policy, except allocation of agricultural land. Each State
has a right to frame the rehabilitation policy considering the
extent of its resources and other priorities. One State is not
G bound if in a similar situation, the other State has accorded
additional facilities even over and above the policy. The
definition of "displaced family" cannot be read in isolation,
rather it requires to be considered taking into account the
eligibility criteria for allotment of land in Clause (5) of the R &
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 523
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

R Policy. To that extent, the judgment of the High Court is liable A
to be set aside.

CONCLUSIONS:

86. In view of the above, the direction given by the High
Court in paragraph 64 (i) of the judgment. is modified to the 8
extent that the displaced families who have not withdrawn SRG
benefits/ compensation voluntarily and submit applications for
allotment of land before the Authority concerned, shall be
entitled to the allotment of agricultural land "as far as possible"
in terms of the R & R Policy, and for that purpose, the C
appellants must make some government or private land
available for allotment to such oustees if they opt for such land
and agree to ensure compliance with other terms and
conditions stipulated therein.
D
In case suitable land is available in the land bank, the
same woulc;l be offered to such oustees. In case, dispute of
suitability of land-is raised, it would be adjudicated upon and
determined by the GRA. The authorities must render all possible
assistance to the oustees to purchase the land by negotiations. E
In case the land is not available as mentioned hereir\above, the
State must ensure compliance of Clause 5.4 of the R' & R Policy
to the full extent in the cases of the Scheduled Castes/
Scheduled Tribes and to the extent of 2 hectares in case of
other marginal farmers. In case the extent of the land acquired F
is more than 8 hectares, the same shall be paid according to
the provisions contained therein.

The Government must continue to search for additional land
than what is already available in the land bank and to find out
the means of its purchase for allotment to the oustees. The G
Government should also ensure that the allocated land is not
encroached upon by the unscrupulous persons.

Direction given by the High Court to allot agricultural land
to major sons of the oustees in Paragraph 64 (iii) of the H

•
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A impugned judgment is hereby set aside.

In the instant cases, the R & R Policy or amendment
thereto in 2003, has not been under challenge. There was no
prayer by the respondents to quash the said amendment. Relief
8 not sought by the party cannot be granted by the Court. More
so, the direction has been issued by the High Court to grant
relief in the impugned judgment and order taking into account
the said amendment. The same is not under challenge at the
behest of respondents before us. In such an eventuality, it was
not desirable for the High Court to make any comment on the
C competence of the State to amend the policy and the finding
so recorded in Para 38 of the judgment cannot be sustained
in the eyes of law, and thus is set aside.

Civil Appeal No. 2082 of 2011
D
87. The present appeal has been preferred by the
appellant/writ petitioners mainly on the 3 issues on which no
relief has been granted by the High Court. Therefore, the appeal
is limited to the extent of: whether landless oustees are entitled
E to allotment of agricultural land; whether the NWDT Award
dated 12.12.1979 is applicable to the present project of the
Omkareshwar Dam; and, thirdly, whether the oustees of 5
villages which have already been submerged, are entitled to
allotment of lang in lieu of land acquired, in spite of the fact that
F the SRG had already been granted to them.

88. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal
have already been elaborately mentioned in connected Civil
Appeal Nos.2115-2116 of 2011, thus, the same are not
repeated here and we proceed to decide the issues involved
G herein.
89. Shri Sanjay Parekh, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, has submitted that R & R Policy does not provide
for land for agricultural purposes to landless persons. However,
H the Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Forest and
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 525
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Environment dated 13.10.1993 granting clearance for the A
Omkareshwar Dam provided for allotment of land to landless
labourers also. The NWDT Award is applicable in the case of
the Omkareshwar Dam also for providing the resettlement and
rehabilitation of all kinds of oustees of the five villages, whose
land had already been submerged in view of the orders of the B
Court passed, from time to time, though paid compensation
under the Act 1894/SRG, are also entitled for allotment of
agricultural land in terms of R & R Policy. Hence, to thatextent,
the judgment and order of the High Court impugned herein, is
liable to be set aside. c
On the contrary, the appeal had been vehemently opposed
by S/Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad and P.S. Patwalia, learned
Senior counsel appearing for the respondents contending that
R & R Policy does not provide for allotment of land to landless
persons. More so, the clearance given by the Ministry of Forest D
and Environment stood qualified by the words "as permissible"
meaning thereby, the landless labourer shall be entitled to
allotment of land in case it is permissible in law for the time
being in force or any other policy framed by the State to that
effect. They have further submitted that NWDT Award was E
meant only for the Sardar Sarovar Dam as a water dispute had
arisen among the States sharing the water of the Narmada river
· under the Award and thus the said Award has no application
whatsoever so far as the Omkareshwar Dam was concerned.
In view of the fact that 5 villages had already been submerged F
long back and the oustees thereof, had been paid
compensation for their land acquired/SRG, the question of
reopening the issue is not permissible. Thus, the appeal is
liable to be dismissed.
G
We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

90. The Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry of
Forest and Environment dated 13.10.1993 granting clearance
for the Omkareshwar Dam Project with a condition, stated as H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A under:

'(vii) The Rehabilitation Programme should be extended
to landless labourers and the people affected due to canal
by identifying and allocating suitable land as permissible.
A time bound programme should be submitted by
B
December, 1993."

91. The High Court has held that the said condition so
added stood qualified by the words 'as permissible' and thus,
the landless labourers would get the land even for agricultural
C purposes to the extent of 2 hectares (about 5 acres), if it is
permissible in law or any other government policy. In addition
thereto, the High Court had further taken note of the fact that
all other reliefs including the transportation charges, plots for
residential accommodation and preference for employment etc.
D etc., shall be available not only to landless labourers, but also
to major sons of such oustees induding landless labourers. As
the said condition imposed by the Ministry of Forest and
Environment while granting clearance is as stood qualified, and
has been subject to any other law for the time being in force or
E the government policy etc., we do not feel that landless
labourers are entitled to allotment of land. More so, the R & R
Policy itself provides a particular mode of retaining 50% of the
compensation amount and 50%. to be recovered in 20 years.
As the landless labourers never had any land, they are not
F entitled to any compensation under the Act 1894, thus, the
question of allotment of land to them would not arise. The R &
R Policy itself provides that such persons are entitled to get
Rs.49,300/- to buy productive employment creating assets etc.,
and such money can also be used for acquiring land. Such
G terms cannot be interpreted to mean that the landless labourers
become entitled to allotment of land for agricultural purpose to
the extent of 2 hectares. The policy is to be read as a whole,
as it is not permissible for a party to pick up one word or phrase
or one sentence and claim relief on the basis of the same. In
case, the major sons, as we have already held hereinafter, are
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 527
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

not entitled to allotment of agricultural land, the question of A
landless labourers being entitled to the same does not arise.
More so, the words 'as permissible' cannot be given a
complete go-bye. In Gurbax Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.,
AIR 1967 SC 502, this Court while interpreting the provisions
of Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, interpreted the B
words 'permissible area' while determining the surplus area
and held that permissible area means that the land owner is
entitled to reserve land not exceeding. the said area and the
balance remains surplus area. Therefore, permissible area was
defined as an area which is permissible for a person to retain c
under the provisions of that Act. Thus, permissible area can
legitimately be defined as the area reserved under the Act.
Similarly, in Municipal Committee, Patiala v. Model Town
Residents Association & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2844, this Court
interpreted the phrase 'permissible classification' to mean what D
is permissible in law. In Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills v. Chief
Commercial Superintendent, N.R. & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 126,
while interpreting Rule 161A of the Indian Railways Conference
Association Rules and Section 73 of Railways Act, 1989,
construing the term "permissible carrying capacity", this Court E
held that the normal carrying capacity means, it cannot exceed
the upper limits prescribed under the Statute/law.

92. The Government of Madhya Pradesh in Narmada
Valley Development Project had issued its Omkareshwar
Multipurpose Project, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Plan in F
August, 1993, according to which landless persons had been
defined as:

"1.2(a) Landless Persons:

A person, who, whether individually or jointly with members G
of his family, does not hold any agricultural land or does not
have any land for agriculture .... ."

Clause 6 thereof further provided for the families of
landless agricultural labourers, a rehabilitation grant of H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.K.

A Rs.11,000/-; transport assistance; allotment of plots in rural
areas for residential purpose; and various other special
financial assistance. The relevant part of Clause 9.1 and 9.2
reads as under:

"9.1 The Narmada Valley Development Authority will
8
ensure appropriate arrangements for discharge these
responsibilities within a stipulated time-frame. In the interim
period special financial assistance will be given to supplement
the income of the landless agricultural labourers and landless
scheduled caste and schedule tribe oustee families for three
C year in descending order which shall be in addition to the grant
in aid mentioned in Para 6.1. This period of three years will be
calculated from the payment year of the grant in aid under Para
6.1. Thus, a landless oustee family will get a special income
support amount of Rs.8,250/-, Rs.5,500/- and Rs.2,750/- in the
D second, third and fourth year of displacement respectively. In
addition, a further sum of Rs.12,500/- shall be kept in reserve
for every landless oustee family and shall be made available
for executing an independent viable scheme for earning
livelihood or for purchase of productive assets. The above
E support amounts will be 75%, 50% and 25% respectively of the
poverty line and the amount to be kept in reserve is also linked
with the poverty line. If the scale of the poverty line is revised,
the amount of special support amount and the reserve shall also
be proportionately increased accordingly. For other landless
F special financial assistance of Rs.19,500/- will be given for the
purpose of productive assets.

9.2 Amount to be paid to the landless displaced families
shown in Para 6.1 and 9.1 will be credited to a special fund by
G the NVDA and can be made available to the oustees for
acquisition of a suitable productive asset, including land, in one
or more installments as required."
93. It has been submitted by Shri Parekh that the word
'land' mentioned in Clause 9.2 means that the government has
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 529
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B._S. CHAUHAN, J.]
to provide financial assistance for acquisition of suitable land A
in one or more installments, as required. Such an interpretation
is not permissible for the simple reason that the area mentioned
in Clause 9.2 is subject to the provisions of paras 6.1 and 9.1.
Para 6.1 provides for a claim to the tune of Rs.11,000/- and
para 9.1 deals with other grants as mentioned hereinabove. s
Therefore, such an interpretation is not permissible. Had it been
the intention of the Ministry of Forest and Environment to impose
such a condition, the word 'permissible' would not have been
used. More so, it would have asked the State Government to
amend the R & R Policy accordingly. Thus, in view of above, c
we do not see any force in the contentions made by the
appellant. The reliefs sought by the appellant for landless
labourers are not permissible.

Applicability of the Award:
D
94. Shri Sanjay Parekh, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, has submitted that under the provisions of Act 1956,
a Tribunal was constituted and it had made the Award on
12.12.1979 and it provides for various reliefs to the oustees
and all the benefits granted by the said Award to the oustees E
are applicable in case of the oustees of the Omkareshwar Dam
Project. The High Court has rejected the said contention of the
appellant on the ground that the Tribunal had been constituted
to resolve the water dispute as defined under Section 2(c) of
the Act, 1956, for the reason that a dispute had arisen between F
various States i.e. the States of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh,
Gujarat and Rajasthan. The matter was limited to resettlement
and rehabilitation of 6147 oustee families spread over in 158
villages in the State of Madhya Pradesh as a consequence of
Sardar Sarovar Project. Therefore, the High Court after G
considering the entire arguments, has come to the conclusion
that the Tribunal was considering only the resettlement of the
aforesaid oustee families spread over 158 villages in the State
of Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, the Tribunal was concerned
only with those persons and it did not take in its ambit any other H
I

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A future plan or project. The findings recorded by the High Court
read as under:

"Thus, all the aforesaid directions in the NWDT Award
were in relation to the Sardar Sarovar Project and were not
applicable to displaced families affected by the acquisition of
8
land for the Omkareshwar Project."

95. Shri Sanjay Parekh could not point out anything from
the Award which may be explained or interpreted to suggest
that the terms of the Award would be applicable to any project
C to be taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh in the future. More
so, the Award itself provides for distribution of water among the
States and to regulate the amount of water distributed by the
Tribunal. Clause 11 thereof, dealt with the directions regarding
acquisition of submerged land and rehabilitation of persons
D displaced by the Sardar Sarovar Dam. Sub-clause 111(1) thereof,
fastened the total liability of compensation for land acquisition
and rehabilitation etc. on the State of Gujarat, as it reads as
under:

E "Gujarat shall pay to Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra all
costs including compensation, charges and expenses incurred
by them for or in respect of the compulsory acquisition of lands
required to be acquired as aforesaid."

96. Sub-clause IV provides for provisions for rehabilitation
F and it reads as under:

"IV(1) : According to the present estimates the number of
oustee families would be 6147 spread over 158 villages in
Madhya Pradesh, 456 families spread over 27 villages in
G Maharashtra, Gujarat shall establish rehabilitation villages in
Gujarat in the irrigation command of the Sardar Sarovar Project
on the norms hereinafter mentioned for rehabilitation of the
families who are willing to migrate to Gujarat. For oustee
families who are unwilling to migrate to Gujarat, Gujarat shall
H pay to Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra the cost, charges and
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 531
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
expenses for establishment of such villages in their respective A
terr!tories on the norms as hereinafter provided."

97. Clause XIV thereof, provides for setting up of
machinery to implement the decision of the Tribunal. Clause
Vlll(3) provides for future dams etc., only to the extentthat any
8
further projects in Madhya Pradesh shall not infringe the rights
of the States created under the Award.

Thus, we do not find anything in the Award which provides
any benefit to the oustees of the Omkareshwar Dam or
suggests that the Award is applicable in the present case also. C
We do not find any reason to take a contrary view than· what
has been taken by the High Court on the issue.

Entitlement to land in lieu of submerged land:

98. In the instant case, we are concerned with the rights D
and entitlements of the oustees of the 5 villages which had
already been submerged. In fact, the project has affected the
residents of 30 villages. Five villages had already been
submerged. Before the High Court, the question arose as to
whether the oustees of those 5 villages which have already E
been submerged, were entitled to the benefits of R & R Policy
and they had been Awarded only the compensation/ SRG and
the area of these 5 villages has been submerged during the
pendency of litigation before the High Court and this Court. This
Court while disposing of the Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of F
2011 against this very judgment vide order dated 14.5.2008,
has issued a large number of directions and also asked the
oustees to approach the GRA. However, Clause 4 thereof
reads as under:
G
"The above interim direction will come in the way of the
State Government making efforts to provide solution for land
wherever required in terms of its R & R Policy."

99. The High Court decided the issue observing that as
H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A submerging of the 5 villages took place in view of the orders
by the courts and the oustees had been paid compensation/
SRG and this Court had passed the order not to submerge the
remaining 25 villages till the completion of rehabilitation took
place, it was not proper for the High Court to direct the
B respondents to restore the status quo ante for the 5 villages in
issue.

100. There are claims and counter claims in regard to
voluntary acceptance of compensation amount/SRG by the
C oustees of those 5 villages. S/Shri R.S. Prasad and P.S.
Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents, have relied upon the report of GRA dated
28.4.2007 to show that all those persons have accepted the
benefit of SRG and nothing remains to be adjudicated upon.

D 101. The record does not contain sufficient material to
adjudicate upon the factual aspects involved herein. The GRA
is the best forum to decide the claims of such persons.
However, in view of the settled legal proposition that no person
should suffer from an act of the Cour. ::ind to ensure that the
E oustees of the 5 villages which have already been: submerged
under the orders of the Courts, do not face hostile discrimination
at the hands of the authorities; they shall be entitled '.to the relief
to which the other oustees are entitled in Civil Appeal Nos.
2115-2116 of 2011.
F In case, any of the oustees of these 5 villages is not
satisfied with what he has been Awarded by the State
Authorities and he approaches the GRA in his personal name
and establishes his case, he would be entitled to the relief
granted by us in Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011.
G
Civil Appeal Nos.2083-2112 of 2011

102. These appeals have arisen out of the impugned order
dated 23.9.2009, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
H at Jabalpur, in Interlocutory Application Nos. 4679 and 4804
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 533
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
of 2009 in Writ Petition No. 4457 of 2007, by which the High · A
Court has allowE;!d the said applications and directed the
appellants to rehabilitate the oustees so far as the land
measuring 284.03 hectares in the 5 villages, namely, i.e.
Dharadi, ·Nayapura, Guwadi, Kothmir and Narsinghpura is
concerned, and not to withdraw the acquisition proceedings in B
respect of the said area.

103. S/Shri R.S. Prasad and P.S. Patwalia, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, have submitted
that the High Court has committed an error by directing the
rehabilitation of the occupants of the land in dispute in the said· C
5 villages, recording a wrong finding; that as the possession
of the land had been taken by the government the acquisition
proceedings cannotbe reversed. The land stood vested in the
State; the land indispute would stand submerged actually and, ·
therefore, withdrawal otthe acquisition proceedings was not D
permissible; though the land· acquisition proceedit;tgs had not
been completed and the actual physical possession.of the land
in dispute has not been taken. The persons/tenure holders
interested are still in possession of their respective lands.
Therefore, the appellants have a right, not to acquire the land. E
Entries in revenue records after mutation do not confer any title
or interest in the property. The land in dispute would not be
submerged even temporarily unless the flood situation occurs
on back water level. Therefore, the authorities had taken a
decision on 2.4.2009 to abandon the land acquisition F
proceedings. The land in dispute would be water locked unless
the height of the road is enhanced. However, considering the
cost of rehabilitation as very high, the authorities have taken a
decision to raise the level of the road to the extent that no part ·
of the land in dispute would ever be submerged or water locked G
and people residing there or occupying the land would have
access to the said land. Therefore, the appeals deserve to be
allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is liable to
be set aside ..
H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R.

A 104. On the contrary, Shri Sanjay Parekh, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents, has submitted that land stood
vested in the State free from all encumbrances as actual
physical possession of the land in dispute had been taken in
December, 2007; tenure holders thereof stood evicted; not a
B single tenure holder is in possession of its holdings today;
mutation entries had been made in the revenue records; Award
had been made by the Land Acquisition Collector; money had
been deposited in the treasury by the appellant, as it was not
accepted by the oustees for the reason that they wanted
c rehabilitation rather than compensation or SRG, some people
had got the amount of compensation enhanced by filing
references under Section 18 of the Act 1894. Hence, the
question of denotifying the said land under Section 48 of the
Act 1894, at this stage does not arise. The appeals are devoid
D of any merit and are liable to be dismissed.

105. We have considered the rival submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record .
.
106. In the instant case, a huge chL:nk of land was notified
E under Section 4 of the Act 1894, in these five villages on
9.11.2007 and 10.11.2007. Section 6 declarations were issued
on 20.11.2007, 22.11.2007 and 23.11.2007. Notices under
Section 9 were issued on 22.11.2007 and 23.11.2007 and the
date of hearing fixed on 7.12.2007 and 8.12.2007. Awards
F were made on 20.12.2007, 22.12.2007 and 26.12.2007.
Subsequent thereto, a letter was written by the NHDC, the
company on 3.8.2007 to the Member (Rehabilitation), Narmada
Valley Development Authority for approval of land acquisition
of these five villages, which reveals that after having surveyed
G the area, there were certain practical difficulties in raising the
level of the roads above BWL in respect of certain areas (land
in dispute) because the level of the agricultural lands is lower
than the BWL. Therefore, the land would be submerged in the
back water submergence and it would require an amount of 11
H crores to raise the level of the roads upto BWL. Thus,
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 535
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
acquisition of remaining 284.03 hectares of land of these five A
villages was requested to be approved for acquisition.

Ho\'.lfever, it is, evident from the letter dated 5.10.2007 of
the NVDA that the land in dispute measuring 284.03 hectares
in the said five villages would not be submerged, in fact, it would
8
be water locked, as it reads that "some area of a village
becoming island or houses surrounded by flood or a village
which has become an unviable unit". The acquisition' of 284.03
hectares of land of five villages was approved and grant of an
amount of Rs.550 lakhs was made.
c
107. By letter dated 2.4.2009, the previous plan was
reconsidered in respect of acquiring the said land for five
villages considering that the cost of rehabilitation would be
much more than raising the level of the road at the cost of· 11
crores, which would prevent this area from being water locked. D
' .

108. Therefore, the case of the State had been that the
land in dispute measuring 284.03 hectares would not be
submerged temporarily or permanently, rather it may at the
most become in-accessible at the time of highest flood situation E
exceptionally and in case the level of the road is raised, it may
work as embankment and this land would not be submerged.
Thus, on this premise; the authorities thought it proper to
abandon the acquisition proceedings.

109. The State authorities have pleaded before the High F
Court by filing rejoinder affidavit that the standard practice in
dam projects involving submergence in India as prescribed by
Central Water Commission (CWC) that all lands and properties
or the houses are acquired upto full reservoir level (FRL) and
only properties or the houses are acquired above FRL upto the G
Back Water Level (BWL). The lands above FRL will no doubt,
be under water upto BWL for a few hours during floods due to
back water and the lands will be benefited due to silting during
that period. The land which remains temporarily under water
above FRL and upto BWL is not acquired as after a few hours H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A the backwater recedes and the land is available for normal
agricultural purposes. The lands about 5 to 10 feet below FRL
should also not be acquired as these lands are likely to come
out of water by 15th December every year as the water is
gradually used from the dam for irrigation and/or power
B generation. Presently the practice is that the land which
remains submerged under water temporarily is generally given
on pattas to farmers as it is fit for agricultural purpose.

110. The order of the High Court dated 22.6.2007 in the
C interim application filed by the respondents reads as under:

" .... The consequence is that the five villages namely
Gunjari, Paladi, Sailani, Bakhatgarh and Rampura could be
affected by the submergence at 189 M and its back water on ,
account of the closure of the radial and sluice gates of
D Omkareshwar Dam.
Regarding the other villages, the case of the petitioner as
well as the respondents contesting before us is that
rehabilitation measures are yet to be completed in these
E villages and that these villages were not to be submerged at
189 M on account of the closure of the radial and sluice gates
of Omkareshwar dam. We are of the considered opinion that
Court takes up the matter and finally decides the grievance of
the petitioner with regard to rehabilitation measures. The
respondents should not severe electricity and water supply and
F demolish pubic buildings such as schools etc. in these 25 other
villages or take up any coercive step which would force the
oustees to leave the villages during the pendency of the writ
petition and until the oustees receive all their rehabilitation
benefits. We accordingly restrain the respondents from
G severing electricity and water supplies and demolishing public
buildings such as schools etc. in the other 25 villages and from
taking any coercive step which will force the oustees to leave
these villages during the pendency of the writ petition or until
further orders passed by this Court."
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 537
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
111. So far as the acquisition of land in such a situation A
is concerned, even the rehabilitation schemes under the NWDT
Award, provided that the BWL at the highest flood level in the
Sardar Sarovar would be worked out by the CWC in
consultation with the States of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat.
The other relevant part reads specifically "the lands which are B
to be compulsorily acquired".

112. A reference Award made in this case on 4.8.2009
also particularly reveals that "the property acquired under the
project will not be covered by water, but after filling of water, it
will be difficult for the villagers to reach upto that level" and the C
symbolic possession had been taken on 8.12.2007 as is
evident frorn para 29 of the said Award.

113. In the instant case, the issue to be determined is
whether it is necessary to acquire this land compulsorily, likely D
to be submerged temporarily or permanently and also, whether ·
the acquisition proceedings had reached the stage of no return,
i.e. it cannot be abandoned. Undoubtedly, most of the land in
these five villages which was likely to be submerged
temporarily and permanently below the FRL plus MWL and land E
affected by back water resulting from MWL plus 141.21 mtrs.
(460 ft.) had already been acquired and there is no dispute in
respect of the same. The dispute remains only in respect of
284.03 hectares of land in these five villages, wherein BWL in
exceptional floods etc., may make the said land water locked F
though it may not be submerged permanently.

Whether submergence temporarily for a very short period
in an exceptional flood situation, warrants acquisition of the land
in dispute?
G
114. The High Court while dealing with the said
applications did not deal with the issue specifically as to
whether the possession of the land has actually been taken or
even symbolic possession has been taken by the State; as to
whether the persons interested have been evicted from the said H I
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A land; or they have voluntarily abandoned their possession; or
they are still in physical possession of the land; or as to whether
after being evicted they had illegally encroached upon the land
in dispute. A direction has been issued observing as under:

"The lands in these 5 villages of the oustees were
8
acquired by notifications issued under the Land Acquisition
Act, and the NVDA has now passed an order on 2.4.2009
saying that the land/property of these 5 villages shall not be
acquired and the action taken till now be dropped as per the
C provisions of law ....... The respondents, therefore, will have to
provide all the rehabilitation benefits to the villagers of the 5
villages and for the purpose of rehabilitation, the order dated
2.4.2009 of the NVDA is of no consequence. The two /As
stand disposed of. n
D 115. The appellants herein have raised an objection that
the tenure holders of the said land are still in actual physical
possession and they had never been evicted. However, on
behalf of the respondent i.e. Narmada Bachao Andolan, Shri
Alok Agrawal, Chief Activist of the organisation, has filed the
E counter affidavit dated 1.2.2010 before this Court, wherein it
has specifically been mentioned as under:

(a) The acquired lands/properties of these 5 villages stood
already vested in the State. The State is not competent to
F withdraw the land acquisition proceedings.

(b) The order dated 2.4.2009 as not to acquire the land of
the five villages is a nullity and void ab initio because the
possession of the lands has already been taken. The land
has already vested in the State. This may be seen from the
G judicial orders of Reference Courts Devas; the land record of
the revenue authorities of the State Government, the order of
the Land Acquisition Officer and the affidavits of the concerned
oustees which were placed on record before the said
authorities.
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 539
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(c) The order of the Land Acquisition Officer dated A
14.B'.2008 to Tahsildar, Bagli district Devas asking for mutation
in favour of NVDA, makes it evidentthat as the land acquisition ·
, proceedings in question stood completed and possession of
the land had_ b,een taken by the State.
B
(d) The order in mutation proceedings had never been
challenged by NVDA and thus, attained finality and it makes it
clear that the possession is with the NVDA.

(e) As per Section 117 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code,
the record of rights entered in the land records is presumed to C
be correct, until the contrary is proved.

(f) Information received from the Tahsildar, Bagli under the
. Right to Information Act reads that the lands and houses of
these 5 villages had already been transferred in favour of NVDA. D

(g) The Reference Court recorded a judicial finding that the
possession of concerned land/houses of these villages was
taken on 8.12.2007. On this basis, the Reference Court directed
the payment of interest on the compensation amount from the
recorded date of possession, i.e. 8.12.2007 upto the date of E
payment @ 9% p.a. for one year and 15% p.a. after one year.

(h) The oustees of the five villages had filed a large number
of affidavits before the authorities/courts concerned stating that
possession of their lands/properties acquired had been F
taken in December 2007. (Emphasis added)
116. There are claims and counter claims regarding
"taking possession of the land". It is submitted on behalf of the
appellants that symbolic possession in the facts and
circumstances of the case does not meet the requirement of G
law and, therefore, the State has a right to withdraw the
acquisition proceedings. On the contrary, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents would submit that taking of
actual physical possession of the land is not necessary and
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A taking symbolic possession is enough. More so, such a
submission has become merely academic, as the oustees are
not in actual physical possession of the land in dispute.

117. The question does arise as to what is the meaning
of taking possession - whether it is taking of actual physical
8
possession or symbolic/paper possession which would be
sufficient to meet the requirement of law.

118. In Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors.,
AIR 1975 SC 1767, this Court while dealing with the issue,
C referred to various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 particularly Order XI Rules 35, 36, 96 and 97 and came
to the conclusion :-
"19 ....... If the property is land over which does not stand
0 any building or structure, then delivery of possession over the
judgment-debtor's property beco1nes complete and effective
against him the moment the delivery is effected by going upon
the land, or in case of resistance, by removing the person
resisting unauthorisedly. A different mode of delivery is
E prescribed in the Code in the rules aforesaid in regard to a
building, with which we are not concerned in this case."

119. In State of T.N. & Anr. v. Maha/akshmi Ammal &
Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 269, this Court held as under:

F "Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by
way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally
accepted norm".
120. Similarly in Ba/mokand Khatri Educational &
G Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1996) 4
SCC 212, this Court held as under:-
"lt is now well settled legal position that it is difficult to take
physical possession of the land under compulsory
acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is
H
NARMADA-BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 541
MADHYA 'PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

drafting the panchnama in the presence of panchas and A
taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries
is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land."

(Emphasis added)

121. In P.K.Kalburqui v. State of Kamataka, (2005) 12 8
SCC 489, this Court held that if the land is vacant and
unoccupied, taking symbolic possession by the State
Government, would amount to taking possession. In the said
case, in spite of the fact that symbolic possession of the vacant
land had been taken, the Hon'ble Minister directed the issuance C
of a Notification under Section 48 of the Act 1894 on the basis
of his understanding of the law that symbolic possession did
not amount to actual possession and that the power to withdraw
from acquisition could be exercised at any time before actual
possession was taken. This Court has held as under:- D

"There can be no hard-and-fast rule laying down what act
would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of
land. In the instant case the lands of which possession was
sought to be taken were unoccupied, in the sense that there E
was no crop or structure standing thereon. In such a case
only symbolic possession could be taken ... such
possession would amount to vesting the land in the
Government."

122. In National Thermal Power Corporation v. Mahesh F
Datta & Ors., (2009) 8 sec 339, after resorting to the urgency
clauses under Section 17 of the Act 1894., a possession
certificate had been issued on behalf of the Collector,
Ghaziabad on 16.11.1984 making it. evident that possession
of lands in question therein, had been taken. After making of G
the Award under Section 11 in some cases, references under
Section 18 of the Act 1894 had also been decided by the
District Judge, Ghaziabad, vide order dated 12.10.1993 and
persons aggrieved approached the Allahabad High Court for
enhancement of compensation. It was at this stage that the H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A NTPC Ltd. realized that it would not be possible for certain
reasons for it to have the power plant on the land under
acquisition and site thereof should be shifted. Thus, inter-a/ia
on the premise that possession of the entire land notified under
Section 4 of the Act 1894 had not been taken, the State of U. P.
s issued a Notification dated 11.11.1994 under Section 48 of the
Act 1894, denotifying the land. The said notification was
challenged by the "persons interested" therein by filing the writ
petition before the High Court. The writ petition was allowed
by the High Court holding that mere symbolic possession was
c enough to meet the requirement of taking possession under
Section 16 of the Act 1894 and on taking such symbolic
possession, the land vested in the State free from all
encumbrances could not be divested.

This Court held that taking over of possession in terms of
D the provisions of the Act would however, mean actual
possession and not symbolic possession. The Court further
observed:
"27. When possession is to be taken over in respect of
E the fallow or parli land, a mere intention to do so may not
be enough ......... If the lands in question are agricultural
lands, not only actual physical possession had to be
taken but also they were required to be properly
demarcated .... "
F xx xx xx xx
"44 ....... The burden of proof could be discharged only
by adducing clear and cogent evidence ..... "

G (Emphasis added)
123. In this regard, it may also be pertinent to deal with
mutation proceedings heavily relied upon by the respondent no.
1. Mutation proceedings are much more in the nature of fiscal
inquiries. "Mutation of a property in the revenue record does
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 543
MADHYA PRADE.SH [DR. B:S. CHAUHAN, J.]
not create or extinguish title, nor has it any presumptive value A
of title. It only enables the person, in whose favour the mutation
is entered, to pay the land revenue in question." (Vide: Thakur
Nirman Singh & Ors. v. Thakur Lal Rudra Pratap Narain
Singh, AIR 1926 PC 100; Smt. 'sawami v. lndetKaur& Ors.,
AIR 1996 SC 2823; R. V.E. Venkata Cha/a Gounder v. B
Arulmign Ciswesaraswamy & V. Temple & Anr., AIR 2003 SC
4548; and Suman Verma v. Union of India & Ors., (2004) 12
sec 57).
Therefore, entries in the revenue record are of no
assistance to determine the present controversy. C

124. In view of the above, law on the issue can be
summarized to the effect that no strait-jacket formula can be
laid down for taking the possession of the land forthe purpose
of Sections 16 and 17 of the Act 1894. It would depend upon D
the facts of an individual case. In case the land is fallow and
barren and does not have any structure or crop on it, symbolic
possession may meet the requirement of law. However, this
would not be the position in case crop is standing on the land
or a _kachha or pacca structure has been raised on such land. E
In that case, actual physical possession is required to be taken.
·There may be a case where the acquiring authority is in
possession of the land, as the same has already been
requisitioned under any law or the property is in possession of
a tenant, in such a case symbolic possession qua the tenure F
holder would be sufficient.

125. In the instant case, in view of the fact that land in
dispute is an agricultural land and has 167 dwelling houses, law
in fact requires taking over the actual physical possession. The
respondent no. 1 has asserted that the tenure holders are not G
in possession of the said land. We considered it proper to
appoint a Commissioner and to have his report. Thus, vide
order dated 24.2.2011, this Court requested the District Judge,
Indore to have an inspection of the lands in dispute in five
H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A villages and submit the report as who is in actual physical
possession of the same.

126. In pursuance of our direction dated 24.2.2011, Shri
M.K. Mudgal, learned District and Sessions Judge, Indore
(M.P.) has submitted a detailed report after having conducted
8
spot inspections and examining all the tenure holders in respect
of the land in dispute in presence of Shri Alok Agrawal, Chief
Activist of Narmada Bachao Andolan, (who remained present
in this Court throughout the proceedings also and had been
instructing the learned counsel for the said party) and recorded
C the following findings of fact:

(1) So far as the land in dispute in villages Dharadi, Guadi,
Kothmir, Nayapura and Narsinghpura, having an area of
284.03 hectares is concerned, the original tenure holders '
D are in actual physical possession;
(2) The Bhumiswamis (tenure holder) had sown the crops
on the said land;

(3) They have admitted that they had been sowing the
E crops even after acquisition proceedings.
(4) The tenure holders are in possession of the acquired
land on the ground that they had still not been rehabilitated
as per the scheme of the State Government. Therefore,
F they are compelled to continue growing the crops and also
using the other parts of the land for habitation.
(5) They are in possession of their respective lands already
acquired as they have not yet been offered the land in lieu
of the land so acquired and they would make a shift from
G the acquired land after compliance of the said obligation
by the State.
The report concludes as under:

H "Therefore, on the spot inspection and the recorded
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 545
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

evidence, there is no doubt in my mind to conclude that A
the standing crops have been sown by the former
Bhumiswamis and the acquired lands of five villages in
questions are actually in possession of the former
Bhumiswamis even now. It has also got to be deduced
further that N. V.D.A. has never been in possession of the B
aforesaid lands since the acquisitions of the same."
{Emphasis added)

127. We have seen the D.V.Ds. and C.Ds. of the videos,
'
prepared during the time of inspection by District Judge, Indore
in the presence of hundreds of tenure holders and officials. It C
is evident from the same that the tenure holders identified their
land in presence of Shri Alok Agrawal, the social activist. The
entire land is having wheat, cotton, maize and millet crops. The
said tenure holders have admitted that they had been cultivating
the land for last several years and they had never been D
dispossessed from the land in dispute by the State. Shri
. Agarwal had been shown advancing legal submissions before
the District Judge, Indore, justifying why the original tenure
holders are still in actual/physical possession of the land.
E
128. The District Judge, Indore, has recorded the
statements of all the tenure holders. For example, we quote the
statement of one Shri Devi Singh S/o Pahar Singh r/o Village:
Nayapura, Post: Ratanpur, Tehsil: Bagli, District: Devas,
Madhya Pradesh. The same reads as under: F

01 - My land is in Village Nayapura. The land is in
Shamlati, its area is approximately twenty acres. The said
land is affected by the Omkareshwar Dam Project. On 8th
December, 2007, the then Land Acquisition Officer, Shri
Chaturvedi came to Village Nayapura, gathered the G
farmers together and informed them alongwith me that the
land no longer belongs to any of us and it has now
become the State Government's land and the possession
of the said land was with the State. At that time, the land
H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A was vacant.

02- From that day onward, the Government has not been
collecting land revenue for the said land and the concerned
society has stopped extending the facilities of providing
seeds and fertilizers. I alongwith other farmers have
B
submitted an affidavit in this regard in the High Court at
Jabalpur. Under the Resettlement & Rehabilitation
Scheme, we were supposed to get land in lieu of land
acquired. We had been shown land in village Khorda,
Tehsil Harsud, but some other people had already
c encroached upon some of that land and some of it was
grazing land which was unfit for agriculture. That is why we
have not taken the land that was offered to us.

03 - We have not yet been given land as under the
D Rehabilitation Policy, that is why we are cultivating the
acquired land. At present our crop is standing on the site.
As soon as we get land under the Rehabilitation Policy,
we will vacate possession of the acquired land.

04 - Yesterday, my land was inspected by the District
E
Judge, Indore. My crops were found to be standing at the
site, which was taken on record and witnessed by me.

The record was read aloud to Signed at my instruction

F the deponent and he agreed Sd/-

that it was correct.

( M.K. Mudgal )
G 129. In view of the above, this becomes crystal clear that
none of the tenure holders, so far the land in dispute is
concerned, has been evicted/dispossessed. All the tenure
holders are enjoying the said land without any interference. The
tall claims made by the respondents before the High Court were
H totally false. The High Court was not justified in entertaining their
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 547
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
applications in this regard, without verifying the factual aspects. A

130. In such a fact-situation, as the actual physical
possession has not yet been taken by the authorities and the
entries in the revenue records etc. are not the conclusive proof,
therefore, the State Government is competent to exercise its
power under Section 48 of the Act 1894. However, it will be 8
subject to the decision on another relevant issue regarding
submergence of the land in dispute permanently or temporarily
which is to be considered hereinafter.

131. Before adverting to the next issue, it is desirable to C
deal with the conduct of the NBA. The question is not of
justification of the tenure holders to retain possession of the
land, rather it had emphatically been argued by Shri Sanjay
Parekh, learned counsel appearing for the said applicanU
respondent, that powers under Section 48 of the Act 1894 could o
not be resorted to because the tenure holders had already been
physically dis-possessed and land stood vested in the State.
Therefore, the same could not be divested. The matter was
argued by Shri Sanjay Parekh at great length to impress upon
the Court that the tenure holders had been actually dis- E
possessed long ago. This fact was denied by the State. It was
only after considering the rival submissions on behalf of the
parties that this Court thought it fit and appropriate to have a
spot inspection report and then the District Judge, Indore, was
asked to make a local inspection and submit the report. The F
report has been made after making an inspection of the area
and recording statements of the tenure holders in presence of
Shri Alok Agrawal, Chief activist of NBA and thus, we accept
the same. It is evident from the said report that statements
made by the said applicanUrespondent in the Court, in this G
regard are factually incorrect and false. The Court has been
entertaining this petition under the bona fide belief that NBA
was espousing the grievance of inarticulate and illiterate poor
farmers, with all sincerity and thus, would not make any
misleading statement. However, our belief stands fully belied.
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R.

A Applicant/respondent made pleadings and advanced
arguments without any basis only to secure unwarranted
benefits to those tenure holders. In the instant case it stands
discredited totally in the eyes of this Court. This Court had been
a little careful and cautious in this regard, which has exposed
B the true picture.

132. In such a fact-situation, the NBA not having personal
interest in the case, cannot claim to be dominus litis. Thus, it
ought to have acted at every stage with full sense of
responsibility and sincerity. Earlier also, this Court in Narmada
C Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 586,
has disapproved the conduct of the Narmada Bachao Andolan
and described it to be most unfortunate that it had celebrated
the 4th anniversary of the stoppage of work of the dam under
the interim orders of the Court. This Court found it to be an
D obstruction in the way of implementing the R & R Policy.
However, at that time this Court was assured by the said NBA
that they "shall not directly or indirectly give any cause for
concern by this Court." But, in our opinion, it has not been able
to keep its solemn undertaking given to this Court.
E
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:

133. It has often been stated that PIL jurisdiction should
be exercised cautiously in matters that primarily require the
attention of the democratic process, or the State or those
F issues whose crevices and complexities the court may not
easily unravel, and comparatively generously in cases involving
public interest of sections of people for whom the administration
of justice and its reach are not effective and the rights delivery
processes, are shown to be weakened by power and influence.
G (Vide: R. and M. Trust v. Koramangla Residents Vigilance
Group & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 894).

134. Where the cause of action is genuinely in the general
public interest, the court will relax the requirement of bona tides
H and appoint an amicus curiae to deal with the matter and keep
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 549
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the matter out of the power of the original applicant. [Vide: Ml A
s Holicow PicturesPvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors.,
AIR 2008 SC 913; and A. Abdul Farook (supra)) ..

135. The 'rights' of the public interest litigant in a PIL are
always subordinate to the 'interests' of those for whose benefit 8
the action is brought. The status of dominus litis could not be
conferred unreflectively or for the asking, on a PIL petitioner as
that would render the proceedings "vulnerable to and
susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable
cases be used by persons for personal ends resulting in
prejudice to the public weal". (vide: Sheela Barse v. Union of C
India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2211).

136.. The standard of expectation of civic responsibility
required of a petitioner in a PIL is higher than that of an applicant
who strives to realise personal ends. The courts expect a public D
interest litigant to discharge high standards of responsibility.
Neglig~nt use or use for oblique motives is extraneous to the
P,IL process for were the litigant to act for other oblique
considerations, the application will be rejected at the threshold.
Measuring the 'seriousness' of the PIL petitioner and to see E
whether she/he is actually a 'champion' of the cause of the
individual or the group being represented, is the responsibility
of the Court, to ensure that the party's procedural behaviour
remains that of an adequate 'champion' of the public cause.
(Vide: The Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 1993 F
SC 892; Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1;
and Kusum Lata v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 180).

137. The constitutional courts have time and again
reiterated that abuse of the noble concept of PIL is increasing
day-by-day and to curb this abuse there should be explicit and G
broad guidelines for entertaining petitions as Plls. This Court
in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors.,
(2010) 3 sec 402, has given a set of illustrative guidelines,
interalia:
H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A (i) The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding the
correctness of the contents of the petition before
entertaining a PIL.

(ii) The court should also ensure that there is no oblique
motive behind filing the public interest litigation etc. etc.
B
Therefore, while dealing with the PIL, the Court has to be
vigilant and it must ensure that the forum of the Court be neither
abused nor used to achieve an oblique purpose.

C MISLEADING STATEMENT AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT

138. A person seeking relief in public interest should
approach the Court of Equity, not only with clean hands but also
with a clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. Thus, he who
0 seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim "Jure Naturae
Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius ·Detrimento Et /njuria
Fieri Locup/etiorem", means that it is a law of nature that one
should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. The
judicial process should never become an instrument of
E oppression· or abuse or means to subvert justice.

139. "The interest of justice and public interest coalesce.
They are very often one and the same". Therefore, the Courts
have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest.
F A petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement(s),
if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of
the process of the Court and such a litigant is not required to
be dealt with lightly. Thus, a litigant is bound to make "full and
true disclosure of facts". The Court is not a forum to achieve
G an oblique purpose.
140. Whenever the Court comes to the conclusion that the
process of the Court is being abused, the Court would be
justified in refusing to proceed further with the matter. This rule
has been evolved out of need of the Courts to deter a litigant
H from abusing the process of the Court by deceiving it. However,
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 551
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the concealed fact must be material one in the sense that had A ·
it not been suppressed, it would have an effect on the merit of
the case/order. The legal maxim "Juri Ex lnjuria Non Oritur"
means that a right cannot arise out of wrong doing, and it
becomes applicable in a case like this. (Vide: The Ramjas
Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 852; 8
Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242; Ramniklal
N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1997 SC
1236; Sabia Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1999) 1
SCC 271; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of
Bihar & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 166; and Union of India & Ors. v. C
Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90).
141. It is a settled proposition of law that a false statement
made in the Court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead
the Court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to criminal
contempt, as it tends to impede the administration of justice. It D
adversely affects the interest of the public in the administration
of justice. Every party is under a legal obligation to make truthful
statements before the Court, for the reason that causing an
obstruction in the due course of justice "undermines and
obstructs the very flow of the unsoiled stream of justice, which E
has to be kept clear and pure, and no one can be permitted to
take liberties with it by soiling its purity". (Vide: Naraindas v.
Government of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1252;
The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Mis. Madhya
Pradesh Khair Industries & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 946; and Afzal F
& Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 397).

142. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited &
Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 481, this Court held that:
"Prerogative writs. .. ... . .. are issued for doing substantial G
justice. It is, therefore, ·of utmost necessity that the
petitioner approaching the writ court must come with
clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court
without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 6 S.C.R.

A appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of
relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of
misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at
the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.·
(Emphasis added)
B 143. While deciding the said case this Court relied upon
the leading case of R. v. General Commissioners for the
purposes of the Income Tax Act for the District of Kensington,
(1917) 1KB 486, wherein it had been observed as under:

c "... when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief
on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair
disclosure of all the material facts-it says facts, not law.
He must not misstate the law if he can help it-the court 1

is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about
D the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the
facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that
obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been
fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any
action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect
E statement ....... If the applicant makes a false statement
or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the
court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground
alone .. .. . The rule has been evolved in the larger public
interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the
process of court by deceiving it." (Emphasis supplied)
F
144. In such a case the person who suppresses the
material facts from the court is guilty of Suppressio Veri and
Suggestio Falsi i.e. suppression or failure to disclose what a
party is bound to disclose, which may amount to fraud.
G
145. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable
conclusion that the NBA has not acted with a sense of
responsibility and so far succeeded in securing favourable
orders by misleading the Court. Such conduct cannot be
H approved. However, in a PIL, the Court has to strike a balance
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 553
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
between the interests of the parties. The Court has to take into A
consideration the pitiable condition of oustees, their poverty,
inarticulateness, illiteracy, extent of backwardness,
unawareness also. It \s desirable that in future the Court must
view any presentation by the NBA with caution and care,
insisting on proper pleadings, disclosure of full facts truly and B
fairly and in case it has any doubt, refuse to entertain the NBA.
However, considering the interests of the oustees, it may be
desirable that the Court may appoint an Amicus Curiae to
present their cause, if such a contingency arises.

146. In view of the above, we are of the considered C
opinion that no order is required on the IA Nos. 196-210, 211-
225 and 241-255 of 2011 filed under Section 340 of the Code
of Criminai Procedure, 1973, by both the parties, as dealing
with the said applications would not serve any purpose. More
so, the IA Nos. 226-240 of 2011 filed for modification of the D
order dated 5 . 4.2011. Thus, all the said IAs stand disposed of.
147. In view of the serious controversy raised in these
appeals, this Court vide order dated 24.2.2011, requested the
ewe to make a local inspection and submit its report as to E
whether the land measuring 284.03 hectares in these 5 villages,
would be submerged temporarily or permanently or merely water
locked.
148. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the CWC after
having spot inspection submitted its report dated 22.3.2011. F
The relevant part thereof reads as under:
(i) Village Kothmir- .................. .
"115. 53 hectare area (under reference) of this G
village falls between FRL and BWL. This will come under
temporary submergence when water level exceeds FRL
(196.60 m)."

(ii) Village Narsinghpura- ...... ..... .
H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A Out of the total 21.58 hectare area (under reference
) of this village, 19.30 hectare falls between FRL and BWL
and will come under temporary submergence when water
level is between FRL (196.60 m) and BWL. •
(iii) Village Dharadi- .............. .
B
"The 103.09 hectare area of village (under reference)
falls between FRL and BWL, which will come under
temporary submergence when water level exceeds FRL
(196.60m)."
c
(iv) Village Nayapura-............ ...... ..

"The 33. 83 hectare land (under reference) of village falls
between FRL and BWL which will come under temporary
submergence when water level exceeds FRL (196. 60 m). •
D
(v) Village Guwadi-................ ..
"The 10.00 hectare land (under reference) of village falls
between FRL and BWL, which will come under temporary
E submergence when water level exceeds FRL (196.60m)."

(vi) Conclusion of the Committee: Out of the total land
- subject matter of dispute ad-measuring 284. 03 hectare
in the aforesaid five villages; 281. 75 hectare falls
between FRL and BWL, which will come under temporary
F submergence due to back water effect. The remaining
2. 28 hectare area will not come under submergence due
to back water levels when water levels are up to BWL.
149. The parties were given copies of the report and
G asked to submit their objections, if any. In response to the said
order, the parties submitted their comments/objection to the
report submitted by the ewe.
The State Government has submitted that the report
H suggested that 2.28 hectares of the area will never be
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 555
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
submerged even when water levels are upto BWL. However, A
the remaining area of 281. 75 hectares falls between FRL and
BWL, would be under temporary submergence due to back
water effect. In such a fact-situation, the ewe guidelines of
1997 provide that MWL at the dam site during maximum flood
and BWL is the corresponding flood level at maximum flood in B
the pondage area. Hence, when MWL occurs at the dam site,
BWL will occur simultaneously in the vicinity of the reservoir
further up stream. In such a case, agricultural land affected by
back water is not acquired in a dam project, as that land is
submerged only temporarily during floods hardly for 2-3 days c
which may occur rarely, once in a period of 1000 years. Rather
the land is benefited due to silting during floods and is available
for cultivation after the temporary flood recedes. The guidelines
issued by the CWC had been adopted by the State that
agricultural land temporarily coming under submergence
0
between FRL and BWL need not be acquired. However,
houses in the temporary submergence area must be acquired.
In order to fortify its stand, the State Government had quoted
paragraph 6.2.3. of the guidelines for preparation of project
estimates for river valley projects of CWC March 1997. Further, E
State has placed reliance on Clause XI-II (2) of NWDT Award,
which also provides for the same.
150. It has further been submitted by Shri Ravi Shankar
Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for the State that all
the dwelling structures which are 167 in number would be F
acquired positively in terms of the R & R Policy and in spite of
the fact that the agricultural land would not be acquired, the
benefits provided under the R& R Policy shall be granted to all
such oustees who fulfill the requirement of the provisions of
clause 1.1 which defines the 'displaced person' under the R & G
R Policy and such a course will be in consonance with the
'guidelines issued by the ewe.
151. In view thereof, it has been submitted that as per the
CWC guidelines, only the land covered by structures must be H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A acquired and not the entire land. Therefore, the report of the
ewe should be accepted with this understanding and
clarification.
152. On the other hand, the Narmada Bachao Andolan -
the writ petitioner, has submitted that the report does not require
8
any further explanation, there are 167 houses situated on the
concerned lands of these five villages which are bound to be
acquired. The remaining entire land has to be acquired in view
of the decision taken by the NVDA in its 144th me~ting dated
5.10.2007, wherein it was resolved that it was necessary to
C acquire the land in dispute and subsequent decisions taken by
the parties, particularly, dated 25.3.2009 and 2.4.2009, are
arbitrary, malafide and unconstitutional. Under the R & R Policy,
even any land temporary submerged, is bound to be acquired.
In support of such a contention, reliance has been placed on
D the definition of "displaced person" contained in Clause 1.1 of
R & R Policy which speaks of the person whose land is likely
to come under submergence whether temporarily or
permanently. Further reliance has also been placed upon the
judgment of this Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an - II
E (Supra) providing for the same and in view thereof, it has been
submitted that the land is compulsorily to be acquired.

153. An extract from guidelines for preparation of project
estimates for river valley projects of ewe March 1997 is
F reproduced below:-

"6.2.3.

"Generally acquisition may be done upto FRL only. The
area between FRL & MWL may be acquired only if the
G submerged land is fertile and the duration of submergence
beyond FRL upto MWL is long enough to cause damage
to crops i.e. over 15 days duration. (for acquisition of land
the effect of back water need not be taken into
consideration).
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 557
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
)()()( )()()( )()()( )()()( A

All structures coming under submergence between
FRL and MWL should be acquired. If the structures coming
under submersion are of religious or archeological interest,
provision must be made for re-establishing these 8
structures above MWL".

154. The Clause XI - II (2) of the NWDT Award for the
Sardar Sarovar Project reads as under:

, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra shall als_o acquire for c 1

Sardar Sarovar Project under the provision of the Land
Acquisition Act 1894, all buildings with their appurtenant
.land situated between FRL + 138.63 m (455') and MWL
+ 141.21 m (460') as also those affected by the Back
water effect resulting from MWL = 141.21 m (460')." o
·155. Reason for not acquiring land between FRL and BWL
(MWL at dam site):-
(i) The ewe guideline 1997 and clause Xl.11(2) of.
NWDTA provision mentioned above clearly states that E
th'e agricultural land affected by BWL is not acquired in
a dam project as a policy matter.

(ii) It will submerge only temporarily during maximum flood
once in 1000 years. F

(iii) The land gets benefited due to silting during flood and
will be available for cultivation after flood recedes. It
becomes more fertile.
(iv) The land gets only submerged temporarily in BWC due G
to flood (once in 1000 years) and should not be left
unused. It will be a national loss.
(v) The land may get encroached if it is acquired and left
without use as it is very fertile.
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

A (vi) ............................... ."

156. In Narmada Bachao Ando/an - II (Supra), the Court
has placed reliance upon the report of the Narmada Control
Authority (NCA), dealing with the NWDT Award, wherein it has
been mentioned as under:
8
"47. The Award, as noticed hereinbefore, contained two
sub-clauses relating to the directions on the State
Government for compulsory acquisition of the land by the
States of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra under the
C provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This obligation on
the part of the State to acquire land is, thus, neither in doubt
nor in dispute. The additional directions are that those
persons whose 75 per cent or more land of a continuous
holding is required to be compulsorily acquired, will have
D an option to compel compulsory acquisition of the entire
contiguous holding; and acquisition of buildings with their
appurtenant land situated between FRL + 138. 68 metres
(455? and MWL + 141.21 (460? as also those affected
by the backwater effect resulting from MWL + 1451.21
E metres. The submergence due to maximum water level
and backwater would take place only after it reaches full
height.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
F 50 ....... .
Further it was decided as per decision in the last
meeting of the Sub-group all possible arrangements for
R&R should be made by the concerned State Govts. For
G completing the same in all respect both in regard to
oustees affected by the permanent as well as temporary
submergence six months ahead from submergence. Actual
allotment of land, house plot and payment of compensation
etc. and not merely offer of such facilities as per the R&R
package should be made in respect of all PAFs (both
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN ETC. ETC. v. STATE 559
OF MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
categories of affected by permanent and temporary A
submergence) except in the case of hardcore PAFs who
refuse to accept the package and unwilling to shift.
Temporary submergence even for a short period can
affect the oustees badly and that it is desirable to keep
this in mind while rehabilitating the oustees. n (emphasis B
supplied)

157. If we read the above referred to provisions of the R&R
Policy, findings in NWDT Award, project report prepared by
CWC in March 1997 and observations made in Narmada C
Bachao Ando/an - II (Supra) and analyse it properly, the
following picture emerges:
(i) In case the land/dwelling unit of the tenure holder is
submerged temporarily, he is entitled for the benefit of
0
R&R Policy;
(ii) In case of temporary submergence of the agricultural
land between FLR and MWL. and those affected by the
back water affect resulting from MWL, only the buildings
with their appurtenant land would be acquired. But the E
agricultural land is not to be acquired; and
(iii) In case, the dwelling units are acquired because of
temporary submergence, such persons shall be entitled for
the benefits under R&R Policy. F
158. We have not only considered the rival submissions
made by learned counsel for the parties but in view of the fact
that the matter is extremely technical, we requested the ewe
to depute Mr. U.K. Ghosh, Chief Engineer (NOA- CWC), who
had been the Chairman of the Committee, to render assistance G
as the Court wanted certain explanation/clarification from his
team, thus called them in the Chambers on 27.4.2011 and
again on 5.5.2011. We discussed various aspects of the report
and objections filed by the parties. They have explained the
concept of BWL and Dam Overtopping as under: H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A BWL : BWL in the upstream of a dam is formed by
incoming flood while passing through the reservoir created
by artificial obstruction in a river channel by construction
of an weir or a dam.

Dam Overtopping : Dam overtopping implies water flow
B over the dam top. Flow of water over the dam top may
occur due to:

(a) Increase in water level in the reservoir higher than
the top level of the dam due to an inflow volume
c greater than the project design flood, due to under-
estimation of the same at the time of project
planning and design.

(b) Mechanical failure in reservoir operation or due to
human negligence.
D
On the main issue as to whether the land in dispute is to
be acquired or not, the relevant part of their written opinion
dated 6.5.2011 reads as under:

E "As per yearwise record of maximum flood discharge
at Omkareshwar dam, since 1951 up to 2003 (53 years),
the flood discharge never exceeded the design spillway
capacity of 69,000 cumecs. The statement of yearwise
maximum floor discharge is enclosed at Annexure - I.
F From the Standard Project Flood (SPF) hydrograph, as
adopted for working out the backwater level in the
Omkareshwar Reservoir, it is noted that duration of flood
magnitude above design spillway capacity at FRL is about
two days only. Therefore, during Monsoon season
temporary submergence due to backwater effect above
G FRL will not be more than 4 to 5 days.
In respect of non-Monsoon period it is to mention that
there will be daily regulated release from both Indira Sagar
Dam in the upstream of Omkareshwar dam as well as from
H
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 561
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. RS. CHAUHAN, J.]

Omkareshwar dam itself for power generation and other A
commitments. The reservoir level at Omkareshwar dam
are likely to be maintained within FRL by suitable reservoir
operation at all times during non-monsoon period.

In the present case, the disputed land ad-measuring
8
284.03 hectares between FRL and BWL comes under
temporary submergence for a duration of less than 15
. days when a flood of SPF magnitude, which is 1 in 1000
years return period flood for this project impinges the
reservoir at FRL. Therefore, keeping in view all the above C
points given in Para 2(i) to Para 2(iv), the Committee is
of the view that the agricultural land~ within FRL and BWL
need not be acquired as per the guidelines for preparation
of Project, Estimates for River Valley Projects prepared
by Central Water Commission in March, 1997."
D
(Emphasis added)

' \159. Jn view of the expert opinions rendered by ewe and
other materials on record, we reach the inescapable conclusion
that the agricultural land of these five villages is not to be E
acquired as it may only be under temporary submergence for
a very short period, which occurs throughout the cquntry during
floods in monsoon. Such a submergence is always beneficial
to agricultural produce as the land gets enriched due to silting
during the flood and becomes more fertile. More so, such an
· acquisition is not in the interest of the State as the land cannot F
be put to any use whatsoever, and there is a possibility that
such land would be encroached upon by unscrupulous
elements.

160. CONCLUSIONS/RESULT: G

(i) Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116/2011 filed by the
State of M.P. and NHDC ,.

These appeals involved two issues namely, (i) allotment'
H
562. SUPREME-COURT REPORTS ~ [2011] 6 S.C.R.

A of land in lieu of land acquired; and (ii) entitlement of major son
to get the allotrnent of land as a separate family. So far as the
first issue is concerned, in respect of the same, we hold that in
view of the provisions contained in R & R Policy, the State
Authorities are under an obligation to allot the land to the
e oustees "as far as possible". In case· an oustee has not
accepted the compensation/SRG or has any grievance in
respect of area/quality/location of land allotted or for any other
entitlement, he may approach .the GRA and the GRA will
adjudicate upon the issue and pass an appropriate order in
c individual cases after giving an oppo.rtunity of hearing to all the
parties concerned. Needless to say, the person aggrieved by
the order of GRA shall be entitled to approach the High Court
for appropriate relief. However, in case of private person, the
application/petition would be in the name of that individual
person duly supported by his affidavit..
0
So far as the issue of entitlement of major son for allotment
of land. as a separate family is concerned, our conclusion is in
the negative. In other words, th.ere is no such entitlement.
. ..
E (ii) Civil Appeal No: 2082/2011 filed by NBA

This appeal involved three issues namely (i) entitlement of
land to ttie landless labourers; (ii) applicability of NWDT Awarer
in the Omkareshwar dam project; and (iii) entitlement of
allotment of land to the oustees of five villages already.
F submerged. Our conclusion in respect of Issue Nos. (i) & (ii) is
in the negative. However, on Issue No.(iii), the oustees shall be•
entitled for the relief as given to the oustees on Issue No. (i) in
Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-211612011.

G (iil)Civil Appeal Nos. 2083-209712011 and 2098-2112/2011

These appeals have been preferred by the State of M.P •
. and NHDC in respect of acquisition of land of five. villages,
wherein the State wants to withdraw the _acquisition
H proceedings. Our conclusion is that in the fact-situation of the··
NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF 563
MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
case, the State is entitled to abandon the land acquisition A
proceedings in exercise of its power under Section ~8 of the
Act 1894. However, it shall not apply to 167 dwelling units on
the said land. Such persons whose dwelling units are acquired
shall be entitled for the benefit of R & R Policy to the extent
provided therein. The State shall establish the roads etc. after s
raising the height of the Bandh as proposed by the Authorities.

(iv) The IA. Nos. 196-210, 211-225, 241-255 of 2011 and
226-240 of 2011 filed by both the parties under Section 340
Cr.P.C., do not require to be dealt with in view of our C
observations made in para 146 of this judgment.

All the appeals and IAs. stand disposed of accordingly. No
order as to costs.

161. We have b_een given to understand that on the 0
Narmada River, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, in all 29 major
and minor projects are contemplated. Some of them have
already been completed, but on account of stay order by the
court/Authority some projects could not be completed. It is
unfortunate that in spite of the fact that a huge amount has been E
spent, yet no one is able to reap the fruits of investment. The
State should take immediate steps to get the final verdict in
such cases or stay vacated and start the project at the earliest.

162. Before parting with the case, we record our deep
appreciation for the assistance rendered to this Court by Shri F
M.K. Mudgal, learned District Judge, Indore, and officials of the
CWC, particularly Shri U.K. Ghosh, Chief Engineer (NBP),
CWC, Shri M.P. Singh, Director (FCA), CWC, and Shri D.P.
Singh, Director (ND&HW), CWC, New Delhi.
G
R.P. Appeals disposed of.