NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.versusKIRPAL SINGH
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 22
- Decided
- 10 January 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
Employees retiring under the SVRS 2004 are entitled to pension under the 1995 Pension Scheme if they have at least ten years of qualifying service, as "retirement" in paragraph 14 is to be given a liberal, contextual meaning.
Summary
The respondents, employees of National Insurance Co., opted for voluntary retirement under the General Insurance Employees Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2004 (SVRS 2004) and claimed pension under the General Insurance (Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995. The insurers rejected the claim, arguing that pension under the 1995 scheme required twenty years of service as per paragraph 30, which the respondents did not meet. The High Court held that paragraph 14 of the 1995 scheme, which requires only ten years of qualifying service for any retirement, applied to the SVRS 2004 retirees. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, interpreting "retirement" in paragraph 14 liberally and noting that the SVRS 2004 does not adopt the twenty‑year requirement of paragraph 30. Consequently, the respondents were entitled to pension after completing ten years of service. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether employees who retire under the Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2004 are eligible for pension under the General Insurance (Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995.
- Whether paragraph 14 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, requiring ten years of service, applies to voluntary retirees under the 2004 scheme despite the twenty‑year requirement in paragraph 30.
- Interpretation of the word "retirement" and the effect of the term "means" in statutory definitions.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 1 S.C.R. 380
A NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.
v.
KIRPAL SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 256 of 2014)
JANUARY 10, 2014
B
[T.S. THAKUR AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
General Insurance Employees Special Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, 2004:
c
Para 3, 5 and 6 - Vo/unary retirement Scheme -
Eligibility - Qualifying service - Held In view of para 6 of
SVRs of 2004 and Para 14 of Pension Scheme of 1995, any
employee retiring from service of company/corporation would
0 qualify for payment of pension if he/she has rendered a
minimum of ten years of service on the date of retirement -
Since para 29 and 30 of Pension Scheme 1995 do not govem
the entitlement for those seeking the benefit of SVRS of 2004,
para 14 can be invoked, which prescribes a qualifying service
E of ten years only as a condition of eligibility - Expression
"retirement' appearing in Para 14 of Pension scheme 1995
should not only apply to cases which fall under Para 30 of the
said scheme but also to a case falling under SVRS of 2004
- Thus, those opting for voluntary retirement under SVRS of
2004 would also qualify for payment of pension as they had
F put in the qualifying service of ten years stipulated under Para
14 of Pension Scheme 1995 - General Insurance
(Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995 - Para 14, 29 and 30.
Words and Phrases:
G
Word 'means' and the expression, "unless the context
otherwise requires" - Connotation of- Interpretation of statues.
The respondents opted for voluntary retirement in
H 380
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 381
SINGH
terms of the General Insurance Employees Special .A
Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2004 (SVRS of 2004), and
claimed ;pension as one of the benefits admissible to
them under para 6 thereof. The claim was rejected by the
appellants on the :ground that in terms of para 6 of SVRS
of 2004, pension would be admissible to those seeking B
voluntary r.etirement only if they were eligible for the same
under the General lns1uance (Employees) Pension
Scheme., 1995 (Pension Scheme 1995) and Para 30 of the
Pension :Scheme 1995 made only such em.ployees
eligible for pension who had completed twenty years of c
qualifying service; and as the .respondents had not
completed twenty years of qualify.ing service on the date
of their voluntary retirement, they were not eligible for
pension 1995. The writ petitions filed by the respondents
were allowed ho1ding the respondents to be entitled to 0
claim pension.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.·1 • .A conjoint reading of para 6 of SVRS of
2004 and para 14 of the Pension Scheme 1995, would E
leave no manner·of doubt that any employee retiring from
the service of the company/corporation would qualify for
payment .of pension if he/she has rendered a minimum
of ten years .of service on the date .of retirement. [para 7]
[387-G] F
1.2. Para 29 and Para 30 of the Pension Scheme 1995
provides for '"superannuation pension" and "pension on
voluntary retirement", .respectively. The SVRS of 2004
does not obviously rest the claim for payment of pension
on any one of the said two provisions. That is because G
what is claimed by the employees- respondents ·is not
superannuation pension nor is it pension on voluntary
retirement within the meaning of para 30. As a matter of
fact, para 6 (1 )(c} of the SVRS of 2004 s~pecif.ically
provides that the notional benefit of additional five years H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014} 1 S.C.R.
A to be added to the service of the retiring employee as
stipulated in para 30 of the pension scheme shall not be
admissible for purposes of determining the quantum of
pension and commutation of pension. It follows that the
SVRS of 2004 did not for the purposes of grant of
B pension adopt the scheme underlying para 30 of the
Pension Scheme 1995. [para 10-11) [389-F-H; 390-E-G]
1.3. The provisions of para 6 of the SVRS of 2004
read with para 14 of the Pension Scheme 1995 which
C stipulates only ten years qualifying service for an
employee who retires from service to entitle him to claim
pension would entitle those retiring pursuant to the
SVRS of 2004 also to claim pension. Since paras 29 and
30 of the Pension Scheme 1995 do not govern the
entitlement for those seeking the benefit of SVRS of 2004,
0 para 14 can be invoked, which prescribes a qualifying
service of ten years only as a condition of eligibility. Not
only because the provision for payment of pension is a
beneficial provision which ought to be interpreted more
liberally to favour grant rather than refusal of the benefit
E but also because the Voluntary Retirement Scheme itself
was intended to reduce surplus manpower by
encouraging the employees to opt for retirement by
offering them benefits like ex-gratia payment and pension
not otherwise admissible in the ordinary course. [para 11]
F [390-G-H; 391-A-B, D-E]
1.4. Therefore, this Court holds that the expression
"retirement" appearing in Para 14 of the Pension scheme
1995 should not only apply to cases which fall under
G Para 30 of the said scheme but also to a case falling
under a Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme of 2004.
So interpreted, those opting for voluntary retirement
under the said SVRS of 2004 would also qualify for
payment of pension as they had put in the qualifying
H service of ten years stipulated under Para 14 of the
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 383
SINGH
Pension Scheme 1995. [para 11] (391-E-G] A
1.5. The word 'means' used in statutory definitions
generally implies that the definition is exhaustive. But
that general rule of interpretation is not without an
exception.· An equally well-settled principle of 8
interpretation is that the use of the word 'means' in a
statutory definition notwithstanding the context in which
the expression is defined cannot be ignored in any
forensic exercise meant to discover the real purport of
an expression. (para 12] [391-G-H; 392-A]
Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v.
Automobile Proprietary Ltd. (1968) 1 W.L.R. 1526; The
Vanguard Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. Madras v. Fraser
& Ross & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 971; Paul Enterprises & Ors. v.
Rajib Chatterjee and Co. & Ors. 2009 (1 ) SCR 259 = (2009) D
3 SCC 709 State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. B.E. Billimoria &
Ors. 2003 (2 ) Suppl. SCR 603 = (2003) 1 sec 336 K. v.
Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 188 =
(1997) 2 SCC 53; and Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless
General Finance 1987 (2) SCR 1 = (1987) 1 SCC 424 - E
referred to.
1.6. In the case at hand, Para 2 of the Pension
Scheme 1995 defines the expressions appearing in the
scheme. But what is important is that such definitions F
are good only if the context also supports the meaning
as~igned to the expressions defined by the definition
clause. The context in which the question whether
pension is admissible to an employee who has opted for
voluntary retirement under the 2004 scheme assumes
importance as Para 2 of the scheme starts with the words G
"In this scheme, unless the context otherwise requires".
There is nothing in the context of 1995 Scheme which
would exclude its beneficial provisions from application
to employees who have opted for voluntary retirement
H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A under the Special Scheme 2004 or vice versa. The term
retirement must in the context of the two schemes, and
the admissibility of pension to those retiring under the
SVRS of 2004, include retirement not only under Para 30
of the Pension Scheme 1995 but also those retiring under
B the Special Scheme of 2004. That apart, any provision for
payment of pension is beneficial in nature which ought
to receive a liberal interpretation so as to serve the object
underlying not only of the Pension Scheme 1995 but also
any special scheme under which employees have been
C given the option to seek voluntary retirement upon
completion of the prescribed number of years of service
and age. [para 16] (396-A-F]
Case Law Reference:
D (1968) 1 W.L.R. 1526 referred to Para 12
AIR 1960 SC 971 referred to para 13
2009 (1) SCR 259 referred to para 14
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 603 referred to para 14
E
1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 188 referred to para 14
1987 (2) SCR 1 referred to para 15
CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 256
F of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2008 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.
13382 of 2007.
G WITH
C.A. Nos. 257 & 258 of 2014.
Jaideep Gupta, Jyoti Dastidar, rnnesh Mathur, S.L. Gupta,
H Dua Associates, A.K. De, Rajesh Dwivedi, Debasis Misra,
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 385
SINGH
Ranjan Mukherjee, Dr. S.K. Verma, Mohit Saroha, Gautam A
Narayan, Nikhil Nayyar, Mubashir Mushtaq, TVS. Raghvendra
Sreyas for the appearing parties. ·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. B
2. The short question that falls for determination in these
appeals is whether the respondents who opted for voluntary
retirement from the service of the appellant-companies are
entitled to claim pension under the General Insurance c
(Employees) Pension Scheme 1995. The High Court having
answered the question in the affirmative, the appellant-Insurance
Companies have appealed to assail that view.
3. The controversy arises in the following backdrop:
D
4. In exercise of its powers under Section 17A of the
General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, the
Central Government made what is described as General
Insurance Employee's Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme,
2004 (hereinafter referred to as "SVRS of 2004"). Para 3 of E
the scheme stipulating the eligibility conditions for employees
who could opt for voluntary retirement from the services of the
insurance company is as under:
"Eligibility F
(1) All permanent full time employees will be eligible
to seek special voluntary retirement under this
Scheme provided they have attained the age of
40 years and completed 10 years of qualifying
services as on the date of notification. G
(2) An employee who is under suspension or against
whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or
contemplated shall not be eligible to opt for the
s~em~ H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A Provided that the case of an employee who is
under suspension or against whom disciplinary
proceeding is pending or contemplated made be
considered by the Board of the Company
concerned having regard to the facts and
B circumstances of each case and the decision
taken by the Board shall be final."
5. In para 5 of the scheme those seeking voluntary
retirement were held entitled to ex-gratia amount to be
determined according to the said provision. In Para 6 of the
C scheme were stipulated other benefits to which the employees
opting for voluntary retirement under the scheme would be
entitled. It reads as under:
"6. Other. benefits.-
D
(1) An employee opting for the scheme shall also be
eligible for the following benefits in addition to the
ex-gratia amount mentioned in para 5 namely:-
(a) Provident Fund,
E
(b) Gratuity as per Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39
of 1972) or gratuity payable under the
Rationalisation Scheme, as the case may be;
(c) Pension (including commuted value of pension)
F
as per General Insurance {Employee's) Pension
Scheme 1995, if eligible. However. the additional
notional benefit of the five years of added service
as stipulated in para 30 of the said pension
Scheme shall not be admissible for the purpose of
G determining the quantum of pension and
commutation of pension.
(d) Leave encashment.
H (2) An employee who is opting for the scheme shall
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 387
SINGH [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
not be entitled to avail Leave Travel Subsidy and A
also encashment of leave while in service during the
period of sixty days from the date of notification of
this scheme."
(emphasis supplied)
B
6. The respondents who opted for voluntary retirement in
temrs of the SVRS of 2004 afore-mentioned appear to have
claimed pension as one of the benefits admissible to them
under para 6 above. The claim was rejected by the appellants
forcing the respondents to agitate the matter before the High C
Court in separate writ petitions filed by them. The High Court
has by a common order dated 25th January, 2008, allowed the
said petitions holding the respondents to be entitled to claim
pension. The High Court has taken the view that para 6 of the
SVRS of 2004 read with para 14 of the General Insurance D
(Employees) Pension Scheme 1995 entitled the employees to
claim pension so long as they had rendered a minimum of ten
years of service in the Corporation/Company from whose
service they were seeking retirement. Para 14 of the Pension
Scheme 1995 reads as under: E
"Qualifying Service: Subject to the other condition
contained in this scheme, an employee who has
rendered a minimum ten years of service in the
Corporation or a Company, on the date of retirement
shall qualify for pension." F
7. A conjoint reading of para 6 of SVRS of 2004 and para
14 of the Pension Scheme 1995, would leave no manner of
doubt that any employee retiring from the service of the
company/corporation would qualify for payment of pension if he/ G
she has rendered a minimum of ten years of service on the date
ofretirement. The expression 'retirement' has been defined in
para 2 (t) of the Pension Scheme 1995 as under:
H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A · 2 Definition:- In this Scheme unless the context
otherwise requires:-
xxx xxx xxx
(t) "retirement" means -
B
(i) the retirement in accordance with the provisions
contained in paragraph 12 of General Insurance
(Rationalisation and Revision of Pay Scales and
Other Conditions of Service of Supervisory,
c Clerical and Subordinate Staff) Scheme, 1974
notified under the notification of Government of
India, in the Ministry of Finance(Department of
Revenue and Insurance) number S. 0. 326(£)
dated the 27th May, 1974;
D (ii) the retirement in accordance with the provisions
contained in paragraph 4 of the General
Insurance {Termination, Superannuation and
Retirement of Officers and Development Staff)
Scheme, 19 76notified under nbtification of
E Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance
(Department of Economic Affairs) number
S.0.627(E) dated 21st September, 1976;
(iii) voluntary retirement in accordance with the
F provisions contained in paragraph 30 of this
scheme;
8. It was contended on behalf of the appellant-companies
that in terms of para 6 of SVRS of 2004 (supra) pension will
be admissible to those seeking voluntary retirement only if they
G were eligible for the same under the Pension Scheme 1995.
Para 30 of the Pension Scheme 1995 in turn made only such
employees eligible for pension who had completed twenty years
of qualifying service. Inasmuch as the respondents had not.
admittedly completed twenty years of qualifying service on the'
H
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 389
SINGH [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
date of their voluntary retirement, they were not eligible for A
pension under the Pension Scheme 1995.
9. On behalf of the respondents, it was argued that the
respondents had not sought voluntary retirement in terms of
para 30 of the Pension Scheme 1995 which is a general 8
_provision and which stipulates twenty years of qualifying service
for being eligible to claim pension nor was it a case where the
SVRS of 2004 either specifically or by necessary implication
adopted para 30 of the Pension Scheme 1995 for determining
the eligibility of those seeking retirement under the said scheme. C
The respondents had, it was contended, voluntarily retired
pursuant to the SVRS of 2004 which was different from what
was envisaged under para 30 of the Pension Scheme 1995.
The condition of eligibility for pension stipulated under para 30
viz. twenty years of qualifying service had, therefore, no
application to the respondents implying thereby that the claim D
for pension ought to be seen in the light of Para 14 of the
Pension Scheme 1995 treating retirement under the Special
Scheme of 2004 also as a retirement for the purposes of that
para.
E
10. We find considerable force in the contention urged on
behalf of the respondents. The Pension Scheme 1995 provides
for "superannuation pension" and "pension on voluntary
retirement". Superannuation pension is regulated by para 29
of the Pension Scheme 1995 while voluntary retirement F
pension is governed by para 30 which read as under:
"29. Superannuation Pension: Subject to the other
condition contained in this scheme, an employee who
has rendered a minimum ten years of service in the
Corporation or a Company, on the date of retirement G
shall qualify for pension.
-
30. Pension on voluntary retirement: (1) At any time
after an employee has completed twenty years of
qualifying service, he may, by giving notice of not less H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 1 S.C.R.
A than ninety days, writing to the appointing authority, retire
from service.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring
B voluntarily under this paragraph shall be increased by a
period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition
that the total qualifying service rendered by the employee
shall not in any case exceed thirty years and it does not
take him beyond the date of retirement."
c
(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this
paragraph shall be based on the average emoluments
as defined under clause (d) of paragraph 2 of this
scheme and the increase, not exceeding five years in his
0 qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional
fixation of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension"
11. The SVRS of 2004 does not obviously rest the claim
for payment of pension on any one of the above two provisions.
That is because what is claimed by the employees-
E respondents before us is not superannuation pension nor is it
pension on voluntary retirement within the meaning of para 30
(supra). As a matter of fact, para 6 (1 )(c) of the SVRS of 2004
specifically provides that the notional benefit of additional five
years to be added to the service of the retiring employee as
F stipulated in para 30 of the pension scheme shall not be
admissible for purposes of determining the quantum of pension
and commutation of pension. It follows that the SVRS of 2004
did not for the purposes of grant of pension adopt the scheme
underlying para 30 of the Pension Scheme 1995. Such being
G the case, the question is whether the provisions of para 6 of
the SVRS of 2004 read with para 14 of the Pension Scheme
1995 which stipulates only ten years qualifying service for an
employee who retires from service to entitle him to claim
pension would entitle those retiring pursuant to the SVRS of
H 2004 also to claim pension. Our answer is in the affirmative. If
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 391
SINGH [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
paras 29 and 30 do not govern the entitlement for those seeking A
the benefit of SVRS of 2004, the only other provision which can
possibly be invoked for such pension is para 14 (supra) that
prescribes a qualifying service of ten years only as a condition
of eligibility. The only impediment in adopting that interpretation
lies in the use of the word 'retirement' in Para 14 of the Pension B
Scheme 1995. A restricted meaning to that expression may
mean that Para 14 provides only for retirements in terms of
Para (2)(t) (i) to (iii) which includes voluntary retirement in
accordance with the provisions contained in Para 30 of the
Pension Scheme. There is, however, no reason why the c
expression 'retirement' should receive such a restricted
meaning especially when the context in which that expression
is being examined by us would justify a more liberal
interpretation; not only because the provision for payment of
pension is a beneficial provision which ought to be interpreted
0
more liberally to favour grant rather than refusal of the benefit
but also because the Voluntary Retirement Scheme itself was
intended to reduce surplus manpower by encouraging, if not
alluring employees to opt for retirement by offering them benefits
like ex-gratia payment and pension not otherwise admissible E
to the employees.in the ordinary course. We are, therefore,
inclined to hold that the expression "Retirement" appearing in
Para 14 of the Pension scheme 1995 should not only apply to
cases which fall under Para 30 of the said scheme but also to
a case falling under a Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme
of 2004. So interpreted, those opting for voluntary retirement F
under the said SVRS of 2004 would also qualify for payment
of pension as they had put in the qualifying service of ten years
stipulated under Para 14 of the Pension Scheme 1995.
12. We are mindful of the fact that the word 'means' used G
in statutory definitions generally implies that the definition is
exhaustive. But that general rule of interpretation is not without
an exception. An equally well-settled principle of interpretation
is that <the use of the word 'means' in a statutory definition
notwithstanding the context in which the expression is defined H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A cannot be ignored in any forensic exercise meant to discover
the real purport of an expression. Lord Denning's observations
in Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v. Automobile
Proprietary Ltd. (1968) 1 W.L.R. 1526 are, in this regard,
apposite when he said:
B
"It is true that 'the industry' is defined; but a definition is
not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context
of the phrase which 1t defines, realising that the function
of a definition is to give precision and certainty to a word
or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain-
c but not to contradict it or supplant it altogether"
13. In The Vanguard Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd.
Madras v. Fraser & Ross & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 971 one of the
questions that fell for determination before .nis Court was
D whether the definition of the word "insurer" included a person
intending to carry on a business or a person who has ceased
to carry on a business. It was contended that the definition
started with the words "insurer means" and, therefore, is
exhaustive. This Court repelling that contention held that
E statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to
the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses
which created them and it may be that even where the definition
is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a
certain thrng, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat
F different meaning in different sections of the Act depending
upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in
statutes generally begin with the qualifying words ·unless there
is anything repugnant in the subject or context". This Court
observed:
G "The main basis of this contention is the definition of the
word 'insurer" in the s. 2(9) of the Act. It is pointed out that
that definition begins with the words "insurer meansn and
is therefore exhaustive. It may be accepted that generally
the v1ord "insurer" has been defined for the purposes of
H the Act to mean a person or body corporate, etc., which
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 393
SINGH [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
is actually carrying on the business of insurance, i.e., the A
business of effecting contracts of insurance of whatever
kind they might be. But s.2 begins with the words "in this
Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context" and then come the various definition clauses of
which (9) is one. It is well settled that all statutory B
definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the
qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses
which created them and it may be that even where the
definition is exhaustive inasmuch as .the word defined is
said to mean a certain thing, it is possible .for the word to c
have a somewhat different meaning in different sections
of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That
is why .af/ definitions in statues generally being with the
qualifying words similar to the words used in the present
case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the
0
subject or context. therefore in finding out the meaning
to the word "insurer" in various sections of the Act, the
meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the
definition clause. But this is not inflexible· and there may
be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to
be departed from on account of the subject or context in E
which the word has been used and that will be giving effect
to the opening sentence in the definition section. namelv.
unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context. In view of this qualification. the court has not only
to look at the words but also to look at the context, the F
co/location and the object of such words relating to such
matter and interpr:et the meaning intended to be
conveved by the use of the words under the
circumstances. Therefore, though ordinarily the word
"insurer" as used in the Act would mean a person or body G
corporate actually carrying on the business of insurance
it may be that in certain sections the word may have a
somewhat different meaning."
(emphasis supplied) H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A 14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Paul
Enterprises & Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee and Co. & Ors. (2009)
3 SCC 709 where this Court once again reiterated that the
interpretation clause should be given a contextual meaning and
that all statutory definitions must be read subject to the
B qualification variously expressed in the interpretation clause,
which created them. In State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. B.E.
Billimoria & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 336 also this Court restated
the principle that meaning of an expression must be determined
in the context in which the same has been used. Reference
c may also be made to K. V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997)
2 SCC 53 where this Court made the following apposite
observations:
"Apparently, it appears that the definition is conclusive
as the word "means" has been used to specify the
D members, namely, spouse, son, daughter, grand-child or
dependent parent, who would constitute the family.
Section 2 of the Act in which various terms have been
defined, open with the words "in this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires" which indicates that the
E definitions, as for example, that of "Family", which are
indicated to be conclusive may not be treated to be
conclusive if it was otherwise required by the context. This
implies that a definition, like any other word in a statute,
has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of
F the Act as also the object for which the Act was made by
the Legislature.
While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind
that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not
repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would
G
aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to
be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat
or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be
ignored and not accepted.
H Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case,
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. v. KIRPAL 395
SINGH [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
is preceded by the words "unless the context otherwise A
requires''. the said definition set out in the Section is to
be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the
normal rule may be departed from if there be something
in the context to show that the definition could not be
applied". B
(emphasis supplied)
15. We may also gainfully refer to the decision of this Court
in Reserve Bar:Jk of India v. Peerless General Finance (1987)
1 SCC 424 where this Court declared that the best
interpretation is .tbe one in which the Court relies upon not only C
the test but also-the context in which the provision has been
ma~ We can do no better than to extract 'the following
passage from that decision:
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. o
They are the-bases of interpretation. One may well say if
the text is the texture. context is what gives the colour.
Neither can' be ignored. Both are important. That
interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation
match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we E
know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute
must be reai. first as a whole and then section by section.
clause by cla.use. phrase by phrase and word by word. If
a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with
the glasses of the statutemaker, provided by such context,
F
its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may
take colour and appear different than when the statute is
looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With
these glasses-we must look at the Act as a whole and
discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and G
each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the
scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word
of a statute cari.be construed in isolation. Statutes have
to be construe.ct so that every word has a place and
everything is inJts place."
(emphasis supplied) H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A 16. In the case at hand Para 2 of the Pension Scheme
1995 (extracted earlier) defines the expressions appearing in
the scheme. But what is important is that such definitions are
good only if the context also supports the meaning assigned
to the expressions defined by the definition clause. The context
B in which the question whether pension is admissible to an
employee who has opted for voluntary retirement under the
2004 scheme assumes importance as Para 2 of the scheme
starts with the words "In this scheme, unless the context
otherwise requires". There is nothing in the context of 1995
c Scheme which would exclude its beneficial provisions from
application to employees who have opted for voluntary
retirement under the Special Scheme 2004 or vice versa. The
term retirement must in the context of the two schemes, and
the admissibility of pension to those retiring under the SVRS
of 2004, include retirement not only under Para 30 of the
0
Pension Scheme 1995 but also those retiring under the Special
Scheme of 2004. That apart any provision for payment of
pension is beneficial in nature which ought to receive a liberal
interpretation so as to serve the object underlying not only of
the Pension Scheme 1995 but also any special scheme under
E which employees have been given the option to seek voluntary
retirement upon completion of the prescribed number of years
of service and age.
17. In the result these appeals fail and are hereby
F dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to
costs.
R.P. Appeals dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.