Holding

The period of officiating service of the temporarily appointed AEEs between 1990 and 2005 must be counted as regular service for seniority, placing them above the 1997 batch of regularly appointed candidates.

Summary

The petitioners, originally appointed as Work Inspectors in 1990 and later as temporary Assistant Executive Engineers (AEEs) between 1990‑1992, sought seniority over the 1997 batch of AEEs recruited through the APPSC. The State Government regularised the temporary AEEs in 2005 but placed them below the 1997 regular recruits, later issuing a revised order in 2006 granting them seniority. The High Court quashed the 2006 order, holding the Government had become functus officio. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of functus officio does not apply to legislative rule‑making, and that the appointments, though termed temporary, were not ad‑hoc or stop‑gap and therefore the period of officiating service (1990‑2005) must be counted for seniority. Applying the precedent of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, the Court affirmed that the period of officiating service is creditable when the employee continues uninterruptedly until regularisation. Consequently, the revised G.O.M. 262 of 2006 was upheld and the High Court’s judgment was set aside.

Issues considered

The period of officiating service of temporarily appointed AEEs (1990‑1992) should be counted for seniority over the 1997 regular batch.
Whether the State Government became functus officio after G.O.M. No. 234 (2005) and could not issue a revised order.
The applicability of the doctrine of functus officio to administrative rule‑making authority.
The relevance of Proposition (A) versus Proposition (B) of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra to the present appointments.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the period of officiating service of the temporarily appointed Assistant Executive Engineers-AEEs between 1990-1992 including the appellants should be taken into account for considering their seniority over and above the 1997 batch of through APPSC-private respondents. Headnotes† Service Law – Seniority – Counting of the period of officiating service – Appellants regularly appointed in 1990 as Work Inspectors in the State Corporation – For the project-based exigency, in 1992, the appellants

Subjects

SeniorityCounting of the period of officiating serviceWork InspectorsTemporary Assistant Executive EngineersRegular selection processDe hors the rulesStop‑gap or ad‑hoc arrangementProposition (B) of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association caseAdministrative actionsJudicial reviewRule‑making powerAdministrative dutiesPrinciple of Functus OfficioAndhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes Cooperative Development CorporationJudicial forum or quasi‑judicial authorityPanchayat Raj Department

Judgment

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1060 : 2025 INSC 212

P. Rammohan Rao
v.
K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 2717-2719 of 2025)
13 February 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the period of officiating service of the temporarily
appointed Assistant Executive Engineers-AEEs between 1990-1992
including the appellants should be taken into account for considering
their seniority over and above the 1997 batch of regularly appointed
candidates through APPSC-private respondents.

Headnotes†
Service Law – Seniority – Counting of the period of officiating
service – Appellants regularly appointed in 1990 as Work
Inspectors in the State Corporation – For the project-based
exigency, in 1992, the appellants and one other appointed
as temporary AEEs u/r.10(a)(i)(1) of the Rules – Private
respondents appointed as AEEs in 1997, after undergoing the
regular selection process through APPSC in accordance with
the Act of 1994 – Subsequently, services of appellant came
to be regularized by G.O.M No. 234 on 27.06.2005, and the
appellants placed below the last regularly selected candidate of
AEEs in terms of seniority – Subsequently, State Government
introduced a classification amongst temporarily appointed
AEEs based on their dates of appointment with reference to
the promulgation of Act of 1994 – Issuance of revised G.O.M
No. 262, dated 17.06.2006, stipulating that the temporary
AEEs appointed between 1990-1992 would be placed below
the last regular AEE appointed through the APPSC, prior to
the enactment of the Act of 1994 – Challenge to – High Court
quashed the G.O.M No. 262 dated 17.06.2006 – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – State Government fully justified in issuing
the revised G.O.M. No. 262 – Period of officiating service-period
between 1990 to 2005 of the appellants and the batch of the AEEs
appointed between 1990-1992 to be counted as regular service for
determining the seniority, entitling him/them to be placed above the
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1061

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

1997 batch of regularly appointed candidates-private respondents in
the seniority list – At the time of the appointment of the appellants
and other similarly placed candidates as AEEs between the years
1990-1992, there was a vacuum in rules governing the appointment
of AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department, as such it cannot be said
that these appointments were de hors the rules – Notwithstanding
the designation of the appointments of the appellants and similarly
situated candidates as being temporary, such appointments were
neither restricted by a fixed tenure nor conceived as a stop-gap
or ad-hoc arrangement – While characterized as temporary, these
appointments were not intended to address a transient or interim
requirement, rather, they were structured to ensure continuity and
stability within the workforce – Services of the appellants and other
similarly situated candidates were regularised in 2005, and the same
attained finality – Once the services of employees are regularised,
the ad-hoc or stop-gap nature of the appointment does not survive –
Since there were no selection rules in force in the Panchayat
Raj Department for appointment of the appellants as temporary
AEEs in 1992, the appellants clearly falls under Proposition (B) of
the Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of
Maharashtra’s case, that if the initial appointment is not made by
following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee
continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his
service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating
service will be counted – Furthermore, the rule-making power of
the legislature cannot be curtailed or nullified by application of the
concept of functus officio – Reasoning assigned by the High Court
that the State Government became functus officio after issuance
of G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27.06.2005 and could not have issued
the revised G.O.M. No. 262 dated 17.06.2006 is untenable and
ultra vires the Constitution – Reasoning by the High Court that
the private respondents, as affected parties, were required to
be heard before the issuance of the revised G.O.M. No. 262 is
unsustainable and contrary to the established legal principles – If
the State Government is compelled to afford an opportunity of
hearing to every individual or entity likely to be affected by its
administrative decision-making, its rule-making authority would
be severely constricted, defeating the very purpose of efficient
policy implementation and undermining its ability to discharge its
administrative duties – Thus, the order passed by the High Court
quashed and set aside – Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate
Service Rules – Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments
to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay
Structure) Act, 1994. [Paras 34, 35, 37, 38, 47]
1062 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Doctrines/Principles – Principle of functus officio – Application
of concept of functus officio on legislatures:
Held: Rule-making power of the legislature cannot be curtailed or
nullified by application of the concept of functus officio – Principle
of functus officio normally applies to a judicial forum or a quasi-
judicial authority and would have no application to the rule-making
authority which is within the domain of the State Government by
virtue of Art. 245 of the Constitution. [Para 42]

Case Law Cited
Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State Of
Maharashtra [1990] 2 SCR 900 : (1990) 2 SCC 715 – followed.
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985)
3 SCC 398 – relied on.
Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association v. UOI [2023] 6
SCR 731 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 309; Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union
of India (2012) 11 SCC 257; Santosh Kumar v. State of A.P.
[2003] Supp. 1 SCR 264 : (2003) 5 SCC 511; Amarendra Kumar
Mohapatra v. State of Orissa and Ors. [2014] 2 SCR 1031 : (2014)
4 SCC 583 – referred to.

List of Acts
Andra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1996;
Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services
and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act,
1994; Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj and Rural Development
Act; Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj and Rural Development
Rules.

List of Keywords
Seniority; Counting of the period of officiating service; Work
Inspectors; Temporary Assistant Executive Engineers-AEEs;
Regular selection process; De hors the rules; Stop-gap or ad-hoc
arrangement; Proposition (B) of the Direct Recruit Class II Engg.
Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra’s case; Administrative
actions; Judicial review; Rule-making power; Administrative
duties; Principle of Functus Officio; Andhra Pradesh Schedule
Castes Cooperative Development Corporation; Judicial forum or
quasi-judicial authority; Panchayat Raj Department.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1063

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No(s). 4036-4038 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2023 of the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WP Nos. 3903, 3910
and 4173 of 2011
With
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No(s). 4596-4597 of 2024 and Civil
Appeal No(s). 2532-2541 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Gaurav Agarwal, B. Adinarayana Rao, Guru Krishnakumar, Sr. Advs.,
Ms. Devina Sehgal, S. Uday Bhanu, Byrapaneni Suyodhan, Kumar
Shashank, Ms. Tatini Basu, Ms. Rao Vishwaja, P. Vamshi Rao Adv, P.
Mohith Rao, Ms. J Akshitha, Shaik Sohil Akthar, Eugene S Philomene.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Gaurav Agarwal, Gaurav Agrawal, Sr. Advs., Dr. K. Lakshmi
Narasimha, Ms. Bina Madhavan, S. Uday Kumar Sagar, Ms.
Niharika Tannerce, M/S. Lawyer S Knit & Co, Ms. Devina Sehgal,
S Uday Bhanu.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 4036-4038 of 2024
Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 4596-4597 of 2024

1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals take exception to the final judgment and common
order dated 21st September, 2023 rendered by the High Court for
the State of Telangana at Hyderabad1 whereby the Division Bench

1 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘High Court’.
1064 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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allowed the batch of writ petitions preferred by the private respondents
herein and quashed the Government Office Memorandum2 No. 262,
dated 17th June, 2006, issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
4. Facts in a nutshell relevant and essential for the disposal of these
appeals are as under.
5. The appellants who hold the qualification of B. Tech (Bachelor of
Technology) were selected and appointed as Work Inspectors in
the Andra Pradesh Scheduled Castes Cooperative Development
Corporation3 on 1st January, 1990 and were serving in the said
department. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.M.
No. 89, dated 9th February, 1990, sanctioning posts of Assistant
Executive Engineers4 for achieving Phase-II of the Andhra Pradesh
Primary School Project,5 which was initiated in collaboration between
the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Government of United
Kingdom in the year 1983. The said project was time-bound and
hence, directions were issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh
to the Chief Engineer, to fill up the posts immediately from the list
available with the Andra Pradesh Public Service Commission,6 and
if the list was not adequate then the Chief Engineer was permitted
to recruit the candidates through the employment exchange.
6. Since the list available with the APPSC was inadequate to fill the
posts required for the project, the Chief Engineer wrote to the
State Government, and in response thereof, G.O.M. No. 429,
dated 6th March, 1990, was issued by the Panchayat Raj and Rural
Development Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, directing
that these vacancies may be filled up from the Work Inspector/
Draughtsman/Tracers who were already serving in the Panchayat
Raj Department and possessed a graduation degree in Engineering
i.e. B.E./B.Tech. It was further clarified that the nature of these
appointments would be temporary under Rule 10(a)(i) of the Andra

2 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘G.O.M.’
3 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘Corporation’.
4 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘AEEs’.
5 To achieve the first objective 84 primary school building with improved designs were constructed in 11
selected project districts. In order to achieve phase-II of the project construction work needed to be
entrusted to the Panchayat Raj Engineering department and to have a separate class of engineer’s staff
for undertaking construction of buildings of primary schools and teachers’ centres.
6 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘APPSC’.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1065

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

Pradesh Subordinate Service Rules7 pending amendment to the
Special Rules for Panchayat Raj Engineering Services. The said
G.O.M. also contained a direction to frame a formula for the promotion
of the above-mentioned candidates, taking into account the strength
of cadre and the retirement vacancies in the next two years as per
the rules. A Committee was also constituted to consider the proposal
for temporary appointments and for filling up the remaining vacancies.
7. Thereafter, another G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990 was
issued by the Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Department,
whereby 386 posts of AEEs were sanctioned under the Cyclone
Emergency Reconstruction Project.8 The appellants herein and
one individual who were already serving as Work Inspectors were
appointed as temporary AEEs on 5th December, 1992 against these
vacancies. It is an undisputed fact that the appellants herein and
his peers were appointed against substantiate vacancies created
for the project.
8. Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments
to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay
Structure) Act, 19949 came to be enacted on 15th January, 1994 to
streamline the recruitment process. The same was made effective
retrospectively from 25th November, 1993.
9. Thereafter, the G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June, 1994, came to be
issued by the Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Department,
creating 729 posts of AEEs for taking up the works related to rural
water supply and sanitation.10 Under the said G.O.M., employment
assurance scheme and employment guarantee scheme were also
created.
10. In July, 1994, the Technical Grade-I Inspectors filed Original Application
No. 533 of 1994 before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal,11
to consider their cases for appointment as AEEs against the project
based vacancies. The APAT vide order dated 4th July, 1994 disposed
of the O.A., wherein the State Government was directed to consider

7 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Service rules’.
8 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CERP’
9 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Act of 1994’.
10 ‘Jawahar Rojgar Yojana Scheme’.
11 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘APAT’.
1066 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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the case of Work Inspectors for appointment to the posts of AEE
before notifying the vacancies to employment exchange.
11. In compliance with the aforesaid direction passed by APAT, G.O.M.
No. 1289, dated 10th August, 1994, came to be issued by the
Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Department in relation to the
appointments under the ‘Jawahar Rojgar Yojana Scheme’, permitting
the Chief Engineer to fill up the vacancies of AEEs which had been
created by way of G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June, 1994, from
eligible Work Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers having the requisite
degree qualification. The aforesaid G.O.M. No. 1289 contained a
specific stipulation that the candidates would be appointed temporarily
subject to the condition that they should make an endeavour of
selection through the APPSC, failing which, they would be reverted
back to their original cadre of Work Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers.
12. AEEs appointed under Rule 10(a)(i) of the Service Rules from the
category of Work Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers and the candidates,
who were selected from the list tendered by the employment
exchange between 2nd August, 1989 to 30th June, 1995, made several
representations requesting the State Government to regularize their
services as most of them had completed more than five years in
service.
13. In 1995, Notification No. 8 of 1995 came to be issued by the APPSC
inviting applications from eligible candidates for appointment in various
posts including that of AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department.
The recruitment process for the aforesaid appointment was to be
conducted under the Act of 1994. The aspiring candidates appeared
in the test conducted by the APPSC and as many as 627 posts were
filled and the successful candidates including the private respondents
herein were appointed in the year 1997, upon due selection by APPSC.
14. Being aggrieved by the non-consideration of their representations for
regularisation, the temporary AEEs (including the appellants herein),
who had been appointed between the years 1990-1995, filed Original
Application No. 5730 of 1995 and batch matters before the APAT,
seeking regularisation of their services as they had been working
on a temporary basis for several years. The APAT, vide order dated
19th February, 1996, disposed of these O.A.s, directing the State
Government to take a decision regarding the claim of regularisation
of services of temporarily appointed AEEs within a reasonable time.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1067

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

The APAT, further, directed that till such decision was taken, the
services of the applicants therein shall not be terminated.
15. In compliance with the above direction, G.O.M. No. 997, dated 27th
July, 1996, was issued by the State Government rejecting the prayer
seeking regularisation of the temporarily appointed AEEs with the
observation that there was no provision in the extant service rules
for recruitment to the post of AEEs by promotion.
16. Aggrieved by the aforesaid G.O.M., the temporary AEEs, who were
appointed between 1990-1995, again approached the APAT via
various Original Applications.12 Initially, a stay was granted by the
APAT vide order dated 10th August, 1996, suspending the operation
of G.O.M. No. 997, dated 27th July, 1996, and a direction was issued
to the State Government, not to notify the vacancies occupied by the
applicants therein for the purpose of selection/appointment.
17. In the meantime, and during the pendency of the aforesaid Original
Applications,13 the Government issued another G.O.M. No. 234
dated 27th June, 2005, whereby the services of all temporary AEEs
appointed between 1990-1995 and continuing in service on that
date were regularised. It was further clarified that the services of
all the temporary AEEs, who were appointed between the years
1990-1995, shall be regularized below the last regularly selected
candidate of AEEs.
18. Pursuant to the issuance of the aforesaid G.O.M., the pending Original
Applications filed before the APAT were dismissed as withdrawn
vide order dated 13th December, 2006, and liberty was granted to
the applicants therein to work out their remedies, if they were still
aggrieved after the issuance of G.O.M. No. 234.
19. Though satisfied with the regularisation of their services, but aggrieved
by the denial of seniority under the G.O.M. No. 234, AEEs appointed
between 1990-1992, including the appellants herein, made various
representations to the State Government, claiming that they were
appointed before the promulgation of the Act of 1994, and thus they
were required to be treated as a different class from those appointed
between 1993-1995, which was after the promulgation of Act of
1994. It was asserted that G.O.M. No. 234, had caused significant

12 O.A. No. 4991 of 1996, O.A. No. 5547 of 1996, O.A. No. 4427 of 1997 and batch matters.
13 Id.
1068 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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prejudice and injustice as the Engineers appointed between 1990-
1992 had been placed below the AEEs appointed during the year
1997 in the order of seniority, who had thereby lost nearly 10-15
years of continuous service. The State Government was requested to
regularize the services of this category of AEEs appointed between
1990-1992 from the date of joining the posts.
20. The State Government, after examining the representations and the
prolonged service of the temporary AEEs appointed between the
years 1990-1992, modified G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th June, 2005,
and issued a revised G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006, which
inter alia provided that: -
“5. Accordingly, in partial modification of the orders issued
in the G.O. 1st read above, the Government hereby directs
the Engineer-in-Chief, Panchayat Raj, Hyderabad to
regularize the services of the Assistant Executive Engineers
who were appointed during the period 1990-92 below the
last regular Assistant Executive Engineer appointed
through Andra Pradesh, Public Service Commission
prior to the promulgation of Act, 2/94.”
(emphasis supplied)

21. In effect, the above G.O.M. directed that the temporary AEEs
appointed before promulgation of the Act of 1994 would retain their
seniority from the date of their initial induction on the posts.
22. Being aggrieved by the issuance of the revised G.O.M. No. 262, dated
17th June, 2006, the AEEs regularly appointed through the APPSC
Notification No. 8 of 1995, i.e., the private respondents herein, who
had joined service in the year 1997 and also, the AEEs appointed on
a temporary basis between 1993-1995, filed Original Applications14
before the APAT. In these batches of Original Application, the
State Government filed an affidavit specifically asserting that the
appointments made between 1990-1992 were not de hors the service
rules and there was no requirement of selection on these posts
through the APPSC as the same were exempted from the purview
of the Commission (APPSC).

14 O.A. No. 5818/2009, O.A. No. 10733/2009, O.A. No. 5933/2009, O.A. No. 6020 of 2009 and batch
matters.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1069

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

23. Vide a common order dated 3rd February, 2011, the APAT dismissed
the Original Applications15 preferred by the 1997 Batch regularly
appointed candidates (private respondents herein) and allowed the
Original Applications16 preferred by the temporary AEEs selected
between 1993-1995. The APAT, while upholding the validity of G.O.M.
No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006, also held that the temporary AEEs
appointed between 1993-1995 were also entitled to a similar treatment
as extended to those appointed between 1990-1992 and that the
candidates regularly appointed through APPSC in 1997 (private
respondents herein) could not claim seniority over the candidates
whose regularisation was done in the year 2005.
24. The 1997 batch regularly appointed candidates (private respondents
herein) assailed the common order dated 3rd February, 2011 passed
by the APAT by filing writ petitions17 before the High Court. These
writ petitions came to be allowed by the learned Division Bench
vide final judgment and common order dated 21st September, 2023
which is subjected to challenge in these appeals by special leave.

Submissions on behalf of the appellants: -
25. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
advanced the following pertinent submissions assailing the impugned
judgment: -
(a) That the appellants hold the qualification of Bachelor in
Engineering. They were duly selected and appointed as
Work Inspectors on 1st January, 1990 in the Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Castes Co-operative Development Corporation
against a sanctioned post.
(b) That the State Government felt an imminent need for qualified
engineers to carry out the Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction
Project (CERP) in the year 1990. The Panchayat Raj Department
issued G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990, sanctioning
another 386 posts of AEEs under the CERP. At that point in

15 O.A. No. 5018/2006, O.A. No. 5109/2006, O.A. No. 5789/2006, O.A. No. 6394/2006, O.A. No. 6423/2007,
O.A. No. 1892/2010 and O.A. No. 4056/2010.
16 O.A. No. 5818/2009, O.A. No. 5933/2009, O.A. No. 6020/2009, O.A. No. 6023/2009, O.A. No. 6038/2009,
O.A. No. 10733/2009 and O.A. No. 10897/2009.
17 Writ Petition Nos. 3903, 3910, 3954, 4173, 4434, 4435, 4437, 4439, 4441 and 22422 of 2011.
1070 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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time, no rules were in place for the appointment of Engineers
in the Panchayat Raj Department. To meet the exigency, the
appellants and one other who were already serving as Works
Inspectors in the Cooperative Department Corporation were
appointed as temporary AEEs under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of Andhra
Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules vide order dated
5th December, 1992. Their appointment was in no manner de
hors the rules or a backdoor appointment.
(c) That no challenge was ever laid by the private respondents
to the G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June, 2005, vide which the
services of the appellants and other similarly situated candidates
were regularized and thus, the same has attained finality. He
urged that the services of the appellants and the similarly
situated candidates could not be regularized at an earlier point
in time due to the need for amendment of the Andhra Pradesh
Panchayati Raj and Rural Development Act/Rules and for the
creation of a channel for the absorption of the appellants and
similarly placed persons. He urged that the delay in amending
the aforesaid rules cannot be attributed to the appellants and
they cannot be put to a disadvantage for this reason by placing
them below the last regularly appointed employee selected after
the promulgation of the Act of 1994.
(d) That the appellants and the other similarly situated candidates
are of the 1990-1992 batch and have continued to discharge
their functions uninterruptedly for the last 31 years while securing
periodic promotions. If the impugned order is not set aside,
they would be placed below the regularly recruited batch of
1997(private respondents herein) and thereby, they would lose
7 years of seniority. He further stated the appellants are due
to retire in January, 2026 and they will superannuate without
receiving the promotion to which they are rightfully entitled.
(e) The learned counsel tried to draw a clear distinction between
the G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990, vide which the
sanctioned posts under CERP were created and the appellants
were appointed as AEEs, and the G.O.M. No. 1289, dated 10th
August, 1994. He urged that G.O.M. No. 1289, which permitted
the department to fill up the further project-based vacancies to
the posts of AEEs, contained an express stipulation that the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1071

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

candidates were being appointed temporarily, subject to the
condition that they should seek selection by APPSC, failing
which, they would be reverted as Work Inspectors, whereas,
no such condition existed in G.O.M. No. 540 dated 30th August,
1990.
(f) That though the terms of appointment would show that the
appointment of the appellants and the similarly situated
candidates was temporary, however, it was neither limited by
time, nor was it meant to be a stop-gap/ad hoc arrangement.
He drew the Court’s attention to the G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th
June, 1994, which dealt with Jawahar Rozgar Yojana Scheme
and urged that this G.O.M. contained a clause providing that
as and when the Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project/
Circles/Divisions are abolished, the persons working in these
Circles/Divisions/Sub-Divisions shall be posted in newly
sanctioned Circles and Divisions. The posts that were sanctioned
for the CERP in the office of the Chief Engineer, CERP would
stand abolished w.e.f. 30th June, 1994, but the staff would
continue to attend the residual work till the work is completed.
He urged that there was a clear intent on the part of the State
Government while issuing this G.O.M. that the persons working
in the Sub-divisions created under the CERP would be posted
to new Circles/Divisions/Sub-Divisions under the Panchayat Raj
Department and thus, for all practical purposes, the services of
the appellants and his peers who were appointed as AEEs under
the CERP were to be absorbed into the cadre of Panchayat
Raj Department upon the completion of the project.
(g) That the State Government had filed a counter affidavit in the
writ petitions18 filed before the Division Bench by the regularly
appointed 1997 batch recruits(private respondents herein)
challenging the G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June 2006, wherein
a specific plea was taken that the appointments to the post of
AEEs made between 1990-92 were not de hors the service
rules and at that point of time, there was no requirement for
these selections to be made through the APPSC as the same
were exempted from the purview of the Commission (APPSC).

18 Supra Note 16.
1072 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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(h) That the Division Bench has passed the impugned order on an
erroneous assumption that once the State Government issued
G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June, 2005, it became ‘functus
officio’ and could not have modified the same by re-examining
the case of the temporary employees appointed between 1990-
1995 and supersede the same by issuance of the G.O.M. No.
262, dated 17th June, 2006. He submitted that the doctrine of
‘functus officio’ is not applicable to administrative decisions
based on policy considerations and if such doctrine is made
applicable to the rule-making power of the Government, the
administrative setup would be virtually crippled. In this regard,
he placed reliance on Rule 25 of the Andhra Pradesh State and
Subordinate Service Rules, 1996, and the judgment of this Court
in Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association v. UOI.19
(i) That the reasoning given by the Division Bench for quashing the
G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006, vide which the benefit
was given to the temporary appointees (including the appellants
herein) that the same was issued without hearing the affected
persons i.e. the writ petitioners(private respondents herein)
is ex-facie misplaced. He urged that there is no requirement
in law for issuance of notice to the set of employees likely to
be affected where the Government takes a policy decision
of conferring the benefit of regularisation and fixing the date
from which the seniority is to be reckoned for a particular set
of employees.
(j) That neither was the State Government denuded of the power
to amend the earlier G.O.M. nor was there any requirement of
hearing the candidates likely to be affected by the revised G.O.M.
before its issuance thereof. He urged that the rule-making power
of the State Government cannot be curtailed by the principle of
‘Audi alteram partem’ because such a view would virtually bind
the hands of the State Government, and it would lose the right
to exercise the rule-making power. In this regard, he placed
reliance on Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India.20
(k) That the G.O.M. No. 262 was passed in consonance with the

19 2023 SCC OnLine SC 309.
20 (2012) 11 SCC 257.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1073

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extant rules and the procedural requirements. The representations
filed by the appellants and his peers pursuant to the issuance
of G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th June, 2005, were objectively
considered by the State Government, and a well-considered
equitable policy decision was taken to count the services of the
candidates appointed between 1990-92 from the date of their
initial induction in service as temporary AEEs and as a sequel
thereto, the appellants were assigned seniority from the said date.
(l) That the instant case falls under Proposition(B) enumerated
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Direct
Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State Of
Maharashtra,21 which lays down that “If the initial appointment
is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules
but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the
regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the
period of officiating service will be counted.” He urged that no
rules were in force in the Panchayat Raj Department when
the appellants were appointed. They continued in his post till
regularisation in 2005, and thus, the period of the temporary
service (i.e. from 1990 to 2005) of the appellants before the
regularisation, has to be counted for determining their seniority.
He concluded his submissions by urging that the impugned judgment
has disturbed the settled seniority of the cadre posts which has been
in vogue for the past two decades, and as a result, the appellants
are placed below the private respondents who are more than seven
years junior to them at the fag end of their career and thus, deserves
to be set aside.
26. Learned senior counsel representing the State Government has
supported the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for
the appellants.
On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for the appellants
and the State implored the Court to allow the appeals, set aside the
impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench, and restore the
judgment passed by the Tribunal (APAT).

21 (1990) 2 SCC 715.
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Submissions on behalf of the private respondents:
27. E-converso, learned senior counsel representing the private
respondents strenuously supported the impugned judgment. He
advanced the following submissions:-
(a) That the respondents were appointed as AEEs in 1997 after
undergoing a regular selection process in pursuance of
Notification No. 8 of 1995, dated 8th December, 1995 issued by
APPSC. On the other hand, the appellants and other similarly
situated candidates were appointed as AEEs purely on a
temporary basis during 1990-1995, either on promotion, on
recruitment by transfer or were sponsored by the employment
exchange.
(b) That the appellants and other similarly situated employees were
neither appointed with due adherence to any selection procedure
nor was their appointment made in accordance with any service
rules. He urged that the appellants were not even borne in the
cadre as on the date on which the respondents were regularly
selected as AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department and thus,
the respondents who were directly recruited through APPSC are
entitled to be placed above the appellants and other similarly
situated temporary AEEs in the order of seniority.
(c) That the APPSC published Notification No. 4 of 1990 calling
for applications from all persons aspiring to be appointed
as AEEs on a regular basis. Further, a second opportunity
was given vide another Notification No. 8 of 1995 calling for
applications for regular selection on the post of AEEs. He thus
urged that sufficient opportunities were given to the appellants
and similarly situated persons to get appointed via the direct
recruitment process conducted by the APPSC, but they did not
avail of the same.
(d) That vide G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th June, 2005, a final decision
was taken and the services of the appellants and other similarly
situated employees were regularized. However, they were rightly
directed to be placed below the last regularly selected candidate
appointed through APPSC. He submitted that this G.O.M.
was a final policy decision taken by the State Government,
since it was issued after duly taking into consideration the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1075

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recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-Committee and the
General Administration Department and also the fact that the
appellants and other similarly situated candidates had rendered
more than 10 years of uninterrupted service and were working
against the sanctioned posts.
(e) The learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondents
fairly submitted that the decision to regularise the services of the
appellants and other similarly situated candidates was justified.
He, however, urged that once a final decision had been taken
and orders were passed with respect to seniority vide G.O.M.
No. 234, the State Government became functus officio and could
not have re-examined and re-opened the issue of seniority on
the basis of representation made by the affected parties.
(f) That vide the revised G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006,
one set of the employees who were appointed between 1990
and 1992(including the appellants herein) were placed above
the respondents in the seniority list. He urged that the revised
G.O.M. was issued without affording an opportunity of hearing to
the respondents herein as no notice was given to them before
taking a decision adversely affecting their seniority, which is in
utter violation of principles of natural justice and thus, the same
was rightly struck down by the Division Bench.
(g) That the factors forming the basis for the issuance of the revised
G.O.M. No. 262 were evidently within the knowledge of the
State Government at the time of issuing the earlier G.O.M. No.
234. However, no sufficient explanation has been offered by
the State Government as to why these critical considerations
were overlooked during the formulation of the earlier G.O.M.,
thereby necessitating the subsequent revision.
(h) That the instant case falls under the corollary drawn to
Proposition(A) enumerated by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’
Association(supra), which lays down that “where the initial
appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and
made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post
cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.”
He urged that the initial appointment of the appellants and
the similarly situated persons to the post of AEEs was ad-hoc
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and not according to the rules prevailing in the Panchayat Raj
Department, and thus, the period of temporary service (i.e.
from 1990 to 2005) rendered by the appellants prior to their
regularisation cannot be counted for determining the seniority.
He concluded his submissions by urging that granting seniority to the
appellants over and above the respondents is totally unconstitutional
and de hors the rules, and, therefore, the High Court was wholly
justified in quashing the revised G.O.M. No. 262. He urged that the
view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is unassailable
in the eyes of law and hence, the appeals merit rejection.
28. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced at the bar and have gone through the impugned judgment
along with the material placed on record.

Discussion and Conclusion:
29. A few important facts which are not in dispute and require mention
for the adjudication of the present appeals are noted below:-
(i) The appellants and his peers were holding the qualification
of B.E/B. Tech and were regularly appointed in the year 1990
as Work Inspectors in the Andhra Pradesh Schedules Castes
Cooperative Development Corporation.
(ii) Vide G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990, the State
Government sanctioned 386 posts of AEEs under the Cyclone
Emergency Reconstruction Project (CERP) of the Panchayat
Raj Department with a purpose to carry out the project-based
reconstruction of the infrastructure including schools, etc., which
had been destroyed in a cyclone. The appellants and one
similarly placed candidate were transferred from the Corporation
and came to be appointed as Assistant Executive Engineers
(AEEs) on a temporary basis in the said project vide order dated
5th December, 1992. The relevant portion of the appointment
order is extracted below: -
“1. In pursuance of the orders issued in G.O. 3rd, 4th,
and 6th cited and basing on the recommendation of
the Committee, the candidates annexed to this order
who were appointed as Work Inspector/Draughtsman,
Tracer in S.C. Corporation, Tribal Welfare Department,
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P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

weaker Section, Housing Scheme under Social
Welfare Department and Panchayati Raj Engineering
Department and possessing graduate qualification
in engineering are hereby appointed as Temporary
Assistant Executive Engineers in the zones mentioned
against their names in the annexure I to IV in
A.P.P.R.E.S. against the posts sanctioned under
Cyclone reconstruction Project (CERP) sanctioned in
G.O. 1st cited 2nd cited under rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the
General Rules for state and Sub Ordinate services
in the scale of pay of Rs. 1,330-60-1, 980-70-275/
with usual allowances as admissible under the rules
from the actual date of joining and allotted to Chief
Engineer (CERP) P.R. Hyderabad.
2. The appointment referred to in para (1) above
is purely temporary and does not confer any right
for regular appointment or otherwise liable to be
terminated at any time without prior notice or intimation
and without assigning any reasons therefore, since
the project is temporary.”
Thus, it is clear that a specific reference was given while taking
the decision for these temporary appointments, that the said
appointments were being made under Rule 10(a)(i) of the
General Rules for State and Subordinate services i.e., Andhra
Pradesh Subordinate Service Rules. In this background, there is
no dispute that the appellants were appointed as AEEs against
the regularly sanctioned posts albeit on a temporary basis.
(iii) The private respondents were appointed as AEEs in 1997, after
undergoing the regular selection process through APPSC in
accordance with the Act of 1994.
(iv) The appellants and similarly situated employees continued to
serve as AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department for almost
13 years before their prayer for regularisation was favourably
considered by the State Government vide G.O.M. No. 234, dated
27th June, 2005. However, this G.O.M contained a stipulation
that the services of all temporary AEEs (including the appellants
herein) appointed between 1990-1995 would be placed below
the last regularly selected candidate of AEEs in terms of
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seniority. This G.O.M. further directed that all the temporary
appointments made between 1990-1995 and continuing on that
date, shall be excluded from the purview of APPSC under the
proviso to clause 3 of Article 320 of the Constitution of India.
Aggrieved by the denial of seniority and being placed below
the private respondents, the appellants and others filed various
representations to the State Government contending that the
AEEs appointed during 1990-1992, i.e., before the promulgation
of the Act of 1994, and those appointed between 1993-1995,
i.e., after the enactment of the Act, should not be treated at
par. They asserted that these groups were in different legal
classes and could not be merged as directed in G.O.M. No.
234. Additionally, they claimed that significant injustice had been
done to the AEEs appointed between 1990-1992, who were
made junior to AEEs appointed in 1997, thus losing nearly 10-
15 years of continuous service. As a result, they would retire
without the chance of receiving even a single promotion during
their entire service tenure.
(v) These representations were considered and accepted by the
State Government, leading to partial modification of the earlier
G.O.M No. 234 and issuance of a revised G.O.M No. 262, dated
17th June, 2006, wherein the State Government introduced a
classification amongst temporarily appointed AEEs based on
their dates of appointment with reference to the promulgation of
Act of 1994. The classification divided the AEEs into two groups:
those appointed between 1990-1992 and those appointed
between 1993-1995. The revised G.O.M. further stipulated
that the temporary AEEs appointed between 1990-1992 would
be placed below the last regular AEE appointed through the
APPSC, prior to the enactment of the Act of 1994.
(vi) The reason assigned by the State Government for this
modification and sub-classification (i.e. one group of AEEs
appointed between 1990-1992 and the other between 1993-
1995), was that the temporary AEEs in the first group had
put in 10 years of interrupted service including the services in
the feeder cadre of Work Inspector/Draftsmen/Tracer before
their appointment as temporary AEEs. The significant delay in
considering their prayer for regularisation in the Panchayat Raj
Department was attributable to the fact that the Government
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1079

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

could not amend the service rules as per G.O.M. No. 429, dated
6th March, 1990, to take up the regularisation of the temporary
AEEs. Therefore, one of the crucial factors in the decision to
issue the revised G.O.M. No. 262 was the Government’s inaction
in amending the service rules, as required by G.O.M. No. 429.
(vii) The decision to regularize the services of the appellants and
other similarly situated candidates, appointed as temporary AEEs
between 1990 and 1995, taken by the State Government vide
G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June 2005, remains unchallenged
and has, therefore, attained finality.
30. Thus, the Court finds merit in the appellants’ contention that the delay
in the regularisation of their service was attributable to the need
for amendments to the Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj and Rural
Development Rules, which were necessary to create a channel for
absorption into the cadre.
31. Seen thus, the fundamental issue that boils down for consideration is:
“Whether the period of officiating service of the temporarily appointed
AEEs between 1990-1992(including the appellants herein) should
be taken into account for considering their seniority over and above
the 1997 batch of regularly appointed candidates through APPSC
(private respondents herein)”?
32. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit
Class II Engg. Officers’ Association(supra), after considering all
the earlier decisions, summarized the legal position with regard to
the determination of seniority in service in para 47 of the judgment.
For the purposes of the present controversy, paras (A) and (B) of
para 47 are relevant and are extracted hereunder: -
“47. To sum up, we hold that:-
(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according
to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date
of his appointment and not according to the date of his
confirmation.
The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial
appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules
and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in
such post cannot be taken into account for considering
the seniority.
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(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following
the procedure laid down by the rules but the
appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the
regularisation of his service in accordance with the
rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.”
(emphasis supplied)

33. The appellants contend that their case falls under Proposition (B),
while the private respondents argue that it aligns with the corollary to
Proposition (A). To resolve this dispute, two crucial aspects must be
examined: (i) the prevailing rules in the Panchayat Raj Department,
State of Andhra Pradesh, and (ii) whether the appellants initial
appointment was purely ad-hoc or a temporary stop-gap arrangement.
34. It is undisputed that at the time of the appointment of the appellants
and other similarly placed candidates as AEEs between the years
1990-1992, there was a vacuum in rules governing the appointment
of AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department. To address the project-
based exigency, the appellants and one other were appointed as
temporary AEEs under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the General Rules for
State and Subordinate Services, i.e., Andhra Pradesh State and
Subordinate Service Rules. The relevant rule is extracted below:-
“10. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT INCLUDING
A P P O I N T M E N T S B Y D I R E C T R E C R U I T M E N T,
RECRUITMENT/APPOINTMENT BY TRANSFER OR
BY PROMOTION:
(a) Where it is necessary in the public interest to fill
emergently a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a
service, class or category and if the filling of such vacancy
in accordance with the rules is likely to result in undue
delay the appointing authority may appointing a person
temporarily, otherwise than in accordance with the said
rules, either by direct recruitment or by promotion or by
appointment by transfer, as may be specified as the method
of appointment in respect of the post, in the special rules.
…..
(i) Temporary posts requiring special qualifications.
Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or special
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1081

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

rules, if and when, a temporary post is created as an addition
to the cadre of any service, class or category and the holder
thereof is required by the State Government to possess such
special qualifications, knowledge or experience, any person
who possesses such qualifications, knowledge or experience
and who is considered to be the most suitable person to
discharge the duties, of such post may, irrespective of other
considerations, be appointed temporarily to that post by
the appointing authority; but the person so appointed shall
not, by reason only of such appointment, be regarded as a
probationer in such-service, class or category nor shall be
acquire thereby any preferential right to future appointment
to such service, class or category.”
35. Since there was a vacuum in the rules, it cannot be said that these
appointments were de hors the rules. Further, this Court finds merit
in the distinction drawn by the counsel for the appellants between
G.O.M. No. 540 dated 30th August, 1990 and the later G.O.M. No.
1289 dated 10th August, 1994, both issued by the Panchayat Raj
Department. A careful comparison of the two G.O.M’s highlight
a significant difference in their terms and conditions. G.O.M. No.
540, which created the sanctioned posts for AEEs under CERP, did
not include any clause making the appointments conditional upon
selection by the APPSC. There was no provision for reversion to a
lower position if the appointees were not selected through a regular
selection process conducted by the APPSC. On the other hand,
G.O.M. No. 1289, issued on 10th August, 1994, explicitly provided
that the appointments were temporary and subjected the appointees
to the rigor of selection through the APPSC or else face reversion.
It stipulated that the candidates who were not selected through
APPSC, they would be reverted to the position of Work Inspectors.
This clause made it clear that the appointments under G.O.M. No.
1289 were temporary and contingent upon selection through the
APPSC, a stipulation that was notably missing in G.O.M. No. 540.
The absence of such a condition in G.O.M. No. 540 indicates that the
appointments under that order were not of a temporary or conditional
nature as those made under G.O.M. No. 1289.
36. Also, upon a perusal of G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June 1994,
concerning the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana Scheme, it is apparent that
the State Government had a specific and unequivocal intent to retain
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the services of individuals posted under the CERP Circles/Divisions,
since, this G.O.M specifically directed that upon abolition of the
CERP Circles/Divisions, the personnel temporarily appointed under
the project(s) would be reassigned to the newly sanctioned Circles
and Divisions, underscoring the Government’s intent to maintain
employment and continuity of service. The relevant extract from
G.O.M. No. 391 is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“10. As and when the Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction
Project Circles/ Divisions are abolished, the persons
working in these circles/ Divisions shall be posted to the
new circles and divisions. The sub-divisions attending to
cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project Works shall
stand abolished w.e.f. 30.6.1994 A.N. and the persons
working in these Sub-Divisions shall be posted to New
Circles/ Divisions Sub-divisions now sanctioned.
11. The posts which were sanctioned for Cyclone Emergency
Reconstruction Project works in the office of Chief Engineer
(CERP) shall also stand abolished w.e.f. 30.6.94 A.N. but
the staff in O/o Chief Engineer (RWS) sanctioned in this
order will continue to attend to the residual work if any of
the C.E.R.P. till the work is completed.”
37. Thus, this Court is of the view that, notwithstanding the designation of
the appointments of the appellants and similarly situated candidates
as being temporary, such appointments were neither restricted by
a fixed tenure nor conceived as a stop-gap or ad-hoc arrangement.
While characterized as temporary, these appointments were not
intended to address a transient or interim requirement, rather, they
were structured to ensure continuity and stability within the workforce.
38. Further, it is an admitted fact that the services of the appellants and
other similarly situated candidates employed between 1990-1995 were
regularised vide G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th June, 2005, which was
not challenged before any forum and has attained finality. It is trite
that once the services of employee(s) are regularised, the ad-hoc or
stop-gap nature of the appointment does not survive. In this regard,
we may gainfully refer to Santosh Kumar v. State of A.P.,22 wherein,
while dealing with a similar issue and the self-same service rules, this

22 (2003) 5 SCC 511.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1083

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

Court upheld the regularisation of services of temporary employees
with retrospective effect and granted them seniority from the date of
initial appointment holding that their case falls under Proposition(B)
of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association(supra). The
relevant extract of the said judgment is as follows:-
“10. …………. The respondent and others were appointed
as Sub-Inspectors out of seniority looking to the outstanding
merit and record prior to the direct recruits like the appellant.
Their services were admittedly regularised by relaxing the
Service Rules in the exercise of power available under Rule
47 of the General Rules. The appellant did not challenge
the validity of Rule 47 and no mala fides were established
against the authorities in exercise of powers of relaxation
under the said Rule. The Tribunal has recorded a finding
that the Rule relating to the method of recruitment was not
relaxed but only the conditions which had to be fulfilled for
the purpose of promotion to the category of Sub-Inspector
were relaxed; this finding is not disturbed by the High
Court; there was no relaxation as to the basic qualification;
the State Government regularised the services of the
respondent and others with retrospective effect from the
date they were temporarily appointed as Sub-Inspectors
(OSSIs). It is also not disputed that they continued in
service uninterruptedly for about 12-13 years till their
services were regularised with retrospective effect.
This being the factual position it could not be said
that the corollary to para 47(A) of the aforementioned
Constitution Bench judgment applies to the facts of the
present case. Once their services were regularised it
cannot be contended that their initial appointment was
only on ad hoc basis and not according to the rules
and made as a stopgap arrangement. On the other
hand, para 47(B) supports the case of the respondent.”
(emphasis supplied)

39. Similarly, this Court in Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of
Orissa and Ors.,23 while dealing with a similar issue of grant of

23 (2014) 4 SCC 583.
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seniority to ad-hoc employees upon regularisation with effect from
the date they were appointed on an ad-hoc basis especially when
the ad-hoc appointment had continued without any interruption till
their regularisation, answered it in the affirmative observing thus:-
“68. Appearing for the State of Orissa, Mr Nageswara Rao
contended that grant of seniority to ad hoc Assistant
Engineers regularised under the legislation w.e.f. the
date they were appointed on ad hoc basis was legally
permissible especially when the ad hoc appointments
had continued without any interruption till their
regularisation. ………. The case at hand, according to
the learned counsel, fell under Proposition B formulated
in the said decision. Grant of seniority from the date of
initial appointments did not, therefore, suffer from any
constitutional or other infirmity to warrant interference
from this Court.
69. Mr Shishodia appearing for some of the parties,
on the other hand, contended that seniority could be
granted only from the date of regularisation under
the enactment and not earlier. The learned counsel for
some of the interveners adopted that contention, including
Ms Aishwarya appearing for some of the diploma-holder
Junior Engineers and urged that ad hoc service rendered
by the Engineers appointed otherwise than in accordance
with the rules could not count for the purposes of seniority
and that even if Section 3(1) of the Validation Act was
held to be valid, Section 3(2) which gave retrospective
seniority from the date they were first appointed on ad
hoc basis must go.
……..
71. There was some debate at the Bar whether the case
at hand is covered by corollary to Proposition A or by
Proposition B (supra). But having given our consideration
to the submissions at the Bar we are inclined to agree
with Mr Rao’s submission that the case at hand is
more appropriately covered by Proposition B extracted
above. We say so because the initial appointment of
ad hoc Assistant Engineers in the instant case was
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P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

not made by following the procedure laid down by the
Rules. Even so, the appointees had continued in the
posts uninterruptedly till the Validation Act regularised
their service. There is, in the light of those two significant
aspects, no room for holding that grant of seniority and
other benefits referred to in Section 3(3) of the impugned
Act were legally impermissible or violated any vested right
of the in-service Assistant Engineers appointed from any
other source.
72. Proposition A, in our opinion, deals with a situation
where an incumbent is appointed to a post according to
the rules but the question that arises for determination
is whether his seniority should be counted from
the date of his appointment or from the date of his
confirmation in the said service. The corollary under
Proposition A, in our opinion, deals with an entirely
different situation, namely, where the appointment
is ad hoc and made as a stop-gap arrangement in
which case officiation in such post cannot be taken
into consideration for seniority. Be that as it may, as
between Propositions A and B the case at hand falls
more accurately under Proposition B which permits
grant of seniority w.e.f. the date the appointees first
started officiating followed by the regularisation of
their service as in the case at hand.
……
78. Having said so, there is no reason why a similar
direction regarding the writ petitioners degree-holder
Junior Engineers who have been held by us to be
entitled to regularisation on account of their length of
service should also not be given a similar benefit……….
(emphasis supplied)

40. Applying these precedents to the facts of the case at hand, we are
of the firm view that the case of the appellants clearly falls under
Proposition(B) of the Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’
Association(supra) as there were no selection rules in force in
the Panchayat Raj Department for appointment of AEEs at the time
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of appointment of the appellants as temporary AEEs which was
in the year 1992. These appointments though termed temporary,
were not bound in a fixed tenure and were not stop-gap or ad-hoc
in nature. The appellants worked uninterruptedly on the same post
till the regularisation of their service vide G.O.M No. 234 dated 27th
June, 2005.
41. The Division Bench of the High Court gave imprimatur to the
contention of the private respondents (the regularly appointed
candidates of the 1997 batch), that the issuance of G.O.M. No. 234,
dated 27th June 2005, rendered the State Government ‘functus
officio’, thereby precluding it from both revisiting or reopening the
matter and issuing the revised G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June
2006. Consequently, the Division Bench allowed the writ petitions
filed by the private respondents herein and quashed the revised
G.O.M., observing as follows in Para 29 of the impugned judgment:
“29………After taking a final decision, the State Government
could not have re-examined the case of the contesting
respondents, and that too, only for such of those contesting
respondents who were appointed during 1990-92, on the
ground that they were appointed prior to the promulgation
of Act 2 of 1994. When the State Government has taken
a final decision in G.O.Ms.No.234, it becomes functus
officio and hence, it could not have touched the same by
re-examining the case of the contesting respondents and
granted relief by issuing G.O.Ms. No.262 dt. 17-06-2006
contrary to the findings recorded in the earlier G.O.…….”
42. It cannot be disputed that the rule-making power of the legislature
cannot be curtailed or nullified by application of the concept of functus
officio. The principle of functus officio normally applies to a judicial
forum or a quasi-judicial authority and would have no application
to the rule-making authority which is within the domain of the State
Government by virtue of Article 245 of the Constitution of India.
43. This Court in the case of Orrisa Administrative Tribunal Bar
Associations(supra), while dealing with the application of the
doctrine of ‘functus officio’ to the sphere of the administrative
decision-making by the State and its impact on the policy decisions,
observed that “if the doctrine of ‘functus officio’ were to be applied
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1087

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

to the sphere of administrative decision-making/rule-making power
of the State, the executive power would be virtually crippled and the
State would find itself paralyzed, unable to change or reverse any
policy or policy-based decision and its functioning would be brought
to a grinding halt. The relevant extract from the said judgment is as
follows:
“113. Turning to the present case, the appellants’ argument
that the Union Government was rendered functus officio
after establishing the OAT does not stand scrutiny. The
decision to establish the OAT was administrative and based
on policy considerations. If the doctrine of functus officio
were to be applied to the sphere of administrative
decision-making by the state, its executive power
would be crippled. The state would find itself unable to
change or reverse any policy or policy-based decision
and its functioning would grind to a halt. All policies
would attain finality and any change would be close
to impossible to effectuate.
114. This would impact not only major policy decisions
but also minor ones. For example, a minor policy
decision such as a bus route would not be amenable to any
modification once it was notified. Once determined, the
bus route would stay the same regardless of the demand
for, say, an additional stop at a popular destination. Major
policy decisions such as those concerning subsidies,
corporate governance, housing, education, and social
welfare would be frozen if the doctrine of functus officio
were to be applied to administrative decisions. This is
not conceivable because it would defeat the purpose
of having a government and the foundation of
governance. By their very nature, policies are subject
to change depending on the circumstances prevailing
in society at any given time. The doctrine of functus
officio cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where
the government is formulating and implementing a
policy.”
(emphasis supplied)
1088 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

44. Therefore, we are unable to concur with the reasoning assigned by
the High Court that the State Government became functus officio
after issuance of G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June, 2005 and could
not have issued the revised G.O.M. No. 262 dated 17th June, 2006.
The view so taken by the Division Bench is untenable and ultra vires
the Constitution of India.
45. Further, it is a well-settled principle of law that while administrative
actions and statutory rules that impact citizens’ rights are subject to
judicial review, the notion that the State must provide a prior hearing
to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making power
is fundamentally flawed. In this regard, we are benefitted by the
judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Union
of India v. Tulsiram Patel,24 wherein it was held that:
“101..……….So far as the audi alteram partem rule
is concerned, both in England and in India, it is well
established that where a right to a prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed
would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a
right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded
where the nature of the action to be taken, its object
and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory
provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the audi
alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would
have the effect of paralysing the administrative
process or where the need for promptitude or the
urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out
in Maneka Gandhi case [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2
SCR 621, 676] at p. 681. If legislation and the necessities
of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice
including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can a
provision of the Constitution, for a constitutional provision
has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory
provision……..”
(emphasis supplied)

24 (1985) 3 SCC 398.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1089

P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas and Ors. Etc.

46. In Patel Engg. Ltd.(supra), this Court held as follows:
“38. …….that there is no inviolable rule that a personal
hearing of the affected party must precede every decision
of the State..……”
47. We are also of the considered view that the reasoning assigned by
the High Court, in the impugned judgment that the private respondents
herein, as affected parties, were required to be heard before the
issuance of the revised G.O.M. No. 262 dated 17th June 2006, is
unsustainable and contrary to the established legal principles. Such an
interpretation by the Division Bench has far-reaching and potentially
disastrous implications. If the State Government is compelled to
afford an opportunity of hearing to every individual or entity likely to
be affected by its administrative decision-making, it would effectively
paralyze governance by imposing an undue procedural roadblock.
This would place the State in a position where its rule-making authority
would be severely constricted, defeating the very purpose of efficient
policy implementation and undermining its ability to discharge its
administrative duties.
48. In the wake of the discussion made above, we answer the issue
in the affirmative and hold that the period of officiating service (i.e.
period between 1990 to 2005) of the appellants and the batch of the
AEEs appointed between 1990-1992 has to be counted as regular
service for determining the seniority, entitling him/them to be placed
above the 1997 batch of regularly appointed candidates(private
respondents herein) in the seniority list. The State Government was
fully justified in issuing the revised G.O.M. No. 262 dated 17th June,
2006, which is unassailable in the eyes of law.
49. Consequently, we are of the view that the impugned judgment dated
21st September, 2023, is unsustainable in the eyes of the law and
thus, the same is quashed and set aside.
50. The appeals are allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
51. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). _________ of 2025)
(Diary No. 27613/2024)
52. Delay condoned.
1090 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

53. Leave granted.
54. In terms of the judgment passed in Civil Appeals arising out of
SLP(Civil) No(s). 4036-4038 of 2024 and connected matters, these
appeals are disposed of accordingly.
55. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain