NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIAversusM/S. GANGA ENTERPRISES AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2003 INSC 434
- Decided
- 28 August 2003
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S N VARIAVA
Holding
Forfeiture of the bid security is valid; an on‑demand bank guarantee is a separate contract that can be enforced even if the underlying contract is not concluded, and such disputes are contractual and not within the jurisdiction of Article 226.
Summary
The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) issued a tender for toll collection requiring a bid security of Rs 50 lakh in the form of an on‑demand bank guarantee, which could be forfeited if the bidder withdrew his bid within the 120‑day validity period. Ganga Enterprises submitted the bid, became the highest bidder, but withdrew the bid on 20 Nov 1997 before the validity expired. NHAI accepted the bid on 21 Nov 1997, but since the bidder had withdrawn, the performance security was not furnished and the agreement was not signed; consequently NHAI encashed the bank guarantee. Ganga Enterprises filed a writ petition for refund of the forfeited amount, which the Delhi High Court allowed, holding that an offer could be withdrawn before acceptance and that forfeiture was void. The Supreme Court reversed this, ruling that forfeiture of the bid security was valid because the bank guarantee is a separate contract of guarantee that can be enforced irrespective of the existence of an underlying contract, and that such contractual disputes are not maintainable under Article 226. The writ petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the forfeiture of bid security on withdrawal of a bid before acceptance is permissible under the Indian Contract Act.
- Whether a dispute arising from the forfeiture of bid security is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
- Whether an on‑demand bank guarantee can be enforced irrespective of the existence of an underlying contract.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 226, s. 299
- Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 5
Subjects
Judgment
A NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
v.
MIS. GANGA ENTERPRISES AND ANR.
AUGUST 28, 2003
B [S.N. VARIAVA AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]
Contract:
Tender-Forfeiture of bid security-Bidders required to furnish bid
C security and performance security-Bid SPcurity to be forfeited if bidder
withdrew his bid during period of bid validity-Respondent gave his bid/
offer and furnished bank guarantee for bid security-Later, when he came
to be highest bidder, withdrew his bid before expiry of period of bid
validity-Appellant encashed the bank guarantee-Writ petition by
respondent for refund of amount allowed by High Court-Held, by
D invoking the bank guarantee and/or enforcing the bid security, there is no
statutory right, exercise of which was being fettered-There is no term in
the contract which is contrary to the provisions of the Contract Act-The
Contract Act merely provides that a person can withdraw his offer before
its acceptance-But withdrawal of an offer, before it is accepted, is a
E completely different aspect from forfeiture ofearnest/security money which
has been given for a particular purpose-A person may have a right to
withdraw his offer but if he has made his offer on a condition that some
earnest money will be forfeited for not entering into contract or if some
act is not performed, then even though he may have a right to withdraw
F his offer, he has no right to claim that the earnest/security be returned to
him-Forfeiture of such earnest/security, in no way, affects any statutory
right unde1 .. 1e Contract Act-Such earnest/security is given and taken to
ensure that a contract comes into existence-In government contracts, such
a term is always included in order to ensure that only a genuine party
G makes a bid
Contract-Contract of guarantee-Tender-Bid security by way of
bank guarantee-Forfeiture of on withdrawal of bid during period of bid
validity-A contract of guarantee is a complete and separate contract by
itself-The law regarding enforcement of an "on demand bank guarantee"
H is very clear-If the enforcement is in terms of the guarantee, then Courts
114
NATIONAL HJGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA v. GANGA ENTERPRISES 115
must not interfere with the enforcement of bank guarantee-The existence A
or non-existence of an underlying contract become irrelevant when the
invocation is in terms of the bank guarantee-The bank guarantee
stipulated that if the bid was withdrawn within 120 days or if the
performance security was not given or if an agreement was not signed, the
guarantee could be enforced-The bank guarantee was enforced because B
the bid was withdrawn within 120 days-Therefore, it could not be said
that the invocation ofthe bank guarantee was against the terms of the bank
guarantee-If the guarantee was rightly invoked, there was no question of
directing refund-Bank guarantee-Courts' power to interferewith.
Constitution of India, 1950: c
Articles 226 and 299-Contractual disputes-Writ petition-
Maintainability of-Tender-Forfeiture of bid security-Writ petition for
refand of amount allowed by High Court-Held, disputes relating to
contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226-The dispute in this case D
was regarding the terms of offer-It was thus a contractual dispute in
respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum.
Kera/a State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC
293; State of V.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd, (1996) 6 sec 22 E
'
and B.D.A. v. Ajai Pal Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116, relied on.
Verigamto Naveen v. Government of A.P., (2001) 8 SCC 344 and
Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 247, held
inapplicable.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURlSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4123 of
1999.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.98 of the Delhi High Court
in C.W.P. No. 739 of 1998.
G
Mukul Rohatgi, Raju Ramachandran, Additional Solicitor Generals,
Dushyant Dave, Sanjeev Sachdeva and Ms. Priya Puri, Mrs. Niranjan
Singh, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Kamal Mohan Gupta,
Mrs. Rita Choudhary, Manish Kumar and Sunil Kumar Jain for the
apearing parties. H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A The following Order of the Court was delivered :
This appeal is against the Judgement of the High Court of Delhi dated
30th October, 1998.
Briefly stated, the facts are as follows :
B
The Appellant issued a tender notice calling for tenders for collection
of toll on a portion of the highway running through Rajasthan. The last
date of submission of bid was 31st July, 1997. It was also provided that
toll plazas would be got completed by the authority and handed over to
C the selected enterprise. There was two types of securities to be furnished,
one being a bid security in an amount of Rs. 50 lakhs (Rupees fifty lakhs
only). The other was a performance security by way of a bank guarantee
of Rs. 2 Crores (Rupees Two crores only). Clauses 7.1 to 8 deal with bid
security. They read as under :-
D
"7. Bid Security.
7. I. The bidder shall furnish, as a part of his bid, a Bid Security
in an amount of Rs. 50 Lakhs (Rupees Fifty Lakhs only), or an
equivalent amount in a freely convertible currency. The Bid
E Security shall, at the bidder's opinion, be in the form of a Bank
Draf, or Guarantee from a Bank located in India. The Bank
Guarantee shall be in the Form of Bank Guarantee for Bid
Security included herein, valid of 150 days after the last date for
submission of the bid.
F
7.2. A bid not accomoanied by an acceptable bid security shall
be rejected by National Highways Authority of India as non-
responsive.
G 7.3. The Bid Security of unsuccessful bidders will be returned by
National Highways Authority of India as promptly as possible but
not later than 30 days after the expiratio;i of the period of bid
validity.
7.4. The Bid Security of the successful bidder will be returned
H
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA r. GANGA ENTERPRISES 117
by National Highways Authority oflndia soon after the bidder has A
furnished the required Performance Security.
7.5. The Bid Security may be forfeited :
(a) if the bidder withdraws his bid during the period of bid
validity; or B
(b) in case the successful bidder fails within the specified period
to
(i) furnish the required Performance Security; and
(ii) sign the Agreement.
c
8. Bid Validity.
Bid shall remain valid for a period of 120 days after the last
date of bid submission." D
Thus, it is to be seen that the bid security of Rs. 50 lakhs was not for
performance of the contract. It was in essence an earnest to be given to
ensure that the bidder did not withdraw his bid during the period of bid
validity and/or that after acceptance the performance security is furnished
and the Agreement signed. The other terms pertained to the anticipated E
contract for collection of toll. It must be mentioned that the bid validity
period was 120 days.
In terms of this tender document the Respondent gave his bid or offer.
The offer/bid was in terms of the tender and thus it was also in two parts. F
The first part being an offer that the bid would not be withdrawn during
the bid validity period and/or that on acceptance the performance security
would be furnished and the Agreement signed. The second part of the offer
dealt with the terms and conditions pertaining to the performance of the
contract of collection of tolls, ifthe offer was accepted. As earnest/security
for performance (of the first part of the offer) the Respondent along with G
his bid furnished a bank guarantee in a sum ofRs .. 50 Lakhs as bid security.
The bank guarantee furnished was a "on demand guarantee" which
specifically provided that the bank guarantee could be enforced "on
demand" if the bidder withdraws his bid during the period of bid validity
or if the bidder, having beeen notified of the acceptance of his bids, fails H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A to furnish the performance security or fails to sign the Agreement. The
amount of the Bank? Guarantee was to be paid by the bank without demur
on the written demand merely stating that one of these conditions had been
fulfilled. The moment the bank guarantee was given and accepted by the
Appellants the first portion of the offer, regarding bid security, stood
B accepted. Of course, this did not mean that a competed contract in respect
of the work of toll collection had come into existence.
It is an admitted position that 120 days would have come to an end
of 28th November, 1997. In August the technical bids were opened. In
September the financial bids were opened, wherein it was found that the
C Respondent was the highest bidder.
On 20th November, 1997 the Respondent withdrew his bid i.e. he
·withdrew his bid before the expiry of 120 days. On 21st November, 1997,
the Appellants accepted the offer of the Respondent. However, as the
D Respondent had withdrawn his bid the performance guarantee was not
furnished and the Agreement was not entered into. The Appellants thus
encashed the bank guarantee for Rs. 50 lakhs.
The Respondent then filed a Writ Petition in the High Court, for
E refund of the amount. On the pleadings before it, the High Court raised
two questions viz. {a) whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without
authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and
also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act and (b) whether the writ
petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract.
Question (b) should have been first answered as it would go to the root
F of the matter. The High Court instead considered question (a) and then
chose not to answer question (b). In our view, the answer to question (b)
is clear. It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in the
cases of Kera/a State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Ka/athil reported in
G [2000] 6 sec 293, State ofU.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. reported
in (1996) 6 SCC 22 and B.D.A. v. Ajai Pal Singh reported in (1989) 2 SCC
116. This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms
of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a Writ
Court was not the proper forum. Mr. Dave however relied upon the cases
H of Verigamto Naveen v. Government ofA.P. reported in [200 l] 8 sec 344
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA v. GANGA ENTERPRISES 119
and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India reported in [1986] 3 SCC A
247. These however are cases where the Writ Court was enforcing a
statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a Writ Court can
interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability
the Petition should have been dismissed.
By the impugned Judgment the Writ Petition has been allowed. The B
High Court holds that the offer was withdrawn before it was accepted and
thus no completed contract had come into existence. The High Court holds
that in law it is always open to a party to withdraw its offer before its
acceptance. To this proposition there can be no quarrel. We therefore did
not permit Mr. Dave to cite authorities for the proposition that an offer can C
be withdrawn before it is accepted.
The Court, however, then goes on to hold as under :
"The statutory right having been so exercised, the fetter
imposed by the clause to the contrary in the tender documents and D
the bank guamatee could not override the provisions of the Indian
Contract Act. Any clause in so far as it is contrary of comes in
conflict with the provisions of the Indian Contract Act is inoperative
and void and connot be enforced. To have an enforceable contract
there must be an offer and unconditional acceptance. A person E
who makes an offer has the right of withdrawing it before
acceptance. Until the offer is accepted unconditionally it creates
no legal right and the bid can be withdrawn at any time. Once it
is held that there is no completed contract between the parties no
further question can arise. There can be no breach of contract. F
There is no statutory rule or an act whenunder the security deposit
in the form of a bank guarantee could be claimed by the
respondent No. 2. The position may, however, be different ifthere
is a statutory rule having force of law precluding withdrawal of
a bid before its acceptance. The petitioner was entitled to withdraw G
the bid because the prohibition against withdrawal does not have
the force of law and there was no consideration to bind him down
to the condition. In the present case there was no acceptance by
respondent No. 2 on the date of withdrawal of the bid by the
petitioner. In the circumstances the invocation and encashment of
the bank guarantee is illegal and void and is liable to be set aside." H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A In our view, the High Court fell in error in so holding. By invoking
the bank guarantee and/or enforcing the bid security, there is no statutory
right, exercise of which was being fettered. There is no term in the contract
which is contrary to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. The Indian
Contract Act merely provides that a person can withdraw his offer before
B its acceptance. But withdrawal of an offer, before it is accepted, is a
completely different aspect from forfeiture of earnest/security money
which has been given for a particular purpose. A person may have a right
to withdraw his offer but if he has made his offer on a condition that some
earnest money will be forfeited for not entering into contract or if some
act is not performed, then even though he may have a right to withdraw
C his offer, he has no right to claim that the earnest/security be returned to
him. Forfeiture of such earnest/security, in no way, affects any statutory
right under the Indian Contract Act. Such earnest/security is given and
taken to ensure that a contract comes into existence. It would be an
anomalous situation that a person who, by his own conduct, precludes the
D coming into existence of the contract is then given advantage or benefit
of his own wrong by not allowing forfeiture. It must be remembered that,
particularly in government contracts, such a term is always included in
order to ensure that only a genuine party makes a bid. If such a term was
not there even a person who does not have the capacity or a person who
E has no intention of entering into the contract will make a bid. The whole
purpose of such a clause i.e. to see that only genuine bids are received
would be lost if forfeiture was not permitted.
There is another reason why the impugned Judgment cannot be
F sustained. It is settled Jaw that a contract of guarantee is a complete and
separate contract by itself. The Jaw regarding enforcement of an "on
demand bank guarantee" is very clear. If the enforcement is in terms of
the guarantee, then Courts must not interfere with the enforcement of bank
guarantee. The Court can only interfere if the invocation is against terms
of the guarantee or if there is any fraud. Courts cannot restrain invocation
G of an "on demand guarantee" in accordance with its terms by looking at
terms of the underlying contract. The existence or non-existence of an
underlying contract become irrelevant when the invocation is in terms of
the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee stipulated that if the bid was
withdrawn within 120 days or if the performance security was not given
H or if an Agreement was not signed, the guarantee could be enforced. The
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA v. GANGA ENTERPRISES 121
bank guarantee was enforced because the bid was withdrawn within 120 A
days. Therefore, it could not be said that the invocation of the bank
- guarantee was against the tenns of the bank guarantee. If it was in tenns
of the bank guarantee, one fails to understand as to how the High Court
could say that the guarantee could not have been invoked. If the guarantee
was rightly invoked, there was no question of directing refund as has been B
done by the High Court.
Mr. Dave submitted that the Respondent had no option· but to
withdraw his offer as the Appellants had not completed the toll plazas. He
pointed out that the period of the contract was to be from !st October, 1997
to 30th September, 1999. He submitted that even though the contract, if C
accepted, was to commence from I st October 1997, the Appellants had not
accepted the offer till 20th November, 1997 and thus Respondent had to
withdraw his offer. He submitted that it has come on record that the toll
plazas were not completed till March, 1998. He submitted that the
Respondent was forced to withdraw his offer because of the inaction/ D
negligence on the part of the Appellant. He submitted that under these
circumstances Respondent shold not be penalized by forfeiture of his
deposit. We are unable to accept this submission. The Bid security was
given to meet a specific contingency viz. non-withdrawal of the offer within
120 days. The contingency having arisen, Appellants were entitled to E
forfeit. It may only be mentioned that in the proposed Agreement there
is a clasue which provides that if therre is a delay on the part of the
Appellants, which results in delay in the work of collection of toll, the
amount payable by the Respondent would be reduced pro-rata. Thus by
reason of the delay Respondent would not have suffered. Also Respondent
was well aware that 120 days would end on 28th November, 1997. Thus F
the Respondent was aware when he gave his offer, that acceptance could
be delayed till 28th November, 1997. Thus non-acceptance till 20th
November, 1997 was not a ground would justify action of Respondent in
withdrawing his offer.
G
In this view of the matter, the impugned Judgment is set aside. The
Appeal is accordingly allowed. The Writ Petition of the Respondents shall
stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
)
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