P. KUMARAKURUBARANversusP. NARAYANAN & ORS.

                 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2006 : 2025 INSC 598

                           P. Kumarakurubaran
                                    v.
                           P. Narayanan & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025)
                                  29 April 2025
              [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint filed by
       the appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
       1908 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, R.11(d) – Limitation Act,
       1963 – Art.59 – On 05.05.1974, appellant herein was assigned a
       vacant site by the special tahsildar – He executed a power of
       attorney (registered on 06.01.1978) in favour of his father for
       purpose of construction – Contrary to which, father of appellant
       executed a sale deed on 10.10.1988 in favour of second
       respondent/defendant no.1/grand daughter – On coming to
       know of the same, the appellant filed a complaint on 09.12.2011
       under land grabbing cell against family of defendant no.1 –
       Thereafter, in 2014 appellant instituted a suit to seek declaration
       and other consequential reliefs – Respondents/defendants
       filed an application u/Or.VII, R.11 CPC and sought rejection of
       plaint on the ground that it was undervalued and was barred
       by limitation – Application was dismissed by the trial Court –
       However, the High Court allowed the civil revision petition and
       held that suit was barred by limitation – Correctness:
       Held: It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
       governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes
       a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff
       first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief – The
       emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction
       per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in
       cases involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of
       documents, hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired
       knowledge of such facts – In the instant case, appellant specifically


* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                              2007

               P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


     averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of
     documents, he immediately lodged a land grabbing complaint
     on 09.12.2011 – On the other hand, the respondents/defendants
     stated in their application filed u/Or.VII R.11 CPC that the appellant
     had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by his father in
     favour of defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time and hence,
     the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation – The
     issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be
     aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the
     plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that
     necessarily require appreciation of evidence – At this preliminary
     stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their
     face value and assumed to be true – Once the date of knowledge
     is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action,
     the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily – It becomes
     a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at
     the threshold stage u/Or.VII R.11 CPC – Therefore, rejection of the
     plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to
     lead evidence, is legally unsustainable. [Paras 11, 12, 12.1]

                              Case Law Cited
     Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali [2020] 5 SCR 694 : (2020)
     7 SCC 366; Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji
     Thakkar & Others [2021] 9 SCR 103 : (2021) 17 SCC 100; Shakti
     Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Another [2020]
     6 SCR 538 : (2020) 17 SCC 260 – relied on.
     N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board,
     2024 INSC 817 : [2024] 10 SCR 952; Raghwendra Sharan Singh v.
     Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs. [2019] 4 SCR 1069 : (2020)
     16 SCC 601; Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant
     Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another,
     2024 INSC 1025 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844; Daliben Valjibhai
     & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another, 2024 INSC
     1049 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963.

                              List of Keywords
     Order VII Rule 11 of CPC; Rejection of plaint; Suit barred by
     limitation; Article 59 of Limitation Act, 1963; Prior notice of
2008                                                           [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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      transaction; Accrual of cause of action; Mixed question of law and
      fact; Preliminary stage; Plaint at their face value; Appreciation of
      evidence; Prima facie; Power of attorney; Misuse of authority.

                                     Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025
      From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2020 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Madras in CRPNPD No. 131 of 2018

                                   Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant:
      K. K. Mani, Ms. T.archana, Rajeev Gupta.
      Advs. for the Respondents:
      S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv., M/s. Ksn & Co., Siddharth Naidu,
      V Balachandran, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Viresh Kumar Bhawra,
      Sandhya Dutt, Aakash Elango, Naresh Kumar.

                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                         Judgment

      R. Mahadevan, J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This Civil Appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated
      03.09.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras1 in
      CRP (NPD) No. 131 of 2018, whereby the High Court allowed the
      Civil Revision Petition filed by Respondent No.1 and rejected the
      plaint filed by the appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of
      Civil Procedure, 19082 on the ground that the suit was barred by
      limitation.
3.    Originally, the appellant / plaintiff instituted a suit bearing O.S. No.
      310 of 2014 before the Principal District Court, Chengalpet, against
      the respondents / defendants and the Government authorities for
      the following reliefs:


1    For short, “the High Court”
2    For short, “CPC”
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      2009

                P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


     (i)    Declaring that the appellant is the legal owner of the suit
            schedule property,
     (ii)   Issuing a permanent injunction against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3
            restraining them from causing any interruption on the peaceful
            possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the
            appellant,
     (iii) Declaring the sale deed bearing No. 303/1993 dated 10.10.1988
           registered in Pudukottai Sub Registration Office, Tuticorin
           District, in favour of Defendant No. 1 with respect to the suit
           schedule property as null and void,
     (iv) Declaring the Settlement Deed bearing No. 1493/2012 dated
          16.04.2012 registered in Alandur Sub Registration Office
          executed by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No. 2 with
          respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,
     (v)    Declaring the General Power of Attorney Deed bearing No.
            3725/2012 dated 31.12.2012 registered in Alandur Sub
            Registration Office executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of
            Defendant No. 3 with respect to the suit schedule property as
            null and void,
     (vi) Issuing a permanent injunction that Defendant No. 5 should
          not register any document created by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3
          with respect to the suit schedule property except the appellant,
     (vii) Issuing a permanent injunction directing Defendant No. 5 not
           to issue building plan permit to Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 except
           the appellant for the construction of new building in the suit
           schedule property, and
     (viii) Cost of the suit to be paid by the Defendants to the appellant.
4.   It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant was assigned a vacant
     site by the Special Tahsildar, Saidapet, Tamil Nadu, on 05.05.1974.
     He constructed a roof house and was in possession and enjoyment
     of the said property by paying tax and other charges. While so, he
     executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his father, K. Pothikannu
     Pillai, which was registered on 06.01.1978 as Document No.
     04-11-101-102-3/1978 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Thallakulam,
     Madurai, for the purposes of putting up construction, entering into
     agreement, and performing other relevant activities. Contrary to
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     the same, the father of the appellant executed a sale deed on
     10.10.1988, in favour of the second respondent / Defendant No.1 /
     granddaughter vide Document No. 303/1993 on the file of the Sub-
     Registrar, Pudukottai, which according to the appellant, was illegal,
     as the Power of Attorney did not authorize his father to alienate
     the property. After coming to know about the same, the appellant
     approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and
     gave a complaint on 09.12.2011 under Land Grabbing Cell against
     the family of Defendant No. 1. Subsequently, the appellant applied for
     the individual patta to the Special Tahsildar, Alandur, on 24.02.2012
     and also made a representation to Defendant No. 4 not to register
     any document with respect to the suit schedule property. In the
     meanwhile, the father of the appellant had died. Following the same,
     the second respondent / Defendant No.1 executed a settlement deed
     in favour of the third respondent / Defendant No.2 vide Document
     No. 1198/2012 on 16.04.2012. Subsequently, the third respondent /
     Defendant No.2 executed a General Power of attorney deed in favour
     of the first respondent / Defendant No.3 on 31.12.2012. Thereafter, the
     defendants made application for building permission on 05.07.2013,
     to which, the appellant filed his objection. In the said circumstances,
     the appellant came forward with the suit for the reliefs stated supra.
5.   During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the respondents /
     defendants filed an interlocutory application bearing I.A. No. 151 of
     2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking
     rejection of the plaint, on the ground that the suit was undervalued
     and was barred by limitation.
6.   After hearing both sides, the Additional District and Sessions Judge,
     Kancheepuram District at Chengalpet, by order dated 04.10.2017,
     dismissed the aforesaid application, observing that the grounds
     raised by the defendants can only be addressed after conducting a
     detailed trial based on the material facts, records, and other related
     issues, and therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.
     Challenging the same, the appellant / plaintiff preferred a Civil Revision
     Petition bearing No. 131 of 2018 before the High Court.
7.   By order dated 03.09.2020, the High Court allowed the aforesaid
     Civil Revision Petition after having held that the suit was barred by
     limitation. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant / plaintiff is before
     us with the present appeal.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                           2011

                     P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


8.    The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court
      erred in allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
      and in rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation, particularly while
      exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Adding further, it is submitted
      that the question of limitation - especially in matters involving the
      knowledge or notice of the impugned transaction- is a mixed question
      of law and fact, which cannot be conclusively determined without
      a full-fledged trial. The Additional District Judge, upon a careful
      consideration of the pleadings, rightly held that the suit raised triable
      issues requiring evidence, and therefore, correctly declined to reject
      the plaint at the preliminary stage. It is also submitted that the plaint
      contains specific averments challenging the alienation of the suit
      property by the appellant’s father, who had no authority to do so;
      and that, the appellant, being a third party to the document, has duly
      and correctly valued the suit in accordance with the provisions of the
      Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955; and hence, the
      rejection of the plaint either on the ground of limitation or valuation,
      without affording the appellant an opportunity to adduce evidence,
      is contrary to the settled principles of law.
      8.1. It is also submitted that a suit seeking a declaration along with
           a consequential relief of injunction cannot be construed as a
           suit for declaration simpliciter. Such a suit is one for declaration
           with further relief as contemplated under section 34 of the
           Specific Relief Act. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed solely
           on the basis that one of the prayers may not be maintainable
           or barred. The dismissal of the entire suit on the strength of a
           single prayer without examining the merit and maintainability
           of the consequential relief is legally untenable. In this regard,
           reliance was placed on the decision of this court in N. Thajudeen
           v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board3 in which, it
           was held that the suit for a declaration of a right cannot be held
           to be barred so long as right to property subsist.
      8.2. The learned counsel submitted that the power of attorney relied
           upon is specific in nature and is confined solely to matters
           relating to construction and obtaining necessary approvals.
           It did not confer any authority upon the appellant’s father to


3    2024 INSC 817
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          execute a sale deed or enter into a sale agreement. In the
          absence of such authority, the execution of the sale deed
          and the settlement deed by the respondents is wholly without
          jurisdiction and stands vitiated by fraud.
     8.3. The learned counsel further pointed out that the appellant has
          sought the relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction
          by expressly disputing the right, title, and possession claimed
          by the respondents. The plaint contains specific allegations
          regarding fraudulent alienation, subsequent encumbrance, and
          the absence of authority on the part of the appellant’s father
          to effect the transfer of the suit property. These are serious
          and contested issues that necessitate a detailed adjudication
          based on oral and documentary evidence. At the threshold
          stage, it is impermissible for the Court to assess the truth or
          falsity of these averments or to summarily reject the suit on
          the ground of limitation. Furthermore, the Additional District
          Judge, in declining the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
          committed no jurisdictional error, as the plaint disclosed triable
          issues requiring full-fledged trial. However, the High Court while
          exercising revisional jurisdiction, has erroneously interfered with
          the order of the trial Court and proceeded to reject the suit at
          the preliminary stage.
     8.4. Stating so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by
          setting aside the order passed by the High Court.
9.   Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1, at the outset,
     submitted that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed as per the
     judgment of the High Court, which rightly held that the suit filed by
     the appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. Continuing further,
     it is submitted that in the plaint, the appellant failed to establish the
     date of knowledge of the alleged transaction, which was a significant
     and material fact necessary to corroborate the cause of action for
     filing the suit. On the other hand, the certified copy of the sale deed
     dated 10.10.1978 executed by the power of attorney holder, namely,
     the father of the appellant, was alleged to have been received by the
     appellant on 28.07.2011. If the said date is construed as the date of
     knowledge, the suit ought to have been instituted within a period of
     three years therefrom i.e., on or before 27.07.2014, in accordance
     with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the plaint
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          2013

                 P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


     came to be filed only on 03.12.2014. Consequently, the High Court
     upheld the maintainability of the interlocutory application filed by the
     respondents under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint.
     9.1. It is also submitted that the appellant and the respondents are
          closely related, as the power of attorney holder was the father
          of the appellant, and the respondents are the appellant’s sister,
          nephew, and niece. Therefore, the appellant’s contention that
          he remained unaware of the alleged transaction for a period
          of 26 years is untenable in law.
     9.2. Further, the learned counsel referred to the power of attorney
          and submitted that the terms ‘signing and filing of all applications
          and agreement and Indemnity Bonds’ clearly indicate that the
          appellant’s father, acting as the power of attorney holder, was
          duly authorized to execute lawful agreements. Accordingly,
          he executed the sale deed dated 10.10.1988 in favour of the
          second respondent / Defendant No.1 under the authority of
          the said document.
     9.3. The learned counsel also submitted that a bare perusal of the
          averments in the plaint reveals that the suit is barred by limitation.
          In this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court
          in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali4 and Raghwendra
          Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh(Dead) by LRs5 wherein, it
          was held that when the foundational facts, as pleaded, squarely
          attract the bar of limitation, no trial is warranted and the suit is
          liable to be dismissed at the threshold. That apart, the learned
          counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Shri Mukund
          Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje
          Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another6, wherein, it was
          clearly held that the spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d)
          CPC is only for the courts to nip at its bud when any litigation
          ex-facie appears to be a clear abuse of process.
     9.4. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the respondents /
          defendants being the absolute owners of the property, have
          been in peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof. However,


4   (2020) 7 SCC 366
5   (2020) 16 SCC 601
6   2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844
2014                                                         [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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          the appellant, having suppressed material facts, deliberately
          instituted the suit after an inordinate delay of 26 years. Therefore,
          the impugned order passed by the High Court rejecting the
          plaint does not warrant any interference by this Court.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon careful
    perusal of the pleadings, the material on record, and the impugned
    judgment, we find it necessary to examine whether the rejection of
    the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was justified in the facts
    and circumstances of the present case. It is to be pointed out at this
    juncture that though the respondents / defendants sought to reject
    the plaint on two grounds - valuation of the suit and limitation - the
    High Court rejected the plaint solely on the ground that it was time-
    barred. Accordingly, we shall confine our consideration in this appeal
    to the issue of limitation.
11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs
    suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period
    of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff first had
    knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under
    Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se, but on the
    accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations
    of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the
    date on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.
12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint
    that upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly
    carried out among the defendants in relation to the suit property,
    he immediately approached the Additional Commissioner of Police,
    Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 against
    the family of Defendant No.1. Subsequently, he applied for patta in
    his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to
    Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff
    and that no registration concerning the same should be carried out. He
    has also submitted an objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting
    that no planning permit be granted to anybody except the appellant
    in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the appellant instituted
    the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential
    reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents / defendants stated in
    their application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant
    had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by his father in
    favour of Defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time and hence,
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            2015

                  P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


     the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation. While
     the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue of
     limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court
     in revision, took a contrary view and allowed the application filed
     under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the
     ground that the suit was barred by limitation.
     12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to
           whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware
           of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the
           plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters
           that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this
           preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must
           be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once
           the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the
           basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be
           decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and
           fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under
           Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on
           the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead
           evidence, is legally unsustainable.
     12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions
           of this Court, which have consistently held that when the
           question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on
           the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the
           stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:
            (i)   Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai
                  Kachrabhai & Another7
                        “10. The First Appellate Court came to the
                        conclusion that the defendants made an
                        application for correcting the revenue records
                        only in the year 2017 and on the said application
                        the Deputy Collector issued notice to the
                        plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time
                        when the plaintiffs came to know about the
                        execution of the sale deed. It is under these
                        circumstances that the suit was instituted in the


7   2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105
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        year 2017. While the High Court came to the
        correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the
        Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3
        years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return
        a finding that in cases where the document is
        registered, the knowledge must be presumed
        from the date of registration.
        11.
        12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai
        Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for
        cancellation of sale deed was opposed through
        an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground
        of limitation, this Court specifically held that
        limitation in all such cases will arise from date
        of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:
        “15. What is relevant for answering the matter
        in issue in the context of the application under
        Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the
        averments in the plaint. The plaint is required
        to be read as a whole. The defence available
        to the defendants or the plea taken by them in
        the written statement or any application filed
        by them, cannot be the basis to decide the
        application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only
        the averments in the plaint are germane. It is
        common ground that the registered sale deed
        is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge
        the registered sale deed ordinarily would start
        running from the date on which the sale deed
        was registered. However, the specific case of
        the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had
        no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution
        of such sale deed by their brothers, original
        Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai
        Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They
        acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and
        immediately took steps to obtain a certified
        copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt
        thereof they realised the fraud played on them by
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            2017

               P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


                    their brothers concerning the ancestral property
                    and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had
                    approached their brothers (original Defendants 1
                    and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with
                    their possession and to partition the property
                    and provide exclusive possession of half (½)
                    portion of the land so designated towards their
                    share. However, when they realised that the
                    original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any
                    heed to their request, they had no other option
                    but to approach the court of law and filed the
                    subject suit within two days therefrom. According
                    to the appellants, the suit has been filed within
                    time after acquiring the knowledge about the
                    execution of the registered sale deed. In this
                    context, the trial court opined that it was a triable
                    issue and declined to accept the application filed
                    by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of
                    the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view
                    commends to us.
                    …
                    19. In the present case, we find that the
                    appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the suit
                    was filed immediately after getting knowledge
                    about the fraudulent sale deed executed by
                    original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them
                    in the dark about such execution and within two
                    days from the refusal by the original Defendants
                    1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful
                    enjoyment of use and possession of the
                    ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm
                    the view taken by the trial court that the issue
                    regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the
                    facts of the present case, is a triable issue and
                    for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected
                    at the threshold in exercise of the power under
                    Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
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                        13. In view of the above, there was no justification
                        for the High Court in allowing the application
                        under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not
                        evident from the plaint averments itself. The High
                        Court was also not justified in holding that the
                        limitation period commences from the date of
                        registration itself. In this view of the matter the
                        judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.”
            (ii)   Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji
                   Thakkar & Others8
                        “11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj
                        Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC
                        331: (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of
                        plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power
                        conferred on the court to terminate a civil action
                        at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions
                        precedent to the exercise of the power are
                        stringent and it is especially so when rejection
                        of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation.
                        When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge
                        of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of
                        action only at a particular point of time, the same
                        has to be accepted at the stage of considering
                        the application under Order 7 Rule 11.
                        12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge
                        Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai
                        Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 :
                        (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the
                        date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge
                        of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the
                        question whether the suit is barred by limitation
                        or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence
                        the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.
                        13…
                        14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a
                        few sentences here and there from the plaint and


8   (2021) 17 SCC 100
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                              2019

                 P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


                        contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice
                        of the proceedings and that therefore limitation
                        started running from the date of constructive
                        notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice
                        is raised by the respondents, after asserting
                        positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge
                        as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In
                        any case, the plea of constructive notice appears
                        to be a subsequent invention.”
            (iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India
                  & Another9
                        “6. The central question is: whether the plaint as
                        filed by the appellant could have been rejected
                        by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?
                        7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample
                        power to the court to reject the plaint, if from
                        the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the
                        suit is barred by any law including the law of
                        limitation. This position is no more res integra.
                        We may usefully refer to the decision of this
                        Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar
                        Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20,
                        the Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66)
                        “13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable
                        to be rejected in the following cases:
                        ‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
                        (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and
                        the plaintiff, on being required by the court to
                        correct the valuation within a time to be fixed
                        by the court, fails to do so;
                        (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued
                        but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
                        stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by


9   (2020) 17 SCC 260
2020                                             [2025] 4 S.C.R.

           Supreme Court Reports


        the court to supply the requisite stamp paper
        within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to
        do so;
        (d) where the suit appears from the statement
        in the plaint to be barred by any law;
        (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
        (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
        provisions of Rule 9;’
        14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra
        [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003)
        1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order
        7 Rule 11 of the Code that:
        ‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked
        into for deciding an application thereunder are
        the averments in the plaint. The trial court can
        exercise the power … at any stage of the suit —
        before registering the plaint or after issuing
        summons to the defendant at any time before
        the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of
        deciding an application under clauses (a) and
        (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in
        the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the
        defendant in the written statement would be
        wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560,
        para 9).
        15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate
        Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate
        Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the
        basic question to be decided while dealing with
        an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of
        the Code is whether a real cause of action has
        been set out in the plaint or something purely
        illusory has been stated with a view to get out
        of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
        16. “The trial court must remember that if on a
        meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint
        it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          2021

               P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


                    sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it
                    should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule
                    11 CPC taking care to see that the ground
                    mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting
                    has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it
                    has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing
                    by examining the party searchingly under Order
                    10 CPC.” (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal
                    [(1977) 4 SCC 467] , SCC p. 468.)
                    17. It is trite law that not any particular plea
                    has to be considered, and the whole plaint has
                    to be read. As was observed by this Court in
                    Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982)
                    3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be
                    rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed,
                    the plaint as a whole must be rejected.
                    18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh
                    Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed
                    that the averments in the plaint as a whole have
                    to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule
                    11 Order 7 was applicable.
                    19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr.
                    [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus: (SCC
                    pp. 146-47, para 15)
                    ‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation,
                    dissection, segregation and inversions of the
                    language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If
                    such a course is adopted it would run counter to
                    the cardinal canon of interpretation according to
                    which a pleading has to be read as a whole to
                    ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to
                    cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it
                    out of the context in isolation. Although it is the
                    substance and not merely the form that has to
                    be looked into, the pleading has to be construed
                    as it stands without addition or subtraction or
                    words or change of its apparent grammatical
                    sense. The intention of the party concerned
                    is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and
2022                                            [2025] 4 S.C.R.

           Supreme Court Reports


        terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the
        same time it should be borne in mind that no
        pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat
        justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’
        20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It
        makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain
        necessary averments relating to limitation,
        the same is liable to be rejected. For the said
        purpose, it is the duty of the person who files
        such an application to satisfy the court that the
        plaint does not disclose how the same is in
        time. In order to answer the said question, it is
        incumbent on the part of the court to verify the
        entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where
        a plaint is rejected, the court has to record the
        order to that effect with the reasons for such
        order.”
        8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of
        Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable
        Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust
        [(2012) 8 SCC 706: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612],
        observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras
        10-12)
        “10. … It is clear from the above that where the
        plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the
        relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected
        within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently
        stamped and not rectified within the time fixed
        by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose
        the required copies and the plaintiff fails to
        comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court
        has no other option except to reject the same.
        A reading of the above provision also makes it
        clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the
        Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit
        either before registering the plaint or after the
        issuance of summons to the defendants or at
        any time before the conclusion of the trial.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                             2023

               P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


                    11. This position was explained by this Court
                    in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003)
                    1 SCC 557], in which, while considering Order
                    7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under:
                    (SCC p. 560, para 9)
                    ‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes
                    it clear that the relevant facts which need
                    to be looked into for deciding an application
                    thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The
                    trial court can exercise the power under Order 7
                    Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before
                    registering the plaint or after issuing summons to
                    the defendant at any time before the conclusion
                    of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an
                    application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11
                    Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are
                    germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the
                    written statement would be wholly irrelevant at
                    that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written
                    statement without deciding the application under
                    Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural
                    irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction
                    by the trial court.’
                    It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule
                    11, the court has to look into the averments in
                    the plaint and the same can be exercised by
                    the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also
                    clear that the averments in the written statement
                    are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to
                    scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In
                    other words, what needs to be looked into in
                    deciding such an application are the averments
                    in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken
                    by the defendant in the written statement are
                    wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided
                    only on the plaint averments. These principles
                    have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co.
                    Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184]
2024                                             [2025] 4 S.C.R.

           Supreme Court Reports


        and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune
        Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].
        12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T.
        Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC
        467], wherein while considering the very same
        provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of
        the trial court in considering such application,
        this Court has reminded the trial Judges with
        the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
        ‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if
        on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the
        plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in
        the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue,
        he should exercise his power under Order 7
        Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground
        mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever
        drafting has created the illusion of a cause of
        action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by
        examining the party searchingly under Order
        10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to
        irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would
        insist imperatively on examining the party at
        the first hearing so that bogus litigation can
        be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal
        Code is also resourceful enough to meet such
        men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against
        them.’
        It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious
        and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or
        material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge
        to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If
        clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
        of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the
        abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
        Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it should be nipped
        in the bud at the first hearing by examining the
        parties under Order 10 of the Code.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                           2025

               P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


                    14. All these events have been reiterated in
                    Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause
                    of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said
                    para opens with the expression “the cause of
                    action to file the suit accrued in favour of the
                    plaintiff and against the defendants when the
                    illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated
                    21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify
                    as to how the interest was being calculated”.
                    This averment cannot be read in isolation.
                    ….
                    22. It is well-established position that the cause
                    of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle
                    of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being
                    barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed
                    question of fact and law. Even for that reason,
                    invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In
                    the present case, the assertion in the plaint is
                    that the appellant verily believed that its claim
                    was being processed by the regional office and
                    the regional office would be taking appropriate
                    decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken
                    after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of
                    the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another
                    letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action
                    taken by the Bank was in accordance with the
                    rules and the appellant need not correspond with
                    the Bank in that regard any further. This firm
                    response from the respondent Bank could trigger
                    the right of the appellant to sue the respondent
                    Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had
                    eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003
                    and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit
                    on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to
                    cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the
                    appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a
                    mixed question of fact and law, depending on
                    the response of the respondents.”
2026                                                        [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-
    reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court
    had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication
    upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant’s assertion that
    the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority
    upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned
    transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in
    time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved
    disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without
    the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the
    plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred
    by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether
    the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false
    or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this
    Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes
    a misapplication of the well-established principles governing the
    exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same
    reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the
    respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable.
14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred
    in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in
    favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a
    house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause
    authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without
    the appellant’s consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father
    executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond
    the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about
    misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be
    rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly,
    we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which
    cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within
    its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the
    matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising
    its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have
    interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in
    the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual
    disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under
    the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      2027

                  P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.


15. In light of the foregoing, the judgment and order dated 03.09.2020
    passed by the High Court in CRP (NPD) No. 131 of 2018 is set aside
    and the order dated 04.10.2017 passed by the Additional District
    Judge, Chengalpattu in I.A. No. 151 of 2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014
    is affirmed. As a sequel, the suit is restored for trial on its merits.
    It is, however, made clear that the trial Court shall proceed without
    being influenced by any of the observations made by the High Court.
16. This appeal stands allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order
    as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Application(s),
    if any, shall stand closed.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan