Holding

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding disputed civil rights in a writ petition; the writ petition must be dismissed and the appeal allowed.

Summary

The appellant sought to set aside a Kerala High Court order that granted police protection to the first respondent, who claimed to be the head of a religious trust. The High Court had determined the respondent's entitlement to the office, a question that was already pending before a civil court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had usurped the jurisdiction of the civil court by adjudicating disputed civil rights in a writ proceeding, which is beyond the scope of Article 226. It emphasized that Order 9 Rule 9 of the CPC bars a party from seeking the same relief in a writ petition when a civil suit is pending, and that a writ for police protection can only be issued to enforce a right already declared by a civil decree. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court judgment was set aside, directing the petitioner to seek protection through the appropriate police channels.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court can entertain a writ petition for police protection when the right to the office is a disputed civil right pending before a civil court.
Whether Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes filing a writ petition for the same relief.
Scope and limits of a writ of mandamus directing police protection under Article 226.
Whether a writ proceeding can substitute for a civil suit in determining rights under a trust deed.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 9 Rule 9
Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 226
Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Subjects

Writ jurisdictionArticle 226Police protectionCivil suitOrder 9 Rule 9Religious trustMandamusJurisdictional overreachCivil rights

Judgment

,,, P.R. MURLIDHARAN AND ORS. A
v.
SWAMI DHARAMANDA THEERTHA PADAR & ORS.

MARCH I 0, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.] B

~, Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 2 I and 226-Code of Civil
Procedure, I 908-0rder IX. Rule 9-Suit for declaration of title/continuation
as head of a religious Institution/Trust filed by the petitioner-Dismissed by
Trial Court-Another suit filed by other contender-Petitioner filing a writ
c
petition for police protection-High Court granting police protection to
petitioner holding that he was entitled to hold the office of the Head of the
Trust-On appeal, Held: Since suit on contentious issues pending before a
Civil Court, High Court usurped the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by
determining the contentious issues-In order to determine such disputed D
question offact, not only the interpretation or the document alone but adduction
'
of oral evidence also necessary-Besides, another contender for the post also
raised a contention-Under the circumstances, High Court could not have
gone into such questions in a writ proceeding-A writ proceeding cannot be
a substitute for a civil suit since jurisdiction of a civil court is wide and
plenary-Hence, impugned judgment is set aside, however, the petitioner may E
approach to the Superintendent ofPolice by filing an appropriate representation
for police protection, if he so desire.

Writs-Writ of mandamus-Writ jurisdiction of High Courts-Exercise
of-Discussed
F
Respondent claiming himself to be a Sansyasi in the tradition of "Sree
Chattambi Swamy Thiruvadikal" and Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan
of "Vadayampadi Asharamam" filed a petition in the Civil Court for a •
declaration that he was entitled to continue in the capacity of head of the
religious Institution The suit was dismissed for. default. An application for G
restoration of the suit was also dismissed. The said religious institution
resolved to amend the deed of trust so as to abolish the post of
Sthiradhayakshan and to vest his powers and duties in the President of
the Institution.

1163 H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 2 S.C.R.

A First respondent challenged the purported resolution by filing a suit
f
in the Civil Court. An interlocutory application was filed by another
contender for the said post for getting himself impleaded as a party. The
suit filed by the first respondent was dismissed; he then filed a writ petition
before the High Court praying for police protection. A Division Bench of
the High Court went into the question as to whether the first respondent
B was entitled to hold the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan for
the purpose of issuing an appropriate direction as regard grant of police
protection. The High Court held that 'the State and the police officials
have got a legal obligations to give protection to the life and properties of
the appellant upon arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold
C the said office. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD, (Per Sinha, J.J:

D 1.1. The High Court, despite noticing that the suits on contentious
issues were pending in the Court of Munsif, sought to usurp the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court. It determined the contentious issues which were '
required to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act. 11168-F, GI

E 1.2. A person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of
determining such disputed questions of fact which was beyond the scope
and purport of the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ
jurisdiction as it also involved determination of disputed questions of fact.
Respondent no. I who sought to claim a status was required to establish
the same in a court of law in an appropriate proceeding. He for one reason
F or the other, failed to do so. The provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code
of Civil Procedure stares on his face. He, therefore, could not have tiled a
writ petition for getting the self same issues determined in his favour which
he could not do even by tiling a suit. Indeed the jurisdiction of the writ
Court is wide while granting relief to a citizen of India so as to protect
G his life and liberty as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, but while doing so it could not collaterally go into that question,
determination whereof would undoubtedly be beyond its domain. What
was necessary for determination of the question arising in the writ petition
was not the interpretation of the document alone, but it required adduction
of oral evidence as well. Such evidence was necessary for the purpose of
H explaining the true nature of the deed of trust, as also the practice followed
P.R. MURLIDHARAN v. SWAMI DHARAMANDA THEERTHA PADAR 1165
by this trust. (1169-A-DJ A
1.~ ·The impleading applicant has raised a contention that he alone
was ordained to hold the said office as per the bye-laws of the trust. The
qualification of the first respondent to hold the office was also in question.
In this view of the matter, such disputed questions could not have been
gone into by the High Court in a writ proceeding. Furthermore, the B
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is wide and plenary. In a case of this nature,
a writ proceeding cannot be a substitute for a civil suit. Hence, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside. In the event, the
first respondent feels that he as a person should receive protection to his
life he may make an appropriate representation to the Superintendent of C
Police who after causing ail inquiry made in this behalf may pass an
appropriate order as is permissible in law. (1169-D-GJ

Per Balasubramanyan, J., (Supplementing):

1.1. A Writ Petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus D
directing the police authorities to give protection to a Writ Petitioner,
i cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It would be an
abuse of process for a Writ Petitioner to approach the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a
property without first est~blishing his possession in an appropriate Civil E
Court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be
resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India would remain effective and meaningful only when
it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations. (1170-B, DJ

1.2. The fact that a Writ Petitioner may be barred from approaching F
the Civil Court, in view of Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
or some other provisions, is no ground for the High Court to take upon
itself, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the duty to adjudicate
on the civil rights of parties for the purpose of deciding whether a writ of
mandamus could be issued to the police authorities for the protection of G
the alleged rights of the Writ Petitioner. [1170-FJ

1.3. A writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give
protection to the person of a Writ Petitioner can be issued, when the court
is satisfied that there is a threat to his person and the authorities have
H
-.( .-
1

1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A failed to perform their duties and it is different from granting relief for
the first time to a person either to allegedly protect his right to property
or his right to an office, especially when the pleadings themselves disclose
that disputed questions are involved. (1170-G, HJ

1.4. A writ for "police protection" so-called, has only a limited scope,
B as, when the court is approached for protection of rights declared by a
decree or by an order passed by a civil court. It cannot be extended to
cases where rights have not been determined either finally by the civil
court or, at least at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner,
and then too in furtherance of the decree or order. [1171-C)
c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1634 of2006.

From the Final Judgment dated 22.9.2004 of the Kerala High Court in
W.P. (C) No. 16047 of 2004.

D T.L. V. Iyer, S. Sukumaran, Alam Gir, A. Deb Kumar and Rauf Rahim
for the Appellants.

K. Radhakrishna, Udaya Kumar Sagar and Ms. Bina Madhavan for Ml
s. Lawyer's Knit & Co., for the Respondents.

E P. Krishnamurthy, Kulbhushan Arora, K. Rajeev, Ramesh Babu M.R.
(N.P.) and R. Sathish for the Applkant

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.

F Application for impleadment is allowed.

The respondent herein claimed himself to be a Sansyasi in the tradition
of "Sree Chattambi Swamy Thiruvadikal" and Madathipathi and
Sthiradhyakshan of Parama Bhattara Gurukula Seva Sangham, popularly
G known as "Vadayampadi Asharamam". The respondent filed a suit in the
Court of Munsiff, Kolencherry being O.S. No. 71 of 2000 for a declaration
that he was entitled to continue in the said capacity and he was not allowed
to discharge his duties attached to the said office in tertns of the purported
order dated 20.1.1996 of Kailasanatha Theertha Padar. The said suit was
dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the said suit was filed
H which was also dismissed.
t
P.R. MURLIDHARAN v. SWAMI DHARAMANDA THEERTHA PADAR [SINHA, J.)1167

,-
It is not in dispute that the appellants herein had raised a contention A
that the general body of the Seva Sangham had met on 7.1.2001 and resolved
to amend the deed of trust so as to abolish the post of Sthiradhayakshan and
to vest his powers and duties in the President of the Seva Sangham.

Kailasanatha allegedly served as Sthiradhayakshan since 1996 onwards.
It was stated that while he was on pilgrimage, the first respondent claimed B
himself to have taken over the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan
of the Ashram, although he had allegedly no qualification therefor.

It is not in dispute that in relation to the affairs of the trust a suit being
O.S. No. 30 of 2002 is pending in the Court of Munsif, Kolencherry. The
said suit has been filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair, founder member of the C
Ashram questioning the aforementioned purported resolution dated 7.1.2001.
An interlocutory application has been filed by Brahmasree Kailasa Nadananda
Teertha Padar for getting himself impleaded as a party. The said applicant in
his impleadment application alleges that as per the byelaws, he had admittedly
been serving in the said capacity since 1995 and, thus, in law continues to D
be the Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan. Indisputably, the said applicant as
also the first respondent herein are parties in the suit being O.S. No. 30 of
2002.

Thought the suit filed by the first respondent was dismissed, he filed a
writ petition before the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam praying for police E
protection which was marked as WP (C) No. 16047/04. A Division Bench of
the said High Court went into the question as to whether the first respondent
was entitled to hold the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan for the
purpose of issuing an appropriate direction as regard grant of police protection.
The High Court opined that 'the State and the police officials have got a legal F
-+ obligations to give protection to the life and properties of the appellant upon
arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold the said office. The
High Court proceeded to determine the said purported question in the light
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and opined:

"Respondent 5 and 6 have not given adequate and effective police G
protection in spite of repeated requests which only paved the way of
the contesting respondents and others to take law into their hands and
act contrary to the terms of the trust deed. Such being the conduct of
the respondents, their assertion that Ext. P3 is fabricated by the
petitioner cannot be believed. Going by the facts and circumstances
of the case, and on going through the materials placed before us, we H
1

1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A are inclined to accept the averment made by the petitioner that he is
Sthiradhyakshan and Madathipathy of the Ashramam.''

It was directed:

"We have therefore no hesitation to allow this writ petition giving
B direction to respondent 5 and 6 to give adequate and effective police
protection to safeguard the interest of the petitioner being the
Sthiradhyakshan and Madathipathy of the Vadayampadi Ashramam.
Petitioner be given effective police protection so as to discharge the
function as Sthiradhyakshan and Madathipathy as per Ext. Pl trust
deed for his peaceful residence in the Ashramam ... "
c
Aggrieved thereby the Appellant is before us.

Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner and Mr. P. Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the applicant in the impleadment application submitted that the
D High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so.

Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent no. 1, on the other hand, took us through various documents
referred to by the High Court in its impugned judgment for the purpose of
E showing that having regard to the resolution dated 20. I .1996, the respondent
no. 1 was entitled to function in the capacity of Madathipathi and
Sthiradhyakshan. Our attention was also drawn to the fact that the first
respondent was ordained therefor and, thus, he could not be removed from
the post of Sthiradhyakshan and Madathipathy as per the terms of the trust.

F The question is a contentious one. Construction of the said trust and the
rights and obligations thereunder were in question. The first respondent filed
a suit in that behalf. The said suit was dismissed. In terms of Order 9 Rule
..
9 of the Code of Civil Procedure another suit would not be maintainable at
his instance. We have noticed herein before that another suit being O.S. No.
30 of 2002 is pending in the court of the Munsif. The High Court, despite
G noticing the said fact, sought to usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court. It,
as noticed hereinbefore, determined the contentious issues which were required
to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

It is one thing to say that in a given case a person may be held to be
entitled to police protection, having regard to the threat perception, but it is
H
1
P.R. MURLIDHARAN v. SWAMI DHARAMANDA TIIEERTHA PADAR [SINHA, J.J 1169

another thing to say that he is entitled thereto for holding an office and A
discharging certain functions when his right to do so is open to question. A
person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining
such disputed questions of fact which was beyond the scope and purport of
the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction as it also
involved determination of disputed questions of fact. The respondent no. I B
who sought to claim a status was required to establish the same in a court of
law in an appropriate proceeding. He for one reason or the other, failed to do
so. The provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure stares
on his face. He, therefore, could not have filed a writ petition for getting the
self same issues determined in his favour which he could not do even by
filing a suit. Indeed the jurisdiction of the writ court is wide while granting C
relief to a citizen of India so as to protect his life and liberty as adumbrated
under Article 2 I of the Constitution of India, but while doing so it could not
collaterally go into that question, determination whereof would undoubtedly
be beyond its domain. What was necessary for determination of the question
arising in the writ petition was not the interpretation of the document alone,
but it required adduction of oral evidence as well. Such evidence was necessary D
for the purpose of explaining the true nature of the deed of trust, as also the
practice followed by this trust. In any event, the impleading applicant herein,
as noticed hereinbefore, has raised a contention that he alone was ordained
to hold the said office as per the bye laws of the trust. The qualification of the
first respondent to hold the office was also in question. In this view of the E
matter, we are of the opinion that such disputed questions could not have
been gone into by the High Court in a writ proceeding.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the civil court is wide and plenary. In
a case of this nature, a writ proceeding cannot be a substitute for a civil suit.
F
+ For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained
which is set aside accordingly. However, in the event, the first respondent
feels that he as a person should receive protection to his life he may make
an appropriate representation to the Superintendent of Police who after causing
an inquiry made in this behalf may pass an appropriate order as is permissible
in law. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations. G
In view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no
.. order as to costs .

P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.
H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A 1. I respectfully agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned
Brother and agree that the appeal has to be allowed and the decision of the
High Court set aside.

2. A Writ Petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the police authorities to give protection to a Writ Petitioner, cannot
B be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach
the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party
has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the Writ
Petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the
petitioner applying for it, the police authorities are not giving him the needed
C protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction.
But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection
in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon
and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted
civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a Writ Petitioner to approach
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ
D of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession
of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil
court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted
by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised
E prudently and in appropriate situations.

3. In the case on hand, various disputed questions arose based on a
deed of trust and the facts pleaded by the Writ Petitioner and controverted by
the other side. The High Court should have normally directed the Writ
Petitioner to have his rights adjudicated upon, in an appropriate suit in a civil
F court. The fact that a Writ Petitioner may be barred from approaching the
civil court, in view of Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or
some other provisions, is no ground for the High Court to take upon itself,
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the duty to adjudicate on the
civil rights of parties for the purpose of deciding whether a writ of mandamus
could be issued to the police authorities for the protection of the alleged
G rights of the Writ Petitioner. A writ of mandamus directing the police
authorities to give protection to the person of a Writ Petitioner can be issued,
when the court is satisfied that there is a threat to his person and the authorities
have failed to perform their duties and it is different from granting relief for
the first time to a person either to allegedly protect his right to property or
H his right to an office, especially when the pleadings themselves disclose that
+
J

,P.R. MURLIDHARAN v. SWAMI DHARAMANDA THEERTHA PADAR [BALASUBRAMANYAN, l.J 1171

disputed questions are involved. My learned Brother has rightly pointed out A
that the J;ligh Court was in error in proceeding to adjudicate on the rights and
obligations arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and
the deed itself. I fully agree with my learned Brother that the High Court
should not have undertaken such an exercise on the basis that the right of the
Writ Petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is sought to be B
affected by the actions of the contesting respondents and their supporters and
that can be prevented by the issue of the writ of mandamus prayed for.

4. A writ for "police protection" so-called, has only a limited scope,
as, when the court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree
or by an order passed by a civil court. It cannot be extended to cases where C
rights have not been determined either finally by the civil court or, at least
at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner, and then too in furtherance
of the decree or order.

5. Having said this, I agree with my learned Brother and allow the
appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition D
filed by the first respondent.

S.K.S. Appeal allowed.