Supreme Court of India
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LIMITEDversusADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (ADMINISIRATION), BAREILLY DIVISION, BAREILLY AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 192
- Decided
- 1 April 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- G S SINGHVI
Holding
The Supreme Court held that ‘person’ under s.154(1) includes companies, and because the appellant concealed material facts, it has no right to relief; the Collector’s order stands and the lease does not revive the appellant’s claim.
Summary
Oswal Fats and Oils Ltd, a company, applied for permission under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 to purchase more than the permitted 12.5 acres but bought 40.45 acres without approval. The Collector ordered that only 12.5 acres could be retained and the excess 27.95 acres vested in the State; the High Court upheld this order. The company later entered a lease with the State for the excess land but concealed the lease from the authorities, seeking to revive its claim. The Supreme Court examined whether the term "person" in s.154(1) includes a company and whether the concealment of material facts barred the company from relief. It held that the definition does include companies, that the company’s concealment violated the duty of candour, and that the lease could not revive its entitlement, thereby affirming the Collector’s order. The appeal was dismissed and costs were imposed.
Issues considered
- The meaning of "person" in section 154(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and whether it includes a company.
- Whether the concealment of the lease agreement and other material facts by the appellant deprives it of the right to be heard on the merits.
- Whether the appellant was denied a fair hearing (audi alteram partem) in the proceedings before the Collector and the Additional Commissioner.
- Whether a post‑facto sanction under section 154(3) can be granted to validate the excess land purchase.
- Whether the State Government may renew the lease of the excess land after the 30‑year term.
Legislation cited
- Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904s. 3, s. 4(33)
- Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950s. 154, s. 154(1), s. 154(2), s. 154(3), s. 166, s. 167
Subjects
Land reformZamindari abolitionRestriction on land transferInterpretation of statutesConcealment of material factsClean hands doctrineLease agreementPost‑facto sanctionNatural justice
Judgment
[2010] 5 S.C.R. 927
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LIMITED A
v.
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (ADMINISIRATION),
BAREILLY DIVISION, BAREILLY AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 7962 of 2002)
B
APRIL 01, 2010
[G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950:
c
s. 154 - Restriction on transfer by bhumidhar - Purchase .
of 40.45 acres land in certain villages through different sale
deeds by a Company -: Order of Collector and Additional
Commissioner that Company entitled to retain only 12.50
acres - Purchase of the remaining land measuring 27. 95 D
acres in violation of ss. 1541167 and would vest in State
Government - Upheld by High Court - Company and State
Government entered into lease agreement whereby Company
took 27.95 acres land on lease from Government by
conceding that it had purchased excess land in violation of E
s. 154(1) and the same vested in State Government -
Company withheld the lease agreement from Additional
Commissioner, High Court and this Court - No prayer made
to lead evidence to prove that purchase not in violation of s.
154(1) - No grievance that order of Collector was violative of
natural justice - Collector was right in relying upon the written F
statement filed on behalf of Company admitting violation of
s. 154 - By execution of lease agreement, object and purpose
of the Act and order passed by Collector, stood.frustrated -
Thus, State Government directed not to renew lease of the
Company after 30 years and deal with excess land as per the G
provisions of the Act.
s. 154(1) - Word 'person' appearing in s. 154(1) -
Construction of - Held: It cannot be construed in a manner
I
927 H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A which would defeat the object and the purpose of legislation
- Word 'person' includes any company or association or body
of individuals, whether incorporated or not - Co-operative
society is also included by virtue of explanation to s. 154(1)
- Words and phrases.
B
Interpretation of statutes: Use of word 'include' in
interpretation clause - Held: Is used to enlarge the meaning
of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statue -
When it is used, those words or phrases must be construed
as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify
C according to their natural import, but also those things which
the interpretation clause declares that they shall include -
Words and phrases.
Practice and procedure: Concealment of material facts
D - Effect of - Held: Such person has no right to be heard on
the merits of his grievance - Court not only has the right but
a duty to deny relief to such person.
Costs: Imposition of - Aggrieved party not approaching
E quasi judicial and judicial forums including this Court with
clean hands and obtaining interim orders - Issuance of
direction to pay Rs.2 lacs as costs .
. The appeJICfnt-company proposed to set up a paper
project It authorized Kamal Oswal (Director), T.R. Sharma
F {General Manager) and Jai Prakash Kaushal (Authorised
Signatory) of the company to negotiate and finalise the
purchase of land. An application was filed on behalf of
the appellant for grant of permission uls. 154(2) of the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 for
G purchase of land in excess of 12.5 acres. However,
without waiting for the permission, the appellant
purchased 40.45 acres land through different sale deeds.
The State Government filed suits challenging the transfer
of land in favour of the appellant. In the written statement,
H the appellant conceded that the land was purchased in
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 929
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS.
contravention of the Act and prayed that it may be A
allowed to retain 12.5 acres out of the disputed land. The
Collector and the Additional Commissioner declared that
the purchase made by the appellant in excess of 12.50
acres is against the provisions of ss. 154/167 of the Act
and it would be entitled to retain only 12.50 acres and the B
remaining land measuring 27.95 acres would vest in the
State Government. The Single Judge of High Court
upheld the order. Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1. A person who does not disclose all
material facts has no right to be heard on the merits of
his grievance. A person who approaches the Court for
grant of r«i;!lief, equitable or otherwise, is under a solemn
obligation to candidly disclose all the material/important D
facts which have bearing on the adjudication of the
issues raised in the case. He owes a duty to the court to
bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing/
suppressing any material fact within his knowledge or
which he could have known by exercising diligence
E
expected of a person of ordinary prudence. If he is found
guilty of concealment of material facts or making an
attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the court not
only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such
person. [Paras 15] [948-E-G]
F
State of Haryana v. Kamal Distillery Co. Ltd. (1977) 2
SCC 431; Vijay Kumar Kathuria v. State of Haryana (1983)
3 SCC 333; Welcome Hotel and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and Ors. (1983) 4 SCC 575; G. Narayanaswamy
Reddy (dead) by LRs. and Anr. v. Government of Karnataka G
and Anr. (1991) 3 SCC 261; S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu
(dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and Ors. (1994)
1 SCC 1; Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Oswal
Agro Furane and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 297; Union of India and
others v. Muneesh Suneja (2001) 3 SCC 92; Prestige Lights H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 5 S.C.R.
A Ltd. v. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449; Sunil Poddar
and Ors. v. Union Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC 326; K.D.
Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. (2008) 12
SCC 481; G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel
and Ors. (2009) 3 sec 141; Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and
s Ors C.A. No. 523912002 decided on 3.12.2009; Hari Narain
v. Badri Das AIR 1963 S.C. 1558, referred to.
R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner (1917) 1 KB
486, referred to.
c 1.2. After one year and five months of passing of
order by the Collector, the appellant and the State
Government entered into a lease agreement dated
15.10.1994 whereby the latter agreed to give excess land
measuring 27.95 acres to the appellant on lease for a
D period of 30 -years at an yearly rent of Rs.281.05. The
lease a~reement was signed on behalf of the appellant
by the Director and the General Manager (Liaison). In the
lease agreement, the lessee-appellant candidly admitted
that transfers made in its favour by the Bhumidhars were
E contrary to s. 154 of the Act and were void and, as such,
land vested in the State Government uls. 167. [Para 13]
[946-F-H; 947-A]
1.3. The lease agreement was not brought to the
notice of the Additional Commissioner and the Single
F Judge of the High Court and neither of them was
apprised of the fact that the appellant had taken 27.95
acres land on lease from the Government by
unequivocally conceding that it had purchased excess
land in violation of s. 154(1) of the Act_ and the same
G vested in the State Government. In the list of dates and
the memo of special leave petition filed in this Court also
there is no mention of lease agreement dated 15.10.1994.
This shows that the appellant has not approached the
Court with clean hands. The withholding of the lease
H agreement from the Additional Commissioner, the High
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 931
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS.
Court and this Court appears to be a part of the strategy A
adopted by the appellant to keep the quasi-judicial and
judicial forums including this Court in dark about the
nature of its possession over the excess land and make
them believe that it has been subjected to unfair
tre9tment. If the factum of execution of lease agreement B
.and' Its contents were disclosed to the Additional
Commissioner, he would have definitely incorporated the
same in order dated 30.5.2001. In that event, the High
Court or for that reason this Court would have non-suited
the appellant at the threshold. However, by concealing a c
material fact, the appellant succeeded in persuading the
High Court and this Court to entertain adventurous
litigation instituted by it and pass interim orders. If either
of the courts had been apprised of the fact that by virtue
of lease deed, the appellant has succeeded in securing D
temporary legitimacy for its possession over excess land,
then there would have been no occasion for the High
Court or this Court to entertain the' writ petition or the
special leave petition. [Para 14] [947-F-H; 948-A-D]
2.1. The appellant in his written statement filed before E
the Collector admitted that land had been purchased
without waiting for the permission of the Government
under the belief that permission will be granted for
establishing the industry. Not only this, it was candidly
stated that the appellant has no objection if any legal F
action is taken with regard to land in excess of 12.50
acres. In the proceedings of the suits, no prayer was
made on behalf of the appellant for permission to lead
evidence to prove that the purchase made by it from
Bhumidhars was not in violation of Section 154(1) of the G
Act. Before the Additional Commissioner and the High
Court, the appellant did not make a grievance that the
Collector had passed order without giving it a reasonable
or effective opportunity of hearing. Thus, the appellant
cannot now contend that the Collector did not act in
H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 5 S.C.R.
A consonance with the rule of audi alteram partem. (Para 21)
(953-A-D]
2.2. Though, the counsel for the appellant made
strenuous efforts to convince the Court that TR had no
B authority to make tacit admission of the illegality
committed in the purchase of land and that he had no
right to make an offer for surrender of excess land, but it
is not impressing. A reading of resolution dated
14.10.1991 makes it clear that TR, the then General
Manager of the appellant was authorised to take all
C actions necessary for transfer of land. That apart, in vievy
of lease agreement dated 15.10.1994, which was not
produced by the appellant before the Additional
Commissioner, the Single Judge of the High Court and
even this Court (for the first time, the lease agreement
D came to the fore when a copy thereof was annexed with
the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent),
challenge to the competence of TR to make an admission
that the land was purchased by the appellant without
waiting for the State Government's permission and that
E appropriate legal action can be taken with regard to
excess land pales into the realm of insignificance. The
counsel was at loss to explain as to how in the face of
the lease agreement, which was signed by none else than
the Director of the appellant, whose name finds mention
F in Resolution dated 14.10.1991 and General Manager
(Liaison) and which contains unequivocal admission that
the land was purchased in violation of s. 154(1) and, as
such, the transaction was void and that by virtue of s.
167, excess land vested in the State Government, it can
G be said that TR acted beyond his authority in filing the
written statement. Thus, it is not possible to find any fault
with the order of the Collector who relied upon the
written statement filed on behalf of the appellant and
declared that land in excess of 12.50 acres will vest in the
H State Government. [Para 22] (953-E-H; 954-A-C]
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL COMMNR., 933
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS.
3.1. Section 154(1) declares that no Bhumidhar shall A
be entitled to transfer any land other than tea gardens by
sale or gift to any person if holding of the transferee
would exceed 12.50 acres. An explanation was
;ubseq·Jently added to clarify that the word 'person' shall
include and be deemed to have included a co-operative B
society on June 15, 1976. Proviso to s. 154(1) lays down
that where the transferee is a co-operative society, the
land held by it having been pooled by itS members u/s.
77(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act,
1965 shall not be taken into account for the purpose of c
computing 12.50 acres. Under sub-section (2), the State
Government is empowered to authorize transfer of land
in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is
of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a
registered co-operative society or an institution D
established for a charitable purpose, which does not
have sufficient land for its need or the transfer is in the
interest of general public. The sub,Stantive part of sub-
section (3), which was added by an amendment made in
2005, lays down that every transfer of land in excess of
the limit prescribed under sub-section (1) shall require E
prior approval of the State Governrnent. By virtue of
proviso to this sub-section, the .State Government has
been clothed with power to g~ve post facto approval on
payment of the specified amount as fine. Section 166
declares that every transfer made in contravention of the F
provision of the Act shall be void. This obviously includes
s. 154(1). Section 167 enumerates the consequences of
void transfers. Clause (a) of Section 167(1) lays down that
a transfer which is void by virtue of SEtction 166, the
subject matter of transfer shall be deemed to have vested G
in the State Government from the date of transfer. In
terms of Section 167(2), the Collector is entitled to take
over possession of any land or other property which ·has
vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) and
H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 5 S.C.R.
A also direct eviction of ~my person occupying such land
or property. [Para 24] [957-B-H; 958-A-B]
3.2. The submission 'that a company is not a 'person'
within the meaning of s. 154(1) of the Act and, therefore,
the restriction contained therein is not applicable to
8 transfer of land in favour of a company sans merit. A
reading of s. 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses
Act, 1904 makes it clear that the provisions contained in
the U.P. General Clauses Act are applicable to all Uttar
Pradesh Acts including the present Act. By virtue of s.
C 3(1) of the General Clauses Act, the definition of the word'
'person' contained in s. 4(33) will be deemed to have been
engrafted in the Act and the same cannot be given a
restricted meaning. Rather, in view of the definition
contained ins. 4(33) of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the
D word 'person' appearing ins. 154(1) would include ~ny
company or association or body of individuals, whether
incorporated or not. This is strengthened by the language
of explanation added to s. 154(1) whereby it was declare,d
that the expression 'person' shall include a co-operative
E society. The word 'include' is generally used in
interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of
the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statue
and'when it is so used those words or phrases must be
construed as comprehending, not only such_ttiings, as
F they signify according to their natural import,\but also
those things which the interpretation clause declares that
they shall include. The word 'include' is susceptible of
another construction, which may become imperative, if
the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not
G merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural
significance of the words or expressions used. It may be
equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that case it may
afford an exhaustive explanation of the· meaning which
for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached
H to those words or expressions. [Para 25) [958-C, G-H; 959-
A-E]
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 935
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS.
State of Bombay and Ors: v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha A
and Ors. AIR 1960 SC 610; CIT, A.P. v. Taj Mahal Hotel,
Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550, referred to.
Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99,
referrej to.
B
3.3. The word 'person' appearing in s. 154(1) cannot
be construed in a manner which would defeat the object
and purpose of legislation. If a narrow meaning is given
to the word 'person' appearing in s. 154(1), the purpose
of legislation viz., abolition of zamindari and making tillers C
owner of the land, which is in consonance with the
mandate of the object of social justice set out in the
preamble and the provisions contained in Articles 38 and
39 of the Constitution, would be substantively defeated
because in that event companies, corporations, etc. will D
be able to grab the land of the tillers by offering them
comparatively remunerative prices and again make them
landless poor. It cannot be said that the word 'person' in
s. 154(1) means a human being or a natural person only
and that the explanation by which a co-operative society E
was included in the said word is indicative of the
legislature's intention to give a narrow meaning to the
word 'person' The explanation instead of narrowing the
meaning of the word 'person' makes it clear that the same
would include a non-natural person. [Paras 27 and 30] F
[960-H; 961-A-B; 966-E-F]
Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274;
S.K. Gupta and Anr. v. K.P. Jain and Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 54;
Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Central Bank G
of India v. State of Kera/a and Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 94;
Hasmukhlal Dahayabhai and othws v. State of Gujarat and
Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 100; Raman/a/ Bhaila/ Patel v. State of
Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 449, relied on.
H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 .S.C.R.
A 4. The submission that if share of the individual
Director is taken into consideration, the total land of the
appellant would not exceed 12.50 acres is to be rejected
in view of the contents of lease agreement. That apart, no
evidence was produced before the Collector or the
B Additional Commissioner to prove that the land was
purchased in the name of the Directors of the appellant.
Even before the Single Judge of the High Court and this
Court, no such evidence has been produced. [Para 31]
[966-H; 967-A-B]
c 5. The submission that a direction may be given to
the State Government to accord post facto sanction to the
purchase of excess land cannot be entertained much less
accepted because the appellant has been found guilty of
not coming to the Court with clean hands. In any case,
D in the absence of any factual foundation, such a plea
cannot be entertained at this stage. [Para 32] [968-F]
6. The appellant's grievance against the direction
given by the Single Judge to the Chief Secretary to
E ensure that possession of excess land is taken without
delay does not merit consideration because the State
Government had already granted lease of excess land to
the appellant. [Para 33] [968-G-H]
7. It is impossible to fathom any rational reason for
F this action of th.e State Government in granting lease of
excess land to the appellant ignoring that the appellant
had purchased land in patent violation of s. 154(1) of the
Act. By executing lease agreement dated 15.10.1994, the
concerned officers of the State effectively frustrated the
G object sought to be achieved by the legislature by
enacting the Act and the order passed by the Collector.
[Para 34] [968-A-B]
8. Since the appellant has not approached the quasi
H judicial and judicial forums i.e., the Additional
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 937
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS.
Commissioner, the High Court and this Court with clean A
hands and succeeded in securing interim orders, it is
ordained to pay costs, which is quantified at Rs.2 lacs.
With a view to ensure that functionaries of the State
Government may not connive with the appellant and
compound the wrong already done, the Government of B
Uttar Pradesh is directed not to renew the lease of the
appellant at the end of 30 years period and deal with
excess land in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
[Para 35] [969-C-E]
Case Law Reference: c
(1917) ~ KB 486 Referred to. Para 15
(1977) 2 sec 431 Referred to. Para 17
(1983) 3 sec 333 Referred to. Para 17 D
(1983) 4 sec 575 Referred to. Para 17
(1991) 3 sec 251 Referred to. Para 17
(1994) 1 sec 1 Referred to. Para 17
E
(1996) 4 sec 291 Referred to. Para 17
(2001 > 3 sec 92 Referred to. Para 17
(2007) 8 sec 449 Referred to. Para 17
F
(2008) 2 sec 326 Referred to. Para 17
(2008) 12 sec 481 Referred to. Para 17
(2009) 3 sec 141 Referred to. Para 17
AIR 1963 SC 1558 Referred to. Para 18 G
(1899) AC 99 Referred to. Para 25
AIR 1960 SC 610 Referred to. Para 25
(1971) 3 sec 550 · Referred to. Para 25 H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A AIR 1953 SC 274 Relied on. Para 26
(1979) 3 sec 54 Relied on. Para 26
(1987) 1 sec 424 Relied on. Para 26
(2009) 4 sec 94 Relied on. Para 26
B
(1976) 4 sec 1oo Relied on. Para 28
(2008). 5 sec 449 Relied on. Para 29
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
C 7982 of 2002.
From the Judgment & Order dated 16.07.2001 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
25819 of 2001.
D
Manoj Awarup, Lalita Kohli (for M/s. Manoj Swarup & Co.)
for the Appellant.
T.N. Singh, Shekhar Raj Sharma, Chandra Prakash
Pandey, for the Resporidents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by refusal of the
learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court to quash orders
dated 24.5.1993 and 30.5.2001 passed by Collector, Pilibhit
F (for short, 'the Collector') and Additional Commissioner
(Administration), Bareilly (for short, 'the Additional
Commissioner') respectively under the U. P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short, 'the Act'),
declaring that 27.95 acres land purchased by the appellant in
G Shahi and Khamaria Pul villages of District Pilibhit shall vest
in the State Government, the appellant has filed this appeal.
2. The appellant is a company incorporated under Section
149(3) of the Companies Act, 1956. In 1991, the appellant
H decided to set up agro based paper projects in the State of
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 939
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
U.P. By resolution dated 14.10.1991, the Board of Directors A
of the appellant authorised Shri Kamal Oswal (Director), Shri
T.R. Sharma (General Manager) and Shri Jai Prakash Kaushal
(Authorised Signatory) to negotiate and finalise purchase of
land in the State of Uttar Pradesh and/or other States and
Union Territories, to sign sale deeds etc. for effective B
acquisition/transfer of land. Paragraphs (e} and (f) of that
resolution read as under:
'To sign for and on behalf of the company all sales deeds
conveyance deeds, lntkals, Mutations and other C
documents necessary for the effective acquisition/transfer
of the land in the name of the company and for this purpose
to appear for and on behalf of the company before any
court of law, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar, Patwari, Registrar,
Sub Registrar of any other land transferring authority.
D
And to do all other acts, things and deeds for and on behalf
of the company which any of the above noted persons in
the discharge of their lawful duties consider proper and· in
the best interest of the company."
E
3. Soon thereafter, an application dated 24.10.1991 was
submitted on behalf of the appellant to Joint Director of
Industries, Bareilly Zone, Bareilly for grant of permission under
Section 154(2) of the Act for purchc.ise of land in excess of 12.5
acres. The relevant portions of that application are extracted
F
below:
"Our Company is proposing to set up a 100 TPD (Gross)
Agro based paper project in area adjoining villages of
Shahi Kamariapul, Adhkata Nazrana. For this project we
require about 200 Acres of land out of which about 50 G
Acres shall be in Pilibhit District and about 150 Acres in
Nawabganj Tehsil of Bareilly District.
The proposed paper project shall utilise Agricultural
wastes such as wheat Straw, Rice Straw and Bagasse
H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A etc. as the main raw materials. The project shall generate
direct employment opportunities for about 750 persons
and for many more indirectly. The project shall be of
special benefit to the people living in the areas near the
site.
B
We through this letter are applying to your office for the
permission under section 154 of ZALR Act for purchase
of land in excess of 12.5 Acres for industrial purpose. We
are enclosing two additional copies of this letter. We are
also enclosing the site plan, recommendations of Technical
c Consultants for your ready reference.
/ ,
We shall be pleased to furnish any other information
required by you in this connection. We wish to bring to your
kind notice that we plan to start the purchase of land for
D this project from next month i.e. Nov. 1991."
4. However without waiting for response of the concerned
·authority, the appellant purchased 40.45 acres land in Shahi
and Khamaria Pul villages, Pargana Jahanabad, Tehsil and
E District Pilibhit through different sale deeds executed between
January and April, 1992.
5. The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged transfer of
various parcels of land in favour of the appellant by filing
identical suits under Sections 154, 167, 168A and 194 of the
F Act. The transferors, who were impleaded as parties in all the
suits did not contest the same. However, the appellant filed
identical written statements in all the cases. In first paragraph
of the written statement filed in Suit No.133 of 1993, the
appellant admitted all the paragraphs of the suit. In the
G additional statement, the appellant virtually conceded that the
land was purchased in contravention of the Act and stated that
it may be allowed to retain 12.5 acres out of the disputed land.
This is evinced from English translation of paragraphs 2 to 4
of the written statement which are reproduced below:
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 941
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
"2. That all the lands of both the village had been A
purchased for establishment of Industry after making the
payment to the farmers. But I had the knowledge of law in
Punjab and was not well conversant with the provisions of
U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act therefore, I purchased the
land in question which is more than 12 acres. We had B
given an application dated 24.10.1991 to the State
Government for the permission of establishment of Industry
and only thereafter we started purchasing the land without
waiting for the permission from the Government because
we had the belief that permission will be granted to us for c
establishment of Industry.
3. That we filed application for mutation of whole of the
land under the sale and all of them had been accepted and
we continued the purchasing of land because we had the
belief that we are not violating any provision of Zamindari D
Abolition Act.
4. That the details of land which we want to keep for the
establishment of factory, measuring twelve and a half acres
out of the disputed land, are being given in the succeeding E
paras and we have no objection for any legal action with
regard to the remaining land."
The particulars of the land suit sought to ~e retained by
the appellant were given in the affidavit of Shri T.R. Sharma. A F
sketch map showing those khasra numbers were also filed with
the written statement.
6. By an order dated 24.5.1993, the Collector declared that
the purchase made by the appellant in excess of 12.50 acres
is against the provisions of Sections 154/167 of the Act and G
that it will be entitled to retain only 12.50 acres and the
remaining land measuring 27.95 acres would vest in the State
Government. The relevant portion of the order passed by the
·Collector is extracted below:
H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A "I have heard the arguments of Government Counsel
(Revenue) for State and the learned counsel for M/s. Oswal
Fats and Oil Limited and perused the records. After
hearing the arguments of both the parties and the perusal
of records, I have reached on the conclusion that the
B defendants M/s. Oswal Fats and Oil Limited, New Delhi
have purchased the total land measuring 40.45 Acres in
Village Shahi and Khamaria Pul, Pargana Jahanabad,
Tehsil and District Pilibhit, as detailed above. However as
per the provisions of Section 154/167 of Jamindari
c Abolition and Land Management Act, they can possess
only 12.50 Acres land. Therefore, the transfer of remaining
land measuring 27.95 Acres, which is in excess than 12.50
Acres, is against the provisions of Section 154/167 of Z.A.
Act. The defendant Company Oswal Fats and Oil Limited
has also given the option for 12.5() Acres land, in their
D
affidavit. Therefore, the remaining land except the 12.50
Acres land mentioned in the Affidavit dated 19.05.93 is
liable to t>e merged into the State."
7. The appellant questioned the order of the Collector by
E filing revision under Section 333 of. the Act. In the memo of
revision, it was claimed that excess land was purchased under
the belief that the State Government would grant permission
under Section 154(2). It was then urged that although the Board
of Directors had given power to Shri T.R. Sharma to appear
F before any court of law on behalf of the appellant, he was not
authorized to enter into a compromise or give consent for
retaining the particular land. Another plea taken by the appellant
was that the company consists of 8 directors and if each
Director is entitled to have a share of 12.5 acres, the purchase
G made by the appellant will not exceed the prescribed limit.
However, at the hearing of the revision petition, the plea that
Shri T.R. Sharma had filed written statement and affidavit
beyond the scope of his authority appears to have been given
up and it was submitted that the general manager had been
H authorised to pursue the case but he did not do it properly. The
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 943
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Additional Commissioner dismissed the revision of the A
appellapt and confirmed the order of the Collector by recording
following reasons:
"It is clear from the perusal of records that the defendants
themselves have admitted iri their objections filed before 8
the court below that the land in question had been
purchased for establishment of Industry and purchased the
land more than 12.50 acres intentionally. They have also
given the details of land which they want to keep with them
and agree for merging of remaining land into the State.
Revisionist has stated that they had given an ,application C
for obtaining the permission and it has also been admitted
that they had purchased the land in excess than 12.50
acres without waiting for the permission. In these
circumstances, the court below has correctly passed an
order for merging of 27.95 Acre land into the State, which D.
is in excess than the 12.50 acres land and this order does
not require any intervention. Therefore, the Revision, being
devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed."
8. The appellant challenged the orders of the Collector and E
the Additional Commissioner in Writ Petition No.25819/2001
by taking up the position that Shri T.R. Sharma was not
authorised to enter into a compromise or to make a statement
relinquishing the land in favour of the State Government. It was
also pleaded that the appellant was entitled to purchase land F
in excess of 12.50 acres because its case is covered by the
explanation appearina below Section 154(1) of the Act.
9. The learned Single Judge rejected the argument on the
issue of lack of authority of Shri T.R. Sharma to indirectly admit
violation of Section 154(1) of the Act and to agree to surrender G
excess land by making the following observations:
":t is apparent on face of record that petitioner Company
has no authorization either general or special to hold land
in excess of 12 .50 acres by State Government. H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S C.R.
A Indisputably the petitioner Company is not a Co-operative
Society registered under the Co-operativ~ Societies Act
nor petitioner Company is established for charitable
purposes. Nothing is brought to my notice that the present
Company is established in the interest of general public.
B Contrary to it, there are overwhelming materials on record
and also from attending circumstances it is inferable that
the petitioner Company is an establishment established
with profit orientation for its shareholders. It is pertinent to
mention here that the petitioner Company has not
c produced its certificate of registration under the
Companies Act. During the course of argument articles of
association of Nuskar Enterprises Ltd. is produced by the
learned counsel for the petitioner. It is not understandable
as to why the certificate of registration under the
Companies Act is not produced before the Court. It is also
D
not understandable as to how the Articles of Association
of Nuskar Enterprises Ltd. has nexus with the petitioner
Company. I am of the view that even if the affidavit dated
19.5.1993 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) of the General
Manager of the petitioner Company giving consent to
E relinquish the land in excess of 12.50 acres in favour of
State Government is ignored even then the findings of
respondents No.1 and 2 are sustainable for the reasons
given hereinabove."
F The learned Single Judge then- referred to the provisions
of Sections 152, 154, 166 and 167 of the Act and held that the
purchase made by the appellant in excess..ef 12.50 acres was
illegal per se and its case does not fall within the ambit of the
exceptions carved out in sub-section (2) of Section 154. The
G learned Single Judge rejected the appellant's plea that·
surrender made by Shri T.R. Sharma was unauthorized and
held that the Collector did not commit any illegality by declaring
that excess land will vest in the State Government.
Simultaneously, he gave a direction to the Chief Secretary to
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 945
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
ensure that possession of the excess land is taken by the A
Government free from all encumbrances without any delay.
10. At this stage, we may mention that during the pendency
of the suits filed by the State Government before the Collector,
the appellant instituted Suit No.25/1992-93 under Section 143 B
of the Act, which was disposed of by Pargana Adhikari, Pilibhit
vide her order dated 12.7.1993 by declaring that 7.97 acres
land purchased by the appellant in Tehsil and District Pilibhit
was non-agricultural land.
11. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant C
argued that the order passed by the Collector was vitiated due
to violation of the basics of natural justice inasmuch as the
concerned officer did not give reasonable opportunity to the
appellant to defend its case on the issue of alleged violation
of Section 154 of the Act and the Additional Commissioner and D
the learned Single Judge gravely erred in confirming/upholding
the order of the Collector. The learned counsel further argued
that Shri T.R. Sharma, who was holding the post of General
Manager was not authorised to make any concession on behalf
of the appellant or give consent for surrendering 27.95 acres E
land on the ground that the purchase of land was made in
violation of.mandate of Section 154 and the Collector was not
at all justified in acting upon the concession made by Shri T.R.
Snarma. Learned counsel then referred to Section 154 of the
Act and submitted that the embargo contained in that section F
is not applicable to the appellant's case because purchase
made by a company does not fall within the ambit of that
section. The learned counsel reiterated the plea that if each
director of the company is held entitled to purchase 12.50 acres
of land, the purchase of 40.45 acres land by the appellant G
cannot be treated as violation of Section 154(1 ). He lastly
argued that even if transfer of land in favour of the appellant is
held to be contrary to the mandate of Section 15411), the Court
may direct the State Government to accord post facto sanction
in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 154 which was inserted
H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 5 S.C.R.
A by an amendment dated 24.3.2005. Learned counsel also
criticized the direction given by the High Court to the Chief
Secretary to take possession of the excess land and submitted
that while deciding the writ petition filed by the appellant against
the orders of the Collector and the Additional Commissioner,
s the learned Single Judge was not justified in treating the case
as a public interest litigation.
12. Shri T.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents supported the impugned order and argued that the
C Collector did not commit any error by declaring that the excess
land will vest in the State Government because the purchase
was made by the appellant without obtaining permission in
terms of Section 154 of the Act. Learned counsel relied upon
the averments contained in the written statement filed on behalf
of the appellant in Suit No. 133/1993 and argued that after
D having indirectly admitted contravention of Section 154(1) of the
Act, the appellant did not have the locus to challenge the orders
of the Collector and the Additional Commissioner on the ground
that Shri T.R. Sharma was not authorized to give option for
retaining the particular parcels of land and the learned Single
E Judge rightly held that the transfers made in violation of Section
154 were null arid void.
13. Before dealing with the respective arguments/
submissions, we consider it appropriate to note that after one
F year and five months of passing of order by the Collector, the
appellant and the State Government entered into a lease
agreement dated 15.10.1994 whereby the latter agreed to give
excess land measuring 27.95 acres, the details of which were
given in Schedule 'A' appended to the agreement, to the
G appellant on lease for a period of 30 years at an yearly rent of
Rs.281.05. The lease agreement was signed on behalf of the
appellant by Shri Kamal Oswal, Director and Shri J.P. Kaushal,
General Manager (Liaison). In the lease agreement, a copy of
which has .been annexed as Annexure CA-1 with the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in this Court, the
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 947
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS~ [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
lessee i.e., the appellant candidly admitted that transfers made A
in its favour by the Bhumidhars were contrary to Section 154
of the Act and were void and, as such, land vested in the State
Government under Section 167. This is.evinced from the
following paragraphs of the lease agreement:
B
"AND WHEREAS the transfers as aforesaid made by
the Bhumidhars in favour of the Lessee in respect of the
land described in Schedule 'A' hereto being in
contravention of Section 154 of the Uttar Pradesh
Jamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
(hereinafter called "the said Act'? were void under Section C
166 of the said Act and consequently the said land vested
in the Government of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter called
"the State Government'? under Section 167 of the said
Act, free from all encumbrances with effect from the date
of their transfer. D
AND WHEREAS the lessor at the request of the Lessee
has agree to demise and land vested in the State
Government as aforementioned subject to the rights and
restrictions and the several convenants hereinafter E
expressed for the purposes of the said project."
(emphasis supplied)
14. It is quite intriguing and surprising that the lease
agreement was not brought to the notice of the Additional F
Commissioner and the learned Single Judge of the High Court
and neither of them was apprised of the fact that the appellant
had taken 27.95 acres land on lease from the Government by
unequivocally conceding that it had purchased excess land in
violation of Section 154(1) of the Act and the same vested in G
the State Government. In the list of dates and the memo of
special leave petition filed in this Court also there is no mention
of lease agreement dated 15.10.1994. This shows that the
appellant has not approached the Court with clean hands. The
withholding of the lease agreement from the Additional H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 5 S.C.R.
A Commissioner, the High Court and this Court appears to be a
part of the strategy adopted by the appellant to keep the quasi-
judicial and judicial forums including this Court in dark about
the nature of its possession over the excess land and make
them believe that it has been subjected to unfair treatment. If
B the factum of execution of lease agreement and its contents
were disclosed to the Additional Commissioner, he would have
definitely incorporated the same in order dated 30.5.2001. In
that event, the High Court or for that reason this Court would
have non suited the appellant at the threshold. However, by
C concealing a material fact, the appellant succeeded in
persuading the High Court and this Court to entertain
adventurous litigation instituted by it and pass interim orders.
If either of the courts had been apprised of the fact that by virtue
of lease deed dated 15.10.1994, the appellant has succeeded
in securing temporary legitimacy for its possession over excess
0
land, then there would have been no occasion for the High
Court or this Court to entertain the writ petition or the special
leave petition.
15. It is settled law that a person who approaches the Court
E for grant of relief, equitable or otherwise, is under a solemn
obligation to candidly disclose all the material/important facts
which have bearing on the adjudication of the issues raised in
the case. In other words, he owes a duty to the court to bring
out all the facts and refrain from concealing/suppressing any
F material fact within his knowledge or which he could have known
by exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary
prudence. If he is found guilty of concealment of material facts
or making an attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the
court not only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such
G person. In one of the earliest decisions on the subject i.e., - R.
v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner (1917) 1 KB 486,
Viscount Reading, Chief Justice of the Divisional Court
observed:
"Where an ex parle application has been made to this
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 949
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes A
to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the
applicant was not candid and did not fairly state the facts,
the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an
abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with
the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in B
the Court, but one which should only be used in cases
which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has
been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful
examination will be made of the facts as they are and as
they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and C
everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the
view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the
true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing
is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived,
then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant D
in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by
means of a misleading affidavit."
16. The above extracted observations were approved by
the Court of Appeal in the following words:
E
"It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring
under the notice of the Court all facts material to the
determination of his right to that injunction: and it is no
excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the
importance of any facts which he has omitted to bring
F
forward. If an applicant does not act with uberrima fides
and put every material fact before the Court it will not grant
him an injunction, even though there might be facts upon
which the injunction might be granted." His Lordship rightly
pronounced: "The Court, for its own protection, is entitled
to say: We refuse this writ. .. without going into the merits G
of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicant
in bringing the case before us." Warrington, L.J. was also
of the same opinion. In a concurring judgment His Lordship
observed: "It is perfectly well settled that a person who
H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A makes an ex parte application to the Court - that is to say,
in absence of the person who will be affected by that which
the Court is asked to do - is under an obligation to the
Court to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material
facts within his knowledge, and if he does not make that
8 fullest possible disclosure, then he cannot obtain any
advantage from the proceedings, and he will be deprived
of any advantage he may have already obtained by means
of the order which has thus wrongly been obtained by him."
17. This Court and different High Courts have repeatedly
C invoked and applied the rule that a person who does not
disclose all material facts has no right to be heard on the merits
of his grievance - State of Haryana v. Kamal Distillery Co.
Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 431, Vijay Kumar Kathuria v. State of
Haryana (1983) 3 SCC 333, Welcome Hotel and others v.
D State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. (1983) 4 SCC 575,
G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by LRs. and another v.
Government of Karnataka and another (1991) 3 sec 261,
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath
(dead) by LRs. and others (1994) 1 SCC 1, Agricultural and
E Processed Food Products v. Oswal Agro Furane and others
(1996) 4 SCC 297, Union of India and others v. Muneesh
Suneja (2001) 3 SCC 92, Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank
of India (2007) 8 SCC 449, Sunil Poddar and others v. Union
Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC 326, K.D. Sharma v. Steel
F Authority of India Ltd. and others (2008) 12 SCC 481, G.
Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and others
(2009) 3 SCC 141 and C.A. No. 5239/2002 - Dalip Singh v.
State of UP. and others, decided on 3.12.2009.
18. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 S.C. 1558, this
G Court revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making
following observations:
"It is of utmost importance that in making material
statements and setting forth grounds in applications for
H special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution,
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 951
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS: [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
care must be taken not to make any statements which are A
inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with
applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes
statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the
petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray
the confidence of the Court by making statements which B
are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the
appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material
statements made by the appellant in his application for
special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the
respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may c
have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on
the strength of what he characterizes as
misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for
special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the
conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the D
appellant ought to be revoked."
19. In Dalip Singh's case, the appellant's grievance was
that before finalizing the case under the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, the prescribed authority
did not give notice to the tenure holder Shri Praveen Singh E
(predecessor of the appellant). On a scrutiny of the records, this
Court found that the prescribed authority had issued notice to
Shri Praveen Singh, which was duly served upon him and held
that the appellant is not entitled to relief because he did not
approach the High Court~with clean hands inasmuch as he F
made a misleading statement in the writ petition giving an
impression that the tenure holder did not know of the
proceedings initiated by the prescribed authority. The preface
and para 21 of that judgment read as under:
G
"For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic
values of life i.e., 'Satya' (truth) and 'Ahimsa' (non-
violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi
guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life.
Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system - H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A which was in vogue in pre-independence era and the
people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts
irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
independence period has seen drastic changes in our
value system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old
B ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so
intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to
take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and
suppression of facts in the court proceedings. In last 40
years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who
c belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They
shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for
achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed
by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time
to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established
that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice
D
or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted
hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
21. From what we have mentioned above, it is clear that
in this case efforts to mislead the authorities and the courts
E have transmitted through three generations and the
conduct of the appellant and his son to mislead the High
Court and this Court cannot, but be treated as
reprehensible. They belong to the category of persons who
not only attempt, but succeed in polluting the course of
F justice. Therefore, we do not find any justification to
interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the
appellant's prayer for setting aside the orders passed by
the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority."
G 20. Notwithstanding our conclusion that the appellant is
guilty of contumacious conduct and is not entitled to any relief,
we have thought it proper to deal with the argument advanced
by the learned counsel for the appellant on the issues of
violation of rules of natural justice and non applicability of
Section 154 of the Act.
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 953
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS: lG.S. SINGHVI, J.]
21. The question whether the appellant was denied A
reasonable opportunity to defend its cause needs
consideration in the light of the written statements filed on behalf
of the appellant before the Collector, wherein it was admitted
that land had been purchased without waiting for the permission
of the Government under the belief that permission will be B
granted for establishing the industry. Not only this, it was
candidly stated that the appellant has no objection if any legal
action is taken with regard to land in excess of 12.50 acres. In
the proceedings of the suits, no prayer was made on behalf of
the appellant for permission to lead evidence to prove that the c
purchase made by it from Bhumidhars was not in violation of
Section 154(1) of the Act. Before the Additional Commissioner
and the High Court, the appellant did not make a grievaricelhat
the Collector had passed order without giving it a reasonable
or effective opportunity of hearing. In this view of the matter;the D
appellant cannot now contend that the Collector did not act in
consonance with the rule of audi alteram partem.
22. Though, Shri Manoj Swarup made strenuous efforts to
convince the Court that Shri T.R. Sharma had no authority to
make tacit admission of the illegality committed in the purchase E
of land and that he had no right to make an offer for surrender
of excess land, we have not felt impressed. A reading of
resolution dated 14.10.1991 makes it clear that Shri T.R.
Sharma, the then General Manager of the appellant was
authorised to take all actions necessary for transfer of land. F
That apart, in view of lease agreement dated 15.10.1994, which
was not produced by the appellant before the Additional
Commissioner, the learned Single Judge of the High Court and
even this Court (for the first tinie, the lease agreement came
to the fore when a copy thereof was annexed with the counter G
affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent), challenge to the
competence of Sri T.R. Sharma to make an admission that the
land was purchased by the appellant without waiting for the
State Government's permission and that appropriate legal.
action can be taken with regard to excess land pales into the H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A realm of insignificance. The learned counsel was at loss to
explain as to how in the face of the lease agreement, which was
signed by none else than Shri Kamal Oswal (Director of the
appellant), whose name finds mention in Resolution dated
14.10.1991 and General Manager (Liaison) and which contains
B unequivocal admission that the land was purchased in violation
of Section 154(1) and, as such, the transaction was void and
that by virtue of Section 167, excess land vested in the State
Government, it can be said that Shri T.R. Sharma acted beyond
his authority in filing the written statement. This being the
c position, it is not possible to find any fault with the order of the
Collector who relied upon the written statement filed on behalf
of the appellant and declared that land in excess of 12.50 acres
will vest in the State Government.
23. We shall now consider whether the restriction
D contained in Section 154(1) is not attracted in a case involving
transfer of land by Bhumidhar in favour of a company. In this
context, it is important to bear in mind that the Act was enacted
by the State Legislature to achieve the goal of social and '
economic justice enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution.
E It provides for abolition of zamindari system, which involves
intermediaries between tiller of the soil and the State and for
acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law
relating to land tenure. Sections 154, 166 and 167 of the Act,
which contain restriction on transfer of land by Bhumidhar and
F also specify the consequences of transfer made in violatiori of
that restriction, read as under:-
"154. Restriction on transfer by a bhumidhar.- (1) Save
as provided in sub-section (2), no bhumidhar shall have,
the right to transfer by sale or gift, any land other than tea
G
gardens to any person where the transferee shall, as a
result of such sale or gift, become entitled to land which
together with land if any, held by his family will, in the
aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) in Uttar
Pradesh.
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 955
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Explanation.- For the removal of doubt it is hereby A
declared that in this sub-section the expression 'person'
shall include and be deemed to have included on June 15,
1976 a 'Co-operative Society':
Provided that where the transferee is a co-operative B
society, the land held by it having been pooled by its
members under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 77
of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965
shall not be taken into account in computing the 5.0586
hectares (12.50 acres) land held by it.
c
(2) Subject to the provisions of any other law relating to
the land tenures for the time being in force, the State
Government may, by general or special order, authorise
transfer in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1)
if it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a D
registered cooperative society or an institution established
for a charitable purpose, which does not have land
sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the interest
of general public.
E
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, the
expression 'family' shall mean the transferee, his or her
wife or husband (as the case may be) and minor children,
and wher'a the transferee is a minor also his o~ her parents.
(3) For every transfer of land in excess of the limit F
prescribed under sub-section (1) prior approval of the
State Government shall be necessary:
Provided that where the prior approval of the State
Government is not obtained under this sub-section, the G
State Government may on an application give its approval
afterward in such manner and on payment in such manner
of an amount, as fine, equal to twenty-five per cent of the
cost of the land as may be prescribed. The cost of the land
H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 5 S.C.R.
A shall be such as determined by the Collector for stamp
duty.
Provided further that where the State Government is
satisfied that any transfer has been made in public interest,
it may exempt any such transferee from the payment of fine
B
under this sub-section.
166. Transfer made in contravention of the Act to be
void.- Every transfer made in contravention of the
provisions of this Act shall be void.
c
167. Consequences of void transfers.- (1) The following
consequences shall ensue in respect of every transfer
which is void by virtue of section 166, namely-
(a) the subject-matter of transfer shall with effect from the
0 date of transfer, be deemed to have vested in the State
Government free from all encumbrances;
(b) the trees, crops and wells existing on the land on the
date of transfer shall, with effect from the said date, be
E deemed to have vested in the State Government free from
all encumbrances;
(c) the transferee may remove other movable property or
the materiais of any immovable property existing on such
land on the date of transfer within such time as may be
F
prescribed.
(2) Where any land or other property has vested in the
State Government under sub-section (1 }, it shall be lawful
for the Collector to take over possession over such land
G or other property and to direct that any person occupying
such land or property be evicted therefrom. For the
purposes of taking over such possession or evicting such
unauthorised occupants, the Collector may use or cause
to be used such force as may be necessary."
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 957
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
24: While enacting law for abolition of zamindari system, A
the legislature was aware of the ground reality that despite the
welfare measures which may be taken by the State to protect
the interest of poor farmers, economically affluent class of
people may persuade or pressurize them to part with their sole
source of sustenance i.e., the land. This is the reason why a B
ceiling has been imposed on transfer of land by Bhumidhar.
Section 154(1), in no uncertain terms, declares that no
Bhumidhar shall be entitled to transfer any land other than tea
gardens by sale or gift to any person if holding of the transferee
would exceed 12.50 acres (Earlier the prescribed limit was 30 c
acres but by an amendment it was reduced to 12.50 acres).
An explanation was subsequently added to clarify that the word
'person' shall include and be deemed to have included a
cooperative society on June 15, 1976. Proviso to Section
154(1) lays down that where the transferee is a cooperati_ve D
society, the land held by it having been pooled by its members
under Section 77(1 )(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative
Societies Act, 1965 shall not be taken into account for the
purpose of computing 12.50 acres. Under sub-section (2), the
State Government is empowered to authorize transfer of land
E
in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the
opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered
cooperative society or an institution established for a charitable
purpose, which does not have sufficient land for its need or the
transfer is in the interest of general public. The substantive part
of sub-section (3), which was added by an amendment made F
in 2005, lays down that every transfer of land in excess of the
limit prescribed under sub-section (1) shall require prior
approval of the State Government. By virtue of proviso to this
sub-section, the State Government has been clothed with
power to give post facto approval on payment of the specified G
amount as fine. Section 166 declares that every transfer made
in contravention of the provision of the Act shall be void. This
obviously includes Section 154(1). Section 167 enumerates the
consequences of void transfers. Clause (a) of Section 167(1)
lays down that a transfer which is void by virtue of Section 166, H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A the subject matter of transfer shall be deemed to have vested
in the State Government from the date of transfer. In terms of
Section 167(2), the Collector is entitled to take over possession
of any land or other property which has vested in the State
Government under sub-section (1) and also direct eviction of
B any person occupying such land or property.
25. The argument of Shri Manoj Swarup that a company
is not a 'person' within the meaning of Section 154(1) of the
Act and, therefore, the restriction contained therein is not
C applicable to transfer of land in favour of a company sans merit.
Since, the word 'person' has not been defined in the Act,
reference can usefully be made to the definition of that word in
the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904. Sections 3 and
4(33) of that Act read as under:
D "3. Application of the Act to other enactments. - (1) The
provisions of this Act shall apply to this Act and to all Uttar
Pr;;idesh Acts, whether made before or after the
commencement of this Act.
E (2) The Pf<?Visions of this Act in their application to any
enactment or statutory instrument shall be subject to any
contrary requirements of the context of the enactment or
instrument that is to be interpreted.
4. Definitions. - In all Uttar Pradesh Acts, unless there is
F anything repugnant in the subject or context, -
xxxx )()()()( )()()()(
(33) "Person" shall include any company or association
or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;
G
xxxx xxxx xxxx"
A reading of Section 3(1) reproduced above makes it
clear that the provisions contained in the U.P. General Clauses
H Act are applicable to all Uttar Pradesh Acts including the Act
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 959
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
with which we are concerned. To put it differently, by virtue of A
Section 3(1) of the General Clauses Act, the definition of the
word 'person' contained in Section 4(33) will be deemed to have
been engrafted in the Act and the same cannot be given a
restricted meaning as suggested by the learned counsel.
Rather, in view of the definition contained in Section 4(33) of B
the U.P. General Clauses Act, the word 'person' appearing in
Section 154(1) would include any company or association or
body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. This view of
ours is strengthened by the language of explanation added to
Section 154(1) whereby it was declared that the expression c
'person' shall include a cooperative society. The word 'include'
is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge
the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of
the statue and when it is so used those words or phrases must
be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they D
signify according to their natural import, but also those things
which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.
The word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which
may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient
to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of E
adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions
used. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that
case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning
which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attachad
to those words or expressions. - Dilworth v. Commissioner of
Stamps (1899) AC 99. In State of Bombay and others v. F
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others AIR 1960 SC 610,
Gajendragadkar, J., observed:
"It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition
denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in G
any sense. Where we are dealing with an inclusive
definition, it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive
interpretation upon terms of wider denotation.
In CIT, A.P. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad (1971) 3
H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A SCC 550, this Court interpreted the word 'plant' used in Section
10(2)(vi-b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Speaking for the Court,
Grover, J., observed:
"The very fact that even books have been included shows
that the meaning intended to be given to 'plant' is wide.
B
The word 'includes' is often used in interpretation clauses
in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases
occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used
these words and phrases must be construed as
comprehending not only such things as they signify
c according to their nature and import but also those things
which the interpretation clause declares that they shall
include."
26. Moreover, if the word 'person' used in Section 154(1)
D is interpreted keeping in view the object of legislation and by
applying the rule of contextual interpretation, the applicability of
which has been recognised in Poppatlal Shah v. State of
Madras AIR 1953 SC 274 (para 7), S.K. Gupta and another
v. K.P. Jain and another (1979) 3 SCC 54 (para 25), Reserve
E Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd. and others (1987) 1 SCC 424 (para 33) and Central
Bank of India v. State of Kera/a and others (2009) 4 SCC. 94
(para 98), it becomes clear that the sa1.1e would include hllriian
being and a body of individuals which may have juridical or non
F juridical status.
27. At the cost of repetition, we consider it appropriate to
observe that the primary object of Section 154(1) is to put a
restriction/ceiling on the transfer of land by a Bhumidhar to any
other person by sale or gift. Though, sub-sections (2) and (3)
G of Section 154 empowers the Government to dilute the rigor
of the restriction contained in Section 154(1 ), if that section is
read in conjunction with Sections 166 and 167 which provide
for consequences of transfer made in contravention of the Act
including Section 154(1 ), the word 'person' appearing in
H Section 154(1) cannot be construed in a manner which would
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 961
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
defeat the object and purpose of legislation. If a narrow A
meaning is given to the word 'person' appearing in Section
154(1), the purpose of legislation viz., abolition of zamindari and
making tillers owner of the land, which is in consonance with
the mandate of the object of social justice set out in the
preamble and the provisions contained in Articles 38 and 39 B
of the Constitution, would be substantively defeated because
in that event companies, corporations, etc. will be able to grab
the land of the tillers by offering them comparatively
remunerative prices and again make them landless poor.
28. At this stage, we may notice two precedents which C
have direct bearing on the interpretation of word 'person'. In
Hasmukhlal Dahayabhai and others v. State of Gujarat and
others (1976) 4 sec 100, this Court was called upon to
interpret Section 6 of the Gujarat Ceiling Act, 1961. It was
argued on behalf of the appellant that the concept of person D
embodied in Section 6(2) was contrary to the concept of that
word in second proviso to Article 331A(1) of the Constitution.
While repelling the challenge, this Court observed:
"It is evident that Section 6 conceives of each "person" E
holding land as a single .unit whose holding must not
exceed the ceiling limit. Section 2 sub-section (21) says:
"'person' includes a joint family",. Thus, the term "person"
is not, strictly speaking, defined in the Act. Section 2 sub-
section (21) only clarifies that the term "person" will F
"include" a joint family also. It certainly does not exclude
an individual from being a person in the eyes of law.
This has been done apparently to make it clear that, in
addition to individuals, as natural persons, families, as
conceived of by other provisions, can also be and are G
persons. This elucidation of the term "person" is in keeping
with Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which
·lays down: " 'person' shall include any company or
association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
or not". H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A We have referred to the Central General Clauses
Act 10 of 1897 and not to the State General Clauses Act,
which also contains a similar clarification, because Article
367 of our Constitution provides that the definitions
contained in the Central Act "apply for the· interpretation of
8 the ConititutioFl". The argur:nent which has been advanced
before us is that the concept of the term "person", having
been fixed by the Central General Clauses· Act, this
concept and no other must be used for interpreting the
second proviso to Article 31-A( 1) of the Constitution which
c lays down:
"Prollided further that where any law makes any
prol4sion for the acquisition by the State of any
estate and where any land comprised therein is
held by a pf;rson under his personal cultivation, it
D shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any
portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit
applicable to him under any Jaw for the time being
in force or any building or structure standing thereon
or appurtenant thereto, unless the iaw relating to the
E acquisition of such land, building or structure,
provides fo"r payment ·of compensation at a rate
which shall· not be less than the market value
thereof."
F It is true that, but for the provisions of Section 6, sub-
section (2) of the Act, the term "person", which includes
individuals, as natural persons, as well as groups or bodies
of individuals, as artificial persons, such as a family is; the
entitlement to the ceiling area would be possessed by
every person, whether artificial or natural. In other words,
G
if Section 6(2) of the Act was not there, each individual
member' of a family woulel -h(lve been entitled to hold land
upto the ceiling limit if it was his or her legally separate
property. This follows from the obvious meaning of the
terrn "person" as well as the inclusive definitions given both
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 963
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
in the Act under consideration and in the General Clauses A
Act.
Spouses and minor children, as natural persons, have not
been debarred from holding their separate rights to land
by the provisions of the Act. It is not the object of the Act
B
to do .that. The object of the Act, as set out above, is
twofold: firstly, to limit the ceiling area of each holder; and,
secondly, to acquire what falls beyond the ceiling limit so
that the State may distribute it to more needy persons. It
is not disputed that compensation is provided for
acquisition of what exceeds the ceiling area in every case. C
As was held bythis Court''in H.H. Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kera/a the amount of
compensation fixed cannot be questioned. Therefore, no
provision of the Act could be or is challenged on the
ground that the required compensation is not prescribed D
for an acquisition under it as required by Article 31 (2) of
the Constitution or is inadequate."
29. The issue was recently considered in Raman/a(
Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 449. That case E
involved interpretation of the provisions contained in the Gujarat
Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1.960. The High Court held that
the word 'person' appearing in Section 6 of ·the Act .includes
an association of persons and as such 10 co-owners were
entitled to only one unit i.e. 36 acres. It was argued on behalf F
of the appellant that the definition of "person" in the General
Clauses Act cannot be read into the definition of "person" in
the Ceiling Act and in any case co-owners cannot be
considered as a body of individuals or association of persons
and each co-owner should be considered as a person for the G
purposes of the Ceiling Act. The Court referred to the provisions
of Gujarat General Clauses Act, which is pari materia to the
General Clauses Act, 1897 and held:
"The extent of land that could be held by the appellants
depends upon the interpretation of the word "person" in H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A Section 6(1) of the Ceiling Act which provides that "no
person shall ... be entitled to hold ... land in excess of the
ceiling area". If the ten co-owners are considered as an
"association of persons" or "body of individuals'', and
consequently as a "person", then the ten co-owners
B together as a person, will be entitled to only one unit of land
which is the ceiling area per person. But if "association of
persons" or "body of individuals" is not a "person", or if a
co-ownership is not .an association of person/body of
individuals, then each co-owner or the family of each co-
c owner, as the case may be will be a separate "person"
having regard to the definition of person in Section 2(21-)
of the Ceiling Act, in which. event, each family will be
entitled to hold one unit of land.
The word "person" is defined in the Act, but it is an inclusive
D definition, that is, "a person includes a joint family". Where
the definition is an inclusive defin.ition, the use of the word
"includes" indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of
the word used in the statute. Consequently, the word must
be construed as comprehending not only such things which
E they signify according to their natural import, but also those
things which the interpretation clause declares that they
shall include. Thus, where a definition uses the word
"includes", as contrasted from "means", the word defined
not only bears its ordinary, ,,Popular and natural meaning,
F but in addition also bears the extended statutory meaning
(see S.K. Gupta v. K.P. Jain following Dilworth v. Commr.
of Stamps and Jobbins v. Middlesex Country Council).
The ordinary, popular and natural meaning of the word
"person" is "a specific individual human being". But in law
G the word "person" has a slightly different connotation and
refers to any entity that is recognised by law as having the
rights and duties of a human being. Salmond defines
"person" as "any being whom the law regards as capable
of rights and duties" or as "a being, whether human or not,
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. ·V. ADDL. COMMNFt, 965
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
of which rights and duties are the attributes" A
(Jarisprudence, 12th Edn., p. 299). Thus the word
"person", in law, unless otherwise intended, refers not only
to a natural person (male or female human being), but also
any legal person (that is an entity that is recognised by law
as having or capable of having rights and duties). The B
General Clauses Act thus defines a "person" as including
a corporation or an association of persons or a body· of
individuals whether incorporated or not. The said general
legal definition is, however, either modified or restrict.ed
or expanded in different statutes with reference to the c
object of the enactment or the context in which it is tised.
For instance, the definition of the word "person" in the
Income Tax Act, ·1s very wide and includes an individual, a
Hindu Undivided Family, a company, a firm, an association
of persons or body of individuals whether incorporated or D
not, a local authority and every other artificial juridical
person. At the other extreme is the Citizenship Act,
Section 2(f) of which reads thus: ' "Person" does not
include any company or association or body of individuals
whether incorporated or not.' Similarly, the definition under
Section 2(g) of.the Representation of People Act, 1950, E
is "person" does not include a body of persons.
Bo.th definitions of the word "person", in the General
Clauses Act and the Ceiling Act, are inclusive definitions.
The inclusive definition of "person" in the General Clauses F
Act applies to all Gujarat Acts unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or the context. The inclusive
definition of "person" in Section 2(21) of the Ceiling Act,
does not indicate anything repugnant to the definition of
"person" in the General Clauses Act, but metely adds "joint G
family" to the existing definition. Therefore the definition of
person in the Ceiling Act, would include the definition of
person in Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act. The
resultant position can be stated thus: the definition of
person in the General Clauses Act, being an inclusive H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A definition, would include the ordinary, popular and general
meaning and those specifically included in the definition.
The inclusive definition of "person" in the Ceiling Act, in the
absence of any exclusion, would have the same meaning
assigned to the word in the General Clauses Act, and in
B addition, a "joint family" as defined. Thus, the word "person';
in the Ceiling Act will, unless the context otherwise requires,
refer to:
(i) a natural human being;
C {it) any legal entity which is capable of possessing
rights and duties, including any company or
association of persons or body of individuals
(whether incorporated or not); and
0 (iit) a Hindu Undivided Family or any other group or u~it
of persons, the members of which by custom or
usage, are joint in estate and residence."
30. In view of the above, the argument of the learned
counsel that the word 'person' in Section 154(1) means a
E human being or a natural person only and that the explanation
by which a cooperative society was included in the said word
is indicative of the legislature's intention to give a narrow
meaning to the word 'person' is liable to be rejected. In our
view, the explanation instead of narrowing the meaning of the
F word 'person' makes it clear that the same would include a non
natural person.
31. The submission that if share of the individual Director
is taken into consideration, the total land of the appellant would
G not exceed 12.50 acres is being mentioned only to be rejected
in view of the contents of lease agreement. That apart, no
evidence was produced before the Collector or the Additional
Commissioner to prove that the land was purchased in the
name of the Directors of the appellant. Even before the learned
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 967
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Single Judge of the High Court and this Court, no such A
evidence has been produced. In Raman/al Bhailal Patel's
case, this issue was considered and answered in negative in
the following words:
"Instead of buying the land (172 acres 36 guntas) jointly
B
under the four sale deeds it was open to the ten persons
to have bought the lands individually, that is each of them
purchasing such extent of land as he or she wanted. If they
had registered the sale deeds individually (subject to each
of them being entitled to buy agricultural land, under the C
land reforms laws in force) each couple would have been
entitled to hold land to the extent of one unit. Instead of each
individual or couple purchasing the land in their respective
names, if for convenience in negotiations, ten individuals·
buy the land jointly, the position will be no different. It cannot
be said that merely because the sale deed is in the joint D
names of ten persons, they purchased the land as "an
association of persons" or as "body of individuals" with the
common intention of carrying on agricultural activities jointly
or producing income, profit or gain or carry on some
common joint venture. In fact before purchasing the lands, E
the ten persons had entered into an agreement placing on
record that the object of purchasing the lands jointly was
only to facilitate negotiations and avoid duplicating the
purchase procedures and not to cultivate them jointly. There
is no evidence of any joint cultivation, nor any evidence of F
any intention to have a joint venture. On the other hand, after
purchase, they divided the lands and informed the Land
Revenue Authorities and each co-owner was registered as
the owner of the respective land allotted to him/her. This
is not a case where a body of individuals purchased the G
land with the intention of having a continued community of
interest by way of a joint venture or as a business venture.
It is therefore not possible to treat the ten purchasers as
an "association of persons/body of individJ.Jals" nor is it
permissible to treat them as a single "person", thereby H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R.
A restricting their entitlement to hold land to only one unit,
even though there are ten purchasers.
The Tribunal and the High Court were right in holding that
the word "person" in the Ceiling Act includes an
"association of persons/body of individuals". But they were
B
not justified in treating the co-owners as an "association
of persons", or in holding that the ten co-owners will be
entitled to own only one unit. Having regard to Section 6(2)
of the Act, the share of each couple (husband and wife) in
the land, plus any other land individ~aMheld by them will
c have to be calculated to find out whether.they held any land
in excess of the ceiling limit. Therefore, the share of each
appellant in the lands jointly purchased, with the ~ddition
of the lands held by his spouse, and addition of ariy other
land held by them, will give the basis for determining the
D surplus land. For example, if a husband's share as co-
owner is 20 acres and wife's share as co-owner is 20
acres, and their other individual holding is another 10
acres (all of the same category in 'C' Class), the total
holding of the family will be 50 acres (20+20+10 acres)
E and the surplus will be 14 acres."
32. The submission of Shri Manoj Swarup that a direction
may be given to the State Government to accord post facto
sanction to the purchase of excess land cannot be entertained ·
F much less accepted because the appellant has been found
guilty of not coming to the Court with clean hands. In any case,
in the absence of any factual foundation, such a plea cannot
be entertained at this stage.
33. The appellant's grievance against the direction given
G by the learned Single Judge to the Chief Secretary to ensure
that possession of excess land is taken without delay does not
merit consideration because as mentioned in the earlier part
of this judgment, the State Government had already granted
lease of excess land to the appellant.
H
OSWAL FATS AND OILS LTD. v. ADDL. COMMNR., 969
BAREILLY DIVISION AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
34. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary A
to express our serious reservation about the bona tides of the
State Government in granting lease of excess land to the
appellant. It is impossible to fathom any rational reason for this
action of the State Government ignoring that the appellant had
purchased land in patent violatiqn of Section 154(1) of the Act. B
By executing lease agreement dated 15.10.1994, the
concerned officers of the State effectively frustrated the object
sought to be achieved by the legislature by enacting the Act
and the order passed by the Collector.
35. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Since the C
appellant has not approached the quasi judicial and judicial
forums i.e., the Additional Commissioner, the High Court and
this Court with clean hands and succeeded in securing interim
orders, it is ordained to pay costs, which is quantified at Rs.2
lacs. With a view to ensure that functionaries of the State D
Government may not connive with the appellant and compound
the wrong already done, we direct the Government of Uttar
Pradesh not to renew the lease of the appellant at the end of
30 years period and deal with excess land in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. E
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Land reform"Sign in to search