NEERU YADAVversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 713
- Decided
- 29 September 2015
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
The High Court’s bail order is set aside because it ignored the accused’s criminal antecedents and relied solely on parity, contrary to the discretionary principles under Section 439 CrPC.
Summary
The appellant Neeru Yadav challenged the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to respondent No.2, a repeat offender accused of multiple heinous offences including murder and armed assault. The High Court had relied primarily on the doctrine of parity, noting that other co‑accused had been released on bail, and had not considered the accused's extensive criminal history. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in accordance with established bail principles, including the nature of the offence, severity of punishment, risk of tampering with witnesses, and the accused's prior record. It held that the High Court erred by ignoring the accused's status as a history‑sheeter and by granting bail on a whimsical basis, thereby violating the discretion required in such serious cases. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the bail order, directing that the accused be taken into custody or, if already detained for other matters, not be released on bail in the present case.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court correctly exercised its powers under Section 439 CrPC in granting bail to a history‑sheeter accused of heinous offences.
- Whether the doctrine of parity can justify bail when the accused's criminal antecedents and the seriousness of the charges have not been duly considered.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2015) 10 S.C.R. 802
A NEERUYADAV
v.
STATE OF U.P.ANDANR.
(Criminal Appeal No.1272 Of 2015)
B SEPTEMBER 29, 201~
[DIPAK MISRA AND PRA~ULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 439 - Special
powers of High Court or Court of Session reg~rding bail -
C Exercise of jurisdiction by High Court u/s. 439 - High Court
enlarged respondent no.2 on bail on the basis of parity-
Sustainability of the order- Held: High Court totally ignored
the criminal antecedents of the accused - High Court
0 weighed the doctrine of parity- Respondent no.2 is a history-
sheeter and is involved in heinous offences which cannot be
regarded as jejune - Law expects· the judiciary to be alert
while admitting these kind of accused persons to be at large
andthe emphasis is on exercise of discretion judiciously and
E not in a whimsical manner-:- Thus, the order passed by the
High Court is set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 On a perusal of the list, it is quite vivid
F that the respondent no.2 is a history-sheeter and is
involved in heinous offences. Having stated the facts and
noting the nature of involvement of the accused in the
crimes in question, there can be no scintilla of doubt to
name him a "history-sheeter". The High Court totally
G ignored the criminal. antecedents of the accused. What
weighed with the High Court was the doctrine of parity.
A history-sheeter involved in the nature of crimes
reproduced herein, are not minor offences so that he is ·
not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
H" heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of
802
NEERU YADAVv. STATE OF U.P. 803
imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases do A
create a thunder and lightening having the effect
potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The
law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these
kind of accused persons to be at large and, therefore,
the emphasis is on exercise of discretion judiciously and B
not in a whimsical manner. [Paras 9, 15] [810-G-H; 814-
B-C]
1.2 It is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as the
cancellation is not sought because o~ supervening C
circumstances. The annulment of the order passed by
the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have
not been taken into consideration which includes the
criminal antecedents of the accused and that makes the
order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result is D
the lancination of the impugned order. The order passed
by the High Court is set aside. If the respondent no.2 is
at large, he would be taken into custody forthwith; and
if he is still in custody because of certain other cases,
he would not be admitted to bail in connection with the E
instant case. [Para 18, 19) [814-G-H; 815-A-B]
Chaman Lal v. State of U.P (2004) 7 SCC 525:
2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 584 - relied on.
F
State of U.P. v. Marmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC
2:2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 454; Puran v. Rambilas
(2001) 6 ~cc 338: 2001 (3) SCR 432; Nareodra
K. Amin v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC
584:2008 (6) SCR 1149; Prakash Kadam v. G
Ramprasad Vishwanah Gupta (2011) 6 SCC
189:2011(6) SCR 800; Ram Govind Upadhyay
v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598:2002 (2)
SCR 526; Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi
(2001) 4 SCC 280:2001 (2) SCR 684; Prasanta H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015]10S.C.R.
A KumarSarkarv. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC
496:2010 (12) SCR 1165 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 454 referred to. . Para 5
B
2001 (3) SCR 432 referred to. Para 5
2008 (6) SCR 1149 referred to. Para 5
c 2011(6) SCR 800 referred to. Para 5
2002 (2) SCR 526 referred to. Para 10
2001 (2) SCR 684 referred to. Para 10
D 2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 584 relied on. Para 11
2010 (12) SCR 1165 referred to. Para 12
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1272 of2015.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.12.2014 of the
High Court, Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 25466 of 2014.
-
F Pradeep Kumar Yadav, Manju Jetley for the Appellant.
R. K. Dash, Abhisth Kumar, Dhirendra Kumar, Somraj
Choudhary, Archana Singh, P. George Giri, Ginesh P. for the
Respondents.
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. The present appeal, by special leave,
on a summary glance may appear that a victim who might have
an axe to grind against the accused, the respondent no.2
H herein, and further to wreck his vengeance has approached
NEERU YADAVv. STATE OF U.P. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 805
this Court seeking cancellation of his bail, possibly being A
. emboldened by the inaction of the State authorities who have
chosen to maintain sphinx like silence or decided to assume
the stagnated posture of a splendid sculpture of Rome, and
invigorated by the thought that he can singularly carry the
crusade, without any support, for he has a cause to vindicate B
by valiantly exposing the legal infirmities in the order passed
by the High Court admitting the 2"d respondent to bail and also
unconceal the lackadaisical attitude of the State, but on a
keener scrutiny the initial impression melts away and the
perversity of the order impugned gets unrolled. Be it stated, at C
a narrow level it may look like a combat between two
individuals, but when analytical scrutiny is done and the State
is compelled to wake up from its slumber, the unveiling of facts
reveal the contestation between the accord and the discord,
0
the scuffle betwixt the sacrosanctity and the majesty of law on
one hand and the maladroit ingenious efforts to get the benefit
by the abuse of process of the Court on the other. The analysis
has to be made, that being an imperative command, between
the hones_t nidification and the surreptitious edifice. E
2. Mr. Pradeep Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the
appellant, with all the distress and the intellectual agony at his
command, has submitted that the High Court without
appropriate analysis and even without being fully apprised of F
the fact situation, solely on the basis of parity, as if it is the only
foundation or for that matter, the comet that has come off to
shine, has enlarged the respondent no.2 on bail totally being
oblivious that no accused, however influential he may be or
clever he thinks to be, cannot be allowed to rn,Jllify the sanctity G
and purity of law and jettison the age old values "truth in action"
and "the firm and continuous desire to render to every one
which is due", the two fundamental pillars of justice. The plea,
submits Mr. Yadav, apart from cleverness also shows an
attempt of the nonchalant mind of the respondent No 2 to H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 10 S.C.R.
A engage in fertile imagination possibly thinking that the ground
of parity is the real structure of palladium to bring the nemesis
of the prosecution and put the Court in a situation to choose
between Scylla and Charybdis. And, at this juncture, we must
state that both the appellant and the State (though at a later
B stage) have become Argus-eyed and destroyed the ingenious
foundation so astutely built by the accused.
3. Keeping in view the aforesaid submissions, we shall
proceed to adumbrate the requisite factual score. One Salek
C Clland s/o. Satpal Singh lodged an FIR at P.S. Kavinagar,
Ghaziabad on 25.02.2013 about 11.45 a.m. against certain
persons relating to the murder of his elder brother, Yashvir
Yadav. On the basis of the lodging of the FIR, the criminal law
was set in motion and eventually chargesheet was filed which
D formed the subject matter of Case Crime No. 237 of 2013 for
the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302,
307, 394, 411, 454, 506, 1208 read with Section 34 IPC.After
the application for bail was rejected by the learned trial Judge,
the accused person, respondent no.2, moved the High Court
E in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 25466 of 201 ~· It was
contended before the High Court that an omnibus role had
been ascribed to him and the other accused persons that they
had indulged in general firing as a consequence of which one
F person had died, for he had received three gun shot injuries. It
was also contended that there was no credible evidence against
the accused persons. The real plank of submission before the
High Court, as is perceptible, was that prayer for bail in respect
of 11 accused persons including Mitthan Yadav had already
G been allowed, and there was no justification to deny him the
said benefit as he was similarly placed.
4. The prayer for bail was resisted by the Public
Prosecutor contending, inter alia, that there was indiscriminate
H firing by the accused person causing fatal injuries. The High
NEERU YADAV v. ::>TATE OF U.P. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 807
Court, after hearing both the parties, has passed following A
order:-
"In view of above facts, considering the nature of
allegation, severity of punishment and period of detention,
without expressing any opinion on merit, it is a fit case B
for bail.
Let the applicant Budhpal @ Buddhu be enlarged on bail
on his furnishing a personal bond with two heavy sureties
each in the like amount to the satisfaction of court c
concerned in case crime no. 237 of2013 under Section
147, 148, 149,302,307,394,411,454,506, 1208, 341.P.C.
Police Station Kavi Nagar, District Ghaziabad with the
following conditions:
D
(i) The applicant will not tamper with the evidence during
5 the trial.
(ii) ThA applicant will not pressurize/intimidate the
prosecution witness.
E
(iii) The applicant will appear before the trial court on the
date fixed, unless personal presence is exempted.
In case of breach of any of the above conditions, the court
below shall be at liberty to cancel the bail." F
The said order is the subject matter of assail in the present
appeal by special leave.
5. At the outset we are obliged to clarify that it is not an
appeal seeking cancellation of bail in the strictest sense. It G
actually calls in question the legal pregnability of the order
passed by the High Court. The prayer for cancellation of bail
is not sought on the foundation of any kind of supervening
circumstances or breach of any condition imposed by the High H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 10 S.C.R.
A Court. The basic assail is to the manner in which the High Court
has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC while
admitting the accused to bail. To clarify, if it has failed to take
into consideration the relevant material factors, it would make
the order absolutely perverse and totally indefensible. That is
B why there is a difference between cancellation of an order of
bail and legal sustainability of an order granting bail. [See State
of U. P. v. marmani Tripathi 1 , Puran v. Rambilas 2, Narendra
K. Amin v. State of Gujarat3 , and Prakash Kadam v.
C Ramprasad Vis~wanah Gupta4]
6. Having cleared that maze, we may clarify, though
seriously urged by Mr. P. George Giri that there is no warrant
for cancellation of bail as there has been no supervening
circumstances, yet the said enthusiastic submission leaves
D us unimpressed, as that is not the real thrust of the matter.
7. The mystery does not end there. Mr. P. George Giri,
learned counsel for the respondent on 14.9.2015, in course of
hearing, on instructions advanced an eminently innocuous, but
E innovative plea with the potentiality to create immense
confusion that the description of respondent no.2 is absolutely
erroneous, and, in fact, he is not the accused in any case. Mr.
Pradeep Kumar Yadav very fairly stated that there has been a
· typographical error in describing the name of the respondent
F no.2, for his name should have peen Budhpal@ Buddhu s/o.
Sh. Ram and not Santpal Yadav. Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior
counsel appearing for the State apprised us that the address
is correct as state~ in the FIR and the chargesheet and the
same is also reflected in the application for grant of bail. Taking
G note of the said situation, we permitted the cause title to be
corrected. However, the issue having been raised regarding
1
(2005J 8 sec 21
2
(2001 J a sec 338
H 3
(2008J 13 sec 584
• (2011) a sec 189
NEERU YADAVv. STATE OF U.P. [DIPAK MISRA, J,] 809
the identity of the respondent no.2, to clear our conscience, A
we asked the State to show us the documents that he is the
person who is a.ccused of the offence. On the next occasion,
documents were shown and we were satisfied, and we allowed
the ambitious submission to burn into ashes, or to put it
differently, evaporate in the thin air. B
8. It is interesting to note that learned counsel for the
appellant and the learned counsel for the state submitted that
the respondent no.2 is still in jail despite the order of bail as he
is involved in so many cases. We will take up the said issue at C
a later stage. It is submitted by Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for
the appellant that despite the factum of criminal history pointed
out before the High Court, it has given it a glorious ignore which
the law does not countenance. The solitary and the singular
grievance which is propounded with solidity that the High Court D
should have dwelt upon the same and thereafter decided the
matter. Mr. Dash; learned senior counsel (though the State has
not moved any application for setting aside the order of bail
granted by the High Court for the reasons which are
unfathomable) unhesitatingly accepted the said submission. E
In the additional affidavit, an independent chart has been filed
by the state and we find that apart from the present case, there
are seven cases pending against the respondent no.2. The .
chart of the said cases is reproduced below:-
F
" 1. FIR Nci. 664/02 u/s 302 IPC, PS Kavinagar,
Ghaziabad.
2. FIR No. 558/04 u/s. 392, 411 IPC, PS Kotwali, D,ist.
Bulandshahar.
3. FIR No. 14/05 u/s. 398, 401, 307 IPC PS Naida, G
Gautam Budh Nagar.
4. FIR No. 15/05 u/s. 25, 27 Arms Act, PS Sector 49,
Naida, Gautam Budh Nagar
5. FIR No. 1614/08 u/s. 364, 302, 201 IPC, PS Sihani H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 10 S.C.R.
A Gate, Ghaziabad 6.
FIR No. 98/05 u/s. 2/3 Gangster Act, PS Sector 49,
Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar
!- FIR No. 451/12 u/s. 60 PS Sector49 Noida, Gautam
B Budh Nagar"
9. On a perusal of the aforesaid list, it is quite vivid that
the respondent no.2 is a history-sheeter and is involved in
heinous offences. Having stated the facts and noting the nature
C of involvement of the accused in the crimes in question, there
_ can be no scintilla of doubt to name him a "history-sheeter".
The question, therefore, arises whether in these circumstances,
should the High Court have en1arged him on bail on the
foundation of parity.
D
10. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh 5 ,
it has been clearly laid down that the grant of bail though
involves exercise of discretionary power of the Court, such
exercise of discretion has to be made in a judicious manner
E and not as a matter of course. The heinous nature of crimes
warrants more caution as there is a greater chance of rejection
of bail though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter. In the said case, reference was made to Prahlad
Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi 6 , and thereafter the court
F proceeded to state the following principles:-
"(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not
only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the
punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and
the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
G
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being
tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat
for the complainant should also weigh with the court in
the matter of grant of bail. ·
H ' c2002) 3 sec 598
• c2001) 4 sec 280
NEERU YADAV v. STATE OF U.P. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 811
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence A
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered B
and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have
to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the
event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness
of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the
accused is entitled to an order of bail." C
11. It is a well settled principle of law that while dealing
with an application for grant of bail, it is the duty of the Court to
take into consideration certain factors and they basically are,
(i) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in o
cases of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, (ii)
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses for
apprehension of threat to the complainant, and (iii) Prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. [See Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P.7 ) E
12. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee8 ,
while dealing with the court's role to interfere with the power of
the High Court to grant bail to the accused, the Court observed
that it is to be ~een that the High Court has exercised this F
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with
the basic principles laid down in catena of judgments on that
point. The Court proceeded to enumerate the factors:-
"9 .... among other circumstances, the factors [which are) G
to be borne in mind while considering an application for
bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
1
(2004) 7 sec 525
• (201 O) 14 sec 496 H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 10 S.C.R.
A to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
B released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
c
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail." ·
D
13. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of
the concept of liberty and its curtailment by law. It is an
established fact that a crime though committed against an
individual, in all cases it does not retain an individual character.
E It, on occasions and in certain offences, accentuates and
causes harm to the soqiety. The victim may be an individual,
but in the ultimate eventuate, it is the society ~ich is the victim.
A crime, as is understood, creates a dent in the law and order
situation. In a civilised society, a crime disturbs orderliness. It
F affects the peaceful life of the society. An individual can enjoy
his liberty which is definitely of paramount value but he cannot
be a law unto himself. He cannot cause harm to others. He
cannot be a nuisance to the collective. He cannot be a terror
to the society; and that is why Edmund Burke, the great English
G thinker, almost two centuries and a decade back eloquently
spoke thus:-
"Men are qualified for civil liberty, in exact proportion to
their disposition to put moral chains upon their own
H appetites; in proportion as their love to justice is above
NEE RU YADAV v. STATE OF U.P. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 813
their rapacity; in proportion as their soundness and A
sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and
presumption; in proportion as they are more disposed
to listen to the counsel of the wise and good, in
preference to the flattery of kr.aves. Society cannot exist
unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be 8
placed somewhere and the less of it there is within, the
more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal
constitution of things that men of intemperate minds
cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters9 •
c
14. E. Barrett Prettyman, a retired Chief Judge of US Court
of Appeals had to state thus:-
"In an ordered society of mankind there is no such thing
as unrestricted liberty, either of nations or of individuals. o
Liberty itself is the product of restraints; it is inherently a
composite of restraints; it dies when restraints ~re
withdrawn. Freedom, I say, is not an absence of restraints;
it is a composite of restraints. There is no liberty without
order. There is no order without systematised restraint. E
Restraints are the substance without which liberty does
not exist. They are the essence of liberty. The great
problem of the democratic process is not to strip men of
restraints merely because they are restraints. The great
problem is to design a system of restraints which will F
nurture the maximum development of man's capabilities,
not in a massive globe of faceless animations but as a
perfect realisation, of each separate human mind, soul
and body; not in mute, motionless meditation but in
flashing, thrashing activity. 10 " G
15. This being the position of law, it is clear as cloudless
Alfred Howard, The Beauties of Burke (T. Davison. London) 109
10
Speech at Law Day Observances (Pentagon, 1962) as quoted in Case H
and Comment, Mar-Apr 1963
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 10 S.C.R.
A sky that the High Court has totally ignored the criminal
antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with the High
Court is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the
nature of crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are
not minor offences so that he is not to be retained in custody,
B but the crimes are of heinous nature and such crimes, by no
stretch of imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases
do create a thunder and lightening having the effect potentiality
of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The law expects the
judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused
C persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on
exercise of discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical
manner.
16. In this regard, we may profitably reproduce a few
D significant lines from Benjamin Disraeli:-
"! repeat. ........ that all power is a trust-that we are
accountable for its exercise- that, from the people and
for the people, all springs, and all must exist."
E
17. That apart, it has to be remembered that justice in its
conceptual eventuality and connotative expanse engulfs the
magnanimity of the sun, the sternness of mountain, the
complexity of creation, the simplicity and humility of a saint
F and the austerity of a Spartan, but it always remains wedded
to rule of law absolutely unshaken, unterrified, unperturbed and
loyal.
. 18. Before parting with the case, we mciy repeat with profit
G that it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation
is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The
annulment of the order passed by the High Court is sought as
many relevant factors have not been taken into consideration
which includes the criminal antecedents of the accused and
H that makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable
NEERU YADAV v. STATE OF U.P [DIPAK MISRA, J.) 815
result is the lancination of the impugned order. A
19. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed
by the High Court is set aside. If the respondent no.2 is at
large, he shall be taken into custody forthwith; and if he is still
in custody because of certain other cases, he shall not be B
admitted to bail in connection with the present case. We make
it clear that we have not expressed any opinion with regard to
other cases and simultaneously we also clearly state that our
observations in this case are only meant for purpose of setting
aside the order granting bail and would have no impact or effect C
during the trial.
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
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