Holding

Workers are entitled to appear and be heard at the hearing of a winding‑up petition, and the court may permit their participation even though the Companies Act does not expressly grant such a right.

Summary

The case arose when a group of shareholders filed a winding‑up petition against Ramakrishna Industries Ltd. and obtained an interim injunction that threatened the payment of wages and supplies to the company's employees. Three trade unions representing the workers applied to be impleaded as respondents, arguing that the winding‑up and the injunction would adversely affect the workers' livelihood and that they should be heard under the principles of natural justice. The Company Judge and the Madras High Court rejected the applications, holding that only creditors and contributories have locus standi under the Companies Act, 1956. On special leave, the Supreme Court held that workers have a right to appear and be heard at the hearing of a winding‑up petition, even though the Act does not expressly confer such a right, because the order can have adverse civil consequences and must satisfy the audi alteram partem rule. The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court order, and directed that the unions be permitted to appear and be heard, while noting that the right to intervene is not a statutory entitlement but may be granted at the court's discretion. The judgment emphasized the evolving socio‑economic role of companies, the constitutional mandate for workers' participation, and the need to interpret statutes in light of contemporary public‑interest considerations.

Issues considered

The question whether workers or their trade unions have locus standi to be heard or impleaded in a winding‑up petition under the Companies Act, 1956.
Whether the principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem, apply to winding‑up proceedings affecting workers' interests.
Whether Rule 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 confers a right on workers to appear at the hearing of a winding‑up petition.
The impact of constitutional provisions (Arts. 38, 43A) on the interpretation of the Companies Act with respect to workers' rights.

Legislation cited

Companies Act, 1956s. 433, s. 439, s. 440, s. 445(3), s. 447, s. 464, s. 466, s. 478, s. 517, s. 542, s. 543, s. 549, s. 556, s. 557, s. 560
Companies (Amendment) Act, 1963s. 10, s. 11
Companies (Court) Rules, 1959s. 34, s. 9B
Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951s. 15-A
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Subjects

winding‑upworkers' right to be heardnatural justiceaudi alteram partemlocus standitrade unionsprovisional liquidatorCompanies Actpublic interestconstitutional lawarticle 43A

Judgment

922
A
NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS' UNION ETC.
v.
P.R. RAMKRISHNAN AND OTHERS.
B
December IO, 1982

[P.N. BHAGWATI, 0 CHJNNAPPA REDDY, E.S. VBNKATARAMIAH,
BAHARUL {SLAM AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.]

c Indian Companies Act, 1956-S. 433-Petitlon for winding-up of company-
Orders likely. to adversely affect interests. of workers-Workers have right to
appear and be heard-Workers also entitled ta hearing on their own request when
application for appointment of provisional liquidator is being considered-Trade
Unions representing workers competent to intervene on behalf of workers.

Companies (Court) Rules, 1959-R. 34=-Provides for procedure only-Does
not confer on workers right to appear at hearing of Winding-up petition.

D The respondents were two grotJps of sharebOtder.s of a private: limited
company which had a thousand personi under its employn1ent. A group of
shareholders filed a petition for winding-up the company under els. (e) and (f) ·of
s. 433 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 along with applications for an interim
·injunction and for appointment of a provisional liquidator. The Company Judge
passed an order of injunction restraining the company from borrowing any
moneys from banks, financial institutions or others without the prior permission .•
E of the cOurt. Tt::iree trade. unions representing the employees Of the company
filed applications for being im;:ileaded as respondents/interveners in the winding-
up petition clain1ing that the interests of the employees had bee'n adversely
affc\:ted by the interim order. The Company Judge rejected these applications. A
Division B~nch of the f-Iigh Court turned down the appeal preferred by one of_tbe
unions and that union sought special leave to appeal against _the order ·or the
Division Bench-while the other two unions sought special leave to appeal againsc
F the order of the Company Judge.. The Court granted special leave to all the three
unions and perrniued the Con1pany Judge to pass orders on the application
pending before him for appointment of a provisional liquidator with the direction
that the liquidator shall not tike any st.:ps wh\ch would prejudicially affect the
emplojtees.
G
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that si Dee an order winding
up a company amounts to notice or termination of services of its employees under
s. 445(3) and since even an interim Order freezing the resources of the company
might affect the interest of the employees by making it difficult for the company
to pay their ~ages, etc.. it would be contra~y to f~ir judicial pr_ocedure and
H violative of the rule audi alteram partem to deny the employees the right to be
'1eard before any order prejudicially affecting their interests is made. The
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRiSHNAN 923
employees who contribute materially to the working: of a company and enable it
to effectively play its socio-econarnic role are equal, if not more important,
-,,/ partners in the running of the company and they must be heard io a proceeding
for 'windihg tip of the company. It was further urged ihat under L 34 of the
Comi>anies (Court) Rules, 1959 tbe employees have a right to appear at the
hearirig of a wioding·up petition either to· suppOrt or to ~ppose it.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the employees of a 8
company have no locus standi in a wiading-up petition as the Act does not
contain any provision conferring such a right on them ; that since the Act is a
Se1f·contained Code exhaustive in regard to all matters relating to a company, no
such right could be spelt out in their favour outside the provisions of the Act t
, that r. 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 does not confer such a right on
r thein and that, under the various provisions of the Act·includiog ss. 439 and 440J
it is only .the creditors and contributorie's and in certain specified contingencies, c
the Registrar and the Central Government, who are entitled to participate in ihe
proceedings for winding up of a coinpany. It was further coritendcd that in this
case it was not even the .eiilployees, but the three trada unioas, who had applied
for being heard, and since the trade union·s had no right to be heard, Jheir.
applications hild been rightly rejeCtCd.

Allowing the appeals, [)
;

HELD: By.Majority: Per Bhagwati, Chinnappa Reddy and Baharul Islam,
JI. (Yen.,:ataramiah and Amarendra Nath Sen, JI. dissenting):

The workers of a company ar~ entitled to appear at the hearing of the
winding-up petition whether to support or to oppose it. ."They have a lrJcus,standl
to appear and be beard both befQre .the petition ,is admitted and an order for R
advertisement is made as also after the admission and advertisement of the
petition unti! an order ·js made for winding up the company. The workers also
have a right of appeal against a winding up order. But when a winding-up order
has become final, the workers ordinarily would not have any right to participate
in any proceeding in -the course of winding up the company though there may be
rare cases where in a proceeaing in the 'CoiJrse of winding up, the interests of the
workers may be involved and iii such a case it may be possible to coniend that F
the workers must be h~ard before an order is made by ~ho co:.1rt. Even in an
application for appoiQtment of a provisional liquidator the workers have a right
to t:>e heard if they so wish but neither the petitioner in the winding up petition
nor the court is under any Obligation to give no1ice of such application to the
workers. (956 A-El

In the instant case the circumstarice that the workers were not ·1ipard by G
the Company Judge before he passed the order appointing the provisional
liquidator would not have the e:ffeet of vitiating the _order but it would be open to
the workers to apply to the court for vacating that order. (956 F-G]

(i). The ciiaking of a winding-up order on a petition for winding-up would
have an adverse cOnsequence on the Workers inasmuch as the continuance of
their servi~ would be ~criously jeopardised and their right to work and earn H
924 SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS {! 983) l S.C.R,

A their livelihood would be disastrously imperilled. It is an elementary principle
of law that no order involving adverse civil consequences can be passed against
any person without giving him an opportunity to be heard against the passiug of
such order. If the audi alteram partem rule has been held to be applicable in a
quasi-judicial or even in an administrative proceeding, it would a fortiori 'apply in
a judicial proceeding such as a petition for winding-a~ of a company. No system
Of law which is designed to promote justice through fair-play in action can permit
8 the court to make a winding-up order which has the effect of bringing about
termination of the services of the workers without giving them an opportunity of
being heard against the making of such order. Unless there is expre<Js provision in
the Act which forbids the workers from appearing at the hearing, the workers
must be held entitled to appear and be heard in the winding-up petition.
[950 A-E]
c;
StateofOrissav.Dr.BinaPani, [1967] 2 SC.R. 625;A.K. Kraipak v.
Union of lndia, (1970] 1 S.C.R. 457 and Maneka Gandhi v, Union of lndia, [1978]
'i S.C.R. 621 referred to.

(ii) There is no provision in the Act which excl~des the workCrs from
appearing at the hearing of a winding-up .petition. Merely because the right to
0 apply for winding up a company is not given to them it does .not fo11ow as a
necessary consequence that the workers have no right .to appear and be heared in
a winding-up petition filed by one or more of the persons specified in s. 439. In
fact, there- would be no point in conferring that right on the workers since they
cannot have any interest in demolishing the enterprise which is the source of their
livelihood. So also, the circumstance that the right to make applications or be
consulted in the course of the winding up of a company is conferred under s. 440
and other provisions of the Act only on the creditors and contributories does not
E "in any way militate against the right of the workers to appear and be heard in the
.winding·up petition. Once the winding~up order is made, the assets of the
company have to be realised, the creditors to be paid and if there is any surplus
it bas to be distributed among the contributories and, therefore, at that stage, it is
only the creditors and contributories who have an interest and that is why in the
course of the wiading up it is the creditors and contribiltories who have been
given a voice. Sections 440, 464, 466, 478, 517, 542, 543, 549, 556, 557 and 560
deal with a stage after the winding up bas commenced, These sections have
F nothing to do with the question whether the company should be wound up or
not. [950 F; 948 D-F; 951 B; 951 C-E; 949 A·H] .

(iii) After the amendment of ss. 397 and 398 of the Act by ss.10 and 11
of the Companies (Amendn1ent) Act, 1963, the court, while deciding whether a
company should be bound up, has to take into consideration not only the interest
of the shareholders and editors but also public interest in the shape of the need of
G the community and the interest of employees. It is therefore axiomatic that the
workers must have an opportunity of being heard for projecting and safeguard·
ing their interest before a winding-up order in made. [951 G: 952 B-F]

Jn the instant case, the Division Bench of the High Court, after conceding
H that the court had to take into consideration the interest of the workers, went
. wrong in holding that the workers had no locus standi to file an application for
being heard in the winding-up. petition. [952 G-Hi 953 A-B]
NATIONAL TEXTILES V. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 925

Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., A
(1981] 2 S.C.R. 52, referred to.

Bha/chandra Dharmajee Makaji and Ors. v. Alcock A.shdown and Co. Ltd.
and Ors., 42 Company Cases 190, approved.

(iv) It is true that according to the statement of law contained in the
.leading text books on Compan·y Law, it is only the Company, the creditors
and the contributories who are entitled to appear in a winding·UP petition and
·no other persons have a right to be heard. This statement of the law is based
'on a decision rendered by the English Courts over a hundred years ago when
a company was regarded merely as a legal device brought into being as a result
of a contractual arrangement between the shareholders for the purpose of carrying
on trade or business and the workers were lookec1 ..~upon as no more than
employees of the company working under a master and servant reJationsbip and c
the interest of the public as consumers or otherwise was a tota1ly irrelevant consi·
-'----· deratiOn. It can have no validit:Y in the present times when the entire concept of
' a company has changed. [953 F-H)

In re. Bradford Na,igatlon Company, [1870) 5 Ch. A.C. 600, held in'
applicable.
D
In re. Edwal"d Textiles Limited, 38 Con:ipany Cases 984, overruled.

(v) Our Constitution bas shown profound concern for the workers and
given them a pride of place in the new socio-economic order envisaged in the
Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy: Article 43A states that
the State shall take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way to secure the
participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishments or
E
other organisations engaged in any industry. The constitutioOat mandate
• is therefore clear and undoubted that the management of the enterprise should not
be left en.tirely in lhe hands of the suppliers of capital but the workers should 3.lso
be entitled to participate in it. In a socialist paitern of society the enterprise
which is a centre of econoril.ic power should be controlled not only by capital but
also by labour. It cannot therefore be conteaded that the workers should have
'no voice in the determination of the qUestion whether the enterprise should
F
continue to run or be shut down uri.der an order of the court. The workers who
have contributed to the building of the enterprise have every right to be beard
when it is sought to demol!sh that centre of economic power. [946 C; 947 l)...F]

Peop/e~s Uition for Democratic Rlihts v. Union of India and Ors. (W.P.
No. 8143 of 1981 decided on September 18, 1982) referred to. (i,

(vi) It is not only the shareholders who have supplied capital who are
interested in the enterprise which is being run by a company but the Workers who
supply labour are also '.]equally, interested· because what iS produced by the
enterprise is the result of labour 3s well as capital. Tbe owners of capital bear
... only limited financial risk and otherwise contribute nothing to production while H
labour contributes a major share of the product. While the former invest only a
part of their moneys the latter invest their sweat and toil ; in fact, their Jife itself.
926 stJPRBME COURT REPORTS

A The workers therefore have a special place in a socialistic pattern of society. They
are no more vendors of toil; they are not a marketable commodity to be pur-
chased by the owners of capital. They are producers of wealth as much as
capital ; they supply labour without which capital would be impotent.
[945 G-H: 946 A-BJ

(vii) The concept of a company has'uodergone radical transformation in
B the last few decades. The old nineteenth ,century view which regarded a company
merely as a legal device adopted by shareholders for carrying on trade or business
as proprietors bas been discarded and a company. is now looked upon as a sllcio..
economic institutio~ wielding economic power and influencing the life of the
people. The view that a company is the property of the shareholders can no
longer be regarded as valid. Apart from capital and labour there are other
factors which contribute to the production of national wealth; the financial
c itistitutions aud depositors who provide the additional finance required for pro·
duction· and the consumers and the re'it of the members of the community who
are vitally interested ill the product manufactured. A company, according to the
new socio-economic thinking, is a social institutiOn having duties and responsi~
bili!ies towards the community in which it functions and one of its paramount
objectives is to bring about ma"imisation of social welfare aad common good.
This necessarily involves reorientation of tbinking in regard to the duties and
D obligations Of the company not only vis-a-vis the shareholders but also vis-a-vis
the rest of the community affected by its operations such as workers, consumers
and the Government representing the society. [942 B; 943 A· G; 944 C-D]

Chlranjit Lal Chowdliri v. Union of lndia, (1950] S C.R. 869, referred to.
Panchmahal Steel Ltd. v. Universal Steel Traders, 46 Company Cases 706
E· approved.

per Chinnappa Reddy, J. (concurring) •
(i} Quite apart from _s. 445(3), it is plain that the future of the'workers is
at stake and their right to work is in jeopardy as a result of the presentation o(
the winding·up petition. The workers are so intimately ti~d up tbat their interest
in the survival and the well-being of the company is much more tban the interest
of any shareholder. They cannot be denied a beariog when thei; very existence
is under threat of extinction. [957 D-G]

(ii) It is not correct to say that natural justice is e"clusively a principle
of administrative Jaw. It is first a universal principle and, therefore, a rule of
administrative Jaw. Courts, even morrc than administrators, must obseive natural
G justice. [959 A-CJ

(iii) The Act does not prohibit a hearing to the workers. It ·does not
providC for all situations. The law ''falls to be applied tO a growing and changing
subject matter". The Company Judge must acknowledge the transformation
H which corporations are presently undergoing fr0m capitalist contrivances into
socialist instruments and recognize the ~eality of the workers' interest. The
NATIONAL TEXTILES. V. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 927
working classes, all the world over, are dCmanding "workers· control" and A
..I "industrial democracy". They want the right to work to be secured. ·our
Constitution has accepted the workers' entitlement to control and it is one of the
Directive Prin_ciples of State Policy. It_ is in this context of changing norms- and
waxing values that the workers' demand to be heard has to be judged.
• [957 G-H; 958 B-C-E-F-G]

(iv) The duty ·to hear those asking to be beard is not dependent on the B
vesting of any right under the very statute in respect of which jurisdiction is being
exercised by the Court but on any right whatever which may come under threat.
It is not the law that rights other than those created by a particular statute may
be taken awaY in proceedings under that statute without affording a bearing to
those desiring to be heard. [959 D-Bl

(v) It is not correct to say that once the workers are allowed to enter the
comPany court, the flood gates will be opened, all and sundry will join
c
in . the fray and utter .confusion will prevail. The court is the master of the
proceedings and the uitimate control is with the court. Parties may· not be
impleaded for the mere asking. The court may ask the reason why, if someone
asks to be heard. · [960 B·C]

(vi) The contention that since workers are· not allowed to intervene in a
partition or dissolution of partnership they should also not be ailowed to
D
intervene in a windiog-up petition cannot be accepted. There is no reason why
workers may not be allowed, in appropriate cases to intervene in such actions to
avert _disaster and to promote welfare". [960 D]

(vii) There is good reason for holding that In re. Bradford Navigation
Company is not valid in the present timeS. It was decided in the heydays of
laissez faire at a time when individualism dominated every field and the public
E
interest was but a slow runner. Now the position is reversed. In Britain itself
Corporate law and labour law have changed considerably. After nationalisation
of certain imp.ortant and crucial indu'stries a considerable measure of workers'
control of management of industry has been achieved in that country. One should
rather look to the ConstitutiOo for guidance and inspifation while interpreting the
Jaws. After the 42nd Amend1nent, the Constitution is openly Socialist. The
Directive Principles of State Policy emphasize the role and interest of the workers.
Art. 43A contemplates ·workers• participation in the management of the industry.
There are several provisions in the Act itself which take notice of the element of
public interest. There are other enactments like the Monopolies and Restrictive
• Trade Practices Act and the Industries Regulation ·and. Development Act under
-' whose provisions the activities of a company may be scrutinized in public interest.
There are legislations invcilving.emPloyment ond welfare of labour to which the
mailagements of the compan.ies are subject. The problem before the court must G
• be considered in this context of ferment and development.
[962 F; 961 G-H; 962 A-B; 960 G-H; 961 D·F]

In re. Bradford Navigation Company,· [1870] S Ch. A.C. 600, held in·
applicable.
H
Panchmahal Steel Ltd. v. Universal Stlel Traders, 46 Co'mpany Cases 706
approved. . .
928 SUPREME COURT JlEPOR'ft; [1983) I s.c.R.

A per Baharul Islam, J. (concurring)

The s!atcment of law contained in the English autborilies cited by counsel
for respondents may be good law for England with altogether a different system
of econon1y but it is not applicable in our country, particularly- after the Consti-
tution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, by which the "Socialist" and "Secular"
•
concepts have been incorporated- in the Preamble to our Constitution. The
B workers' right to be heard in a winding-up proceeding has to be spelt out from
the Preamble and Arts. 38 and 43-A of the Constitution and from the general
principles of natural justice. (990 D-FJ

per Venkalaramiah and Amarendra Nath Sen, JJ. (dissenting)

Under the existing law the workers or their unions may make any sugges-
0 tions to the Court at any stage but they cannot claim to be impleaded as parties
to the winding-up petition as of right. Tbe privilege of making suggestions to
the court in public interest is different from the right to be impleaded as a party
with the conco1nitant right to enter into c~ntest with the other parties and of
making an order in appeal before higher courts. Tlie latter right bas to be
conferred expressly by the statute in any person who wishes to exercise it. [979 D]
D
(i) The principles of administrative law have not much relevance to the
administration of the affairs of a company, the primary purpose of
administrative law being the imposition of checks on the powers of govern~
ment or its officers so .that they may not either abuse their powers or go
out of their legal bounds. In particular, the proceedings relating to winding-up
by court are subject to the orders of higher courts in appeal and are not amenable
~.!. to interference by superior cotlrts as in the case of actions of government or its
officern. (967 H, 968 A-BJ

(ii) The Jaw on the question as to who can be heard as of right in a
winding-up proceeding is clear and is based on the decision of the English Court
in In re. Bradford Navigation Company. The decision may be of the last century
but there is hardly any justilication to depart from it even now unless compelled /'-.-
by the statute to do so.(970 B-D; 971 E]

In re. Bradford Navigation Company, (1870] 5 Cll. A.C. 600 • referred
to. •
Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed.) Vol. 7 Para 1028 referred to.

G (iii) That only the company, creditors and contributories (apart from the
•
Central Government or the Registrar when they choose to intervene under the
express provisions of the Act) are entitled to participate in the windin&·up
proceedings is clear from s<>. 439, 447 and 557. Sections 450(2), 466, 478CI),
517, 518, 542, 543, 546(1), 549(1) and 556 show that only the Company. tho
official liquidator, liquidator, creditors, contributories oi' the Registrar have a
H statutory right to participate as of right in the winding up proceedings. The
4

work~rs or their trade unions have not been given any such right.
[969 C·D; 971 F; 972 E·H; 973 A-Fl
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 929

In re•. Edward Textiles Ltd., 38 Company Cases 284 apptoved.

(iv) 'Under s. 433, a co·mpany may ·be ·wound up by the court on one ·or
more of the following gtounds : (a) if the company !ta;, by special resolution,
resolved that it may be wound u·p.by court ; (ll) if default ls ;made m·delivetmg
the statutory report to -the Re'gistrar Or -in holding ther sio.tutory Ineeting ; (c) :i_f tbe
"Cotnpany does not comtneoce 'its busitiess Within a year from ·its incorporation, or
suspends its business for a whole year; (d) if the number of members iS reduced, B
in the case of .a public -company, below seven, and in the c8se of a private
compaoy, below two ; (e) i(tbe company is unable to pay its debts ; and (f) if tho
court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company -should be wound

• up. As regards the ground mentioned at (a), when a company has passed a special
resolution that it may be wound up by the court, the ·employees and workers
c8n have hatd(y any ground lo object. The pOstiiOn is the ·same when ahy of the
defaults mentioQed in (b) and (c) are coinmitted by the 'l!Ompany. ·The officers and c
empJoyees o-C the cO'mpany also ~fihot~ get over the deficiency in the reqU.ired
numbe'r pf members of a ·C<>fil}Jany tefe:rred.to in .(d) above. When a company is
unable to pay its debts and~ creditor moves a petition for winding-up under {C)
ilbove, he cannot be compelled ·tO prove his claim not merely -agatnst the company
but also against the officers and employees. When there . is a de8dtock ih the
• management -Of the company ariSing out of disputes amongst the directors or '
when some directors without 8.ny justi6c8tiOii ·exChldC some other directOts ftorb. D
the management,of the c~mpany and a petition for windin·g-up is filed under (f),
above, it would be unreasonable to expect the excluded directors to fight a case
both against the directors who are responsible for their exclusion and Riso against
the.officers and employees who 4re neither creditors nor ·contributories but who
may be supporting the contesting directors .. (968 H; 969 A-B; 969 F-H; 970 A-B]

In the instant case_.-it is seen from the grounds of objection filed by the E
trade unions that they are oiLly interested in supporting the cause of One set of·
> respondents against the other by making cert&.in general submissions. Tho
petitioners in the Company Petition would be in a more dis-advintageous position
if they have· to face the opposition of the trade unions also in addition to tho
respondents to that petition. Such a situation should not be created by extending
the area of controversy by a _liberal interpretation of the provisions of litw when
there are no compelling reasons to do so. [985 ,E-G] F

(V) There are spec;:ific provisions in the Act and the Rules (ss. 417 tO 420,
5JO(l)(b) to (f) and 635-B and r. 152 read with Form No. 67) dealing with the
rights of employees of a coaipany. The right to resist a winding-up petition is not
ODO such right. [975 D•EJ . .~
G
(vi) It js because of some doubts that had been expressed earlier 3boUt
the continuance or the empioyinent of the employees or a compilny ordered to bO
cOmpulsorily wound up that s. 445(3) waS enacted making it clear that the passirig
of the otder of winding-Up aiiiOurits to a notice of discharge of the Cil:iployCCs
concerned. Section 44~(3) cortesponds to the termination of SetviCe brollgbt.
about by the abolition or a p6st uodei' a Governin'ent or by the closil.re Of a H
bu$iness, ~either of which as the law stands today i-equires c;orqP--IH~n¢ with the
.. principles of natural justice. [915 Jl.Cj .
930 SUPREME CQUR1 REPORTS {1983] l S,C,R.

A (vii) It is true that public interest which may include within its scope
interests of employees of a company has to be kept in view by the courts in
exercising certain powers under the Act. Sections 388·B, 394, 396, 397 and
408 do refer to the concept of public interest. These provisions· deaI with the
powers of the Central Government and the Court. They ·do not, however,
state that trade unions can as of riaht intervene in the proceedings arising under
them. (975 F-H)
B
Bhalchandra Dharmajee Makoli and Ors. v. Alcock, Ashdown and Co. Ltd.
and Ors., 42 Company Cases 190 referred to.
i
Jn the instant case the High C.ourt has pa1sed necessary orders to protect
the interests of the employees. As these orders stand today, the workers can
c atw8ys approach the High Court by way or a company application for appropriate
orders whenever they feel that their working c·onditions are adversely affected
during the pendency of the proceedinas. It is not necessary that the workers or
the. tradc·unions should be impleaded as parties to the winding-up petition
enabling them to contest the same ; their presence on record is not necessary for
a complete and effectual adjudication of the petition. The trade unions are, there- •
fore, neither necessary nor proper parties to the winding-up petition on t.he facts
D and in the circumstances or this case including the element of public interest
involved in any liquidation proceeding. (985 H; 986 H; 987 A-CJ

(viii) In F•rtiliztr Corporation Kamgar Union (Rtgd.) Sindri and Ori. v.
'Union of India and·Or1., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 52 the court was concerned with opera-
tions in a public sector company and the activities of the government. The
observations contained therein cannot have any relevance to a case involving the
E affairs or a company which ia governed only by -the express provisions of company
law and other relevant statutes. [982 C]

(ix) As the Jaw stands today, the w·orkers in a factory owned by a
company do not have any hand in the birtl~ of a company, in it_s workingur ding
·its existence and also in its death by dissolution. Workers• participation in the
affairs of a company or the ushering in of an industrial'dernocracy is quite a
F laudable object. That is the reason for enacting Art. 43-A. Art. 43-A clearly
states that the State sb~ll take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way to
secure the participation of workers in the management of undertakings etc. The
High-powered Expert Committee on Companies and MRTP Act, has made certain
recommendations in this behalf in paragraphs 11.27 and 18.137 of its report and
it is for the Par1iament to take steps to implement them .. The legislature has not
taken concrete steps in this regard. The suggestions made by the committee
G em~h3size that at present workers have no right to contest winding-up proceed-
itigs. It is significant that there is no recommendation made even in this report
about tbe right of trade unions to contest winding-up petitions. The court cannot
siCP in and intrOduce drastic amendments into the company law. Many of the
Directive Principles ai'e still to be implemented by passing appropriate legislation.
This Court cannot compel the executive by issuing writs. to implement the policy
H Underlying them. There are well-recognized limitations on the power of the
court making inroads into the legitimate domain of the legislature. If the legiS-
lature ell~ee!;Js jt~ pt;>wer, this Court steps in. If the executive exceeds its power'
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 1)3j

then also this court steps in. If this court exceeds its power what can people do 1 A
Should they be driven to seek an amendment of the law on every occasion?- The
only Proper solution is the observance of re.~traint~by this court' in its pronounce.o
men ts so that they do not go beyond its own legitimate sphere. It may be that
the workers who ate likely to be affected by the winding-up need .a larger protec·
tion. That can be done only by legislative action. This Court cannot make any
order which will conflict with the existing law.
., . [982 G-H; 983 A; 977 E-F; 983 G; 983 B-D;i989 C] ,8
be
(x)' The P"roposition that law"should not -static but-shouldf8row.cannot
be disputed. But it should be' the result of the cxci:;cise of legislative judgmellt,
particularly when a departure from express provisioµs 9f a statute,or an establish-
ed p;actice is t~ be made." A discusSion iDvolving a:ucomprehensiVe view of all
interests whiCh are likely to be affected by any dedsion in such 3. matter
is not pvssible before a court where only the parties to; a Case or their lawyer~-, c
are heard. [987 D-F]

. . (xi) It is Dot correct to say that there is rio other. remedy at all for work-
men who.are likely to be affected by the winding-up order 'made by the court. It
is open to,the workers or their trade unions to mov¢ the. Central oOveromCot to-,
take. a'ppropriate steps under tho Industrial (Developlnent and-Regulation) Act,
1951 the provisions of which proVi4e that where a company owning an industrial'
D
undertaking is being wOund .itp by_ or under the supervision of-thC High Court
and the business of such comp8.ily is ndt beina continued, the Central GOv~rnmont
may investigate into the possibilit:Y of ru!lning or restarting the indus~rial
undertaking. provide relief to it or take steps to ensure that the undertakiD.g
is soid as a running concern. or prepare a sch~me. of reconstruction of the
CQmpany·and send it to the.trade unions of employees concerned inviting their'
suggestions and objections. · [976 A-H; 977 A-Cl E

(xii) "Wh!!n ~nee the right to 'contest a winding·up petition is exteitded to·
workers either o.n the principle of equi1Y or of administrative Jaw, on' the same .
principle it would logically follow that all others wh'o may have" dealings with the
company such as commission agents, ·selling agents. etc. whose contracts with tho
company are going to be terminated by-reason of its .liquidation also have to be
allowed to contest;·the proceedings.- Such a claim is not permissible. [974 BJ ..

Ex parte Maclure, [1870].L.R: S Cb. 737, referred to.

(xiii) It is no doubt true that the view of the High Court is also iri ~Con
for~ity with the view prevailing- in England .. That does not mean ·that the High
Court bas surrendered its judgment to a fo~igp. practice because that is the very G
view which is being followed till now in the Indian Courts. A foreign decision is'
either worthy of acceptance or nOt depending upon the reasons contained in it
and no.t its origin or agC. There· is no reason why we should not follow a well--
reasoned foreign decision unless it is opposed to our ethics, _trcidition and juris·
prudence or otherwise unsuited to our conditions. Moreover. it is difficult, even·
though it may not be impossible, to administer the company laW as it is now in H
force in India without the aid of the principles laid down by some of t_be leading
English cases. [987 H: 988 A-Fl '
932 StJPilBMil coiJllt REPORTs (1983) 1 s.c.R

A Needle Indullrles (India) Ltd, and Or>. v. Needle Industries Neway (India)
Holding Ltd. and Ors.,.[1981] 3 S.C.R. 698, referred to. · ·~

Per A.marendra Nath Sen, J. (agreeing with Venkataramiah, J .)

(i}, If. the right to panicipate in a winding-up proceeding is to be judged
!i'om the view-poi'nt of the interest of any party who may be prejudicially affected
B ' as a result of an 'order of winding·up being made, it must logically follow that not
Only every, employee of lhe company but also various other parties and· persons
who have 'trade relation~ or dealings with the company must necessarily.be held
t!) h~vo the same rig~t to be heard in such ~a proceeding; further; Iio suit for dis·
solution of a partnefsbip Can also be decided without impleadiog 'the employees •
) of' the firlrr and other parties having trade relations with th~ firm. '
c [992 A-E; 991 HJ

(i~) A c~mpany can only be wound up in accordance with the prov1s1ons
Qf the Act. The right to have a company wound-up is a right createci by the
statqte.. The entire pioceediog in relation· to the winding-up is governed by -the
pr~visions of tt~e Act and the Rules. The Act recog-niSes that a company may go
into·liqU.idation without any intervention by the Court and also undef the super-
'·
vision. of the court. Where the comp.any goes into liquidation without reference
0 tQ,coqrt~.the.~ploy~es of the company who have to meet the saine fate of losing·
tJ:teir employµ-aent cannot have any voice or say in the procedure to be adopted
fo; liqµidation of the company. i992 F-G; 993 B-C]

(iii) The right of-appearance-and of being· heard in. a winding-up pro-
ceeding has 'Jecn conferred on persons whom the legislature considered to.be·
E necessary or proper parties for effective adjudication of the proceeding before the
"
®:Urt. Jf. a company is.commercially insoJvent and is Unable to. pay its.debt.s, it
ll'5. qeqessar~ly to be wound up and the employees can have bar_dly anything to
a,ay in.sue~ a case for.. ass_i$ting ibe court in.deciding the m~tter.. [993 B-0]

. (iv) Although an employee·cannot claim·to appear and be heard. in: a ,.
winding-up petition as a matter-or right, the court-may, in any. appropriate case, /-
require or permit any em"loyce to appear at any stage of a winding up proceed-
ing and he3.r him, if it is of the opinion that it' is necessary in the· interest of
administration of justice and for proper disposal of any matter. [998 H; 999 A]

(v) The legislature bas made suitable provisions in the Act -for safe·
' 8\larding _w~at is cpnsidcrcd to be in the interest of einployecs or in public interest.
G The introduction of Art. 43A in the Constitution does not affect the position in
any.wiiy, Participation in. the management does not by itself create any right to
app~ar Rnd be hea_~d in a windjng-:up_ petition. Unless otherwise named per-
son'a~ly, as~ a paity to. sucJi. a petition, no person, merelY on the grouod·tbat·be
h~ppens tQ be in the manageo.ient of the company, is entitled to appear and· be
.....
heard in a_ winding-up_proceediog. Perso.ns in management-may, if so authorised,
H appCar and particiPate in such a proceeding on behalf of. the company.
. [995 D; 995·E-H]
NATIONAL TEXTILES v.. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 933

(vi) The Indian and the English, Companies Acts contain simita'r pro- A
visions. As early as in 1870 the English court held that no perSQD had a right to
be, heard against a petition for winding-up of. a company except creditors and
contributoriCs. Thit -decision still_holds good and is considered good Ja.w .. The
English Act has undergone_ changes from time to time with the paisfng- or various
ICgislations for the. benefit and . welfare of employees. An order 'winding up a
company. affects the employees in_ England in the sa·me way as it does in India. It
canoe! be said that wofkers in England 8re nOt conscious of· the imi:>Ortant role B
they P,iay in the functioning Of a companY. . Despite all ·these, the right Of an
· employee' or any trade union representing the workers to participate and be hea.rd
in a wiriding-up petition is not r'ecogni'sCd in England. Even.. ib our country,
though ttie provisions of the Act have undergone chatiges and various enactments
tor the .W~lfare of the workers hay~ been· passed from .rihie·tc,- tiiile, the tCgislature
has not coli1idered' it 'proper or necessary to amend the Act to confer arty· such
right ori the worktrs. [996 A-IY; 996 H; 997 A:-B; 998 F] ' ·' C
In " Bradford Navigation Company, [1870] S' Ch. A.C. 600, referred fo.
of
Halshury's Laws England (4th Ed.) Vol. I!Cp. 614 ;-Palmer's Company.
Preccdeots,(7th Ed.) Part 11, p. 77 and Buckley on the Companies Act, (14th Ed.)
Vol. l,,p. 546 referred to.'
Hind Qve;seas Private Ltd. v. Raghunath frasad Jhunjhunwala and~Or1., D
[1976) 2 S.C ,R. 226, distinguished.

2. By majOritY : Per Bhagwati~ Chinnappa Reddy and· Baharul l'la;n;_ JJ.
( Venkataramiah ditd A'marendra Nath Sen, JI. diS$enting) : -Trade· unions are
competent- to-make applicatiOns before 'the-·Compa.ny Judge hearing· a winding-up
petition on behalf of the workers i'epresented:-by tbent · [9'56 H]
E
Jn tbis·~case the a"pplitatiOns Were made by, the unions -on behalf of the
~orkmen represented by them .and though made in the name of the Union~ the
applications were in reality and substance applications of the workmen who were
members. of each respective Union. The controversy therefore really is not
whether the unions of ~o_rk~en arc entitled'tO be heard in a winding-up petition
brit Wliether the workmen bave sucli rfg~t when a winding-Up petition is. filed F
against a company, [939'0-H]
'
PlT Venkataramiah and Amarendra Nath Sen; JJ. (dissenting) : In none
of the English text books on Compar..y Law.-tbcre is any statement tb·tliC effect
that trade unions of officers and employees of a company for whose winding-up a
· petition is filed would. be entitled as of right to be impleaded as parties and to G
contest the petition. It is not. also shown that any such right of a ·trade union is
recognised by the Indian LaW "wliich more or less correspondS to English Law in
this regard. The decision of the Bombay High· Court in In ,.e Edward Textiles· Ltd.
is a Clear authority for the propositioD that at any rate trade unioos have no
locus standi to op}lose a· windibg-up petition. - We shall proceed to· decide this
case on the assumption that the application, for, impleadiog wa;:; made in fact on H
behalf of the workers and not by the trade uriions. [968 C-F]
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] .I s.c.e.

A In re Edward Textiles Ltd., 38 Company Cases 284, referred to.

3. By the Full Court: Rule 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959
·does not confer a right on the workers to appear at the bearing of a winding-up
petition. [955 G; 973 G; 994 E-F]

per Bhagwati, Chinnappa Reddy and Baharul Islam, JJ. : The object and
B purp~se of r. 34 is not to confer a right on anyone to appear at the hearing of
the winding-up petition but merely to provide for the procedure to be followed
before a person who is otherwise entitled to appear in a winding-up petition can
be heard in support of or in opposition to the winding-up petition. [955 F]

Per Venkataramiah, I: The words "every ' person" in r. 34 o( the
•
c . Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 do not entitle a worker who is neither a share-
holder nor a cont~ibutory to support' or oppose a winding-up petition under that
rule because they refer only to a person who is otherwise entitled to do so un<ler
the Act. An anamotous result that may flow from the acceptance of the case of
the workers is that whereas in a winding-up by court they may get an opportunity
to contest the petition, the voluntary winding-up -proceedings or winding-up under
the supervision of the coUrt would go on without any such contest although in alt
D cases ultimately the workers will be discharged from service. A construction which
· leads to such a discriminatory result should be avoided. [973 G-~; 974 A]

per Amarendra Nath Sen, J, : RUie 34 only lays down the-procedure to be
followed by any Person who intends to be heard at the beadng of a petition; it
does not deal with the right o( any person to appear at the hearing nor d~es it
create any such right in any person. Rule 9B in part Ill of the Rules makes
E specific provision in that behalf. [994 E-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals .Nos. 4065-67
of 1982.

Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated
F 30.11.81 and 14.9.1981 of the Madras High Court in O.S.A. No. 148
of 1981 and Company Appeal Nos. 880-881 of 1981.

M.K. Ramamurthy, · Somyaji, Ambrish Kumar, Miss Nitya
Ramakrishnan for the Appellants in CA. No. 4065/82.
G
.G.Vasanta Pai, S.N. Kacker, O.C. Mathur and D.N. Mishra
for the Respondents in CA. 4065 of 1982 and for the Appellants in
CA. Nos. 4066-67/82.
'>·
H R.K. Garg, A.T.M. Sampath and P.N. Ramalingam for the
Appellants in CA. Nos. 4066-67 /82.
NATJONAL TEXTILES •• P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 935

. V.M. Tarkunde, E.G. Aggarwala, R. Salish, V.K. Pandia and A
T.S. Vishwanath Rao for the Respondent Nos. 6-9 and 11·14 in CA.
Nos. 4066-67 of 1982.

O.C. Mathur, · Ravinder Narain and D.N. Mishra for the
Resl?ondents in ~.A. 4065 of 1982.
B
M. Natesan ·and M. Raghuraman for the Intervenor.

The following Judgments were delivered

'
BHAGWATI J. The•e three appeals by special leave raise a
;ho rt but interesting question of law relating to the right of workmen c
employed in a conipany to appear and oppose a petition· for winding
. up of the company. The controversy between the parties arises out
of a petition for winding up· a private limited company called
Ramakrishna Indusiries (P) Limited (hereinafter referred to as a
'company). The Company' has three units, one a textile mill in the '
D
name of Jotie Mills which employs about 500 workmen, another, a
workshop for manufacture of textile and other machinery which
employs about 400 workmen and the third a printing press which ·
brings out a Tamil daily, called "Nav India" and employs about
100 workmen. It is a closed company in which there are two
groups of 'shareholders, one gronp consisting of respondent Nos. 1 l!l
to 5 and the other· consisting of respondent Nos. 7 to 14. Respondent
Nos. I to 5 hold ·608 shares and respondent 'nos. 7 to 14 687 sharea
while the remaining 300 shares belong to a Trust in which both the
groups are .equally represented on the Board of Trustees. It appears
that a serious dispute arose between Respondent nos. 1 to 5 on .tbe
one band and Respondent nos. i to 14 on the other in regard to the F
management of the affairs of the company and since the dispute
could not be settled amicably, Respondent nos. I to 5 filed a petition
for winding up the Company on two grounds set out in cl_auses
(e) and (f) of section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956. One ground
was that the Company is unable to pay its debts and the other was
that'it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound up.
G
The winding up petition ·was filed by Respondent nos. I to 5 not
only as contributories but also . as creditors of the Company ..
,, Immediately on fil.ing the winding up petition on 13th July 1981,
Respondent nos. I to 5 submitted an application, being company H
application no. 844 of 1981, for an interim injunction and on this
application; an ex parte order was niade by the learned Company
936 SUPREME COURT IUIPOa:ts [19831 I S.C.R;
A Judge restraining the Company which was respondent no. 6 in the
winding up petition as als~ Respondeni nos. 7 to 14 from borrowing
any monies from bank.s, financial institutions or others without the
prior permission ·of the Court and from. alienating and/or creating
any charge or· encumbrance over any of the assets of the Company
in its various enterprises. The immediate consequence of this ex
B parte order of injunction was that the Jotie Mills Employees Co-
. operative Store stopped issuing any provisions or supplies to the
workmen from 18th. July 1981 and the workmen were also unable
from 23rd July 1981 to enjoy the benefits under the Employees State
Insurance Scheme. The workmen also apprehended that on account
c of the ex parte order of injunction, they may not be able to get
their wages which were due to be paid on 7th August 1981. Now
some of the workmen were mem_bers of the National Textile Workers
'Union, some others were members of the Coimbatore District
Nation.al Textile Employees Union, while still some others were
members of the Coimbatore District Engineering Workers Union,
D . The Coimbatore Districi National Textile Employees Union with a
view to protecting the interests of its members made an application,
being company application no. 880/8i on 28th July 1981 for
· impleading itself. as a respondent. The Coimbatore District
En.gineering Workers Union also made a similar application to the
Company Judge on the same day, being Company Application
E No. 881 of 1981. So also the National Textile Workers Union
made an application, being company application no. 883 of 1981, '.
to the Company Judge on 29th July 1981 praying that it may be
permitted to intervene in the winding up petition and that the ex
parte order of injunction may be vacated. Respondent· nos. 1 to S
filed their affidavit in reply to these three applications and the
. principal con1ention raised by them was that the National Textile r
/
Workers Union, the Coimbatore District National Textile Employees
-Union and the Coimbatore District 'Engineering Workers ·Union
had no locus standi. to appear and oppose the winding up petltioo,
since the workmen who were. members of these three unions were
neither creditors nor contributories of the company. These three
G applications came up for hearing. before the Company Judge and.
after hearing full arguments on both sides, the Company Judge made
~n order dated 14th September 1981 rejecting. all the three applica·
tions on the ground that under the Companies Act 1956, the work-
men had no right either io get impleaded in the winding up petition
H pr even to intervene in· the winding up petition. The Company Judge
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 937

followed the decision of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court A
in In re Edward Textiles Limited(') in taking this view. The Company
Judge conceded and this concession had to be made hecause of .the
observatfons of this Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors:(') and of the High Court of
Bombay in Bhalchandra· Dharamaji Makajiv .. Alcock Ashdown and
_Co. Ltd.(') that the factors to be taken into account by. the court B.
while disposing of a winding up petition would include the interest
of the workmen of the company, but observed that "tlie duty of the
'. . court to consider the interest of the worker ~f the company would
,,,..--
.
not create a right in such workers to intervene in the. absence of
express provision in the Companies Act and in the teeth of such
Cl
~ right specifically conferred only on the creditors and contributories."
The National Textile Workers Union thereupon preferred an
a
appeal before Division Bench of the High Court but the Division
Bench also took the same view and held that tliough it was /
undoubtedly true that while disposing of a winding ~p petition
preferred en the ground that it is just• and equitable to wind
up the company, the court must consider the interest of the work-
D
men, it does not mean "that everybody who is remotely interest-
ed in the company can file an application to implead himself as a
party in the petition for winding up" and "merely because 'in·
considering the question whether to wind up or not the court has
also to take the larger point of public interest including that of the E
workers into consideration, ·it will not clothe the Unions with any
locus siandi to file applications for impleading themselves as parties ·
or to be heard in the company petition." The Division Bench
accordingly rejected the appeal and this led to the filin ~ of Special ·
Leave Petition No. 9661 of 1981 in this Court by the National
'\. Textile Workers Union. The Coimbatore District National Textile F
"~- Employees Union and the Coimbatore District Engineering Workers
Union did not prefer any . appeal against the judgment of the·
Company Judge before the Division Bench of the· High Court biit
they preferred Special Leave Petitions Nos. 10248 and 10249 of 1981
directly in this Court against the judgment of the Company Judge;
We issued notice on all the three Special Leave Petitions and when G
.- the Respondents appeared ·before us, we intimated to them that we
will dispose of the entire controversy ·between the parties on the
Special Leave Petitions and that is how full and detailed argume11\&

(I) 38 Company Cases 284. ll
(2) [1981] 2 SCR 52.
(3J 42 Company Cases 190.
938 SUPllBME COURT llBPORTS [1983) 1 s.C.k.

were advanced before us at the hearing of the Special Leave
Petitions. We now proceed to dispose of these cases after granting
special leave to appeal in each of the three special leave petitions.
\
Before ~c proceed to discuss the basic and vital question that
arises for consideration in these appeals; ft is necessary to set out
B a few further facts which may have some bearing on the final relief ·
to be granted by us. On the same day on which respondent Nos. l
to 5 filed the winding up petition and applied for interim injunction,
they also made an application, being Company Application No. 843
of 1981, praying for appointment of Provisional Liquidator of the
. company. Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 appeared at the time when
c. this applicatfon was presented and asked for , time ·to file their
affidavit in reply and time was granted by the Company Judge up to
10th August, 1981.. Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 thereafter filed an
affidavit in reply on I 0th August, 1981 and after hearing both sides
in a bitterly contested argument, the Company Judge made an order
on· 7th December 1981 appointing the official liquidator as Provi-
sional Liquidator of the Company. The workmen represented by
D the National Textile Workers' Union, the Coimbatore District
National Textiles Employees' Union and the Coimbatore District
Engineering \V orkers' Union did riot have an opportunity of being
heard before the order appointing Proyisional Liquidator was'passed
by the Company Judge, because as pointed out above, their applica-
tions for impleading themselves as parties in the winding up petition
E or in any event, for being allowed to intervene in the winding up
petitions were rejected by the Company Judge on 14th Septeniber,
1981 and this rejection was confirmed by the Diyision Bench of the
High Court on 30th September 1981. The result was that the order
appointing Provisional Liquidator of the company came to be inade
by the Company Judge without any opportunity being given to the
F workmen represented by these three Unions to appear and show
~ause against the making of such order. It may be pointed out
_that the order appointing Provisional Liquidator was stayed for some
time by the Division Bench of the High Court in an appeal preferred
by respondent Nos. 6 to 14 but the application for stay • was
·ultimately dismissed by the Division Bench and the Official. •
· Liquidator immediately thereafter took charge of the -affairs of the
company.

H We may now proceed to consider the question that arises for
determination before us, The question, briefly stated, is : when a
NATIONAL TEXTILES, v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 939

petition for winding up a company is filed in court, are the workmen A
of the company entitled to ask the court to implead them as· parties
in the winding up petition or to allow them to apppear a!ld contest
the winding up petition or they' have no locus standi ai all so far·as
winding up petition is concerned and they must helplessly watch the
proceedings as outsiders though the result of the winding up petition
may be to bring about termination of their services and thus affect
them vitally by depriving them of their nieans of livelihood.? It is
a· well established principle of administrative law that uo order
entailing adverse civil consequences can be made by the State or a
public authority unless the person affected is afforded an opportunity
to show cause against the making of such order by controverting the
allegations made against him and presenting his own positive case, c
but in case of, a winding up petition, it was contended on behalf of
respondents Nos. 2 to 5, that though the result of successful termina-
tion of a winding up petition may, and in most cases, would be to
put an end to the services of the workmen and throw them on the
streets, tliey are not entitled to an opportunity to be heard against
D
the making of the winding up· order, because under the Companies
Act 1956, it is only the creditors and contributories and in certain
specified contingencies, the Registrar and the Central Government
who can present a petition for winding up. a company and the
workmen have no locus at all in a winding up petition except where
their dues have remained unpaid in which case they would be
entitled to be heard in a winding up petition, but that would be in
their capacity as creditors and not as workmen. It was also ·urged
on behalf of respondent Nos. I to 5 that in any event, even if work-
men have a right to intervene in a winding up petition in the present
case, it was not the workmen who had applied for being heard in
the'winding up petition but the applications were made by the three F
·unions and since a Union of workmen has no tight to be heard,
the. applications of the three unions were rightly rejected. . This last
contention of respondent Nos .. 1 ·to 5 is obviously untenable and it
need not detain us. It is incontrovertible-and this .indeed· could
not be disputed on behalf of respondent Nos. I to 5-that the
applications were made by the Unions on behalf of the workmen G
' represented by them and though made in the name of the unions, ·
the applications were in reality and substance · appli9ations of the
7 workmen who were members of each respective union. The
controversy therefore really is not whether the unions of workmen
·are entitled to be heard in a. winding up petition but whether the
workmen have such right when a winding up petition is fi!ed against
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1983] I S.C.R.

A a company. We may straight away point out that though the
applications made by. the Coimbatore District National Textile
Employees and Coimbatore District Engineering Workers Union
were for impleading them as parties in the winding up petition, it
was conceded on behalf of these two unions that they were not
pressing their applications for being added as parties, because there
B was no procedure known to Companies Act 1956 for any one to be
impleaded as a party in a winding up petition and even the creditors·
and contributories were not entitled to be added as parties and they
were claiming only the right to appear and be heard.in support or
· opposition to the ·winding up petition. The contention of these two ·-
c unions was therefore a limited one and that was also the narrow
contention advance_d on behalf of National Textile Workers' Union,
namely, that the workmen represented by them were entitled to
intervene in the winding up petition and to be heard before any
order was made by the Company Judge in the winding up petition,
because arty such order might affect the interest of the workmen. It
0 was pointed out on behalf of the three un.ions that even if an
interim order were to be made by the Company Judge which might
prejudicially affect the workmen by freezing the resources of the
company so as to make it difficult. for the company to pay the
wages of the workmen or bringing about stoppage of the business
of the company resulting in non-payment or diminution of their
wages or· termination of their services,. the workmen must surely
be afforded an opportunity to be beard before any such interim
order is made. lt would be contrary to every recognised· principle
offair judicial procedure and violative of the rule of dudi alteram
par/em which constitutes one of the basic principles of natural
justice, to deny to the workmen the right to be heard before an
F order is made by the Company Judge prejudicially affecting their
interest. Additionally, reliance was also plaoed on behalf of the
three unions on Rule 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules 1959 which
provides as follows :

G "Rule 34. Notice to be given by persons intending to appear
at the hearing of petition-Every- person, who
intends to appear at the hearing of a petition,
whether to support or oppose the petition, shall
serve on the petitioner or his advocate, notice
H of his intention at the address given in the
advertisement. ;The notice shall contain the
address of .1uch person, and be signed by him
l'
NATIONAL tBXTILBS v. P.R. ilAMAKRiSHNAN (Dhagwati, J.) 941

or his advocate; and save as otherwise provided A
by these rules shall be served (or if sent by post,
shall be .posted in such tinie as to reach the
addressee) not later than two days previous to·
the day of hearing, and in the case of a petition
for winding ·up·not later than live days previous
to the day of hearing.' Such notice shall lie in
Form No. 9; with such variations as the .circum-
stances may require, and where such person
intends to oppose the petition, the grounds of
his opposition, or a copy of his affidavit if any,
shall be ·furnished along with 'the. notice. Any
person who has failed to comply with this rule G
shall not except with the leave 'of the Judge,
' be. allowed to appear at the .hearing of the
petition." .

The argument urged on behalf of the. three unions was that this D
rule confers a right on the workmen to appear at the hearing, of the ·
winding up petition either to support it or to oppose it arid clearly
I
recognises that they are entitled to intervene and. be beard in the
winding up petition. Respondent Nos. I to 5 however seriously
challenged the locus of the workmen to appear and be ·heard in the
·winding up 'petition and contended ~hat so far as the winding up E
petition is concerned, it is only the creditors and contributories and
in certain specified contingencies the Registrar and the Central
Government who are entitled to ~ppear at the hearing of the. winding
up petition whether to support or to oppose it. The right to be
heard in .the winding up petition, contended respondent Nos. 1 t~ 5
is governed solely by the provisio.ns of the Companies Act 1956 and F
since no such right is conferred on the workmen by any provision -
of the Companies. Act 1956, the workmen are. not entitled t\l
intervene in the winding up petition, even though the making of a •
winding up ord~r may result in termination of their services. ·The
workmen, according to respondent Nos. 1 to 5, could appear at the
hearing of the winding up petition and make their submissions only G
.J
in their capacity as creditors if any part of their wages remained
unpaid. by the ·company but they had no locus to. appear in thei~
capacity as workers .. These, rival contentions urged on behalf of the
parties raised an interesting question of law which we shall now
proceed to consider. ·
H
ti9~3l i s.c.il.

A There is one very importani consideration which we must bear
in mind while dealing with this question and it is necessary to advert
to it at the present stage. The concept of a company ha• undergone
. radical transformation in the last few decades. The traditional view
of a company was that it was a convenient mechanical device for
carrying on trade and industr¥, a mere legal frame work providing
B a convenient institutional container for holding and using· the
powers of company management. The company law was at that
time conceived merely as a statute intended to regulate the structure
and mode of. operation of a special type .of economic institution
called company. This was the view which prevailed for a long "time
in juristic circles all over the democratic world including United
c States of America, United Kingdom and India. That was the time ----~
when the doctrine of laissez faire held sway and it dominated the
political and economic scene. This doctrine glorified the concept
of a free economic ·society in which State. intervention in social and
economic matters was kept at the lowest possible leveL But gradually
- this doctrine was eroded by the emergence of new social values
0 which recognised the role of the State as an active ·participant in the
social ·and economic life of the citizen in order to bdng about·
general welfare and common good of the community. With this
change m socio-economic thinking, the developing role of companies
in modern economy and their increasing impact on individuals and
groups, through the ramifications of their activities, began to be
E increasingly recognised. It began to be realised that the company
is a species of social organisation, with a life and dynamics ofits
own and exercising a significant power in contemporary society. The
new concept of corporate responsibility transcending the limited
traditional views about the relationship between management and
shareholders and embracing within its scope much wider groups
F ,/
affected by the trading activities and other connected operations of
companies, emerged as an important feature of contemporary
• thought on the role of the corporation in modern society. The
adoption of the socialistic pattern of society as the ultimate goal of
·the country's economic and social policies hastened the emergence
G of this new concept of the corporation. The socio-economic
objectives set out in Part IV of the Constitution have since guided
and shaped this new corpJrate philosophy. IWe shall presently refer
to some of the Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Part
IV which clearly' show the direction in which the corporate sector
H is intended to move and the role which it is intended to play in
•
the social and economic life of the nation. But, one thing i3 certain
\

NATIONAL lEXTILES v. P.R.. RAMAKRiSHNAN ·(Bhagwati, J.) 943.
that the old ninteerith century view which regarded a company A
merely as a legal device adopted by shareholders !or carrying on
trade or business as proprietors has been discarded and a . company
0
is now looked upon as ~ socio-economic instiiution wielding
economic power and influencing·the life of the people.

"It is now accepted on all hands, even in predominantly
capitalist countries, !hat a company is not property. The traditional
view that the company is the property of the shareholders is now
an exploded myth. There was a time when a group controlling· the
majority of shares in a company used to say : "This is our concern.
We can do what we like with it." The ownership of the concern was.
c
identified with those who brought in capital. That was the outcome
of the property-minded capitalistic s'ociety in. which the concept ·of
company originated. But this view can no longer be regarded as
valid in the light of the changing socio-economic concepts and
values. Today social scientists and' thinkers regard a COm,£any as D
a living, vital and dynamic, social organism with firm and deep
rooted affi!iati.ons with the rest of the community in which it
functions. It would be wrong to.look upon it as something belonging
to the shareholders. It is true" that the shareholders bring capital,
but capital is· not enough. It is only one of the factors which
contributes to the production of national wealth. Taere is another E
equally, if not more, important factor of production and that is
labour. Then there are the financial institutions.and depositors,
wh'o provide the additional finance required for production and
lasily; there are the consumers and the rest of the members of the
community who are vitally interested in the product manufactured
in the concern. Then bow can it be said that capital, which is only F
one of the factors of- production, should be regarded as owner ~
having an exclusive· dominion over the concern, as if the concern
belongs to it? A company, according to the new socio-enconomic
thinking, is a social institution having duties and responsibilities
'
. . .
towards the community in which it functions.· The ·supreme :Court
pointed out as far back as 1950 in Chiranjeetlal v. Union of India ;
. .
G

"We should bea;g-mind that a corporation, .which i~
engaged in production of commodities vitally essential I()
the community, has a social character of its 'own and it ,
must not be regarded as the concern primarily or only of
those who invest their llloney in it.'' ·
944 SUPR8ME CouRt REPORTS [1983] I S.C.R.

A Pt. Govind Ballabh Pant also pointed out in one of his speeches :

" ... industry is not an isolated concern of the share-
holders or the managing .agents alone. It reacts on the
entire people in the country, on their economic conditions,
on employment or standard of living, on everything that
8 conduces to the material well being." ·

The same view was also expressed at the International Seminar on
Current Problems of Corporate Law, Management ·and Practice
held in New Delhi where it was observed that "an enterprise is a
c citizen. Like a citizen it is esteemed and judged by its actions in
relation to the community of which it is a member as well as by
its economic performance." That is why it is regarded as one of the
paramount objectives of a company .to bring about maximisation of
social welfare and commQ_n good .. This necessarily involves re-
orientation of thinking in regard to the duties and obligations ·of a
D compmy not only vis-a-vis the shareholders but also vis-a·vis the
rest of the community affected by its operations such as workers,
consumers and the Government representing the society. There was
at one time a serious controversy between two schools of thought,
one repr~sented by Adolf Berle and .the other by Professor Dodd,
as regards the nature of duties and obligations owed by directors
E representing management of a company. Adolf Berle took the view
that directors are trustees only for sha,reholders-that is the traditional \
view which directly flows from a purely capitalistic approach which
identifies ownership and dominion with capital-while Prof. Dodd
believed that directors are trustees not only for shareholders but
also for the entire ·community. Ultimately, however, in his subse-
F quent book, "Twentieth Century Capitalist· Revolution", Adolf Berle' /
conceded that Prof. Dodd was right and that modern directors are
not limited· to running business enterprise for maximum profit
motive alone, but are in fact administrators of community system
or of a social institution. That is why we find that in recent times
G , there is considerable thinking on the subject of social responsibilities
of corporate ma'nagement and. it is now acknowledged even in highly.
developed countries like the United States and England that maxi·
misation of social welfare should be tire' legitimate goal of a company
and shareholders should be regarded not as proprietors of the
company, but merely as .suppliers of capital entitled to no more
than reasonabl~ return and the company should be responsible not
only to shareholders but also to Workers, consumers and the Other
NATIONAL TEXTILES v P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 945

members of the Community and should be guided by considerations
of national economy and progress. This new concept of a Company
was felicitously expressed by Desai, J. sitting as a Judge of the
Gujarat High Court in Panchmahal Steel Ltd. v. Universal Stee(
Traders(') in the following wnrds :

· "Time-honoured approach that the compan}" law must B
safeguard the interest . of investors and shareholders of the
company would be too rigid a framework in which it can
now operate. New problems call for a fresh approach. And
/ in ascertaining and devising this fresh approach, the objec-
tive for which the company is formed may provide a guide
· line for the direction to be taken. As Prof. De Wool of
c
Belgium puts it, the company has _a three-fold reality-
economic, human and public-each with its own internal
logic. The reality of the company is ~uch broader than
that of an-association of capital; it is .. a human working
community that . performs a collective action for the ·
common good. In recent years a debate is going on in the
world at large on the functions and foundations of corpo-
rate enterprise. The ''preservationists" and the ''reformers'' o_
are vigorously propounding their views on the possible
reform of company; the modern trend emphasising the
public interest in corporate enterprise.''

Tlie learned judge elaborated this ·"modern trend" by quoting from
Prof. Gower's. book on "The Principles of Modern Company Law" :
"One section of the community whose interests as such are not
' -
afforded any ptotection, either under this head or by virtue of the
provisions (or investor or . creditor protection, are the workers and F
_employees -0f the taken-over company. This is a particularly uµfor-
tunate facet of tbe principle that the interest of the company' means
only the interest of the members and not of those whose livelihood
·is in practice much more closely involved."

We are concerned in these appeals only with the ·relationship G
of the workers vis-a-vis the company. It is clear from what we have
stated aGove that it is not only the _shareholdets who have•supplied
capital who are interested in the enterprise which is being run by a
company but the workers who supply labour are also equally H
u) 46 Company Cases 706.
,
946 SliPRllME COURt REPORTS [!\)Sj] 1 s.c.R

A interested because what is produced by the enterprise is the result of
labour as well as capital. In fact, the owners of capital bear only
limited financial risk and otherwise contribute nothing to production \ ...
while labour contributes a major share of the product While the
former invest only a part of their moneys, the latter invest their
. , sweat a_nd toil, in fact their life itself. The workers ther~fore have a
B ' special place in a· socialist pattern of society. They are no more
vendors of toil, they are not a marketable commodity to be purchased
by the owners of capital. They are producers of wealth as much as
capital. They· supply labour without which capital would be_impotent
and they are, at the least, equal partners with capital in the enterprise.
Our constitution bas shown profoubd concern for 'the workers and
c given them a pride of place in the new socio-economic order envisa·
ged in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy.
The Preamble contains the profound declaration pregnant with
meaning and,hope for millions of peasants and workers that India
shall be a socialist democratic republic where social and economic
justice will inform all institutions of national life and there. will be
D equality of status and ·opportunity for all and every endeavour shall
be made to promote fraternity ensuring the dignity of the individual.
Every one is assured under Article 14 equality before the law and
equal protection of the laws and implicit in.this provision is the
guarantee of equal remuneration for men and women for some work
or work of a similar nature. Traffic in human beings and begar and
E other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited under Article 23
and Article 24 mandates that no child below the age of 14 may be
e~ployed ·in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous
employment. These two Articles recently came up for construction
before this Court in People's Union/or Democratic Rights & Ors.
v. Union of India.& Or~.( 1 ) Article 38 imposes obligation on the
F
·state, albeit unenforceable in a court pf law, to "strive to promote
the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as
it may a social order in which social justice shall inform all the
institutions of the national life". This is followed by Article 39
which inter alia obliges the State to direct its policy towards securing
G that the citizens, men and women equally have the right to an
adequate means of livelihood, the ownership and control of the
material resource·s of the community are so distributed as best to
subserve the common good, the operation of the ec~~omic system

.H
(1) decided on 18th September 1982 (W.P. No 8143of1981).
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. p .R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 947

does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of pioduc- A
.-..: ' . tion to the common detriment, there is equal pay for equal work
for both men and women and the.health and strength of .workers,
men and women and the tender age of children are not abused and
citizens are not forced by ·economic necessity to enter avocations
unsuited to their age or strength. The State is directed by Article
41 to make effective provision, within the limits·of its economic B
capacity and development, for securing the right to work and Artfole
42 requires the State to. make provision for securing just and
humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 43
provides that the . State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable
legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, a Ii ving
wage, conditions of work ensuring decent standard of life and full
c
enjoyment of leisure .and social. and cultural opportunities. Then
follows Article 43A which is intended to herald industrial democracy
and in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. mark "the end of industrial
bonded labour". That Article says that the State shall take steps,
by suitable legislation or in any other way,' to secure the participa- D
tion of workers in the management of undertakings, establishments
or other organisations engaged in any industry. The constitutional
mandate is therefore· clear and undoubted that the management o
the enterprise should not be lefi entirely in the hands of the suppliers
of capital but the workers should also be entitled to participate in
it, because in a socialist pattern of society, the enterprise which is a E
centre 9f economic power should be controlled not.only by capital
b~t also by labour. It is therefore idle to contend thirty two years
after coming into force of the Constitution and particularly after the
introduction of. Article 43A in the Constitution that the workers
s)lould have no voice in the determination of the question whether
the enterprise should continue to .mn or be shut down under an F
order of the court. It would indeed be strange that the workers
who have contributed to the building of the enterprise as a· centre of
economic power should have no right to be heard when it is sought
• .to demolish that centre of economic power .

- -
The principal argument urged against the right of the workers ·
G
;r .
to be heard in the winding up petition · was that under the scheme Qf
the Companies Act 1956, it is only the creditors aud contributories
7
who' are entitled to appear and be heard in a winding up petition.
The Companies Act 1956 is . a self· contained code exhaustive in H
regard to all matters relating ·to companies and since there is no
provision in that Act conferring on the workers a right to intervene
948 SUPREME COUltT ll.llI'ollTS I t9S3i I s.c.a.
A in a winding up petition, no such right can be spelt out in their
favour outside the provisions of that Act Respondent Nos. 6 to 9 .
relie"d upon various provisions of the Companies Act 1956 in support
of their contention that the workers have no locus in a winding up
petition but we do not think these provisions lend any support to
that contention. The first provision relied upon by Respondent
B Nos. 6 to 9 was section 439 wqich inter alia provides as to who
shall be entitled to make an application for winding up of a
company. It is DO doubt true that this section confers the ril!iit to
present a winding up petition only on certain specifically enumerated
persons and the workers are not included in that enumeration and
therefore obviously, the workers have no right to prefer a petition
0 for winding up of a company. The right to apply for winding up
of a company being a creature of statute, none other than those on
whom the right to present a winding up petition is conferred by the
statute can make an application for winding up a ·company and no
such right having been conferred on the workers, they cannot prefer
a winding up petition against a company. But from this exclusion
D of the workers from the right to present a winding u·p petition, i.t
does not follow as a necessary consequence that the workers . have
no right to appear and be heard in a winding up petition filed by
one or more of the persons specified in section 439. It may be that
the workers have no right to present a· winding up petition against
the company, but if a winding up petition is properly filed by any of ·
E the persons entitled to do so under section 439, they may still be
entitled to appear and be heard in support or opposition to the
windi_ng up petition. That would depend upon whether their
interest is likely to be affected by any otder which may be matle on
the winding up petition. The next section relied- upon by respondent
Nos. 6 to 9 was section 440 which says that where a company is
F
being wound up voluntarily or subject to the supervision of the
court, a petition for its winding up by court may be presented by
any person authorised to do so under sectiof. 439 or the official
Liquidator, but the court shall not make a winding up order unless •
it Is satisfied that the voluntary winding up or winding up subject to
G • the supervision of the court cannot be continued with due regard
to the interests of the creditors or contributories or both. It was
iug~d on behalf of respondent Nos. 6 to 9 that this section shows
that the winding up of a company_ is intended to be for the benefit
of the creditors and the contributories and the interest of rhe
H workers has no place at all in the winding up and is not required to
be taken into account in winding up the company. This argument
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R.- RAMAKRJSHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 949

is also in our opinion futile because what this section deals with is A
the stage after the winding up has commenced, whether volu.ntary
or subject to the supervision of the · court, while we are concerned
with a stage, anterior to the making of a winding up order. There
can be little doubt that the object'of winding up being to 'realise the
assets of the company, pay the preferential claims and expenses of ·
liquidation and then discharge the debts of the creditors in full or 8
pari passu and i(after paying to' the creditors, there is any surplus,
distribute the same among the shareholders by way of dividend and
...., ultimately dissolve the company, it is only the creditors and the
contributories who would be affected by any action taken in the
course of winding up of the company and that is why we find several
provisions in the Companies Act 1956 which speak of winding up c
being carried ori with due regard to the interest of the creditors and
the contributories or after consultation with them or confer rights
on the creditors and the contribu\ories to make applications for
diverse purposes .with a view .to effective winding up of the company.
Such provisions are for instance to be found in section 464, 466,
478, 517, 542, 543, 549, 556, 557 and 560. These provisions apply
D
at a stage ·after a winding up order' is made by the court or the
voluntary winding up has commenced or an order is made for
.continuance of winding up subject to the supervision of the
court, when winding up having "been ordered or resolved, what
remains to be done is only to wind up the company, pay the E
creditors and if there·is any surpllls, distributeJhe same among the
shareholders. These provisions do· not deal with a situation prior
to the making of the winding up order when the question is whether
th'e company should be ·ordered to be wound· up or not. While the
company is continuing to subsist, the workers would be employed
in th.e enterprise which is being run by the company and they would F
be earning their livelihood. from such employment, but if an order
for winding np is made, their services would, except in cases where
the business of the company is continued, stand terminated by
reason of sub-section (3) of section 445 which provides that a
winding up order "shall be deemed to be notice of discharge to the
officers and employees of the company, except _when the business of G
• the company is continued." Ordinarily when a winding up order
is made, the business of the company would cease to continue and
even ifthe Liquidator is authorised to carry on the business, such
i continuance would be only for the beneficial winding up of the
H
company and the logical and inevitable end would be the ultimate
discontinuance of the business. The \Daking of a winding up order .
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983J I S.C.R.

A on a petition for winding up would therefore almost certainly have an
adverse consequence on the workers in as much as the continuance
of their service would be seriously jeopardised and their right to
work and earn their livelihood would be disastrously ·imperilled.
Now it is an elementary principle of law, well settled as a result of
. several decisions of this Court and particularly the decisions in
B State of Orissa v. Dr. Bin 1 Pani,(') A.K. Kraipa v. Union of India,(')
and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(') that no order involving
adverse civil consequences can be passed against any person without
. giving him an opportun_ity to be beard against the passing of such
order and this rule applies irrespective of whether the proceeding in
which it is passed is a quasi judicial or an administrative proceeding.
c The audi alterum part em rule which mandates that no one shall be
condemned unheard -ls one of the basic principles of natural justice
and if this rule has been held to be applicable in a quasi-judicial or
even in' an administrative proceeding involving adverse civil conse-
D quences, it would a fortiori apply in a judicial proceeding such as
a petition for winding up of a company. It is difficult to imagine
how any system of law which is designed to promote justice through
fairplay i;, action can permit the court to.make a winding up order
which has the effect of bringing about termination of the services of
· the workers without giving thelll an opportunity of being heard
E against tne making of such order. It would be violative of the
basic principle of fair procedure and unless there is express provision
in the Companies Act 1956 which forbids the workers from appear-
ing at the hearing of the winding up petition and participating in it,
the workers must be held entitled to appear and be hel\rd in the
winding up petition. That is the minimum requirement of the
F principle of audi a/terum part em which cannot. be ignored save on
pain of invalidation of the order of winding up. Here we do not
find any provision in the Companies Act 1956 which in so many
terms exc"ludes the workers from appearing at the hearing of the
winding-up petition with a view to supporting or opposing it and
the only ground on which the right of the workers to appear and .be
G heard in the winding up petition is disputed is that there is no
~pecific provision in tile Act entitling them to do so and the right to
apply for winding up as also to participate in the. proceedings in the
course of winding up is conferred only on the creditors and the

(I) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625.
.. (2) [1970) I S.C.R. 457 •
(3) l t 978] 2 S.C.R. 621.
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKIUSHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 951
••
contributories. But. we have pointe!i out above that merely because
the right to apply for winding up a company is not given to. the
workers it does not mean that· they cannot appear to support or
oppose a winding up petition whiCh is properly filed. by one or the.
other persons specified in section °439. There would, in fact, be no·
point in conferring the right to apply for winding up of a company
on the workers since they cannot have any interest in demolishing
8
tlie enterprise which is the source of their livelihood and particularly
when the only effeci of the windin,g up order would be to render
them unemployed and to bring about winding up of the company
for the benefit of the creditors and the contributories. So also the
circumstance that the ri)lht to be consulted or to make applications in
the course of the winding up of a. company is conferred only on the
c
creditors and the contributories does not in any way militate against
the right of the Workers to appear and be heard in the winding up
· petition because once the winding up order is made, the assets of
the company have to be realised, the creditors have. to be paid and
if there is any surplus it has to be distrib!Jted ain~ng the contribu- 0
tories and therefore at that stage it is only the i:re'ditors and the ·
contributories who have an interest and that is why in the course of
the winding· up it is the crec\itors. and the contributories who have
been given a voice. Thai has nothing to do.· with the question
whether the company should be wound up or not which is a
question .in which the workers are vitally.concerned and on which
they must obviously be heard before ariy decision i~ taken by the
court.

This view which we are taking is icy accord with the decision
of the High Court ot Bombay, namely, Bhalchandra Dharrnajee
Makaji .and Ors. v. Alcock Ashdo.wn & Co, Ltd. & Ors. where the
Company Judge, while disposing of an application for appointment F
of Official Liquidator as Provisional Liquidator, pending the hearing
and final disposal of the main petiti0n for winding up, said :

"After the amendment of sections 397 and 398 of the
G
Companies Act bl\ sections 10 and II of the Companies
(Amendment) Act (Llll of 1963), it would appear that the
.affairs of' the company have to be conducted not only in
i the best interest of its members for their profit but also in
a manner which is not prejudicial to public interest. The H
element of public interest enters into the management of
the companies after 1963. ·The modern corporaiion 'has
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1983] I s.c.R.

A become the ao'C;pted instrument of social policy, because
it affects a large part of the economic life of the com- \,....
munity. It bas become an instrument for the improvement
of the economic standards of the people and for economic
growth of the nation. Society depends for some of its
needs on corporate enterprise. It has therefore an interest
B in . its stability and efficiency as an economic institution.
The element of public interest also arises from the responsi-
bility for ensuring a minimum wage to the numerous
employees in the corporate sector. It is necessary to see
. that people who put their labour and lives into a concern
get fair wages, continuity of employment and a recognition
c of their jobs where they have trained themselves to highly
skilled an·d specialised work. In deciding whether the court
should wind up a company or change its management the
court must take into consideration not only the interest of
the shareholders and creditors but also public interest in
D
• the shape of the need of the cc,mmunity and the interest of
the employees. This, in my opinion, is the requirement of
_sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act."

If in deciding whether the court should wind up a company or
change its management the court must take into consideration not
E ' .
only the interest of the shareholders and creditors but also amongst
.
other things the· interest of the wor.kers, it is axiomatic that the
workers must have an opportunity of being beard for projecting
and safeguarding their interest before a _winding up order is made
. by the court. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court bas
of course conceded in the judgment under appeal that "in considering
F the question whether to wind up or ncit the court has to take the
larger point of public interest including that of the workers into
consideration" but that in the opinion of the Division Bench would
not "'clothe the workers with any locus staodi to file an application
for being heard in the winding up petition. With the greatest
respect to the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, we
G must express our emphatic disapproval of this approach. It amounts
. to the court telling the workers : "No dopbt in deciding whether .
the company should be wound up or not, we are bound to take
into consideration your interest but you need not be neard because
we know best' what .your interest requires." This paternali~tic
H attitude towards the workers that though they are most vitally
concerned and their interest is required to be taken into considera-
tion, they rieed not be heard because the court in its wisdom knows,
NATIONAL TEXTILES V. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Bhagwati, J.) 953
,.
presumably more than the workers themselves, what is in their A
interest and they should leave their fate ·into .the bands of the, court
without even a .whisper of an argument sounds. lik~·a .relic of a
, by-gone age and must be abandoned. If the interest of the workers
bas to be taken into account, the :workers must have a say because
. they know best where their .interest lies and they" must have an
opportunity of placing · bcfore."tbe court ieleyant material bearin!I
upon their·interest.
;,_1

. Considerable reliance was however 'placed ·on behalf cii'
respondent Nos ..6 to 9 on "the statement of the law on this point
contained in tiie leading text books on company · la:w. ilesj:>onderit · c
j'los. 6 to 9 drew our ·attention to 'Palmer Company Precedents (17th
Edn.) volume 2 at. page 77 'where it is sfated that any creditor or
sbareboler may app~ar to . support or opposb the petition 'but "tio
one else can do so even if he has 'an indirect interest 'in the con ti hued
existence of the company. So also in Buckley on the Companies
·Act (14th Edn.) at page 546 the law has 'been sfatea in the following D
terms, naniely, "th"e only persons entitled fo ··be heatd afe tlie
company, its creditors and contribuforie's .. ; ... ' .. tli'e court may 'in it~
discretion hear other person_• who have an interest in order 'to leatli
what public grounds there are in favour of, or in 'opposition to,-the
winding up ...... but such persons can .be heatd only as amid curiae
and cannot appeal." Our attention was also invited to Halsbur)"ii
Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol.· 7 'where a similar statement of the
law is to be found at page" .614 paragraph 1028. Now it is
undoubtedly true_ that according to the statement of the "law contain-
ed in these three leading text books, ·it is only the company, the
creditors and the contributories who are entitled to appear on the
.Winding Up petition and no oth~r' persons have a right to be heard, F
but this statement of the law is based on the cild decision 'in Re.
Bradford Navigation Co.mpany which · was carried in appeal and
decided as Re. Bradford Navigation Company. This decision given
by the English Courts ·over a hundred years ago when a company was
regarded merely as a legal device brought ,into being as a result Of a G
contractual arrangement between ihe shareholders ,for the purpose
• of carrying on trade or ·business and the workers were looked upoh ·
as no more than employees.Of the company working under a master
and servant relationship and the interest of the public as consumers
~r otherwise was a totally irrelevant consideration and it clifl have
no validity in the present times when the entire concept .of a a
company bas changed and it h11s l;>een · transformed into a dyn11111ic
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983J I s.c.~.

A 11odo.-economic institution in which capital and ·labour are both
eq~al part~ers, possibly with heavy weightage in favour of labour
and 'the interest of the public as consumers as also the general
welfare and common good of the community constitute a vital
consideration. We cannot allow the dead band of the past to stifle
the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still ; it must
B change with the changing social concepts and values. If the bark
that protects the tree fails to grow and expand alongwith the tree,
it will either choke the tree or if it is a living tree, it will shed that
bark and grow a new living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law
fails to respond to the needs of changing society, then either it will
stifl~ the growl~ of the society and choke its progress or if the . .
c society is vigorous enough, it will cast away the law which stands
i~ the way of its growth. Law must therefore constantly be on the
move adqpting itself to the fast changing society and not lag behind.
It must shake off the inhibiting legacy of its colonial pa•t and assume
a dynamic role in the process of social transformation. We cannot
therefore mechanically accept as valid a legal rule which found -
D favour with the English courts in the last century when the doctrine
qf laissez faire prevailed. It may be that even toda y in England
the courts may be following the same legal rule which was laid
down almost a hundred years ago, but that can be· no rea•on
why we in India should continue to do likewise. It is possible that
this legal rule inight still be finding a place in the English text books
E
because no case like the present one has arisen in England in the
last 30 .years and the English courts might not have had any
occasion to consider the acceptability of this legal rule in the
· present times. But whatever be the reason why this legal rule
continues to remain in the English text books, we cannot be
F persuaded to adopt it in our country, merely on the ground that it
has been accepted as a ~alid rule in England. We have to build out
own jurisprudence and though we may receive light from whatever
)
source it comes, we cannot surrender our judgment and accept as
v:ili<.I in our couniry whatever has been decided in ·England. The
rule enunciated in re : Bradford Navigation Company case (supra)·
G does not commend itself to us and though it has been followed by
a single J~udge of the Bombay High Court in re Edward Textiles
Limited (supra),' we do not think it represents correct law.

<' We may also mention that on be'half of the appellants some
·reliance was placed on Rule 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules 1959
'r.
in support of their contention that not· only the creditors and .the
contri~µ!ori~s but also other persons are entitled to appear at the
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN"(Bhagwatl, J.) 955

hearing of a winding up petition and the workers cannot therefore
be excluded. This Rule provides that every person who intends to
appear at the hearing of a winding up petition, whether to support
or to oppose it, shall serve on the petitioner or his advoca1e
notice of his intention at the address given in the adv.ertisement
and such notice shall be in form No. 9 and where such person
intends to oppose the winding up petition, · the grounds of his B
opposition or a copy of bis affidavit if any shall • be 'furnished
along with tlie notice .. The appellants contended that under this
Rule any one who wants to· appear in a winding up petition can
do so, provided be serves on the petitioner or his advocate, notice of
his intention at the address given in the· advertisement and complies
with the other requirements of this Rule and therefore if the workers c
de~fre to appear at the bearing of the winding up petition; they
are entitled to do so.. The ·answer given on behalf of respondent
Nos. 6 to 9 to this contention wa8 that Rule 34 is. applicable only
after a winding up petition is admitted and an order is made for
advertisement of the winding up petition and it bas no application D
at the stage when the winding up petition is before the court only
for the purpose of deciding whether or not it should be admitted
and advertised. ·It was also urged on behalf of respondent Nos. 6
to 9 that in any event Rule 34 does not confer a right on any and
every person to appear at the hearing of the winding up petition,
i.otends so to appear he must take.various .steps set out in that Rule E
beginning with service of notice on the petitioner or his advocate
before he can be heard on the winding up petition. · We are inclined
to agree with ·this contention of respondenf Nos. 6 to 9. It is
·obvious that the object and purpose of Rule 34 is not to confer a
right on any one to appear at the hearing of the winding up petition
but merely to provide the procedure to be followed before a person F
who is .otherwise entitled to appear . in a winding up petition can
be heard in support or opposition of the winding up petition.. This
rule cannot therefore he relied .upon by the appellants as conferring
a right on the workers to appear at· the hearing of a wiQding up
petition. ·But, one thing is clear that this Rule does poctulate that
apart from the creditors and contributories there may be other G
• persons who are entitled to appear at the hearing of the winding up
petition because it is not confined in its application to the creditors
and contributodes but uses the generic imprCssiori.· ·"every person"
and to this limited extent it does undoubtedly len<I .~\lm~ support to
H
the contention of the apJ!"llants,
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) I S.C.ll.
A We are therefore of the view that the workers are entitled to
appear at the hearing of the winding up petition whether to support
or to oppose it so long as no winding up order is made by the court.
The workers have a locus to appear and be heard in the ~foding
up pet.ition both before the winding up petition is admitted and an
order for advertisement is made as also after the admission and
B advertisement of the winding up petition until an order is made for
winding up the company. If· a winding up order is made and the
workers are aggrieved by it, they would also be entitled to prefer an
appeal and contend in the appeal that no winding up order should
have been made by the Company Jtidge. But when a winding up
.a order is made and it bas .become final, the workers ordinarily would
not have any right to participate in any proceeding in the course of
winding up the company though there may be rare cases where in a
proceeding in the course of winding up, the interest of the workers
may be"involyed and in such a case it may be possible to contend that
the workers must be heard'before an order is-made by the court. We
D think that even when an application for appointment of a provisional
liquidator is made by the petitioner in a winding up petition, the
worker~ would have a rigbf to be heard 'if they so wish because the
appointment of a provisional liquidator may adversely affect the
, interest of the workers. But we may make it clear that neither the
petitioner nor the court would be under any obligation to give notice
Ill of such application to the workers. It would be for the workers to
apply for being heard and if they do so, they would be entitled to
appear and be heard on the application for appointment of pro-
visional liquidator. The workers therefor~ in the present case had
a right to be heard before the provisional liquidator was appointed
by the Company Judge but the circumstance that the workers were
F not so heard would not have the effect of vitiating the order /
appointing provisional liq'uidator, ·because ori the view taken by us,
it would be open to the workers to apply to the court for vacating
that order and it would be. for the court after considering the
material produced before it •and hearing the parties to decide whether
that order should be vacated or not.
..
We ·accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the order, dated
14th September 1981 made by a Singie Judge of the High Court. and
confirmed by the Division Bench on 13th September 1981 and direct
H that the three Unions shall be entitled_ to appear and be heard in
the winding up petition. There will be no order· as to costs of these
appeals.
1'1ATfoNAL TilXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Chinnappa Redjy, l) 957
CHJNNAPPA REDDY, J. I agree with my brother Bhagwati. I' A
wish' to add a few· words not because I have much more to say;
nor ever hope to say what be has said, more felicitously but because ·.
my, brother Venkataramiah bas disagreed and my regard. for him
compels•me to add a few words of explanation ..

''··.. you ·take my life when you do take the means whereby B·
I live" (Sbakespeare : The Merchant Venice). •

This indeed is the· cry of the workers of Ramakrishna Indus~ ;
tries '(ll) Ltd. who desire to be heard before the bread is taken out
\lf their mouths. A' battle royal appears .to be raging between two· C.
rival groups of shareholders of the company. A petition for Wind-
ing-up the company has been presented by one group of share-
------·· holders. And an application for the appointment of a provisional
liquidator too. Quite apart from Sec. 445 (3) of the Companies
Act which provides that the order for winding-up shall be deemed·
. to be notice of discharge of the officers and employees of the
company, except when the business of the c~mpany is continued, it
is plain· tbai tlie future of· the workers~is at stake and their right to
work is in jeopardy as a result of the presentati'on of the winding-up
petition. U~like the shareholders, to m,ist of wb~m the shares
they 'hold represent mere investments and to some of whom,, the
means to control the affairs of the company, to the workers, the life E
~f !lie company is tlieir, own and. its welfare is theirs.. They are so
iatiinaiely tied.' up that their interest in the survival and the well•
beiiig of the company is much more than the interest of any
sliareliolder.:: lie he an ' investor~ a 'c~rporate commander' or a
corporate inariipulator. How then is it possible that these persons.,,.:
th~ worlfors whose very existence may be.under threat of exlinc-·
to
tion::...aie "be 4enieda .bearing, even if sought, when a petjt\onfoi:'
w'indin'g-up is presented io a court. 1t is .said that the. to~l'anies
Act does not contempl~ie a hearing to the workers.. Only contribu:
tories and credilqrs may''b~ heard it seems .. Workers may'n~t be.
allowed to throng the company cou'rt, only ihose who buy,. seB an_d
control shares and the usurers, the stockbrokers and the money
brokers. Those who invest money may be heard, those who invest
their lives may' not ·be· ·heard; ·No. ·The Companies Act does not
1
prohibit a· bearing to ,the worlCers., ·The: Com]lailies Ai:t' does iJot
say ·who may be 'heard. ··The Companies·Act·does.irot provide'fo.r
, all situations.. The Company· Judge must decide.some mattersO .He'
must use his imagination. ·He must use bis discretion.· But; 'without'
transgressing aliy, legal notni's·Compatiy Law is•not a 'field' in :·which
958 · SUPIU!ME COURT REPoRTS l19s3i i s.<l.it
'
'flnaiily is lo be expecled'. The law 'falls to be applied to a growing
A and changing subject matter'. This is recognised in the report of
the Jenkins Committee in the. United Kingdom and in this country,
in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Companies Amend-
ment Act of 1974. So, when.new situations arise, as indeed.they are
bound to arise having regard to the complexities of growth and
B change, the Company Judge cannot retreat into the Corporate shell.
• but must expand and expound. He must take the bull by the horns .
as it were. He must recognise and expose the reality of the workers'
interest and the dubiety of ihe interest of the others. He must -"'-
acknowledge the \transformation which corporations are proseotly
undergoing from capitalist. contrivances into socialist instruments.
c •
No doubt, it was the creative genius of the bourgeoisie thai
invented the corporations and the companies, invested them with a
corporate soul and a juristic personality and called them legal entities
in order to meet the growing and complex demands of modern
industry and management, to conduct business and commercial
D
activities more conveniently and efficiently, and essentially to foster,
consolidate and stabilise the 'Capitalist system of society under whose
aegis alone the exploiting class· could thrive and continue to exploit
the working class. Corporations became the symbol · of competitive
capitalism. But the historical processes continue at work. The move-
E ment is now towards socialism. The working classes, all the world
over; are demanding 'workers' control' and 'Industrial Democracy'.
They want security and the right to work to be secured. They want th~
control and direction of their lives in their own hands and not in the
hands of the industrialists, bankers and brokers. Our constitution
has accepted the workers' entitlement to control and it is one of the
Directive Principles of State Policy that the State shall take steps, by /
suitable legislation or in any other way, to secure the participation
of workers in• 'the management of undertakings, establishments or
other ort!anisations ·engaged in any industry. It is in this context of
changing norms and waxing values that one has to judge the
workers' demand to be heard.
G
And, what !lo the workers want? They want to be heard lest
their situati.on be altered unheard. They invoke natural justice, so
to claim justice. They invoke the same rule which the courts compel
H administrative tribunals to observe. Cao courts say, natural justice
need not be 'observed by them as they know how to render justice
without observing natural justice? It. will surely be a travesty of
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. l'.R. RAMAKRISllNAN (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 959

justice to deny natural justice on the ground thafeourts know better.
There is a peculiar and surprising misconception of natural justice;·
in some quarters, that it is, exclusively, a principle of administrative'
law. It.is not. [tis first a universal principle -and, therefore, a rule
of administrative law. It is that part of the judiciai procedure Which·
is imported into the administrative process' because of·its u'niver'
sality. · "[t is of the essence of most systems of justice,--certainly of 8
the Anglo-Saxon System-that in litigation both sides of a. dispute
must be heard before decision. 'Audi Alterum · Partem' was the
aphorhm of St. Augustine which was adopted ·by the courts at a
time when Latin Maxims were fashionable". ''Audi Alterum Partem
is as much a principle of African" as it .is of En'glish legal procedure;'
a popular Yoruba saying is: 'wicked and iniquitous is he who decides
a case upon the testimony of only one party to it" (T.O. Elias : The
Nature. of African Customary Law).· Courts even more than adminis-'
trators must observe natur~l 'justice. ; ' '· ·

. e'.l ""
[t is said that the Companies Act does. not confer any special
rights on the workers, .they are virtual strangers to the Act and so
why should they be heard in the petition for winding-up ? The duty
to hear those asking to be heard is not dependent on the vesting· of.
any right under the very statute in respect of which jurisdiction is
being exercised by the court, but on any right whatever which may
-· come under. threat. Surely ·it is not. the law· that rights other than
those created by a particular statute may b~ taken away· in proceed-
E

ings under that statute without affordi.i1g a hearing to tboso desiring ..
to be heard. [f the statute .says only so and so will bl' heard and,
. no other, of course, no other will be beard . . [f the statute d()es not
'~ say who may be beard, but prescribes the procedure for the hearing,
. ~. that procedure must be followed by every one who .want to be heard F
and what applies to one will apply to the other •.. If creditors and
contributories desire to . be heard and are beard, so shall workers.
After bearing the workers, the court may say that, on the· facts .and
circu111stances of the case, it is not necessary to hear them further; .
but they cannot be turned away at. the .very threshold. It. may . be
that it is not for them to support or oppose the winding-up peiition
for any of the traditional reasons. But they may. !!lake suggestfons
which may avert winding-up, save the company and save their o_wn.
live.s. They may have suggestions 10 make for restructuring '.the,
company or for the transfer of the undertaking as a running busi- .H.
ness. The workers themselves may offer to run the industry forming
themselves into a society. They niay have a myriad suggestio.ns -io
SUPREME c<iuit RBPoRT5 (j 983j I s.c.R

make,. which they can do if they are allowed to .be beard. If .every
bolder of a, si_ngle share out of thousands may be heard, if every'
petty creditor may be heard, why can't the workers be heard ? It is
sai~ that once the workers are allowed to enter the Company. Court,
the flood gates will be opened, all and sundry will join in the.fray
an.d utter confusion will prevail. These are dark forebodings. for
wliich there is no possible justification. The interest of the workers ·
is..• limited.
. _,. It is the interest of the others,
. those that battle for
cqntr91. and for. power that may create chaos and eonfusion. It
mu.st not be forgotten .that the court is the master of. the proceed-
ings an'1 the ultimate control is with the court.. Parties may not be
impleaded for the mere asking or beard fc;>r the mere seeking. The
c court, may well ask the reason why, if some one seeks to be· heard.
Wo~kers will ,n.ot cr~wd the Company Court and the Court will not
be helpless to.keep out those whom.it is not necessary to hear., It is
said that workers will not be allowed to intervene. in a partition er a
partnership action to oppose partition or dissolution of partnership
and so. why should they be allowed to intervene in a winding-up peti·
tion. That is begging the question. There is no reason why workers
D may. not be allowed, in appropriate cases, to intervene in partition
and partnership actions to avert disaster and to promote. welfare. As
we said, impleading and hearing . are not for.the mere asking and
seeking;

E
Re Bradford Navigation Company and • passages ·from. text •. ·.
books for which the case is the source of authority were relied upon,
10 urge that none but contributories and creditors may be heard·in
winding-up petition. Re Btadford Navigation Company is a relic
of an alien past.. Fortunately it· is not a binding precedent.· While ·
we have learnt and borrowed a great deal from British· Jurisprudence, /
we have been drawing the lioe now and then, here and there, because
F
their law, thelr jurisprlldenee suits their genius and ours must]develop
according to our genius.· Our needs are different;· our social; political
and economic bases are different; our aspirations are different; our
systems are different; the stages of our development are different.
We have a written constitution which is omnipresent when oure laws
G
are made, tested, interpreted or executed. We look to the constitu-
,
tion for guidance and inspiration when we interpret the. laws. The.
~2nd Amendment of-the Constitution has introduced new lights into
the Constitutioil'. The Constitution is now openly socialist The·
Direciive Principles of State Policy repeatedly emphasise the role and
interest of the workers. Article 43-A, also introduced by the 42nd
. '
NATIONAL TllXLiLES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 961
Amendment contemplates worke.rs' participation in. the management A
of industry. Other Directive Princi;iles require the State to make -
provision for securing the right to work, for securing just and
humane conditions of work and for securing the right to an adequate
means of livelihood. The State is enjoined .to. direct its policy
towards securing that the ownership and control of the material
resources of the ·community are so distributed as best' to subserve B
the common good.and that the operation of the economic system
does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of procluc-
tion to the common detriment. Obviously, it is nationalisation that
is in view and nationalisation must mean the setting up of public
corporations and the transformation of private corporations 'into
public corporations. Truly the Constituti_on envisag~s work~rs' c
control ahd nationalisation as two of the roads to socialism. Private
corporations hitherto regarded as bastions of private property and
leaders of capitalist economy are undergoing transformation and,
are surely acquiring the character of public institutions. The public
interest element is now quite a ·predominant factor in the Com-
D
panies Act itself. 'There are several provisions in the Companies
Act which take _notice of the element of public· interest: There are
other enactments like the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Act, the Industries Regulation and Development" Act, under whose
provisions, the activities· of ·a. company in~y be scrutinised in the
. public interest. There are a . host of other legislations involving
employment and welfare. of labour, . to which the managements o( E
companies are subject. The transformation of a company's.character
from private to public is going,on right before our eyes. even ·as the
institution of private property is also losing its diathesis. It .is in this
context of ferment and development that we must. consider the
problem before us. There is no sanctity attached to the age of a
judgment o-r to the circumstance that the ·decision is' that of· an F
English Court from where we have borrowed most of our company
law. Re Bradford Navigation ·company was decided in the heydays
of laissez faire at a time when individualism dominated every field
and the·public interest was but a slow• runner. Now the position is
reversed., Laissez faire . has long· been dethroned and ·all interests G
are increasingly subordinated to the· public interest Corporations·
are themselves assuijling a public character and function like mini-
States but surely they wili not be allowed to fnnction as slave States·
where the voice of the slave "!ay never be·lieard ..
H
In Britain itself corporate law and labour law have changed
considerably and are still changing. Courts no longer·· view. trade

•
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983J 1 s.c.R.
A unions with suspicion, as conspiracies as they once ·did. The right \.
to work, the right to collectively bargain and the right to strike are
well recognised. After nationalisation of certain important and
crucial industries by the successive Labour Governments, workers'
participation in management has become a reality and today a
considerable measure of workers' control of management has been
B achieved in industry.
There are now persistent demands that Company Law too
should recognise the interest of workers in a company. Prof. Gower
in his "The Principles of Modern Company Law'' says:-
•
c "One section of the community whose interests as such
are not afforded any protection, either under this bead or
by virtue of the pr.ovisions for investor or creditor protec-
tion, are the workers and employees of the taken-over
company. This is ·a particularly unfortunate facet or the
principle that the interest of the company means only the
D interest of the members, and not of those whose livelihood
is in practice much more closely invo.lved".
Again be says, later,
"The vexed question of tiie relationship between the
employees and the company which employs them is, in fact,
E a dominant theme in the current debate which flows over
from company to labour law. It is generally accepted that
it is unreal for company law to ignore, as at present our ·
law largely does, that the workers are as much, if not
more, a part of the company as the members of it".
F That is the way the wind is blowing in- Britain and there is, there-
fore, good reason for holding that· the rule in Bradford Navigation
Company is not valid in the.present times.

I may conclude by a reference to the following observations
made in another connection by D.A. Desai, J in Panchmahals Steel
G Ltd. v. Universal Steel Traders(').

"Time-honoured· approach that the company law must
safeguard the interest of investors and shareholders of the
company would .be too rigid a framework in which it can
H - ...._
(2) 46 Company Cases 706;

•
NATIONAL TBX'IJLES v. P.R. RAMAKRJSHNAN (Venkataramlah, J.) 963

now operate. New problems call for a fresh approach . ·.. A
As Prof. De Wool of Belgium puts it: the company has a
three-fold reality •. economic, human and public-each with
its own internal logic. The reality of. the company is much
broader than that of an association of capital; it is a human
working community that performs a collective action for
the common good. In recent years, a del.pte is going on in B
the world at large on the functions and foundations of ·
corporate enterprise. The "preservationists" and the
"reformers" are vigorously propounding their views on the
possible reform of comp.any, the modem trend emphasising
the public interest in corporate enterprise".
c
. The case itself is an instructive one and demonstrates bow an imagi-
native Company Judge may help to restructure and infuse new life
into a comJ>any whose life .is. ebbing out; within the four corners of
the statute and keeping in view the interests not merely of the credi-
tors and the contributories but also the interests of the workers . D

•
Viewed from any· angle, of · natural justice, of the constitution
or of the expanding theory of company law, there, appears to be no
obstacles to a Company Judge hearing the workers, when· asked,
after a winding up petition is presented; I agree with the order pro- E
posed by- Bhagwati, J.

F
VENKATARAMIAH, J. I had ·the privilege of reading the draft
··judgment prepared by my learned brother, Bhagwati, J. but I regret
mr inability to agree with him.

G
Messrs Ramakrishna Industries (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Company') which is carrying on its business at Coimbatore.
in the State of Tamil Nadu is a closely held private limited company
governed by the Indian Companies Act, l 956 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Act'). The Company's paid up capital is Rs. 15,95,000 ·H
divided into 1595 equity shares of Rs. 1,000 each, the bulk of

' .
~64 SUPREME c6URT REPORTS (19S3)i s.c.il.

A which i~ h~ld by the members of a Hind'u family whose relationship
is as ,follows :

V. Rangaswami Naidu - Chinnammal (wife)
(deceased) (deceased) ( 7 shares)
(10 shares)
B. I
I
I
-I I
I I
V. Kamalammal =R. Venkata- P.R. Rama- = Mrs. 'Raje-
(wife) swami Naidu krishnan. swari
c (164 shares) (20 shares) : (34 shares) Ramakrishnan
I I (85 shares) ~r--•

I L
I 1·-~
I I
I I I I'
V.. Radha- V. Mano- V. Rajkumar ' I
krishnan . haran (148 shares) I
D (164 shares) (146 shares) =Thnlasi , I. '
'
=Anusuya I
I
I
I
I
. K. Prabhu
I
R. Baba Chaodersekhar
I
I
S. R. K. Prasad
E (160 shares) (168 shares) (.J 61 •share;)

The gronp of R. Venkataswami Naidu holds 642 shares and
the group of P.R. Ramakrishnan is holding 608 shares. 17 shares
stand in the : name of late V. kailgaswami Naidu·and his wife and
300 shares are held by. V. Rangaswami Naidn Educational Trust.
F
R. Venkataswami Naidu and P.R. Ramakrishnan are trustees for
life of V. Rangaswami Naidu Educational Trost having control° over
the shares held by the Trust They .are·also treated' as Life Directors.
Only 5 shares stand in the name-of .'others. V. Kamalammal,
Mrs. Rajeswari Ramakrishnan, V. Radhakrishnan V. Manobaran,
'G K. Prabhu and R. Baba Chandersekhar are directors and V.
, Rajkumar is the Managing Director of the Company. The Company
is thus under the exclusive control arid· management of the members
belonging to one family. 'serious differences having arisen amongst
them regarding the IDanag~ment of the affairs of the Company,
P.R. Ramakrishnan, bis wife and sons filed a petitioli being Company
H
Petition No. 30 of 1981 on ihe file of the High Court of Madras
on Jilly 13, '1981 for the•winding'np of the·Company under section

/
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 965

• 433(e) and (f) of the Act on the ground that it was just and equit-
able to do so in view of the alleged deadlock that bad arisen in the
administration of the affairs of the Company. The petition _charged
the memb~rs belonging to the gr~up of R. Venkataswami Naidu with
acts of misconduct;waste and malversation,· a detailed reference to
which. is unnecessary for purposes of this case. Along with the above
A

petition, the petiiioners therein flle~ Company Application No. 843
of i981 praying for the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator and
Company Application No. 844 of 1981 for an iiitedni order restrain-
ing t_be Company and other respondents from borrowing moneys
from bankers and other •·financial institutions wit.bout prior permis-
sion of the Court and from otherwise ali~nating the assets of the
Company pending disposal of the sajd application. The· learned
Company Judge' passed an interim order on July 13, i98l itself
restrainfog until further orders the eleven respondents named in the
application from borrowing ~ny moneys from banks, finanCial insti-
tutions or others witbou( prior permission: of the Court and from
alienating and/or creating any charge or encumbrance over any of D
the assets of the Company in its. various enterprises. The above.
interim order was passed even though on the same date application .
was opposed by the co_unsel for the responden\s therein. The case
was adjourned for further consideration to August 10, 1981. On
August 19, 1981, the above interim order :-vas made absolute in the
following terms :- E
__,'
"In the result there will be an · injunction restraining
respondents.-! to 6 from borrowing any moneys from banks,
financial .institutions 'or others and from alienating and/o!
creating any charge or encumbrance over any of the assets
of the first respondent company in its various enterprises .F
except that the first respondent c_ompany is. entitled to
honour any pending contract entered into by the company
with third 'parties before the presentation oftbe application,
all its existing commitments vis-a-vis its staff and· labourers,
electric charges, central excise duty, LIC premium, pay-
ments due to employees cooperative stores, telephone bills
and sales-tax dues, availing the existing bank facilities with
any of its bankers, .sllbject to the ~ondition that the parti-
culars for all these payments and the source from which
such payments were )o be met, a~e furnished in detail to_
the ·applicants. It is again made clear that the company is
H
always at liberty to approach court for further dire9(ions
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19831 ls.c.~-

and that, the applicant's right to impugn any such transac-
A
tion under section 536(2) is left untouched". t
In the meanwhile three trade unions viz. the Coimbatore
District National Te~tile Employees' Union, Coimbatore ; the
Coimbatore District Engi_neering Workers' Union, Coimbatore and
B the- National Textile Workers' Union (INTUC), applicants in
Company Application Nos. 880, 881 and 883 of 1981 respectively
applied to the Court to implead them as respondents to the winding-
up petition i.e. Company Petition No. 30 of 1981 alleging that their
interests had been adversely affected by the interim order - which
according to them bad the effect of preventing the management of the
c Company from paying amounts due to· workers and also making pay-
ments for securing supplies to the stores from which the workers
were buying articles of food and other provisions. Tbese applications
were opposed by the petitioners in the winding-up petition stating
that the trade unions being neither creditors nor shareholders had
- no locus srandi to be- impleaded as respondents to the petition.
0 It may be mentioned here that the Company Petition for winding-up
· bad not yet been advertised at that stage and_ Rule 34 ~f the
Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was not attracted. The Company
Judge dismissed these applications filed by the trade unions for .
impleading them as respondents by his order dated September 14,
1981. Against that order only the National Textile Workers' Union
E (INTUC) filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High l .
Court being OSA No. 148of1981-. That appeal was dismissed by
the Division Bench on September 30, 1981. The petition for special
leave to appeal (Civil) No. 1961of1981 was filed before this Court
under Article 136 of the -Constitution · by the National. Textile
Workers' Union (INTUC) on November 6, 1981. The said Special
F a
Leave Petition came up for orders before Bench of three Judges OD
November 19, 1981._ On that date noiices were issued to the respon-
dents, The High Court was permitted to .pass its orders on the
application for appointment of a provisional liquidator which was
pending before it but it was ordered that in the event of a provisional
G liquidator being appointed, he should not take any steps which would
prejudically affect the workers. The above order was further_ modified
by this Court on December I, 1981. The petition_ was posted for hear-
ing and disposal before a Bench of five Judges as the matter involved
an important question of law relating to the .focus standi of the trade
H unions to be impleaded as respondents to a winding-up petition and
their right to oppose or support it.
NATIONAL TEX11LES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN ( Venkataramiah, J.) 967

Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 10248 and · A
10249 of 1981 filed respectively by the Coimbatore District National
. Textile Employees' Union and the Coimbatore District Engineering
Workers' Union directly against the o.rder of the Company Judge
dated September 19, 1981 rejecting their applicatiom for being
· impleaded as parties to the Company Petition are also ·heard along
with the above Petition for special leave to appeal (Civil) .No. 9661 B
of 1981.

At the outset it should be noted that the company ·laiv in force
in India i.e. the Act, as in England, is an amalgam ·of certain princi-
ples of the law of contract,.of the law of p~rsons and of the law of c
partnership which require the partners of a firm to be just and faith-
ful towards each other. ,A company is an association of persons for
some common object or objects. A Company has a legal personality.
It is an artificial person as opposed to a natural person. It comes
into existence on its registration in accordance with law. The memo-
randum of association and the articles of ·association-of a company D
j which are filed at the time of its registration .are considered as the
constitutional documents which contain the fundamental terms which
govern it. The memorandum contains conditions some of which are
basic tO its existence even though they may be alterable by following
the prescribed procedure. The articles which contain the terms
relating to the internal regulation may be altered by the members by
passing appropriate resolution. The articles are, however, subject to
the terms of the memorandum. ·Both these documents should,
however, conform to the Act. The actions of the company are sub-
ject to the doctrine .of ultra vires whose purpose is to protect investors
in the company and to protect the interests of its creditors. The
F
directors of a company are its agents and they stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the company. The duties of good faith which are impo-
sed by this fiduciary relationship are virtually identical with those
imposed on trustees. The directors are generally expected not to place
themselves in a position where their duties towards the company con-
flict with their personal interests. A company cease·s to be in existence G
on its dissolution which follows the winding-up proceedings which
may be either by the Court or voluntary winding-up (either members'
. ·voluntary winding-up or creditors' voluntary winding-up) or winding
up subject to supervision of the Court. There are detailed provisions
in the Act governing the different winding-up proceedings referred to H
above. The principles of administrative law which concern the
control of governmental power have 11ot much relevance to the
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983} I S.C.R.
A administration of the affairs of a company, the primary purpose of
administrative law being the imposition of checks on the powers of
government or its officers so that they may not either abuse their·
powers or go out of their legal bounds. In particular, the proceed·
ings relating to winding-up by Court are subject to the orders of
higher courts in appeal and are not amenable to interference by
8 superior courts as in the case of actions of government or its officers.
The winding-up proceedings by Court are governed by the Act and
the Rules made thereunder.

We have been taken through various English text books on
c Company Law such as 'Palmers Company Law', 'Gore Browne on
Companies', 'Buckley on the' Companies Acts' and Gower's Principles
-._,-~--·
or Modern Company Law. In none of them there is any statement
to the effect that officers and employees (who are not creditors or
contributories) of a company for whose widing-up a petition is filed
would be entitled as_ of right to be impleaded as parties and to
contest the petition. There is also no authority of English Courts
recognising such a right in any trade union. It is not also shown
that any such right of a trade union is recognised by the Indian law
which more or less corresponds to English law in this regard The
decision of the Bombay High Court In re. Edward Texiile Ltd.(1 } is a
clear authority for the proposition that any /rate trade unions have
E no locu~ standi to oppose a winding-up petiti~n.

We shall proceed to decide this case on the assumption that ' ..
the application for impleading was made, in fact on behalf of the
workers and not by the trade unions.

F The main argument urged in support of these appeals is that
because under section 445(3) of the Act the, passing of a winding-up
order of a company by th~ Court amounts to a notice of discharge to
the officers and the employees of the Company, except when· the
business of the company is continued, the 9fficers and employees
should be afforded an opportunity to contest a winding-up petition
G after being impleaded as parties and if possible avoid the winding-up
of the company. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to
refer to some of the provisions of the Act. Section 433 of the Aci ·
sets out six circumstances in which a company may be wound up by
the Court. A company may be wound .up by the Court on one or
H more of the following grounds, namely, (a) if the company has by

(I) 38 Company Cases 284,

I
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 969

A
.
special resolution, resolved that ·the company may be wound up by
the Court, (b) if default is made in delivering the statutory report
.
the Registrar or in holding tile statutory meeting, (c) if the company
to'
'

does not commence its business within a year from its incorporation,
or suspends its business for a whole year, (d) if the number of
members is reduced, in the case of a publi.c company, below
seven, and in the case of private company below, two, (el 8
if the company is unable to pay its debts and (fl if the Court . is of
opinion that: it· is just and equitable that the company should be
., wound up. Section 439 of the Act provides th"c: t an application to
the Court for the winding-up of a company shall be made by way of
a petition presented to the· Court subject to the provisions of that
section. · A petition for winding-up of a company may be filed by CJ
all or any. or" the following viz. the company, its creditors including
any contingent or prospective creditors or by any .contri.butory: Such
a petition can be filed by the Registrar of Companies and in a case
• falling- under section 243, by any person authorised by the Central
Government. Sub-section (2) of section 439 of the Act treats certain
classes of persons as creditors for purposes of ·that section. Sub- D
section (3) ·of section 439 treats the balder of a fully paid up share
. also as a contributory even though he may not be liable to contribute
any further sum io the assets of a company in the event of its being
WOIJDd up and a contributory may file a petition for winding-Up
provided he is not .debarred from doing ·so by sub-section (4) of
section 439. The Registrar can file a· petition under clauses (b), (c), E
(di, (ei and (f) of section 433 of the Act subject to the conditions
specified in section 439 except in cases where he is authorised under
section 439(1)(f). Sub-sections (6); (7) and (8) of seciion 439 of the
Act refer to the other conditions governing the filing of a.winding-up
petition.
F
Wlien a company has passed a special resolution resolving that
the ·company may be wound up by the Court:the employees and
workers can have hardly any ground to object to the winding· up of
the company .. The position is the same whe~ any of the defaults
mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of section 433 of the Act are com-·
milted by the company. The officers and employees of the company G
. also cannot get over the deficiency in' the required number of
members of a company Teferred to· in clause (d) of secti~n 433.
When a company is unable to pay its debts, a creditor may move ·a
petition for the windi~g-up of the company. Such a creditor cannot H
be compelled to prove his·claim not merely . against the company but
also. against the officers and employees, W(!eri t!wre is ii. d~adloi:I<;
970 SUPREME COURT REpORTS [1983] I s.c.R.

.A in .the management of the company arising out of disputes amongst

'
the directors or where soine directors , without any justification
exclude some other directors.from the management of the company,
it would be unreasonable to expect the excluded directors to fight
the case boih against the directors who .are responsible for their
exclusion and also against the officers and employees who are neither
B creditors nor contributories but who may be supporting the contest·
ing directors. The law on the question as to who can be heard as
ofright in a winding-up proceeding is .set out in paragraph 1028 in
Volume 7 of Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition) thus:

" ... Only the petitioner, the company, and creditors and
contributories are entitled to appear on the petition ;
other parties have no right to be heard, and, even if .
court of first. instance elects to hear them as amici
curiae, they have no right of appeal."
•
The above passage is based on the decision of the English
D Court. in In re. Bradford Navigation Company(') where Sir W.M.
James, L J. observed at page ~OJ thus :

"I am of opinion. that this preliminary objection must
prevail. It appears to me that the Appellants' argument is
based upon a misconception of .what a winding- up order
E
and what a winding-up petition is. It is a substitute for a
suit for winding-up a partnership. I't is a power irpplicable
by the Act of Parliament to corporations as well as to
unincorporated societies. Partners. have a right to file a
bill one against the other, and to have the usual decree for
.F the administration of the partnership property, and for the
settling of the partnership accounts and liabilities. In the
case of large companies, winding'up was thought to be a
more convenient course than a common partnership suit,
but in ever)' other respect it is the same. In a common part·
'
nership suit nobody can be made a party, or can be· heard,
•
G a
except the partners themselves, and,' originally, winding· up
was the same thing. Contributories were the only persons
who could be heard ; but as creditors were interfered with •
by the operation of the winding-\)p, the Act of Parliament
has made a winding-up a matter both for creditors and
contributories. A creditor may' present a petition for \

I.
(1) [1870] 5 Cb. p. 600.
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 971

winding-up, and b() th creditors and ·contributories· are heard A
./ upon that ; but it is new to me to say that any person who
has an interest i~, or a right to or in respc;ct .of, soine of
the property of the company,.large or small, bas right to
appear as a litigant here, because that company chooses to
apply for an order with respect to iiself. In· this case the
company was desirous of being wound up. I am of opinion B
that the winding-up order does not in the".sligbtest degree
derogate from any right whatever which any member of the
public has with respect to this canal. The winding-up will
/ deal with such rights as' the partners in tlie partnership can
deal with themselves.. The Court will deal with it just as
the partners themselves could have dealt with it" ...... In the c
Court below the Court might·very well say to a person so·
situated, "I should be glad to bear you as amicus curiae, if
you have an interest, that I may know what public grou!}ds
•
. there are." There the Court might use its discretion, and
think it right to bear ·such· an objection ; but when it comes
before me on a Petition of Appeal from the Order, then the
D
.• Appellant must show that be fills some character in which
be bas a right to litigate with the company. I am of opinion
that be does not fill any such character, and that the
Petition of Appeal must be refused with costs."
l!I
This decision may be of the last century but. there is hardly
any justification to depart from it even now unless compelled by the
statute to do so.

That only the company, creditors ·and contributories (apart
from the Central Government or the Registrar when they choose to F
intervene under the express provisions of law) are entitled to parti-
cipate in the winding·up proceedings is emphasised by sections 447
arid 557 of the Act. I They read : .
•
''447. Effect of ~nding-up order-An order for G
winding-up a company shall operate in favour of all the
creditors and of all the contributories of the company as if
it. had been made on the joint" petition of a creditor and of
., a contributory."
H
"557. Meetings to· ascertain . wishes of creditors. or
contributories.-(!) In all matters relatin~ to the windin·g-up

•
972 SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS (1983] l S.C.R.

A ·of a cdmpany, the Court may-
\.
(a) have regard. to the wishes of creditors .or contributories
of the company, as proved to it by any sufficient
evidence; ·

B (b) if it thi,nks fit for the purpose of ascertaining those
wishes, direct meetings of the creditors or contri-
b.utories to be called, held and_ conjlucted . in such
manner as the Court directs ; and

r (c) appoint a person to ·act as chairman of any such
c meetings and to report the result thereof to the Court.

· (2) When ascertaining the wishes of creditors, regard
shall be had to the value of each creditor's debt.

,, (3) When ascertaining the wishes of contributories,
D regard shall be had to the number of votes which may be
cast by each contributory."

That a company, the Official Liquidator, the liquidator,
creditors and contributories alone can effectively participate in and
contest the winding-up proceedings is clear from some of the other
E provisions of the Act governing the wiodiog~up · proceedings. Under
section 450(2) of the Act before appointing a provisional liquidator,
the Court has to give·notice to the. company and give a .reasonable
opportunity to it io make its representations, if any, unless, for
special .reasons to be rec6rded in writing, the Court think> fit to
'dispense with such notice. The Court may, under section 466 of /
the ·Act at any time after ma.king a winding-up order, on the .
application either of the Official Liquidator or of any creditor or
contributory, make an order staying the winding-up proceedings on
being satisfied that there are good reasons to pass such an order.
Section 478(3) authorises any creC!lt'ilr or contributory in addiiton
G to the Official Liquidator to take part in the public examination
of promoters, directors etc. held for the ' purpose of enquiring into
the conduct of such promotees · or directors in connection with the
. promotion or formation or the conduct. of the business of the
' company. Section 517 of the Act provides that in a voluntary
H · winding-up; an arrangement entered irito by the company and the '
creditors as provided therein is binding on the creditors and any
~reditor or contributory who is aggrieved by such arrangement may

•
NAtlONAl THXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkatatamiah, J.) 913

appeal. to the Court. Under section 518, the liquidator or any A
contributory or any creditor may apply to.the ·court in a voluntary.
winding·up proceeding to determine any question arising in the
winding-up of a company. Under section 54 ! . of the Act on the
application of ,the Official Liquidator or the liquidator, or .any
creditor or contributory of the. company the· Court· may, if it thinks
fit and proper so to do, declare that any persons who were knowingly 8
. parties to the carrying cin of business of the company .with intent to.
defraud creditors or any other person shall be personally responsible
for all or any of the debts or liabilities as the Court may direct. The
Court ·can exercise power to assess damages against·delinque.nt direc· ·
tors of a company which is ordered to. be wound-up under section
543 on the application of the Official Liquidator, or of the Liquidaror,
~·
. ----·. or of any creditor or contributory made within the prescribed time.
In ·the.case of a voluntary winding-up under section 546 .any creditor-.
or contributory m.ay_ apply to the Court with respect io exercise of
any P.OWer by the liquidator under section 546(1). Section 549(1)'
of the Act provides that at any time after the making of an order
_, D
for the winding-up of a company .by or subject to' the supervision
' . of1the Court, any creditor or contributory of the company . may, if
the Supreme Court, by.rules prescribed so permit and in accordance
with and.subject to such.rules.but not further ()r otherwise, inspect
the.books and. papers of the company, . A_ny cred~or or contributory:.
may. under , section 556 apply to the Court to enforce tile duty of
liquidator to make returns etc. These and other provisions Of the
Act· show that only the company, the Official Liquidator,.liquidator,
creditors, contributories· .or !·he Registrar have-a statutory rightto ·
of
participaie as right in the \Vinding-up proceedings as provided .in·
the Act. The workeu or thek trade unions· have not been given any•
such right, FL-

The words 'every person' in Rule 34 of the .Companies (Court)·
Rules, 1959 (which is almosi similar to the- corresponding English
Rule) do not entitle a- worker who is neither a shareholder rior a
contributory to support or oppose a winding-tip peiition under ti:iat G·,. -
Rule because they refer only. to a person who is otherwise entitled
· 10· do· so under the Act. We sh6uld· also bear in mind thai -an
' anam:olous result that may llow from the acceptance of the case
or-the workers is that whereas in a winding-up by Court they maf'.
get an opportunity to cont~st the petition: the voluntar~ winding-up
proceedings.or winding-up under the supervision of the Court would
go on without any such contest although in all cases ultimately the
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (198)] l s.c.R.

A workers will be discharged from service. A construction which
leads to such a discriminatory result should be avoided.

When once we extend the right to con\est a winding-up
petition to workern either on the principle of equity or of adminis-
trative law, on the same principle it would logically follow that all
B others who may have dealings with such as commission agents,
selling agents etc. whose contracts with the company are going to
be terminated· by reason of its liquidation also have to be allowed
to contest the winding-up proceedings. Such a claim is not permis- '
sible. On this question, it may be useful' to refer. to the case of Ex
Parle 'Maclure('). In that case a person entered , into an agreement
c with an insurance company to act as their agent for five years, and
to transact no business except for the company, in consideration
of which he was to receive a fixed salary and a!So a commission of
IQ. percent, on all business transacted. Before the five years expired
the company was wound up·voluntarily. It was held, affirming the
D decision of Romilly M.R., that the agent was not entitled to prove
against the company· for . the loss of his commission during the
remainder of the term of five years. James L.J. said : "I am cleaHy
of opinion that the Master of the Rolls was. right..... 11 is the case
of a person engaging a servant, and saying, 'I engage you for five •
.Years, I will pay yon £ 500. a year for that'period-that. s,um is
secured to you-and then, in order· to give you an inducement to
carry on the business effectually, properly, and .prudently, I will give
you l 0 per cent, ·commission· upon the net profits to be earned by
that business. I am of opinion that this was a contract which did
not give the servant the right. to determine what the extent of the
business was to be. He could not call upon ihe directors to issue
F new poHcies to accept new premium, or to take new risks, if they
were not minded to do it. He could. not say, 'Such a person has
brought in a policy of insurance;'.and you must accept that." Because
if he had a right to say 'You must carry on .the business'. he would
also have a right. to say 'You must carry on the' business in the .
usual and proper manner,' and that would be giving a servant the
G right of controlling tlie ma•ter in the mode· in which he chose to
carry on his business. Now, I am quite satisfied that the meaning
of the contract was nothing of the kind. It was never intended to
·give the servant·the right C)f dictating as to the extent of business,
whether more or less, or nothing, but he sim~ly took the chance of
H
_(I) (1870] L.R• S Cb. 737.
NATiONAL TBXTiLES. v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (V~nkaiaramiah, 1) .975

the company ·finding it a profitable business and carrying it on. The A
I
J company had a right to reduec the business to a minimum ; and if
. they had a right to reduce it to a minimum, they had a right to
reduce it to nothing-as far as h~ was concerned."

It is because of some doubts that" had been expressed earlier
about the continuance of the .employment_ of the employees of a B
company ordered to be compulsorily wound up that section 445(3}
was ·enacted making it clear that the passing of the order of
winding-
up amounts to a notice of discharge of the employees concerned ~
Section 445(3) c;:orresponds to the termination of service ·brought
about by the abolition of a po~t un.d er a Government' or by
the
closure of a business, neither of which as the Jaw stands today· c
requires compliance with· the principJes of natural justice._ . It may,
however, attract section . 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act;
• 1947 in.appropriate cases.

Jnthe Act, there· are specific provisions dealing with th'e · rights
D
of employees of a company. Sections. 417 to 420 of the Act deal
with employees' s~cu(ities and provident funds and 'clauses (b) to (f)
of section 530( 1) 'deal with preferential payments to be made to the
~
eJIJployees of a compao.y in liquidation from out of its assets. S~ion
635-B of the Act deals with the protection to which the employees
are entitled during investigation into the affairs -of a company. Rule
E
152 of the Companies. (Court) Rules, 1 959 (read with Form No. 67)
relates to proof of arrears of workmen's wages. The right to resist
a wiliding-up i;>etition is not one such right. ,,

It° is .true that public illterest which niay include within its
scape interests of employees of a company has to be kept in view
F
by the Court as observed in Bhalchandra Dharmajee Makaji and Ors. ·
. v. Alcock, Ashdown ' and Co. Ltd. and· Ors.(1) in exercising certain
powers under the Act. S~ctions 388-B, 394, 396, 397 and 408 of
the"Act do refer t9 the concept of public interest. The.se ·provisions
deal with the power of the Central Government to remove managerial
personnel from office on the recommendation :of the High Court.
compromises. arrangements and reconstruction of companies and
power of the' Court and the ·Government to prevent oppressiop · or
a
mismanagement of affaits of company. .They do not, liowever,
state that trade unions can as of right intervene in the pr0ceedings
~rising under them. H
l (1) 42 Company Cases. I~.
·916 SUPREMB COUllT REPORTS (l983l t s.c.a.

A It is not correct to say that there ·is no other remedy at all
for workmen who are likely to be affected . by the winding-up . order \_
made by the Court. Section 15-A of ·the Industrial (Development
and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act ~o. 65 of 1.951) which applies to
textile industry as well confers power on the Central Government to
carry out investigation into the affairs of a company in liquidation.
B It reads·:

"15-A. · Power to investigate into the affairs of a
company in liquidation-(1) Where a company, owning an
industrial un~ertaking is being wound up by or under the
'.
supervision of the High Couri, and the business of such
c company is not being continued, the Central Government
may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary, in the interest
of the general public and, in particular, in the interests ·of
production, supply or distribution of ahicles ·or cl~ss of
articles relatable to the concerned scheduled industry, to
D investigate into the possibility of running or restarting the
industrial undertaking, make an application to the High
Court praying for permission to make, , or cause to be
made,· an. investigation into such possibility by such per~on
or body of persons as that Government iµay appoint for
the purpose.
E
(2) Where an application is made 1by , the .Central
Government under sub-sectfon (1), the High Court shall,
in
notwithstanding anything contained the Companies Act~
1956 (I of 1956) or in any other law for the time being in
force grant the permission prayed for."
F , I'

The provisions of Chapters III-AA and lll·AB of the Industrial
(Development · and Regulation) Act, 1951 confer on the Central.
G~vernment powers regarding management or control of industrial
undertakings owned by corupanies in liquid.ati<;>n and power to
G provide relief to certain indusfrial undertakings 1including those .to
which Chapter III·A is applicable. Chapter III-AC of th.a t Act
· deals with the power of the Central Government in respect of
liqq,idation and reconstructiQn of companies. Jn particular, section .
I 8·FD(I) of that Act inter· a/ia provides that if, i on receipt of the ·
· report submitted by the authorised person, the CCntral Government
ff is satisfied in relation to a company, owning the industrial under•
taking, which is being wound up by the High Court, that its ass..
and liabilities are such . that in the ioteres~ of its creditors,
NATIONAL TEXTILES-v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 977

contributories the i_ndustrial undertaking should 1?e solid.as a running
) concern, as provided in· section 18-FE thereof it may by order
decide accordingly. Sub-section (2) of section 18-FD of that Act
stat_es that notwithstanding anything contained in sub~section (\)
thereof the Central Government may prepare a scheme for recons-
truction of a company if it is sati.sfied having regard 'to all relevant
. circumstances mentioned therein that it is proper to do so . When
B
such a scheme is prepared, the Central Government bas to send
it to the regfatered trade unions, if any, of the employees concerned
for their suggestions and objections. (See section 18-FF(3)). Any
scheme finally
-
approved would prevail.
notwithstanding · anything
contained in sections 391 to 394-A (both inclusive) of the Act. It is
open to the workers or their tr!f.de unions to move the Cenfral
c
Government to take appropriate steps under the aforesaid provisions
in order to protect the interests of the workers who are likely to be
affected by the winding-up orders.
•
Article 43A of the Constitution clearly stat.es that the State D
shall take steps by suitable legislation or in any ~tber way to secure
the participation of workers in the management of undertakings,
• establishments or other organisation engaged in- any industry. The
High-powered Expert Commit!.; on Comp'!nies and MRTP Acts
headed by Justice Ra:jinder Sachar of the Delhi High Court baa
also made certain recommendations about provisions to be made. E
_)
for workers' participation in management of companies. (Vide
paragraphs 18.127 to-18.143 of the Report). ·Parliament may take
early steps to implement soµie of the recommendations made by the
said Committee. It is significant that there is no recommendation
made even in this Report al?out the right of trade unions to contest
winding-up petitions. If the workers are issued .shares then they F
would no doubt be eo'titled to participate in the winding-up
proceedings as contributories. This may, be one way of sol viog the
problem by legislative means. Another way of providing a forum
to the workers' representative in matters relating to·the winding-up
' .
of a colllpaoy -is to amend section 292 of the Act as suggested in
para 11.27 and para)8.137 of the Report of the Sachar· Committee._ · G
Those paragraphs are reproduced below for ready reference : ·

_"11.27 The workers' representation on company
Board makes it necessary to provide that companies H
must ensure that certain decisions are necessarily taken
at the Board level and the Board do not_ delegate
978 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS (1983) I s.c.R.

A the .powers in respect of these matters to committees
er other functionaries in the organisation, otherwise the
participation of workers at the Board level is likely to
prove ineffective. The powers and functions which
cannot be delegated by the Board, and which must be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to take
8. policy decision are in respect of the following matters :-

(a) winding-op 6f the company ;

(b) changes in the memorandum and articles of associa-
tion ; .
c
(c) changes in the capital structure of a company (e.g. as
regards the relationship between the Board and the
shareholders a reduction or increase in the share
capital ; as regards the relations between the Board and
senior management, the issue of securities on a take- .
D over or merger) ;

(d) disposal of a substantial part of the undertaking ;

(e). the allocation or disposition of resources to the extent
not covered in (a) tq (d) above ; and
(f) the appointment, removal, control and remuneration
of management, whether as members of the Board or
in their capacity as ~xecutives or employees.

The suggestion regarding (a) to (e) above is on the same
line as the present power <if the Board to declare dividend.
In other. words, the shareholders will not be able to exercise
powers mentioned in (a) to (e) above unless recommended
by the Board. We would, therefore, suggest that section
292 be amended to provide for .the exercise of the fore-
going powers of the Board of a company .which is required
G by law to ensure participation of workers in management."

"18.137 Jn order to ensure effective particip_ation by
workers' representatives. at the Board level section 292
should be amended to provide that certain decisions are
H necessarily taken only at the Board level and no delegation
to Committees of the Board or to other functionaries is
made.''
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R~ RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 979

./; These suggestions emphasise that at present workers have no A '
right to contest winding-up procc_edings.

It is also open to_ Parliament to make a law on• the lines· of
sections 63 to 69 of the Employment Protection Act, 197_5 passed .
by the Parliament in the United Kingdom to give any additional
protection necessary for workmen who are likely to be_ affected B
adversely by the winding-up proceedings.. (See Palmer's -Company'
Law (22nd Bdn. Vol. I, p. 919)). ·Parliament may also consider the
introduction of a provision corresponding to section 74 of the
Companies . Act of J980 passed by the British Parliament. Such
. steps_ may mitigate any hardship that may be cansed to _the workers
as a consequence of the winding-up of a' company. c
It ha:s to be emphasised that the privilege of making suggestions
to the Court in the public interest is different from the right to be
impleaded as a party with the concomitant right to enter into
contest with the other parties and of taking an order in appeal
before higher courts.· The latter right has fo be conferred expressly D
by the statuie on any person who wishes to exercise it._ ~Jnder the.
' existing Jaw, the workers or their unions may make any suggestions
to the Court at ~ny stage but they cannot claim to be impleaded as
parties to _<he winding-up petition as of right.
E
_; The decision· of this Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar
Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.(1) does not
lend_any support to the case of the trade unions. In that case
which attracted the principles of ·administrative law the petitioner
trade union pleaded that Article.14; Article 19~1)(g) and Article 311
of the Constitution had been violated by the sale of_ the plant and F
equipment of a factory in which its members were · working.
Ultimately the petition was dismissed by this Court. ·one of the
distinguishing features of that case is that the factory - involved -in
that case wa• in the public_. sector and owned by the Government
against which a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was
maintainable. Chandrachud C.J. observed in the course of his G
i,udgment at pages 60-61 thus :

"Secondly, the right of Petitioners 3 and 4 and of the
other workers to carry on the occup11tion of industrial
workers is not, in any manner affected by the impugned H
(I) [19Sl) 2 S.C.R. 52.
980 SUPREME COURT RllPOR'tS 11983] I s.c.&.

A sale. The righ.t to pursue a calling or to carry on an ,
occupation is not the same thing as the right to work in •
a partfoular post under a contract of employment. If the
workers are retrenched consequent upon and on account
of the sale, it will be open to them to pursue their rights · '
and remedies under the Industrial laws. But the point to
8 be noted is that the closure of an establishment in which
a workman is for the time being employed does not by
itself infringe his fundamental right to carry on an occupa- ·.
tion which is guaranteed by Article 19(l)(g) of the
Constitution. Supposing a law were passed preveniing a
certain category of workers from accepting employment in
c fertiliser factory, it would be possible to contend then that
the workers have been deprived of their right to carry on
, an occupation. Even assuming that some of the workers
may eventually have to be retrenched in the instant case,
it will not be possisble to say that their right to carry on
·an occupation has· been violated. It would be open to
D them, though undoubtedly it will not be'Casy, to find out
other avenues of employment as industrial workers. Article
·\
J9(1)(g) confers a broad and general right which is available
to all persons to do work of any particular kind and of
-their choice. It does not confer the right to bold a particular
job or to occupy a particular post of one's choice. Even
E under Article 311 of the Constitution, the right to continue
in service falls with the abolition of the pqst in which the ..
'
person is working. The workers in the instant case can no
inore complain of the infringement of their fundamental
right under Article i9(l)(g) than can a Government servant
complain of the termination of his employment on. the
F abolition· of his post. The choice and freedom of the
workers to work as industrial workers is not .affected by the
sale. The sale may at the highest affect their locum, but
jt does not affect their locus, to work as industrial workers.
This is enough unto the day. on Art. 19(l)(g)."
G
On the question of locus standi of workers to maintain the
petition, the learned Chief Justice observed at pages 65-66 thus :

"That disposes of the question as regards the maintain-
H ability of. the writ petition. But, we· feel concerned ·to
point· out that the maintainability of a writ petition which
.. NATIONAL TEXTILBi .. · P.P. RAMA~RISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 981

is correlate.d to the existence and violation of a fundamental A
J ·.right is n6i always t~ be confused with the locus to bring
proceedings under Article 32. · These two matters often
mingle and coalesce with the result that it becomes difficult
to consider them in water-tight compartments. The
q·uestion whether a person has the locus to file a pro-
ceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses B
·a legal right and that right is voilated.. But, in an appro-
priate case, it may become necessary in the changing
awareness of legal rights and social ·obligations to take a
broader view of the question of locus to initiate a
pro~eeding, be it under Article 226 or under Article 32' of
the Constitution. If public property is dissipated, it would c
require a s!rong argument to ·convince the Court that
representative segments of the public or at least a section
of the public which is dire~tly interested and affected would
have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties
and ·obligations. Public enterprises are owned by the .
people and those who run them are accountable to the
D
' people. The accountability of the public sector to the
Parliament is i~effective because the . parliamentary control
of public enterprises is "diffuse and haphazard". We are
·not too sure if we would have refused reliefto·tbe workers ·
if we would have found that the sale was unjust. unfair or
. mala fide.';·
Krishna Iyer, J. in bis concurring opinion observed at pages
70- 71' thus :

"A pragmatic ·approach to social justice compels us to
F
·- interpret constitutional provisions, including those like
Arts. 3.2 ·and 226, with a view to see that effective policing
of the corridors of power is carried out by the court until
other ombudsman arrangements-a problem with \,Vhicb
Parliament has been wrestling for too long- emerges. I
·.have dwelt at a little· length on this policy aspect and the
G
court process because the learned Attorney General
'
challenged the petitioner's locus standi ·either qua worker
·-or qua citizen fo question in court the wrong doings of the
public sector although he maintained that what had been
... done by the Corporation was both bO'na fide and correct. · H
We certainly agree that judicial interferen~e with the
Administration cannot be meti.culous in our Montesquien

•
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I S.C.R.

A system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp
or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be
clearly defined and . never exceeded. If the Directorate 'of
a Government company has acted fairly, even if it has
faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a super-auditor,
take the Board of Directors to task. This function is
B limited to testing whether the administrative action has
been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and
has substantially complied with· the norms of procedure
set for it by rules, of public administration "

c 'A reading of the aforesaid passages shows that the Court was
concerned in that case witb,operations in a public sector cpmpany
and the activities of the Government. These observations cannot
have any relevance to a case involving the affairs of a company
.which is governed only by express provisions of company law and
other relevant statutes.
D
As the Jaw stands today, workers cannot contend that a factory
owned by an individual proprietor, on his death, should not be
divided amongst bis heirs, even though, they may lose their jobs.
They cannot resist a partition suit, in which one of the items of
property in respect of which relief is claimed is the factory ia which
E they are working, filed by a junior member of Hindu joint family
against the manager contending that the said factory is the separate
property of the manager and should not, therefore, be partitioned
merely because they may be discharged from service in the event
of the suit being ·decreed. They cannot resist the suit for dissolution
of a firm which owns the factory in which they, are working evetf
F
though at the distribution of the assets of the firm, the factory may
have to be dismantle i and sold. The position cannot be different
in the case of a company which is wound up by the Court. As the
law stands today, the workers fo a factory "Wned by a company
do not have any hand in the birth of a company, in its working
G during its existence and also in its death J;y dissolution. If the Jaw
expressly says that a memorandum of a company should be signed
by some future employees of the company, or that there should be
workers'· representatives on its board of directors or that the
company should not be wound up without consulting the wishes of \
H the workers, then they can certainly claim all such rights. Workers'
*'
participation in the affairs of a company or the ushering in of an
industrial democracy is quite a laudable object. That is the reason
NATIONAL TBXTILBS v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkafaram°iah, J.) 983

, for enacting Article 43-A of the Constitution which requires the. A
State to take steps, by suita/ile legislation or in any other way, to
J secure the participation of workers :in the management of under-
takings, establishme~ts .or other organisations engage.d in any
industry. The Legislature has not taken any concrete steps in this
regard. But, can the Court step in .and introduce drastic amend·
m.eiJts into the company law? Surely, it cannot. Even though there .B
is no express statement in our constitutional law incorporating in
it the doctrine of s.eparation of powers, in the interpretation of the
Constitution this Court has broadly adopted the said doctrine.
(See Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain ('). Even though by
virtue ot' its power of interpretation of law ·the Court in an indirect
way is making law, it should be stated that there are well recognised· c
. .limitations on" the power of the Court making inroads into the
legitimate domain of the Legislature. If the Legislature exceeds its
power, this Court steps in .. ,If the Executive exceeds its power, then
also this Court steps in. If tliis Court exceeds its power, what can
people do ? Should they be driven to seek an amendment of the
law on every such occasion ? The only proper solution is the D
observance of restraint by this Court in its pronouncements so that
• they do not go beyond its own l.egitimate sphere .

It is true that there are now new kinds of weapons lik.e
consumers' protection agitations against big companies whose E
activities are likely to affect the life of the community adversely. But,
for those agitations to be effective the Legislature should wake up
and make appropriate laws under which the consumers can bring
action against erring companies. In the absence of any ·such law,
this Court cannot issue directions to the companies on the basis of
_complaints from the members of the public. F
There are several areas where it is necessary for the Legislature
to make law. A reading of the provisions in Part IV of the Consti-
_tution shows that rriany of them are still to be implemented by the
passing of appropriate legislation. Article 41 of the Constitution
dealing with the right to work, Article 43 dealing with living G.
wages· etc ..for workers,. Article 44 which insists upon the introduc-
' #on of a uniform civil code for all citizens and Article 47 dealing
with the duty of' the State" to raise the level of nutrition and the
standard of living of the people aro some of the articles which have
! to be implemented either by the Legislature or by the Executive:

(I) (1976Jl2 S.C.R. 347.

•
'.984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] I S.C.R.

A Would this Court compel the Executive by issuing a writ to
implement the policy underlying Article 41, Article 43 and Article
47 without being backed up by necessary laws? Would this Court
enforce a uniform civil code in respect of all citizens, without the
aid of an appropriate legislation even though the concept of equality·
is enshrined in the Constitution and Article 44 specifically requires
B the State to endeavour to secure for ·all citizens a uniform civil
code? It may not do so Tlie only solution for many of these
social problems is to appeal to the appropriate organs of the State
to do their assigned job in the best interests of the Community. It •
is wrong to think that by some strained construction of law, the
Court can find solution to all problems.
c
In this very case, when arguments were going on [ suggested
that it may be appropriate to issue notice to the Company Law
· Administration of the Union of India so that the Court could have.
the benefit of the views of the Government.· It was not, however,
D acceded to.by the majority. The presence of the Union Government
in the present case as a party might have brought to its attention
the need for initiating necessary 'legislation, if it really fdt that it
was advisable to do so, for providing an opportunity to workers of
a company also to contest. the winding-up proceedings. It is, how~
ever, a· matter for regret that no tangible steps ·appear to have been
E taken to amend the Act even though the Sachar Com.mittee Report
• which contains many recommendations· which when implemented
would make the'· companies. which are centres of economic power
accountable to the' society at large and make them fall in line with
the current views on thei.r · social responsibilities, was forwarded to
the Government more than four years ago.
F

It may be that the employees or their trade unions are interest-
ed in requesting the Court to dispose of the factory a• going conern
so that their rmploymen t may not be '!ffected. How are they
interested in supporting one set of directors against whom charges
G
of waste, misappropriation and mismanagement are made by the
other set who are alleged to have b~n totally excluded from '
management by attempts amounting to oppression ? Ii1 the instant
case the trade unions concerned have filed almost a common state- \
H ment containing their grounds of objection ,:along with their notice
to appear in the proceedings filed under Rule 34 of the Companies
(Court) Rules 1959 p1muant to the· advertisement issued by the

•
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. F.R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkataramiah, J.) 985.

Court. The grounds of objection filed by the Coimbatore District A
National Textile Employees' Union are set out below in extenso :

''1. That the Company Petition is not maintainable under
the Companies Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as
the 'Act'.
B
2. That no case bas been made out by the petitioners
under section 433(f) of the Act.

3. That, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it is
not just and equitable that the company should ·be
·~ wound up. c
4. That another remedy is available to the petitioners and
hence the Comp.any cannot be wound up by virtue ·.Of
section 443(2) of the Act.

5. That the objector craves leave to reserve his right' to D
amplify and elaborate the above grounds · in the
counter affidavit io be filed to·the company petition."

It is seen from the foregoing that the trade unions are only
interested in supporting the cause.of the respondents against whom
allegations are made by the petitioners in the Company Petition by E
making certain general submissions, without traversing the various
allegations made in it. The respondents who are already on record
and who are. actually contesting the petition are! capable of· looking
after their interests and need not rely upon the support of the trade
unions who are neither creditors nor contiibutories and· who do
F
not know the details of the internal administration of the affairs of
the Company. The petitioners in the Company Petition would be
in a more disadvantageous position if they have to face the opposi-
tion of the trade unions also. Such a situation should not be created
by extending the area of controversy by a liberal interpretation of the
provisions of law when there are no compelling reasons to do so.

The High Court has in this case passed necessary orders in
order to protect the interests of the employees in Company Appli-
7 cation No. 844 of 1981 and in C.M.P. No. 11159 of 1981. The.
order passed in Company Application No. 844 qf 198\ is already set H
out above.
(

986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] I S.C.R.
A In C.M.P. No. 11159 of 1981 the High Court has passed the
following order :-

"This is a petition filed by the appellants in O.S.A.
No. 128 of 1981 for permitting the first appellant/company
to raise with its Bankers viz., Bank of Baroda, .Coimbatore, ·
B a temporary loan of an amount not exceeding Rs. 5,25,000
for the purpose of paying bonus to the workers of Jothi
Mills, as per the Memorandum of setllement entered into.
between the Company and its work_eis under section 18( 1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 10.I0.1979 by
pledging or charging the assets of the Company .............. .
c Though in form the appellanti; have prayed for raising of
a loan for honouring the commitment of Rs. 5,25.000
towards bonus for 1he workers of Jothi Mills by pledging
or charging the assets of the company during the argument
the learned counsel for the appellants was willing to avail
D of the existing.facilitie' in the Central Bank as provided
in the order Itself. Though for av.ailing the existing bank
facilities there is no need for any specific direction from •
this Court as the order appealed against itself gives such
liberty, the learned counsel for the appellants by way of
abundant caution requires such an interim dire~tion in
E this petition. The learned counsel for the respondents
pointed out that availing of the existing facilities ,_
referred to in the order of Shanmukhan, J., is a facility
that was available as on 13.7.1981 we think the learned
counsel for the respondents is well-founded in this con-
tenlion. (sic) But even so if the Banks as on 13.7.1981 the
F petitioners are entitled to avail the same in order to honour
the commitment relating to 'bonus for workers. Since
the order under appeal itself permits the petitioners to avail
of the existing Bank facilities with any of its Bank though
the application in form asked for raising of the ioan with
the Bank of Baroda, Coimbalore, we make it clear that it
is open to the petitioners to avail of the Bank loan facilities
with the Central Bank within the limits prescribed as on
13.7.1981. This is the only clarification that need be
given in this petition and no further orders are necessary."
(emphasis added) \-
H
These orders show that the High Court has kept in ·its view
the interests of worl<er~ wll!le Bivin1:1 directions in the ease from
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. p R. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkqtaramiah, J.) 987

/ time to time and that there is no longer any ground to complain A
about. According to the· petitioners in the winding-up petition the
occasion for the complaint of the workers had been cleverly engineered
· by the contesting respobdents. Be that as it may, as the orders .,f the
High Court stand today the workers can always approach it by
way of a company application for appropriate orders whenever
·they.feel that their working conditions are adversely affected during 8
the pen.dency of the proceedings. It is not necessary that the
workers or the trade unions should .be impleaded. as parties to the
Company Petitio~ enabling them to contest the winding-up petition.
Their pn:sence on record is not necessary for complete and effectual
adjudication of the winding-up petition. The trade unions are,
therefore, neither. necessary nor proper parties to the winding-up . c
petition on the facts and in the circumstances.of this case including
the element of public interest involved in any liquidation proceeding.

Before concluding it should be stated that it is not correct to
bold that the order of the High Court 'smacks of elitism' or 'sounds
.like a relic of feudal age' or is an 'obnoxious' one. The High Court
D
has decided the case in accordance with the prevailing view in the
country. No case in which a different view is taken. is cited before us.
Nobody disputes the proposition that law should not be static. It
should no doubt grow but it should have its legitimate birth and in a
case like this in the precincts of the Legislature. It should be the result E
of the exercise of legislative judgment, particularly when a departure
from express provisions of a statute or an established practice is to
be made, Judges are not expected to know all aspects of every such
matter. A discussion involving a comprehensive view of all !nterests
which are likely to be effected by any decision ·which makes a ·serious
departure from a well-settled principle of law would not take place ll'
before a court where only the parties to a case or their lawyers are
heard. Members of the public also would not know· what· is hap-
pening in courts. The publicity which a proceedi~g in the Legislature
would receive is not given to the proceedings in Court. Even the
· elected representatives of the people who are charged with the duty
of making laws may not know what is happening in a court of law. G
Therefore, it is aiways better to leave such matters t~ the decision'
of the Legislature, instead of the court, sometimes by a majority of
. .
one assummg power to make a new law.
'

It is no doubt true that the view of the High Court is also in H
conformity with the view prevailing in England,. That does not
mean that the High Court has s11rrendered its judgment to a foreign
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11983] I s.c.•.

A practice, because that is ·the very view which is being followed till
now in the Indian courts. We should not forget that the very con-
cept of company law is foreign to our country. It origninated in
Great Britain and our company law contained in successive Acts
passed by the ·Indian Legislature is modelled on British Jaw and
experience. There is a large body of company juri,pruden~e which
8 is common to all the Commonwealth countries. There may, how-
ever, be some local changes but the pattern appears to be common.
The practice of relying on foreign decisions whatever may be their
age only when they are in conformity with what we wish to hold
and of condemning them only on the ground that they are ancient
foreign decisions when they do not accord with our views is not ..... --
correct. A foreign decision (even though it may not be binding) · ~
is either worthy of acceptance or not depending upon the reasons
contained in it and not on its.origin or age. There is no reason
why we should not follow a well reasoned forei go decision unless it '
is opposed to our ethics, tradition and jurisprudence or otherwise
unsuited to Indian conditions. Can we say that the law of habeas
D corpus which has found its way into India from England is bad
only because if came frnm a foreign country or bas an ancient
origin ? The writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari referred to in Art. 32 and
Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, ther ule of promissory estoppel,
the principle of audi alterum partem and many other pripciples which
are applied by the Indian courts are all of foreign origin. Even the
socialist prinCiple is not entirely of Indian origin. It is difficult to
shut our eyes to realities of life.
:
Moreover, it is difficult even though it may not be impossible Y
to administer
. the company Jaw as it is now in force in India without / .
the aid of the principles laid down by some of the leading English
cases like Salomon v. Salomon & Co.( 1) laying down the principle of
corporate personality, Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v.
Riche(') dealing with the rule of ultra vires, Royal British Bank v.
Turguand(') laying down the rule of 'indoor management", Hedley
G Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.(') which establishes the
liability for negligent mis-statements in prospectuses, Foss v.

\
(1) f.1897] A,C. 22.
ff (2) (1875] L.R. 7 H.L. 653.
(3) [1856] 6 E & B 327 (Exch., Ch.)
(4) [1964] A. C. 465.
NATIONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRiSHNAN (Baharu/ Islam, l) 98<i

Harbottle(') and Burland v. Earle(') dealing with the principle of A
'the fraud on a minority' and Ebrahimi v. Westbo~rne Galleries(')
dealing with the application of the 'just and equitable' principle in
ordering the winding-up of a company. A reading of the decision of
this Court in Needle Industries (lndia) Ltd. & Ors. v. Needle Industries
Newey (India) Holding Ltd. & Ors.(') rendered by Chandrachud, C.J.
shows the importance of foreign decisions in deciding case arising B
under thi: Indian Company law which out of necessity bas to keep
pace with the well established Principles prevailing in many other
parts of the world for sustaining international trade and commerce.
Adoption of an universal system of mercantile law and obedience
to the conventions of the International Labour Organisation con-
stitute two important compulsions of modern international economic c
ts ·fife. It may be that the workers who are likely to be affected by
the winding-up need a larger protection. Th.at can be done only by
legi~lative action. This Court cannot, however, make any order·
' which will conflict with the existing law.

Io the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. No costs . D.
•
BAHARUL !SLAM, J. I have carefully read· the judgments
prepared and orders proposed by my Brothers Bhagwati and
Venkataramiah JJ. I entirely agree with Bb.agwati J. and regret my
inability to agree with Venkataramiah J. Any provision of any E
statute has. to be interpreted. keeping in view the letter and spirit
of the Constitution. Any interpretation that is not in consonance
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution is obnoxious and
unacceptable.
-
·1n tb.e winding-up proceedings in question, the National Textile F
Workers' Union filed the petition before the High Court witb. a
prayer to be heard before any order for winding-up was passed. The
reason was the workers' apprehension of termination of their services
in case of winding up of the Company. It is true, tb.ere is no express
provision in the Companies Act giving the workers any right to be
beard in a winding up proceeding before the Court. There is no G
express bar either. · Learned counsel for Respondents Nos. 6 to 9,
in support of his contention that the workers bad no right to be

/ (!) [1843) 2 Hare 461.
(2) [1902] A.C. 83. B
(3) [1973) A.C. 360,
(4> [1981J 3 s.c.R. 698.
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I S.C.R'
A heard in a winding up proceeding, cited Halsbury's Laws of England,
volume 7 page 614 para 1028 (4th Edition). The learned author has
stated the law on the subject thus :

"Only the petitioner, the Company and creditors and.
contributories are entitled to appear on the. petition ; other
parties have no right to be heard, and even if the Court
at the first instance elects to hear them as amici curiae, they
have no right of appeal."

This statement of the law has been made on the authority of
the judgment in Bradford Navigation Co. rendered as early as 1870 :
c (1970) 5 Ch. A, Page 600).

Learned counsel also cited Palmer Company Precedents (17th
Edition) Vol. 2, page 77, in which the law to the above effect was
stated. Learned counsel has submitted that the Company Law in •
India is the same as in the Company Law in England. The· 1aw
D cited may be good law for England with altogether a different system
of economy ; but is abhorent to India,_ p9.rticularly. after the
Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, by which the "Socialist"
and "Secular" concepts have been added and incorporated into the
Preamble of our Constitution. Our 'Democratic Republic' is no
longer merely 'Sovereign' but is also 'Socialist' and 'S_ecular'. A
E
Democratic Republic is not Socialist if in such a Republic the workers
have no voice at all. Our Constitution has expressly rejected the
old doctrine of the employers' right to 'hire and fire'. The workers
are no longer ciphers ; they have been given ·pride of place in our
economic system. The workers' right to be heard in a winding-up
F proceeding has to be spelt out from _the Preamble and Articles 38
and 43-A of the _Constitution and from the general principles of
natural justice.

AMARENDRA NATH SEN, J. I have read the judgment of my
learned brother Bhagwati, J. and also the judgment of my learned
G brother:venkataramiah, J. I cannot persuade myself to agree with
the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati, J. -I agree with the
judgment and order proposed by my learned brother Venkataramiah,
J. I shall indicate my .reasons for the view (hat I have taken.

H \
The material facts of this case have been set out in the
juagment of my learned brother Bhagwati J. and also in the judgment
of my learned brother Venkataramiah, J. The arguments advanced
NATIONAL TEXLILES V, P.R. RRMAKIUSHNAN 991
(Amarendra Nath Sen, J.)

from the Bar have been considered by both of them. It does not,
therefore, become necessary for me to reproduce them in this
judgment.

Whether the employees of, a Company in their capacity as
employees can claim as a matter of right to appear and be heard in B
a petition presented to court for the winding-up of the Company, is
the question for decision in this case. · ·

The right of an employee in his capacity as such to be beard
in a proceeding for winding-up of a company has been canvassed as
a proposition of law. The contention urged oil behalf of the trade
unions representing the workers. of the company is that whenever a
c
petition is presented to a Court for the winding up of a company,
the employees of the compa~y have the right to appear and be heard
, in the said pr0ceeding.
The principal argument advanced on behalf of the trad.; unions
representing the workers is that the employees of a company are D
equal partners of the management of the company, if not the more
important one, and the company, in view of the socio-economic role
it plays and it has to play in the country, can no longer be consider-
ed to be the concern of the members of the company. Further, the
argument is that the employees very maierially contribute to the
E.
working of a company and help the company in effectively playing
its socio·1~conomic role and promoting the interests not only of the
company, but also the larger interests of the nation and an order
of winding up seriously affects the interest of the empl~yees, virtually
•'-. taking away the means of their· livelihood. It has been submitted
that as an order of winding up of the company affects so seriously
\ F
''- the interests of the emplc>yees, the employees must have a say and
~
·must be beard in a proceeding for winding up before the Court. ·

I have earlier observed that the arguments· advanced from the
Bar on behalf of the trade unions have been noted at length by my
learned brothers Bbagwati and Venkataramiah, JJ. The arguments
no doubt express noble sentiments which I share ; but, in my
G
opinion, the arguments fail to establish that the employees have a
right to appear and be heard in a petition presented to a Court for
the winding up of a company. If the right is to be conceded to
/ employees on these· grounds it must logically follow that every H
employee of a company, whether he is a wo.rker within the meaning
of the Industrial Disputes Act or he is a member of the management
SUPREME COURT REP<lRTS [l9S3j i s.c.R

A staff, must enjoy the same right to appear and be beard in every
such proceeding for the winding up of the company. An order for
winding up affects all the employees of a company, whether they are
workers belonging to any trade union or not or whether they are
officers of the company, high or low, not being members of any
union or association. Further if the right to participate in a winding
B up proceeding is to be judged from the view point of the interest
of any party who may be prejudicially affected as a result of an
~ order of winding UP. being made, various other parties .who have
trade relations with the company must necessarily be held to have
the same right to be beard in a winding up proceeding. It is common
knowledge that various persons,· apart from the employees of the
c company, also depend for their survival on the supplies of various
materials, ingredients and components to the company and with
the.liquidation of a company, all such persons who are· making
their living out of their dealings with the company have to go
without occupation and have to face disaster. Persons having existing '
contracts with the company are also seriously prejudiced when an
D order of winding up of the company is made.

If the test of injury and adversely affecting tlle interests are
·•
consid~red to be sufficient to entitle a party· to a hearing in a pro-
ceeding on the footing that they are persons aggrieved, no. suit for
dissolution of a partnership can also be decided without impleading
E the employees of the Jirm and various other parties having trade
relations with the firm, ~s the dissolution of a firm may ·prejudicially
affect the interests of the employees or the various other persons
dealing with the firm.

It has to be borne in mind that a company can only be wound
F up in accordance with ihe provisions of the Indian Companies Act.
The right to have a company wound up is a right created by the
Statute. The entire procee\!ing in relation to the winding up of a
company is regulated by the statute, namely, the Indian Companies
Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the procedure to be
G followed is further supplemented by the provisions· .contained inJthe
rules made under the Act known as the Companies (Court) Rules, ,
1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).

The various modes of winding up of the company, under \
H what circumstances a company may be wound up by Court and
who are the persons competent to present a petition ·to Court for
the winding up of the company and who are the persons entitled to
· NATiONAL TEXTILES v. P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 993
(Amarendra Nath Sen, J.)
A
be beard c;m such a petition, are provided for in the Act and in the
Rules.

Xt has to be borne in mind that apari from the right of the
Court to order the winding up of a company in an appropriate case,
the Act recognises that a company may go into liquidation without B
any intervention by the Court and also· under the supervision of
Court, provided the necessary conditions laid down in the Act in
this regard are complied with. · Where the Company goes into
liquidation without reference to court or under the supervisiou of
the Court, the employees of the company who have to meet the
same fate of losing.their employment, as and when the coiiipany is c
wound up by the Court, do not and cannot have any voice or say in
the procedure to be adopted for the liquidation of the company.

In the case of winding up of any company by Court, the parties
who can move the Court for winding up of !he company are
specifically mentioned in the Act and only such persons are competent D
to present the winding up petition. The procedure to . be followed
on such a petition for windin·g up of the company being presented
to court a.nd the parties who are entitled to be heard on the petition
are dealt with and provided for in the Act and the Rules. The right
of appearance and of being heard. in a winding up proceeding has
been conferred on persons whom the Legislature considered to E
be necessary or proper parties for effective adjudication of the
·proceeding before the Court. The Act provides that a creditor to
. whom a company is indebted in a sum exceeding Rs. 500 and whose
debt has not been paid by the company notwithstanding the statutory
notice being served on the company is entitled to present a petition
for the winding up of the company and in such a case, the creditor F
whose debt cannot be properly disputed, is entitled to an order of
winding up on the ground of insolvency of the company. If a
company is commercially insolvent and is unable to pay its debts,
the company has necessarily to be wound up and the employees of
the company can have hardly anything to say in such a case for
assisting the Court in deciding the matter.
G

My learned brother Venkataramiah, J. has· referred to the
various provisions of the Act and also to relevant Rules, which go
?
to !ndicate that no such right of the employees to appear and parti-.
H
cipate in a winding up proceeding is recognised. Rule 34 of the
Rules on which strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel
994 SUl>REME COURT REPORTS [l 9S~ l I s.c.R..
•
A appearing on behalf of the trade unions, is not of any assistance.
The said Rule reads as follows :- \~

"Every person, who intends to appear at the hearing
of a petition, whether to support or oppose the petition,
shall serve on the petitioner or his advocate, notice of his
B intention at the address given in the advertisement. The
notice shall contain the address of such person, and be
signed by him or his advocate, and same as otherwise pro-
vided by these rules shall be served (or if sent by post, shall
be posted in such time as to reach the addresse) not later
than two days previous to the day of hearing, and in the
c cas~ of a petition for winding up not later than five days
previous to the day of hearing. Such ·notice shall be in
Form No. 9, with such variations as the circumstances may
require, and where· such person intends to oppose the
petition, the grounds of his opposition or a copy of bis
D affidavit if any, shall be furnished along with the notice. Any
person who has failed to comply with this rule shall not
except with the leave of the Judge, be allowed to appear at
the bearing of the petition."

This particular Rule appears in Part I and in Part I of the Rules,
E general provisions are made. This Rule only lays down the procedure
to be followed by any person who intends to be beard at the hearing
of a petition, whether to support or oppose the petition, and this Rule
does not deal with the competence or right of any particular person
to appear at the hearing of. any petition nor does this rule create any
right in any person. Part III of the Rules makes specific provisions·
F with regard to winding up by Court. Rule 9B in Part III reads :- y
"Every contributory or creditor of the company shall be
entitled to be furnished by the petitioner or by bis advocate
with a copy of the petition within 24 hours of his requiring
· the same on payment of the prescribed charges."
G
For properly and effectively. adjudicating upon any winding-up '
petition, the parties must necessarily know the grounds contained in
the petition on which the Court has been moved for · the winding-
up of the company to make representation with regard to the same.
H Rule 9B requires that copies of the petition in terms of the said
rules are to be furnished to every contributory or creditor of the
company and the said rule makes no mention of the ·employees of
NATIONAL TEXTILES V, P.R. ~AMAKAISHNAN 995
(Amarendra Nath Sen, J.).
A
the company. I agree with my-brother
. Venkataramiah, J. that
-
ori a
proper consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act and also
of the Rules, an employee of a company in his capacity as such does
not have any right to appear and be heard in a petition presented.
to Court for the winding-up of the company. · It will be noticed on
an analysis of the provisions of the Act that from the stage of the B
formation of the company till the very last stage of its dissolution,
company jurisprudence does not recognise any right of an employee
in his capa~ity as an employi!e of the company in the matter of
formation of the company, its functioning and its ultimate
/
winding-up.
c
The Act, howe_ver, makes necessary provisions as to deposit of
employees' security monies with a Scheduled Bank in S. 417 of the
Act. The Act also makes suitable- provision in Section 418 about
Provident Funds of Employees. Necessary provisions for preferen-
tial payment of wages or salary of an employee in case of winding- 0
up of a company have been made in Section 530 of the Act. For
safeguarding what the Legislature considers to be public interest,
the Legislature in various sections' of the Act has made suitable pro-
visions casting various obligations on the company with penal con-
sequences and has conferred powers on the Government.

The introduction of Art. 43A in the Constitution which
reads--"The St_ate shall take steps, by suitable legislation or in any
- other way, to secure the participation of workers in the management
of undertakings, establishments or other organisations· engaged in
any industry"-does not affect the position in any way. Participation
in the management of a company does not by itself create any right F
- in any such person to appear and be heard in a windfng-up petition.
Unless otherwise named personally as a party to a winding:up petition,
no person merely on the ground that he happens to be in the mana-
gement of the com pay is entiHed as a matter of right to appear and
he heard in a winding-up proceeding. Persons in mariagement of the
company may, if they are so authorised, appear and participate in G
a winding up proceeding on behalf of the company and representing
the company. They will, however, be entitled to appear if they are
members or creditors of the company in such capacities, but not
/ as members of the management. A director of a company must of
necessity be a member of the company, as provided in the Act. H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.C.ff,

A It is worth mentioning that the Indian Companies Act is based
on the English Companies Act and both the Acts contain more or \
'<> .
less similar provisions. The provisions of the Indian Companies
Act with "regard to the winding-up Cf the Company are almost alike
to the provisions contained in the English Companies Act. As early
as 1870 the English Court in Re : Bradford Navigation Co.( 1) held
B on a consideration of the provision of the English Act that no
person bad a right to be heard against a petition for winding-up of
a company except creditors and contributories. It is no doubt true
that this decision, still holds good and IB considered to be good law,
as will be evident froiµ the comments in authoritative text books on
the subject. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. •VII at
c p. 614, it has been !aid down-"Only the petitioners, the company,
·and creditors and contributories are entitled to appear ·on the peti-
tion; other parties have no right to be heard, and, even if the Court
of first instance elects to hear them as amici curiea, they have no
right of appeal." In Palmer's Company Precedents (7th Eda), Part
II, the following observations appear at p. 77 :-
D y
"Any creditor or shareholder may appear to support or
oppose the petition. But no one else can do so, even if he
has an indirect interest in the continued existence of the
company."
E On the basis of the decision in Re : Bradford Navigation Co. (supra),
the following comments have been made at p. 546 in Buckley on
the Companies Act, 14th Edn. Vol. I:-

"The only persons entitled to be beard are the company,
the creditors and contributories. The Court may, in its
discretion bear other persons who have an interest in order
to Jea'rn what public grounds there are in favour of, or in
opposition to, the winding up but such persons can be heard
only as amici curiae, and cannot appeal."

G Various legislations for the benefit and welfare of the
employees have since been passed in England and the Company
Act in England also did undergo various changes from time to
time. The employees of a company in England are affected in
the same way as the employees of a company in India when an
H
(I) [1870] S Ch. App. 600.
NATIONAL TBXTILBS V, P.R. RAMAKRISHNAN 997
(Amarendra Nath Sen, J.)
A
order for winding up of the company is made. It cannot be
said that workers in England are not conscious of their status
·and position and of the important role they play in the proper
functioning of a company and in England there are also the trade
unions of the workers for defending, protecting and improving the
conditions and rights of the workers. Despite all these, the right of B
an employee or any trade union representing the workers to parti-
cipate and be heard in a winding-up· petition is not recognised in
England.

I have to observe that Mr. Ramamurthi, learned counsel
appearing for one of the trade unions, has placed very strong reliance c
on thi: following observations of this Court in the case of Hind
Overseas Private Limited v. Raghunath Prasad Jhunjhunwala and
Ors.(1 ) : -
'
"Although the Indian Companies Act is modelled on
the English Companies Act, the Indian Law is developing 0
on its own lines. Our law is also makin·g significant progress
of its own as and when necessary. Where the words used in
both the Acts are identical, the English decisions may throw
good light and reasons may be persuasive. But as the Privy
Council observed long ago in Ramanandi Kuer v; Kalawati
Kuer(2 ).
• .E
It has often been pointed out by this Board that
where there is a positive enactment of the Inuian
Legislature, the proper course is to examine the langu-
age of that statute and to ascertain its proper meaning-
uninfiuenced by any consideration derived from· the
previous state of the law or of the English. Law upon F
which it may have been founded.

If it was true in the twenties it is more apposite· now
that the · background conditions and circumstances of the
• G
Indian society, the needs and. requirements ~f our country
call for a somewhat different treatment. We will have to·
adjust and adapt, limit or extend, the principles derived
j

n
II) fl976] 2 S.C.R. 2261at p. 240,
(2) (1928] P.C. 2,
998 SUPRBME COURT RE~ORTS [1983f j ;,C.R.

A from English decisions, entitled as they are to great respect,
suiting the conditions of our society and the country in
general always, however, with one primary consideration in·
view that the general interests of the shareholders may not
be readily sacrificed at the altar of squabbles of directors of
powerful groups for power to manage tbelcompany."
B
These observations, to my mind, are· of no assistance in deciding
the question involved in this appeal. These observations were made
in different context. These observations, however, indicate that
where the provisions of the Indian Act and the English Act are
alike, the decisions of the English Courts throw good light and the __ __......_.-,
c reasons may be persuasive, it is no doubt true that tfie decisions of
the English Courts do not have a _binding effect and the proper
course for this Court while considering or interpreting an enactment
of the Indian Legislature is to examine the language of the Statute
D to ascertain its proper meaning unifluenced by any consideration
derived from the provisions of the English Law upon which it may )
have been founded. Principles of construction of a statute are well '·'
settled •.

It is significant to note that no decision of any Court in India
E could be cited where the claim of an employee in his capacity as an
employee to participate and be heard'in a petition for winding up
of the company as a matter of right has been accepted. On the other
hand, the settled legal position in this country so far bas been that
no employee could claim any such right. It is interesting .to note that
though in this country also the provisions of the Companies Act
have undergone various changes from time to time and various
enactments for the welfare of the workers have been passed from
time· to time, the Legisiature in our country did not consider it
proper or necessarylto amend the provisions of the Indian Companies
Act to confer any such right on the workers.

G
I, however, wish to make it clear ihat although an employee
of a company as an employee of a company cannot claim to appear
and be heard in a petition for winding-up of the company as a
matter of right, yet in any appropriate case the Court in a winding- \
up proceeding may require or permit any employee to appear at any
stage of a winding-up proceeding and hear him, if the Court be of
th.e opinion that the employee or the employees should be heard in
NAtiONAL TEXTILES V. P.R. RAMAK~ISHNAN 999
(Amarendra Nath Sen, J.)
A
.,. the internsts of administration of justice and for proper disposal of
any' matter. It appears that in this very case, the Court at an earlier
stage of' the proceeding had, in fact,' heard the employees and
redressed their just grievance.

With these observations I agree with the order proposed by B
my learned brother Venkataramia]\, J.

H.L.C. Appeals allowed.
/

.,
..

' .

•

/