P.L. TATWALversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 115
- Decided
- 19 February 2014
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- S MUKHOPADHAYA
Holding
The Standing Committee, as the appointing and removal authority under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, is the competent authority to grant prior sanction under s.19(1)(c) of the PC Act, but a fresh inquiry is required to confirm that the sanction was granted after proper consideration of the material.
Summary
The appellant, an Assistant Engineer of the Ujjain Municipal Corporation, was prosecuted under sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for alleged irregularities in a building contract. He argued that, because he was appointed by an Administrator, only the Administrator or the State Government could grant the required prior sanction for prosecution, and that the sanction granted by the Standing Committee was invalid. The Supreme Court held that under s.19(1)(c) of the PC Act, the authority competent to remove an officer from service is the competent sanctioning authority, and for the appellant that authority was the Standing Committee, as per s.58 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. While the Court affirmed that the sanction order was valid, it emphasized that the sanctioning authority must apply its mind to the material before it, and ordered a fresh inquiry to determine whether such an application of mind occurred. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court and trial court orders and remitted the matter to the Special Judge for a proper inquiry, allowing the appeal in part.
Issues considered
- The identity of the competent authority to grant prior sanction under s.19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for an Assistant Engineer appointed by an Administrator.
- Whether the sanction granted by the Standing Committee was valid and made after proper application of mind to the relevant material.
- Whether the quashing of prosecution against the appellant's superiors precludes prosecution of the appellant.
Legislation cited
- Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956s. 424, s. 58
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 19(1)(c)
Subjects
Judgment
(2014] 2 S.C.R. 1116
A P.L. TATWAL
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 456 of 2014)
FEBRUARY 19, 2014
B
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.]
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988:
c
s. 19 (1) (c) rlw 13 (1) (d) and 13 (2) - Previous sanction
-- Competent Authority - Assistant Engineer appointed when
Corporation was ruled by Administrator - Sanction accorded
by Standing Committee of Corporation - Held: Administrator
D is only an ad hoc arrangement made by Government u/s 424
of Municipal Corporation Act when an elected committee is
superseded or dissolved -- Standing Committee being
appointing authority of appellant, was the competent aut/1ority
to accord sanction - Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation
E Act, 1956 - SS. 58 and 424.
s. 19 - Previous sanction for prosecution -Application of
mind by competent authority - Held: The authority has to be
apprised of all the relevant materials, and on such materials,
it has to take a conscious decision as to whether the facts
F would reveal the commission of an offence -- The decision
making on relevant materials should be reflected in the order
and if not, it should be capable of proof before the court -- In
the instant case, though appellant made a specific objection
before Special Judge, the order does not indicate any inquiry
G by the court in this regard -- Orders passed by High Court and
trial court are· set aside and matter is remitted to trial court to
record a finding as to valid sanction - It may also consider
the effect of quashing of the prosecution as regards superior
officers and there being no sanction for prosecution of others.
H 1116
P.L. TATWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1117
The appellant, an Assistant Engineer, along with A
others, was sought to be prosecuted for offences
punishable u/ss 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 on the allegations of irregularities
in the award of the contract and construction of
administrative building for the Corporation. At the B
relevant time, the Corporation was ruled by an
Administrator. However, the sanction was granted by the
Standing Committee of the Corporation.
In the instant appeal, it was mainly contended for the
appellant that since he was appointed in service by the C
Administrator, sanction for prosecution could be given
only by the Administrator and in his absence by the State
Government; that there was no proper and valid sanction
by the competent authority; and that since the
proceedings for prosecution against his superior officers D
had been quashed, proceedings in his case also be
quashed as it was not likely in such a situation to have a
successful prosecution.
Allowing the appeal in part, the Court E-
HELD: 1.1 In view of s. 19 (1) (c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, the competent authority to give
previous sanction in the case of the appellant is the
authority competent to- remove him from service. No
doubt the appointing authority is the authority competent F
to remove him from service. Under s. 58 of the Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956, the Standing Committee is the
competent authority for appointment of the appellant. The
Administrator is only an ad hoc arrangement made by the
Government u/s 424 of the Municipal Corporation Act G
when an elected committee is superseded or dissolved.
It so happened that the appointment of the appellant was
at a time when the Municipal Corporation was ruled by
the Administrator. It is the Standing Committee which
gave the sanction by its order dated 27 .08.1996. H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.
A Therefore, the trial court and the High Court cannot be
faulted in taking the view that there was an order of
sanction for prosecution from the competent authority.
[para 7-9] [1122-C-D; 1123-A-B, D]
1.2 The grant of sanction is only an administrative
8
function. It is intended to protect public servants against
frivolous and vexatious litigation. It also ensures that a
dishonest officer is brought before law and is tried in
accordance with law. Thus, it is a serious exercise of
C power by the competent authority. The authority has to
be apprised of all the relevant materials, and on such
materials, it has to take a conscious decision as to
whether the facts would reveal the commission of an
offence under the relevant provisions. The decision
making on relevant materials should be reflected in the
D order and if not, it should be capable of proof before the
court. Though the appellant made a specific objection in
this regard before the Special Judge, in the order dated
27.12.2004, there is no inquiry by the court in this regard.
There is no reference at all to the recommendation made
E by the Municipal Commissioner. [para 12 and 15] [1125-
E-G; 1126-E]
1.3 In the circumstances, the trial court should
conduct a proper inquiry as to whether all the relevant
F materials were placed before the competent authority
and whether it has referred to the same so as to form an
opinion as to whether the same constituted an offence
requiring sanction for prosecution. Accordingly, the
orders passed by the High Court and the trial court are
G set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial court to
conduct a proper inquiry as to according of the sanction.
[para 16] [1128-B-C]
1.4 The fact that the ptoceedings for prosecution in
the case of the Commissioner and Administrator, who
H were the controllin_g officers of the appellant, have been ·
P.L. TATWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1119
quashed, may also be brought to the notice of the Special A
Judge which would be considered at the time of
consideration of charge, in case the court enters a
finding on valid sanction and decides to proceed with the
case. The court may also consider the fact that there is
no sanction for prosecution in the case of the B
Superintending Engineer and the City Engineer, who
were the superior officers of the appellant at the relevant
time and in whose case, the Standing Committee decided
not to give sanction on the ground that they were not in
service when the decision on sanction was taken. [para c
17] [1128-D-F]
State of Maharashtra through Central Bureau of
=
Investigation v. Mahesh G. Jain, 2013 (3) SCR 850 (2013)
8 sec 119 - relied on.
D
Chittaranjan Das v. State of Orissa 2011 (7) SCR 836 =
(2011) 7 sec 167 - cited.
Case Law Reference:
2011 (7) SCR 836 cited para 2 E
2013 (3) SCR 850 relied on para 3
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 456 of 2014.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2011 of the
High Court of M.P. at Indore in CRR No. 96 of 2005.
Rekha Pandey, Shiv Prakash Pandey for the Appellant.
C.D. Singh, Sakshi Kakkar, Bhupender Pratap Singh for G
the Respondent,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.
A 2. The appellant along with two others were sought to be
prosecuted under Section 13(1 )(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'PC Act').
The allegations pertain to the irregularities in the award of the
contract and construction of administrative building for the
B Corporation of Ujjain during the period 1991-1993. At the
relevant time, the appellant was working as the Assistant
Engineer in the Corporation and the Corporation was ruled by
an Administrator. In the case of the co-accused Shri D.L.
Rangotha, the then Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation
c and Shri D. P. Tiwari, the then Administrator of the Corporation,
the State Government and the Central Government respectively
had declined to grant sanction, while they were in service.
Since the prosecution was sought to be launched after their
retirement, the same was challenged before the trial court and
the High Court unsuccessfully. However, by order dated
0
21.08.2013, in Criminal Appeal No. 1213 of 2013 and Criminal
Appeal No. 1214 of 2013, this Court quashed the proceedings
for prosecution against Shri D. L. Rangotha and Shri D. P.
Tiwari on the ground that once sanction for prosecution is
E refused by the competent authority while the officer is in service,
he cannot be prosecuted after retirement notwithstanding the
fact that no sanction for prosecution under the PC Act is
necessary after the retirement of a public servant. The order
was passed following the decision in Chittaranjan Das v. State
of Orissa 1 .
F
3. However, in the case of the appellant herein, sanction
was granted by the Standing Committee of the Corporation
while he was in service. Though the same was subsequently
withdrawn, that order was set aside by the High Court holding
G that the order on withdrawal was passed without proper
application of mind.
4. The appellant has three main contentions:
H 1. c2011) 7 sec 167.
P.L. TATWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1121
[KURIAN, J.]
(i) Since he was appointed in service by the A
Administrator, sanction for prosecution can be
given only by the Administrator and in case, the
Administrator is not in position, then the sanction
is to be given by the State Government who
appoints the Administrator. B
(ii) At any rate, there is no proper and valid sanction
by the competent authority ..
(ii) Since the proceedings for prosecution against his
superior officers have been quashed by this Court, C
proceedings in his case also be quashed since it
is not likely in such a situation to have a successful
prosecution. ··
5. It is not in dispute that the appellant was appointed by 0
the Administrator when the Corporation was ruled by the
Administrator. Therefore, it is the contention of the appellant that
the competent authority to give sanction for prosecution under
Section 19 of the PC Act is theAdministrator and in case the
Administrator is not available, the sanction is to be given by E
the State Government.
6. We are afraid, the contentions cannot be appreciated
as the same do not found any basis in law or logic. Section
19( 1) of the PC Act reads as follows:
F
"19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable
under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been
committed by a public servant, except with the previous
sanction,- G
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in
connection with the affairs of the Union and is not
removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Central Government, of that
H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 2 S.C.R.
A Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed in
connection with the affairs of a State and is not
removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the State Government, of that
B
Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office."
c (Emphasis supplied)
7. The appellant comes under Section 19(1 )(c). The
competent authority to give previous sanction is the authority
competent to remove one from service. No doubt the appointing
authority is the authority competent to remove him from service.
D Under Section 58 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the
Standing Committee is the competent authority for appointment
in any post in the municipality having a salary for more than
Rs.400/- per month. For easy reference, we may extract the
relevant portion from the statement made on behalf of the State
E Government on a specific query from the court:
"The Respondent most respectfully submits that (sic)
Section 45 and 48 of the Municipal Corporation Act 1956
empowers the Municipal Corporation to establish the
F committees and through Gazette Notification 1977 dated
21.03.1977 whereby Section 58 of the Municipal
Corporation Act was amended, power was vested in the
Standing committee to appoint any persons on the post
of any such municipal post, which has maximum salary of
G more than Rs.400/-....
xxx xxxxxx xxx
The Respondent most respectfully submits that the above
mentioned amendment was made in 1977 and the
H Petitioner was initially appointed in the Municipal
P.L. TATWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1123
[KURIAN, J.]
Corporation on 17.12.79 by the Standing committee ... " A
8. The Administrator is only an ad ho.c arrangement made
by the Government under Section 424 of the Madhya Pradesh
Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 when an elected committee
is superseded or dissolved. It so happened that the
8
appointment of the appellant was at a time when the Municipal
Corporation was ruled by the Administrator. That does not mean
that there should be an Administrator to take any decision with
regard to the sanction for prosecution of the appellant under
the PC Act.
c
9. The Statute is very clear that the authority competent to
· remove an officer from service is the authority to give sanction
for prosecution. In the case of the appellant, being an employee
having a salary of more than Rs.400/- per month, the authority
competent to remove him from service is the Standing D
Committee. It is the Standing Committee which gave the
sanction by its order dated 27.08.1996. Therefore, the trial court
and the High Court cannot be faulted in taking the view that
there was an order of sanction for prosecution from the
·· competent authority. E
10. It is vehemently contented by the learned counsel for
the appellant that there is no proper and valid sanction for
prosecuting the appellant. The authority has not applied its mind
and has not taken a conscious decision by referring to any of
the relevant materials. It is pointed out that the authority has only F
accepted the recommendations of the Commissioner. But there
is nothing to show that the recommendation was before the
authority. Still further, it is pointed out that the order of sanction
does not indicate reference to any material; however, the
enclosures give an indication that the inquiry report of the G
Special Police Establishment and government letter were
before the competent authority. In order to appreciate the
contention properly, we shall extract the Resolution of the
Standing Committee, which reads as follows:
H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.
A "RESOLUTION N0.309 DATED 27-08-1996 OF
STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING. UJJAIN
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
With regard (sic) to sanction of prosecution in Crime
No. 54/93 against Administrator of Municipal Corporation
B
and others, letter of Commissioner Municipal Corporation
No.310 dated 22.06.1996 stating that "the Government
has sought sanction for prosecution of Shree R.K. Sharma,
the then Superintending Engineer, Shree R.K. Bhagat the
then City Engineer, Shree P.L. Tatwal, the then Assistant
c Engineer, who were posted with Municipal Corporation
Ujjain. Under section 19(1 )(c) (sic) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, sanction for prosecution can be accorded
by the authority which is competent to remove such public
servant from the office. The Standing Committee is the
D Appointing Authority of the above three officers. That way
Corporation is competent to accord sanction for
prosecution against them. The factual position about the
three officers is as below. Shree R.K. Sharma the then
Superintending Engineer was not from this department
E and was sent on deputation by the government and is now
at presently retired. Shree R.K. Bhagat the then City
Engineer has since retired and Shree P.L. Tatwal the then
Assistant Engineer is presently posted with Municipal
Corporation Ujjain. So please intimate Honourable Mayor
F about the above factual position and decision about grant
of sanction be intimated so that the government may be
intimated of the decision.
After discussion. unanimously resolved that as per
the recommendation of Municipal Commissioner. sanction
G is granted to take action to prosecute the concerned
officers. Action be taken according to law.
Sd/- (Smt. Anju Bhargav)
Chairman, Standing Committee
H Municiipal Corporation Ujjain
P.L. TATWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1125
[KURIAN, J.]
Copy:- A
Sr. No.:- 1334 Date :- 11-9-96
Commissioner, Ujjain Municipal Corporation to take
necessary action.
B
Enclosed:- Government letter and photocopy
of enquiry report of Special Police
Establishment.
Sd/- C
Municipal Secretary
Ullain Municipal Corporation"
(Emphasis supplied)
11. It may be seen that only the second paragraph of the 0
Resolution speaks about the sanction and that is following the
recommendation of the Municipal Commissioner. Whether that
formed part of the government letter, it is not clear. The contents
otherwise of the government letter are also not clear.
12. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function. E
It is intended to protect public servants against frivolous and
vexatious litigation. It also ensures that a dishonest officer is
brought before law and is tried in accordance with law. Thus, it
is a serious exercise of power by the competent authority. It has
to be apprised .of all the relevant materials, and on such F
materials, the authority has to take a conscious decision as to
whether the facts would reveal the commission of an offence
under the relevant provisions. No doubt, an elaborate discussion
in that regard in the order is not necessary. But decision
making. on relevant materials should be reflected in the order G
and if not, it should be capable ~f proof before the court.
13. In a recent decision in State of Maharashtra through
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mahesh G.Jain2 , the court
2. (2013)8SCC119. H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.
A has referred to the \(ari0us decisions on this aspect from
paragraph 8 onwards. ~ has been held at paragraph 8 as
follows:
"8. In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P.§. this Court
lucidly registered the view that (SCC p. 174, para 3) it is
B incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction
has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being
satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out
constituting an offence and the same should be done in
two ways; either (i) by producing the original sanction which
c itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the
grounds of satisfaction, and (ii) by adducing evidence
aliunde to show the facts· placed before the sanctioning
authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. It is well settled
that any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail
D because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution,
the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio."
14. After referring to subsequent decisions, the main
principles governing the issue have been culled out at
E paragraph 14 which reads as follows:
"14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that
the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning
authority after being satisfied that a case {or sanction has
been made out.
F
14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the
sanctioning authority has perused the material placed
before it and, after consideration of the circumstances, has
granted sanction for prosecution.
G
14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the
evidence that the material was placed before the
sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived at
upon perusal of the material placed before it.
H
P.L. TATWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1127
[KURIAN, J.]
14.4. Grant of sanction is only an administrative A
function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima
facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would
constitute the offence.
14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the 8
sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as
it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.
14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the
materials placed before it and some of them have not been
proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction. C
14.7. The order of sanction is a prerequisite as it is
intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against
frivolous and vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order
of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner D
and there should not be a hypertechnical approach to test
its validity."
15. Though the appellants made a specific objection in this
regard before the Special Judge, unfortunately in the order
dated 27.12.2004, it is seen that there is no inquiry by the court E
in this regard. There is no reference at all to the
recommendation made by the Municipal Commissioner.
Before the High Court also, though the submissions were
reiterated, the only consideration in that regard is available at
paragraph 21 of the impugned order which reads as follows: F
•'
"21. It is not a case of the applicant that standing
committee of the Municipal Corporation was not
competent to grant sanction under section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Undisputedly, G
the competent authority had passed the orders of
sanction against all the accused persons
concerned. The order of the sanction was passed
after considering the whole record of the case and
proper application of mind. The applicant failed to H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R.
A demonstrate the order of sanction is suffering from
non application of mind."
16. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the trial
court should conduct a proper inquiry as to whether all the
relevant materials were placed before the competent authority
8
and whether the competent authority has referred to the same
so as to form an opinion as to whether the same constituted
an offence requiring sanction for prosecution. In that view of the
matter, we set aside the impugned order passed by the High
Court and also order dated 27.12.2004 passed in Special
C Case No. 12 of 2004 by the trial court and remit the matter to
the Special Judge (P.C. Act, 1988), Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh.
17. Incidentally, we may also refer to the third point raised
by the appellant. It is the submission that the proceedings for
D prosecution in the case of the Commissioner and Administrator,
who were the controlling officers of the appellant, having been
quashed, there is no point in continuing the trial in the case of
the appellant and it would only be an attempt in futility. This
subsequent development may also be brought to the notice of
E the Special Judge which would be considered at the time of
consideration of charge, in case the court enters a finding on
valid sanction and decide to proceed with the case. The court
may also consider the fact that there is no sanction for
prosecution in the case of the Superintendent Engineer and the
F City Engineer, who were the superior officers of the appellant
at the relevant time and in whose case, the Standing
Committee decided not to give sanction on the ground that they
were not in service when the decision on sanction was taken.
18. The appeal is allowed to that extent. Parties to appear
G before the Special Judge (P.C. Act, 1988), Ujjain, Madhya
Pradesh on 05.04.2014.
R.P. Appeal partly allowed.
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