NORTH EAST KARNATAKA ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATIONversusSMT. SUJATHA

                       [2018] 13 S.C.R. 1043                              1043


       NORTH EAST KARNATAKA ROAD TRANSPORT                                A
                   CORPORATION
                                  v.
                          SMT. SUJATHA
                   (Civil Appeal No. 7470 of 2009)                        B
                       NOVEMBER 02, 2018
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
       Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923: s.30 – Appeal against
the order of Commissioner – Scope of interference – Held: The
                                                                          C
appeal under s.30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of
the Commissioner lie only against the specific orders set out in clause
(a) to (e) of s.30 of the Act with a further rider contained in first
proviso to the Section that the appeal must involve substantial
question of law – In the instant case, employee died while on duty
due to heart attack – The Commissioner allowed the claim petition         D
filed by widow awarding Rs.3,79,120/- – High Court upheld the
decision of the Commissioner – On appeal, held: The Commissioner
decided all the material questions arising in the case properly on
the basis of evidence adduced by the parties and rightly determined
the compensation payable to the respondent – It was, therefore,
                                                                          E
rightly affirmed by the High Court on facts – The concurrent findings
of fact of the two courts below are binding – Even otherwise, there
was no ground to call for any interference on any of the factual
findings – None of the factual findings were found to be either
perverse or arbitrary or based on no evidence or against any
provision of law – These findings are upheld.                             F
       Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923: s.4-A – Interest – Grant
of – The Commissioner allowed the claim petition with direction to
the appellant-employer to deposit the awarded sum within 45 days
failing which the awarded amount would carry interest @ 12% p.a.
– Held: The Commissioner awarded the interest to the respondents          G
@ 12% per annum on the awarded sum but it was awarded from the
expiry of 45 days from the date of order and that too, if the appellant
failed to deposit the awarded sum within 45 days – This direction
of the Commissioner in awarding the interest on the awarded sum
was contrary to law laid down in Pratap Narain’s case and,
                                                                          H
                              1043
1044            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     therefore, not legally sustainable – In the light of this, even though
       the respondent did not challenge this direction yet the question being
       a pure question of law, with a view to do substantial justice to the
       respondent, the order of the Commissioner is modified in respondent’s
       favour to the extent that the awarded sum shall carry interest @
       12% p.a. from the date of accident – Interest.
 B
             Disposing of the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 The questions as to whether the employee met
       with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course
       of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and
 C     in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in
       causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of
       employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of
       the employee, how many are the dependents of the deceased
       employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to
       injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance
 D     coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident etc. are
       some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of
       the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers
       any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment
       and he/his LRs sue/s his employer to claim compensation under
 E     the Act. These questions are essentially the questions of fact
       and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of
       evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded
       thereon are regarded as the findings of fact. [Paras 9-10]
       [1047-G-H, 1048-A-C]

 F           1.2 The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the
       High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a
       Regular First Appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil
       Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The
       appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is
       confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising
 G     in the case. [Paras 11-12][1048-C-E]
             2.1 When an employer files the appeal, he is under a legal
       obligation to deposit the entire awarded sum in terms of second
       proviso to Section 30 of the Act as a pre-condition to file the
       appeal in the High Court except where the appeal is filed against
 H     the order falling in clause (b). It is only when the employer
       NORTH EAST KARNATAKA ROAD TRANSPORT                              1045
            CORPORATION v. SMT. SUJATHA

deposits the entire awarded money along with the memo of appeal         A
duly certified by the Commissioner, his appeal is regarded as
being properly filed in conformity with the requirement of Section
30 of the Act. Such appeal is then heard on the question of
admission with a view to find out as to whether it involves any
substantial question of law or not. Whether the appeal involves a
                                                                        B
substantial question of law or not depends upon the facts of each
case and needs an examination by the High Court. If the
substantial question of law arises, the High Court would admit
the appeal for final hearing on merit else would dismiss in limini
with reasons that it does not involve any substantial question/s
of law. [Paras 13-15][1048-E-H; 1049-A]                                 C
      2.2 In the instant case, the appeal before the High Court
did not involve any substantial question of law on the material
questions. In other words, the Commissioner decided all the
material questions arising in the case properly on the basis of
evidence adduced by the parties and rightly determined the              D
compensation payable to the respondent. It was, therefore, rightly
affirmed by the High Court on facts. In this view of the matter,
the findings being concurrent findings of fact of the two courts
below are binding on this Court. Even otherwise, there is no
ground to call for any interference on any of the factual findings.
None of the factual findings are found to be either perverse or         E
arbitrary or based on no evidence or against any provision of law.
These findings are upheld. [Paras 16, 17][1049-B-C]
      3. The grant of interest on the awarded sum is governed by
Section 4-A of the Act. The Commissioner awarded the interest
to the respondents at the rate of 12% per annum on the awarded          F
sum but it was awarded from the expiry of 45 days from the date
of order and that too, if the appellant failed to deposit the awarded
sum within 45 days. This direction of the Commissioner in
awarding the interest on the awarded sum is contrary to law laid
down in Pratap Narain’s case and hence not legally sustainable.         G
In the light of this, even though the respondent did not challenge
this direction yet the question being a pure question of law, this
Court with a view to do substantial justice to the respondent
consider it just and proper to modify the order of the
Commissioner in respondent’s favour. The order of the
                                                                        H
1046            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     Commissioner is modified in favour of the respondent to the
       extent that the awarded sum of Rs. 3,79,120/- shall carry interest
       at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of accident i.e.
       06.04.1999. [Paras 18-20, 26-30][1049-D-E; 1051-B-G]
             Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr.
 B           (1976) 1 SCC 289 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : [1976] 2 SCR
             872; Kerala State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Valsala K.
             & Anr. (1999) 8 SCC 254 : AIR 1999 SC 3502 : [1999]
             2 Suppl. SCR 657 – followed.
             National Insurance Company Ltd v. Mubasir Ahmed &
 C           Anr. (2007) 2 SCC 349 : [2007] 2 SCR 117; Oriental
             Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mohmad Nasir & Anr.
             (2009) 6 SCC 280 : [2009] 8 SCR 829; Oriental
             Insurance Company Ltd v. Siby George and others
             (2012) 12 SCC 540 : [2012] 6 SCR 1079 – referred
             to.
 D
                              Case Law Reference
       [1976] 2 SCR 872               followed                Para 21
       [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 657        followed                Para 22
       [2007] 2 SCR 117               referred to             Para 23
 E
       [2009] 8 SCR 829               referred to             Para 23
       [2012] 6 SCR 1079              referred to             Para 24
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7470
       of 2009
 F
             From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2006 of the High
       Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. No. 4170/2002(WC).
             Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Adv. for the Appellant.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 G
             ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.
             1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order
       dated 29.11.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
       in M.F.A. No.4170 of 2002 whereby the High Court dismissed the
 H
  NORTH EAST KARNATAKA ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. v.                                1047
     SMT. SUJATHA [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

appellant’s appeal and confirmed the order dated 23.04.2002 passed by         A
the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation (Labour Court), Bellary
(hereinafter referred to as “the Commissioner”).
       2. The issue involved in this appeal lies in a narrow compass. It is
clear from the facts mentioned hereinbelow.
       3. One Mallikarjuna was an employee of the appellant-a State           B
Road Transport Corporation for the State of Karnataka working as a
driver. He died while he was on duty on 06.04.1999 when he felt pain in
his chest and suffered heart attack.
      4. The respondent is the wife of deceased Mallikarjuna. The
respondent filed a claim petition before the Commissioner under the           C
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short “the Act”) claiming
compensation for the death of her husband Mallikarjuna. The appellant
(employer) contested the claim petition.
       5. By order dated 23.04.2002, the Commissioner allowed the claim
petition and awarded a sum of Rs.3,79,120/- with a direction to the           D
appellant to deposit the awarded sum within 45 days, failing which, the
awarded amount would carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
       6. The employer (appellant herein) felt aggrieved and filed appeal
in the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. By impugned order, the
High Court dismissed the appeal, which has given rise to filing of this       E
special leave to appeal by the employer in this Court.
      7. So the question, which arises for consideration in this appeal is
whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the employer’s appeal
and thereby was justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner.
                                                                              F
      8. None appeared for both the parties. We, therefore, perused the
record of the case. On perusal of the record, we are inclined to modify
the order of the Commissioner dated 23.04.2002 in favour of the
respondent to the extent indicated infra.
      9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled
principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an           G
accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of
employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what
manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident,
whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what
                                                                              H
1048             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the
       dependents of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to
       the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was
       any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident
       etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of
       the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any
 B
       bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs
       sue/s his employer to claim compensation under the Act.
              10. The afore-mentioned questions are essentially the questions
       of fact and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of
       evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon
 C     are regarded as the findings of fact.
              11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High
       Court against the order of the Commissioner lie only against the specific
       orders set out in clause (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a further
       rider contained in first proviso to the Section that the appeal must involve
 D     substantial question of law.
              12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the
       Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like
       a Regular First Appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
       1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction
 E     of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the
       substantial questions of law arising in the case.
             13. When an employer files the appeal, he is under a legal obligation
       to deposit the entire awarded sum in terms of second proviso to Section
       30 of the Act as a pre-condition to file the appeal in the High Court
 F     except where the appeal is filed against the order falling in clause (b).
             14. It is only when the employer deposits the entire awarded money
       along with the memo of appeal duly certified by the Commissioner, his
       appeal is regarded as being properly filed in conformity with the
       requirement of Section 30 of the Act.
 G
              15. Such appeal is then heard on the question of admission with a
       view to find out as to whether it involves any substantial question of law
       or not. Whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law or not
       depends upon the facts of each case and needs an examination by the
       High Court. If the substantial question of law arises, the High Court
 H
  NORTH EAST KARNATAKA ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. v.                                  1049
     SMT. SUJATHA [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

would admit the appeal for final hearing on merit else would dismiss in         A
limini with reasons that it does not involve any substantial question/s of
law.
      16. Now coming to the facts of this case, we find that the appeal
before the High Court did not involve any substantial question of law on
the material questions set out above. In other words, in our view, the          B
Commissioner decided all the material questions arising in the case
properly on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties and rightly
determined the compensation payable to the respondent. It was,
therefore, rightly affirmed by the High Court on facts.
       17. In this view of the matter, the findings being concurrent findings   C
of fact of the two courts below are binding on this Court. Even otherwise,
we find no good ground to call for any interference on any of the factual
findings. None of the factual findings are found to be either perverse or
arbitrary or based on no evidence or against any provision of law. We
accordingly uphold these findings.
                                                                                D
       18. This takes us to examine the next question which was wrongly
decided by the Commissioner and the High Court also did not notice the
error committed by the Commissioner.
      19. The question relates to grant of interest on the awarded amount
and further, from which date, it is to be awarded to the claimant               E
(respondent).
       20. The grant of interest on the awarded sum is governed by
Section 4-A of the Act. The question as to when does the payment of
compensation under the Act “becomes due” and consequently what is
the point of time from which interest on such amount is payable as              F
provided under Section 4-A (3) of the Act remains no more res integra
and is settled by the two decisions of this Court.
      21. As early as in 1975, a four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap
Narain Singh Deo Vs. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. (1976) 1 SCC 289:
AIR 1976SC 222 speaking through Singhal, J. has held that an employer
                                                                                G
becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is
caused to the workman in the accident which arose out of and in the
course of employment. It was accordingly held that it is the date of the
accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim, which is material.
      22. Another question analogues to the main question arose before
                                                                                H
1050            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     the Three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Kerala State
       Electricity Board & Anr. Vs. Valsala K. & Anr. (1999) 8SCC 254:
       AIR 1999SC 3502 as to whether increased amount of compensation
       and enhanced rate of interest brought on statute by amending Act 30/
       1995 with effect from 15.09.1995 would also apply to cases in which the
       accident took place before 15.09.1995. Their lordships, placing reliance
 B
       on the law laid down in Pratap Narain’s case (supra) held that since
       the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the
       date of accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim by the
       Commissioner and hence if the accident has taken place prior to
       15.09.1995, the rate applicable on the date of accident would govern the
 C     subject.
             23. After these two decisions, this Court in two cases (both by the
       Two Judge Bench) viz. National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Mubasir
       Ahmed & Anr. (2007) 2 SCC 349 and Oriental Insurance Company
       Ltd. vs. Mohmad Nasir & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 280 without noticing
 D     the law laid down in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) took a
       contrary view and held that payment of compensation would fall due
       only after the Commissioner’s order or with reference to the date on
       which the claim application is made.
              24. This conflict of view in the decisions on the question was
 E     noticed by this Court (Two Judge Bench) in Oriental Insurance
       Company Ltd vs. Siby George and others (2012) 12 SCC 540. Justice
       Aftab Alam speaking for the Bench referred to afore-mentioned decisions
       and explaining the ratio of each decision held that since the two later
       decisions rendered in the cases of Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir (supra)
       which took contrary view without noticing the earlier two decisions of
 F     this Court rendered in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) by the
       larger Benches (combination of four and three Judges respectively) and
       hence later decisions rendered in Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir cases
       (supra) cannot be held to have laid down the correct principles of law on
       the question and nor can, therefore, be treated as binding precedent on
 G     the question.
             25. In other words, the law laid down in Pratap Narain and
       Valsala cases (supra) was held to hold the field through out as laying
       down the correct principle of law on the subject. The Two Judge Bench
       in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd vs. Siby George and others
 H
  NORTH EAST KARNATAKA ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. v.                                 1051
     SMT. SUJATHA [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

(supra) accordingly followed the principle of law laid down in Pratap          A
Narain and Valsala cases (supra) and decided the case instead of
following the law laid down in Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir cases
(supra) which was held per incuriam.
      26. Now coming to the facts of this case, we find that the
Commissioner awarded the interest to the respondents at the rate of            B
12% per annum on the awarded sum but it was awarded from the expiry
of 45 days from the date of order and that too, if the appellant failed to
deposit the awarded sum within 45 days.
       27. In other words, if the appellant had deposited the awarded
sum within 45 days from the date of the order then the respondent was          C
not entitled to claim any interest on the awarded sum, but if the appellant
had failed to deposit the awarded amount within 45 days, then the
respondent was entitled to claim interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of the order.
      28. In our opinion, the afore-mentioned direction of the                 D
Commissioner in awarding the interest on the awarded sum is contrary
to law laid down by this Court in Pratap Narain’s case (supra) and
hence not legally sustainable.
       29. In the light of the forgoing discussion, even though the
respondent did not challenge this direction by filing any appeal in the        E
High Court nor challenged it by filing any appeal in this Court too, yet the
question being a pure question of law, this Court with a view to do
substantial justice to the respondent consider it just and proper to modify
the order of the Commissioner in respondent’s favour so as to make the
same in conformity with the law laid down by this Court in the above
referred two decisions (supra).                                                F
        30. Accordingly and in view of the foregoing discussion, the order
of the Commissioner dated 23.04.2002 is modified in favour of the
respondent to the extent that the awarded sum of Rs. 3,79,120/- shall
carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of accident
i.e. 06.04.1999.                                                               G
       31. The Commissioner is accordingly directed to work out the
total amount payable by the appellant to the respondent in terms of the
order passed by this Court.
      32. Since no one appeared for the appellant as well as respondent
                                                                               H
1052              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     in this case, the Registry shall send a copy of this order to the
       Commissioner, the appellant and the respondent respectively within one
       week.
              33. The Commissioner, on receipt of the order, will issue notice to
       the parties and calculate the total amount to enable the appellant to deposit
 B     the same within one month for being paid to the respondent after due
       verification.
             34. The appeal stands accordingly disposed of with afore-
       mentioned directions and modifications in the order of the Commissioner
       dated 23.04.2002 passed in case No. KAB/KNP/7/985/99.
 C
       Devika Gujral                                               Appeal disposed of.




 D




 E




 F




 G




 H