NEETI MALVIYAversusRAKESH MALVIYA
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 318
- Decided
- 12 May 2010
- Disposal
- Hearing Adjourned
- Bench
- D K JAINC K PRASAD
Holding
The Court held that the question of waiving or reducing the statutory period under Section 13‑B(2) via Article 142 must be decided by a larger bench and therefore referred the matter to a three‑Judge Bench.
Summary
The petitioner, Neeti Malviya, sought to transfer a divorce petition from the Family Court in Bangalore to the Family Court in Hoshangabad. The parties had reached a settlement in Supreme Court Lok Adalat, agreeing that the husband would pay Rs. 65 lakh and that a joint application for divorce by mutual consent would be filed thereafter. The dispute centered on whether the six‑month waiting period prescribed in sub‑section (2) of Section 13‑B of the Hindu Marriage Act could be waived or reduced by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court examined earlier decisions where the Supreme Court had both invoked and refrained from using its extraordinary powers to override the statutory period. Concluding that the issue required a definitive ruling, the Court referred the question to a three‑Judge Bench for consideration, directing the parties to file a joint petition within two weeks.
Issues considered
- Can the period prescribed in sub‑section (2) of Section 13‑B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 be waived or reduced by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution?
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 142
- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 13-B(1), s. 13-B(2)
Subjects
Judgment
[2010] 6 S.C.R. 1103
NEETI MALVIYA A
V.
RAKESH MALVIYA
(Transfer Petition (C) No.899 of 2007)
MAY 12, 2010
B
[D.K. JAIN AND C.K. PRASAD, JJ.]
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
s.13-8(2) - Divorce by mutual consent - Settlement c
between the parties before Supreme Court Lok Ada/at -
Terms of settlement complied with - WaiJ[ng of the period of
second motion in terms of sub-s.(2) of s.13-8 - Held: The
language of sub-s. (2) of s. 13-8 is clear and prima facie admits
of no departure from the time frame laid down therein, i.e. the 0
second motion under the said sub-section cannot be made
earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the
petition under sub-s.(1) of s.13-8 - However, in view of more
than one opinion expressed in the judgments of the Supreme
Court on the issue, the matter referred to a three Judge Bench E
to consider the question: whether the period prescribed in sub-
s. (2) of s.13-8 can be waived or reduced by Supreme Cowt
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142.
Anjana Kishore vs. Puneet Kishore (2002) 10 SCC 194; F
Anil Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain 2009 (14) SCR 90 = (2009)
10 SCC 415; Manish Goel vs. Rohini Goel (2010) 2 SCR
414; Smt. Poonam vs. Sumi! Tanwar 2010 (3) SCR 557 =
JT 2010 (3) SC 259 and Prem Chand Garg vs. Excise
Commissioner, UP., Allahabad 1963 Suppl. SCR 885 =G
AIR 1963 SC 996, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
(2010) 2 SCR 414 referred to para 3
1103 H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R
A 2010 (3 ) SCR 557 referred to para 3
(2002) 1o sec 194 referred to para 9
2009 (14) SCR 90 referred to para 10
1963 Suppl. SCR 885 referred to para 11
B
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transfer Petition (Civil)
No. 899 of 2007.
Satya Mitra, D.N. Pandey, Sanjay Jain for the Petitioner.
c Jasmine Damkewala, Sourabh Seth (for Karanjawala &
Co.) for the Respondent.
· The following Order of the Court was delivered
D ORDER
1. This transfer petition has been filed by the petitioner-
wife, seeking transfer of the Divorce Petition M.C. No.2168 of
2006 titled as Rakesh Malviya Vs. Neeti Malviya, filed by the
respondent-husband, from the court of Additional Principal
E Judge, Family Court, Bangalore (Karnataka) to the Family
Court, Hoshangabad. (Madhya Pradesh).
2. After issuance of notice on 7th December 2007, efforts
were made on various occasions to bring about a
F comprehensive settlement of the matrimonial discord between
the parties. On 6th September 2008, the parties agreed for
mediation. Accordingly, the parties were referred to the Delhi
High Court Mediation Centre. Ultimately, in proceedings before
the Supreme Court Lok Adalat held on 25th April 2009, it was
G reported that the parties had arrived at a settlement. The
settlement agreement dated 24th April 2009 was taken on
record. The relevant portion of the order passed on 25th April
2009 is extracted below:
" ... One of the terms so agreed upon is that the husband
H
. NEETI MALVIYA 1.t. RAKESH MALVIYA 1105
is to pay to the wife an amount of Rupees sixty five lakhs A
on or before 28th February, 2010. It is now agreed before
us that the said amount of Rupees sixty five lakhs shall be .
deposited in this Court as per the schedule of dates
mentioned in the agreement. The amount, so deposited,
shall be put in a Fixed Deposit Receipt for a period upto B
1st May, 2010.
It is also agreed that when full amount in terms of the
agreement is deposited, the parties shall, immediately C
thereafter, move a joint application for grant of divorce by
mutual c:onsent. On the passing of the decree for divorce,
the amount deposited in this Court shall be released to
Neeti without any delay."
D
3 .. The matter remained pending for some time but the
parties continued to discharge their obligations under the terms
of settlement and when the case came up for hearing on 29th
January 2010, it was stated that the respondent-husband shall
deposit the last instalment of money, in terms of the settlement, E
by 28th February 2009, which was done. However, when the
matter came up for final orders on 10th May 2010, learned
counsel for the parties sought time to go through the two
judgments of this Court in Manish Goel Vs. Rohini Goer and
Smt. Poonam Vs. Sumit Tanwar, and assist the Court on the
F
question whether the period of second motion in terms of sub-
.. section (2) of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 .
(for short "the Act") can be waived or reduced by this Court.
4. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties.
G
5. Sub~section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act is the
enabling Section for presenting a petition for diss.olution of
marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent, on the
1. 2010 (2) SCALE 332.
2. JT 2010 (3) SC 259. 'H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A ground that the parties have been living separately for a period
of one year or more, that they have not been able to live
together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage
should be dissolved. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act
provides the procedural steps that are required to be taken
B onc:e the petition for divorce by mut 1al consent has been filed
and six months have expired from the date of presentation of
the petition before the Court. The language of sub-section (2)
is unambiguous and provides that on the motion of both the
parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the
c presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and
not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition
is not withdrawn in the meantime, the Court shall, on being
satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry
as it thinks fit, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage
to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.
0
6. As already stated, the language of the said provision is
clear and prima facie admits of no departure from the time
frame laid down therein, i.e. the second motion under the said
sub-section cannot be made earlier than six months after the
E date of presentation of the petition under sub-section ( 1) of
Section 13-B of the Act.
7. The question with which we are concerned in the present
petition is whether in view of the settlement arrived at between
F the parties, a decree of divorce by mutual consent can be
granted by this Court without waiting for the statutory period of
six months in terms of Section 13-8(2) of the Act. In other words,
the question for consideration is whether or not this Court can
reduce or waive of the statutory period of six months, as
G stipulated in the said provision?
8. At the outset, we may note that in several cases this
Court has been invoking its extraordinary powers under Article
142 of the Constitution of India and passing a decree of divorce
by mutual consent without waiting for the statutory period of six
H months to expire. As a matter of fact, even the family courts in
I
NEETI MALVIYA v. RAKESH MALVIYA 1107
some States, following the ratio of the decisions or the A
directions by their respective High Courts, have been reducing
the period of second motion when they were convinced that
there was no possibility whatsoever of the spouses coming
back together again and granting decree of divorce by mutual
consent in terms of the settlement arrived at between the B
parties in order to give quietus to all the litigations pending
between them.
9. In fact, in Anjana Kishore Vs. Puneet Kishore 3, a Bench
of three Judges of this Court, while hearing a transfer petition,
invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution and C
directed the parties to file a joint petition before the family court
under Section 13-8 of the Act, for grant of decree of divorce
by mutual consent, along with a copy of the terms of
compromise arrived at between the parties. The Court further
permitted the family court to consider dispensing with the need D
of waiting for expiry of a period of six months as required by
sub-section (2) of Section 13-8 of the Act and pass final orders
on the petition within such time as it deems fit.
10. The issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the High E
Court and the matrimonial court to ..reduce or waive of the period
of second motion in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 13-B
of the Act fell for consideration of this Court in Ani/ Kumar Jain
Vs. Maya Jain 4, though in a different context. Taking note of a
number of earlier cases where decree of divorce by mutual F
consent had been granted by this Court without waiting for the
expiry of statutory period of six months, it was held that neither
the civil courts nor even the High Courts can pass orders before
the period prescribed in Section 13-8(2) of the Act has expired.
The Court opined that it is only this Court, in exercise of its G
extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, that
can grant relief to the parties without even waiting for statutory
.period of six months stipulated in Section 13-8 of the Act.
3. (2002} 10 sec 194.
4. c2009J 10 sec 415. H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 11. However, recently in Manish Goel (supra) and Smt.
f'oonam (supra), this Court while taking note of the decisions
in Anjana Kishore (supra) and Ani/ Kumar Jain (supra) has
also referred to various other judgments of this Court taking a
contrary view and has observed that under Article 142 of the
B Constitution, this Court canr.r• altogether ignore the substantive
provisions of the statute and pass orders concerning an issue
which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in
a statute. The Court has also observed that power under Article
142 of the Constitution is not to be exercised in a case where
C there is no basis in law which can form an edifice for building
up a structure. Reference has also been.made to the decision
of the Constitution Bench in Prem Chand Garg Vs. Excise
Commissioner, UP., Allahabad5, wherein it was held that an
order which this Court can make in order to do complete justice
between the parties, cannot be inconsistent with the substantive
0
provisions of the relevant statutory laws. Inter a/ia, observing
that no court has competence either to issue a direction contrary
to law or to direct an authority to act in contravention of the
statutory provisions, the Court finally summarised the law on the
issue before us to the effect that in exercise of power under
E Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court 'generally' does not
pass an order either in contravention of or ignoring the statutory
provisions or exercise power merely on sympathetic grounds.
12. Although it can be gathered from the use of the word
F 'generally' in para 15 and the last paragraph of the judgment
where the Court did not find the case before it to be a fit case
for exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142
ofthe Constitution, that both the said decisions do not
altogether rule out the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by
G this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, yet we feel that
in the light of certain observations in the said decisions,
particularly in Manish Goel (supra), coupled with the fact that
the decision in Anjana Kishore (supra) was rendered by a
Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, it would be
H 5. AIR 1963 SC 996.
NEETI MALVIYA v. RAKESH MALVIYA 1109
appropriate to refer the matter to a Bench of three Judges in A
order to have a clear ruling on the issue for future guidance.
13. Accordingly, we refer the following question for the
consideration of a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges:-
(!) Whether the period prescribed in sub-section (2) of B
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can
be waived or reduced by this Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution?
. 14. We direct the Registry to place the papers of this case c
before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
15. ltis agreed between the parties that in the meanwhile,
they will file a joint petition under Section 13-B of the Act for
grant of divorce by mutual consent in terms of the settlement
0
within two weeks from tocfay. We are informed that the fixed
deposit for the amount deposited by the respondent in terms
of the settlement will be maturing for payment in the first week
of August, 2010. As and when the said fixed deposit matures,
a su·~ of Rupees two lacs and fifty thousand shall be paid to
the petitioner by means of a bank draft payable at !tarsi E
(Madhya Pradesh). The balance amount along with interest
accrued thereon shall be put in a fresh fixed deposit for a period
of six months.
16. List in the month of November, 2010. F
R.P. Matter Adjourned.
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