Holding

The judgment of the Additional District Judge is vitiated for denying a reasonable opportunity of hearing and for an unfair procedure, and is set aside with the matter remitted for fresh disposal.

Summary

The landlord appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal before the Additional District Judge, Moradabad, because his senior counsel was unavailable. The judge refused the request, granted only three days to make alternative arrangements, and then pronounced a judgment that had been prepared in advance, dismissing the appeal. The appellant contended that the refusal to grant a further adjournment and the pre‑prepared judgment denied him a reasonable opportunity of hearing, especially since the respondent was a leading member of the local bar. The Supreme Court held that the procedure adopted was not just, fair or reasonable, and that the judgment was vitiated for denying the appellant a fair hearing. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Additional District Judge and the High Court, remitted the matter to the District Judge for a fresh hearing with due opportunity to both parties, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the refusal to grant an adjournment and the pronouncement of a pre‑prepared judgment violated the appellant's right to a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Whether the procedure adopted by the Additional District Judge was just, fair and reasonable under Order 17 and Order 20 of the CPC.
Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the writ petition summarily under Article 127 of the Constitution.
Whether the judgment and order of the Additional District Judge can be set aside on the ground of procedural unfairness.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 17, s. Order 20
Constitution of Indias. Article 127
U.P. Rent Control Act (or applicable Rent Control Act)s. Section 21(1)(a), s. Section 21(IA)

Subjects

adjournmentright to be heardprocedural fairnesssenior counselevictionlandlord-tenantjudicial discretionCPCArticle 127Supreme Court

Judgment

A

NIRANKAR NATH WAHI AND OTHERS
v.
FIFTH ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, B
MORADABAD AND ORS.
Jwie 7, 1984
[A.P. SEN AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.]
c
Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Order 17 and Order 20-Adjournment,..-Request
for further adjournment to engage Senior Counsel refused-District. Judge keeping
judgment ready and pronouncing judgment dismissing appeal-Procedure whether
just, fair and reasonable.
Practice and Procedure : Adjourment-Request for by appellant to engage
Senior Counsel~Refused of-District Judge keeping judgtnent ready and deiivering D
• judgment-Whether there is denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing-
Whether procedure adopted by District Judge in preparation Of!.d pronounce~
ment of judgment vitiated.
The appellant in the appeal was the landlord. He sought an adjourn-
ment of the hearing of his appeal that was pending before the Additional District
Judge on the ground of indisposition of his senior . counsel. The respondent
tenant was a leading member of the local bar. The Additional District Judge E
refused the prayer, but granted three days' time for making alternative arrange-
ments and directed that the appeal be posted for hearing of further
arguments and that on fail';lre to urge arguments, the judgment would be
pronounced. On the adjourned date, the appellant again sought adjourn-
ment on the ground that he could not secure the services of his out!.station
senior counsel and that his counsel wolfld not be able to appear fo.r at least a
month and that he ffiay be granted further time to engage· another senior counsel.
F
The Additional District Judge refused the adjourment on the ground that more
than sufficient time had been garnted for additional arguments, and added :
"The judgment is ready which is delivered". The appeal was dismissed by
pronouncing the judgment which had been kept 'ready for being delivered'.

A writ petition to the High Court by the a~pellant uJllier Art. !27
• was rejected in limine. · G
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behelf of the appellant
that: (!) as the respondent was-a leading and influential member of the local bar,
members of the local bar were not willing to appear- in41fp.e matter .and that the
appellant was genuinely handicapped in securing the services of an out-station
senior counsel and (2) that even though the appeal was fixed for making
further oral submissions on the adjourned date, the Additional District Judge H.
kept the judgment r~ady and pronounced it w"'~n the appellant appeared and
requested for further time to engage a senior counsel. · ·
.. ' ' ' : ' ' ' \
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S.C.R.

Al1owing the appeal,
HELD: The judgn1ent rendered by the District Judge is vitiated by
reason of the failure to grant reasona_ble opportunity of hearing to· the appel-
lant and by reason of the procedure adopted in connection with the preparation
and pronounce1ncnt of the judgment. The High Court also erred in rejecting
the 'vrit petition sumn1arily. The judg1ncnt and order passed by the High
B Court as well as those passed by the Additional District Judge are set aside and
the matter remitted to the Court of the District Judge for being disposed of,
after affording a reasonable opport~nity of hearing tu both the parties.
(924-G-925 B]

In the eyes of Jiiigant a senior member of the bar when shed perso-
naliy, n1ight enjoy certain amount of syn1pathy with the members of the
c judiciary before ·whom he is practising day in and day out. This aspect can-
not be overlooked having regard to the realities of life. [922 D}
The learned Judge should have shown awareness of this dimension of the
matter and bearing in 1nind the adage that ijustice must also arpear to have been
done', ought to have dealt with the request for a short adjournment with
a degree of understanding. [922 E]

D It is common knowledge that when a leading men1ber of the Bar is sued
or sues in a personal capacity, the members of the Bar \vhere he is practising •
are more than reluctant to accept a brief against the colleague and friend on
account of personal relations Of' on account of likelihood -of embarrassment.
In a matter like this, the litigant pitted against a leading member of the Bar,
inay also want to engage a cou_isel of his choice and confidence for it n1ay well
appear tO hin1 that not every member of the Bar might present his case with
E the degree of zeal, enthusiasn1 sincerity and conviction which ordinarily a litigant
c::xpects fron1 his advocate. {922 H; 923 A]
The learned Judge could not have armed himself with a readymade ,.._
judg1nent dismissing the appeal when further arguments on behalf "f.
of the appellant were yet to be heard. And a·pparently there was no
time·compulsion to pronounce the 'judgment on that very day. The
Judgment rendered by the learned Judge is thus vitiated by reason of the
failure to grant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appeallant and by
reason of the procedure adopted in connection \vith the preparation and
pronouncement of the judgment. [924 F-G]
It was also not difficult to realise that a landlord is the last person

G
intercSted in prolonging the eviction proceedings or the appeal arising from the
order passed in such proceedings. The Additional District Judge should have
shown awareness of this dimension of the matter, and under the circumstances,
..
might wel.1 have granted a short adjournment to enable the appellant to engage
a senior counsel of his choice and confidence. [922 F-Gj
CIVIL APPBLLAT1i JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2562 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.1983 of the
Allahabad High Court in WP No. 8933 of 1983. ·
R.B Mehrotra Advocate for the appellants.
K.P. Gupta Advocate for the respondents.
N.N. WAHi v. DiSTT. JUDGE (Thakkar, J.) 919

The Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by A
THAKKAR, J. "Justice", we do not tire of saying, "must not
only be done", but "must be seen to done". And yet at times
some Courts suffer from temporary amnesia and forget these words
of wisdom. In the result, a Court occasionally adopts a procedure
which does not meet the high standards set for itself by the B
judicia;y, The present matter falls in that unfortunate category
of cases. That is the reason why, though we do not feel very
happy in doing so, we have had to grant special leave for disposing
of the appeal not on merits, but only for the purpose of setting
aside the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Additional
District Judge, Moradabad. To set it aside on the ground that the c
prOcedure adopted by the learned Judge at the hearing of the
appeal was not just and fair. And in order to consequently remand
the matter for hearing the appeal afresh with a view to dispose it
of on merits in accordance with law.

The order·sheet of May 20, 1983 of the record of the appeal D
in the .Court of the learned District Judge shows tha.t the appellant
sought adjournment on the ground of indisposition of his senior
eounsel from Saharanpur with a ·request that the appeal be
adjourned to some date in July. The learned Additional District
Judge refused the prayer but granted three days' time for making
alternative arrangement and directed that the appeal be posted for E
hearing of further arguments on May 23, 1983. He further directed
that in the event of failure to urge arguments on May 23, 1983,
'the judgment will be pronounced." Even so, the appellant again
·sought an adjournment on the ground that he could not secure the
services· of his senior counsel from Sharanpur as he was not able to
appear till the month of July, and prayed for some time to engage F
a senior counsel from Moradabad. The learned Additional
District Judge refused the adjournment on the ground thc,t more
than sufficient time had been granted for additional arguments,
rejected the prayer for adjournment, and then added :
•
"The judgment is ready which is delivered." G
The appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District
, Judge by pronouncing the judgment which the learned Judge had
kept ready • for being delivered. As the Act does not provide
for any further appeal or revision •. the High Court was approached
llnder Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, but the High Court H
rejected the Writ Petition in limine. Hence the present appeal
by special leave.
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S.C.R·
A The following facts emerge from the order-sheet :
(I) On May 1~. 1983 the learned Additional District Judge
had felt that the request made by the appellant for further
arguments was justlfied and had granted it.
(2) On May 20, 1983 the Court granted only three days' ·
B time to make alternative arrangement in view of the
fact that the senior counsel from Saharanpur engaged
by the appellant was not in a position to appear on
account of illness.
· (3) On 23rd May, 1983, the arguments were to be heard.
c Notwithstanding that the arguments were yet to be heard·
on this date, the learned · Judge had kept the judgment ·
ready for pronouncing, which he pronounced forthwith
wilst refusing the prayer for adjournment made by the
appellant with a view to engage a senior advocate from
the local bar since the Advocate from Saharanpur
D already engaged by him was not available.
Two infirmities have been pointed out to us in support of the
plea that the procedure adopted was not just and fair :
(i) Even though the appellant was genuinely handicapped in
securing the services of a senior advocate to appear for ,
E him In the matter having regard to the fact that respon- · '
dent No, 3 Kailash Sahai Mathur was a leading and
foffuential member of the Moradabad Bar and members, of
the local Bar were not willing to appear against him In
his personal matter, the learned Additional District Judge
did not afford him a reasonable opportunity for engaging
p
an Advocate ;
(ii) Even though the appeal was fixed for making further oral
submissions, on the day fixed for this purpose, the learned
Additional District Judge h~d kept his judgment ready
and prononced it when the appellant applied for further
G time to engage a senior ll)ember of the Bar to represent
him.
We do not consider it necessary to delve deep into the facts.
It is sufficient for our purposes to say that the said Respondent, on >-
', his own showing, is a leading and influential member of the
H Moradabad Bar as is evident from the following passage extracted
from the written objections filed by the said Respondent himself at
thoi'.trlalj;
N.N. WAHi v. PISTT. JUPGE (Thakkar, J.) 921

-A
a
"He has been member of the State Bar Council
for a number of years and also been Vice President of
the U.P. Lawyers Conference .. The opposite party has
been Secretary, Vice-President and President of the Bar
· Association, Moradabad. He is also manager of S.R.A.N.
Intermediate College, Moradabad. He is a founder life- -' B
member of the Moradabad Civil Courts Club. He has
been President of the Moradabad Rotary Club and is its
member for the last about 33 years. He has also been
Worshipful Master of the Masonic Lodge."

·"He has been member of the Senate, Law Faculty and .c
Board of studies of the Agra University. He is also con-
nected with other Clubs and social and educational
institutions. The opposite party was also the founder
Secretary of the Moradabad Branch of the Indian Law
I,nstitute. In his various capacities, the opposite party has
to meet a variety of persons, junior lawyers, teachers, D t!
rotarians, social worker, clients etc. each day. He has
also a huge library and so stated above a fairJy good
number of family members staying with him, all this makes
even the space at the disposal of the opposite party such
too cramped." ·
E
It has also been established that the appellant was finding it
extremely difficult to engage a lawyer to represent him as he was
pitted against a senior and influential member of the Bar personally,
and was seeking his eviction from premises in his personal occupa-
tion for use as his residence-cum-office. A leading member of the
Bar had already returned the brief, and a senior member of the F
Bar from Saharanpur Bar engaged by the appellant had been
repeatedly asking him to seek adjournments instead of appearing
in the Court to argue the matter on the appointed day. The ·
adjournments were sought presumably because of his understandable
reluctance to appear against a professional brother in a matter
where he was personally concerned. G "

We have no hesitation in assuming that no Court would ever
be influenced by the fact that the Respondent was a leading member
of the Bar and influential person inasmuch as in the eye of law
all citizens are· entitled to equal treatment having regard to the II
doctrine of equality before law. If a case for eviction was made
· out under the relevant statute, the Court would not hesitate to
922 SUPJtEME COURT REPORTS U984] 3 S.C.R.

release the accommodation by ordering eviction against the respon-
dent notwithstanding his status in the legal world or in the society.
If on merits, the application under Sec. 21 (I) (a) and/or under
Sec. 21 (IA) of the Act deserved to be disallowed, the appeal

B
would be dismissed just as it would be dismissed against any other
tenant by reason of the fact that ·it was wanting in merits, not ..
because the respondent enjoyed a particular status in the profes-
sion or in the society. This is what everyone associated with the
world oflaw is doubtless expected to know. But a litigant who is
pitted against such an influential member of the Bar having such a
high status in the society, who himself mentions in his affidavit these
facts, can be excused for not being aware of the doctrine of equality
0
before law, not only in theory but also in practice.

So also the learned Judge might well have realised that the
appellant was fighting a litigation in which a very senior member of
the bar was personally impleaded. as a defendent (respondent) apd
D
that it was understandable if he was labouring under a psychological ·
complex. The complex is understandable because in the eyes of a
litigant a senior member of the bar when sued personally, might
en'joy certain amount or sympathy with the members of the judiciary
before whom he is practising day in and day out. This aspect ...
E cannot be overlooked having regard to the realities of life. ,
The learned judge should have shown awareness of this dimen·
sion of the matter and bearing in mind the adage that .'justice must
also appear to have been done', ought to have dealt with the
request for a short adjourment with a degree of understanding.
I' More particuiarly as it was not difficult to realise that a landlord .is
the last person intersted in prolonging the eviction proceedings or
the appeal arising from the order passed in such proceedings. The
learned Additional District Judge, under the circumstances, might ··-
well have granted a short adjounrment to enable the appellant to
engage a senior counsel of his ·choice and confidence. For this
G reason: It is common knowledge that when a leading member of
the Bar is sued or sues in a personal capacity, the members of the
Bar where he is practising are more than reluctant to accept a brief
against their colleague and friend on account of personal relations
or on account of likelihood of embarrassment. In a matter like
H this, the litigant pitted against a leading member of the Bar may
also want to engage a counsel of h'is choice and confidence for it
may well appear to him that not every member of the Bar might .
.

N.N. WAHi v. DiS'IT. JUDGE (Thakkar, J.) 923

present his case with the degree of zeal, enthusiasm, sincerity and A
conviction which ordinarily a litigant expects from his advocate.

We are afraid that these vital aspects were overlooked by the
learned Judge when i·he granted only three days' time to make
atternative arrangement for engaging a local senior counsel by B
reason of the fact that the Saharanpur Advocate engaged by _the
appellant was not in a position to appear on .the ground of illness.
This short adjournment for three days was granted vide order dated ·
May 20, 1983. But 011 May 23, 1983, the learned Judge refused
to grant further time to the appellant who had not been able to
make suitable arrangement for e_ngaging a counsel on that .date. c
We are of the opinion that the appellant has been denied a reasona-
ble opportunity· of hearing, and that the grievance made by the
appellant, as regards the procedure adopted by the learned Judge
·on this score, is ·not unfounded. This is one of the two reasons
which has impe!led us to set aside the order passed by the learned
D
Additional District Judge and to remand the matter for a fresh
decision in accor.dance with law after affording reasonable opp<Jr·
tunity of hearing to the parties.

The second ground has also been substantiated in ·the sense .
that the appellant cannot be faulted for entertaining the misgiving E
·' that the procedure adopted was not in tune with one's sense of
justice .. The grievance this time arises on account of the fact that
even though May 23, 1983 was fixed for hearing of further· oral
arguments, the learned Judge had kept a judgment ready for being
. pronounced and he proceeded to pronounce it forthwith whilst
refusing the prayer for adjournment made by the appellant. It is
not in dispute that on May.23,)983 the. learned Additional District
Judge had granted three days' time to the appellant to enable him
to engage an advocate to make furthev oral submissions. Since
the matter was posted on 23rd May, 1983, for further oral argu-
ments, the learned Judge could not have commenced writing his
judgment till further arguments were heard on that ,day or the G
request for adJonrnment, if any, was refused. No objection could
have been'!aken if on turning down the request for adjournment on
May 23, 1983, the learned Judge had commenced writing or
dictating his judgment in the Court. But he had kept his judgment
(dismissing the appeal) ready ·for being pronounced. When the H
appellant made a request for an .adjournment for engaging an
advocate, thereqi•cst was turned down and the judgment prepared
924 SUPllEME COURT· REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.

A •'
in advance, dismissing the appeal, y<as straightaway pronounced.
As we p·ointed out earlier, the learned Judge could be expected to.
· be aware of the fact that the appellant being a landlord seeking an
eviction order was not interested in unne·cessarily prolonging the •
hearing of.the appeal. He also could not h'ave been unaware of the
B fact that the respondent was a leading member of the local Bar and
an influential person and that under the circumstances a citizen who
was pitted against him in a personal litigation was likely to feel·that
he was not getting just and fair treatment if the judgment was kept
ready in anticipation that the request for adjournment was going
to be made and. was. going to be refused. Supposing no request
for adjournment was made and a senior advocate had appeared on
behalf of the appellant what would have happened ? Before hearing
his arguments, the learned Judge had already made up his mind
and kept ready a judgment wherein he had reached the conclusion
that there was no substance in the appeal. These embarrassing
facts star'e one in the eye. We do not think that fault can be found
with the appellant if he felt, as any other litigant. would have
perhaps felt, that.the procedure adopted· was lacking in fairness.
In fairness to th-. learned Judge; we must mention that in his order
dated May· 20, 1983, he had observed as under:--,-
'
E "Appeal adjourned to 23-5-83 for additional arguments
falling which judgment would be pron~unced."

But the fact remains that the learned Judge could not have armed
himself with a ready-made judgment dismissing the appeal when
further arguments on behalf of th"'appellant were yet to be heard.
F And· apparently there was no time-compulsion to pronounce the
judgment on that very day. .The judgment rendered by the learned
Judge is thus vitiated by reason of the failure to g.ant reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the aP,pellant and by reason of the
procedure adopted in connection with the preparation and pronoun-
·-
cement of the judgment. We may incidentally observe that we are
G also distressed that the High Court rejected the petition summarily
in the face of these- features and obliged the appellant to apprnach
this Court.

Under the circumstances the appeal must be allowed. The
H judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court as· well as
those passed by the learned Additional District Judge are set aside
11nd -the matter is •emitted to the- Court of the District J~e,
N:N. WAHi v. DISTT. JUDGE (7 hakkar, J.) 925

Moradabad for being disposed of in accordance with law. In view A
of what has transpired, we direct that the learned District Judge .
himself shall hear the appeal, and after affording reasonable
opportunity of h~aring to both the parties to make their submls·
sions, di~pose it of in accordance with law uninfluenced by anything
that might have been stated in the judgment. which is being set
aside. The learned District Judge sha!! dispose· of the appeal as
expeditiously as possible, and, in any event, not later tha.n within
four months fFom the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment,.
which we hereby direct the Ofll.ce to send to the learned Di~triCt
Judge 'l>rthwith'. '

There sha!! 'be no order a1 to coill. c
N.V.K .. Appe1J/ a/lowed.

•